

July 1998

# Operation Joint Endeavor Research Project Final Report

Diane M. Foley  
and  
Alma G. Steinberg



Special Report 38



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United States Army Research Institute  
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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**United States Army Research Institute  
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# FOREWORD



*The U.S. Army Research Institute participated in a large-scale, multi-organization research project examining the experiences of soldiers deployed in support of Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) in Bosnia and the related experiences of their families. The purpose of this report is to (a) provide an overview of the OJE research project; (b) provide a reference list of the research products resulting from the project; and (c) describe ARI's key findings regarding soldier and family attitudes toward their experiences in the OJE deployment.*

*The research findings are based on surveys and interviews conducted with soldiers deployed in earlier phases of OJE and with spouses of deployed soldiers. Portions of the research findings have been briefed to the senior leadership of the Army.*

*Edgar M. Johnson  
Director*

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research reported here would not have been possible without the exceptional support and commitment of many individuals. First, considerable credit goes to the Research Planning and Coordination Group who, as representatives of the research partners, invested a tremendous amount of effort in leading and coordinating this challenging research project. Key members of this group included Dr. Paul Gade and LTC Kurt Langenwalter, ARI; COL Robert Gifford, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research; LTC Mary Westmoreland, Office, Chief of the Army Reserve; and CPT Michael Stewart, Army National Guard.

We are very grateful to the many individuals who devoted considerable time and energy to researching the issues covered in this report. Particularly noteworthy are Dr. Bruce Bell and researchers at the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit – Europe, who dedicated tremendous effort to researching the experiences of families during OJE. Substantial credit also goes to Dr. Beverly Harris, Dr. Jacquelyn Scarville, Dr. Sharon Ardison, Mr. Richard Maisano, and Dr. Halim Ozkaptan, who demonstrated solid commitment to examining soldier attitudes about the deployment for OJE. Finally, we extend our sincere appreciation to the many U.S. Army soldiers and spouses who provided thoughtful and candid responses to our interviews and surveys.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## **Research Requirement:**

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) was directed to coordinate behavioral and behavioral-related health research in connection with Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE). The research requirement was to examine a variety of soldier and family issues related to performance of soldiers in the OJE deployment and the impact of the deployment on soldiers and their families. ARI's portion of this research effort included examining soldier and family attitudes toward their OJE deployment experiences.

## **Procedure:**

Soldier and family attitudes toward their OJE deployment experiences were examined using surveys and interviews. Soldier surveys were administered before, during, and after deployment in support of OJE. Soldier interviews were conducted after soldiers returned from deployment to the Bosnia region. Topics in the soldier surveys and interviews included training, leadership, job tasks, quality of life, impact of deployment, and morale.

Spouse surveys and interviews were conducted with spouses of Germany-based soldiers who were deployed to the Bosnia region. Topics in the spouse surveys and interviews included attitudes toward OJE, impact of deployment on their personal situation, support from the Army, and family adjustment.

## **Findings:**

Findings are presented for Active Component (AC) soldiers deployed to Bosnia, Reserve Component (RC) soldiers who served as backfill in Germany, and spouses whose soldier deployed to the Bosnia region. Each of these groups said the deployment experience had areas of success and areas needing improvement.

AC soldiers felt they were well prepared for their deployment to Bosnia, and were generally satisfied with many quality of life factors. They saw positive consequences of the deployment in terms of their financial situation, future promotion, and civilian job/career. However, they saw negative consequences for their children, their marriage, and the likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation. Many cited examples of poor leadership they experienced in Bosnia and also questioned why they were required to perform tasks that were not part of their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Finally, some said they would have liked a bit more culture-specific preparation.

RC soldiers also felt they were well prepared for serving as backfill in Germany and were generally satisfied with the quality of life in Germany. Most said they spent their time performing their primary (MOS)/Specialty. They tended to report positive consequences of their OJE deployment in terms of their Army career, physical health, financial situation, future promotions, and level of commitment to the Army. However, they saw negative consequences of their deployment in terms of their civilian job/career. Many did not feel respected or treated as equals to the AC. Some wanted the opportunity to deploy to Bosnia rather than serve as backfill in Germany.

Spouses of Germany-based soldiers who were deployed to the Bosnia region relied heavily on various Army family support services (particularly the rear detachment and family support groups), and generally gave high marks to the services that they used. They said that their soldiers were well prepared and would make valuable contributions to the mission, but they were not very supportive of Army participation in OJE.

### **Utilization of Findings:**

This report presents issues that soldiers and families faced in their OJE deployment. Many of these issues were salient in previous deployments, and likely will re-emerge in future deployments. Awareness of the areas of success and the areas needing improvement addressed herein gives Army planners an additional tool as they continue efforts to cope with the challenges of future deployments.

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# INTRODUCTION

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In 1991, the Republic of Yugoslavia broke up, sparking a civil war among Muslims, Serbians, and Croats in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region of the former republic. On December 14, 1995, the Bosnia Peace Agreement was signed in Paris, and the conflict was officially resolved (though tensions among the formerly warring factions persisted). The United Nations then passed Security Council Resolution 1031 (also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement) which established a NATO-led, multinational force to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement. The force was called the Implementation Force (IFOR) and its mission was Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE). American participation in OJE began on December 16, 1995.


The major goals of OJE included enforcing the cease-fire, separating the formerly warring factions, achieving a degree of disarmament, and controlling the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Achieving these goals was originally expected to take about 1 year. However, as OJE progressed, it became clear that more time was going to be needed to assure that the mission goals were achieved and sustained.

The Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel directed the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) to coordinate behavioral and behavioral-related health research in connection with OJE. Specifically:

- ☑ *Coordinate all Army human dimension research activities in order to minimize intrusion and cost.*
- ☑ *Provide immediate feedback to commanders in the field.*
- ☑ *Capture lessons learned from the OJE deployment.*

Under ARI's direction, the project was carried out with various research partners, operating in several focus areas. ARI's research team, headed by Dr. Alma Steinberg and Dr. Paul Gade, met weekly with representatives of the other research partners to coordinate the project.

