


Joint Pub 3-07.5



**Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for
Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations**


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30 September 1997



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force and component commanders in preparing for and conducting noncombatant evacuation operations. Specific information on how forces might be employed is provided.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, US Navy
Director, Joint Staff

Preface

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**
- **Explains the Roles, Coordination, and Interaction between US Organizations and Foreign Agencies**
- **Outlines Command, Control, and Communications**
- **Provides Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations**
- **Covers Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures**
- **Discusses Evacuee Processing**
- **Explains Intermediate Staging Bases and/or Temporary Safe Haven Operations**

Overview

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) have humanitarian, military, and political implications.

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in **evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host-nation citizens, and third country nationals** whose lives are in danger from locations in a host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven and/or the United States. NEOs usually involve swift insertions of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission. During NEOs, **the US Ambassador is the senior authority** for the evacuation and is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The Ambassador speaks with the authority of the President and serves as direct representative on site. **Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty** and may be directed without warning; situational awareness and correct appraisal of the changing political and military environment are key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning. Alternative plans should be developed for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. **The geographic combatant commanders are responsible for**

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planning and conducting NEOs to assist the DOS. Once requested, approved, and directed, the combatant commander will order supporting, assigned, and/or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations. It is imperative that the Ambassador's evacuation plan and the joint force commander's (JFC's) plan for the NEO be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated.

US Organization and Foreign Agencies: Their Roles, Coordination, and Interaction

At all levels, Department of Defense and Department of State (DOS) personnel need to cooperate to execute the NEO successfully.

While the protection of US citizens being evacuated remains paramount, NEOs will probably be conducted in an environment where political concerns and constraints are key considerations. The **Washington Liaison Group** ensures the national-level coordination of planning and implementation of plans of the DOS and the combatant commanders for the protection or evacuation of noncombatants abroad. The **Regional Liaison Groups** ensure coordination of planning in the field and provide advice and guidance in planning and executing NEOs. The **Emergency Action Committee** is the focal point for DOS and Department of Defense evacuation site interface while briefing, coordinating, and planning for the evacuation. The **US Embassy representatives** include the Ambassador, deputy chief of mission, security assistance officer, chief of station, Defense Attache Office, administration officer, political officer, commercial and/or economic officer, consular officer, regional medical officer, regional security officer, public affairs officer, US Marine Corps security guard, Country Team, and other agencies outside the DOS. US military commands, private voluntary organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations often require and provide assistance, and such assistance should be coordinated during a NEO crisis.

Command, Control, and Communications

The DOS, acting on the advice of the Ambassador, determines when evacuation of designated personnel will take place.

Normally, **an evacuation starts with the Embassy emergency action plan (EAP)**, using scheduled airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation. Due to time constraints and the unusual command relationship with respect to NEOs, **operational planning and decision making must be based on a foundation of common understanding of perspectives** concerning the situation, mission, objectives,

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procedures, and free exchange of information. Consultations between the Ambassador and the JFC as well as clear direction to personnel are required in the planning and execution of NEOs. Guidance to the geographic combatant commanders by higher authority is provided in the **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Warning Orders**, which normally cover areas of key concern to the National Command Authorities and provide the theater combatant commander with an overview of the political context within which the NEO is being considered.

Once tasked, the combatant commander decides how the command should conduct the proposed NEO.

Although a single-Service or Service department may be tasked to conduct a NEO, a joint task force (JTF) may also be formed to conduct a NEO. When a JTF is formed, the commander, JTF (CJTF) is responsible for all phases of the military operation including intermediate staging bases (ISBs) and temporary safe havens. **The CJTF has full authority to organize all elements of assigned and attached forces as necessary**, including composition of the JTF; the organization of the JTF's headquarters, staff, location, and facilities; and communication considerations and responsibilities. Other forces may operate in support of or under the tactical control of the JTF, as directed by the combatant commander.

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

US Embassies and consulates are required to have emergency action plans for the area under their cognizance.

The Ambassador is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of EAPs. The combatant commander is responsible for reviewing and commenting on EAPs while supporting the Ambassador's planning and ensuring that the EAP is accurate and adequate to support military operations. **EAPs include the following information:** evacuation sites; anticipated number of evacuees; assembly areas and major supply routes; command posts; key personnel; description of the Embassy communication system, transportation fleet, and warden system; quantity of Class I supplies on hand at the Embassy; and standard map products of the local area, with annotations identifying critical landmarks. **The emergency planning handbook is a consolidated source of guidance for foreign service posts** for planning and dealing with certain emergency situations. In situations where evacuation operations in a hostile environment are required, the provisions of Joint Pub 3-18, "Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations," will apply.

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

In the total evacuation process, the military plays a key supporting role in planning and conducting the operation.

The military is most often viewed as the last resort in a series of evacuation options, and it is important for the CJTF and JTF staff to understand this role when preparing a plan for the evacuation. **Operations at the evacuation site are clearly delineated between those performed by DOS personnel and those performed by the JTF**, yet on occasion these functions may be interchanged. Once the Secretary of State approves an evacuation, the chief of mission (COM) has the authority to implement the plan in a crisis. As early as possible in the planning, the JFC forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. The **advance party** may consist of two elements: the forward command element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and host country authorities and establishes a communication link among the CJTF, geographic combatant commander, and DOS. The **evacuation site party** conducts reconnaissance to evaluate, validate, and confirm assembly areas and evacuation sites. The CJTF, in conjunction with the Ambassador or his designated representative, determines the size and composition of the FCE and evacuation site party.

After insertion of the joint force commander's main body, each component prepares for its part in the operation.

As the advance party rejoins the main body, the JTF may consist of a command and control element, marshalling element, security element, logistic element, and special operations forces. **The size of the JTF depends on the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation.** During evacuation operations, it may be difficult or impossible to insert and establish the support functions for the JTF, but medical, dental, joint rescue, mortuary affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs, special operations, and information operations must be planned, coordinated, and implemented.

Evacuee Processing

Evacuee processing may take place in country at an air terminal, onboard ship, or at a temporary safe haven site.

The evacuation control center (ECC) supports the DOS, which conducts processing, screening, and selected logistic functions associated with emergency evacuation of noncombatants. **Size and composition of the ECC will be determined by the number of evacuees, evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation area.** Of

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primary importance is the nature of the emergency causing the evacuation; it may be a natural, political, or military one. The **JTF's primary duty** is to assist the COM in protecting and evacuating the evacuees. This duty may include providing security and other support in caring for the evacuees as requested. Shelter, safety, interpreters, local immigration, embassy, support liaison, and medical personnel should be present during processing. The three guiding principles for any ECC are **accuracy** (everyone is accounted for), **security**, and **speed** (processing is accomplished quickly and efficiently). For organizational purposes all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator in order to ensure the smooth execution of the operation. The JFC staff should keep abreast of changes in the total number of potential evacuees by receiving periodic updates from the Embassy staff.

Intermediate Staging Base and/or Temporary Safe Haven Operations

Ideally, the intermediate staging base will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is required.

Use of an ISB during deployment provides the JFC many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The ISB may be located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under US control. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station and the likelihood of hostilities increase. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country. Since **ISBs are typically airfields or seaports**, the geographic combatant commander needs to be aware of on-hand information related to facilities and sites being considered as likely ISBs.

A **temporary safe haven**, designated by the DOS and controlled by the CJTF, is a location in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily; ideally, the safe haven would be in the United States. On occasion **an intermediate safe haven may be needed**, such as a US Navy ship, yet evacuees should be removed from the ship to land-based safe havens as quickly as possible. Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required. **A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security** and consist of command groups, reception teams, processing teams, comfort teams, scheduling teams, military pay and allowance teams, and security teams.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide combatant commanders, CJTFs, and their subordinate component commanders in preparing for and conducting a NEO. Specific information on how forces might be employed is provided. This publication is applicable across the range of military operations and in any operational environment.

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

“Man has two supreme loyalties — to country and to family. . . So long as their families are safe, they will defend their country, believing that by their sacrifice they are safeguarding their families also. But even the bonds of patriotism, discipline, and comradeship are loosened when the family itself is threatened.”

B.H. Liddell Hart
Sherman, 1927

1. Introduction

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven in the United States or overseas. A NEO is conducted to evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger. NEOs also may include the evacuation of selected citizens of the host nation (HN) or third country nationals (TCNs).

a. **US Policy.** Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for the protection or evacuation of US citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property abroad. This order also directs the Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) in preparing and implementing plans for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of US citizens. The US policy has resulted in a DOS-DOD policy memorandum of understanding, the objectives of which are summarized in Figure I-1.

DOS-DOD POLICY OBJECTIVES CONCERNING PROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED ALIENS ABROAD

- ✕ Provide for their protection, evacuation to and welfare in a safe area**
- ✕ Reduce to a minimum the number subject to risk of death and/or seizure as hostages**
- ✕ Reduce to a minimum the number in probable or actual combat areas**

Figure I-1. DOS-DOD Policy Objectives Concerning Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad

Chapter I

b. **Characteristics.** NEOs have humanitarian, military, and political implications. **NEOs usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.**

timing of an evacuation. The order to evacuate may not be given at the most opportune time, but rather may be delayed until the last possible moment to avoid actions that may be viewed as a tacit admission of political failure.

2. Terminology

For the purpose of simplification, the term “Ambassador” is used throughout this publication. An Ambassador is a diplomatic agent of the highest rank. Variations of the title Ambassador or other titles referring to the senior DOS diplomatic agent or chief of mission (COM) (e.g., charge d’affaires, consul general) at a particular diplomatic post could be interchanged throughout this publication and not change its relevancy.

a. **The geographic combatant commander may decide to create a joint task force (JTF) to conduct NEO.** When the commander of a JTF (CJTF) is designated, the commander should be prepared to deal with the situation as it exists at the time of evacuation.

b. If a CJTF is already conducting operations other than a NEO and is subsequently tasked with accomplishing a NEO, **the CJTF may task the NEO mission to a component commander.**

3. Special Nature of Evacuation Operations

The command and control structure and the political factors involved in timing the execution of the military support of NEOs make them different from other military operations. **During NEOs the US Ambassador, not the combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the senior United States Government (USG) authority for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees.** The decision to evacuate an embassy and the order to execute a NEO is political. US foreign policy objectives are the determining factor in the

c. **Rules of engagement (ROE)** may be such that the CJTF should be prepared to protect personnel (military and evacuees) from a wide variety of threats while not having the authority to preempt hostile actions by proactive military measures. The CJTF influences the ROE to provide maximum flexibility to the JTF so as to not unduly restrain use of force. The CJTF should be given sufficient ROE to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission. ROE must ensure that the military commander has the authority to protect civilians while demonstrating restraint and, when appropriate, using force proportional to the threat. See Appendix A, “Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict,” for additional guidance concerning ROE.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

The United States Government is responsible for protecting the lives and safety of its citizens abroad. Often, that task falls to our Armed Forces. When conditions of violence or disorder in foreign countries threaten American lives, United States forces, in support of the Department of State, will use all appropriate means to extract American citizens promptly and safely.

SOURCE: National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995

- **Dissemination and use of clearly defined ROE are critical.** Although the objectives (political and military) are not to destroy enemy forces, and armed conflict should be avoided whenever possible, an appropriate and proportional use of force may become necessary. ROE must be as precise as practical; however, ROE must never deny the use of appropriate self-defense measures.
- Upon arrival in country, the JFC shall, if practicable, discuss the ROE with the Ambassador. Modifications to the ROE must be made and approved by the appropriate authorities, via the supported combatant commander.

4. Operational Environments

See Figure I-2.

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty and may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country's government, reoriented political or military relationships with the United States, or a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from a force within or external to a host country. The key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning are situational awareness, a correct appraisal and understanding of the changing political and military environment in which the JTF will operate, and preparation of the

evacuation force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile. **Alternative plans should be developed for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments.**

a. **Permissive Environment.** Under this condition, **no resistance to evacuation operations is expected, and thus the operation would require little or no assembly of combat forces in country.** Evacuees may or may not have been processed and assembled at designated assembly areas, evacuation points, and sites. In such an environment, a JTF can expect host nation concurrence and possible support. The JTF's primary concerns may be logistic functions involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, and coordination with the DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation. A minimum number of security forces should be used during the NEO. Nonetheless, discreet, prudent preparations should be in place to enable the force conducting the NEO to respond to threats to the evacuees.

b. **Uncertain Environment.** An operational environment in which **host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of operations.** Because of the uncertainty, the CJTF may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security units or a reaction force. The ROE developed are disseminated early to ensure that the JTF has had sufficient training and is proficient in application of the ROE. Planning for NEOs conducted in an uncertain environment must always include anticipating the possibility for escalation to a hostile environment.

c. **Hostile Environment.** Personnel may be evacuated under conditions ranging from civil disorder or terrorist action to full-scale combat. Under such conditions,




Figure I-2. Operational Environments



As the operational environment dictates, the joint force commander may task security forces to assist in the evacuation of noncombatants.

the JTF must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. The CJTF may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force or position a large reaction force, either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base (ISB). In addition to normal functions associated with personnel evacuations (embarkation, transportation, medical, and services), the JTF may be required to conduct a forced entry, establish defensive perimeters, escort convoys, participate in personnel recovery operations, and perform the screening of evacuees normally accomplished by DOS officials.

5. Military Planning and Forces

DODD 3025.14, "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad," assigns **the responsibility to plan and conduct NEOs in support of the DOS to the geographic combatant commanders**. Actual evacuation assistance can only be provided upon the request of the SECSTATE to either the Secretary of Defense or the President. **Once requested, approved, and directed, the combatant commander will order assigned and/or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of the**

DOS and the US Ambassador. The Ambassador is not in the military chain of command, but as the senior US official on scene is responsible for the NEO and protection of US citizens, citizens of the HN, or TCNs who have been designated for evacuation. **It is imperative that the Ambassador's evacuation plan and the CJTF's plan for the NEO be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated.**

a. **Military Response.** Normally, the CJTF receives authorization from the appropriate combatant commander before using any forces and facilities in a foreign country for protection and evacuation. However, if a CJTF receives a request from the Ambassador or responsible US diplomatic representative to provide assistance and the delay in obtaining authorization would jeopardize the safety of US citizens, the JFC concerned should respond to the extent deemed necessary and militarily feasible.

b. **Force Options And Considerations Dealing With Multinational Forces.** Force options to conduct a NEO may first and foremost **depend on the operational environment** in which NEOs will be conducted. Many forward presence or

forward-deployed single-Service forces can normally conduct a NEO in a permissive environment. However, a NEO in an uncertain or hostile environment may require formation and deployment of a JTF or deployment of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. In addition to the operational environment, **the HN's support capabilities may play a major role** in determining courses of action for the conduct of NEOs. The combatant commander should consider a flexible force option that provides both early response to a developing situation and a capability to quickly expand should the operational environment become hostile. To provide the smallest opportunity to a potential adversary, **NEO forces entering foreign territory should be kept to the minimum number required** for self-defense and for extraction and protection of evacuees.

- **Command of the Joint Task Force.** Military forces employed in a NEO may be comprised of units from more than one Military Department. Once ordered to support a NEO and following the combatant commander's decision to employ a JTF, **a CJTF will be designated to exercise overall control**

of operations. The JFC is responsible for all activities, to include those shown in Figure I-3. (Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures," provides guidance for forming and employing a JTF.)

- **Force Sequencing.** Force sequencing is the phased introduction of forces into and out of the area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA). **Force sequencing provides the JFC with the option to provide a flexible and rapid response to a NEO** through employment of forward-deployed forces, which may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to be deployed from an ISB. Effective force-sequencing requires detailed knowledge of available Service, joint, and multinational military capabilities.
- **Multinational Forces.** In planning for a NEO, **the Ambassador, combatant commander, and CJTF may consider the possibility of employing multinational forces.** However, the approval for US participation in a multinational NEO will come from the National Command Authorities (NCA). Under an emergency situation involving the

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Initial planning
- Deployment to an intermediate staging base
- Conduct of all military aspects of the evacuation
- Operations at the safe haven (if this mission is assigned)

Figure I-3. Joint Task Force Commander Responsibilities

Chapter I

safety of human life or the protection of property, offers of voluntary service from other countries may be accepted prior to NCA approval.

- Any situation that would cause the United States to initiate a NEO would likely cause other countries to react similarly. **It may be politically or militarily expedient to employ multinational forces in conducting the operation.** These may be either HN forces cooperating in the evacuation or third nation forces whose citizens are also threatened.

- Other nations' forces should not be integrated with US forces unless political

considerations recommend such action or in the event that the other nations' forces have trained and operated with US forces, thus engendering the requisite confidence.

- The use of multinational forces in a potential NEO should be a planning consideration. **The actual use of multinational forces will be a political decision made by the NCA.** If seriously contemplated, detailed multinational planning and rehearsal are important factors in ensuring a successful operation. **The difficulties of obtaining unity of effort within a multinational force may cause serious difficulties in a time-sensitive NEO.**

CHAPTER II

US ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN AGENCIES: THEIR ROLES, COORDINATION, AND INTERACTION

"There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other."

