

JPRS-TAC-91-012
22 MAY 1991



JPRS Report

Arms Control

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European Conventional Arms Talks Analyzed

HK0805003391 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO
in Chinese 24 Apr 91 p 6

["News Analysis" by Wei Wei (1550 8343): "European Conventional Arms Reduction Talks Strive To Break Deadlock"]

[Text] The second round of the European conventional arms reduction [CFE] talks was resumed in Vienna on 18 April after nearly one month of recess. Currently, the United States and the Soviet Union "are engaged in extremely intense talks" in the hope of finding ways to translate the understanding reached in the first round of the talks into practice to break the deadlock in the second round.

The first meeting of the second round of the talks was held on 14 February of this year. According to the previously set agenda, issues such as the number of military personnel to be cut and the establishment of a verification system should be put on the table for discussion. However, from the very start of the talks, the representatives of Western countries accused the Soviet Union of reneging on the agreement of the first round of the talks signed during the summit meeting of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Paris last November. The Soviet Union took an uncompromising attitude and refused to yield an inch. As both sides stuck to their own positions, the debate lasted until 21 March when a recess was announced.

The West accused the Soviet Union of violating the treaty in three ways: First, the Soviet Union shifted about 78,000 heavy-duty tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces and "hid" them in the areas east of the Ural Mountains, which are outside the arms reduction limits; and the West regarded such Soviet behavior as "cheating." Second, while signing the treaty in November, the Soviet Union just agreed that there were 895 military projects needing verification by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but in summer of the same year, the Soviet Union announced the figure to be about 1,600; therefore, the West regarded this Soviet move as "holding back the facts." Third, the Soviet Union turned over three infantry divisions equipped with 3,700 tanks to its naval establishment, which is not included in the armed reduction list, and the West maintained that an additional 1,700 Soviet weapons should be on the list of destruction.

The Soviet Union refuted: The eastward shifting of weapons and the incorporation of land units into the naval establishment were carried out before the treaty. The former was aimed at upgrading the weapons of troops stationed in the areas east of the Urals, and the latter was designed to strengthen coastal defense. The Soviet Union said accusingly: Originally, to protect its own superiority, it was the U.S. opposition to cutting the Navy that the Navy was not included in the treaty reached in the first round of the European conventional arms reduction talks. If the United States firmly sticks to

this point of argument, the Soviet Union will suggest once again that the Navy be put on the limit of conventional arms reduction.

Under these circumstances, the United States and its allies began to put pressure on the Soviet Union. Germany asserted: If the Soviet Union does not change its position, it will not ratify the treaty. The United States threatened not to submit the treaty to the Senate for examination and approval. The Soviet uncompromising attitude will directly hamper the talks on strategic arms reduction. The meeting between the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union, scheduled to take place in February, had to be postponed; and public opinion suggested the main reason behind the postponement was the dispute centering on conventional arms reduction.

On the other hand, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union intends to force its opponent too hard. The West is well aware that in the first round of the talks, the Soviet Union had made major concessions. The loss will outweigh the gain, if the treaty concluded in the first round of the talks is to come to an untimely end. Moreover, without the Soviet participation, the building of a "great Europe" will become empty talk. This being the case, the West feels that if the stalemate in the talks on conventional arms reduction lasts too long, it will be of no benefit to itself.

As the Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist, the Soviet Union needs to consider more about its own security. As such, it hopes to seek the West's understanding rather than willingly go into a deadlock with the latter on this issue. Therefore, while insisting in "making some readjustments to the implementation of the agreement in view of changes in the balance of power," the Soviet Union reminded the West to note that in the days to come, it would "solve the problem of security by relying on just its own efforts" and that conflicts can be solved through consultations and on the basis acceptable to both sides.

According to American newspapers and magazines, in the last month or so, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush frequently exchanged letters, actively seeking a compromise proposition. Evidently, it is because both sides have shown the inclination to compromise that public opinion in the West maintained: The second round of the European conventional arms reduction talks is striving to break the current deadlock.

UN Delegate Advocates Regional Disarmament

OW0105214891 Beijing XINHUA in English
2141 GMT 1 May 91

[Text] United Nations, May 1 (XINHUA)—A Chinese delegate said here today that appropriate regional disarmament is conducive to the relaxation of regional tension and to regional peace, security, cooperation, and development.

Explaining the five-part document which China has submitted to the disarmament commission which is considering the regional disarmament, Hou Zhitong, Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs, said that regional disarmament activities participated by states when specific conditions permit and require will have a positive bearing on other regions as well as global efforts for peace, security and disarmament.

He pointed out that states within the region should make efforts to promote regional disarmament in the following aspects: Respecting the right of states to choose their own political, economic and social systems; respecting each other's sovereignty; seeking peaceful settlement of disputes; not seeking an armament exceeding defence requirements; and participation by all states in settlement of matters in their own region.

As to extraregional states, particularly states possessing the largest arsenals, the ambassador said that they should render active cooperation and support to regional disarmament efforts.

In the fourth part of the document, Hou told the commission, China proposed that the reality that security environment, armament levels, historical background and cultural traditions that are different from region to region should be recognized.

Moreover, he said, full consideration should be given to the following principles: Regions with serious military concentration and high armaments should take the lead in arms reductions; agreement should be reached and measures on disarmament be adopted acceptable to all states in the region; agreement on regional disarmament should not jeopardize security interests of other regions; and extraregional states should respect all regional disarmament agreements.

According to the ambassador, the fifth part of the document proposed some concrete measures and steps for regional disarmament.

In conclusion, the ambassador hoped that China's document would be helpful to the promotion of regional disarmament.

Bush Cited on Giving Up Use of Chemical Weapons

*OW1405014691 Beijing XINHUA in English
2359 GMT 13 May 91*

[Text] Washington, May 13 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush today announced the United States will give up its right to use chemical weapons and destroy the stockpile, if the international community can reach an agreement to ban such weapons.

"The United States will forswear the use of its own chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation

against chemical weapons attacks, as soon as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) enters into force," Bush said in a statement.

He also said that the United States "will commit itself to the unconditional destruction of all of its chemical weapons and chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapons facilities within 10 years" once a CWC agreement takes effect.

An administration official said those two points reflect "important changes" in the U.S. position.

The United States has previously said that it will retain the right to have 2 percent of its chemical weapons in existence essentially until all chemical weapon states join the treaty.

It has also said that it reserves the right to retaliate against chemical weapons attacks with chemical weapons of its own.

Bush said he is taking the step in a hope to accelerate the Geneva negotiations for a global ban on chemical weapons.

He expressed the hope that all major issues in the negotiations would be settled by the end of this year, and a treaty be ratified by the end of 1992.

Bush also called on other nations to join his effort to ban chemical weapons.

Last Soviet SS-20 Missile Destroyed

*OW1305011291 Beijing XINHUA in English
0034 GMT 13 May 91*

[Text] Moscow, May 12 (XINHUA)—The last Soviet medium-range missile, RSD-10 [SS-20], was destroyed on Sunday in Kapustin Yar, on the lower reach of the Volga River.

The destruction means Moscow has now liquidated all medium-range missiles covered by the United States-Soviet medium-range missile treaty.

The missile was popularly called the SS-20 in the West. The first such missile was destroyed in the same place in the summer of 1988.

Under the treaty signed in December 1987, the Soviet Union was obliged to destroy 809 medium-range missiles.

Moscow early last year completed the destruction of all its short-medium-range missiles.

Delegate Urges Bigger UN Role in Disarmament

*OW1405014991 Beijing XINHUA in English
0014 GMT 14 May 91*

[Text] United Nations, May 13 (XINHUA)—A Chinese delegate today hoped the U.N. would play a bigger role in promoting disarmament, maintaining world peace and establishing new international political order.

Speaking at the U.N. Disarmament Commission when its three-week annual session ended here today, Hou Zhitong, Chinese ambassador for disarmament in Geneva, said that the session was convened when major changes have taken place in the international situation, and some preliminary and positive results have been achieved in disarmament fields.

He believed that the tasks before the commission are still arduous. However, he added, further substantial results could be achieved if all member states make greater efforts and continue to strengthen their cooperation.

He said that China, as it did before, will spare no effort to cooperate with other countries and work toward the realization of the disarmament goals.

The Disarmament Commission, a subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly, discussed during the session regional disarmament within the context of global security; ways of sharing military information; the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security; and the role of science and technology in the context of disarmament.

JAPAN

Bush's Chemical Weapons Pledge Welcomed*OW1405111891 Tokyo KYODO in English 1056 GMT
14 May 91*

[Text] Tokyo, May 14 (KYODO)—Japan welcomes U.S. President George Bush's chemical weapons pledge and hopes it will serve to speed up talks now underway on an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday.

Spokesman Taizo Watanabe told reporters that Japan welcomes the statement on chemical weapons made by Bush on Monday as "flexible and forthcoming" and said it would provide "an important impetus" to negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a chemical weapons convention.

"This newly announced position of the U.S. Government is certainly a big step forward," Watanabe said. "We really hope that this would be followed by active cooperation by other participants in this discussion."

Bush stated that the United States will formally fore-swear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation in kind against any state, once the convention enters into force.

Bush also unconditionally committed the U.S. to the destruction of all its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention's entry into force, dropping its earlier position that it would retain a small portion until all states with a chemical weapons capability had signed the convention.

"We wish to work actively together with other parties to the negotiations to build on this U.S. initiative and to achieve the early conclusion of the negotiations," the Japanese spokesman said.

Foreign Ministry sources said the Bush move will likely ease talks in Geneva on some of the most knotty issues, such as the right of retaliation, but obstacles remain on issues relating to inspection, budget, and organization.

The Geneva talks resumed on Monday for a seven-week session after going into recess in late March. Japan is among the 39 countries participating in the conference.

NORTH KOREA

WPK's 'Anti-War, Anti-Nuke' Policy Viewed*SK0805111391 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1015 GMT 8 May 91*

["Anti-War, Anti-Nuke Peace Is Our Party's Consistent Position"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 8 (KCNA)—Anti-war, anti-nuke peace is the unshakable position of the Workers' Party of

Korea [WPK] and the fundamental principle of its foreign policy, declares NODONG SINMUN in a signed article today.

It says:

The current of the international situation more clearly proves the justness of our party's anti-war, anti-nuke peace policy.

Our party's anti-war, anti-nuke peace policy is run through with the idea of averting a nuclear war and defending peace through struggle.

In order to avert a nuclear war and preserve peace, the world people must firmly unite and vigorously wage the anti-war, anti-nuke struggle.

The peaceloving people throughout the world must not be taken in by the deceptive propaganda of the imperialists about "detente," "disarmament" and "peace" but continue to vigorously wage the anti-war, anti-nuke peace struggle with concerted efforts and resolutely check and foil the imperialists' nuclear arms buildup and nuclear war provocation moves.

Our party clearly laid down the policy and ways of averting a nuclear war through struggle.

Our party consistently maintains that the test, production and deployment of nuclear weapons must be prohibited, the existing nuclear weapons be reduced, furthermore, all the nuclear weapons be destroyed totally, nuclear-free, peace zones be established in different parts and gradually expanded throughout the world.

Our party set it as the primary task to prevent a nuclear war and preserve a durable peace on the Korean peninsula, made many peace overtures including the proposal for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and repeatedly urged the United States to show a constructive response.

When the Korean peninsula is turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone, one of the most dangerous hotbeds of nuclear war in the world will be removed and a great progress be made in preserving peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

U.S.' Solarz Proposes Korea Nuclear-Free Zone*SK1405054991 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0430 GMT 14 May 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)—Solarz, chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, proposed making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, according to a report from Washington.

He recently told this to a delegation from Japan's Democratic Socialist Party on a visit to the United States, reported KYODO.

SOUTH KOREA

U.S. 'Flexible Attitudes' on Nuclear Weapons

SK0605104591 Seoul YONHAP in English 1023 GMT
6 May 91

[Text] Seoul, May 6 (YONHAP)—The United States is considering taking flexible attitudes towards North Korea's demand for removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula in a bid to encourage it to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections, according to a local report here Monday.

"It is under a discreet consideration to relocate the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons held by the U.S. forces in Korea with a view to creating an atmosphere suitable for letting North Korea acquiesce in international nuclear inspections," the CHUNGANG ILBO quoted an anonymous source as saying.

Though the United States had so far taken a policy of no-confirmation and no-denial on the existence of nuclear weapons on Korean soil, it is widely believed the U.S. forces deployed in Korea are armed with tactical ones.

"It is the judgement of ranking Korean and American officials that the issue concerning the tactical nuclear weapons known to be held by the U.S. forces in South Korea should be touched upon in any form in order to

properly cope with the matter of North Korea's development of atomic weapons," the source was quoted as saying.

North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1985 but has yet to join the nuclear safeguards accord and there has been rising international concern that Pyongyang may soon have nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang has said it would not sign the safeguards accord as long as Washington deploys nuclear weapons in Korea.

A U.S. plan now under consideration is to replace the existing nuclear arsenal with air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) or the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) of the 7th U.S. Fleet in the Pacific, the paper said.

The plan, which was once considered before the 1980s, sprang into practicality as high-tech weapons proved their accuracy and power in the Gulf war.

Such a position has been repeatedly voiced by the U.S. side and William Taylor, vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently told a news conference here that Korea and the United States should consider removal of ground-based weapons, given the alternative of air- and sea-borne launching platforms for nuclear weapons, according to the report.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

More on Havel Speech at Prague Security Conference*AU3004132691 Prague CTK in English 1143 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague, April 25 (CTK)— For the future of European security Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel suggested today a system of collective pacts embracing three groups of states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—members of the NATO alliance, neutral states, and so-called "post-communist" states.

The issue of European security is not a regional affair, but a matter for the entire world, said Havel in an inaugural speech for a two-day conference on "The Future of European Security."

He pointed out that Europe had been the friction point of a world divided in two until just recently. "Today, when a new, multipolar world is arising on the old continent, it is essential to reflect on its future," Havel said.

The conference assembles government officials from the 35 member-states of the CSCE plus some 100 specialists and journalists concerned with European security and is co-sponsored by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

Havel described the North Atlantic alliance as "a time-tested and democratic institution," and praised it for its "Atlantic dimension," i.e. its inclusion of Canada and the United States. According to Havel, the West European Union and the European Community also have their roles to play in the formation of new European security structures. At the same time he highlighted the significance of the Soviet Union "without whose existence the future of European security cannot be imagined."

Following President Havel's speech was the conference's opening address by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner on "The New Security Equation."

Vranitzky Rejects New European Security Plans*AU2504190591 Vienna Domestic Service in German
1600 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] CSFR President Havel opened a conference on the future of European security in Prague today. There contacts between NATO and the former East Bloc states will be established and a security vacuum after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact is to be prevented.

Among the speakers in Prague was also Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky, who rejected the creation of new security structures in Europe. He proposed to work as far as possible with the already existing institutions because

the development of new structures is too time consuming and laborious. The CSCE is a firm common roof that integrates the various security aspects, Vranitzky said. He called again for increased responsibilities of the Vienna-based CSCE conflict-prevention center.

Italian Minister Addresses Security Conference*AU3004130091 Prague CTK in English 1138 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague, April 26 (CTK)— If the West fails to build pan-European integration it will mean not only the disintegration of the East, but also the disintegration of Western Europe, said Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis today.

In a speech entitled "The Changes in Central and Eastern Europe—Incentive or Setback for European Political Unification," de Michelis labelled the Nato alliance, the European Community, and the Council of Europe as the three pillars of European integration, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the roof, arching from San Francisco to Vladivostok. The address was given on the second and final day of a conference on "The Future of European Security," co-sponsored by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

De Michelis outlined the itinerary for European integration, saying the first phase would include intensifying bilateral cooperation in the East, especially new types of aid agreements between the USSR and its former allies and among the countries of the former East bloc.

He also emphasized the importance of regional cooperation in forums such as the Pentagon and among the Baltic states. This first phase would be concluded sometime in 1995 with an agreement between NATO and the Soviet Union thereby removing a significant source of potential tension and misunderstandings.

At least three Central European States—Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary—could become members of the EC in the second phase, sometime between 2005 and 2010. According to de Michelis, this would strengthen both the influence of the EC and the influence of Central European countries on EC policy and decision-making. The third phase would then consist of putting the finishing touches on the pan-European structures.

Soviet Position at Security Conference Viewed*AU0605145891 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 30 Apr 91 p 5*

[Ivan Horsky commentary: "There Is No Single Recipe; What Did the Conference on the Future of European Security Bring?"]

[Excerpts] The two-day conference on "The Future of European Security" held in Prague at the end of last week was the first forum of this caliber, at least from the

viewpoint of the participating politicians and experts, held since the signing of the Paris Charter of Europe [in November 1990]. [passage omitted]

A speech that received special attention was that of Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, who formulated in an unusually sharply worded statement Moscow's position on the present considerations concerning the future model of Europe's security arrangements. He made it unambiguously clear that Moscow has no intention of giving up its "legitimate security interests," especially regarding its former satellites in Europe. This has provoked rather strong resentment on the part of our representatives and was also reflected in the bilateral Dienstbier-Kvitsinskiy talks.

Moscow has not given up its idea that, after the elimination of the Warsaw Pact, other alliances of a military and political nature should be dissolved as well. It favors an all-European solution, although it realizes the complexity of this process. At the same time, as Kvitsinskiy said, his government does not rule out bilateral and regional approaches as "small boats" of one "large European ship" being prepared. In this connection Romanian Foreign Minister Nastase proposed the formation of some kind of council of Central and eastern

European countries that should consult on, and coordinate their role in the process of creating a security concept for Europe.