ARI's focus area was soldier and family attitudes about their OJE experiences. To determine soldier attitudes, surveys and interviews were conducted with Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC)<sup>1</sup> soldiers before, during, and after deployment. Family attitudes were assessed using surveys and interviews during and after deployment.



<sup>1</sup> The RC in this report refers to the United States Army Reserve-Troop Program Units (USAR-TPU), the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).



Listed below are ARI's research partners and the focus area for which each was responsible.



**WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH (WRAIR) AND UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH UNIT – EUROPE (USAMRU-E), A FORWARD LABORATORY OF THE WRAIR:** Administered surveys and conducted interviews with Army soldiers before, during, and after deployment in order to gauge soldier stress and health concerns. Collaborated with ARI on the family support survey.



**OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE ARMY RESERVE:** Administered surveys and conducted interviews with Army personnel, primarily from United States Army Reserve Troop Program Units (USAR-TPU), before and after deployment to determine the impact of mobilization.



**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD:** Administered surveys and conducted interviews with Oregon National Guard soldiers before deployment to support a feasibility study of Reserve component home station mobilization and deployment.



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) RESERVE AFFAIRS:** Will administer surveys and conduct interviews with Reserve personnel DoD-wide after redeployment to help determine the implication of mobilization experiences on personnel policies.



**VETERANS ADMINISTRATION:** Established a pre-deployment baseline of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among military personnel. Will conduct telephone interviews (in collaboration with the WRAIR) with military personnel after redeployment to examine the impact of a peace operation on PTSD.

Detailed examinations of the research conducted by each of the project partners exist in the many research products they have completed. These products are listed in the reference section at the end of this report. The reference section also lists ARI's research reports.

Reports that provide more extensive detail on the soldier and family issues discussed herein are included in the reference section. Soldier issues and recommendations for leaders based on OJE and other contingency operations are addressed in *Leaders' Guide to Contingency Operations: The Human Dimension*, (Steinberg & Foley, 1998). Important training considerations are presented in *Retention of "Peace Support Operations" Tasks During Bosnia Deployment: A Basis for Refresher Training* (Wisher, Sabol, & Ozkaptan, 1996). Family issues are examined in *USAREUR Family Support During Operation Joint Endeavor: Summary Report* (Bell, Bartone, Bartone, Schumm, & Gade, 1997), written by ARI researchers in collaboration with USAMRU-E.

The focus of the remainder of this report is to highlight the major findings of ARI's inquiries regarding the attitudes of soldiers and families about their experiences during the OJE deployment. First, the research sample and design are described. Next, findings organized around 7 issues are presented. The conclusion follows, summarizing the major research findings and discussing some of their implications.

# RESEARCH SAMPLE AND DESIGN

## Soldier and Family Samples

ARI's attitude and opinion research about OJE experiences relied largely on survey and interview data. The research samples were AC and RC soldiers deployed in support of OJE, and spouses of deployed AC soldiers. Samples were drawn primarily from the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division (1<sup>st</sup> AD) in Germany and the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Vicenza, Italy — both of which are part of the United States Army, Europe and the Seventh Army (USAREUR). Some soldiers from the Continental United States (CONUS) were also included in the samples.



The following section describes the soldier and family support surveys and interviews. Each of the descriptions provides additional information about the specific samples used in the survey or interview.

## Design of Data Collection



### Soldier Surveys

A set of surveys was designed to assess attitudes and experiences of soldiers before, during, and after their OJE deployment. Topics for these surveys included training and preparation; work experiences; quality of life; stress and morale; leadership; impact of deployment on personal situation; commitment to the Army; and career intentions. Most survey items were rated using multipoint response scales. In addition, soldiers answering the surveys could (and did) make their own written comments.

Soldier surveys were administered to enlisted soldiers and officers in the AC, USAR-TPU, ARNG, and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Soldiers who completed the surveys deployed either to the Bosnia region or to Germany (where they served as backfill for the units that had deployed to the Bosnia region). The following are brief descriptions of the pre-, during, and post-deployment surveys.

The pre-deployment survey was administered to AC, USAR-TPU, and ARNG soldiers before they deployed in support of OJE. The CONUS administration sites were Ft. Dix and Ft. Benning; the German administration site was at the 7<sup>th</sup> Army Training Center. Surveys were administered between January and March 1996. A total of 782 soldiers completed this survey.

The during deployment survey was administered primarily to AC soldiers. The large majority of respondents were in Bosnia or Hungary. The survey was given in June and July 1996 to 2,552 soldiers.

The post-deployment survey was administered to soldiers who had completed their OJE deployment to the Bosnia region or Germany. Surveys were administered to (a) AC, USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldiers at redeployment sites in Geissen or Babenhausen from June 1996 to July 1997; (b) AC soldiers in Italy (June 1996); and (c) soldiers in Germany (January - February 1997). A total of 4,455 soldiers completed this survey.

The dynamic and unpredictable nature of deployments required that surveys be administered to soldiers who were available at each of the administration sites. This "convenience" sampling (rather than random sampling) resulted in underrepresentation of some groups of soldiers and prevented generalizability of their survey responses. For example, few RC soldiers who were deployed to Bosnia completed the surveys, thereby preventing inclusion of RC data in analyses of soldiers who were deployed in Bosnia. Two groups of respondents were adequately represented, therefore allowing for generalizability of their responses in this report. These groups are:

- AC enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers who deployed to Bosnia.
- USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers who were assigned as backfill in Germany.

Because these 2 groups experienced very different deployment conditions, their responses are presented separately. Below are the sample sizes for the respondents used in analyses in this report.