Mao Tse-tung, 1937

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities of principal persons and organizations, whether governmental, civil, international, or military, with whom the CJTF may interact while planning or executing a NEO. Detailed information on this subject is found in Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."

embassy personnel without compromising mission requirements. The DOS and embassy personnel can keep the JFC fully apprised of the on-scene conditions and are influential for coordinating actions that greatly affect the NEO. These actions include political constraints on the JFC's legal issues, agreements, rights, privileges, and immunities (if any) within the HN, the ISB, and the safe haven.

2. Role of the Department of State

At all levels, Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS personnel need to cooperate to successfully execute the NEO. This is most important at the Ambassador and JFC level and includes their staffs and all other personnel. **While the protection of US citizens being evacuated remains paramount, NEOs will probably be conducted in an environment where political concerns and constraints are key considerations.** In most cases, the United States may not be actively engaged militarily against the forces posing a threat to the noncombatants. Military action may therefore be limited by the situation. Political constraints may also be imposed on the introduction of military personnel into a country prior to an evacuation operation, thus hampering planning and preparation. **The JFC will fully support the Ambassador's plans and cooperate with DOS and**

a. **Washington Liaison Group (WLG).** The WLG is an organization chaired by a representative of the DOS. Representatives from the Department of Defense and other appropriate departments and agencies of the USG are members. **Its responsibility is to ensure the coordination of planning and implementation of plans of the DOS and the combatant commanders for the protection or evacuation of noncombatants abroad.** Representatives on the WLG are the points of contact for their departments on all matters pertaining to emergency and evacuation planning. Through close coordination between the combatant commander, Joint Staff, and the DOS, the WLG designates the ISB, temporary safe haven, and repatriation site.

b. **Regional Liaison Groups (RLGs).** RLGs are established by the DOS and are chaired by that agency's political advisers to the combatant commanders. They meet as necessary, on the recommendation of the

Chapter II

WLG, to **ensure coordination of planning in the field and provide advice and guidance in planning and executing NEOs.** As a general rule, each RLG covers all Foreign Service posts and embassies within the AOR of the combatant commander with which it is associated. The RLG will be kept informed of any crisis situation that could lead to an evacuation and will ensure coordination of NEO planning between embassies and combatant commanders.

c. **Emergency Action Committee (EAC).** **The EAC is the focal point for DOS and DOD evacuation site interface.** Another important aspect of the EAC mission is to brief, coordinate, and plan for the evacuation or protection of US noncombatants and certain TCNs or HN nationals in a crisis, whether by regular commercial, chartered, or US military transportation.

3. US Embassy Representatives

Joint forces involved in NEOs should familiarize themselves with the duties of the following positions normally found at US embassies and/or missions.

a. **Ambassador.** Appointed by the President, the Ambassador is the senior US official at the Embassy and reports to the President through the SECSTATE. **Full responsibility for direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities in the host country rests with the Ambassador.** During emergencies, the Ambassador is expected to recommend evacuations on a timely basis when circumstances warrant such action. **The decision to evacuate may be initiated by either the DOS or the Ambassador.** If an evacuation is initiated at a post, it will be based on extreme circumstances deemed as life threatening. **However, the Ambassador's authority does not include the direction or command authority over US military forces under**

the command of a US military commander. The Ambassador may be correctly referred to as the COM.

b. **Deputy chief of mission (DCM).** The DCM is the senior diplomatic official in the Embassy below the rank of Ambassador. The DCM has the diplomatic title of Minister, Minister-Counselor, or Counselor (depending upon the size of the mission) and is usually a career Foreign Service Officer. **The DCM usually chairs the EAC meetings and coordinates embassy staff.** The DCM helps ensure that all US in-country activities best serve US interests.

c. **US Defense Representative (USDR).** The USDR in foreign countries is an additional duty title assigned to a military officer serving in a specifically designated position. In most cases, this duty title is assigned to either the Defense Attache (DATT) or the security assistance officer (SAO). The USDR acts as the in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the geographic combatant commander, to provide coordination of administrative, security, and logistic matters to USG officials for all DOD noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the USDR is assigned.

d. **Security Assistance Officer.** The SAO maintains liaison with the HN military forces and is authorized by law to perform certain military functions with the HN military. **The advance party forward command element (FCE) should coordinate with the SAO.** JFCs should be cognizant that not all embassies have an SAO; rather, some may have a Defense Attache Office (DAO) or no military personnel at all. In many countries, security assistance functions are performed within the DAO, and the DATT may also serve as the SAO.

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e. **Chief of Station (COS).** As the senior intelligence adviser to the Ambassador, the COS is an excellent source of information on the country and the current situation.

f. **Defense Attache Office.** The DAO, which consists of one or more Defense Attaches and support personnel, **has the mission of observing and reporting on the military and politico-military situation in country. JFCs may find some of this information particularly valuable during planning for the NEO.** DAO personnel are active duty military attached to the Embassy in a diplomatic status representing the Department of Defense. They may facilitate access to the daily embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written intelligence-related information. All military personnel, even those not assigned to the Embassy or under direct control of the Ambassador, should normally coordinate their activities through the DAO. The DAO duties also include continuing dialogue with HN defense officials on military matters related to threat assessments, military intelligence, and in-country military capabilities.

g. **Administration Officer.** The Administration Officer is responsible for various activities at the Embassy compound, which may include security at small posts; running the commissary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; and handling monetary aspects of embassy business, including foreign service national payroll, cash collection, and the budget. **At a small post with no security officer assigned, the Administration Officer assumes the functions of the post security officer** and has operational control of the Marine security guard (MSG) detachment.

- **General Services Officer (GSO).** The GSO works for the Administration Officer and is responsible for buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance.

- **Information Management Officer (IMO).** Formerly called the communications project officer, the IMO runs the post communications center, processes and tracks all classified pouch material, and oversees the computer system at the Embassy. The IMO is the point of contact concerning the communication capabilities available at the post.

h. **Political Officer.** The Political Officer reports on political developments, negotiates with the host government, and represents views and policies of the USG. The Political Officer maintains regular contact with host government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens of the host country, as well as other countries' diplomats. **The Political Officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.**

i. **Commercial and/or Economic Officer.** The Commercial and/or Economic Officer analyzes, reports on, and advises superiors, DOS, and DOD personnel on economic matters in the host country. Economic officers also negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues.

j. **Consular Officer.** The Consular Officer's major role is to screen, process, and grant US passports and visas. Other responsibilities the Consular Officer may be assigned include attending to the welfare of US citizens and administrative tasks such as maintaining a census of US nationals within the host country. **The Consular Officer provides the requisite number of personnel needed to screen documents of all potential evacuees during a NEO** and provides instructions to any Evacuation Control Center (ECC) personnel needed to staff processing stations.

k. **Regional Medical Officer.** The Regional Medical Officer is qualified for

Chapter II

general practice and is trained to set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The Regional Medical Officer may also advise the JFC on indigenous diseases and proper prophylactic procedures for forces executing the NEO.

1. **Regional Security Officer (RSO).** The RSO is a DOS security officer **responsible for the security functions of all US Embassies and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries.** The RSO provides direction to the MSG detachment via the detachment commander. The RSO oversees the following personnel:

- **Post Security Officer (PSO).** Posts with no RSO have a PSO. **The PSO has general security duties at a specific embassy** (or consulate) and is usually the Administration Officer.
- **Mobile Security Division (MSD).** **The MSD consists of DOS employees of the Diplomatic Security Service who respond to crises in foreign countries.** The MSD is trained to respond to increased threats or critical security needs at an embassy, provide additional security, and provide immediate response to a security-related incident.

m. **Public Affairs Officer (PAO).** The PAO is the Ambassador's adviser concerning public affairs (PA), the director of the United States Information Service (USIS) in country, and overseer of US Cultural Center operations. If the situation permits during an emergency, **the PAO will be responsible for all press releases and inquiries for information directed to the Embassy.** The PAO usually speaks at press conferences that the Ambassador cannot attend. Planners need to identify a proposed point in time or activity when the Department of Defense assumes media responsibility from the DOS (before or during the evacuation process).

n. **United States Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment.** An MSG detachment will have a minimum of six Marines, with the maximum number assigned dictated by need. The Marine Detachment Commander is normally a member of the EAC and is responsible to the RSO or PSO for internal security, protection of classified material, and US personnel. Administration control of detachment Marines is through the Regional Marine Officer (RMO).

o. **Country Team.** **The interdepartmental Country Team consists of key members of the US diplomatic mission or Embassy that work directly with the HN government.** Its purpose is to unify the coordination and implementation of US national policy within each foreign country under direction of the Ambassador. The Country Team meets regularly to advise the Ambassador on matters of interest to the United States and reviews current developments in the country.

- The Country Team members usually include those shown in Figure II-1.
- One aim of the Country Team focus is to direct attention toward identification of potential sources of conflict and threats to US interests in a country and to improve problems by introducing programs designed to assist the economy, enhance medical care, and improve the infrastructure of the country.

4. Other Agencies

During NEOs, the CJTF will probably be required to coordinate with agencies outside the DOS. **For greatest effectiveness, coordination must begin at the first opportunity and be properly managed via the embassy staff.** Other agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs include the following:

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


Figure II-1. Members of the Country Team

a. **US Agency For International Development (USAID).** USAID is a quasi-independent agency that **funds developmental projects representing the nationwide efforts of the Country Team.** Administratively, it functions within the DOS and operates under an administrator who also serves as the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency. USAID carries out economic assistance programs designed to help people of developing countries advance their productive capacities, improve their quality of life, promote economic and political stability, and assist other missions in providing the HN with supplies and equipment to construct needed projects. USAID

maintains liaison with all charitable organizations capable of conducting humanitarian assistance (HA). The agency can respond to virtually any disaster abroad, with emphasis on humanitarian relief in the form of equipment and funds.

b. **US Information Service.** USIS helps to achieve US foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes overseas. **The agency advises US departments outside the continental United States (CONUS) on the possible impact of policy, programs, and official statements on foreign opinion.** It certifies journalists within the HN and works with the local, national, and international media to get media coverage in the United States and elsewhere about the HN government and its efforts. USIS will be interested in the impact of the evacuation on local attitudes and can aid joint forces by fostering popular support for them. It uses a proactive approach to communication to encourage constructive public support abroad for US policy objectives and to unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate US policies.

c. **Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).** By law (42 USC 1313) and Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," **the DHHS is the lead Federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States.** DHHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the US port of entry. The Embassy and DOS will coordinate DHHS assistance rendered to evacuees.

d. **The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel** is responsible for the reception and repatriation of all DOD family members, non-essential employees and DOD contractors in accordance with DODD 3025.14, "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad."

e. **Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).** **If the United States is**

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designated as the safe haven, the INS may meet evacuees at the port of entry. INS representatives in country can assist in identifying the foreign nationals to be evacuated. Responsibilities of the INS include the following:

- Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as immigrants to the United States.
- Grant benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including those seeking permanent resident status or naturalization.
- Prevent unlawful entry into the United States.
- Apprehend and remove persons whose entry is illegal or not in the best interest of the United States.

5. US Military Commands

a. Geographic Combatant Commanders. The geographic combatant commanders have developed general contingency plans for the support of the DOS should such assistance be ordered by the Secretary of Defense. These plans include support for the evacuation of noncombatants. When a situation develops where US military assistance might be needed in a NEO, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will designate the supported and supporting combatant commanders for planning purposes. **Upon request by the Embassy, the geographic combatant commander in whose AOR the Embassy is located, and who is the supported combatant commander, will dispatch a small advance liaison team to maintain contact with the Embassy and coordinate the initial military effort.** The team will have the communications equipment needed to maintain effective contact between the

geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, and the Embassy.

b. Special Responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (USCINACOM) and Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC). Under conditions of a non-emergency evacuation, **USCINACOM and USCINCPAC are the safe haven commanders for DOD repatriation in their respective areas of responsibility.** Additionally, USCINCPAC is responsible for repatriation operations in Hawaii, Alaska, and US territories in the Pacific. USCINACOM has delegated this responsibility to the Army component commander, Commander, US Army Forces Command.

c. Commander, US Coast Guard Atlantic Area, and Commander, US Coast Guard Pacific Area. Due to its reputation as a humanitarian Service, **the Coast Guard may be called upon to play a vital role in certain emergency evacuation situations.** The relatively nonbelligerent nature of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft make them an option in cases where a DOD presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile situation.

d. Special Responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). As a member of the WLG, the special operations forces representative coordinates with the DOS, the geographic combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure the adequacy and timeliness of special operations planning and coordination in support of NEOs.

e. Regional Marine Officer. The RMO is the company commander of the MSGs within a specific geographic region.

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6. Private Voluntary Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Regional and International Organizations

Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," provides a summary of private voluntary organizations (PVOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and regional and international organizations (IOs).

a. PVOs and NGOs are **organizations that may be in a country providing HA or relief when an evacuation takes place.** Approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of humanitarian

relief operation are registered with USAID. USAID publishes a yearly report, titled "Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs," that describes the aims and objectives of the registered organizations. **The JTF should be cautioned that personnel working for these organizations cannot be ordered to leave a country.** However, they may be able to provide valuable up-to-date information as to the location of US citizens. Some of these agencies may not support US goals. An early determination of their position in relation to US policy is recommended.

b. **Regional and International Organizations.** IOs may provide assistance to refugees during a US evacuation from a foreign country.

Chapter II

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CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL

"Your greatness does not depend upon the size of your command, but on the manner in which you exercise it."

Marshal Ferdinand Foch

1. Introduction

The Ambassador, with the approval of the Under Secretary of State for Management, can order the evacuation of USG personnel and dependents other than uniformed personnel of the US Armed Forces and designated emergency-essential DOD civilians who are not under the authority of the US COM. While the Ambassador cannot order the departure of private US citizens and designated aliens, the Ambassador can offer them USG evacuation assistance. Normally an evacuation starts with the Embassy's emergency action plan (EAP), using scheduled airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation. Military assistance is provided in a variety of circumstances, not just when requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission. When the SECSTATE requests military assistance from the Department of Defense, the request is directed by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate combatant commander, who will initiate appropriate military operations. When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or appear imminent, the Ambassador may invoke such elements of emergency evacuation plans as the situation warrants, including requesting assistance of the appropriate military commander, while simultaneously informing the DOS.

2. Command Relationships

Within the country, the Ambassador has been designated as the responsible

authority for the operation. Subject to the overall authority of the Ambassador, responsibility for the conduct of military operations in support of an evacuation and security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the JOA is vested with the JFC. Figure III-1 depicts the chain of command for a NEO.

a. **Decisions During Planning.** Due to time constraints and the unusual command relationship with respect to NEOs, operational planning and decision making must be based on a foundation of common understanding of perspectives (political and/or military) concerning the situation, mission, objectives, procedures, and free exchange of information. In those cases when significant differences between the JFC and Ambassador become obstacles to the success of the operation, they are referred to their respective superiors for resolution.

b. **Consultation Between the Ambassador and JFC.** In the course of planning and executing NEOs, the Ambassador obtains and considers the opinions and professional judgment of the JFC. This requirement, however, in no way limits the Ambassador's overall responsibility.

c. **Direction to Personnel.** All necessary orders from either the Ambassador or JFC to corresponding personnel are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate chain of command. In the event communications cannot be established with higher authority or if the situation




Figure III-1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)/Repatriation Operations Organization Chain of Command

deteriorates to one of combat operations rather than a NEO (regardless of the environment) and US lives are at risk, the JFC takes whatever action is necessary to

protect the lives of US personnel, informs the Ambassador of actions taken, and requests guidance through the DOD chain of command.

3. National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Guidance to the geographic combatant commanders by higher authority is provided in the CJCS Warning Order. This guidance normally covers areas of key concern to the NCA and provides the geographic combatant commander with an overview of the political context within which the NEO is being considered. The scope and objective of US involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response is often provided in general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate courses of actions (COAs). **The CJCS Warning Order defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any planning constraints.** The Warning Order also identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution or requests that the geographic combatant commander develop these factors as part of COA development.

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for the following:

- When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, **coordinate the deployment and employment** of US forces in support of NEO.
- **Appoint the CJCS representative of the WLG** to coordinate the execution of NEO responsibilities.
- **Monitor combatant commanders and the Military Services** participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatants.
- **Recommend to the Secretary of Defense transportation movement priorities**

and the use of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide the appropriate transportation resources in support of DOS requests.

- As a member of the WLG, **coordinate** with the DOS, combatant commanders, and the Services **in the recommended designation of temporary safe havens.**
- When conditions of potential hazard warrant, **recommend** to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) **that the movement of noncombatants into affected countries be suspended.**
- **Periodically evaluate overseas command procedures for NEOs,** particularly during scheduled CJCS exercises.

b. **Secretary of the Army.** The responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army include the following:

- Appoint the Army member of the WLG.
- **Act as the designated DOD Executive Agent for repatriation planning and operations,** and coordinate within the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies (as well as state and local agencies) in planning for the reception and onward movement of DOD family members, nonessential DOD civilians, US nationals, and designated aliens evacuated during a NEO.
- **Establish and operate a joint reception coordination center (JRCC).**
- As specified in the Joint Plan for DOD Noncombatant Repatriation, **manage all requirements identified in support of DOD noncombatants.**

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c. **Secretary of the Navy.** The responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy are as follows:

- Appoint the Navy and Marine Corps members of the WLG.
- **Provide for the designation and training of port liaison officers.**
- When requested, **provide augmentation support to the JRCC**, including appropriate Marine Corps and (if transferred to Navy operational control) Coast Guard assets.
- As required, provide support for evacuated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard noncombatants.

d. **Secretary of the Air Force.** The responsibilities of the Secretary of the Air Force are as follows:

- Appoint the Air Force member of the WLG.
- **Provide augmentation support to the JRCC**, when requested.
- As required, provide support for evacuated Air Force noncombatants.

"Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals."

Sun Tzu
The Art of War,
c. 500 BC

e. **Geographic Combatant Commanders.** The responsibilities for the commanders of geographic combatant commands are as follows:

- **Prepare and maintain plans for the protection and evacuation of US**

noncombatants for whom the DOS and the Department of Defense are responsible in accordance with the DOS and DOD memorandum of understanding.

- **Cooperate with the Ambassador and principal officers** in the preparation of a consular or the Embassy's evacuation plan, contained in the EAP.
- Appoint the military members to the RLGs.
- **Review all DOS EAPs for countries and consular districts in their AOR or where they might logically participate in NEOs.** If during the review of EAPs any of the criteria are not met, corrective action should be requested via the appropriate Ambassador. Criteria to evaluate includes the following:
 - Adequate provisions to protect and evacuate noncombatants.
 - Accurate references to the use of US military facilities.
 - Accuracy of specific planning guidance.
 - Distribution lists for subordinate and adjacent military commands and joint forces.
 - Procedures for periodic review.
- **Provide guidance to the US Defense Representative of the local EAC** regarding the inclusion of military personnel in consular and embassy plans.
- **Ensure that plans are prepared for evacuation of military personnel not included in the Embassy, staff, and emergency essential civilians** operating in support of combat units who will be evacuated after the NEO is executed.



The successful, safe, and orderly evacuation of noncombatants largely depends on the geographic combatant command's ability to coordinate the operation with the Department of State and supporting commands.

- When conditions of potential hazard warrant, **recommend to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that movement of DOD noncombatants into countries or areas be suspended.** Also, recommend evacuation of DOD noncombatants if conditions warrant.
- **If time precludes adequate communication with the DOS or Department of Defense and upon request of the Ambassador, provide assistance for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants.** If timely communication with the Ambassador or the senior DOS representative is not possible, take proper actions necessary to secure the safety of participating personnel as well as other US personnel and foreign nationals who request assistance.
- Upon request, **provide updated noncombatant population statistics** for areas in which the Department of Defense is responsible, through the RLG, to the WLG.
- Upon completion of an evacuation involving DOD resources or personnel, **provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with an after-action report** containing a summary of the activities and recommendations for improving future operations. See CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.25, "Joint After-Action Reporting Systems," for additional guidance.
- **Coordinate the request for, and the tasking of, common-user airlift to support the NEO.** Strategic airlift and aeromedical evacuation (AE) missions are requested through the Air Mobility Command (USAF) (AMC) Tanker Airlift Control Center. Theater airlift assets (if available to the theater) will be tasked to support the NEO upon the authority of the supported geographic combatant commander.
- In accordance with the mission and priorities assigned by the USTRANSCOM, **provide military sea transportation for the evacuation of noncombatants.**
- **Maintain NEO packages (NEOPACKs) covering those nations or areas for which the combatant commander would be involved in emergency**

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operations. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides all organizations with NEO responsibilities with map NEOPACKs, which contain specific maps, charts, and other geographic material to support evacuation planning and operations.

- **Request assistance from US Special Operations Command** when requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater personnel.
- **Designate a JFC, as required.**

f. US Special Operations Command.

The responsibilities of the USCINCSOC are as follows:

- Prepare and provide special operations forces in support of NEOs conducted by geographic combatant commanders.
- Appoint the special operations forces representative of the WLG.

g. US Transportation Command. The responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command include providing common-user airlift to meet requirements as requested by the JFC and validated by the supported geographic combatant commander.

4. Joint Task Force Organization

Once tasked, the combatant commander decides how the command should conduct the proposed NEO. If a JTF is formed to conduct a NEO, it will be established and organized in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),"

and Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures." **The CJTF is responsible for all phases of the operation to include the ISB and temporary safe haven** (if located outside the United States and within the JTF JOA). An ISB or temporary safe haven outside the JTF JOA falls under the responsibility of the supported combatant commander. The NEO JTF is responsible for support and transport of the evacuees to ISBs and safe havens outside the JOA. **The CJTF has full authority to organize all elements of assigned and attached forces as necessary to accomplish the missions inherent in the evacuation operation.**

a. Composition. The composition of the JTF is delineated in the order establishing the force. **The CJTF exercises operational control over assigned forces and normally over attached forces through designated component commanders.** Other forces may operate in support of or under tactical control of the CJTF, as directed by the combatant commander.

b. Joint Task Force Headquarters (HQ) Organization. The CJTF organizes the JTF staff. **The JTF HQ composition, location, and facilities may have a major influence on what the CJTF and staff can accomplish.** An afloat JTF HQ may have limitations that could affect staffing levels and equipment capabilities. A JTF HQ located in a neighboring country may not have restrictions on space or amount of equipment. However, such a JTF HQ may encounter restrictions resulting from increased distances, political sensitivities (of the neighboring country), and other types of limitations.

CHAPTER IV

CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

"The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous."

Hans von Seek
Thoughts of a Soldier

1. US Embassy and Consulate Plans

a. **Emergency Action Plans.** US Embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs for the area under their cognizance. The Ambassador is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of EAPs, one section of which addresses the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for reviewing and commenting on EAPs. EAPs are not tactical operation plans in the sense that military planners think of, but they are the reference materials that support the formulation of an operation plan. The combatant commander should ensure that the EAP is accurate and adequate to support military operations. A copy of the EAP should be on file and maintained at the appropriate combatant commander's headquarters. EAPs include the information shown in Figure IV-1.

b. **Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) 12 FAH-1.** The EPH is a consolidated source of guidance for foreign service posts for planning and dealing with certain emergency situations. The EPH serves as the principal reference for posts in preparing and revising the EAP. Every foreign service post is required to have an operative EPH designed to provide procedures to deal with foreseeable contingencies. This handbook provides a detailed agenda to be addressed by the Ambassador and the emergency team for

planning an evacuation operation. It also provides a two-page "Military Implementation Checklist" of questions most often asked by military commanders and planners concerning an impending evacuation operation. Appendix E, "Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists," provides an example of a checklist for a US military assisted evacuation.

2. Military Planning — Combatant Command Plans

Most military plans emphasize the predeployment phase of the operation because it is a period of intense planning and preparation. Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JFC receives the warning order from the combatant commander and lasts until the evacuation force deploys to either an ISB or the evacuation site. Prior coordination with the staffs of the geographic combatant commander and Embassy can significantly improve planning for the JFC. **The combatant command can provide the JFC with information to begin planning, such as the general contingency plans developed by the combatant commanders.**

3. National Imagery and Mapping Agency

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides selected US missions with NEOPACKs containing specific maps, charts,

CONTENTS OF EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS

Possible courses of action for different threat environments

Location of evacuation sites (landing zones, ports, beaches)

Anticipated number of evacuees (total number by area) categorized by medical status - categories include:

- Persons not requiring medical assistance**
- Persons requiring medical assistance prior to evacuation**
- Persons requiring medical assistance prior to and during evacuation**
- Persons requiring emergency medical evacuation**

Location of assembly areas and major supply routes

Location of command posts

Key personnel (name, location, and desired means of contacting them)

Description of the embassy communication system, transportation fleet, and warden system

Quantity of class I (subsistence) supplies on hand at the embassy

Standard map products of the local area, with annotations identifying critical landmarks

Figure IV-1. Contents of Emergency Action Plans

and other geographic material to support evacuation planning and operations. NEOPACKs are a vital element with which all key individuals should be familiar.

4. Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency provides the DOS, selected embassy DAOs, appropriate military commands, and the Services with Contingency Support Packages and/or US Diplomatic Facilities Graphics for use in evacuation planning. Other intelligence products that may be available and applicable

to the NEO include the Gridded Reference Graphic and the Contingency Support Study. Additionally, the agency is responsible for national-level evasion and recovery intelligence production.

5. Atlantic Intelligence Command and Joint Intelligence Center Pacific

Both the Atlantic Intelligence Command and Joint Intelligence Center Pacific produce NEO intelligence support handbooks (NISH), which cover most scenarios and countries in all the

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations


theaters. NISH are all-source studies that directly support joint operational and tactical planning and are based on the DOS EAPs for embassies and consulates. They consist of annotated aerial imagery and ground photos of embassy grounds, helicopter landing zones, assembly areas, airfields, and seaports, along with encyclopedic data. Information includes post emergency communications listing and country profile.

6. Notification Procedures

To develop a realistic evacuation plan, the JTF staff should know how long it will take to assemble the evacuees once the decision to evacuate has been made. Communication with

distributes messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation and other relevant information.

a. **Shortwave Radio and Commercial Telephone.** Frequently, US citizens and foreign nationals reside outside the large population centers (for example, capitals, large cities, and military bases). Embassy contact with these individuals is often restricted to shortwave radio and commercial telephone systems, which are seldom secure. **Shortwave radio and commercial telephone should be used to notify these individuals only if better means are not available.** However, only the minimum unclassified information necessary should be



Emergency action plans will vary considerably, depending upon the Embassy's physical characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and its security configuration.

potential evacuees may be via a warden system, which is a communication plan to notify individuals having access to private telephones (wardens) and residing in areas of concentrated US population. A warden coordinator prepares lists of wardens and other contacts to cover areas of assigned responsibilities. The wardens prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers and addresses of US citizens residing in their AOR. During an evacuation each warden receives and

transmitted. Significant delays can occur in notifying these citizens that an evacuation has been ordered. This can result in one group of evacuees being at the assembly area while another has yet to be notified of the evacuation.

b. **Recall.** In some cases, a recall system for embassy or consulate personnel is a citizens band radio system tied to a telephone recall. It is usually fast, reliable, and efficient.

Chapter IV

c. **Runners.** In the event of a severe communications outage, personnel acting as runners may be the only way to pass information.

7. Notification Phases

Understanding the phases in which potential evacuees are notified is essential in developing a sensible evacuation plan. Figure IV-2 provides an overview.

a. **Drawdown.** The basic options for drawdown are authorized departure and ordered departure. The Embassy, referred to as the post, is required to prepare lists of personnel to remain at the post in an emergency situation. The list of employees to remain will include those needed to manage an eventual evacuation of US citizens.




Figure IV-2. Notification Phases

- **Authorized Departure.** The Ambassador must request authorized departure status from the DOS. **Employees and family members who wish to leave the post must obtain approval from the Ambassador.** When the authorized departure status is terminated, the official evacuees must return to the post.
- **Ordered Departure.** The Ambassador may determine that a situation has deteriorated to a point that family members and certain employees should leave the post for their safety. **Ordered departure is not optional; family members and employees will be issued orders to leave.** When the ordered departure status is terminated, official evacuees must return to the post.

b. **Evacuation.** The decision to evacuate personnel assumes that the decision to draw down, at least in part, has been made. When feasible, **notification of potential evacuees involves communicating via the established warden system.** As a rule, written messages are more reliable than oral messages and should be used whenever

possible. There are four notification phases for an evacuation.

- **Stand Fast.** When a country's political or security environment has deteriorated and it is perceived that US citizens are threatened, **but an evacuation is either not required or is temporarily impossible, all US citizens are requested to "stand fast" and are given preliminary instructions for preparing to evacuate the country.** The Embassy identifies the wardens and activates its emergency action organization. The Embassy's personnel review the evacuation plans, options, and support requirements, and the Ambassador may consider requesting military assistance. The combatant commander may direct the deployment of a liaison team, activate crisis action response teams, and assign a subordinate JFC as appropriate. For a sample "stand fast" notice, see Appendix F, "Sample Forms Notice."
- **Leave Commercial.** Due to the gravity of the situation, **nonessential US citizens**

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

may be told to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. It is assumed commercial transport will be available and adequate. The following other actions may take place. The Embassy's internal security force may be reinforced by additional MSGs and/or State Department security personnel, or JTFs may be assembled to assist in the evacuation. The Ambassador might request the deployment of a small JTF liaison team to the Embassy to assist in evacuation planning and in anticipation of the requirement for military assistance to conduct the evacuation. For a sample leave commercial notice, see Appendix F, "Sample Forms Notice."

- **Evacuation.** The political or security environment is believed to have deteriorated to the point that the safety of US citizens is threatened. **With DOS approval, the Ambassador orders the departure of the personnel listed below in subparagraph 8b, keeping only an essential skeletal Country Team.** The Embassy would assemble, document, and begin assisting in the movement of US citizens and third and host country nationals to designated safe haven sites. **A mix of commercial charter, private, or military transport might be necessary,** depending on the availability of scheduled commercial transportation. At some point in this phase, the Ambassador might request military assistance, either because the transportation means are inadequate or because of the severity of the threat to the evacuees. Once requested, the combatant commander, upon direction from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commences military evacuation operations. These may range from simple transportation support to the deployment of the JTF. A sample evacuation notice is provided in Appendix F, "Sample Forms Notice."

- **Embassy or Post Closing.** The situation has deteriorated to the point that the Embassy must close and all remaining US citizens and embassy employees are evacuated. This does not include private US citizens and their dependents who desire to remain in the country. A list of personnel who cannot be ordered to depart a country is provided below in subparagraph 8b. Military assistance might not be required until this phase of the evacuation. JTF operations could range from removing the remainder of the Country Team to full-scale evacuation operations. A sample embassy or post closing notice is provided in Appendix F, "Sample Forms Notice."

8. Personnel Assignments and Identification

The first question most often asked by both diplomatic and military planners is, "Who are the evacuees, and how many of them will there be in a crisis?" **There are several groups of evacuees, some of whom the Ambassador may direct to evacuate and some whom the Ambassador cannot.** Understanding how evacuees are organized, notified, and moved to assembly areas helps in determining the number of potential evacuees and assembly time estimates.

a. **Report of Potential Evacuees.** The **Report of Potential Evacuees, also known as the "F-77 Report," identifies the numbers of potential evacuees at each embassy.** Each embassy or consulate is required to submit to the DOS an annual report, on 15 December, of the estimated number of potential evacuees in its area of responsibility. A copy of the most recent report must be filed with the EAP.

- **The accuracy of the report depends on the general level of interest in the potential for an evacuation.** The fear

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that an evacuation may be required is often the most powerful motivator to get an accurate evacuee estimate.

- These counts, however, are only yearly estimates. **The accuracy of the estimate will vary with the speed and severity of the crisis.** If the whole population of a country suddenly perceives a deadly threat, evacuee numbers and panic will be abnormally high. Evacuee estimates will probably be fairly accurate if the period preceding the evacuation has allowed for an orderly assembly of people who want to get out and the perceived threat at the time of the evacuation remains relatively constant. Note, too, that the estimate may be high or low due to seasonally-dependent tourism.

b. Personnel Eligible For Evacuation Assistance

- **The following categories of personnel are eligible for evacuation assistance and can be ordered to depart.**

- US civilian employees of all USG agencies (except DOD employees of military commands who have been designated as “wartime essential”).

- US military personnel assigned to the Embassy (e.g., DATI, security assistance personnel, MSGs).

- Peace Corps volunteers.

- US citizens employed on contract to a USG agency if the contract so provides.

- Family members of those above.

- Family members of all other US military personnel (command and noncommand sponsored).

- **The following categories of personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance, but cannot be ordered to depart.** If these individuals refuse to evacuate, the JTF marshalling team should obtain their signature on the “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” (see Figure F-5), which should be forwarded to the Embassy. If they depart the country, they may return at their discretion and at their expense. These personnel are as follows:

- US citizens employed by non-USG organizations (e.g., World Health Organization).

- US citizens employed by or assigned to international organizations (e.g., UN Disaster Relief Coordinator, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Medical Corps).

- US citizens employed on contract directly by the host government, even though the contract may be funded by the USG.

- US citizens employed by private entities, such as relief organizations, even though the employer may receive some USG funding.

- Fulbright grantees and US citizens in comparable roles.

- Other private US citizens.

- Family members of private US citizens, to include alien spouses, children, and other bona fide residents of the household.

- **The category of non-Americans seeking assistance can be the largest and most difficult to control during a fast-moving evacuation** in an uncertain or hostile environment. The Ambassador

Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations

should establish the policy identifying who will receive evacuation assistance.

9. Coordination With Senior In-Country Military Officials

The CJTF should establish and maintain close liaison with the USDR, who is usually the DATT or the SAO. The USDR will be able to assist in the coordination of JTF activities with the Embassy and to assist the CJTF in obtaining the Ambassador's evaluation of the situation. Additionally, the USDR is able to provide information on the general scope of in-country activities for all DOD noncombatant command elements, including missions, locations, organizations, and unique security requirements.

a. As part of the planning process, the CJTF prepares a commander's estimate covering the various options deemed feasible and any pros and cons relating to each, including political constraints. The CJCS or combatant commander Warning Order will normally provide the CJTF with a concise statement of the US national interests at stake in the NEO to include:

- The safety and welfare of US citizens.
- The continued stability of the local government.
- The maintenance of a firm posture against terrorism.
- A demonstration of support for international commitments.
- The probable environment in which the NEO will be conducted.

b. **The Ambassador should summarize the political objectives and constraints relevant to the JTF's assistance, the nuances involved, and any constraints on the use of force that might be appropriate.**

While these may be obvious to those intimately involved with the situation, the CJTF will be better prepared to comply effectively with a request for help if the reasons have been clearly explained.