Austrian Chancellor F. Vranitzky presented in Prague a kind of compromise proposal, which, like the Czechoslovak approach, prefers a combination of all existing structures and substructures because, in view of the existing military-political parameters, this seems to represent the most feasible path toward the realization of the vision of a new Europe. [passage omitted]

Havel Meets U.S. Official at Security Conference

LD2604203391 Prague CTK in English
1852 GMT 26 Apr 91

[Text] Prague, April 26 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel received here today U.S. First Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who attended the conference on "The Future of European Security" here.

They discussed the building of a future European security system, the role of NATO and the U.S. in the process, and dealt with the problem of conversion in the Czechoslovak arms industry. The U.S. Government offered to Czechoslovakia the training of its military and civilian experts.

ARGENTINA**Signing of MTCR Agreement Considered**

*PY0605162691 Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish
5 May 91 pp 1, 4*

[Excerpt] Defense Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez has reported that "the government is studying the possibility of joining an international agreement for the mutual control of missile technology development," known as the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime].

Gonzalez explained that the MTCR imposes some "restrictions and safeguards on its members," so that "certain types of research, which could lead to the production of highly dangerous missiles that can pose risks for nations or for world peace, will not take place."

"This is the healthiest attitude that Argentina can adopt in order to show that we are not engaged in an arms race, especially as it refers to nonconventional arms like chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons," the minister said.

Gonzalez's statement is linked to the discrepancies that arose some two weeks ago, when the U.S. Government—through Ambassador Terence Todman—expressed concern over our missile project.

While one sector wanted to dismantle the project and receive compensation from the United States—considering the investment made in the project—another sector proposed keeping the elements that could be used to produce a rocket for strictly peaceful purposes.

The Condor program began in 1984 using Egyptian and Iraqi capital and German technology. It was developed during the government of Raul Alfonsin. [passage omitted]

Ministers Decide To Deactivate Condor-2 Program

*PY0505232091 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES
HERALD in English 5 May 91 p 1*

[Text] (NA)—The Argentine defence, foreign and economy ministers met yesterday to agree on a "concrete plan" to deactivate the Condor II missile programme and remove the Space Investigations Commission from under military control, placing it under direct control of the presidency.

The three ministers agreed to cancel the nuclear-capable missile programme in time for Defence Minister Erman Gonzalez' upcoming visit to the US, where he will meet with Defence Secretary Dick Cheney.

The transfer of the Space Investigations Commission to civilians hands would also mark a significant change in Argentine policy, which has traditionally seen such projects run by the military.

Defence Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez, however, yesterday said that the Condor II programme could continue if Argentina signed a multi-national pact to develop the missile for peaceful goals. "It is one of the alternatives," Erman Gonzalez said, "for mutual control of the project."

Statements on Deactivation of Condor-2 Project**Menem: Project 'Totally Deactivated'**

*PY0705003891 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
1537 GMT 6 May 91*

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 6 May (TELAM)—President Carlos Menem has assured that the project to build the Condor-2 missile has been totally deactivated. He denied the existence of any pressure by the United States and Europe to make such a decision.

The chief executive said the Condor-2 project has been "totally deactivated." He affirmed that the nuclear technology used to build it "can be used for peaceful purposes." Menem denied foreign pressure to make this decision and, although he emphasized that he is "respectful toward international relations," he asserted the concepts of "sovereignty and autonomy."

Menem made these remarks after dedicating a new bottling and distribution plant for Pepsi Company, BAESA (Buenos Aires Bottling Company, Inc.), at the intersection of Cruz Avenue and Pepiri Street, in Pompeya District. Menem rejected reports of tension within the Air Force over suspension of the project because "the Armed Forces commander in chief does not admit any type of tension." [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry Denies Deactivation

*PY0605220691 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES
HERALD in English 6 May 91 p 7*

[From the "Argentina in Brief" column]

[Text] (DYN)—The Defence Ministry said in an official statement released last night that the Argentine Government had made no definitive plans to deactivate the Condor II missile programme, as was solicited by the United States government. "Contrary to versions published today regarding the present status of the Condor II project, the Ministry of Defence has yet to decide whether or not the project will be deactivated," informed the press spokesman for that ministry which is headed by Antonio Erman Gonzalez. In a statement read over the phone to reporters, the spokesman asserted that during the meeting, which took place on Saturday [4 May] between the Argentine defence, foreign and economy ministers at the Foreign Ministry, "only hypothetical plans were discussed; no definite decisions were made."

Peaceful Uses of Condor-2 To Continue

*PY1305154291 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1334 GMT 13 May 91*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 13 May (NA) — Defense Minister Erman Gonzalez has announced that "all the installations and equipment" used for the development of the controversial Condor-2 missile will be placed under the National Commission for Space Research (CNIE) and will be used to produce a rocket capable of placing satellites in orbit.

Gonzalez defended the importance of continuing the project for peaceful purposes at a time when "a nonconventional arms project which could have provoked a regional imbalance" has been abandoned.

In remarks to AMBITO FINANCIERO while he was in London, the minister stated that now that we have deactivated the military aspect of the Condor-2 project we have the right to demand that neighboring countries follow our example. "He stressed that Argentina "continues to try to develop satellite technology" and that to achieve this "we will make available all the Condor-2 installations and equipment to the CNIE," which is an Air Force organization that will now be directly subordinated to the presidency.

"It is important to retain the useful components, especially the trained personnel," Gonzalez stressed when he implicitly refuted reports of the total destruction of the plans and the equipment used to build the missile.

Gonzalez stated that in order to develop this project "we must sign agreements with other countries, but not necessarily with the United States," adding that "the schedule for dismantling Condor-2 began in May or June 1990 and that everything that was assembled or in the

process of being assembled has been deactivated and the schedule will conclude when the CNIE is subordinated to the presidency."

CUBA

Cuba Joins Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Organization

Sends Delegation to Mexico City Conference

*FL1005125091 Bonaire Trans World Radio
in English 1130 GMT 10 May 91*

[Text] Representatives of 23 Latin American nations are meeting in Mexico City. These all have pledged to keep Latin America free of nuclear arms. For the first time, Cuba has sent a delegation to the Organization for the Proscription of Nuclear Arms in Latin America. The word proscription means the banning of.

Member countries are hoping that Cuba, Belize, Guyana, and several Caribbean nations will one day join them officially.

Membership as Permanent Observer Approved

*FL1005132991 Havana Tele Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1100 GMT 10 May 91*

[Text] Cuba joined the Organization To Ban Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean [OPANAL] on 9 May in Mexico City as a permanent observer of its work. Cuba's entry was approved by a unanimous decision of the general conference of this continental organization, which has been holding its 12th regular session since 8 May in Mexico City. Jose Fernandez de Cossio, Cuba's representative to OPANAL and ambassador to Mexico, told the meeting that our country has supported initiatives to eliminate nuclear weapons and the strictly peaceful use of atomic energy in many fora.

IRAQ

Sudan Said Ready To Hold Iraq's Chemical Arms*PM0105142191 London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 30 Apr 91 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "After Tariq 'Aziz's Talks in Khartoum, al-Bashir Agrees To Stockpile Iraq's Chemical Weapons"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, SAWT AL-KUWAYT—Reliable sources from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army have revealed that the al-Bashir government has agreed to stockpile Iraqi chemical weapons in Sudan. The sources said that Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz's visit to Sudan was to that end. 'Aziz conveyed to President 'Umar al-Bashir the wish of the Iraqi regime's leader to move his chemical weapons together with Scud missiles and other advanced weapons to Sudan in order to avoid their destruction in accordance with the international resolution.

Meanwhile, world human rights organizations yesterday revealed that conditions in Sudanese prisons, especially in Shala Prison in Darfur and Kabar Prison in Khartoum, are very bad to the extent that some prisoners are suffering from fatal diseases. [passage omitted]

Regime Said To Transfer Chemical Weapons to North*NC0605201091 (Clandestine) Voice of Rebellious
Iraq in Arabic 1935 GMT 6 May 91*

[Text] The sources of our revolutionaries have said [words indistinct] its chemical and bacterial weapons to new areas. The information available to our revolutionaries is that the regime has instructed its competent military organs to transfer these weapons to a number of governorates, particularly in the north. The regime's instructions confirm that the weapons are to be stored in certain areas there. The move coincides with the announcement [words indistinct] and its amounts.

PAKISTAN

President Urges Nuclear Disarmament, Comprehensive Test Ban*BK0305101391 Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 3 May 91 p 12*

[Text] Islamabad, May 2—President Ghulam Ishaq Khan reiterated Pakistan's stand on reversing the nuclear arms race and promoting complete disarmament. In a message read out at the first national conference of Pakistan physicians for the prevention of nuclear war, he said that "Pakistan had recently joined the

countries which have formally requested for convening of an amendment conference to convert the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water into a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. [quotation marks as published]

The President said: "Pending nuclear disarmament, we are committed to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and have consistently supported international efforts to check both the vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. We believe that regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation is the most feasible and effective means to resolve this issue in our own region. In the context of South Asian region, Pakistan has made a number of equitable proposals to India, notably the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia and a bilateral or original nuclear test ban treaty, to keep our region free of nuclear weapons."

The message said that Pakistan was encouraged by the conclusion of an agreement between Pakistan and India last year for not attacking each other's nuclear installations "as an important step towards building up of confidence and strengthening security in the region." It added that Pakistan was prepared to consider any equitable and nondiscriminatory proposal for keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons.

President Ghulam Ishaq said Pakistan was encouraged by the INF Treaty between US and USSR. "We hope that this commendable step would be followed by agreement for substantial reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers leading ultimately to the total elimination of nuclear weapons."

The President in his message said that Pakistan was a peace-loving country and had been advocating general and complete disarmament.

He congratulated the "Pakistan physicians for the prevention of nuclear war" on marking efforts to educate the people on the disastrous consequences of nuclear war.

Bhutto: Nuclear Testing Would Isolate Country*BK0705004691 Hong Kong AFP in English 1729 GMT
6 May 91*

[Text] Karachi, May 6 (AFP)—Pakistan's former prime minister Benazir Bhutto said here Monday that nuclear testing would isolate Pakistan and called for a regional approach to prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

"Although Pakistan has the knowledge, it is not appropriate to undertake detonation because it would isolate us... and increase threats to our security," Ms. Bhutto told reporters at her seaside residence here.

"Before the pressure for detonation mounts, there must be a regional solution," she said, adding that "such a

solution can not be achieved by singling out Pakistan for discriminatory treatment."

This was an apparent reference to a demand that Pakistan sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Islamabad has agreed to sign the treaty, but only if India follows suit.

The United States cut off about 600 million dollars in economic and military assistance in October on suspicions that Islamabad's nuclear programme was geared to military purposes.

Ms. Bhutto, who returned Monday from a three-week foreign tour, also called for "mutual arms reductions between Pakistan and India," adding, however, that this objective could not be achieved by expecting Pakistan to curtail its strength unilaterally.

Ms. Bhutto also expressed deep sorrow over the tragedy in Bangladesh where 126,000 people are feared to have died in last week's cyclone. She said the tragedy was a reminder of the need to channel resources away from military needs and into development.

GENERAL

Petrovskiy Outlines Disarmament 'Priorities'

91WC0100A Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 3, Mar 91 (signed to press 20 Feb 91) pp 3-8

[Article by Vladimir Petrovsky, D. Sc. (Hist.), deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR: "Priorities in a Disarming World"]

[Text] The concept of a disarming world has been introduced by new political thinking. A mere three or four years ago, it would have been taken for utopia. But now it is a political reality, for the world has entered a postconfrontational period, with the cold war over and done with.

It may be described as a transitional world expecting the next century to be free from the theories and practices of the 20th century with its division into warring camps. A transition is coming about from a power balance and reliance on force to a balance of interests and collective security structures as the basis for stability. In maintaining stability at the junction of two eras, it is important to give it new substance.

The paramount task in contemporary politics is to make irreversible the choice in favour of dialogue and cooperation, of a complete renunciation of the philosophy of "deterrence." The history of international relations has shown that Kant was right. He said that when every state began seeking superiority over others in unlimited armaments, peace became in the end—due to the expenditures entailed—a heavier burden than a short war. And then those states, wishing to get rid of that burden, provoked offensive wars. In the nuclear and space era, this policy is suicidal, as has already been proved.

To make positive changes irreversible, it is essential to guarantee their durability. What is the situation with regard to this fundamental problem of the future of our civilisation?

Recent developments invite the conclusion that the Soviet Union and the United States as a complex are not only ceasing to present a threat to peace but becoming a factor for international stability. As for the broader complex, East and West, it is gradually dissolving in a new, common security belt extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The system of peace, security and cooperation based on the UN Charter is beginning to work. Disarmament and regional settlement are becoming levers of a multidimensional approach to every aspect of security.

Stability in the disarming world of today is ensured through a set of global and regional, unilateral and bilateral measures, with a multilateral approach visibly gaining ground. Currently this approach is not just a frame for a mosaic panorama of international politics but an independent and multidimensional activity. It

implies that the world community is arriving at a new internationalism based on consensus, collective efforts to maintain security, the primacy of international law.

Growing multilateralism is ending unilateral imposition. However, it does not detract from the value of positive bilateral and unilateral efforts. On the contrary, the formation of a ramified multilateral infrastructure is making steps on all levels more beneficial for universal security.

At the global level, a multilateral approach found expression in the world community organising resistance to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The UN took a determined stand against that encroachment on the sovereign rights of one of its members. It showed that unity can make the Security Council a reliable instrument of political settlement of conflicts, the central control desk of international security.

At the regional level, we are witnessing a multilateral approach to the European process, that firstling of a new kind of international relations. It is not by coincidence that Europe rivets the attention of all continents. A unique work is on here, one aimed at building a European house combining in its architecture common legal, humanitarian, information, economic and nature conservation spaces. The continent is discarding stereotypes of disunity as it shapes a new system of human relations on the principles of non-violence, solidarity and cooperation. It has undergone truly historic changes making for both continental and global stability.

A multilateral approach is thus coming to the fore, symbolising the unity of the contemporary world. Rejecting national egoism and armed rivalry, humanity is vigorously reinforcing cooperative security structures enabling all countries to rely, not on the primacy of force, but on that of law, on the UN Charter as the principal "weapon" of peace.

With the world disarming, relations between states are gradually shedding the character of military containment. Relying more and more on a multilateral approach and concluding further disarmament agreements, the world community is moving on to a qualitatively new political and legal system of verification and transparency, replacing negative interdependence by positive international codevelopment. As the Soviet President said at the Paris meeting: "Much has begun moving in the world. The vector points to a more secure and more civilised world order based on dialogue between equal partners and a balance of interests, on combining sovereignty with the integrity of contemporary humankind, not on armed force."

To be sure, world peace has yet to become definitive. Civilisation is still not safe from "small wars," from clashes of ambitions or misconceived national priorities. Hence the urgency of internationalising cooperation and building by joint efforts a security system for all in every sphere and on every level of international cooperation.

All this poses new disarmament tasks for the 1990s and the beginning of the next century. The treasury of the new world now includes Soviet-U.S. accords on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and nuclear testing, agreements unprecedented in scope on reductions in armed forces and armaments and on further confidence-building measures in Europe. Coming up for solution are disarmament problems of the postconfrontational period.

The present concept of disarmament calls for cooperation between states, consensus on key issues of universal defence sufficiency and a guaranteed balance of interests. It is primarily from this angle that the role of the UN should be viewed.

We are convinced that now is the time to globalise disarmament and demilitarise international relations with the aid of the UN. The work done by the First (Political) Committee of the 45th Session of the General Assembly fully reflected the urgency of both bringing every country into this process and extending multilateral talks to every type of weapon.

What globalised disarmament means primarily is that all countries—big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, developed and developing—must join in reducing armouries. Taking part in arms reductions on a universal basis is an imperative today showing the connection between disarmament and development. For with real arms destruction off to a start, there are obvious new opportunities for every state or group of states to help quicken the pace of development with their own effort. There is no accepting a situation where the evolution of contiguous regions follows different directions, with disarmament and development in some regions and arming and continued economic backwardness in others.

To release resources for peaceful purposes is a noble task that brooks no delay and can only be fulfilled at the global level. It places a special responsibility on the nuclear powers, permanent members of the Security Council, for the situation in the world. These countries must lead the way in showing realism, circumspection, commitment to collective effort and, above all, a readiness to jettison old stereotypes without hesitation, a sense of the new and a broad outlook.

The Soviet Union and the United States as pioneers of disarmament have already adopted this approach. Their next task is to spur the global process.

This is why the UN should now concentrate on priority problems ripe for multilateral discussion and solution.

First among them is nuclear disarmament, whose ultimate goal, complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, is now realised throughout the world. But far from removing the problem of phased arms cuts, this has aggravated it. Obviously, some countries' reluctance to join in an early liquidation of the "nuclear club" should be correlated somehow with growing opportunities to radically reduce nuclear confrontation. It follows that

currently nuclear containment at a minimum level is the likeliest stage on the road to non-forcible methods of ensuring security. Questions about forms, time and scale can only be answered at talks preceded by in-depth research.

How should the meaning of containment change, seeing that four of the five nuclear powers have declared that they no longer consider one another enemies; that military alliances are being transformed and strategies revised, with troops returning home; and that not only a nuclear conflict but a conventional one is becoming impossible in Europe? It is clear that in the postconfrontational world the role of nuclear weapons as an instrument of politics in East-West relations will decrease substantially.