	<b>enlisted soldiers</b>	<b>officers</b>
AC	1,860	161
USAR-TPU	355	237
ARNG	475	44
IRR	68	89



## **Soldier Interviews**

Interviews were conducted with 484 AC soldiers shortly after they were redeployed to their home stations. All had served in the Bosnia region. Interviews were conducted with soldiers in Italy (June 1996) and Germany (January to February 1997).

Post-deployment interviews included questions addressing their experiences before, during, and after the deployment. Questions focusing on pre-deployment asked about training and preparation. During deployment questions included topics, such as job tasks, contact with others (e.g., media, local civilians, RC soldiers), equipment, rules of engagement, rumors, leadership, discipline, and stress and morale while they were in the Bosnia region. Questions focusing on post-deployment asked about career intentions, unit readiness, lessons learned, and morale after returning from the Bosnia region.



## **Family Support Survey**

The family support survey was administered to USAREUR-based spouses of soldiers in units that had deployed in support of OJE. Surveys were distributed between April and June 1996 to spouses of soldiers who had gone to the Bosnia region early in the deployment. Topics for the family support survey included attitudes toward OJE; communication with spouse; impact of deployment on personal situation; sources of information about spouse and OJE; support from the Army; and family adjustment. In addition to rating survey items using multipoint response scales, respondents were also provided with space to make written comments.

Most of the respondents completed the survey during the time that their soldier was deployed; some completed the survey after their soldier had redeployed. In addition, a small number of surveys were completed by spouses whose soldiers had not deployed. A total of 1,706 surveys were completed. Analyses presented

in this report reflect the responses of spouses (904 enlisted soldier spouses and 341 commissioned officer spouses) whose soldiers were deployed to Bosnia, Hungary, or Croatia at the time of survey administration.



## **Family Support Interviews**

Interviews were conducted with spouses of Army soldiers based in USAREUR during their soldier's OJE deployment. Additional interviews were conducted with members of Army family support systems (e.g., family support group, rear detachment). A total of 257 interviews were conducted in select battalions in Germany (April-May 1996) and Italy (June 1996).

Topics included in the family support interviews were availability of family programs; quality of family programs; family difficulties arising from the deployment; and recommendations for improving family services.

# Findings

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The findings from the soldier and family support surveys and interviews are organized around the following seven issues:

- Training and Preparation
- Assessment of Leaders
- Soldier Tasks
- Quality of Life
- Impact of Deployment
- Army Support for Families
- Family Attitudes about OJE

The first five are predominately soldier issues that are based on data from the soldier surveys and interviews. The issues reflect soldier attitudes about various aspects of their OJE deployment. Each of these issues is divided into two sections. The first section reflects findings for AC soldiers deployed to Bosnia. The second section reflects findings for USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldiers assigned to backfill positions in Germany. Note again that because these 2 groups experienced very different deployment conditions, their responses are presented separately.

The last two issues are family issues based on data from the family support survey and interviews. The first issue deals with attitudes about Army family support services. The second issue deals with spouse opinions toward the OJE mission.

# TRAINING AND PREPARATION



## AC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO BOSNIA

In both interviews and surveys, most AC soldiers said they felt they had received the right amount of training for the deployment to Bosnia (see Figure 1). Soldiers gave particularly high marks to training that helped them perform common tasks (e.g., first aid, map reading, marksmanship); perform small-unit, team tasks; understand the Rules of Engagement; and perform OJE mission-specific tasks (e.g., mine awareness, cold weather tasks) (see Figure 2). Note that enlisted soldiers and officers tended to provide similar ratings of their training for Bosnia.



Despite overall satisfaction with pre-deployment training, soldiers faced some situations for which they felt they needed more preparation in (a) dealing with local children who approached moving vehicles, checkpoints, and the perimeter to beg, talk, or play; (b) communicating peaceful language phrases with friendly local civilians; (c) living and working in the extremely muddy conditions they encountered; and (d) counseling soldiers with family problems that occurred during the deployment. Soldiers suggested that training could be fine-tuned to be further responsive to the specific conditions they encountered during deployment.

In addition, some soldiers were concerned about advanced preparation in terms of logistics, especially for the first few weeks of deployment. They emphasized the importance of having equipment/supplies to cope with the terrain and climate, having sufficient replacement parts on hand, and providing for the soldiers. For example, one soldier said, "My unit went for nearly 48 hours without latrines. Once in the Tuzla area, no one knew where we were supposed to be or who could support us. These are just a few examples of the extremely poor planning in the initial phase of this deployment. The living conditions have improved remarkably."

**FIGURE 1** Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed to Bosnia who said...




	ENLISTED	OFFICERS
<b>They received OJE mission-specific training at:</b>		
home station .....	53 .....	58
5-day Stability Operations Course at CMTC .....	66 .....	65
<b>They received training at their home station and it was...</b>		
about right .....	64 .....	74
more than needed .....	25 .....	15
<b>They received training at the 5-day Stability Operations Course at CMTC and it was...</b>		
about right .....	65 .....	65
more than needed .....	25 .....	30

**FIGURE 2**



**Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers who said pre-deployment training prepared them well to do each of the following**



***IN SOLDIERS' WORDS***

*"Make training at CMTTC more relevant to actual situation in Bosnia. The soldiers acting as fractional soldiers were unrealistic. CMTTC personnel should actually go into sector to get full benefit."*

*"Train more on dealing with civilians."*

*"May help to know customs of country of assignment. This is not covered by any training."*

*"Make sure mission training is specific to area deployed. Should not need down range training for deployment to central region."*





## RC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY

USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldiers also felt their pre-deployment training prepared them for their assignment as backfill in Germany. Some soldiers suggested that additional training on German culture and language would have been helpful. Figure 3 presents survey responses to questions relevant to training for backfill positions.

USAR-TPU and IRR soldiers tended to provide similar assessments of the training they had received. In the ARNG, there were some differences in the percentages of enlisted soldiers and officers who said different aspects of their pre-deployment training prepared them for their deployment to Germany.