10. Embassy Security and Operations

Security outside the Embassy is the responsibility of the host country, while security of the Ambassador and embassy grounds is the responsibility of the RSO. In many cases, US Embassies do not have security forces or personnel. If security is provided, the RSO has DOS security personnel and a small MSG detachment to accomplish this mission. **During the evacuation, the MSG detachment personnel receive their orders from the RSO, while JTF personnel receive their orders from the CJTF.** JTF personnel do not receive orders from the RSO. These two chains of command can potentially cause problems, especially when MSG personnel and JTF personnel work together during the evacuation operation. **It is vital that the JTF staff work out missions and chains of command before the operation.** The CJTF must understand the Ambassador's security plan and integrate the joint forces as smoothly as possible.

a. The Embassy evacuation plans may not provide for the embassy site to be a primary assembly area or evacuation site. However, past experience shows that **during times of crisis large numbers of US citizens, citizens of the host country, and TCNs will go to the US Embassy.** These people will be frightened and may want to leave the country but may not have been included in the notification plan or could not reach the designated assembly area or evacuation site. Separate plans should be developed to deal with these crowds, both as a threat to the Embassy and as evacuees.

b. **Local citizens wishing to volunteer information may arrive at the embassy**

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perimeter without prior notice. These individuals are called “walk-ins.” Embassies have standing operating procedures (SOPs) on the treatment of walk-ins designed to ensure quick and secure access to the appropriate embassy officers. JTFs must be familiar with these SOPs.

c. In some cases local contract guards control the perimeter of each embassy. These personnel are host country citizens who may or may not be armed. Quality of the local guard force varies by country. Some local guards are professional and staffed with personnel who have proven their loyalty to the Embassy’s staff. These local guards can

be very useful in assisting US forces assigned to perimeter security duty. **Planning must consider that some or all local loyal contract guards may desire to be evacuated.** Planning for numbers to be evacuated should include this additional group. In addition, in the event these guards desire to be evacuated at the last minute, consideration must be made for replacement security.

d. MSGs control access into critical facilities where classified material is processed and stored. MSGs have reaction plans to defend these facilities and destroy or evacuate sensitive material or equipment, if necessary.

CHAPTER V

EMPLOYMENT AND EVACUATION OPERATION PROCEDURES

"A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing [an operation] exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little."

Carl von Clausewitz

1. Implementation of Evacuation Plan

In the total evacuation process, the military plays a key supporting role in planning and conducting the operation. Nevertheless, the military is most often viewed as the last resort in a series of evacuation options. It is important for the CJTF and JTF staff to understand this role when preparing a plan for the evacuation. It might be quite natural to assume that the evacuation is a unilateral military operation and prepare the evacuation plan in a vacuum, ignoring the COM's requirements and perspective for the NEO. This is a potentially serious flaw in the coordination between the DOS and the military when preparing and conducting evacuation operations.

a. **Evacuation Site Operations.** Operations at the evacuation site are clearly delineated between those performed by DOS personnel and those performed by the JTF. However, **in cases of emergency the JTF should be prepared to perform functions that are normally executed by embassy staff.** This includes an awareness of movement plans using commercial and private aircraft, ships, and vehicles and all COAs being considered by the Ambassador.

b. **Authority to Invoke.** **Once the SECSTATE approves an evacuation, the COM has the authority to implement the plan in a crisis.** The DOS, acting on the advice of the COM or Principal Officer, will determine when US noncombatants and

foreign nationals are to be evacuated. When unexpected violence flares up or appears imminent and communications with the DOS are cut off, the COM or Principal Officer may invoke such elements of the plan and initiate such actions as the situation warrants.

2. Advance Party

As early as possible in the planning, the CJTF forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. The advance party may consist of two elements: the FCE and the evacuation site party. In a permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE should be inserted before any evacuation site parties. In a hostile environment, the Ambassador's decision will probably be to insert the entire NEO force to immediately commence the operation. **The FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and host country authorities (when authorized by the DOS) and establishes a communication link among the CJTF, geographic combatant commander, and the DOS. The evacuation site party conducts reconnaissance to determine and establish assembly areas and evacuation sites.**

a. **Preparation and Planning.** Deployment of the advance party depends on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and political considerations. **The least conspicuous method is for the advance party to arrive in the host country in civilian clothes on civilian aircraft.** This is possible only if the

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necessary passport and visa arrangements can be made and the environment is permissive.

An uncertain or hostile environment may require forced entry. Use of military aircraft allows the advance party to carry additional equipment that may be needed in setting up the evacuation site and establishing communication and liaison. The following advance party tasks should be accomplished during this phase:

- Request permission from the US Embassy for the advance party to enter the country. The number of FCE members allowed and the insertion method should be requested. Appendix F, "Sample Forms Notice," contains a sample of a notice that the Embassy can begin to staff once released by the CJTF.
- Deploy as soon as possible, and in advance of the main body, to allow maximum time for coordination and to determine external support requirements.
- Develop and brief a communication plan for the advance party.
- Acquire and review appropriate maps.
- Review the Embassy's EAP and the EAP checklists, examples of which are provided in Appendix E, "Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists."
- Assemble and inspect required equipment.
- Develop and brief an escape and evasion plan for the advance party.
- Obtain visitor visas for all members of the advance party.
- Due to possible sensitivity of the political situation in the host country, determine

whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes.

- Consider weapon and ammunition requirements based on the threat assessment.
- Examine the need for specialized equipment; for example, ordnance to assist DOS officials in destruction of classified equipment and documents or sufficient satellite communications (SATCOM) systems to establish communications with the JTF or combatant command headquarters.
- Determine the medical requirements.
- Identify translator and linguistic requirements.
- Via the Embassy, request overflight and landing rights for appropriate countries.
- Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO; obtain assistance to fill gaps created by missing data.
- Assess news media interest in the situation and activities of the JTF and its involvement in the evacuation.

b. Forward Command Element. The FCE coordinates with the Ambassador and members of the Country Team for information and assistance. The FCE normally submits SITREPs to the CJTF. When the main body enters the country, the FCE rejoins the evacuation force and continues operations with the JTF HQ.

c. Forward Command Element Composition. The JFC in conjunction with the Ambassador or his designated representative determines the size and composition of the FCE. The FCE may include the following personnel:

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- **Officer In Charge (OIC).** Provides direct liaison with the senior DOS official at the Embassy to ensure orders of the CJTF and the desires of the DOS are accomplished.
 - **Intelligence Officer**
 - Provides a conduit for intelligence directly from the Embassy and evacuation sites.
 - Coordinates with the DAO, COS, and RSO to provide the evacuation force updated intelligence estimates. The DAO can facilitate access to the daily embassy SITREPs and other intelligence.
 - Obtains information and intelligence, including NEOPACKs, to satisfy JTF intelligence requirements from the Country Team and other embassy sources.
 - Provides a signal intelligence function with equipment that is interoperable with the rest of the communications detachment.
 - Considers the following when evaluating the intelligence picture and developing essential elements of information and other intelligence requirements: (1) Climatological, tidal, astronomical, and lunar phase data; (2) Intelligence on assets, characteristics, and capabilities of ports, airfields, beaches, helicopter landing zones (HLZs) and drop zones (DZs), and key facilities of the HN government for communications, utilities, and health services; (3) Identification of hostile and potentially hostile forces, including local government forces, rebel groups, dissident forces, student groups, and unorganized mob action, with the focus on location and capabilities of potential threat forces to become organized; (4) Identification of any third parties (i.e., external countries) that may attempt to hinder evacuation operations; (5) Identification of friendly third parties that could assist the NEO; (6) Potential for hostile infiltration of evacuees; (7) Satellite imagery of required areas (if available); (8) Liaison with intelligence representatives of other US, third country, and HN agencies as appropriate; and (9) Need for linguists to assist with debriefings or conduct liaison with foreign nationals as required.
 - **Operations Officer**
 - Briefs DOS representatives on the capabilities of the advance party and the JTF.
 - Answers operational questions concerning the evacuation plan. Briefs the OIC concerning any information the Embassy presents that may affect the evacuation plan.
 - Ensures that support is provided to manifest noncombatant evacuees.
 - Assesses the requirement for deployment of combat forces.
 - **Logistics Officer**
 - Coordinates HN transportation assets needed by the advance party and JTF.
 - Arranges for supplies the JTF needs but cannot bring (such as water, medical supplies, and rations).
 - Coordinates nonorganic JTF heavy equipment and materials handling equipment support.
 - Provides on-site logistic assistance to facilitate the evacuation.
 - **Communications Detachment**
 - Sets up and operates necessary communications equipment.
-

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- Determines areas of compatibility between military and DOD and/or DOS on-site communications equipment.
- Resolves any frequency problems that may occur.
- Determines if HN communications equipment is similar to, or compatible with, US equipment.
- Ensures that required single-channel communications equipment is planned for and deployed (high frequency, very high frequency, ultra high frequency, and SATCOM).
- Develops an understanding of the operation of the host country's phone system. Existing domestic telephone lines can be used to back up the military communication systems. Although telephone lines are not secure, manual encryption devices may be used to pass classified traffic and should be planned for. Telephone lines may be the most reliable form of communication, especially to remote evacuation sites. Communications personnel should verify the serviceability of these lines, record numbers, and ascertain dialing procedures for possible use during execution of the NEO.
- Establishes positive communications between the diplomatic mission, geographic combatant commander, and CJTF. Communications must be established between the Embassy and CJTF so diplomatic and politically sensitive situations can be controlled.
- **Medical Team**
 - Advises the FCE OIC of medical considerations that affect the NEO.
- Provides immediate medical assistance as required.
- Determines characteristics of the evacuation area that are related to the cause and spread of disease, such as terrain, soil, climate, animals, plants, sanitary standards of the native population, and endemic and epidemic diseases present.
- Determines the need for special preventive medicine units.
- **Air Officer**
 - Coordinates both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
 - Determines air traffic control requirements.
 - Provides advice concerning the number and type of air assets required, the technical aspects of HLZs and DZs (including the type of security required), fixed-wing landing strips, and air evacuation routes.
 - Selects landing zones (LZs).
 - Provides interface for air-to-ground operations.
 - Surveys air facilities for possible use to support follow-on forces for conduct of defensive combat operations.
- **Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer and/or Fire Support Officer**
 - Identifies and confirms prospective targets to support the NEO (uncertain and/or hostile environments).
 - Coordinates targets with appropriate embassy personnel.

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

- Provides initial terminal guidance support and supporting arms control as required.
- **Public Affairs Officer**
 - Advises and assists the OIC FCE on matters concerning the news media.
 - Serves as a liaison between the FCE and embassy staffs for PA.
 - Works with the Embassy to publicize evacuation efforts in an effort to generate confidence in and a positive perception of the operation. This is always accomplished in close coordination with the Embassy's staff and within the guidelines of approved DOD PA policy.
 - Provides clear, concise, and timely information through the combatant command PA staff to senior DOD PA agencies. Provides information to the PAOs at the temporary safe havens concerning media opportunities prior to the arrival of evacuees.
 - Provides security review of media products to ensure that operational security is not compromised.
 - Establishes an effective command information program.
- **Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Officer**
 - Advises the FCE OIC on PSYOP-related matters.
 - Serves as liaison between the FCE OIC and the supporting PSYOP organization.
 - Coordinates and monitors execution of PSYOP operations to support the NEO.
- Coordinates with the JTF PAO, embassy PAO, and USIS Director to ensure that themes and messages are congruent.
- Validates the PSYOP plan.
- Obtains the Ambassador's approval for PSYOP products and execution of the PSYOP plan.
- **Civil Affairs Officer**
 - Advises the FCE OIC on how to minimize population interference with evacuation operations.
 - Maintains close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective coordination and delineation of civil affairs responsibilities and activities.
 - Assists the JTF in accomplishing its mission by obtaining civil or indigenous support for the NEO.
 - Assists embassy personnel in receiving, screening, and debriefing evacuees.
- **Joint Force Legal Adviser**
 - Advises the FCE OIC on such legal issues as may arise on scene in preparation for and during execution of the NEO.
 - Reviews and assists in preparing instruction packages on ROE, use of force, use of riot control agents, applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), HN law enforcement practices, weapons confiscation, search and seizures, and civilian detention.
 - Conducts liaison with embassy and local officials as required.

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- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician**

- Advises the FCE OIC and embassy staff on bomb identification measures.
- Inspects the Embassy and potential ECC sites.

- **Unit Ministry Team**

- Advises the FCE OIC on any personal evacuee issues which may impact on the evacuation process.
- Provides any required pastoral care.
- Coordinates with other teams such as the Medical Team.
- Functions as the FCE OIC's representative to local and evacuee religious officials.

- d. **Forward Command Element Tasks.**

Forward command element tasks are shown in Figure V-1.

e. **Evacuation Site Party.** The evacuation site party identifies and, where possible, establishes the assembly areas, evacuation sites, and the ECC site. When the evacuation force enters the country and the evacuation commences, the evacuation site party becomes the operations center and/or section of the ECC. Additional information explaining ECC operations can be found in Chapter VI, "Evacuee Processing."

- f. **Evacuation Site Party Composition.**

The composition of the evacuation site party is determined by the CJTF; however, the size may be limited by the Ambassador. It may consist of the following personnel:

- Headquarters Commandant or OIC.
- Operations Officer.

- Intelligence Officer.
- Communications and/or Electronics Officer.
- Personnel Officer.
- Logistics Officer.
- Security Officer.
- Civil Affairs Officer.
- PSYOP Officer.
- Public Affairs Officer.
- Legal Adviser.
- Air Officer.

- g. **Evacuation Site Party Tasks**

- **Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body.**
- **Provide direct liaison with the Chief of the Embassy Consular Office.**
- **Maintain liaison with civilian or local host government agencies involved in the evacuation.**
- **Conduct ground reconnaissance** of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches, HLZs and/or DZs, airports, and ports; obtain photographs, where possible. To ensure that aircraft configurations are taken into account, the air officer will be fully aware of the requirements of potential pickup and delivery sites.
 - Recommend and/or confirm assembly areas, evacuation sites, and HLZs and/or DZs. If required to move assembly area operations, coordinate approval with the COM.

FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT TASKS

- ✓ Initiate liaison with the diplomatic mission:
 - ✓ Brief Department of State (DOS) representatives on the capabilities and missions of the advance party and the joint task force (JTF)
 - ✓ Establish a forward command post that can be expanded to the JTF headquarters staff
- ✓ Provide a continuing presence for planning and ensure a complementary role with DOS personnel
- ✓ Determine whether the operational environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile
- ✓ Advise the commander, joint task force (CJTF) regarding the size and composition of forces required. If specified in the initiating directive, determine whether the JTF is appropriate for the mission
- ✓ Advise the CJTF regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival of the evacuation force
- ✓ Determine existing political and sociological considerations
- ✓ Determine attitude of the local population
- ✓ Establish communications between the forward command element and the CJTF:
 - ✓ Make the communication link to CJTF available to the senior DOS representative
 - ✓ Maintain continuous communication for exchange of planning data and intelligence

Figure V-1. Forward Command Element Tasks

- Prepare initial evacuation site defensive plan and evacuation security requirements.

- Plan and coordinate emergency AE operations for evacuees with serious medical problems.

- Plan and coordinate operations of assembly areas and evacuation areas with DOS representatives.

- **Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites to include the following:**

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- Clear minor obstacles.
 - Plan and layout assembly areas and evacuation sites.
 - Plan and provide for initial terminal guidance at beaches and HLZs and/or DZs.
 - **Collect essential planning information** that includes the following:
 - Assessment of hostage threat.
 - Number and categories of evacuees.
 - Medical status of evacuees.
 - Temporary safe havens determined by the DOS.
 - Political constraints.
 - Number of host country personnel and TCNs to be evacuated.
 - **Assist DOS personnel with news media.**
 - **Establish and maintain communications with the FCE and Embassy.**
 - **Coordinate additional security requirements the HN police may be able to provide.**
 - During permissive NEOs, **coordinate for overflight rights.** In uncertain or hostile environments, consider the need for operations security and airspace coordination prior to coordinating overflight rights.
 - **Initiate PSYOP operations.**
- of the main body, each component prepares for its part in the operation. As the advance party rejoins the main body, the main body may consist of an HQ, marshalling element, security element, logistic element, and special operations forces. The size of the main body depends on the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation. Figure V-2 depicts the JTF main body. Overall JTF organization will comply with Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
- a. **JTF HQ. The JTF HQ coordinates and directs the evacuation.**
 - **Forward Command Element.** The FCE joins the evacuation force and continues operations with the JTF HQ. Effective liaison with the Embassy will be made by the FCE.
 - **Liaison Team.** The liaison activities continue with the Embassy and other agencies as required.
 - **Administrative Team.** The administrative team joins the evacuation site party to form the ECC. The administrative team is responsible for the smooth operation of the ECC processing center. Processing center operations are discussed in Chapter VI, “Evacuee Processing.”
 - b. **Marshalling Element. The marshalling element moves to and secures predesignated assembly areas, brings evacuees to the assembly areas, and escorts them to the ECC.** The size of the marshalling force depends on the number of sites and evacuees.
 - **Marshalling Team.** One marshalling team controls an assembly area and evacuates the citizens in that area. The marshalling team should be large enough to organize into two sections that consist of search
- A JTF “main body” will deploy to effect the on-scene evacuation process. After insertion




Figure V-2. Joint Task Force Main Body

squads and security squads. Search squads may not be needed if the Embassy's evacuation plan has been successfully implemented and all evacuees have been notified. If it has been determined that all evacuees have been informed, then search squads should not leave the assembly area except in emergency cases.