A factor operating in the same direction is the existence of numerous nuclear power stations and chemical plants: realising the disastrous effects of destroying them is likely to discourage countries from starting hostilities.

It is equally obvious, however, that the world must not allow nuclear weapons to be used in so-called small conflicts. If all nuclear powers declare that they will never support aggression in any form, nuclear arms will be isolated from the world still more dependably and will ultimately go out of existence. This is also important for the security of all non-nuclear countries.

Humanity can never rid itself of the nuclear syndrome without banning all nuclear testing. The Soviet Union is ready to stop nuclear tests immediately provided that other nuclear countries do likewise. But as long as the other side is not prepared to do so, all nuclear countries should at the least reduce the frequency and force of tests on a reciprocal basis. To help keep tests to the minimum, scientists could take a resolute stand for switching from full-scale nuclear tests to testing individual components or to a computerised modelling of tests without outright recourse to explosions of nuclear devices.

Global efforts to maintain and strengthen the regime of nuclear non-proliferation must be given absolute priority. One indication of this was last year's fourth conference on the enforcement of the non-proliferation treaty. It showed that the signatories want the treaty to stay in force. Besides, a number of non-signatories showed a tendency to review their attitude to the treaty.

The danger of nuclear terrorism must not be overlooked, especially now that the situation in some regions has been destabilised. The Soviet Union as a nuclear power realises its responsibility for non-proliferation and for the prevention of unauthorised access to nuclear arms. Its leadership has declared that it will never allow these arms to be acquired by anyone. They have always been and will remain in the hands of the country's armed forces as a single whole.

The Persian Gulf crisis has cast a stark light on the danger of rockets and chemical weapons spreading wide and of flows of conventional armaments getting out of

hand. A certain headway has already been made towards neutralising these threats: there is consensus in favour of the early signing of a convention on destroying all chemical weapons and banning their manufacture, and the international community has established a regime of control over missile technology. As for curbing trade in arms, the problem has still not reached the stage of international talks. What is needed primarily is serious work on agreeing the extent of international openness. It is to be hoped that the relevant research soon to be completed by the UN will contain weighty recommendations. From the Soviet point of view, setting up under UN auspices an arms deliveries register would be an important concrete step. It would pave the way for efforts to lend arms deliveries, above all to crisis areas, an orderly character.

Thus the Soviet Union favours a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation. It considers that the UN should concentrate on this increasingly important problem.

Generally speaking, a balance is needed between every nation's exercise of its right to defence and the prevention of arms concentration on a scale likely to provide the material prerequisite for aggression.

The connection between strengthening the non-proliferation regime and settling regional conflicts stands out more and more. It is particularly inadmissible to balance on the brink of the emergence in seats of tension of further countries possessing nuclear weapons. Another reason why the danger of proliferation persists is that various areas of the globe are saturated with non-nuclear armaments making for potential instability there. Hence to settle regional conflicts as well as to bring about a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation today is to work for a durable world order and stave off a dangerous spread of armaments.

The transition from confrontation to cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States offers further opportunities in this respect. The great powers are interested in maintaining stability and security in the world in line with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. However, these interests are no longer defended on a narrow scale, unilaterally. They are pursued through multilateral cooperation within the UN and its Security Council as well as at the regional level. I wish to stress that we see in this the beginnings of a new type of containment of a potential aggressor by increasingly using multilateral political and legal means.

The UN Charter was drawn up in the wake of a world conflagration, as a result of cooperation between the great powers. Now as in the past, it is orientated to this cooperation, for mechanisms of agreement fail in the face of hostility between nuclear giants.

Having buried the cold war, the world is coming to hope and, indeed, to feel confident that the collective security

system envisaged by the UN Charter will succeed in guaranteeing the rights of every member of the Organisation.

Now to be efficient in maintaining peace, the UN needs not only means of persuasion but means enabling it to suppress aggression. With due regard to this requirement, the Military Staff Committee will have to be made an effective vehicle of cooperation. The early experience of consultations between permanent Security Council members involving military experts warrants a measure of optimism.

The Soviet Union considers that all foreign military presence in the world must be ended and has begun acting accordingly. The return of troops to national territory is inseparable from globalising disarmament. It must go hand in hand with enabling the Organisation to make greater use of its peace-making potentialities, in particular its multinational forces detailed to fight aggression.

The Soviet Union admits of using force in situations specified by the Charter but this has to be done solely by decision of the UN, with the consent of the Security Council and in conformity with international law. Retaliation as an inevitable response to aggression should raise a solid barrier to any attempts to achieve hegemony by force of arms. It can end unilateral arbitrariness and prevent any recurrence of power politics.

Regional security structures need to be reinforced considerably. The case of Europe is evidence of their high efficiency in maintaining peace.

It should be remembered, however, that Europe is only a part of the world and that its destiny is also shaped beyond its boundaries. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe therefore calls on all countries of the world to show solidarity and join efforts in order to uphold universal values.

The fear of the European house isolating itself from the rest of the world is groundless. The security system being set up in Europe is an unquestionable component and the prototype of the global collective security system envisaged by the UN Charter. Cooperation in Europe for the common good, not at anyone's expense, is the only justifiable logic of real deeds.

To promote stability in Europe means promoting it at the planetary level as well. Moulding truly civilised relations on the continent as it advances to a common house will set an example for other regions of the world, which will proceed, needless to say, on the initiative of the countries concerned and with due regard to regional peculiarities. Lastly, Europe's ability to contribute to the solution of global problems hinges directly on progress toward ending division and organising all-round cooperation on the continent.

Thinking in global terms yet acting within local bounds is an approach applicable in any national civil society. It

also holds promise for regional neighbourliness. Regional organisations will have to play an appreciable role in renewing the world. Their potential has yet to be drawn on, and their cooperation with the UN should increase. The Arab factor, for one, can and should contribute tangibly to the curbing of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Everyone in the Arab world is concerned primarily about how soon the Gulf crisis will be resolved. At the same time, they are thinking about the future, about postcrises regional security structures. These are visualised as a series of measures intended to effect a gradual advance to reasonable defence sufficiency and the transformation of the region into a zone of growing mutual confidence free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

Looking ahead in this case as in others helps lay the groundwork for realistic solutions. It will be recalled that the initial concepts of organising postwar world security were discussed at Tehran in 1943, at the height of fighting on the war fronts. We now need at least an equal degree of historic vision.

A tie-in of the UN with regional organisations can go a long way towards strengthening security on a really multi-dimensional, complex basis. We support the idea of doing special research into the regional aspects of security, with the UN playing the main role.

A comprehensive, multidimensional approach to security predetermines a common stake in organising resistance to new threats: terrorism, drug trafficking, ecological disasters. After all, security can only be universal, since tranquillity in the big house known as the earth cannot be shared out among nations.

A world that is disarming and renewing itself needs preventive, not crisis diplomacy. The UN should make greater use of its means of forecasting likely conflicts so as to prevent them or their expansion by joint efforts. Indeed, to increase the preventive potential of a multilateral approach, it is time to discuss the idea of using through the UN a ramified system of preventing conflicts.

This calls for a new vision of the world and, in accordance with it, an up-to-date interpretation of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. Sovereignty and non-interference do not entitle any country to use an iron curtain: they entitle it to manage its affairs on its own but with due regard to the interdependence of the world, which means exercising one's independence more and more by participating in international agreements and organisations and assuming one's share of responsibility. Supervision of respect for human rights and of elections, inspection in the military sphere and humanitarian aid during ethnic conflicts are becoming accepted practices, and this means that in a disarming world, the international community must react to trouble in any country as it might to its own trouble.

Enhancing the prestige of the UN in today's world requires also a post-confrontational reading of the UN

Charter. The Charter has proved so viable precisely because it was conceived as a guide to relations of peace and cooperation between democratic countries united by a common goal. Every country should learn to read it from beginning to end, bringing its rights into line with its duties. If this is done, the Charter as an expression of the collective wisdom of civilisation will fruitfully serve its main purpose, which is to maintain international peace and security.

To lay the foundation of global cooperation with the aid of the UN, it is necessary to provide funds for improved mechanisms of multilateralism. This is the price of peace. It follows that every UN member must unfailingly honour its financial obligations under the Charter. Along with this, it is important to make judicious use of financial and manpower resources, improve coordination both in the UN itself and in its specialised agencies and put an end to duplication in their programmes.

The world's political scene has undergone a radical change. There are no more stone walls, "iron" and "bamboo" curtains that used to keep peoples apart. The world is realising it is one family capable of the most daring deeds in the name of freedom and human dignity.

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Defense Committee Head on Arms Trade Controls

*PM0105160091 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English 23 Apr 91*

[Interview with Leonid Sharin, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and National Security, by Ilya Kiselev; place and date not given: "Leonid Sharin on Arms Proliferation Control"]

[Text] Leonid Sharin, the Acting Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defence and National Security, talks to Novosti's Ilya Kiselev about the Soviet Union's stand on arms proliferation control.

[Kiselev] In the Gulf the allied forces fought under United Nations colours against Iraq which built its war-making potential with the help of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Do you think it is time all exports of arms and military technology be stopped so that no other small nation can become an international threat?

[Sharin] I think the Soviet Union, like all the other permanent members of the Security Council, bears its share of responsibility for contributing to Iraq's war-making capability which went beyond reasonable sufficiency. But frankly, my opinion is that Baghdad's aggressive and reckless actions against the neighbouring friendly Arab state came as a surprise to many, our government included.

Attempts to revise the Soviet approach to arms proliferation have been made on more than one occasion. Thus, Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to the members of the Club of Rome in 1985 and the Soviet Foreign Minister's letter to the UN Secretary General of August 1990 both contained specific proposals to this effect.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has recently taken steps to curtail arms supplies to some volatile regions, including Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and Cambodia; refused to supply Scud missiles to Iraq, and after the aggression was unleashed completely stopped arms supplies to Iraq. Naturally, the Soviet attitude to arms supplies is changing under the impact of general processes seeking to free foreign policy from an ideological slant.

[Kiselev] Nevertheless, is the USSR fully prepared to discontinue arms supplies or how far will it go in curtailing such supplies?

[Sharin] I think the issue of reduced arms supplies requires a balanced approach based on reciprocity, since unilateral steps will hardly have a positive effect, whoever takes them. If the other arms producers do not reciprocate, or if steps are not taken to settle regional conflicts, the void of the arms market will be immediately filled by other supplies, either traditional exporters or some third world countries which have embarked on the course of large-scale arms production under license. Unless conflicts are settled politically, mutual suspicion will remain to create a demand for new armaments.

Therefore, the real question is whether the world community is prepared to effectively control and regulate arms sales, rather than whether the Soviet Union or any other country is prepared to discontinue arms supplies.

[Kiselev] What can facilitate a breakthrough towards a reduced arms trade?

[Sharin] Only a phased approach and concerted efforts by all states. You would know that the process has already got under way. A special UN group is preparing a study on ways to make international arms supplies more transparent. This is only a first step, but unless there is glasnost and openness in the arms trade, this important international problem can hardly be addressed.

[Kiselev] How large are Soviet arms sales?

[Sharin] They totalled 56 billion roubles in 1985-1989.

[Kiselev] On the initiative of the US an agreement to control export of equipment and technology for nuclear-tipped missiles was concluded in 1987. The parties to the agreement are Canada, France, Germany, the US, Britain, Italy, Japan and recently Spain. The Soviet Union is not a party to the treaty although it is a major exporter of such missiles. Is it now the right time for the Soviet parliament to consider acceding to the agreement?

[Sharin] In 1987 seven Western nations did not conclude an agreement on the control of export of technologies for nuclear-tipped missiles. What they did conclude was an agreement on control of technologies and missiles of certain parameters. In particular, where operational missiles are concerned, the agreement covered missiles capable of delivering a payload of more than 500 kg to a distance of over 300 km. The type of warhead was of no importance, though, of course, the restrictions were primarily aimed against missiles capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads.

It follows from your question that the USSR is a major exporter of such missiles. But as far as I know, the only country the USSR supplied such missiles to was Afghanistan.

As for the Soviet Union's joining the agreement you mentioned, we are prepared to accede to this regime, but on equal terms. We described our stand in the Soviet-American statement on non-proliferation signed last July. Our proposal for participation in the regime on equal terms has not been considered yet by the signatories.

I have a feeling that they want us to abide by the treaty but would not accept our participation on equal terms with the others. The discriminatory CoCom restrictions with respect to our country are still in force. So, now the ball is in the Western court.

[Kiselev] What about nuclear arms? Some experts suggest the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty does not work effectively.

[Sharin] I cannot agree with that. By the number of signatory states—they are 141 now—the 1968 treaty is the most universal and authoritative arms-limitation agreement. True, the fact that China, France, Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and some other states have not acceded to the treaty gives us cause for concern. At the same time, thanks to the consistent efforts of many participants, including the USSR, these countries are now more likely than ever to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime in one form or another.

In 1995 a conference will be convened to decide on the future of the treaty. The further development of the world military-political situation will largely depend on the decision to be taken. If this important, though not quite ideal, instrument of maintaining stability in the world is not preserved, the threat to international security and the risk of conflicts will grow manifold.

At the same time, we should not ignore the fact that many states, including parties to the treaty, criticise nuclear powers for failure to meet their commitments to stop the nuclear arms race and promote nuclear disarmament. Naturally, the future of the non-proliferation treaty will largely depend on the progress at the Soviet-American talks on this set of problems, which includes among other things limitation and cessation of nuclear tests during the time left before 1995.

[Kiselev] Can any other specific steps be taken?

[Sharin] Fully aware of the threat new nuclear states could pose to our planet and our country, the Soviet Union seeks to make the 1968 treaty a treaty of unlimited duration. The Soviet government continues to actively cooperate with the US and Britain, the depositors of the treaty like the USSR, as well as with many other countries who are keenly interested in preserving and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

[Kiselev] Premier Mulroney of Canada proposed that a world summit be convened under the UN auspices to limit trade in military hardware, and, first and foremost, to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological armaments, as well as of ballistic missiles. What is the Soviet reaction to this proposal?

[Sharin] As far as I know, the Soviet leaders positively responded to Mulroney's proposal. I think the problem should be viewed in a broad international context, involving both suppliers and receivers of arms. Here, the UN has an important role to play, the more so since discussions on the issue of the world arms trade have already started at this organisation.

[Kiselev] What kind of agreements and on what terms could the USSR accept in principle?

[Sharin] It is too early to speak of a potential agreement. We should first limit arms supplies on the basis of reciprocity, and in the context of political solutions to regional conflicts.

UN Discusses Package of Disarmament Documents

*LD0805155291 Moscow TASS in English 1125 GMT
8 May 91*

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] New York, May 8 (TASS)—A large package of working documents on various aspects of disarmament are being discussed in closed-door consultations by the current session of the UNO Commission on Disarmament.

The working group on a regional approach to disarmament in the context of universal security is holding heated debates, with delegations from six countries having submitted their ideas and proposals.

The delegates want to try a new approach, in view of the recent tragic events in the Gulf. Austrian diplomats stressed responsibility, shared by all countries, to promote a stable peace and security in the region. They noted the possibility of reaching accords on a peace settlement and proposed that the verification of any information, supplied within the framework of regional information exchange forms, be guaranteed.

The Pakistani package of ideas includes regional agreements prohibiting nuclear tests and establishing nuclear-free zones, joint statements by regional states not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons and agreements promising non-aggression against each other's nuclear structures.

Pakistan also proposed that limitations or ultimate levels be introduced on deploying conventional armed forces, direct communication lines between heads of state be set up and regular meetings between military leaders in the region be regularly held.

The package of regional measures should include limiting all kinds of armaments and disarmament, stresses the working document tabled by the Soviet Union. The regional approach seeks to achieve the lowest possible level of armaments without encroaching on anyone's security. Participants in the process should undertake multilateral political, military, economic and other obligations.

The Soviet delegation proposed discussing an approximate of a structure for regional security. Such a structure could limit military potentials to certain levels, renounce the development, production, acquisition and deployment of all types of weapons of mass destruction, restrict deliveries to other regions and the acquisition of conventional armaments, elaborate a system of confidence building measures and establish regional centres to lessen the danger of war and to prevent conflicts.

Limiting armaments and disarming at the regional level should be accompanied by control measures. The United Nations should provide this control. Permanent Security Council members could serve as guarantors of regional agreements, the document says.

UN Commission Endorses Disarmament Proposals

*LD1405131991 Moscow TASS in English 0847 GMT
14 May 91*

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] New York, United Nations, May 14 (TASS)—A series of recommendations for nuclear disarmament, a regional approach to disarmament, objective information on military affairs, and the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament has been endorsed by a session of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, which ended here on Monday. The recommendations were in a report adopted at the final meeting of the session.

Debates and consultations lasted over three weeks and demonstrated the importance of results in efforts to limit arms and disarm, specifically, the INF treaty and nascent agreement on strategic offensive arms. However, many delegates believe that these steps should be supplemented by efforts towards multilateral disarmament.

Recommendations endorsed by the commission include further developing the exchange of information on military matters, involving U.N. regional centres in problems of peace and disarmament and drawing up a U.N. list on conventional arms supplies.

Emphasis was placed on continuing work on confidence-building measures, ensuring the security of non-nuclear states, banning the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, and setting up zones of peace and zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The role of science and technology in international security was discussed in detail for the first time. Participants agreed that it is important to channel scientific and technological progress constructively and make it serve peace, disarmament and development.