**FIGURE 3** Percentages of RC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed as backfill to Germany who said...



	USAR-TPU ENLISTED/OFFICERS	ARNG ENLISTED/OFFICERS	IRR ENLISTED/OFFICERS
<b>They received OJE mission-specific training at:</b>			
home station .....	59 / 63	81 / 52	32 / 10
CONUS pre-deployment site .....	52 / 75	58 / 64	66 / 80
<b>They received training at their home station and it was...</b>			
about right .....	64 / 68	63 / 86	*
more than needed .....	26 / 25	23 / 14	*
<b>They received training at their CONUS pre-deployment site and it was...</b>			
about right .....	63 / 55	47 / 42	54 / 56
more than needed .....	28 / 34	40 / 54	35 / 38
<b>Pre-deployment training prepared them well to:</b>			
perform their mission tasks .....	63 / 75	69 / 79	77 / 67
work with military personnel from other U.S. services .....	76 / 79	75 / 89	88 / 83
perform OJE mission-specific tasks .....	58 / 59	63 / 79	77 / 77
perform small-unit, team tasks .....	81 / 78	83 / 76	79 / 85
perform common tasks .....	81 / 79	87 / 91	84 / 86

\* Few IRR soldiers received this training.

# ASSESSMENT OF LEADERS



## AC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO BOSNIA

AC soldiers cited examples of both good and poor leadership during their deployment to Bosnia. They said good leaders stood up for and supported soldiers, spent time with soldiers out of concern rather than obligation, and occasionally pitched in to help soldiers with assigned details. Soldiers thought these actions demonstrated teamwork and caring.



Soldiers said poor leaders told subordinate leaders both what to do and how to do it, made decisions at higher levels that should have been made at lower levels, bypassed the chain of command and went directly to the soldiers, ordered subordinates to “Just do it, don’t ask why,” and did not trust subordinate leaders to get things done correctly. Soldiers identified many of these behaviors as micro-management. One soldier wrote, “Micro-management shows lack of faith in soldiers and destroys unit morale” (see Figure 4). Many soldiers felt that micro-management interfered with their job performance.

Other examples that soldiers saw as poor leadership included jeopardizing soldier safety, requiring soldiers to violate rules, requiring soldiers to present a false impression for visiting VIPs, enhancing leader comfort at the expense of soldiers, and breaching soldier confidentiality. For the soldiers, these leader behaviors created ethical concerns.

Responses to surveys provided further insight regarding soldier perceptions of leaders during deployment to Bosnia. Overall, fewer enlisted soldiers than officers said their unit leaders were very good at leadership skills. Few enlisted soldiers felt that Army leaders put Army values into practice to a great extent, or felt it was easy to work with their unit leaders (see Figures 4 and 5). Field grade officers were frequently seen as mostly concerned about their own careers, rather than about the mission or their troops.

**FIGURE 4**

**Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed to Bosnia who said...**




	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>
<i>Micro-management interfered a moderate amount or a lot with performing their Army job</i> .....	64	58
<i>Their unit leaders were very good/excellent in:</i>		
supervision .....	33	47
technical skills .....	32	53
delegating .....	26	34
influencing others to accomplish the mission .....	25	47
working with higher level leaders .....	24	47
trusting subordinates .....	23	38
caring about soldiers .....	22	37
integrity .....	21	46
communication skills .....	20	34
empowering lower level leaders .....	18	33
caring about Army families .....	17	35
rewarding initiative .....	12	33
<i>Army leaders put Army values into practice to a great/very great extent</i> .....	26	44
<i>Most members of each of the following rank groups were concerned about the mission and the welfare of their troops:</i>		
Junior NCOs .....	68	77
Senior NCOs .....	46	70
Company grade officers .....	35	70
Field grade officers .....	29	50
<i>Most members of each of the following rank groups were mostly concerned about their career:</i>		
Junior NCOs .....	12	2
Senior NCOs .....	21	6
Company grade officers .....	33	6
Field grade officers .....	44	23

**FIGURE 5**



**Percentages of enlisted soldiers and officers who said it was easy/very easy to work with their unit leaders**



***IN SOLDIERS' WORDS***

*"The Army rewards those leaders who put their careers first by advancing their careers. But the soldiers will perceive this and lose any sense of personal loyalty."*

*"Leaders better get their priorities off looking good for their next promotion and start thinking of their soldiers' welfare."*

*"When a full-bird colonel is conducting weapon site inspections instead of a specially trained long-range surveillance team doing it, it sends a bad message that we don't trust our subordinate units or their leaders."*

*"Listen to your lower enlisted — just because they wear a different piece of metal on their collar doesn't make them stupid. Before telling them to stop crying and drive on, look and listen."*



## RC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY

USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldier survey responses reflected their opinions about their leaders during their deployment as backfill to Germany (see Figure 6). Over one half of USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR enlisted felt that micro-management interfered with their job performance. A soldier commented that “Many mid-level NCOs were prevented from making decisions and were not allowed to develop plans of attack on tasks. They were told exactly what to do and watched closely while they did their tasks.”

Overall, fewer enlisted soldiers than officers said their unit leaders were very good at leadership skills. Army leaders were not generally seen as putting Army values into practice to a great extent. Few ARNG enlisted said it was easy to work with their unit leaders (see Figure 5).

There was widespread discontent with the amount of respect RC soldiers received from AC leaders and soldiers. One soldier summarized this sentiment as follows: “Our active duty hosts did not recognize us as ‘real’ soldiers, thereby not allowing our talented and well-trained soldiers to perform their job without a certain amount of ridicule and harassment.” RC soldiers frequently used disrespectful terms such as “second-class citizens” or “red-headed stepchildren” to describe how the AC made them feel.

About 34% of USAR-TPU, 45% of ARNG, and 33% of IRR enlisted soldiers said that company grade and field grade officers were concerned mostly about their own careers, rather than about the mission or their troops. Over one third of ARNG enlisted also said this about senior NCOs. One soldier wrote, “All officers need to do their jobs based on the mission requirements and not their own personal agenda. ‘We’ must replace ‘me’.”