- The search squads locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area. Each search squad should have an interpreter and, if possible, a guide. A lost squad in a potentially hostile

environment can create significant problems for the evacuation force. Interpreters may be required to assist the search squads in moving from the assembly areas and to locate evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect.

- A security squad provides security to the team during movement and in the assembly area.
- Consideration should be given to attachment of one-to-three member Tactical PSYOP Teams, with their


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organic loudspeakers, to the marshalling teams. The organic loudspeakers can facilitate communication with the local populace and noncombatant evacuees. Additionally, dependent upon the country, PSYOP personnel may be able to provide interpreters.

- **Marshalling Force Operations.** The marshalling team locates evacuees and moves them to assembly areas and eventually to the ECC. The marshalling team may have several search squads

- Movement control requires: (1) identifying primary and alternate routes and check points; (2) having local road maps available for each driver; (3) planning for convoy control and security; (4) identifying safe houses or areas if vehicles break down or become separated or lost; and (5) ensuring that adequate communications equipment is available for convoys.

- Assembly area operations include: (1) establishment of perimeter security, even



In accordance with mission priorities and available assets, noncombatant evacuation operations may use a number of transportation modes, to include small craft sea transportation.

under the control and direction of the team's OIC. The following should be considered during marshalling operations:

- Sufficient transportation for the search and/or security squads and evacuees. All evacuees should be prepared to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or wheeled vehicles. Other considerations include: (1) the use of local drivers, if available, because of their experience and familiarity with the local road network; (2) availability of sufficient mechanics for emergency repairs; and (3) briefing of military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

in a permissive environment; and (2) sufficient transportation available to move evacuees to the ECC. Vehicles belonging to the evacuees may be used to transport personnel to the ECC.

- Search squad operations include: (1) obtaining a list of potential evacuees from the Consular Officer; (2) obtaining copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee; (3) having copies of the "Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity" readily available (see Appendix F, "Sample Forms Notice") for evacuees who refuse to leave; (4) briefing each evacuee on the baggage limitations set

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by the Embassy, positive identification requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be transported; (5) recording the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee; (6) escorting evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC (Evacuees may drive their vehicles directly to the ECC, and search personnel should note the individual's name and intent); and (7) identifying evacuees not on the list provided by the Embassy.

c. Security Element. Security forces are used as necessary at the evacuation sites, ECC perimeter, LZs, aircraft, staging and/or parking areas, and landing sites for naval landing craft. Security forces can also provide a reaction force if a marshalling team or other unit encounters difficulty or requires assistance. To determine the size of the security force, consider the following:

- Enemy threat to evacuation operations.
- Anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in and around the evacuation objective area.
- Crowd control requirements at each site.
- Number of evacuees.
- Number of marshalling and search teams required to search for evacuees.
- Number of evacuation sites.
- Size of the ECC.
- Transportation available to cover the assigned areas.
- Personal security of the Ambassador.
- Type of resources used to evacuate personnel.

d. Logistic Element. The logistic support provided should be limited to the minimum essential support required for the evacuation. Consideration should be given to the following factors in determining requirements for logistic support of the JTF:

- Characteristics of the evacuation area.
 - Resources available: (1) existing and potential facilities for support to the JTF, such as facilities for the storage and distribution of supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, medical facilities, medical supplies, and other facilities; and (2) food, water, fuel, and consumables.
 - Climate, weather, and terrain.
 - Number of evacuees and their needs.
- Potential threats to the evacuation.
 - Adversary and/or potential adversary strength and activity.
 - Disposition and location.
- Strength and composition of the JTF.
 - Total troop strength.
 - Composition of the JTF in terms of ground, air, and naval combat forces, combat support, and combat service support units.
 - Logistic support capabilities of each component and separate unit.
- Time constraints and duration of operation.
- Logistic support required by the Embassy and evacuees.
- Availability and suitability of host-nation support (HNS) as an alternative to deploying US military logistic support.

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- Experience in conducting NEOs.
- Prearranged HNS and/or inter-Service support agreements as appropriate.
- Capabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to provide rapid evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties.

4. General Considerations

a. **Medical and Dental.** During evacuation operations, it may be difficult or impossible to insert and establish the medical support function for the JTF because of time and operational constraints. Comprehensive and detailed casualty and medical support planning should be implemented to cover immediate medical and surgical treatment points. Special units organized for this purpose may save lives and permit a more expeditious evacuation. Depending on the size and scope of the evacuation operation, there may be the potential for large numbers of both military and civilian casualties.

- The Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) is a joint agency established to regulate and monitor the flow of patients to medical treatment facilities. The TPMRC matches patients with the most appropriate medical treatment facility based on patient needs and bed availability in the area of operations.
- Primary casualty receiving and treatment ships (PCRTSs) may provide medical treatment resources offshore. The classes of ships with this capability include:
 - General Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship.
 - General Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship (with internal dock).
 - Amphibious Assault Ship.
 - Aircraft Carriers.
- AE is the movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. The Air Force is responsible for operating a common-user, fixed-wing AE system. HQ AMC is responsible for serving as the single AE proponent for the Air Force, managing and operating the intertheater and CONUS AE systems. Intratheater AE is a responsibility of the geographic combatant commander. USTRANSCOM will task HQ AMC to provide AE forces to strategic airfields in theater to evacuate casualties between theaters (intratheater) or from a theater of operations to CONUS (intertheater) reception airfields. Distribution of patients within CONUS from these strategic airfields is a HQ AMC responsibility. Intratheater common-user AE will be provided using a combination of theater-assigned AE units and/or deployment of theater-specific AE elements. Refer to Joint Pub 4-02.2, "JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations," for additional information on AE.
- Other considerations for medical staffs planning NEOs include the following:
 - Experience has shown that the common medical complaints of personnel being evacuated are nausea, dehydration, and diarrhea. Most frequently, sick evacuees will be children.
 - Particularly effective medical staffs during NEOs include general medical officers, family practitioners, pediatricians, internists, and psychiatrists and/or psychologists.
 - Well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance service is essential.

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

- A separate area close to the disembarkation point should be designated to perform medical assessments, dispense medication, and conduct patient staging.

- Medical staff should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in identification.

- Medical staffs may anticipate medicinal requests that include antibiotics, diarrhea medicines, pain relievers, silvadene, eye and ear drops, cough and cold formulas, and high blood pressure medications.

- When possible, patients should be given written instructions on how to continue care for themselves or for children under their supervision.

- Special plans and attention to the situation will be required to move and evacuate personnel hospitalized in HN medical facilities.

- AE missions may require movement of urgent or priority patients in aircraft not completely filled. Due to patients' severe conditions, the aircraft will normally not be delayed for nonmedical evacuees to be moved to the airfield in order to fill the aircraft to maximum capacity.

b. **Combat Search and Rescue.** The need for combat search and rescue (CSAR) in an uncertain or hostile NEO environment is readily apparent. **The CJTF may establish a joint search and rescue center to plan and coordinate CSAR and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions.** Joint Pub 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)," provides guidance for planning, coordinating, supporting, and executing joint search and rescue missions.

c. **Mortuary Affairs.** Mortuary affairs personnel ensure proper and dignified

treatment of human remains. **The JTF should plan for mortuary affairs for both military personnel and evacuees.** Even in a permissive NEO environment, deaths among elderly, critically ill, or newborn evacuees may be encountered. For doctrinal guidance and information pertaining to the search, recovery, evacuation, and identification of the dead or temporary burial of remains in theaters of operations, refer to Joint Pub 4-06, "JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations." The decision to transport remains is dependent on but not limited to the specifics of the situation, to include the tactical environment, weather, and capacity of receiving ships and aircraft. (Note: PCRTSs are outfitted with limited morgue facilities.) **Under no circumstances should remains be transferred before all evacuees have been safely transported.**

d. **Public Affairs.** **The CJTF will ensure accurate and timely release of information about the operation is made to the media to the maximum extent possible consistent with the security of the operation and the safety of personnel involved.** Speed of media transmission makes it probable that a worldwide audience will have immediate access to information about the conduct of the operation and its participants. To ensure that the media does not provide intelligence to persons hostile to the operation, the PAO working with embassy personnel needs to manage PA through accurate and timely releases concerning the NEO. During NEOs, the JTF PAO needs to ensure that all PA announcements have been approved by the Ambassador or the designated representative. Additional PAO responsibilities include the following:

- Advise the CJTF on all aspects of PA.
- Develop a PA plan that coordinates all public and command information functions, including publication of JTF bulletins, newsletters, video tapes, and press releases.

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- Review materials prior to public release.
- Establish procedures in accordance with guidance promulgated by higher authority.
- As required, obtain appropriate clearances for press releases.
- Distribute information pertaining to the JTF and its operations in accordance with established command security policies.
- Serve as liaison and escort for civilian and military information media representatives. In anticipation of, and prior to operations:
 - Ensure that the information plan is updated daily.
 - Determine PA personnel and equipment requirements.
 - Obtain a current list of legitimate media representatives in country to coordinate release of information during a crisis.
- Determine and disseminate CJTF guidance on the release of public information.
- Provide civilian and military media office space, to include press room or news center near the proposed command post, emergency operations center, or ECC.
- During operations:
 - Establish a press conference schedule and conduct press briefings.
- Provide rapid response to press queries.
- Disseminate a daily JTF information news bulletin.
- Disseminate news to subordinate units as appropriate.

e. **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP can greatly facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostile environments. Principally, **PSYOP efforts can facilitate the passage of pertinent information to noncombatant evacuees**, and PSYOP efforts and assets can execute programs and disseminate products that induce an attitude and/or behavior of noninterference toward the NEO among the local populace. Prudent employment of PSYOP can prevent the degeneration of a permissive or uncertain environment into a hostile environment. See Appendix C, "Psychological Operations Considerations," for PSYOP capabilities and planning considerations.

f. **Command and Control Warfare (C2W).** C2W is the integrated use of PSYOP, military deception, operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare, and physical destruction. **Planners should consider how C2W can support a NEO.** For example, denial of critical information about friendly capabilities and limitations before a NEO is essential in a hostile environment. Planners should incorporate security measures into their plans and operations. See Joint Pub 3-13.1, "Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," for a complete discussion of the planning and employment of C2W in joint operations.

Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures

EASTERN EXIT

In early January 1991, US military forces executed Operation EASTERN EXIT, a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of the US Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia. The primary forces involved in this ten-day operation were US Navy and US Marine Corps forces diverted from Operation DESERT SHIELD.

EASTERN EXIT was conducted on the eve of the war with Iraq, and thus received relatively little attention. In other circumstances, such a short-notice and high-risk operation might have garnered front page headlines around the world. The NEO evacuated 281 people from over 30 nations, including 12 heads of diplomatic missions and 39 Soviet citizens from amidst a bloody civil war.

The military operation itself might seem more like a Hollywood script than reality. Little over two days after leaving the North Arabian Sea, USS Trenton launched two CH-53Es with a 60-man combined SEAL and Marine evacuation force. The launch occurred in the middle of the night, over 450 miles from Mogadishu. En route, the two helicopters conducted two nighttime aerial refuelings. On arrival off the coast, the two CH-53Es descended to 25 feet and sped over the city, landing in the Embassy compound even as looters were at its walls.

The 60-man evacuation force quickly moved into fighting positions to protect the Embassy and the two CH-53Es soon took off with the first 61 evacuees. Despite intermittent harassing fire, the evacuation force held its fire during the 17 hours it spent on the ground. US forces, using night vision devices, conducted the final evacuation in the middle of the night with the support of ten CH-46s operating from USS Guam.

SOURCE: Siegel, Adam B., EASTERN EXIT: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991, Center for Naval Analyses, October 1991

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CHAPTER VI EVACUEE PROCESSING

“... there must be a clear-cut, long-term relationship established between operational intentions and administrative resources. Successful administrative planning is dependent on anticipation of requirements.”

**Montgomery of Alamein
Memoirs, 1958**

1. Evacuation Control Center

The ECC supports the DOS, which conducts processing, screening, and selected logistic functions associated with emergency evacuation of noncombatants. The JTF should, however, be prepared to perform functions that are DOS responsibilities, if required. **Size and composition of the ECC will be determined by the number of evacuees, evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation area.** Of primary importance is the nature of the emergency causing the evacuation; it may be a natural, political, or military one.

2. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart

Figure VI-1 contains a recommended ECC flow chart.

3. Evacuee Processing

Evacuee processing may take place in country at an air terminal, onboard ship, or at a temporary safe haven site. Regardless of location, a comprehensive plan for reception and care of evacuees should be implemented. **The JTF's primary duties include maintaining order in the evacuation site and supporting the Ambassador's efforts to care for noncombatant evacuees.**

a. **Procedures During Processing.** At an air terminal, port, or beach, the evacuee processing should be located in a building, tent, or other appropriate place to provide

shelter and safety to the evacuees. **The area should be staffed with security, interpreters, local immigration, embassy, support liaison, and medical personnel.** The following procedures should be considered:

- Use military police when available.
- Use easily recognizable markings on US personnel, vehicles, and equipment.
- Disarm evacuees prior to evacuation processing.
- Establish a policy concerning JTF responsibility to secure evacuee valuables during processing.
- Provide interpreters for bilingual information at control sites.
- Upon initial screen, use tags for visual identification.
- Establish provisions for searching women, children, and disabled and/or injured.
- Use DOS personnel of the same sex as evacuees to conduct searches.
- Have medical personnel present.
- Have a chaplain present, if available.
- Establish procedures for very important persons (VIPs), government officials, and TCNs.




Figure VI-1. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart

- Organize evacuees and ensure the following:
 - Establish a single point of contact between evacuee group and the CJTF.
 - Contact civic officials to increase control and response for the evacuation.
 - Request additional diplomatic license plates for authorized use by JTF personnel during the operation.
 - Determine the need for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel (HN or US military).
- b. **Onboard Ship.** Should the environment on land preclude the use of an in-country

Evacuee Processing

ECC, **evacuees may be processed onboard a ship.** If it is a US Navy ship, responsibility for processing evacuees may then rest with the ship's commanding officer.

c. **Minimum Processing Requirements.** Minimum processing requirements are used in those cases when there is a concern for the protection and safety of evacuees and the JTF. The procedures used will meet the following guidelines:

- Security of JTF personnel and equipment will not be compromised to expedite processing.
- Processing of persons with life threatening medical problems will be expedited.
- All evacuees will be screened for verification of identity and documentation as well as prioritization. Classification, priorities, and considerations for evacuees are explained in paragraph 5 of this chapter.
- Prior to implementation, the Ambassador and the CJTF will agree on procedures for minimum evacuee processing.

4. ECC Processing Center

The three guiding principles for any ECC are **accuracy — everyone who should be accounted for is accounted for; security — evacuees and the JTF are safeguarded from all threats; and speed — processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.** As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven or the United States. All evacuees should be screened to certify identification and to ensure that documentation is accurate and all

information provided is current. Representatives from the Embassy's consular affairs office should be in the ECC to assist in determining the eligibility of questionable evacuees. If evacuees arrive without escort, processing personnel should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation prior to allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. The processing center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation and consists of the following:

a. **Headquarters Section.** The HQ section is responsible as follows:

- Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the ECC.
- Maintains liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation.
- Advises the CJTF on the progress of the evacuation.
- Maintains communications with all elements of the evacuation force to include ships, control aircraft, remote sites, evacuation vehicles, DOS personnel, HN security forces, and the ECC.

b. **Reception and/or Search Station.** The reception station personnel collect all available information from the marshalling teams who escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling team's log book is valuable because it may reduce the processing time. The evacuees should be moved into a holding area where the following should be accomplished:

- Receive, search, segregate, and brief incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives. The initial briefing should be given by senior officials who provide sufficient

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information to ease fears about the evacuation process. It should include the following:

- Summary of the reasons for the evacuation.
- Stations through which the evacuees will process.

evacuee, with nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a point of contact (POC) in the United States for notification.

- Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing center.



Successful evacuee processing begins with the initial briefing from senior DOS representatives, which provides sufficient information to ease fears about the evacuation process.

- Need for an inspection of personnel and baggage.
- What support to expect at the temporary safe haven.
- What to expect upon arrival in the United States.
- What the repatriation center will provide.
- Amnesty opportunity for any restricted items.
- Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity where possible). Maintain a roster of each

VIPs and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides if available.

- Inspect for restricted items. Each evacuee and all baggage should be inspected at the conclusion of the briefing. Areas used for individual inspections should be screened. Hand-held metal detectors can expedite the inspections. All restricted items should be confiscated.
- Many foreign countries sell drugs over the counter that US law requires a prescription to obtain. Medical personnel on the inspection team can aid in identifying these drugs.

Evacuee Processing

- All weapons, excluding those of USG personnel, will be impounded and receipts issued to the owners. Embassy or customs officials should be consulted about the disposition of these weapons. Unless the weapons are illegal in the United States, they will be returned to the owners at the repatriation center.