START TALKS

Arms Experts Comment on Hopes for START Conclusion

*LD0205191191 Moscow World Service in English
1510 GMT 2 May 91*

[Excerpts] Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments continue in Geneva. Here is the Radio Moscow military expert Colonel Vadim Solovyev, with the details:

[Solovyev, in Russian fading into English translation] The American side has attempted to (?revive) the important general understandings on the reduction of individual types of strategic armaments, including those confirmed by the heads of the foreign policy agencies of the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington on 12 December last year. [passage omitted]

Then there was a long interval in the Geneva talks. A few days ago, work on the text of the treaty was resumed, said Col. Solovyev.

And now here's the opinion of the Soviet representative Lieutenant-General Petr Ladygin:

[Ladygin, in Russian fading into English translation] The Soviet side had used this working intermission to prepare for active work at the talks with American partners. We hope that the United States also used the technical intermission for finding final solutions to the unresolved, mostly technical questions.

I am a participant in the talks myself, with ample experience in solving similar questions at an international level, and I can definitely say that if the sides demonstrate willingness, the strategic arms limitation treaty could be completed within a limited period of time. That was clear at the beginning of the year, but if the United States is reluctant to complete this work in the near future, we are ready to work with Americans as much as they wish. We realize that an agreement on

considerable cuts in strategic offensive weapons is necessary for the international community as a whole, not just the Soviet Union or the United States.

START Treaty Said Near Ready for Signing

*LD1305145291 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 13 May 91*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The Soviet Union and the United States have scrapped all their medium- and shorter-range missiles. These were capable of carrying a nuclear charge from 500 to 5,500 km. The United States got rid of its last missile of this kind on 1 May. The Soviet Union did the same on Sunday [12 May] at Kapustin Yar, the base where the first Soviet ballistic missile had been launched. This completes action on the key provision of a treaty—the INF—which Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed in December 1987. For the next 10 years the two nations will be carrying out inspections to make sure that neither one nor the other should re-adopt missiles of this kind. Now what is the next step to bring about nuclear disarmament? We put this question to Yuriy Solton, and this is what he writes:

A treaty to slash strategic arms should come next. If the Soviet Union, the United States, and all other countries want to survive, they badly need such a treaty. Strategic missiles are capable of delivering powerful nuclear charges to almost any place in the world. Delays in preparing the 500-page treaty, especially artificial ones, arouse concern. The present delay I'm sure is artificial. There are political reasons behind it.

Although cuts in strategic weapons draw objections from some people in this country, too, it's the United States (?who) have virtually conditioned the completion of the START treaty for strategic offensive arms on ironing out differences that crop into the interpretation of an agreement already signed—it's the treaty for conventional armed forces in Europe. The United States believes re-subordinating three Soviet motorized infantry divisions with their hardware to coast guard forces clashes with the treaty and damages the trust that disarmament needs so badly.

I'm not inclined to justify either side, writes Yuriy Solton. All I want to say is this: According to both Soviet and American authorities, the dispute can be easily settled. Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush discussed the issue over the telephone on Saturday. Moscow is sending Chief of General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev to Washington. The two presidents hope the talks in the American capital will help adopt a decision that both sides could accept. The other START issues will cause no problems.

I believe that despite the present delay, the treaty will be ready for signing at the Soviet-U.S. summit to be held

one of these coming months. What supports my optimism are the latest personal contacts between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush. The two leaders exchanged messages and discussed over the telephone Soviet-American relations and differences with the sincerity and trust so characteristic of both.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Space Expert on Apr SDI Tests Aboard Discovery

PM0105122191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Apr 91 Union Edition p 8

[Interview with Colonel A. Radionov, leading specialist in USSR Defense Ministry Space Units, by V. Litovkin under "Details for IZVESTIYA" rubric; place and date not given: "What Discovery Is Carrying"]

[Text] The American reusable spacecraft Discovery was launched from Cape Canaveral at 1433 Moscow time 28 April. In the United States the flight program statement was brief—"carrying out scientific research work."

What in fact is Discovery carrying in its payload bay? Colonel A. Radionov, a leading specialist in the USSR Defense Ministry Space Units, tells us.

"The purpose of the flight is to carry out complex experiments and research into establishing satellite reconnaissance of space and orbital means of high-accuracy ballistic missile interception in space," Alexandr Ivanovich [Radionov] says. "The American astronauts—there are seven of them, working in two shifts, day and night—have to launch a number of spacecraft into orbit, some of which will then be returned to earth. These will carry out tasks of a reconnaissance nature and test methods of identifying warheads."

[Litovkin] What research apparatus is installed on board Discovery?

[Radionov] There are five systems. Their total payload is four and a half tonnes. The principal system is the "Cirris" [Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation] infrared telescope, a kind of space night vision instrument. It has been developed specially for shuttle-type spacecraft and was first taken into space in 1982, where it was designed to record high-definition spectral characteristics of the earth's limb and the flame plumes of ballistic missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere. That is to say a telescope capable of revealing warhead-carrying reentry vehicles against the luminous background of the planet, and consequently of helping to destroy them.

On board there is also a radiometer, a space radiolocator, and an ultraviolet telescope which operates in conjunction with the radiometer and "Cirris."

One interesting detail. The same instrument system is also located on the deployable unit. With the aid of the remote manipulator the unit will be injected into open

space, and when the craft has made the appropriate maneuvers the unit will be located 10 km behind and 1,525 meters below it. This enables both the general configuration and the spectral characteristics of the plumes of the ship's operating engines to be observed, which is fundamentally important in setting up high-accuracy methods of hitting ballistic missiles.

Three small satellites will be launched into space in addition to this unit. Their payload is in the region of 85 kg, and their distance from the craft will be around 150 km. On a command from earth they are to eject various types of missile fuel components into space. In this way the possibility of camouflaging missile warheads and finding them in a gaseous cloud will be tested.

[Litovkin] So you mean they are testing components of the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]?

[Radionov] It's not me saying this; it's what the Americans themselves are claiming.

[Litovkin] What other instruments will be launched into space?

[Radionov] There are two other satellites aboard Discovery. One of these is a small Lightsat weighing 60-70 kg. The U.S. military leadership plans to use spacecraft of this type as communications, reconnaissance, navigation and meteorological data provision tools for commanders in the tactical chain—tank, platoon, and company commanders...

The second spacecraft, weighing 1,926 kg, comprises five containers carrying a secret payload designed to test the advanced components, assemblies, and hardware of future military items in space.

[Litovkin] Is our Buran also capable of carrying out these tasks?

[Radionov] It's hard to answer this question. Nobody has ever required it to perform tasks of this sort. Its test flight planned for the end of 1991 or the start of 1992 envisages docking with the Mir orbital station, transmitting the results of on-board experiments from orbit, and testing the cosmonauts' rescue procedures.

As you can see, the tasks are exclusively economic and scientific in character. And they have no relation whatsoever with the military establishment.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Soviets Observe Destruction of Last U.S. GLCM's

Missiles Destroyed 1 May

LD0205055391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2246 GMT 1 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Korolev]

[Excerpts] Washington, 2 May (TASS)—The last consignment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles [GLCM] subject to elimination in accordance with the treaty between the USSR and the United States on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was destroyed on Wednesday at the Davis-Monthan Air Base. [passage omitted]

Under the terms of the agreement, this was observed by a group of Soviet military inspectors that arrived in the United States. Speaking before the start of the official ceremony, the head of the Soviet experts, Lt. Gen. V.N. Medvedev stressed that from now on "1 May will also be known to the whole world as the day of the elimination of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, which took place in Arizona." [passage omitted]

Group Leader Comments

*LD0105142991 Moscow International Service
in Hungarian 2000 GMT 30 Apr 91*

[Text] In accordance with the Soviet-U.S. missile treaty, the last group of ground-launched cruise missiles will be destroyed in the United States on 1 May, while the last Pershings will be destroyed on 6 May. On 12 May the Soviet Union will destroy its last RSD-10 [SS-20] missile—it is of the same class. This will be done at the missile-testing centre in Kazakhstan.

Lieutenant General Vladimir Medvedev, commander of the center that deals with the reduction of the nuclear threat, has given a statement about the significance of this event.

It is this event that completes the three-year period of elimination; that is, I would say this is the principal phase of the validity of the missile agreement, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Medvedev told our correspondent. During this period we have destroyed an extraordinarily large number of missiles; the Soviet Union has destroyed 1,846 while the United States has destroyed 846. We may say that we have certainly fulfilled the aim of the treaty—namely, the destruction of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

From a military standpoint, the mission of the missiles was their employment in the European theater. It was precisely for this reason that their destruction was important, primarily in view of European (?detente). Through this we have contributed in a significant degree to the progress of mankind on the road to nuclear disarmament.

The event is also important because this is the first practical step in the sphere of (?advancement), and we have completed this in its entirety. We expect that it will open the road toward further significant measures in the process of nuclear disarmament.

Recently, at the arms reduction negotiations, including those in Europe, a certain crisis of confidence has developed. Would it not be possible to overcome that by using the experience gained in the implementation of the

Soviet-U.S. missile treaty? The three-year duration of the treaty, Lt. Gen. Medvedev says, has passed extraordinarily smoothly from the point of view of confidence in the two sides. This, naturally, does not mean that no questions were raised between the two sides against each other. There were such questions on both the technical and the organizational level, and there were even problems whose tone was political. We have, however, succeeded quite quickly in resolving the overwhelming majority of these problems.

The treaty has provided the means for direct contacts between military personnel who deal with the operation of military technology. This contact was extraordinarily useful because contact between individuals made possible an assessment of the ideas of those whom we had described in the past as our enemies.

Gen Medvedev on Implementation of INF Treaty

*AU0605110991 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 3 May 91 p 5*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vladimir Medvedev, head of the Soviet National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, by NOVOSTI correspondent Valeriy Pogrebenkov for NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, "on the occasion of the destruction of the last U.S. cruise missile in Arizona on 1 May in the presence of a Soviet expert group headed by Medvedev:" "The Last Missiles Are Scrapped"]

[Text] [Pogrebenkov] On 1 June three years will have passed since the INF Treaty came into force. What has happened during this period?

[Medvedev] Indeed, the first three-year state of a so-far-unprecedented treaty is coming to an end. Unprecedented because for the first time in history both superpowers have committed themselves to the destruction of two classes of missiles, of land-based intermediate-range missiles with a range of 1,000 to 5,500 km and of short-range missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km. For the Soviet Union this category contains six types of missiles and 1,846 units, for the United States four types with 846 units.

After the elimination of its last land-based cruise missiles, the United States, according to a Pentagon report, will destroy the last "Pershing-2" in Longhorne, Texas, on 6 May. The Soviet side will destroy its last RSD-10, which is known as SS-20 in the West, in the area of Kapustin Yar on 12 May.

[Pogrebenkov] Could the USSR have fulfilled its obligations under the treaty ahead of time?

[Medvedev] The process of liquidation was strictly synchronized by both sides to reach the goal at the same time. Many factors had to be taken into consideration: For instance, we had more missiles and, therefore, had to be quicker with their destruction. Nevertheless, both sides will conclude the destruction of the missiles two

weeks before the end of the three-year period. This lead will be used to clear up the question of liquidating the warheads of the "Pershing-1a," which belong to the Bundeswehr, the nuclear warheads of which are, however, in the hands of the Americans.

[Pogrebenkov] Have there been many difficulties in fulfilling this treaty?

[Medvedev] Of course, there were problems, technical problems and such with a political touch, but this was not unexpected in this completely new task.

[Pogrebenkov] Does the destruction of the last missiles mean that this document is now part of history?

[Medvedev] Not at all. The treaty is not limited to any period; according to the protocol on inspections, each side has the right to on-site inspections for 13 years after the coming into force of the treaty—until the year 2001.

[Pogrebenkov] Why 13 years?

[Medvedev] Probably, 10 or five years would also have been enough. Perhaps the first disarmament treaty needed a special stability reserve of mutual trust.

[Pogrebenkov] Was the elimination of the missiles very expensive?

[Medvedev] We all have to get used to the idea that disarmament is not cheap. For the time being, one can say that the costs for the elimination of the missiles and the inspections are estimated at some dozens of millions of rubles—certainly less than is spent for the lethal arms race every year.

[Pogrebenkov] What ecological consequences will the destruction of the missiles have? After all, they were not only disassembled, but also detonated?

[Medvedev] Before we started to fulfill the treaty, we made an expert report. Ecological supervisors were constantly in the area of destruction and took air samples before and after the detonations. We strictly adhered to the ecological requirements.

[Pogrebenkov] What is the significance of the INF Treaty for future disarmament agreements, in your view?

[Medvedev] First of all, the treaty shows that the two superpowers are able to seriously implement agreements. Here a breach, so to speak, was made for the following treaty on the reduction of the strategic offensive weapons. Second, valuable experiences were gathered for inspections.

Political, Military Significance of INF Treaty Stressed

*LD1205105191 Moscow TASS in English 1032 GMT
12 May 91*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, May 12 (TASS)—The scrapping of Soviet missiles, envisaged by the Soviet-American treaty on middle and shorter range missiles, will be completed at the Kapustin Yar firing range today. The destruction of American missiles, in keeping with this treaty, was completed in the United States a few days earlier. Today it is apparently time to glance back at the road traversed by the two countries and to assess the importance of this treaty and its results.

I believe very few people now doubt the treaty's political and military significance. Its political importance lies in the fact that it has marked a turning point in Soviet-American relations or, in a broader sense, in the development of international policy in general. It has actually laid the beginning for the process that finally put an end to the "cold war" epoch. There is one more very important point. We have learned a new approach to the problem of security, according to which political means should always prevail over military ways.

From the military point of view, the middle and shorter range missiles treaty contributed to the stabilisation of the military- strategic situation. It was the first step towards ending the steadfast military build-up. After all, it envisaged the destruction of highly accurate missiles, most of which take very little time to hit the target, but are rather vulnerable on their launching pads. Systems with such performance characteristics are particularly fit for the first strike. It is not without reason that NATO strategy envisaged the use of middle-range U.S. missiles for dealing the first nuclear blow. They served as a link between battlefield nuclear weapons and the strategic nuclear strike force, as rungs in the nuclear war "escalation ladder".

Hence, two rungs have now been knocked out of this "escalation ladder" and the very concept of controlled west-east war escalation has been put in question. I believe the time has come to start talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

It goes without saying that the agreement on middle and shorter range missiles was of fundamental importance for the entire development of the disarmament process. It ought to be admitted that the parties to these negotiations, which continued for six years, were confronted by very difficult problems. The fact that the talks were resultative shows that it is possible to find mutually acceptable compromises in the most difficult cases given the goodwill and true desire to achieve the set goal.

I believe it is very important that the following precedent has been created for the first time by these talks: Renunciation of the "classical" equal armaments reduction scheme by both sides. A new approach has emerged. Now the side that has more armaments will have to cut them by a larger margin. This approach has allowed both sides to fully scrap two important classes of weapons. Moreover, and this is also unusual in the practice of disarmament, they have scrapped mostly new and fully combat efficient systems, not obsolete armaments as it

was frequently the case in the past. An important breakthrough was also made in controlling the treaty's observance: on-spot inspections were widely used for the first time. This makes both sides confident in the fulfillment of all the treaty provisions.

Gen Medvedev Notes Final Missile Destruction

*PM1405150991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 May 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Medvedev, chief of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, by correspondent V. Litovkin; place and date not given: "By Destroying Missiles We Strengthen Trust"]

[Text] On 12 May the last Soviet RSD-10 [SS-20] intermediate-range missile will be destroyed at the Kapustin Yar range; a few days earlier the United States destroyed its last ground-launched cruise missile 1 May and its last Pershing-2 6 May. Thus the final point of the treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington 8 December 1987 on eliminating their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is being fulfilled.

What did these missiles represent, how did the elimination process go, and how was it monitored? Lieutenant General V. Medvedev, chief of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, now talks to our correspondent about that:

[Medvedev] The treaty signed by M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in December 1987 envisaged the elimination of all the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in our countries' possession, in other words, those missiles with an operational range of 500-1,000 km and also 1,000-5,500 km. There are six types of Soviet missiles and three types of U.S. missiles. Our missiles included the RSD-10 [SS-20], R-12 [SS-4], and R-14 [SS-5] intermediate-range missiles and the ground-launched RK-55 cruise missile, which we tested but had not deployed by the time that the treaty was signed. It was included in the treaty as a special category.

Our shorter-range missiles—the OTR-22 [SS-12] and OTR-23 [SS-23]—have an operating range of 500-1,000 km, as I have already said. But there is a special feature to the OTR-23. Its range is less than 500 km, but nevertheless it is included in the treaty. We agreed to this political step to ensure the signing and ratification of the accords that were reached.

The U.S. side has eliminated the Pershing-2 and the BGM-109G cruise missile—these are intermediate-range missiles—and also the shorter-range Pershing-1A. In all, the USSR has eliminated 1,846 missiles—this can be said now—and the United States has eliminated 846.

The treaty expects that our countries will do away with these missiles entirely. The production and testing of missiles was banned during their elimination—in other words, these two classes of missiles have been removed entirely from our nuclear arsenals.

The significance of this step is obvious if you consider that the nuclear potential of such missiles exceeds all the charges ever detonated by mankind. In addition, their flight time was so short that the danger of their use created a destabilizing situation on the European continent. After all, this is where the main potential was deployed. Admittedly, we kept a certain quantity of missiles of this type in the Asian part of the country, but they were also eliminated.

[Litovkin] How was the destruction of the missiles verified? How were the problems that occurred during elimination resolved? I know that problems occurred on both sides.