Finally, RC soldiers felt they were not sufficiently recognized for their dedication and sacrifices. They suggested that the AC leadership did not understand that RC soldiers “had to leave families and jobs and lives to come over here.”

**FIGURE 6**



**Percentages of RC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed as backfill to Germany who said...**

	USAR-TPU ENLISTED/OFFICERS	ARNG ENLISTED/OFFICERS	IRR ENLISTED/OFFICERS
<b>Micro-management interfered a moderate amount or a lot with performing their Army job</b> .....	56 / 44	60 / 50	53 / 53
<b>Their unit leaders were very good/excellent in:</b>			
supervision .....	30 / 49	25 / 40	34 / 45
technical skills .....	33 / 52	26 / 54	35 / 44
delegating .....	28 / 45	21 / 42	24 / 46
influencing others to accomplish the mission .....	24 / 44	20 / 40	26 / 35
working with higher level leaders .....	32 / 49	22 / 46	32 / 49
trusting subordinates .....	27 / 47	20 / 31	28 / 38
caring about soldiers .....	24 / 42	17 / 31	26 / 32
integrity .....	23 / 51	21 / 40	25 / 39
communication skills .....	23 / 46	15 / 33	26 / 32
empowering lower level leaders .....	24 / 40	16 / 29	22 / 28
caring about Army families .....	25 / 46	18 / 37	21 / 34
rewarding initiative .....	20 / 42	14 / 27	20 / 27
<b>Army leaders put Army values into practice to a great/very great extent</b> .....	25 / 40	22 / 29	25 / 26
<b>Most members of the following rank groups were concerned about the mission and the welfare of their troops:</b>			
Junior NCOs .....	62 / 69	53 / 61	49 / 72
Senior NCOs .....	45 / 65	39 / 58	46 / 60
Company grade officers .....	36 / 63	31 / 66	37 / 52
Field grade officers .....	37 / 54	31 / 44	39 / 35
<b>Most members of the following rank groups were mostly concerned about their career:</b>			
Junior NCOs .....	15 / 8	23 / 13	16 / 11
Senior NCOs .....	24 / 13	35 / 16	28 / 14
Company grade officers .....	29 / 14	46 / 13	29 / 12
Field grade officers .....	38 / 27	44 / 31	37 / 49

# SOLDIER TASKS



## AC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO BOSNIA

In interviews and surveys, AC soldiers reported spending a great deal of time performing tasks from their MOS/Specialties (see Figure 7). They also reported spending a lot of time doing what they considered to be non-MOS/Specialty-specific tasks (e.g., guard duty, tasks from other MOSs). In fact, in interviews, they frequently described their primary tasks as pulling guard duty, filling sandbags, and doing tasks they considered belonging to a different MOS.

Many soldiers felt overburdened by guard duty, sandbag details, and four-vehicle convoy requirements because they did them in addition to their MOS tasks. They often believed that they were doing far more work than their unit could support and suggested that other units/MOSs were getting away with relatively little to do. Interestingly, many of these other units also reported feeling overburdened by work requirements.

Soldiers questioned why they were required to do many of the tasks they performed in Bosnia. They also complained about having to do work that they saw as not really needed, but assigned just to keep them busy or to make their leaders look good. For example, sometimes they were required to do work they considered already completed (such as refilling sandbags, tearing down and rebuilding bunkers, and repositioning concertina wire) and to do additional missions for which their unit leaders volunteered. One soldier suggested, "Instead of doing

busy work, let soldiers relax for half the day. It will boost morale."

At the same time, many soldiers did indicate that there were significant periods of time in which they had little to do. Over one half of enlisted soldiers and one third of officers reported that they often spent their time waiting around (see Figure 8).




Soldiers — both enlisted and officers — also reported that they were frequently bored during their Bosnia deployment. About 41% said that boredom interfered a moderate amount to a lot with performing their Army job.

**FIGURE 7** Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed to Bosnia who said...



	ENLISTED	OFFICERS
<i>They often/very often spent their time doing each of the following:</i>		
guard duty .....	71	10
their primary MOS/Specialty tasks .....	66	78
small-unit, team tasks .....	49	45
tasks from other MOS/Specialties .....	43	43
task details .....	40	6
common tasks .....	36	42
manning a checkpoint .....	32	11
OJE mission-specific tasks .....	31	23
 <i>Boredom interfered a moderate amount or a lot with performing their Army job</i> .....		
	46	37

**FIGURE 8** Percentages of enlisted soldiers and officers who said they often/very often spent their time waiting around







## RC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY

USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldiers also answered survey questions about the use of their time during deployment as backfill to Germany (see Figure 9). Overall, the majority of these soldiers said they often spent their time doing their primary MOS/Specialty tasks.

Some RC soldiers who said they felt poorly utilized during their deployment objected to being placed in backfill positions instead of being sent to Bosnia. In a survey comment, one soldier wrote, "The Army doesn't think the RC is good enough to handle Regular Army duties and keeps us from being a direct part of operations. We're just backfill."

About one third of RC soldiers said they often spent their deployment time waiting around (see Figure 8). ARNG enlisted soldiers were more likely to say this.

More USAR-TPU enlisted soldiers than officers reported that boredom interfered a moderate amount to a lot with performing their Army job, but this imbalance did not hold true for ARNG and IRR soldiers. About 36% of ARNG and about 28% of IRR soldiers reported that boredom interfered with their work.