- The persons, property, papers, and families of foreign ambassadors authorized to go to the United States are exempt from search under any circumstances without specific direction from the DOS.

- The persons, property, papers, and families of foreign diplomats (other than ambassadors) authorized passage to the United States are exempt from search. However, personal baggage may be searched if there is reasonable cause to

- Based on reasonable belief, the JFC may refuse to evacuate any baggage suspected of containing weapons or explosives.

- Evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals should be separated and escorted to the screening and interrogation station. The screening should be voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation. At the conclusion of the interrogation, the evacuees will be allowed to continue the processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area.

c. **Registration Station. Personnel should complete all administrative paperwork prior to leaving the country.** Foreign nationals must either be on the list of potential evacuees provided by the embassy or post, or secure approval from the US Embassy before



The Evacuation Control Center supports the Department of State in processing evacuees accurately, securely, and in a quick and efficient manner.

believe that the baggage contains restricted items. All searches should be conducted in the presence of the diplomats or their authorized agent.

- Diplomatic pouches will not be searched.

they can continue processing. The Ambassador or designated DOS representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification. If there are doubts about a person's identity, the matter should be turned over to the DOS and the person should be evacuated. Registration station personnel should

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ensure that foreign nationals are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC. Military police should be available to react to any hostile incidents. Each evacuee should do the following:

- Prove identity by using passports, dependent identification cards, seaman's papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes US citizenship.
- Provide information to the registration clerks concerning background and personal history. The State Department's EPH provides for a standard one-page Evacuee Documentation Card (OF-28) that has three carbon copies. All critical information is recorded on the form, to include personal data, health and citizenship status, privacy warning, and promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC while the copies can be used as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in-processing at the temporary safe haven.
- Receive a copy of DD Form 2585, "Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet," which should be completed before arrival at the repatriation center.

d. **Debriefing Station.** This station is optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation. It should be staffed by counterintelligence personnel. **Each evacuee should be debriefed to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the evacuees, or other USG activities in the country.** Areas of interest might include the following:

- Locations of other potential evacuees.
- Changes in the political situation.
- Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might oppose the evacuation.

• The true intent of a threatening third party — consider the following:

- Capability and likelihood of carrying out a threat.
- Can the third party be influenced?
- Can the potential threat be stopped or countered?

e. **Medical Station.** The medical station provides emergency medical treatment and immunizations required by the safe haven country. **As required, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for first aid and to identify medical conditions that may have an effect on the evacuation process.** Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should:

- Screen to determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment or evacuation.
- Perform emergency treatment as required.
- Isolate persons infected with contagious diseases.

f. **Transportation Station.** **Transportation personnel prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles.** Some considerations are as follows:

- Coordinate surface or air transportation to include movement of personnel to the evacuation area, transportation of evacuees to designated aircraft and/or landing craft, and internal evacuation site requirements.
- Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel

Evacuee Processing

aboard vehicles, aircraft, and/or landing craft.

- Maintain roster of all embarked personnel showing destination and identifying information.
- Organize evacuees into transportation groups ("chalks"), issue boarding passes for aircraft, and verify baggage tags.
- Ensure that information on the passenger manifest agrees with information provided on the evacuee register.
- Ensure sufficient transportation assets to transport evacuees and their baggage to the point of embarkation.

g. Comfort Station. The comfort station is a temporary waiting area for evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft. Comfort station personnel should make the evacuees' stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy. Some considerations are as follows:

- Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.
- Sufficient sanitation facilities.
- Senior personnel and medical personnel and Unit Ministry Teams and assistants available to counsel evacuees, especially families with young children.
- Male and female personal items.

5. Classification, Priorities, and Consideration for Evacuees

For organizational purposes all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator. These categorizations are critical to the smooth execution and success of the operation and are used when identifying, moving, and locating evacuees. The JTF staff

should keep abreast of changes in the total numbers of potential evacuees by receiving periodic updates from the Embassy's staff. These updates will be provided in the form of a total number for all evacuees and number by category.

a. Classification. The following system, shown in Figure VI-2, governs priorities of evacuations. A priority designator includes a combination of a Roman numeral and capital letter indicating major and minor priorities assigned to each individual. Aliens for whom the United States has accepted responsibility are afforded the same major and minor category consideration as US-sponsored evacuees.

b. First Priority. US citizens in the following order:

- Those with current identification such as passports, birth certificates, DOD identification cards, seaman's papers, air crew cards, and anyone designated as first priority by the Ambassador, regardless of national affiliation. The Ambassador is the final authority.

- Those with expired US passports less than 10 years old.

- Those with expired US passports over 10 years old.

c. Guidelines. Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:

- Evacuees are not enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).

- The minimum force required should be used.

- Evacuation can be an unsettling experience, especially for children and families who have become separated. As a rule, presenting a patient, courteous, and professional attitude will do much to calm the situation and all evacuees.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF EVACUEES

Major Categories

- I - American citizens
- II - Alien immediate family members of American citizens
- III - Foreign Service National and Third Country National employees of the US Government
- IV - Eligible non-Americans who are seriously ill, injured, or whose lives are in imminent peril (but who do not qualify for a higher priority)
- V - Others eligible (as directed by the Ambassador or joint force commander)

Minor Categories

- A - Pregnant women
- B - Unaccompanied children under 18
- C - Aged and infirm
- D - Adults with children
- E - Adults 18 or older

Figure VI-2. Classifications of Evacuees

- Depending on the situation, personal baggage may be limited.
- People should not be separated from their baggage.
- Baggage should be searched for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or items declared to be restricted items. Be considerate but firm; the safety of personnel is paramount.
- The CJTF should establish a policy concerning pets. Whenever possible allow pets to accompany evacuees except in situations where lives will be jeopardized or security compromised. If pets arrive for evacuation, a pet control facility will need to be established.
- Personnel should not accept gifts, tips, or bribes. All personnel must be aware of this prohibition.
- All questions about an evacuee should be referred to the DOS representative.
- Persons of higher priority may elect evacuation in a lower priority to avoid separating families. If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of a family, the entire family will be evacuated medically.
- Well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance service is essential.
- Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in identification.

Evacuee Processing

- When possible, patients should be given written instructions for medical care, especially care for children.

d. Request For Asylum or Temporary Refuge. International law and custom have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger. **It is the policy of the United States to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to TCNs solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in imminent danger the life or safety of a person, such as pursuit by a mob.** The officer in command of an aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides which measures can prudently be taken to provide temporary refuge. No information shall be released to the media concerning requests for asylum until cleared by the DOS. Any requests by

foreign governments for the return of an individual must be reported to the DOS representative. Until determination is made by the DOS, safeguard those who have requested asylum or temporary refuge. Do not release personnel against their will to a third party force. The safety of JTF personnel and security of the unit must be taken into consideration along with the following:

- Grant temporary refuge in cases where the requesting individual is in imminent danger, irrespective of whether asylum or temporary refuge is requested.
- Let DOS representatives handle asylum requests through the appropriate channels.
- Establish procedures to notify the combatant commander of actions taken in cases of requests for asylum.

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CHAPTER VII

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE AND TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS

"The work of organization is never done, and the structure has to be continually adapted to new and anticipated conditions."

Ralph J. Cordiner

1. Intermediate Staging Base

Use of an ISB during deployment provides the CJTF many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station increases and the likelihood of hostilities increase. The ISB may be located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under US control. Ideally, the

ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is required. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces, such as additional airlift for unforeseen movement requirements and/or combat forces (such as air units capable of offensive attacks and airborne infantry units) in the event that forced entry is required.

a. **Advantages.** Those items shown in Figure VII-1 can be accomplished at the ISB.

ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

- ⊗ The commander, joint task force can finalize evacuation plans
- ⊗ The joint task force (JTF) staff can gather additional intelligence information
- ⊗ The JTF can conduct rehearsals and briefings
- ⊗ Units have the opportunity to redistribute and finalize loads
- ⊗ Personnel can recuperate after a long trip from their deploying base
- ⊗ A reaction force or additional security personnel can pre-stage for contingency operations
- ⊗ It can function as the temporary safe haven for the operation

Figure VII-1. Advantages of an Intermediate Staging Base

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b. Coordination. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country. If the ISB is an established US base in a foreign country, using the ISB as a staging point for launching forces into another country can pose significant political problems. The CJTF should advise the DOS of the requirements for the ISB. The ISB should meet the following criteria:

- Be capable of handling the aircraft or ships used in the evacuation.
- Possess effective communication with JTF and combatant command headquarters, advance party, ECC, temporary safe haven, and the ISB Embassy.
- Have adequate facilities for billeting, messing, and sanitation for the evacuation force and evacuees if used as the temporary safe haven.
- Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft.
- Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical supplies; and ammunition.
- Be close to major medical facilities, if possible.
- Be located to provide maximum possible OPSEC.
- Have overflight rights.
- Have PA contingency plan for planned or “no-notice” media presence.
- Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the evacuation can transit without refueling.

- Have adequate local and area security forces to protect US personnel and equipment. This protection could be accomplished either by the host nation or by security forces from the deployed ISB Support Element.

c. Selection Criteria. Selecting an ISB for the NEO is a time-sensitive issue. Since ISBs are typically airfields or seaports, the geographic combatant commander procedures should include querying USTRANSCOM for on-hand information related to facilities and sites being considered as likely ISBs.

d. Composition. The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is required and what is already on site at the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern facility requires substantially less than one at a lesser developed location. Some considerations for the ISB force are as follows:

- Maintenance and service requirements for aircraft.
- Liaison with the Embassy and civilian agencies (police, military, customs, and others as required).
- Interpreters.
- Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, and sanitation.
- Contracts for local services and supplies.
- Local security.
- Air traffic control and movement control.
- HN medical infrastructure.
- Overflight rights.

Intermediate Staging Base/Temporary Safe Haven Operations

2. Temporary Safe Haven Site

A temporary safe haven, designated by the DOS, is a location in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an intermediate or temporary safe haven. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. **An intermediate safe haven may be a US Navy ship; however, the evacuees should be removed from the ship to land-based safe havens (in the United States or a third country) as quickly as possible.** If a temporary safe haven is required, the DOS coordinates with the government where it will be located. **Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required.** The following factors should be considered when selecting a site:

a. OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to ensure mission success and prevent undue pressure against the temporary safe haven government.

b. Capability to communicate with the ECC, JTF HQ, and local embassy.

c. Airfield or port capacity suitable for the aircraft or ships being used, both for the evacuation and later onward movement for the evacuees. Consideration should be given to the following:

- Twenty-four-hour operations for the airfield and port.
- Availability of HN controllers to control the airfield and the requirement for JTF controllers.
- Balance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of anticipated air flow.

- Total numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation.
- Condition of aircraft parking areas.
- Length, width, and condition of runways and taxiway.
- Airfield search and rescue, security, fire fighting, and logistic support.
- Airfield maintenance support.
- Capabilities of airfield facilities.
- Channel and harbor depth.
- Berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages.
- Types and capabilities of tugs.
- Availability of equipment to load and/or offload ships, if required.
- Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic considerations.
- d. Proximity to major transportation hubs.
- e. Adequate billeting, rations, and potable water for evacuees and the temporary safe haven force.
- f. Although the temporary safe haven operates under the authority of the host government, it may not have the goodwill of the local population. It may be a prime target for terrorism and riots. The CJTF should plan for such situations and protect the evacuees and the JTF personnel.

3. Organization and Functions

The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC's processing section, **operates under the control of the CJTF.** It should deploy no later than the evacuation

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force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following elements:

a. **Command Group.** The command group coordinates the overall operation and should consist of the commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned OIC, communications officer, Family Center staff, chaplain, liaison officers, and interpreters. The Family Center staff provides and coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The chaplain ministers to the spiritual needs of the safe haven force and evacuees and helps them deal with the stress and hardship created by the evacuation. The liaison officers and interpreters maintain contact with the US Embassy and the host government. The command group is responsible for the following:

- Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the temporary safe haven.
- Maintains liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies that may be involved with the operation.
- Advises the CJTF on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations.
- Establishes procedures for government officials and TCNs if not previously established by the JTF.
- Establishes provisions for searching women and children as well as disabled and injured persons.

b. **Reception Team.** This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section.

- **Briefing Section.** This section should brief the evacuees on their arrival concerning the following:

- Current political situation in the HN.
- Description and operation of the temporary safe haven.
- Further traveling options and arrangements.
- Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.
- Projected departure times for flights to the United States.

• **Public Affairs Section.** The PAO, working with the HN embassy personnel, releases accurate and timely information to the media. However, release of information on the NEO or temporary safe haven operations within each country is the responsibility of the Ambassador. The temporary safe haven PAO has the same responsibilities as the JTF PAO, which are provided in Chapter V, "Employment and Evacuation Operation Procedures." Temporary safe haven PAO responsibilities are as follows:

- Advise the temporary safe haven commander on all aspects of PA.
- Coordinate and supervise all PA and command information functions, to include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information media.
- Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA.
- Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its operations to the news media per JTF policies.
- Escort civilian and military news media representatives.

Intermediate Staging Base/Temporary Safe Haven Operations

- Ensure that the news media are restricted from evacuee billeting areas.
 - Ensure that interviews of JTF personnel and evacuees are held only with the permission of the CJTF and the individual concerned.
 - Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information to the public.
- c. **Processing Team.** This team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC, but should verify that all information obtained from the evacuees is complete and correct.
- **Administrative Section.** This section registers and accounts for all evacuees and ensures that all information required by the DOS or the JTF has been collected. The administrative section should have legal personnel advise evacuees on claims procedures and assist in relations between evacuees, safe haven personnel, and host country nationals. The following should be accomplished:
 - Receive and register incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives.
 - Maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. It should list the nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.
 - Provide escorts for groups of personnel. VIPs and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides if available.
 - Provide for safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait for onward transportation to the United States.
 - **Transportation Section.** The transportation section is responsible to assist in the onward movement of evacuees to their final destination. The USG does not provide for the movement of persons other than US employees and family members (those listed in Chapter IV, "Contingency and Predeployment Planning Considerations," subparagraph 8b). Nongovernment employees evacuated by US-funded charter, whether commercial or military, are asked to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of transportation. The following transportation functions should be considered to ensure an orderly movement:
 - Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees to the United States.
 - Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the JRCC.
 - Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard aircraft, ships, or vehicles.
 - Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel showing destination and identifying information.
 - Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, or wounded.
 - **Intelligence Section.** This section may conduct a debrief of each evacuee if it was not conducted at the JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a temporary ISB, intelligence personnel should arrange to pass

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information gained from evacuees to those forces who are returning to a threat area for follow-on operations. Information should also be reported to the joint intelligence center and Defense Intelligence Agency.

- **Medical Section.** The medical section provides support to the temporary safe haven force. Additionally, this section may need to conduct evacuee medical screening if this was not performed at the ECC. Medical services may include any or all of the following functions:

- Determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment.
- Perform emergency treatment as required or coordinate with a local hospital to perform the treatment.
- Advise the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine.
- Inspect food and water obtained from local sources.
- Evaluate the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases.

d. **Comfort Team.** This team provides logistic support for the operation. It is responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food, and local transportation. A contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to coordinate services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:

- Billeting is ideally accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or contracted from the temporary safe haven country. However, the JTF may be required to establish a tent city. In this event, the temporary safe haven force

arrives early enough to accomplish this before evacuees begin arriving. The CJTF may consider contracting locally for the labor and sanitation facilities.

- Because evacuees will normally leave the HN with little or no food supplies of their own, meals, ready to eat can be used as a temporary solution. However, the temporary safe haven OIC should be prepared to establish a food service section to provide special diets to foreign nationals or TCNs involved in the evacuation.
- If the climate of the country is substantially different from the evacuee's former residence, the team may need to provide adequate clothing.

- Due to the situation, evacuees may have not had the opportunity to pack personal, comfort, or hygiene items prior to arriving at the evacuation site. The following is a partial list of items the evacuees may need:

baby formula
trash bags
baby food and/or juice
diapers
toilet paper
feminine hygiene supplies
toothpaste and/or toothbrush
soap
shampoo
razors
washing powder
sheets
towels
blankets
candy
wash bucket

e. **Scheduling Team.** This team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees from the temporary safe haven. The scheduling team should do the following:

Intermediate Staging Base/Temporary Safe Haven Operations

- Coordinate with the transportation section for arrangements made for leaving the temporary safe haven.
 - Manifest authorized passengers aboard military or commercial charter flights.
 - Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the points of embarkation.
- f. **Security Team.** This team provides, or arranges for, adequate security at the temporary safe haven site.

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APPENDIX A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

1. NEO-Specific Issues

The rules of engagement for NEOs reflect the limited military objective to be accomplished. NEO ROE limit the use of force to that force which is necessary to successfully complete the mission and provide for the self-defense of US military personnel and defense of noncombatant evacuees. CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces," is the basic source for standing ROE, and includes a specific section addressing NEO.

a. Upon receipt of an initiating directive or warning order, the CJTF immediately reviews the ROE to evaluate their impact on evacuation operations. Potential problems should be identified, and requests for deletion or modification of ROE are forwarded via the combatant commander to the issuing authority. Choice of a concept of operations depends heavily upon the ROE granted for the NEO.

b. Commanders have an inherent obligation and responsibility to protect their forces against attack. ROE do not diminish this obligation and responsibility, but govern the use of force for mission accomplishment.