[Medvedev] The distinguishing feature of the verification mechanism itself was that for the first time it included such an effective measure as the extensive use of on-site verification. In three years of the treaty's operation we carried out around 250 inspections of U.S. facilities in Europe and across the ocean while the Americans conducted nearly 530 inspections on our territory. The discrepancy is because of the fact that there were more sites to check on our side.

In addition, various facilities were subject to inspection—operational missile bases, arsenals, training sites, missile test sites... For example, Barnaul, Novosibirsk, Postavy, Malorita, Karmilava... The list is long—we had 117 such facilities, including the plants in Votkinsk, Petropavlovsk in north Kazakhstan, and Sverdlovsk. The U.S. side had 32 facilities, including the Martin-Marietta plant (Maryland), the Hercules plant (Utah), the depots at Pueblo (Colorado), and the Redstone Arsenal (Alabama)... All these facilities were inspected on a quota basis at short notice—16 hours after the inspection group arrived in the country.

The plants at Votkinsk and Magna (Utah) were verified on a permanent basis. The inspection groups there were simply changed after a certain time.

We and the U.S. specialists visited the destruction sites as often as necessary to be sure of the complete destruction of the missiles and to register this process.

As for conflicts, I can say this much: On a purely technical level there was friction. That is what work is like, especially when it is something completely new and unfamiliar, but we always overcame the friction through mutual respect and amicability. Sometimes with the help of the Soviet-U.S. verification commission, which was created specially for that purpose. On the whole, each missile blown up or cut up increased our mutual trust, not only between the Soviet and U.S. officers and specialists but also the population of the two countries.

[Litovkin] Does it not seem to you that, although blowing missiles up may be effective from the propaganda viewpoint, it does not make sense economically or environmentally? Would it not be better to crush them or cut them up to use them in the national economy afterward?

[Medvedev] Propaganda has nothing to do with it. We chose our method of destruction on the basis of technical potential. We were free to choose any method but opted for detonation. It is more practical. From the environmental viewpoint, there is no great difference between igniting a solid-fuel motor and blowing it up. The only difference is that one process is quick, the other takes longer.

In all instances we conducted a preliminary environmental study and reported its results to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and it was acknowledged that the level of environmental pollution did not exceed the natural level. Furthermore, in each specific instance all the conditions were observed.... For example, we waited for the wind to blow away from housing and so on. That is what happened on our side and the U.S. side.

Incidentally, before the missiles were destroyed everything of value that could be used in the national economy was removed from them. The launchers were dismantled in such a way that they could not launch missiles any more but the chassis could be used. As you know, they are now operating as truck tractors and are a base for cranes....

Generally speaking, if you think back over this past period, it may be said that we have begun looking to the future with greater optimism than three years ago.

Omelichev Comments on Destruction of Last SS-20's

*PM1405110791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 May 91 Second Edition pp 1, 4*

[Report by special correspondent A. Gorokhov: "An Explosion That Will Save the World? PRAVDA Special Correspondent Reports from the Kapustin Yar Test Center"]

[Excerpts] Astrakhan Oblast—The last RSD-10 (SS-20) solid-fuel mobile missiles were destroyed at 1530 hours, Moscow time, at the Kapustin Yar state test center, located in the trans-Volga steppes on the territory of Astrakhan Oblast. The first and most important stage of the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has been fully implemented. [passage omitted]

...Early in the morning of 12 May, before flying to Kapustin Yar, I talked with Colonel General B. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

"We have fulfilled our commitments," Bronislav Aleksandrovich told me, "and destroyed, counting the last two, 1,846 missiles of two classes—intermediate and shorter range.

[Gorokhov] What types were they?

[Omelichev] The intermediate-range missiles include 654 "Pioner" RSD-10 systems, 149 R-12's, six R-14's,

and 80 RK-55 cruise missiles. As for shorter-range missiles, we are talking about 718 "Temp" OTR-22's and 239 "Oka" OTR-23's.

[Gorokhov] So by destroying nearly 2,000 nuclear missiles we have taken the first step on the difficult road to a world without weapons?

[Omelichev] Quite right. The program announced by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 to rid mankind completely of nuclear weapons and make the transition to a nonviolent, nuclear-free world is becoming a tangible reality, as I see it. I would point out that for its part the United States has destroyed 846 missiles of similar classes.

[Gorokhov] To be frank, this arithmetic will not be very clear to PRAVDA readers: After all, we have destroyed 1,000 more missiles!

[Omelichev] Yes, we have destroyed more weapons. But the total destruction of the aforementioned classes of missiles is in our security interests. Why? In the first place, with their destruction there is less likelihood of a regional nuclear conflict, as we say, that might develop into a global catastrophe. This, in turn, lessens the danger of war in general. Second, the United States has withdrawn from West Europe and destroyed all its missiles that were capable of reaching the territory of our country in 8-10 minutes, that is, capable of carrying out strategic tasks in relation to the Soviet Union. Finally, as a result of the treaty, we have guarantees that U.S. intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will not turn up near either the western or the eastern borders of the Soviet Union.

[Gorokhov] You mean that our country's defense capability has not suffered?

[Omelichev] Absolutely. The global strategic military balance has not been upset as a result of the treaty's implementation. Judge for yourself: The vehicles capable of delivering around four percent of all existing nuclear weapons to their targets have been destroyed. But the Soviet Union's defense capability is ensured by all the other nuclear and conventional weapons.... [Omelichev ends]

The final question I put to my interlocutor concerned the impact of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles on the prospects of the disarmament process as a whole. To be frank, there were a few people, were there not, in the West and in our country, who were accustomed to relying entirely on force?

"The signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles in 1987," Colonel General B. Omelichev reckons, "paved the way for other accords. I would point out that on 19 November last year in Paris the heads of 20 European countries, the United States, and Canada signed a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. That same year the USSR and U.S. presidents signed an agreement on the destruction and

nonproduction of chemical weapons. The preparation of the Soviet-American treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive armaments is in its final stages. Although, to be frank, one gets the impression that very recently the U.S. side's interest in completing the elaboration of this agreement has declined somewhat...."

Let us return to Kapustin Yar, to the battlefield where the command "Fire!" has already been given, incidentally, by Lieutenant Colonel A. Guba, who gave the order for the first demolition three years ago. A fireball appeared above the steppes in a matter of a few fractions of a second. In fact, the great story, the great strategy of peace, is unfolding in these expanses, which have only just cast off their bright spring attire.

The world is now a little bit safer. That is no exaggeration. For instance, one of the three warheads on each RSD-10 would be enough to wipe out life if not on one continent, then on a good part of it. The nigh-on 2,700 U.S. and Soviet missiles could turn the entire Old World and the New World into a lifeless desert.

I would also like to say the following: In the course of implementing the treaty our military is acquiring unique experience both in organizing both the actual destruction of armaments and in working in conditions of strict monitoring by U.S. inspection groups.

Lieutenant General V. Medvedev, chief of the USSR National Center for the Reduction of the Nuclear Danger, believes:

"An important aspect of the implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is the well-thought-out system for monitoring the observance of its provisions by means of on-site inspections. The inspections have confirmed the correctness and viability of the selected monitoring procedures and measures."

Colonel V. Tselishchev, one of the Soviet military inspectors just returned from the United States, whom I have known for a long time and who was present in Longhorn, Texas, on 6 May at the destruction of the last U.S. Pershing-2 missile, told me:

"As I watched the Pershing solid propellant burning, I thought: Were it not for the treaty, this missile could have been aimed at Moscow, Minsk, Kiev...."

There is obviously no need to comment at length on the words uttered by the colonel, who served 22 years in the missile forces, on alert duty, in particular with "Pioneer" missiles. Let us express our appreciation, readers, to those who even today, on this truly historic day, are carrying out their alert duty, ensuring our safety, and, in the end, world peace.

Last SS-20's Destroyed 12 May at Kapustin Yar

*91P50182A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 91
Union Edition p 1*

[Article by IZVESTIYA's own correspondent V. Litovkin: "The Last Missile Is Blown Up: The USSR and the United States Have Eliminated Two Classes of Their Own Nuclear Missiles"]

[Text] Kapustin Yar-Moscow—On 12 May at 1530 hours Moscow time, the last two Soviet RSD-10 [SS-20] intermediate-range missiles were eliminated at the Kapustin Yar test site, two hundred kilometers from Volgograd, next to the place where our first ballistic missile was fired in October 1947.

The first step in the history of humanity toward real disarmament has been taken. The two superpowers—the USSR and the United States—have destroyed all 2,692 of their nuclear-capable intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. And although they make up only five percent of both countries' nuclear potential, peace has become five percent more stable, the threat of a nuclear holocaust has been moved back, and trust between our peoples has increased, all of which means that the hope for a stable and long-term peace has also increased.

"I have an ambiguous feeling now," said Colonel General Aleksandr Volkhov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Troops, in a conversation with an IZVESTIYA correspondent. "On the one hand, satisfaction: We have succeeded in agreeing with the Americans on real steps toward disarmament, and we and they will no longer have two entire classes of very terrible missiles, the threat of whose use in Europe has been sharply decreased. But on the other hand, regret at the colossal work of the scientists, designers, engineers, workers and even military men. So much was spent on these missiles.... But that is the price of trust.... We must strive so that there will be less to destroy."

Yes, fulfilling the INF Treaty was not easy for us. Not only from the political and military points of view—also from the economic point of view. The cost of the destruction process of only the intermediate-range missiles exceeded 30 million rubles. True, military experts assert that these expenses are compensated by recovering platinum, gold, silver and other valuable metals, as well as various instruments, which can be used in the national economy, from the missiles. Costs will also be covered by the sale of 150 launcher transporters to enterprises, sovkhozes and kolkhozes, which can use them as tractors or platforms for mobile cranes.

About five thousand vehicles have also been sold for the sum of 14 million rubles. Twenty-five military encampments, with all their developed infrastructure—heated garages, equipment sheds, storage buildings, warehouses, workshops, housing—have been transferred free of charge to the population.... This is in such cities as Karmilava, Umerge, Gusev, Sovetsk, and others.

Eliminating 846 missiles was also not inexpensive for the Americans.

"It is hard for me to estimate the total outlays," Major General Robert Parker, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, told me. "But I know precisely: our agency's annual budget is more than 30 million dollars. In the last three years we have made about 600 inspection trips to your country. We have been convinced of Soviet officers' honesty and fairness, and have succeeded in better understanding your country's traditions, history and spirit. I hope that we will now be friends."

The destruction of the last missiles does not end the action of the INF Treaty. Ahead lie ten years of mutual visits to each other by specialists of both countries, and ten years of inspections and confidence-building. And even further ahead—the ratification and carrying out of the treaty on conventional armaments, and the conclusion of a treaty sharply cutting strategic offensive weapons, the limitation of underground nuclear testing.... Ahead of us lies the hope of strengthening trust and peace in the world. Five percent—this is a good start toward such a wonderful goal.

However, two intermediate-range missiles remain unharmed. They are on display in museums in Washington and Moscow. Go and look at them there. It is already the historical past.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Hopes for 'Success' Emerging at Vienna CFE Talks

PM2504093791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Apr 91 Union Edition p 5

[Correspondent S. Tosunyan report: "Hopes of Success Have Appeared"]

[Text] Vienna—There have been times at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] when the atmosphere of mutual understanding was ousted by difficult arguments. Delegations from 22 countries used to resolve a multitude of complex problems in one fell swoop—but then the misunderstandings began to show, and the dialogue would slow down and sometimes come to a standstill.

Throughout the February-March round, the barometer of the talks only showed "overcast." The euphoria generated by the successful conclusion of work on the document that was then submitted to the participants in the Paris summit meeting and received their approval was replaced by a skirmish over two Soviet divisions that had been transferred to the naval forces. The West claimed that this was contrary to the treaty and that the divisions were scheduled to be disbanded. Our military experts objected—the transfer of the divisions occurred before the document was signed; therefore, no violations were committed. The search for a compromise began.

There have recently been meetings between representatives of a number of countries participating in the talks. As a result, it seems that the possibility of surmounting the problem has taken shape. The diplomats believe it is important that the talks not get bogged down. In the meantime, the joint consultative group has been clarifying the positions of the sides and preparing proposals, and the various groups have been continuing their work.

On 18 April the Soviet delegation submitted a working document for discussion concerning stabilization measures. Specifically, it proposes that states participating in the talks limit personnel and military hardware to a defined level when undertaking maneuvers and give prior notification of the purpose of any given military activity and the number of reservists being called up to participate in field exercises.

The talks between 34 countries on confidence-building measures and security in Europe have also resumed. There has been an exchange of information about military forces and plans to deploy arms systems and hardware. The participants in the forum are unanimous in the opinion that this event is out of the ordinary, because there has never before been such an all-embracing exchange of military information in the history of the CSCE process. Intensive preparations are under way for the second seminar on military doctrines, to be held in Vienna with the participation of the chiefs of general staffs and other high-ranking military chiefs of the European countries, as well as the United States and Canada. In a word, with the start of the new round, hopes for a successful conclusion of the talks have appeared.

Reports, Comments on Troop Withdrawal From Germany

Museum Established

91WC0105A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Apr 91 p 5

["Our correspondent" report: "Museum in an Office"]

[Text] In the near future one of the facilities of the of the [Vyunsdorf] Officers' House will be reequipped as a chamber, tentatively named the "Museum of the History of the Withdrawal of the Western Group of Troops from the Territory of Germany." Photos, video, audio and other materials and related documents will be collected here. Incidentally, unlike museum exhibits, it will be possible to use them all the time—for instance, to see how this or that Soviet military encampment looked at the moment it was turned over to the German side. (And these days they not infrequently make unfounded claims on us.)

Commander on Withdrawal Problems

PM0205191191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Apr 91 Second Edition p7

["Topical Interview" with M.P. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, by V. Izgarshev in Wuensdorf; date not given: "Troops Leaving by Sea"]

[Text] First I shall introduce my interlocutor to readers. He was born into a working-class family in the Transbaykal region in 1935. His father, Sergeant Prokopy Ivanovich Burlakov, died in 1941, defending Leningrad against the fascists. Matvey graduated from Omsk Military School in 1958. He has worked his way up the service ladder from platoon commander to commander in chief. He is married. His wife, Viktoriya Nikolayevna, was at school with him. They have brought up two children: a son and a daughter.

[Izgarshev] Matvey Prokopyevich, we met last year, when you had just begun the withdrawal of units from the Southern Group of Forces to the Soviet Union. You are now having to resolve the very same problems as commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces. Are you a specialist in troop withdrawal?

[Burlakov] A commanding officer is what you might call obliged by service regulations to be a specialist in a very broad range of subjects. I just had a telephone call from Moscow asking me to receive some high-ranking guests from Bonn in the Group: the FRG president, chancellor, defense minister, and foreign minister and the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.... I was talking to some business people just before you arrived. Bankers often come to visit us here in Wuensdorf, incidentally. Well, they have the money and we have the material assets. They want to buy at a favorable price and we cannot sell without a profit.

[Izgarshev] I would like to ask, Matvey Prokopyevich, how your experience in Hungary has come in useful here, in the Western Group of Forces?

[Burlakov] As far as organization of the troop withdrawal is concerned, the same preparations have to be made as regards people, handing over premises, and so forth. If we are talking about differences, it seems to me that they amount to the following: We have a common border with Hungary. You would get on a train in Hungary, pass through Chop—and be home. But here there is a country in between, which has denied our trains transit and caused us additional problems, incidentally. Considerable problems. So now we are pinning our main hopes on the sea. We are leaving Germany by sea.

[Izgarshev] I was in Rostock. I saw them loading military equipment onto Baltic Shipping Company vessels in the port. I realized that these sea trips are going to cost us quite a lot of money....

[Burlakov] Of course they are! Just think what it means to transport more than 300,000 military servicemen and

167,000 members of their families. Plus 26,000 civilians: our workers and employees. Plus 115,000 pieces of equipment and 2.5 million tonnes of materiel. All that has to be back in the Soviet Union by the end of 1994. It is an enormous task....

[Izgarshev] These days you hear people saying that we have made a mistake with the time-scale for the withdrawal. We should do some bargaining with the Germans. The deadline should be extended and more money obtained to provide facilities for the troops being withdrawn....

[Burlakov] Yes, I have heard that opinion expressed. But, first, you do not wave your fists after the fight is over and, second, there is no point in our remaining here longer than stipulated in the agreements. You do not have to be a diplomat to appreciate a simple fact: The situation in Europe and the rest of the world that has developed on the basis of new, realistic approaches—springing in part from our own initiative—does not allow us to change anything in our accords. They really are timely and reasonable.

No, we will go. We will calculate and recalculate which of the remaining facilities we can sell, how we can sell them, and what we can get for them. There is quite a lot of real estate that we have built here: 21,000 buildings; 1,280 residential buildings; 694 barracks; 370 canteens to seat 134,000 people; 401 stores; 56 schools; and 275 public baths. Plus military hospitals, clubs, officer centers, and 28 airfields.... Quite a lot, in short.

The real estate belonging to us is worth more than 10 billion marks. But how much will we get for it? We are greatly in need of money. The 7.8 billion marks allocated by the FRG Government to provide servicemen with housing is enough for 36,000 apartments. But, even by the most modest estimates, we will need another 19,000.... Incidentally, not a single apartment has been built with the German money so far. When will they be built? Have we become carried away with business again?

[Izgarshev] We certainly cannot get by without it. But, however important economic questions may be, they are not the main feature in the life of the Group. You and I, comrade commander in chief, visited a test site and attended tank firing practice three days ago. The results of the firing practice came as no surprise to me. Any idiot can hit the target from a modern tank. But I would like to ask you about something else. Germany is a densely populated country, and the sound of firing, exploding shells, and the rattle of machineguns can be heard all over the district. Now that the agreements have been signed, how do residents react to all the noise our army makes?