**FIGURE 9** *Percentages of RC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed as backfill to Germany who said...*



	<b>USAR-TPU</b>	<b>ARNG</b>	<b>IRR</b>
	<b>ENLISTED/OFFICERS</b>	<b>ENLISTED/OFFICERS</b>	<b>ENLISTED/OFFICERS</b>
<i><b>They often/very often spent their time doing each of the following:</b></i>			
their primary MOS/Specialty tasks .....	72 / 80 .....	87 / 74 .....	60 / 63
small-unit, team tasks .....	31 / 16 .....	31 / 27 .....	27 / 14
tasks from other MOS/Specialties .....	41 / 33 .....	24 / 29 .....	44 / 39
task details .....	18 / 1 .....	14 / 2 .....	20 / 8
 <i><b>Boredom interfered a moderate amount or a lot with performing their Army job</b></i> .....			
	32 / 22 .....	37 / 35 .....	30 / 25



## AC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO BOSNIA

Quality of life (QOL) experiences of AC soldiers in Bosnia differed both by location to which they were deployed (e.g., base camp, remote location) and by the date of deployment. For example, about 39% of soldiers who arrived in Bosnia before March 1996 reported having a hot shower and/or a hot meal in the first week of deployment; over 95% of those who arrived after April 1996 said this.

In part, soldiers made their assessment of QOL conditions in Bosnia relative to their own past experiences and to those of others. For instance, they compared their QOL conditions in Bosnia to those of others in previous deployments (e.g., Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia). They also made comparisons to others who were deployed to Bosnia with them (e.g., military personnel from other IFOR countries, military personnel from other U.S. services, civilian contractors).

In considering their QOL during deployment to Bosnia, soldiers included the following: (a) living conditions (e.g., protection from harsh climate, accommodations, food, access to PX); (b) leisure activities (e.g., sports and gym facilities, Armed Forces Radio Network, live entertainment, movies/TV); (c) R&R and leave policies (e.g., emergency leave, R&R leave, R&R passes); and (d) force protection rules (e.g., alcohol restrictions, flak vest requirements).



**LIVING CONDITIONS:** Enlisted soldiers and officers tended to be satisfied with their living quarters (see Figure 10). In general, there were high levels of satisfaction with the availability of many living condition items, particularly heaters, tents with wooden floors, and hot food. Satisfaction with opportunities to personalize living space was somewhat lower than any of the other items.

**LEISURE ACTIVITIES:** Over half of the enlisted soldiers and officers were well satisfied with the availability of telephones, movies, books, and TV. Few enlisted soldiers were satisfied with the availability of e-mail.

Less than half of the enlisted soldiers and officers were satisfied with the availability of opportunities to take part in sports. Soldiers in units that organized sport activities (e.g., volleyball, basketball) said it increased morale. Barbecues and live entertainment were also cited as morale boosters.

**TIME OFF, R&R, AND LEAVE POLICIES:** Few soldiers (less than one quarter) were satisfied with the amount of time off they received during deployment. Less than one half of both enlisted soldiers and officers were satisfied with opportunities for R&R. Soldiers felt that 2 weeks of leave was too short for the length of the deployment, particularly given that they worked long hours and did not get 2-day weekends or holidays off as they would have received at home station.

Soldiers cited R&R leave as a significant morale booster, even though they said it was emotionally difficult to return to Bosnia. R&R passes to Budapest received particularly favorable reviews from soldiers.

Many soldiers were either unclear about or disagreed with the rules for R&R leave, particularly in conjunction with either emergency leave or leave under emergency conditions. For example, in some units, if a soldier had to go on emergency leave or leave under emergency conditions early in the deployment, even if only for a few days, the soldier may have been placed at the bottom of the R&R list and made to wait until everyone else had gone on R&R.

**FORCE PROTECTION RULES:** Over one half of the soldiers regarded enforcement of the rules for wearing flak vests and the restrictions on liquor as reasonable (see Figure 11). Soldiers who supported these policies suggested that they were necessary for the good of the soldiers and the unit. For example, soldiers in favor of the restriction on alcohol consumption often said it was necessary because “alcohol and guns don’t mix” and they felt this combination was a potential danger to the unit.

However, some soldiers thought some force protection requirements were too stringent. These soldiers commented that the requirement to wear full battle gear did not correspond to their perceived level of threat. Some soldiers also did not understand the logic of the rules for wearing the gear within the lodgment areas. Also, many soldiers interpreted the restriction on alcohol consumption as a sign of the Army’s lack of trust in soldiers.

***IN SOLDIERS’ WORDS***

*“The quality of life for deployed soldiers in Bosnia is extremely high, way higher than any infantryman would expect. I’m very impressed — a job well done.”*

*“Should come up with a program to introduce us to local people, eat their customary foods, sightseeing and look around a little bit.”*


*“R&R policies should be consistent and equal. If one unit has a different or more lenient policy than another, the morale of the less lenient battalion will fall.”*

**FIGURE 10** Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed to Bosnia who said...



	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>
<i>They were satisfied/very satisfied with:</i>		
laundry facility .....	70	79
their quarters .....	63	68
mail service .....	62	75
amount of time off .....	25	19
<i>They were satisfied/very satisfied with the availability of:</i>		
heaters .....	80	87
tents with wooden floors .....	76	84
hot food .....	67	87
hot showers .....	66	74
PX .....	61	70
telephone .....	60	61
movies .....	56	58
TV .....	55	55
books .....	52	60
live entertainment .....	46	43
e-mail .....	29	59
<i>They were satisfied/very satisfied with opportunities for:</i>		
R & R .....	48	42
personalizing their living space .....	42	50
participation in sports .....	41	33

**FIGURE 11** Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers who said each of the following was reasonable/very reasonable






## RC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY

Since USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldiers assigned as backfill in Germany were deployed to an existing military base, their survey responses regarding QOL (presented in Figure 12) are limited to those items relevant to experiences in an established military community.

**LIVING CONDITIONS:** Overall, soldiers tended to be satisfied with their quarters, particularly USAR-TPU and ARNG officers. Soldiers also were satisfied with opportunities to personalize their living space.