- Defensive Actions

- Conducted only as aggressively as necessary to protect US lives (and those of TCN evacuees), property, and equipment. Actions should be proportionate to the level of threat and should halt upon cessation of the aggression.

- May include pursuit only until the attacker is no longer a threat to US personnel (and TCN evacuees), property, and equipment.

- Subordinate commanders should ensure that personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated in the need for use of minimum force. All personnel must be instructed as to the importance of good order and discipline when conducting NEOs.

- Commanders at all levels should exercise caution to use only the force necessary.

- c. Ideally, ROE should allow for approval of requests for joint fire support (such as naval surface fire support and close air support). Authority for employment of riot control agents is available if approved by the combatant commander.

- d. The use of force is normally a measure of last resort. When time and conditions permit, the hostile forces should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. Employment of PSYOP assets and capabilities should be considered toward this end.

2. Use of Force Generally

Guidance on drafting ROE and on the principles of use of force in self-defense and for mission accomplishment must begin with the Joint Chiefs of Staff standing rules of engagement (SROE). The SROE will provide the baseline from which all supplemental ROE are drafted and approved. Additionally, the SROE contain an appendix specific to NEO.

3. Law of Armed Conflict Principles

It is DOD policy that Law of Armed Conflict principles govern actions to be taken by JTF personnel in defense of US personnel, selected host country personnel, and property and equipment. Some of the Law of Armed

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Conflict principles to be considered during the planning process are as follows:

a. No person will kill or wound hostile personnel who have laid down their weapons, have no means of defense, or have surrendered.

b. Shooting of small arms, crew-served weapons, or artillery into populated areas or buildings which are not defended is prohibited unless they are being used for hostile military purposes.

c. Personnel will not fire on religious, social, civic, or historic monuments or facilities; hospitals; or places where the sick or wounded are collected unless they are being used at the time for military purposes. In

this instance, "military purpose" is defined in terms of threat to the accomplishment of the JTF mission. Attack on any of the above named facilities can only be warranted if the place is being used to initiate hostile, aggressive acts that endanger the lives of evacuees or members of the JTF or could prevent accomplishment of the JTF mission.

d. Personnel will not destroy or seize any property unless such destruction or seizure is demanded by necessities of military operations. The phrase "necessities of military operations" assumes the parameters outlined in subparagraph 1d above.

e. All captured or detained personnel will be afforded humane treatment.

APPENDIX B

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

This appendix provides general information and guidance for handling legal matters that may arise during a NEO. The CJTF and subordinate commanders of the evacuation and ISB should have a legal adviser attached to their staffs to advise on military and international legal matters.

1. General

The CJTF and subordinate commanders must ensure that JTF personnel abide by the standards of international law, as well as the provisions of the operation's ROE. The CJTF should establish procedures and policies for immediately reporting and investigating violations. The CJTF must report all suspected violations in accordance with applicable DOD and Service regulations, and should notify the Embassy of a suspected violation within 24 hours of its occurrence.

a. **Role of JTF Legal Adviser.** The JTF Legal Adviser will provide guidance on legal issues involving NEO, in coordination with higher headquarters, DOS agencies, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, foreign governments, and the HN government. The key emphasis will be on assisting with interpretation of and compliance with applicable US laws and regulations; relevant international agreements, including any pertinent SOFAs; and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements impacting on NEO.

b. **Legal Imperatives.** When planning and conducting NEO, commanders must be cognizant of legal imperatives derived from the US Constitution, domestic law, international agreements, and customary international law. In view of this governing framework of laws and regulations, as well as the complexity of legal issues relating to

NEO, commanders must obtain legal guidance at all phases of NEO planning and execution, particularly during the early planning stage.

c. **Legal Input for Operational Planning.** Commanders should ensure that legal advisers at all levels are full participants in all aspects of NEO planning, operational guidance and decisions, and national policy directives. Additionally, operation plans (OPLANs), warning orders, Commander's Estimates, ROE, operation orders (OPORDs), Executive Orders, and other operational documents should be systematically reviewed by the JTF Legal Adviser to ensure compliance with international and domestic law.

2. Specific Guidance and Terminology

a. **Foreign Diplomat.** A foreign diplomat of an embassy staff authorized to go to the United States for evacuation is entitled to special treatment in accordance with international law. Ideally, the individual as well as personal effects and papers are not to be searched, detained, or seized. Family members are also entitled to the same immunity unless they are citizens of the United States. The diplomatic pouch of a diplomatic courier from a state recognized by the United States shall also be immune from any search, inspection, detention, or seizure by US personnel.

b. **Political Asylum or Temporary Refuge.** JTF commanders may not grant political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any person.

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All requests for asylum should be referred to the Embassy or senior DOS representative available.

c. **Status-of-Forces Agreement.** Any SOFA between the host nation and the United States should be reviewed to determine how it applies, if at all, to the current situation involving the NEO. If time permits, it should be modified as necessary prior to the JTF arrival. If no agreement exists, the Embassy may negotiate a temporary agreement with the HN, if time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement, customs, and other legal matters. Given the emergency nature of the NEO, however, it is likely that no special SOFA provisions will be negotiated.

d. **Status of Detainee.** The Embassy should determine the status of a detainee in advance of the JTF deployment. In the absence of this determination, it is US policy to treat a hostile detainee humanely and in accordance with international humanitarian law. Anyone actively detained by US forces in an attempt to deter or in response to hostile action will be accorded the rights of an EPW, even though they may not be an EPW within the context of the Geneva Convention. The Embassy, with the HN, will negotiate the disposition of the detainee.

e. **Claims.** The JTF Legal Adviser or designated claims officer shall develop a plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States. The plan will be coordinated with the appropriate embassy staff member.

f. International Legal Considerations

• **Law of Armed Conflict.** Traditional legal issues associated with the Law of Armed Conflict will not normally arise in the context of NEO, as NEOs typically occur during times of escalating confrontation short of armed conflict.

However, the protections afforded civilians, sick, and wounded under the Law of Armed Conflict are almost universally accepted humanitarian norms respected in many cases despite the absence of international armed conflict. NEO planning and execution should adhere as closely as possible to international humanitarian law principles as a matter of consistent practice.

• **National Sovereignty.** Commanders must ensure that the NEO does not violate the sovereignty of foreign nations other than the host nation. NEO planners and operators must be cognizant of the potential impact of operations on relations with other nations and of all relevant international agreements, including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements.

g. **Legal Assistance.** Implementing plans should provide for preventive law programs designed to avoid sudden and overwhelming demands for emergency legal assistance when evacuation becomes imminent or is implemented. To the extent practical, legal assistance and advice will be made available at safe haven points and collection processing points, in coordination with the US diplomatic mission.

h. **Military Justice.** Military justice will be administered in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

i. **Reporting Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict.** Commanders shall plan and provide for reporting, investigating, and initiating appropriate disciplinary disposition of allegations of Law of Armed Conflict violations, as follows:

Legal Considerations

- With respect to alleged violations of the Law of Armed Conflict committed by or against members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, their commands, promptly investigate, collect and evaluate evidence, and report in accordance with applicable DOD and Military Department guidance. Additionally, forward reports immediately through operational command channels.
 - With respect to alleged violations of the Law of Armed Conflict committed by or against allied military or civilian personnel, conduct appropriate preliminary investigation to determine involvement of JTF personnel and report as required through US operational channels. Once a determination is made that the JTF was not involved, further US investigation will be undertaken only at the direction of the combatant commander.
 - In all instances of reported Law of Armed Conflict violations, make immediate message notification to the appropriate combatant commander. Service component commanders should provide such notification as soon as the tactical situation permits, rather than awaiting complete investigation. Additional details may be supplied by supplemental reports.
- j. **Host-Nation Support**
- Commanders must be aware of applicable basing rights and the status of US forces within the country when planning and executing NEO. Particular care must be paid to ensuring advance procurement of necessary landing, embarkation, and transit rights required to support a given operation.
 - Additionally, the changing political and military situation must be taken into account prior to relying on previously negotiated HNS agreements. Liaison with DOS officials responsible for the particular NEO site must be accomplished in a timely manner.
- k. **Legal Review of Rules of Engagement.**
In all cases in which use of force is contemplated, legal advisers shall be consulted in the planning or preexecution phases to determine the legal basis for intervention and use of force, shall review proposed ROE, and shall assess the legal risks or potential liabilities entailed under international law.
- **Applicable Rules of Engagement.**
Commanders at every level must ensure understanding of ROE by all personnel. Requests for supplemental ROE must be handled in accordance with CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces."
- l. **International Agreements and Congressional Enactments.** Operations conducted may require consultation with, or reporting to, Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution. War Powers Resolution reports will be initiated, as required, by the US Department of State.

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APPENDIX C

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

1. Purpose

This appendix provides guidance for the planning and execution of PSYOP in support of a NEO.

2. General

PSYOP are defined as planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. The CJTF should consider the early planning for and employment of PSYOP. PSYOP resources and capabilities provide the commander with a means of influencing hostile and potentially hostile personnel (combatant and noncombatant) through employment of appropriate media and using the appropriate language(s) and symbols and/or terms of reference. Judicious use of PSYOP can help preclude escalation from a permissive or uncertain to a hostile environment.

3. PSYOP Coordination

PSYOP efforts in support of NEO can produce the following results:

a. Explain the purpose of the US action to counter disinformation, confusion, and rumor.

b. Assist in establishing control of noncombatant evacuees, the neutral local populace, and other groups in the JOA to minimize casualties and to prevent interference with friendly military operations.

c. Prevent or deter interference by hostile forces or other nations.

d. Provide continuing analysis of political and cultural factors to maximize political and psychological effects of the operation.

e. Exploit withdrawal of US forces while creating positive perceptions of US intent and goodwill.

4. PSYOP Forces, Capabilities, and Organization

All Active component and Reserve component PSYOP units are subordinate to US Special Operations Command. Other Active component organizations from the Services have unique capabilities that can be employed to support PSYOP.

a. Military and civilian personnel include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural, ethnic, and religious subtleties of the target audience. Also included are functional experts in technical fields such as broadcast journalism, radio operations, print, illustration, interrogation, layout operations, and long-range tactical communications.

b. Principal capabilities of PSYOP forces are as follows:

- Analyze potential targeted audiences to identify critical communicators and media, cultural and language nuances, and applicable themes and symbols.

- Based on that analysis, develop programs and products that advocate the supported combatant commander's mission and objectives.

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- Employ organic and nonorganic assets to develop, print, and disseminate photographic, audio, visual, and audio-visual products that support these programs.
- c. During contingency operations, the senior PSYOP HQ is normally under the operational control of the supported combatant commander.

5. Responsibilities

The combatant commander's PSYOP officer is responsible for preparing the PSYOP portion of the Operations Annex to the combatant commander's NEOPLAN and/or operation plan in concept format. Authority for approval of PSYOP programs and products should be delegated to the CJTF in the PSYOP Appendix. Additional responsibilities include the following:

- a. Advise the commander on PSYOP-related matters.
- b. Work under the staff supervision of the Operations Officer.

c. Prepare the PSYOP Annex or Appendix of the OPLAN or OPORD.

d. Provide liaison on PSYOP-related matters, as required by the commander.

e. Coordinate and monitor PSYOP during the execution phase of the NEO.

f. Coordinate PSYOP with the staff and Embassy PAOs.

6. PSYOP

If the JFC desires to employ PSYOP, that decision should be coordinated with the Ambassador and appropriate members of the embassy staff. DOS personnel should be able to provide JTF PSYOP personnel with valuable information about the target audience and any programs similar to PSYOP they may have been using in preparation for the NEO or the crisis that precipitated the NEO requirement.

APPENDIX D NEO PLANNING GUIDANCE

This appendix provides questions that may be used to provide a common framework for evacuation planning and operations. These questions may serve as focus for the detailed planning and operational dialog between diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful evacuation operation.

1. Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO? If the evacuation is permissive, are unarmed hostilities expected? If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, will pursuit forces be necessary? What is the likelihood of terrorist activities?
2. What multinational forces will be operating in the area?
 - a. Are multinational forces integrated into the JTF plan?
 - b. How are plans being deconflicted if the evacuations are separate?
3. What is the current situation in the country? In the Embassy? Near the US citizens?
4. Who is the senior US official in charge of the evacuation operation?
5. Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the evacuation site?
6. What is the chain of command for US military forces?
7. What is the relationship between the CJTF and the Ambassador?
8. Will all US mission and/or embassy officials be leaving? If not, who will remain? What action should be taken in the event an embassy official refuses evacuation?
9. Who will screen the evacuees?
 - a. Are there embassy personnel assigned to screen?
 - b. Are there any evacuees (e.g., wardens) who will be able to help with processing and screening?
 - c. What are the JTF requirements for screening?
10. Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting prior to final evacuation departure?
11. Is the Embassy's EAP available? Is it up to date?

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12. Who is the primary point of contact within the Embassy to work with the JTF on details of the operation?
13. What steps are being taken by the Embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation?
14. Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available, who have been in the host nation recently?
15. Is there any intelligence needed immediately from the evacuees?
16. Have the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and routes been verified and surveyed?
17. Have the screening and processing areas been verified?
18. What is the total number of US personnel to be evacuated?
19. What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of evacuees (e.g., TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs to be evacuated?
 - a. Number per priority category.
 - b. Identification.
20. What will be the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of those listed in the EAP?
21. What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the potential troublemakers?
22. What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?
23. What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum?
24. Will it be necessary to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees for weapons or explosives?
25. Who will be available to physically search female evacuees?
26. What proof of US citizenship is acceptable?
27. Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?
28. Will the US Embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it schedules evacuation?
29. What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Will protective clothing be required? Will food be required?

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- a. Type.
 - b. Quantity.
 - c. Location.
30. Are any animals (pets) prohibited from traveling on the designated transportation? Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at the safe haven location?
31. Will JTF search teams be sent after missing evacuees?
32. Is there any sensitive equipment or material that will need to be evacuated or destroyed? Will personnel with requisite clearances be required to assist in evacuating or destroying sensitive equipment or material?
33. Are there procedures to handle claims against US civilians?
34. If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party?
35. What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the JTF evacuation force to avoid confrontation?
36. Who are the key host country personnel and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation?
37. Will medical support be available from the Embassy or host country? Have MEDEVAC procedures been coordinated with the host country? Where are the host country health services?
- a. Location.
 - b. Availability.
 - c. Capability.
38. What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? Should they be given precedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical condition of all evacuees? Are AE assets required? If so, is there a need to pre-stage those assets nearby, and what are the medical evacuation procedures?
39. Where are the host country police forces?
- a. Location.
 - b. Availability.
 - c. Capability.

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- d. Loyalty to the host government.
 - e. Hostility to the United States.
 - f. Factional infighting present.
40. Where are the host country fire services?
- a. Location.
 - b. Availability.
 - c. Capability.
41. Where are the host country military forces?
- a. Location.
 - b. Availability.
 - c. Capability.
 - d. Loyalty to the host government.
 - e. Hostility to the United States.
 - f. Factional infighting present.
42. Will the host government be providing any security for the assembly areas of evacuation sites?
- a. Location.
 - b. Unit.
 - c. Size of security force.
43. What is the potential threat?
- a. Strength.
 - b. Composition.
 - c. Disposition.
 - d. Probable tactics.
 - e. Weapons available.

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44. Will interpreter support be available from the Embassy or the host country?
45. What communications support will be available from the Embassy and how will the communication architecture be set up to support the operations (i.e., networks, frequencies, secure equipment availability, need for relays)?
46. Can portable communications equipment be sent to the Embassy to facilitate improved and secure communication?
47. Will transportation support be available from the Embassy or the host country?
 - a. Type.
 - b. Location.
 - c. Capacity.
 - d. Condition.
 - e. Operators required.
48. Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will it be updated? Who is the lead PA director? Will media representatives be evacuated?
49. Are there areas from which the media are restricted access? Is there a media support plan?
50. What are the ROE for the JTF?
51. What is the guidance on the use of PSYOP?
52. What coordination has been made with the HN media to support the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOP plan?
53. Will the HN media provide support for the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOP plan?
54. What is the role of Civil Affairs in NEO?
55. Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors and insert special operation forces?
56. Who provides country studies for JTF with information such as LZs, concentration of US citizens, port facilities, landing beaches? How will this information be transmitted to JTF?
57. Have all requirements for strategic transportation system been directed to the USTRANSCOM command center and/or crisis action team?
58. What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel?

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- a. Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying US military assets?
 - b. Have air requirements for units and equipment been identified in the Joint Operation Planning Execution System?
 - c. Are US naval assets readily available to stage off the coast?
59. What are the appropriate command and control arrangements if the NEO is conducted as a combined operation?
 60. Who will provide climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic information?
 61. What support is available from other US sources?
 62. What support is required by other US agencies?
 63. What support is available from other participating nations?
 64. What support is required by other participating nations?
 65. Are trained EOD personnel available through the HN?
 66. Are map products of the JOA and the embassy compound available? What are the sources?
 67. Who controls and ensures familiarity with NEOPACKs and other geographic information?
 68. Which evacuees have special medical needs such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional family member, or pediatric health care problems?
 69. What are the ROE?
 70. Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support capabilities?
 71. Will the Ambassador allow an FCE to deploy?

Possible Dilemmas

Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. JTF personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following:

1. Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given situation. When is deadly force authorized?
2. Interpretation of the ROE.