[Burlakov] That is a difficult question. Of course, we now feel far more restricted—I would even go so far as to say oppressed. Night flights are very limited. We can

only drop bombs and launch missiles in our own territory. Combat training of ground forces is mainly conducted in single crews. Tactical exercises cannot extend beyond a battalion. And command-staff training is only on maps. Tracked vehicle movement is confined to the test site. In short, there are a mass of restrictions. But the agreements set out the conditions for combat training exercises, and the sides are adhering to them rigorously.

[Izgarshev] In March 1918, when the government moved from Petrograd to Moscow, V.I. Lenin wrote his famous article, "Our Main Task Today." He expressed the idea that we must learn from the Germans. How do you regard Illich's words today?

[Burlakov] As very topical. We can learn something from the Germans. Industriousness, conscientiousness, and discipline. It is possible to do business with them: They know how to keep their word. But, in my opinion, we must learn from everyone—not just from the Germans.

[Izgarshev] I cannot help but ask you about deserters and black marketeers.

[Burlakov] Every family has its black sheep. But we do not have hundreds upon thousands of deserters, as some unscrupulous people would have you believe. We have 170 deserters, and about 10 rifles have gone missing. This is bad and disgraceful but there is no need to whip up passions.

[Izgarshev] The Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist. Our troops are leaving Eastern Europe and going home. But there is still NATO and there are still foreign troops in the FRG. How will all this affect our security?

[Burlakov] The accords we have entered into with our partners take all this into account. Our defensive doctrine fully safeguards the country's security. I think the internal factors destabilizing the situation in our country now have a greater impact on the state of our defense capability. The interests of our motherland and all its nations and ethnic groups require unity and a stronger union of republics. That is the opinion of servicemen throughout our group.

[Izgarshev] I think PRAVDA readers would be curious to learn about a military commander's daily routine and interests. What do you like to do when you are off duty? What do you read?

[Burlakov] My daily routine is extremely simple. I get up at 0500, 0430 on Mondays. I am on duty by 0630. I get home at 2100, often at 2200. Unfortunately there is no time for leisure. I realize that this is bad but that is how we live. I like to read historical works. They contain the experience of generations, which is always necessary to us. When I was younger I used to do a lot of sport. But now time is at a premium, so I can only play tennis. What else? I watch Vremya and always read PRAVDA, as well as other newspapers and journals.

The hour hand on the clock was on 10 and the minute hand was coming up to 12. The mist was getting thicker

outside. Under his normal daily routine, the commander in chief should have been at home. Especially as he was planning to fly to the Baltic the next day, at 0730 hours: Two dry-cargo ships were being loaded in Rostock and the ferry was on its way....

Withdrawal Accord Takes Effect

*LD0605103191 Berlin ADN in German 1004 GMT
6 May 91*

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The 12 October 1990 agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union on conditions for the limited stay and the logistics of the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops came into force today. German Ambassador Dr. Klaus Blech and USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh exchanged the ratification documents this morning. During the ceremony they said the agreement was an important investment in the future of German-Soviet relations.

Slow Progress Seen at Vienna CSBM Talks

*LD0105220191 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT
1 May 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, May 2 (TASS)—The need to augment the important results, achieved at the talks on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM] in Europe, was stressed at a regular plenary meeting of this forum, which was held in the Austrian capital on Wednesday.

Its participants stated that delegations from 34 states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe put forth several interesting ideas and proposals, which should be studied.

The Soviet delegation also spelled out its specific proposals on the limitation of military activities by all CSCE countries.

Meeting participants noted that the work on a seminar on military doctrines is progressing. There is an impression that the sides are close to a decision on this issue, except the dating of the seminar.

However, the rate of examining some other issues leaves much to be desired. Partners has not begun to discuss many of them, including the mandate of future talks, which will begin after Helsinki-2—the forthcoming CSCE summit in 1992.

The experience of work on the mandate at the Madrid and then the Vienna CSCE summits shows that much effort and some time will be needed for this purpose. However, participants in the talks have not even had a preliminary exchange of opinions on this issue.

Commentary Considers European Security, NATO*LD0205173891 Moscow World Service in English
1510 GMT 2 May 91*

[Anatoliy Potapov commentary]

[Text] It is indisputable that with the end of the Cold War NATO is changing. The Alliance's new tasks and structures will be evidently considered at the summit meeting of the Alliance members next autumn. Also characteristic is the orientation of the statements by the Secretary General Manfred Woerner who said: We are not going to isolate the Soviet Union—we are for cooperation and partnership, not confrontation.

Well, it's quite promising for the new Europe, but regrettably, everything is not that bright. I, for example have many questions on the score.

Mr. Woerner said that NATO today had no definite enemy, while in another interview we can hear the following: The Soviet Union is a strong military power in Europe, and the North Atlantic Alliance should counter-balance this strength. Does it mean that the enemy is still there? And the chief commander of the bloc's troops John Galvin says about the future reduction of NATO armed forces almost by 50 percent and at the same time emphasizes: We need mobile multinational units and the most up to date high precision weapons [sentence as heard]. Another question: against what enemy?

Manfred Woerner reasonably denies any intentions on the possibility of some countries of East Europe joining the bloc, because that would make NATO closer to the Soviet border, and suddenly the North Atlantic Assembly members, legislatures in NATO countries and the Alliance's core, have advanced an idea of creating the so-called association NATO members, who may become those very countries of eastern Europe.

I'm rather worried by the following fact: NATO now actively improves its military structures, not breaks them. The ideas of the last year's London declaration to attach to NATO a political role in a new situation are not unfortunately realized. Only statements on intentions are, of course, not enough.

But if, according to Manfred Woerner, he is going with the help of NATO to breathe life to the Vienna Center for the Elimination of Conflicts, this would be a concrete and positive step politically.

The security of the continent cannot be based on the only military bloc left in Europe. This would in no way strengthen confidence or cancel suspicions.

The general European security is a notion of [word indistinct] and blocs and the Paris Charter has other orientations.

Karpov Meets U.S. Chief CSBM Delegate in Vienna*LD0605124391 Moscow TASS in English 1226 GMT
6 May 91*

[Text] Moscow, May 6 (TASS)—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov today received Ambassador John Maresca, U.S. chief delegate at the Vienna talks on confidence and security-building measures [CSBM], and had a talk with him.

Matters connected with the state of affairs at the Vienna talks were considered and prospects for further negotiation discussed.

Treaty Wanted To Keep NATO From Borders*PM0805154391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 May 91 Second Edition p 4*

["My Opinion" article by Vladimir Gerasimov: "Mistrust Still Rules the Roost"]

[Text] "Exclusively defensive"... "Creates the necessary strategic balance"... "Democratically organized"... This is all about NATO. Again: "This alliance plays an indispensable role in building Europe's future." Such maxims were heard recently in Prague.

There, at the two-day international conference "The Future of European Security," NATO Secretary General M. Woerner and its other organizer—J. Dienstbier, foreign minister of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic—plus representatives of the United States and the North Atlantic alliance countries and all kinds of experts were the opponents of the Soviet delegation. It firmly insisted on NATO's disbandment: Why preserve it, since the military structures of the Warsaw Pact Organization have ceased to exist?

The Soviet side's logic is perfectly clear. The public in the Western European countries values and understands it. Why mothball the symbol and legacy of the Cold War? When 6,000 NATO military aircraft shake the sky over your head (at the height of the NATO summer games up to 40 percent of regular passenger flights are canceled at Frankfurt am Main, for example, one of Germany's main airports); when newspapers breathlessly discuss the Atlanticists' new strategy whose mainstay will be a rapid response force (between 40,000 and 100,000 men); when, after the Persian Gulf war, the United States and Britain insist on giving the military bloc a more active role and greater "geographic" responsibility—all this cannot fail to irritate Europeans. The NATO-ites plainly feel such a negative attitude to them: This is why the flow of information splashes onto heads, trying to prove that being without NATO would be like "going without water: You could not get anywhere."

There is also this argument: NATO provides an opportunity to link Europe with the United States, and the fact that the Soviet "occupiers" are now pulling out of Central and Eastern Europe is disregarded. Why must

the U.S. "occupiers" remain in Western Europe? Why is NATO a "deterrent factor" and why does it "create a strategic balance," while the Warsaw Pact never created one? Is it really impossible, instead of a military bloc, to build a treaty structure? A consultative one?

Unfortunately, military problems are still taxing the politicians, diplomats, and journalists. One of the stumbling blocks at the conference was Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian weekly REFORM earlier published a conversation with Hungarian Defense Minister L. Fur. "Is it possible to create a guarantee that Soviet soldiers will not return? It would be a big comfort to the Hungarian population," the correspondent's view sounded almost provocative, "if a U.S. military base were created at our 'eastern gateway,' in Zahony. Such bases would also be needed on the Yugoslav and Romanian borders." "No way is this feasible," the minister replied. "For 45 years we wanted to free ourselves from foreign invaders, from an external military force. The building of any U.S. military base is totally ruled out." "I do not want to conjecture, but this could still happen," the correspondent concluded.

Some six months ago certain Eastern European politicians could only be heard saying that the former Warsaw Pact states must join NATO as quickly as possible. Rejecting the idea of neutrality, our former allies see integration in the West's defensive and political structures simply as deliverance from the vacuum that is arising with the "invaders'" departure. The NATO-ites have been severe about "showing them the door." The military bloc's preservation does not mean its expansion. That is happening, however—by virtue of the united Germany.

Under conditions when Central and Eastern European countries have no thought of neutrality or a neutral zone, when bloc thinking continues to prevail and the North Atlantic alliance itself is being strengthened by East Germany, and when the U.S. military presence is being maintained in Europe, the Soviet Union naturally wishes to enshrine in new treaties with its neighbors the point that no side will enter into an alliance directed against another side. We do not want the rapid response detachments which the Atlanticists are setting up to appear on our borders.

M. Woerner said in Prague that the Soviet Union must understand that all the peoples of the NATO countries and of Central and Eastern Europe have a desire to build a new Europe with the USSR. The system of all-European security cannot exist without the Soviet Union. It is possible to agree with this. But the same M. Woerner also wagged his finger: The USSR must know that NATO is not indifferent to the countries of central and Eastern Europe. In other words, if anything should happen—NATO will be right there.

This is how we live: Mistrust still rules the roost.

NATO Activity in Northeast Italy Inspected

91WC0112A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 May 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed item: "Inspection on Italian Territory Completed"]

[Text] On 17 May, a group of Soviet military inspectors completed an inspection of NATO military activity in northeast Italy.

The inspection of the declared region was carried out on the basis of the relevant provisions of the 1990 Vienna document.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Deputy Minister: Tests Needed for Third-Generation Weapons

91WC0092A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY
VESTNIK in Russian No 12 Mar 91 p 12

[Interview with Professor Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, deputy minister of nuclear energy and industry, by L. Chernenko under rubric "Without the Stamp 'Secret'"; place and date not given: "The Keys From the Nuclear Arsenal"]

[Text] "If we had begun work on developing the atomic bomb today, with the present state of our economy and society, more likely than not we would never have built it." This statement by one of the developers of Soviet nuclear weapons shocked me. How come? We could do it in the hungry post-war years, in conditions of devastation and hunger, but not now? True, then the society was in a state of moral euphoria, we were ready to endure hardships for the sake of "never ever having war." And now we attack our military-industrial complex much more vehemently than we once did the American. Our once closed "model" cities have now become coupon cities. And the builders of the nuclear-missile shield, people who had once been our national pride, feel themselves far from comfortable in the wake of surprise attacks by politicians of the new wave. Yet even in this difficult situation they continue to work. On what? This was the subject of our conversation with Professor Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, deputy minister of nuclear energy and industry.

[Chernenko] So what are the scientists and specialists in the field of nuclear weapons working on now? After all, it would seem that we have built a huge arsenal possessing tremendous destructive force. What else do we need?

[Mikhaylov] Although our task is to develop weapons we are, nevertheless, engaged in pure science. For nuclear weapons are based on highly complex physical phenomena which are extremely difficult to calculate. This requires fundamental knowledge, flight of the imagination, and high intelligence. That is why in this work we need leading scientists, who even today are continuing

research in this field. Now, thanks to the efforts of science and industry, we have built a large arsenal, thousands of nuclear warheads. But to maintain it we must work constantly to increase the safety of nuclear weapons. This is one of the most important problems on which we are working. We must ensure the safety of nuclear weapons in storage and transportation, moreover, with due consideration of all possible emergency situations, even the possibility of unauthorized access. For that we are developing special designs to increase the safety of nuclear munitions, using insensitive explosives, special locks, refractory casings, and materials with longer shelf life.

It should not be forgotten that the United States and its NATO allies are continuing to improve their nuclear arsenal and develop new types of weapons. This is, primarily, development of third-generation nuclear weapons. Obviously we, too, are working in this area.

[Chernenko] What are third-generation nuclear weapons?

[Mikhaylov] First of all, I would like to say that any sensible professional, whether a military man or a nuclear scientist, realizes that fighting with weapons that now constitute our nuclear arsenal is tantamount to suicide. They are not so much combat weapons as deterrents, weapons of global politics. A nuclear warhead's target may be very small, but the blast will nevertheless cover a large area and the territory contaminated by radioactive fallout will be even larger.

Unlike today's warheads, third-generation weapons will have a small fraction of the yields global contamination effects, but with the same destructive capability. They will be weapons of directional, selective emission of energy on a target. Such a weapon works like a scalpel. A laser beam, electromagnetic, X-ray or microwave radiation, a shock wave: the force of any of these factors is concentrated in the direction of the target.

In other words, third-generation nuclear weapons constitute a special danger, because, in view of their local, directional capability, high accuracy and small radioactive contamination, the temptation may rise to use them globally without the risk of global consequences. They no longer are a deterrent, but a combat weapon, and that is the primary danger. In other words, this is a weapon possessing new qualities in respect of safety, effectiveness, reliability and global consequences. Its development is now underway, and it may well appear within ten years or so. The only barrier to this would be the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

[Chernenko] Isn't it possible to improve nuclear weapons without carrying out tests? After all, there are methods of mathematically simulating the most complex processes on computers...

[Mikhaylov] Of course, we use computers to mathematically simulate processes taking place during explosions, but they are based on data from previous explosions.

Incidentally, the computer capabilities of our centers are one-tenth of those of similar centers in the United States: Los Alamos and the Livermore National Laboratory. Nevertheless, our experts have been obtaining a high level of research results with this hardware. But this cannot go on for long. Sooner or later quantity turns into quality.

Firstly, it should be understood that modern nuclear weapons constitute a highly complex scientific and technical system and not all the processes on which its functions are based can be studied in laboratory conditions. How, for example, can you reproduce the conditions of an explosion in a laboratory? It requires enormous temperatures of hundreds of millions of degrees and tremendous pressures of tens of millions of atmospheres. It is simply impossible to reproduce all this in laboratory conditions. That is why we go from experiment to experiment, from test to test. Because physics is an experimental science. For us a theory is a bridge between two experiments. Their results are used to verify a theoretical model.

Without tests it is also impossible to make nuclear weapons safer, improve the design of nuclear munitions, test the effects of a nuclear explosion on weapons and military materiel, and gain a deeper understanding of the mechanism of the process. Also, time to time it is necessary to check nuclear munitions stored in arsenals. And this, too, requires tests.

[Chernenko] In other words, tests are essential to maintain nuclear arsenals in combat readiness, to improve and developing nuclear weapons. Now it is clear why, against the background of other major disarmament agreements, there has been virtually no progress on the problem of banning tests.

[Mikhaylov] If the United States would accept the Soviet proposal and agree to a complete ban on nuclear tests then it would be simply impossible to improve atomic weapons or develop new types of them. It would be an important step along the road to a nuclear-free world. But so far our proposals about a complete test ban remain unanswered.

Lately the Soviet Union has repeatedly declared unilateral moratoriums on nuclear blasts. Since 1985 our test sites have remained silent for a total of two and a half years. However, the Soviet initiative has met with no response from the United States or other nuclear powers. During the Soviet moratorium nuclear tests continued in Nevada, Lop Nor and Murorua Atoll. Can we accept a unilateral test ban or nuclear disarmament in such conditions? This would disturb the existing parity between the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Chernenko] Viktor Nikitovich, as you yourself said, nuclear weapons constitute a complex scientific and technical system. Its development requires the participation of leading scientists and specialists of the highest class. They also supervise industrial production. And

then what? You hand the finished product over to the military, and that's it! Do you maintain author supervision at the stage when nuclear munitions have been handed over to the customer, or is he the unchallenged owner of the "goods"? What, in general, are the relations between the scientists, the manufacturers and the military?

[Mikhaylov] Together with them we are tackling the same task: working to strengthen the country's defenses. And in this we have good, business-like relations. It should be noted that the military know how to listen to the views of science. True, not always. Sometimes they don't like the scientific-technical approach we try to implement in tackling all issues. Of course, when there were few nuclear munitions we were able to keep them constantly in our field of vision and implement a kind of "author supervision." But as the number of weapons in the nuclear arsenal increased it became harder and harder for us to do this. The nuclear weapons stored in arsenals are becoming less and less under our control, while the military are striving to assume full control. Yet questions of maintenance and storage of nuclear munitions require a scientific and technical approach, the participation of scientists and specialists. After all, military decisions are based on orders, while for us every decision is based on knowledge of the physics of highly complex processes, extensive discussions in commissions of experts, calculations and experiments.