RC soldiers commonly cited inequity when they compared the benefits and pay they received to that of AC soldiers. One soldier wrote, "the RC must receive equal treatment to Active duty personnel. This did not happen in OJE. I am very disappointed with housing, pay, and overall treatment Reserve/National Guard troops received during OJE."



**LEISURE ACTIVITIES:** Overall, the majority of soldiers were satisfied with the availability of the PX, books, and movies. Compared to officers, fewer ARNG and IRR enlisted soldiers were satisfied with the availability of e-mail.

USAR-TPU and ARNG soldiers (particularly ARNG officers) were satisfied with opportunities for participation in sports. Fewer IRR soldiers were satisfied with sport opportunities.

In written survey comments, some soldiers provided examples of other leisure activities. They described spending leisure time traveling around Germany, learning the language and customs.

A number of soldiers pointed to problems with transportation from their housing to other Army facilities. One soldier wrote, "All the supporting facilities were about 10 km away from the billets. The soldiers had to rely on MP patrols and the shuttle bus to get to food or MWR activities... every effort should be made to facilitate the ability to get soldiers to the PX, commissary, bowling alley or any other supporting area."

**TIME OFF, R&R, AND LEAVE POLICIES:** The majority of USAR-TPU soldiers were satisfied with the amount of time off during deployment to Germany. Somewhat fewer ARNG and IRR soldiers were satisfied with their time off.

Overall, USAR-TPU and ARNG soldiers were satisfied with opportunities for R&R. Somewhat fewer IRR soldiers were satisfied with opportunities for R&R.

**FIGURE 12** *Percentages of RC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed as backfill to Germany who said...*



	USAR-TPU ENLISTED/OFFICERS	ARNG ENLISTED/OFFICERS	IRR ENLISTED/OFFICERS
<i>They were satisfied/very satisfied with:</i>			
laundry facility .....	81 / 79	75 / 91	70 / 74
their quarters .....	65 / 79	53 / 68	65 / 65
mail service .....	74 / 71	56 / 78	61 / 64
amount of time off .....	70 / 75	59 / 62	55 / 64
<i>They were satisfied/very satisfied with the availability of:</i>			
PX .....	72 / 81	71 / 86	68 / 71
telephone .....	76 / 74	71 / 82	70 / 68
movies .....	80 / 75	77 / 71	66 / 64
TV .....	60 / 65	64 / 70	57 / 53
books .....	82 / 83	76 / 79	64 / 73
e-mail .....	69 / 73	51 / 81	57 / 69
<i>They were satisfied/very satisfied with opportunities for:</i>			
R & R .....	71 / 74	61 / 68	58 / 56
personalizing their living space .....	68 / 71	63 / 66	61 / 64
participation in sports .....	63 / 69	64 / 82	53 / 57

# IMPACT OF DEPLOYMENT



## AC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO BOSNIA

More AC soldiers said the OJE deployment had a positive rather than a negative effect on their financial situation, future promotions, and civilian job/career (see Figure 13). Also, more officers said the deployment had a positive rather than a negative impact on their Army career.

However, more soldiers said the deployment had a negative rather than a positive effect on their children, their marriage, and likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation. Enlisted soldiers were more likely to report that the deployment negatively rather than positively affected their emotional well-being. Officers were more likely to say the deployment negatively rather than positively affected their physical health.

Soldiers overwhelmingly indicated that the length of their stay in Bosnia was too long. They offered several reasons for this belief. First, some thought it unjustified to deploy soldiers for longer than 6 months for a mission other than war. Second, deployments often occurred back-to-back with another deployment, hardship tour, or train-ups, therefore further increasing their time away from home. Third, other services and military forces of other countries had significantly shorter deployments. Fourth, soldiers felt that they should be allowed to return home when their unit mission was complete; they felt their mission was complete when their work requirements moved from mission to force protection and training. They linked the long deployment to decreased morale, increased stress, and boredom from doing the same tasks over and over.

Many soldiers suggested that attrition will increase because of the OJE experience. That is, more soldiers may leave the Army because they are concerned that long deployments may be a norm of the future. In fact, about one quarter of the soldiers said they will leave the Army sooner than planned because of their deployment to Bosnia (see Figure 14). One soldier wrote, "The Army better learn they can't keep deploying soldiers at the pace we are going. Some have been gone 2 out of the last 3 years. Most are already making plans to get out."

Finally, soldiers suggested that the combat readiness of a unit deployed for peacekeeping decreases over time. In one soldier's words, "Using the Army in this type of deployment only hurts the combat readiness of units. If we continue to become involved in such missions we will become passive and will eventually pay with blood."

### ***IN SOLDIERS' WORDS***


*"A year-long deployment for this peacetime operation is far too long and is causing more hardships on families than leaders really care to address. The psychological impact is that these various deployments, and this one long deployment in particular, are taking their toll on soldiers. Divorces and infidelity greatly increase during times like these."*

**FIGURE 13** Percentages of AC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed to Bosnia who said...



	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>
<b>The OJE deployment had a positive/very positive effect on the following aspects of their life:</b>		
financial situation .....	51	72
future promotions .....	30	43
civilian job/career .....	28	29
Army career .....	24	47
level of commitment to the Army .....	21	33
likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation .....	16	27
marriage or other significant relationship .....	15	24
emotional well-being .....	15	18
physical health .....	15	13
children .....	13	7
<b>The OJE deployment had a negative/very negative effect on the following aspects of their life:</b>		
financial situation .....	8	4
future promotions .....	14	6
civilian job/career .....	5	6
Army career .....	33	33
level of commitment to the Army .....	29	31
likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation .....	55	48
marriage or other significant relationship .....	36	39
emotional well-being .....	25	16
physical health .....	21	28
children .....	45	58

**FIGURE 14** Percentages of enlisted soldiers and officers who said they will leave the Army sooner than planned as a result of their OJE deployment







## RC SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO GERMANY

Overall, USAR-TPU, ARNG, and IRR soldiers tended to report their OJE deployment had a positive rather than a negative effect on various aspects of their lives, including their financial situation, future promotions, Army career, level of commitment to the Army, and physical health (see Figure 15). However, more soldiers tended to say the deployment had a negative rather than a positive impact on their civilian job/career. More USAR-TPU and ARNG soldiers reported that the deployment had a negative rather than a positive effect on their children.