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3. Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the JTF.
4. Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.
5. Terrorism.
6. Bomb Threats.
7. Snipers.
8. Nonambulatory evacuees.
9. Language problems.
10. Religious problems.
11. Potential evacuee's name not on list provided by the Embassy but appearing to be a bona fide evacuee.
12. Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains.
13. Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown identifications.
14. Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband.
15. Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to assembly areas or at the evacuation sites to request evacuation.
16. Listed evacuee refusing evacuation.
17. Evacuee attempting to give bribes to gain favor.
18. Inaccurate evacuation lists.
19. Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area.

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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS

This appendix contains sample checklists from the DOS Emergency Planning Handbook, 12 FAH-1. Checklists similar to these are normally found in an embassy EAP.

CHECKLIST FOR US MILITARY ASSISTED EVACUATION

1. Name and title of American official in charge of the evacuation:
_____.
2. American officials remaining behind: (Attach list with names, means of contact).
3. Post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (Attach list - see DOS Emergency Planning Handbook Exhibit 120 - update to show name, probable location, and means of identification and contact of officer performing each relevant function).
4. Where and at how many stations will the military be conducting screening of evacuees?_____. Who will assist the military?_____.
5. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?_____.
6. Perimeter security needs:_____; assembly areas and embarkation points:_____.
7. What security will host government or controlling authority provide?
_____.
8. Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available if required?
_____.
- 8a. Where are the NEOPACKs located and who has custody of them? _____.
9. Could unauthorized persons forcibly attempt to join the evacuation? If so, what action does the post recommend? _____.
10. What action does the post propose if someone asks for political asylum?
_____.
11. Will the post's OIC vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacuees or should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted?_____.
12. Does the post desire the military to physically search those evacuees that the post cannot vouch for?_____.

Appendix E

13. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search?
_____.
14. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the post plan, give the modified priority: _____.
15. Will food be required? _____ Total Meals: _____.
16. Is potable water available? _____ Quantity of bottled water required: _____.
17. Does the post anticipate that any Americans will refuse evacuation? _____.
18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? If pets are allowed to be transported, have requirements such as customs and quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the pets will be allowed into the safe haven? If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with them to the evacuation processing centers? _____.
19. Does the post anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for missing evacuees? If so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located? (Give radio call sign frequencies, if known.) _____.
20. Would a search operation meet armed resistance? _____.
21. Will the post need help to destroy sensitive materials or equipment? _____.
22. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees (consider all likely points):
How many sets? _____; Frequencies? _____; Additional needs? _____.
23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees? Post: _____
Military: _____.
24. Other items that may affect NEO are:
- a. Travel restrictions, curfew, roadblocks.
 - b. Local military activities.
 - c. Political or security factors affecting evacuation.
 - d. Public affairs considerations.
25. If interpreters are needed, can post provide? _____.

Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

26. Provide updated copies of the post's:
- a. EPH Section 1540 and exhibits for same.
 - b. Communications annex.
 - c. Logistics annex.
 - d. Transportation annex.
 - e. F-77 (Potential Evacuees) Report.
 - f. NEOPACKs
27. Give number of evacuees who are:
- a. Wounded, injured, or ill: litter _____.
 - b. Wounded, injured, or ill: ambulatory _____.
 - c. Pregnant _____.
28. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will be required?

29. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex:
- | | 0-7 yrs | 8-16 yrs | 17-20 yrs | 21+ yrs |
|--------|---------|----------|-----------|---------|
| male | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| female | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
30. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees? _____.
31. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees?
32. Weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation:
_____ lbs. _____ cu.ft.
33. Attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.

ASSEMBLY AREA

LOCATION: _____ DATE: _____

_____ Assembly Area _____ Primary

_____ Embarkation Point _____ Alternate

Appendix E

1. Location: _____.
 2. Grid coordinates: _____.
 3. Reference points: _____.
 4. Size: _____ Estimated capacity: _____.
 5. Shelter: _____.
 6. Cooking facilities: _____ Water: _____.
 7. Food Stocks: _____.
 - Estimated person/days on hand: _____.
 8. Latrine and shower: _____.
 9. Security: _____.
 10. Control point: _____.
 11. Telephone: _____ Radio call sign: _____.
 12. Access, choke points: _____.
 - Alternates: _____.
 13. Nearest police station: _____.
 14. Nearest medical facility: _____.
 15. Emergency power supply: _____.
 16. Distances to embarkation points: _____.
 17. If HLZ, identify: _____.
- This report prepared by: _____.

____ Sketch attached ____ Video attached ____ Photo attached

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE

LOCATION: _____ DATE: _____

1. Designator: _____

Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

- 2. Location: _____
- 3. Grid: _____
- 4. Reference point(s):

- 5. Dimensions:

- 6. Surface:

- 7. Obstacles:

- 8. Recommended air approach(es):

- 9. Recommended ground approach(es):

- 10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s):

- 11. Comments:

This report prepared by:

___ Sketch attached ___ Video attached ___ Photo attached

AIRFIELD SURVEY

LOCATION: _____ DATE: _____

- 1. Name of airfield: _____
- 2. Location (map coordinates): _____
- 3. Fuel (type and availability): _____

Appendix E

- 4. Materials Handling Equipment _____.
- 5. Elevation: _____.
- 6. Runway length: _____.
- 7. Runway width: _____.
- 8. Surface composition and estimated single wheel loading factor: _____
_____.
- 9. Available parking area: _____.
- 10. Largest aircraft accommodated: _____.
- 11. Instrument approach facilities; navigation aids: _____.
- 12. Aircraft obstacles: _____
_____.
- 13. Are runways/taxiways lighted? _____.
- 14. Communications (frequencies, call signs used): _____
_____.
- 15. Physical security: _____.
- 16. Is the airfield under civilian or military control? _____
_____.
- 17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue:
_____.
- 18. Does the airfield meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards for signs, markings, and other applicable requirements? _____
_____.
- 19. What is the availability of Federal Aviation Administration certified air traffic controllers? _____.
- 20. Key contacts: _____.
- 21. Distance from assembly area to airport:
Primary: _____ Secondary: _____.
- 22. Conditions of roads leading to airport: _____
_____.

Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists

23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports: _____

24. On-site assembly areas and capacity: _____

25. Latrine and shower facilities: _____

26. Feeding facilities and capacity: _____

27. Text or copy of description in "Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World":

This report prepared by: _____

____ Sketch attached ____ Video attached ____ Photo attached

Note: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during an evacuation.

SEAPORT SURVEY

LOCATION: _____ DATE: _____

1. Name of seaport: _____

2. Location (map coordinates): _____

3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage: _____

4. Channel depth, depending on season: _____

5. Tide, depending on season: _____

6. Pilots required or available: _____

7. Navigational aids: _____

8. Port or beach obstacles: _____

9. Wharf (description and capabilities): _____

10. Materials Handling Equipment: _____

11. Fuel (type and availability): _____

Appendix E

12. Physical security available and in use: _____

13. Distance from post to seaport: _____

14. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport: _____

15. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport: _____

16. On-site assembly areas and capacity: _____

17. Dining facilities and capacity: _____

18. Latrine and shower facilities: _____

19. Location of nearest medical facility: _____

20. Key contacts, key personnel: _____

This report prepared by: _____

____ Sketch attached ____ Video attached ____ Photo(s) attached

APPENDIX F
SAMPLE FORMS NOTICE

STAND FAST NOTICE

NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____

Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans remain in their homes. Only the most essential outside activities should be conducted and public areas should be avoided until the situation improves. Since there is always the possibility the situation will deteriorate and you will be required to move elsewhere, this office recommends that you promptly take the following precautions:

1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) of food, water, and fuel. If you have a personal automobile, be sure it is ready for immediate use; fill the gas tank and check the oil, water, tires, and battery.
2. If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, contact us immediately at telephone _____.
3. Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, marriage, divorce, and naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance policies; bank books; as well as US and local currency.
4. Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in duplicate.
5. Prepare for each family member one suitcase (66 pounds or less) to contain, as applicable, warm clothing regardless of season, eyeglasses, babies' and children's supplies, and special medications.
6. Listen to the local media and Voice of America, US Armed Forces Radio, or the British Broadcasting Company closely for announcements from the local government or this office.

Your warden is _____, who can be reached at _____.

We are monitoring the situation and will provide you with further guidance. Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy for reference.

Figure F-1. Sample Stand Fast Notice

Appendix F

LEAVE COMMERCIAL NOTICE

NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____

1. In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans whose presence in the country is not essential, depart by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If adult US citizens have compelling reasons for remaining in the area, we suggest that dependents depart with their pets while normal commercial facilities are still available.
2. American citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid passports or visas should not come to this office for travel arrangements. Rather, they should make their own arrangements directly with transportation companies or travel agents.
3. Persons departing are requested to inform this office by telephone _____, or mail of their departure plans, providing the following information: name(s), date(s) and place(s) of issuance of passports, probable date(s) and mode(s) of transportation, and names and addresses of next of kin or other point of contact in the United States or travel agents.
4. This office cannot accept any personal or real property for protection, but will accept copies of inventories of property left in the country and attempt to arrange for protection of such property through the local authorities.
5. American citizens without valid passports or who are unable to arrange for their own travel or that of their dependents because of insufficient funds or other reasons should report to this office as soon as possible. They should bring with them:
 - a. American passports or other proof of US citizenship.
 - b. For non-American spouses, children, and dependents: passports or identification cards and proof of relationship (birth or marriage certificates).
6. Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy for reference.

Figure F-2. Sample Leave Commercial Notice

Sample Forms Notice

EVACUATION NOTICE

NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____

Because of the situation in this country, the Ambassador has determined that the evacuation of all US citizens is advisable. As the operations of this office may be terminated with little or no advance warning, American citizens wishing US Government assistance should contact their wardens or this office immediately (telephone _____). The Embassy/Consulate is arranging chartered transportation to the United States or another safe haven. The issuance of tickets is not feasible and all persons being evacuated will be asked to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation. The Department of State will bill evacuees later for the costs incurred. (US Government personnel and their dependents travel on official orders and therefore their respective agencies, will be billed.) To provide proper protection and to help you leave safely, we ask you to follow these instructions:

1. Your warden is _____ and may be contacted at _____.
2. Your assigned assembly area is at _____.
 - _____ a. Please be there at _____.
 - _____ b. You will be told later when to report.
 - _____ c. Do not bring your vehicle to the assembly point.
 - _____ d. Bring enough food for each family member to have _____ meals.
 - _____ e. Cooking facilities are not available, so bring ready-to-eat food (canned items, sandwiches, etc.).
 - _____ f. Bring an unbreakable container with _____ quart(s) of water per person.
 - _____ g. Pets will be transported during this NEO and are allowed at the assembly point.

(Only checked items apply)

3. Prepare to bring with you all important personal papers (passports, inoculation cards, cash, credit cards, and checkbooks) and one suitcase (66 lbs. or less) per person containing clothing suitable for the local climate as well as for a change of climate. Remember eyeglasses, special medicines, and baby/children supplies. Do not bring firearms or liquor. Pets are allowed only if specifically authorized above.

Figure F-3. Sample Evacuation Notice

Appendix F

4. Adult family members should consider the possibility of becoming separated temporarily. Problems can be avoided by exchanging data concerning bank accounts, addresses and telephone numbers of relatives in the United States, and powers of attorney.

Figure F-3. Sample Evacuation Notice (cont'd)

Sample Forms Notice

EMBASSY/POST CLOSING NOTICE

NAME OF POST:_____ DATE:_____

The situation in this country is such that the US Government is closing its offices here effective_____.

The Embassy of_____ located at_____ will protect US interests until further notice.

We recommend that American citizens leave the country immediately. Until this office ceases operations, we will make every effort to assist US citizens still wishing to depart. Those who plan to remain should provide their names, addresses, and next of kin so this office can pass the information to the Department of State and to the_____ Embassy.

Please pass the contents of this notice to other US citizens and keep it handy for reference.

Figure F-4. Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice

Appendix F

WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. Agreement made, this _____ day of _____, 19____, between

_____ and the military forces of the United States.

2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate _____

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above named individual(s), with the understanding that the offer will not be repeated.

4. Evacuee Signature _____

Evacuee Signature _____

Evacuee Signature _____

Evacuee Signature _____

Figure F-5. Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity

APPENDIX G

REFERENCES

The development of Joint Pub 3-07.5 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities." (18 Nov 88)
2. Memorandum of Understanding Between Departments of State and Defense on the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad. (29 Sep 94)
3. DODD 2000.11, "Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge." (3 Mar 72)
4. DODD 3025.14, "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad." (5 Nov 90)
5. Department of State Emergency Planning Handbook, 12 FAH-1.
6. Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
7. Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations."
8. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
9. Joint Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War."
10. Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."
11. Joint Pub 3-13.1, "Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)."
12. Joint Pub 3-17, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations."
13. Joint Pub 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)."
14. Joint Pub 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."
15. Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."
16. Joint Pub 4-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support to Joint Operations."
17. Joint Pub 4-02.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations."

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18. Joint Pub 4-06, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations."
19. Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."
20. Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations."
21. Joint Plan for Department of Defense Noncombatant Repatriation. Headquarters, Department of the Army (16 April 1992).
22. FM 90-29, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)." (Final Draft) (1 Nov 93)
23. Commander, Surface Warfare Development Group Tactical Memorandum XZ0057-1-93/Operational Handbook (OH) 7-36, "Maritime Conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)." (30 May 93)
24. Center For Naval Analysis 37 39-0003, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs): An Analyst's How-To Guide." (4 Aug 93)
25. CJCS Instruction 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces."
26. CJCS Instruction 3150.25, "Joint After-Action Reporting System."
27. CJCS Manual 3122.02, "Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution."
28. CJCS Manual 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)."
29. CJCS Manual 3122.04, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Supplemental Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)."

**APPENDIX H
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS**

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Marine Corps. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the J-3.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//DOC//(C42)//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

Appendix H

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, "Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands."

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL
1655 Woodson Road
Attn: Joint Publications
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
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700 Robbins Avenue
Bldg 1, Customer Service
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base
Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AE	aeromedical evacuation
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	area of responsibility
C2W	command and control warfare
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJTF	commander, joint task force
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
CONUS	continental United States
COS	chief of station
CSAR	combat search and rescue
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DATT	Defense Attache
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DZ	drop zone
EAC	emergency action committee
EAP	emergency action plan
ECC	evacuation control center
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPH	Emergency Planning Handbook
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FCE	forward command element
GSO	general services officer
HA	humanitarian assistance
HLZ	helicopter landing zone
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
IMO	information management officer
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO	international organizations
ISB	intermediate staging base

Glossary

JFC	joint force commander
JOA	joint operations area
JRCC	joint reception coordination center
JTF	joint task force
LZ	landing zone
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MSD	Mobile Security Division
MSG	Marine security guard
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NEOPACK	noncombatant evacuation operation package
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NISH	noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) intelligence support handbooks
OIC	officer in charge
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PCRTS	primary casualty receiving and treatment ship
POC	point of contact
PSO	post security officer
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
RLG	regional liaison group
RMO	regional Marine officer
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO	regional security officer
SAO	security assistance officer
SATCOM	satellite communications
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SITREP	situation report
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	standing operating procedure
SROE	standing rules of engagement
TCN	third country national
TPMRC	Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center

Glossary

USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCINACOM	Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USDR	United States Defense Representative
USG	United States Government
USIS	United States Information Service
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VIP	very important person
WLG	Washington Liaison Group

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Also called AE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined force. A military force composed of elements of two or more allied nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities. 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given locality. 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, US and foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. 4. The ordered or authorized departure of

noncombatants from a specific area by Department of State, Department of Defense, or appropriate military commander. This refers to the movement from one area to another in the same or different countries. The evacuation is caused by unusual or emergency circumstances and applies equally to command or non-command sponsored family members. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

hostile environment. See operational environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human resources intelligence. The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intermediate staging base. A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation.

Glossary

Also called ISB. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

or areas. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NEOPACK. Preassembled package of selected maps, charts, and other geographic materials of various scales to support the planning and conduct of noncombatant evacuation operations in selected countries

noncombatant evacuation operations.

Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEO. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

noncombatant evacuees. 1. US citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority include: a. Civilian employees of all agencies of the US government and their dependents, except as noted in 2a below. b. Military personnel of the US Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants. c. Dependents of members of the US Armed Forces. 2. US (and non-US) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority include: a. Civilian employees of US Government agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated. b. Private US citizens and their dependents. c. Military personnel and dependents of members of the US Armed Forces outlined in 1c above, short of an ordered evacuation. d. Designated aliens, including dependents of persons listed in 1a through 1c above, as prescribed by the Department of State. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the

Glossary

level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are:

- a. permissive environment — operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.
- b. uncertain environment — operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations.
- c. hostile environment —

operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (Joint Pub 1-02)

permissive environment. See operational environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

repatriation. The procedure whereby American citizens and their families are officially processed back into the United States subsequent to an evacuation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

safe haven. 1. Designated area(s) to which noncombatants of the United States Government's responsibility, and commercial vehicles and materiel, may be evacuated during a domestic or other valid emergency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence,

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however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

uncertain environment. See operational environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)


unit type code. A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each type unit of the Armed Forces. Also called UTC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warden system. An informal method of communication used to pass information to US citizens during emergencies. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-07.5 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