At present, working with customers we see their desire for greater independence from science. We, on the other hand, strive for our word to be decisive in questions of nuclear armaments. It is quite clear that this cannot be left to the military alone. The army, science and industry must work together on this. The "keys" of the nuclear arsenal should not be only in one hands.

[Chernenko] Nowadays theft of weapons has become fairly common. Isn't there the danger that nuclear weapons may end up in the hands of extremists?

[Mikhaylov] This is absolutely impossible. Nuclear weapons are kept in special depots and are guarded extremely reliably. It should also be noted that there are no such depots in areas of ethnic conflicts. Although, of course, in principle nowadays the question of where and how to store nuclear weapons is becoming no less complex than questions of their development and manufacture. To resolve it we need not only technical but also organizational and political measures. And additional investments are, of course, also necessary.

[Chernenko] Lately there have been calls to "divide" nuclear weapons among the republics.

[Mikhaylov] The nation's nuclear arsenal was created by the entire people, all republics contributed to it. The idea of dividing it is quite absurd from the political, economic, scientific and technical points of view. No single republic has either the economic or the scientific and technical capabilities for this.

And then, imagine that instead of one nuclear power—the Soviet Union—there would suddenly appear fifteen states possessing nuclear weapons. What about international law, the non-proliferation treaty? It is hard to even imagine the possible consequences of this in conditions of mounting ethnic strife. Incidentally, political instability in a country possessing nuclear weapons is fraught with serious consequences and cannot fail to alarm the world community. And the following question may also arise: does a country in which political instability is mounting have the right to possess nuclear weapons? Shouldn't international control be established over them?

We must foresee any possible scenario and not allow such a development of events, because that would mean the collapse of our state. The nuclear-missile shield was built by the efforts of the entire nation, the entire country. This mighty potential makes us an influential world power, serves as a guarantee of our safety, a guarantee of the integrity of the state. It is one of the forces cementing the federation.

Nordic Experts Invited To Inspect Novaya Zemlya Test Site

*PM0105115191 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
30 Apr 91 p 3*

[Erik Veigard report: "Permission To Inspect Nuclear Test Sites"]

[Excerpt] Tromsø—The Soviet Union has said that Nordic experts will be allowed to inspect the nuclear test site on Novaya Zemlya. Diplomatic circles are now working on the practical details of the visit.

The Soviet Union will invite representatives from the five Nordic countries and Canada on a two- to three-day visit in September. Last summer representatives of Greenpeace were arrested when they succeeded in landing illegally and measuring radioactivity at one of the nuclear testing sites on Novaya Zemlya.

"On such an inspection we will be able to form an overall impression of the situation, particularly safety arrangements and the collection of data after the tests," director Knut Gussgard of the State Nuclear Inspectorate told AFTENPOSTEN. It is still unclear who will represent Norway at the inspection, but Gussgard takes the view that the Armed Forces Research Institute, the State Institute for Health Physics, and the State Nuclear Inspectorate should be represented.

At the same time as it was announced that the nuclear test site will be opened for inspection, Finnish authorities were informed that they can undertake a complete review of safety at the Soviet nuclear power station on the Kola Peninsula. Finland's nuclear inspectorate has allocated 15 million kroner for the work.

The Finns have long been pressing to be allowed to inspect the nuclear power station on the Kola Peninsula.

Now that they have been granted permission they intend to undertake a full review of all aspects of the power station's safety. The Finns are expected to begin the work this year and it is expected to take them a year to complete. [passage omitted]

Economic Value of Novaya Zemlya Questioned

*91WC0104A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 May 91 First Edition p 5*

[Article by A. Butorin, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, non-party: "Is It Possible To Sow on Novaya Zemlya, or Concerning an Article in the Archangelsk Oblast Newspaper VOLNA"]

[Text] As is known, in the fall of 1990 a group of people's deputies and representatives of the public of the Komi SSR and the Archangelsk Oblast soviet visited Novaya Zemlya. The purpose—to check on various rumors about the radiation situation. The result of the trip, in which specialists on radiation safety participated, was a jointly signed act which bears the signatures of people well-known in the northern region. In particular, it reported that the level of radiation on the Novaya Zemlya range after the conduct of underground nuclear explosions corresponded to background values.

It seemed that the question was settled. But articles have been appearing recently in the mass media now concerning the problems of an island soviet.

On 11 April, the Archangelsk Oblast newspaper VOLNA published correspondence "And Again About Novaya Zemlya." It claims that the territory of the archipelago "today can and should serve the people with its food, raw materials, minerals, and other resources." It seems the author, V. Tolkachev, is raising a topical issue. The economy of the country is neglected, but here is an area that is rich in resources... But the question is: Are these resources there?

Authoritative specialists assert: Alas, there are no industrial mineral reserves on Novaya Zemlya. This is confirmed by the results of numerous surveys. I consulted especially with scientists and geologists. For example, with the deputy chief geological engineer for prospecting on Novaya Zemlya, Chenchenko, and with others. And I was convinced: The reports on mineral wealth unfortunately are unfounded.

As for food resources, I recall that the northern part of the archipelago constitutes an almost solid glacier. The southern part consists of arctic tundra where it is even difficult for reindeer to feed themselves. The fur-bearing types of animals here were rapaciously killed off as far back as the middle of the 1950's, after which all local trapping posts became unprofitable. Even the Novaya Zemlya reindeer got into the Red Book, and its population is being restored only thanks to the existence here of a restricted area.

And now, experiencing difficulties with food products, the population of Archangelsk Oblast is tempting itself with illusory hopes of food supplies from... Novaya Zemlya. I do not think it is necessary to explain what kinds of attitudes they stir up.

Why did the author need all of this? The answer is simple: To justify the necessity for the creation of an island soviet. This, they say, is task number one. And for that reason the population is agitating for "rallies, strikes, and delays in dispatching vessels and flight crews to Novaya Zemlya." But the fact that nearby they are yelling for the resolution of ecological, social, and many other problems seemingly is not noticed.

Another thing is amazing. The creation of a soviet is almost being proposed at the request of the military itself, including a deputy of the oblast soviet, Warrant Officer V. Prokudin. What are the realities?

Meetings with my Novaya Zemlya constituents convinced me: The undertaking with the creation here of a soviet is not warranted by a vital necessity and is far-fetched. There was no native population on the archipelago, and there is none. And the people in uniform here have set up their own structures. But even if suddenly all countries who possess nuclear weapons renounced their testing and our military left Novaya Zemlya, leaving behind what was built for the Archangelsk oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], soon everything there, I think, would become desolate. Why? It must be admitted honestly: We have neither the money nor the power for the functioning of an island soviet. If all the Novaya Zemlya economy is loaded on the back of the soviet, the latter will have to build a whole settlement for personnel. Only it is unlikely that those will be found who desire to live and work in almost hellish conditions for the kopecks paid privates and sailors. An experienced builder and the chief creator, figuratively speaking, of everything erected on Novaya Zemlya, Stanislav Ivanovich Kuzin, cited convincing calculations for me: To support the activity of an island soviet, the Archangelsk oblispolkom would have to expend more than R600 million, and create a special administration. Moreover, without any kind of reimbursement of these costs or income from them.

As for Warrant Officer Prokudin, I render him his due for the independence of his opinions.

And, still, it would be incorrect to reject everything in haste that is being proposed for a change in the range jurisdiction that was established in 1957. Contemporary views are needed on the problem of its functioning, the future increase in ecological safety, and, finally, on the resolution of questions of compensation of the population. I, for example, put forth a proposal that at the present stage the military pay the Archangelsk Oblast soviet compensation for leasing Novaya Zemlya. I am trying to get an independent radiological inspection of adjacent territories.

And I would also like to appeal to my colleagues, deputies of various soviets, with a proposal to try to restrain the pride that sometimes breaks through here. How else would you call the groundless indignation regarding the so-called "prohibitions" on visiting Novaya Zemlya? In principle, a deputy has the right to make a trip to the range. But it must be understood: The chief of the range is guided by pertinent regulations concerning his jurisdiction, which are ratified by the Government of the USSR.

On 28 March, USSR People's Deputy A. Vyucheyev, in whose electoral district the range does not fall, sent the usual letter to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet with a demand to establish a soviet on Novaya Zemlya and to pay the population of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug compensation of R250 million even before the start of a radiological inspection of the territory. Excuse me, how are these figures, taken from thin air, compiled? I think that their appearance can be explained in only one way: haste in conclusions and estimates. But, then, a serious discussion about compensation for adjacency to the range is possible only after the inspection, when it is clarified: Where specifically, to whom by name, and what for and in what amount is compensation being proposed.

I am convinced: Time will put everything in its proper place. The people will come to know the particulars about who tried to transform Novaya Zemlya into a hotbed of social tension in the north of Russia, and for what reason.

Long-Term Environmental Effects of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

*AU0305094691 Paris AFP in English 0833 GMT
3 May 91*

[Text] Perm, Soviet Union, May 3 (AFP)—A radioactive lake was created and several villages were evacuated when Soviet engineers exploded nuclear devices in a 1976 canal-building project in the central Ural mountains, Soviet environmentalists announced.

In a first meeting with western journalists, members of the Perm district council's ecological committee said the blasts were first revealed to locals in 1988. A few people were then authorized to visit the area, committee members said at a press conference here.

Radiation levels on the shore of the artificial lake that was created in the blast topped 1.5 rem an hour, but were as high as five rem on the bottom, according to the committee. (In France, nuclear technicians must not be exposed to more than five rem a year.)

Three nuclear devices totalling 15 kilotons were exploded at a depth of 200 metres (660 feet) in an unpopulated area, 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the village of Krasnovishersk and 300 kilometres (186 miles) northeast of this city with a population of 1.2 millions.

The blasts created the artificial lake, 240,000 square metres (2,580,000 square feet) in size and 12 metres (40 feet) deep, with crystal-clear, blue water, but [passage indistinct] authorities evacuated an undisclosed number of villages, a witness who did his military service in the region told the committee.

Blueprints for the canal project had been drawn up in Moscow. It was to link the northern Kara Sea to the Caspian Sea via the Pechora and Kama rivers. The Kama is a tributary of the Volga. The blast area continues to be monitored by the Energy Ministry but no data have been published since the project was abandoned without an official explanation.

Committee member Yevgeniy Yasterov said civilian engineers carried out 13 nuclear explosions in the Urals between 1960 and 1976.

Vladimir Gubaryev, chief editor of the Communist Party daily PRAVDA and head of the paper's scientific department, told Agence France-Presse in Paris: "Schemes to use nuclear devices for engineering purposes were abandoned three years ago."

Mr. Gubaryev, who contested various aspects of the ecologists' report, said he had monitored several such projects. "They were launched in the 1970s and were part of a series of controlled nuclear explosions that were to facilitate major construction works," Mr. Gubaryev said. "In the Perm region means were to be found to turn rivers in the Dvina basin to the Volga (which empties into the Caspian Sea). I have seen that swampy, scarcely populated area from the air and have seen no such large lake," he said, referring to the ecologists' report.

"The Perm experiment did not cause any radioactive fall-out. It was extremely important because it helped to better understand the geological structure of the northern Urals and Siberia."

Mr. Gubaryev said nuclear explosives had also been used to blow out a burning gas well in the southern Bukhara region after it sent large clouds of smoke into the atmosphere. Another blast in 1971 stopped a leak in an oil well, he added.

"That way we also created an underground gas tank at Orenburg in the Ural region, and gave a boost to oil drilling."

According to Mr. Gubaryev, the basin for Kazakhstan's Lake Shega which collects snow water was created by a nuclear explosion on January 15, 1965. Water from the lake was diverted for the irrigation of pastures, and carp from the lake weighed up to six kilograms (13 pounds), he said, adding that the water was constantly monitored.

"There are no problems," he said.

Soviet Nuclear Testing Veterans Committee Formed*LD1005214991 Moscow TASS in English 2135 GMT
10 May 91*

[By TASS correspondent Anna Sherbakova]

[Text] Leningrad, May 10 (TASS)—Former officers and men who participated in nuclear weapon tests in the 50s and 60s and who formed a committee of veterans of nuclear component units held a conference in Leningrad today.

Many of former servicemen who participated in the manufacture and testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons are now seriously ill. They suffer from disturbances of hearing and sight, malignant tumours, leukaemia, diseases of limbs and joints. Medical experts of the committee believe that these diseases are not related to age. But official medics are reluctant to recognise this fact.

Most veterans believe that the pensionable age should be lowered and demand additional measures for social protection.

The veterans committee which unites more than 700 people residing in various regions was set up in Leningrad just a year ago. Earlier they could not even speak of their situation. The matter is that the officers and men pledged themselves not to speak of tests for 30 years. The committee has recently been registered as an all-union organisation.

"Our purpose is to create conditions for calm and comfortable life for people who sacrificed their health to strengthen the country's military potential," said Vladimir Bentsianov, the committee's organiser and chairman. "The committee demands a government decree which would give its members the same privileges as have participants in military operations. It is planned to set up a medical centre and to get in touch with similar associations in the United States, Britain and Australia, and to form an international centre of participants in nuclear tests.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**Bogachev Views Bush Statement on Chemical Arms***LD1405214191 Moscow TASS in English 2125 GMT
14 May 91*

[By TASS analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, May 14 (TASS)—President Bush on Monday made an important statement concerning changes in the U.S. policy with respect to chemical weapons. He made it clear that the United States was lifting its reservation regarding the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of toxic agents during wars. The

United States reserved the right to use toxic agents in response to a chemical weapon attack.

In addition, the U.S. President made clear that the United States would no longer insist on retaining two per cent of its present stock of chemical weapons—500 tonnes—after signing the chemical weapon convention that is currently being worked out in Geneva.

These decisions by Washington will take effect after the chemical weapons convention is enforced.

The history of chemical weapons negotiations is replete with dramatic events which now inspired hopes for a complete ban on this mass destruction weapons and now caused bitter disappointment. In 1968, the United States stopped the production of toxic agents but the Soviet Union failed to follow the example. Later, the two powers exchanged roles: in 1987, the Soviet Union halted the production of toxic agents but the United States started the output of binary toxic agents, a new kind of chemical weapon.

Chemical weapons negotiations progress was hampered by two interdependent factors—objective arising from the difficulties of verification and subjective rooted in the long-term mistrust between the USSR and the U.S. dating from the cold war years.

The U.S. military for a long time was opposed to the ban on chemical toxic agents as they were sure that the United States was too far removed from potential theatres of war in Europe and Asia and chemical weapons were no threat to the country.

The Soviet Union's practical large-scale measures aiming to reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe thawed the ice of mutual mistrust to a considerable degree. During the Soviet-U.S. summit off Malta, the U.S. President announced that the United States was ready to end the production of binary ammunition and later at the Washington summit the production of all toxic agents. An agreement was reached on a step-by-step liquidation of 98 per cent of the chemical weapon stocks in the Soviet Union and the United States and reducing them to the same level in both countries by the year 2002.

In July 1990, the United States began to withdraw its chemical weapons from German territory. Nevertheless, the work of representatives of 39 countries in Geneva to prepare a convention on a complete ban of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks proceeded at a slow pace. Washington officials now admit that the Geneva negotiation process was being slowed down by the U.S. refusal to agree to a complete elimination of its chemical potential. Now, at long last, this obstacle will be removed.

It is appropriate to recall George Bush's statement in 1988, in which he said that if elected president, he would be remembered for one thing—a complete and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. By far not all U.S.

presidents have kept their election promises concerning arms control. There is every ground to believe that Bush's statement about chemical weapons was quite sincere.

As regards the Soviet Union, this country has never used toxic agents, deployed chemical weapons beyond its own territory or transferred chemical weapons to other countries. The Soviet Union favours the prompt adoption of a convention banning these mass destruction weapons and the complete elimination of stocks under close international scrutiny.

Some of the problems concerning chemical weapons are still awaiting their solution at Geneva negotiations. The position of some countries, including France, is not yet quite clear with regard to the proposal to fully eliminate all toxic agents in the next ten years.

However, hope is still alive that chemical weapons will be finally outlawed soon, for instance by the first half of 1992.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Nuclear Tension on Korean Peninsula Assessed

SK0205023591 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1330 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Station commentator Oleg Alekseyev commentary from the "Today's World" program]

[Text] Speaking to the 85th Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] meeting now being held in Pyongyang, DPRK President Kim Il-song has said that the Korean Peninsula must be turned into a nuclear-free zone. This is not the first time Pyongyang advanced a proposal to turn the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, said our station commentator Oleg Alekseyev.

This issue is an urgent matter. This is because the U.S. forces based in South Korea, on the peninsula, have a massive stockpile of nuclear weapons. It is a well-known fact that approximately 1,000 nuclear warheads are concentrated on the South. Considering the continued tension on the Korean Peninsula, it is needless to say how dangerous these stockpiles of nuclear weapons are.

Considering the positive changes in the world, Washington adopted a decision last year that the U.S. troops in the South of the Korean Peninsula would be reduced to a certain extent. As of today, 43,000 troops are being stationed. By 1993, the forces will be reduced by 7,000. I have not heard that portions, at least, of nuclear weapons that are stockpiled by the U.S. forces would be withdrawn from the South.

It is naive to expect that Washington and Seoul would make an affirmative response to the proposal which Kim Il-song advanced in Pyongyang. Mistrust which has

accumulated over scores of years remains strong. Therefore, it is correct to say that such an issue can be resolved easily. The issue concerning international inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities has been unresolved. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to agree on any reasonable measure to achieve military and political detente on the Korean Peninsula.

However, there are also reasons to be optimistic about the situation. First of all, the fact that Seoul and Pyongyang have expressed their willingness to resume government-level dialogue, which began last year, is one reason. As is known, Pyongyang suspended this dialogue a short while ago on the grounds that the ROK and the United States have persisted in the Team Spirit exercise.

Speaking to the opening session of the meeting, the DPRK president pointed out that Pyongyang is willing to resume the North-South premier-level dialogue. Also, it is very symbolic that the ROK parliamentary delegation is participating in this IPU meeting. Such participation was unthinkable just a few while ago.

U.S., USSR Said To Discuss Nuclear Arms in Korea

SK0205045091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0419 GMT
2 May 91

[Text] Tokyo, May 2 (OANA-YONHAP)—The United States and the Soviet Union are having secret talks on removing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea to prevent a nuclear buildup in North Korea, the Japanese daily NIHON KEIZAI reported Thursday.

High-ranking diplomatic and defense officials of the two superpowers have met several times for the talks since Spring 1990 and direct contact between the United States and North Korea may be realized with the Soviet Union sitting in if progress is made in the U.S.-Soviet encounter, the paper said.

The officials met at least twice last fall, followed by another meeting this year, the daily reported.

Quoting a well-informed Japanese Government source, it said the two countries initiated the talks because of the increasing possibility that Pyongyang can develop nuclear weapons within the next two or three years.

If nothing were done, the Soviet Union and China, North Korea's staunch allies, would dramatically lose military leverage over president Kim Il-song and South Korea might develop its own nuclear arsenal to match North Korea's, the paper said.

The superpowers agree Pyongyang may lose its current stability under Kim once the 79-year-old president dies and fear the subsequent political confusion might touch off a volatile confrontation on the Korean peninsula, NIHON KEIZAI said.

The Japanese Defense Agency predicts North Korea's nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, some 90 kilometers north

of Pyongyang, will be capable of producing enough plutonium to make one atomic bomb by late 1993 and a dramatic increase in production capacity is possible by late 1994 at the latest.

The agency believes the United States has approximately 1,000 small, tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, according to the daily.

There are 43,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

North Korea signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1985 but is yet to sign the nuclear safeguards accord and open its nuclear facilities to international inspection.

Pyongyang stands firm in its claim that it is not aiming at production of nuclear bombs, and says the United States must withdraw its arsenal from the South before enforcing international inspections.

Moscow-Washington negotiations are based on post-cold war developments, including gradual reduction of U.S. military bases overseas, but China and the United States also share common fears about North Korea's nuclear buildup.

Chinese Premier Li Peng, in a recent meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, explicitly said he was hoping against any military confrontation on the Korean peninsula.

The chances of North Korea signing the safeguards accord are uncertain even if U.S. troops remove their nuclear weapons from South Korea, the paper said, since the United States will still have a naval nuclear capability.

It is questionable whether Washington can guarantee that it won't use nuclear weapons, the paper added.

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

Moscow Conference Urges End to Naval Arms Race

PM0105115791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 91
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For Peace in the Ocean; Soviet Public Appeal"]

[Text] Representatives of public organizations, scientists, jurists, and seafarers who gathered for a conference in Moscow on 30 April voiced profound concern at the continuing naval arms race.

Despite the liquidation of the "cold war," the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, and the reaching of an accord on a significant reduction in conventional arms, it was stated at the conference, the question of reducing naval confrontation and strengthening confidence-building measures on the seas and oceans remains open. Furthermore, naval forces have not been included in the overall disarmament process.

The conference participants addressed an urgent appeal to the USSR and U.S. presidents, parliamentarians, statesmen, public figures, politicians, and peacemaking organizations to take all possible measures to take the first steps toward beginning talks on these very complex problems.

Representatives of the Soviet public supported the movement to convene a world conference of "people's diplomacy" on problems of limiting the naval arms race and to create a combined UN naval force.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EC-Wide Arms Export Controls Proposed

91GE0222A Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* in German
25 Mar 91 p 3

[Report by gh: "Daimler-Benz CEO Asks Kohl and Delors To Back Uniform Arms Export Controls"]

[Text] Stuttgart—Edzard Reuter, the Daimler-Benz AG CEO, has called for a Europe-wide uniform export controls on defense or militarily useful goods, technologies, and services when the EC market goes into effect on 1 January 1993.

In the letter to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and to the president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, Reuter has now submitted an initiative of his company to this effect, which was adopted by the Daimler-Benz AG board of directors.

According to it European export controls should be guided by the following principles:

- The contents of the regulations would have to be identical in all countries (directly established EC law). The uniformity of interpretation and application would have to be assured. Changes would have to go into effect simultaneously in all countries.
- In the interest of as efficient an administration as possible (the authorities being fully informed about the applicants, short processing times, easy prosecution of violations, etc.) the application of the uniform regulations should take place in as decentralized a manner as possible through the existing national agencies. For coordination and communication a European export control agency could be established.
- Decisions of these agencies would have to have EC-wide validity, so that the EC will become an internal market free of permits, but identical export permits would have to be valid at all external [EC] borders.
- The export control regulations would have to be exacting but unequivocal, clear and practicable for industry and public administration. This applies especially to the treatment of so-called dual-use goods.
- State agencies must also be prepared to assume responsibility. If sensitive goods are misused by enterprises in third countries or by third countries themselves, the EC must employ diplomatic or commercial policy instruments to help implement the aims of its export control regulations.

Varying Regulations Are Not Acceptable

In the opinion of Daimler-Benz, after introduction of the EC internal market such a uniform European export controls should be extended to all of western Europe in a next step. The export of sensitive goods, technologies, and services worldwide is subject to varying national

regulations and procedures. This state of affairs stands in the way of a logical European security policy and is economically "intolerable" for the affected industry. A renunciation of the production of military goods would be incompatible with the democratic and constitutional defense mission, would lead to a factual and political dependence on foreign suppliers, and would inflict substantial damage on the economy. Implementation of restrictive regulations in only one country would have only a very limited effect on the world order as long as the other most important developed countries were not included.

FRANCE

Ministry Announces Nuclear Test in Mururoa

AU0705180991 Paris AFP in English 1740 GMT
7 May 91

[Text] Paris, May 7 (AFP)—France on 7 May carried out a nuclear test on the Polynesian atoll of Mururoa, the French Defence Ministry announced.

The blast of less than 10 kilotons took place at 1700 GMT, a statement said.

It was the first such test on French-owned Mururoa in the south Pacific this year.

GERMANY

Kohl Calls INF Destruction Policy Success

LD0605093791 Berlin ADN in German 0858 GMT
6 May 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl has said the destruction of the last intermediate-range missiles in the United States and in the Soviet Union today is also an "outstanding success of our policies". Three years after the INF Treaty came into force "land-based nuclear intermediate-range systems with a range between 500 and 5,000 km are now no longer stationed on German soil," Kohl said in Bonn today.

From the very beginning it had been the objective of his defense policy "to create peace with fewer weapons." "Without our steadfastness in this time and without our responsible security policy actions, the Soviet Union would not have been persuaded to negotiate," the chancellor stressed. After all, the INF Treaty had caused a change in Soviet foreign policy and triggered a policy of internal reforms. It was that policy that led to the overcoming of the East-West conflict and the reestablishment of German unification.

Reports, Commentary on Continuing Troop Withdrawals**Genscher on Soviet Accord**

LD0605132891 LD0605103191 Berlin ADN in German 1046 GMT 6 May 91

[Excerpts] Bonn (ADN)—The agreement on conditions for the limited stay and modalities of the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops ratified today is a decisive contribution to the fundamental new start in German-Soviet relations after the year of German unity, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said today. [passage omitted]

According to the Foreign Office, 30,000 Soviet soldiers have already left Germany. A total of 100,000 military personnel and 50,000 civilians are to follow in 1991. That is just over 25 percent of the total. Thirty percent of the forces are to be withdrawn each year in 1992 and 1993. The remaining personnel are to follow in 1994. "We want the Soviet forces to leave our country with friendly feelings," the minister stressed. There have been enough bitter experiences in the past 50 years.

Military Vehicles Converted

LD0605174991 Hamburg DPA in German 1506 GMT 6 May 91

[Text] Neubrandenburg (DPA)—The first Soviet armored personnel carriers (APCs) of the BMP-1 type have been converted to Bundeswehr standard in Neubrandenburg. According to the Bundeswehr on Monday, these APC's are one of the few weapons systems from the former National People's Army's reserves that will, for the time being, be taken over and used by the Bundeswehr. However, conversion is necessary due to the higher safety requirements on operating the vehicle, its roadworthiness, and environmental protection.

According to the statement, around 760 vehicles will be converted. The once largest tank repair firm in Europe will now be run by the System, Instandsetzungs und Verwertungsgesellschaft mbH [System, Repair and Valuation Company Limited], part of the Diehl group. The group's main task will be to take over the scrapping of weapon systems.

Soviet, NATO Troop Withdrawal Viewed

AU0305084391 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 2 May 91 p 5

[Ingo Preissler report: "Legacy of the Cold War"]

[Text] Not too long ago no one would have thought it possible: Within the next four to six years a disarmament process will be taking place in Germany resulting in a reduction of domestic and foreign soldiers on German territory from more than 1.3 million to probably below 500,000. After German unification and the collapse of

the Warsaw Pact as an opponent in the race for strategic positions, Washington, London, and Paris, too, have made decisions about the partial or complete withdrawal of their troops from the old laender.

After the decades of adhering to rigid positions in the East-West poker game, the military in Germany is facing times of a difficulty previously unknown. The soldiers of the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army formerly numbering 580,000, will turn into German forces that will be reduced to 370,000 by 1994, and it can already be predicted that this will not be the end of the personnel reduction.

Moscow made this intermediate goal the precondition for the withdrawal of its own troops from the territory of its late ally, the GDR. A total of 388,000 army members plus about 120,000 civilian employees and relatives will return to the Soviet Union by 1994 and are facing an uncertain future. This is not changed by the German help—for instance in the construction of apartments for the returning soldiers—which was negotiated in connection with the withdrawal.

"Gradual Return" of the French

Overshadowed by this much discussed development, it was almost forgotten that tens of thousands of foreign soldiers are sitting on their packed suitcases also in the old laender, even though in smaller numbers and under different political banners. The situation is clearest concerning the French. As early as last September their President Francois Mitterrand announced the "gradual return" of his troops from the FRG; a decision about the future of the German-French brigade has not yet been made. By 1 September 1991 the French forces in Germany will be "restructured," as a result of which 10,148 military posts—above all in the 3d and 5th Tank Division in the middle and southern stationing area between the Palatinate Forest and Lake Constance—will be abolished. Consequently, more than 700 civilian employees and more than 3,700 relatives will return home. It will not be long before further decisions are made in reducing the forces.

So far, the British have been largely undecided. Even though it is already certain that half of the approximately 70,000 officers and soldiers of the Rhine Army will leave the barracks by 1995, it is still considered "top secret"—apart from a few exceptions—which installations will be specifically affected. Recklinghausen and Krefeld will be closed down at the end of September; in 1992, forces will be withdrawn from Willich and Wildenrath Airport.

The most comprehensive reductions are planned by the Americans on the basis of their "European Base Alignment Plan," the project of restructuring U.S. locations in Europe, which goes hand in hand with newly determining the strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance.

During the time of East-West confrontation, 245,000 U.S. soldiers were stationed at the front line on West German territory. Within the next few years, troops will

be reduced not only to the 195,000 soldiers that were agreed on in Vienna but to a far smaller contingent. Defense Secretary Cheney has already spoken of a ground force strength amounting to that of a corps with two divisions—this would be 70,000 to 100,000 men. In Bonn, insiders did not rule out the possibility that the overall number of U.S. forces in Germany might be around 60,000 soldiers in the future.

135 U.S. Bases Close Their Doors

For the time being, Washington has announced the complete or partial closing down of 135 military installations in Germany. These are mainly smaller bases with a maximum of 230 soldiers each, including those in Goeppingen, Mannheim, Nuremberg, Worms, Zweibruecken, Semach, Fulda, Grafenwoehr, Bamberg, Giessen, and Karlsruhe, as well as a number of "border camps" along the former inner-German border. For the peace movement it is at least a partial success that the closed down bases also include bases that were "hotly contested" in the past, such as Schwaebisch-Gmuend with the former Pershing missile base of Mutlangen.

A Complete Lack of Conversion Schemes

As desirable as the reduction of the military potential on German soil is, just as clear become the problems resulting from the reduction of the troops of the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada. Already this year thousands of civilian German employees will lose their jobs in the old laender. Among the British forces alone 2,000 of a total of 16,000 will be affected in 1991. In highly militarized regions, such as Rhineland-Palatinate, 24,600 Germans are on the payroll of the Allies, in particular of the Americans. Since in Rhineland-Palatinate and also in Baden-Wuerttemberg regional structures are strongly dependent on military installations and quite a number of communities are completely dependent on them, fears are rising that just those areas that had to suffer for decades under the burdens of exercises and flights might now become some kind of "victims" of military detente. The efforts of the trade unions to bring about a long-term alleviation of the predictable harsh changes with a program for creating alternative jobs and through investments in infrastructure have so far fallen on deaf ears in Bonn.

Genscher Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU1305201691 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
7 May 91 p 2

[DDP Report: "To Date, 30,000 Soviet Troops Have Left Germany"]

[Text] Bonn—With the exchange of the ratification instruments in Moscow yesterday, the German-Soviet treaty on the deployment and withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Germany has entered into force. The Foreign Ministry in Bonn stated on this occasion that thereby the so-called transition agreement has also become effective.

Under the two agreements, the troops must be fully withdrawn by the end of 1994.

To date, roughly 30,000 Soviet troops have left Germany. By 1991 about 100,000 military personnel and 50,000 civilian members—25 percent of the entire contingent—will pull out.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party) said in connection with the exchange of the ratification instruments that he was satisfied that legal security was now definitely established. Since German unity was completed on 3 October, the treaty had only been applied provisionally. According to Genscher, however, the past seven months have demonstrated "that the spirit of understanding and the will for cooperation, which marked the negotiations on the treaty, have also marked its application."

Genscher added that individual incidents, which could hardly have been prevented, given the large size of the Soviet troop contingent, have "remained side issues."

Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Cottbus 12 May

AU1405110591 Berlin DER MORGEN in German
8-9 May 91 p 17

[H. Kaschke report: "Soviet Garrison To Be Cleared Out by Friday"]

[Excerpt] Cottbus—On Sunday [12 May] Colonel Borrisov, regiment chief of the largest Soviet garrison in the Cottbus area, will leave Germany by plane. With him the last soldiers of the paratrooper unit, which consisted of more than 3,000 men, are to leave their base in the Cottbus district of Sachsendorf by the weekend.

Since the land routes through Poland are too expensive for the Soviets and the Bonn Government provides only 800 km of roads suitable for tanks for the planned withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Germany, most troops return home by ship. [passage omitted]

Bush Call for Chemical Weapons Ban Welcomed

LD1505081291 Berlin ADN in German 0715 GMT
15 May 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher welcomed George Bush's call for a disarmament conference in Geneva to decide on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons as a significant step toward banning these particularly horrible weapons of mass destruction. The Federal Government unreservedly supports the president's call to find a solution to all the important issues in Geneva by the end of this year and to bring the negotiations to a close within 12 months, said Genscher on Wednesday in Bonn. The German delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, as coordinator this year, will do all it can to achieve this aim.

ITALY

Andreotti, Woerner Discuss NATO Strategy

*AU0305091191 Rome ANSA in English 0816 GMT
3 May 91*

[Text] Rome, 3 May (ANSA)—The future strategies of the Atlantic Alliance, in view of the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe, with special regard to the process underway within the European Community in the areas of security and defense, were at the center of the separate talks NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner had here Thursday [2 May], with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis.

In their talks, both Andreotti and Woerner agreed on the need for NATO to meet the new challenges it must face by reinforcing its internal links, in particular between the United States and Europe. They also shared the view that NATO, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in general, must remain one of the irreplaceable pillars, which guarantee political and military stability in the West.

During their talks, a spokesman for the Prime Minister's Office said, Andreotti and the NATO chief also reviewed the prospects for negotiations to ban chemical weapons and for the further reductions of nuclear and conventional armaments. In particular, the two men focused on the need, especially for weapons of mass destruction, for the greatest control possible. A high level NATO summit is expected to be held next fall for an in-depth review of progress made in this area and what remains to be done.

In view of the NATO summit this fall, both Andreotti and Woerner expressed their hope that the current

situation in the Soviet Union be clarified and that the consensus achieved by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (?abroad) for his perestroika reform program, be also achieved at home.

Particular attention was paid, during the talks at the prime minister's office, to a united Europe's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a sensitive issue in the process which has begun for European political union (EPU) in the fields of security and defense.

In the talks at the Foreign Ministry, Woerner and De Michelis discussed the need to revise NATO strategies, for which an ad hoc committee has been created under the supervision of the Atlantic Council.

For his part, De Michelis observed that "the special transatlantic relationship will remain a fundamental element in the European Community's view of security matters."

SWITZERLAND

Red Cross Calls For Ban on Laser Weapons

*LD0305220591 Bern International Service
in English 2130 GMT 3 May 91*

[Text] The all-Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] has called for international legislation banning the use of laser weapons in armed conflicts.

ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga told a news conference in Geneva that the organization was concerned at studies which showed that laser weapons could be used to deliberately blind enemy troops.

He said that ICRC had organized three meetings with international experts to discuss the impact and control of laser weapons, however, Mr. Sommaruga said there was still a long way to go before there could be international legislation on the weapons.