Some soldiers suggested that greater Army reliance on the RC for non-war operations would have a negative influence on retention. One soldier wrote, "I will gladly serve in the Reserves to be available for emergency situations and war, but I cannot afford emotionally, financially, or careerwise to be available for regular peace operations which appear to be the way of the future." About 18% of USAR-TPU, 18% of ARNG, and 11% of IRR soldiers said they will leave the Army sooner than they had planned as a result of their OJE deployment (see Figure 14).

**FIGURE 15** Percentages of RC enlisted soldiers and officers deployed as backfill to Germany who said...



	USAR-TPU ENLISTED/OFFICERS	ARNG ENLISTED/OFFICERS	IRR ENLISTED/OFFICERS
<b><i>Their deployment had a positive/very positive effect on the following aspects of their life:</i></b>			
financial situation .....	42 / 31 .....	42 / 53 .....	53 / 56 .....
future promotions .....	47 / 52 .....	42 / 71 .....	46 / 54 .....
civilian job/career .....	27 / 22 .....	22 / 16 .....	35 / 21 .....
Army career .....	50 / 69 .....	37 / 66 .....	54 / 64 .....
level of commitment to the Army .....	43 / 57 .....	34 / 53 .....	47 / 59 .....
likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation .....	39 / 48 .....	24 / 38 .....	51 / 52 .....
marriage or other significant relationship .....	23 / 27 .....	20 / 31 .....	27 / 26 .....
emotional well-being .....	32 / 51 .....	23 / 27 .....	43 / 34 .....
physical health .....	32 / 43 .....	31 / 37 .....	41 / 30 .....
children .....	17 / 25 .....	13 / 14 .....	24 / 29 .....
<b><i>Their deployment had a negative/very negative effect on the following aspects of their life:</i></b>			
financial situation .....	24 / 39 .....	25 / 20 .....	19 / 16 .....
future promotions .....	11 / 7 .....	19 / 8 .....	20 / 15 .....
civilian job/career .....	29 / 49 .....	32 / 46 .....	15 / 39 .....
Army career .....	22 / 14 .....	35 / 21 .....	19 / 26 .....
level of commitment to the Army .....	18 / 17 .....	30 / 18 .....	17 / 22 .....
likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation .....	36 / 35 .....	54 / 35 .....	34 / 30 .....
marriage or other significant relationship .....	30 / 31 .....	43 / 26 .....	29 / 25 .....
emotional well-being .....	20 / 20 .....	30 / 22 .....	28 / 25 .....
physical health .....	14 / 13 .....	14 / 7 .....	17 / 21 .....
children .....	35 / 46 .....	52 / 46 .....	32 / 33 .....

# ARMY SUPPORT FOR FAMILIES



When USAREUR-based soldiers deployed to the Bosnia region for OJE, many of their spouses and families turned to Army family support services for various types of help. These services included community service agencies, the rear detachment, and family support activities and services, such as family support groups (FSGs) and the Army Family Team Building (AFTB) Program.

Use of family support services varied widely (see Figure 16). Virtually

all spouses used the military postal service, and more than half used the rear detachment, military banks, and military housing engineers. More spouses of officers than enlisted soldiers who contacted the rear detachment staff found them to be helpful. Predictably, few spouses used services that are oriented to crisis or emergency situations (e.g., Army social work, Army emergency relief). Overall, the great majority of spouses who used the Army family support services found them to be at least somewhat helpful.

Though many spouses contacted their rear detachment for help, some were disappointed with the response they received. For example, when the rear detachment referred spouses to better sources of assistance, some spouses interpreted this action as a “brush off.” This may reflect spouse confusion over rear detachment responsibilities versus those of other support agencies (e.g., the reception battalion, the FSG, community service agencies).

Though the majority of spouses contacted their FSG during the OJE deployment, spouses of enlisted soldiers and officers had somewhat different views about the FSG (see Figure 17). Fewer enlisted than officer spouses (a) said the FSGs were a helpful source of information; (b) were satisfied with the way the FSG worked during the deployment; and (c) frequently participated in the FSG activities during the deployment. Likewise, fewer enlisted than officer spouses took part in the AFTB program or thought it was helpful in preparing them for the OJE deployment.

Because rear detachments attempted to send newly arriving soldiers to the Bosnia region quickly, there sometimes was not much time for the soldier to help his/her family settle into the USAREUR community. This was particularly problematic for families that followed their soldier to USAREUR at a later date.

Some spouses felt they were “dropped at the gate of the post,” without help from their deployed soldier or the appropriate family support personnel (who often had difficulty tracking the arrival of new families). In such situations, the spouse and family were left to cope as best they could. Many suggested that the Army should recognize the greater challenges that exist for taking care of families in USAREUR because of (a) more complicated and time-consuming systems for interacting with the civilian community; (b) more dependence on the military community; and (c) less direct support available from relatives.

Several types of spouses/families were identified as particularly draining on family support services: (a) families with multiple problems (e.g., poor financial management, spouse or child abuse, substance abuse); (b) spouses who were excessively dependent on their soldier; (c) spouses who were overly demanding, expecting family support services to “fill the gap” created by the absence of the deployed spouse; and (d) families that schemed for early return of their soldier by fabricating a crisis. Though these types of spouses/families were only a small proportion of Army families, they created most of the workload for service providers in the family support system.

Once their soldiers were deployed, spouses said they were able to talk with and write to them. This indicates that the Army’s efforts to ensure good communication between soldiers and their spouses were very successful.

A large majority of spouses said that telephone calls and letters from their deployed spouse were helpful sources of information about what was happening to their spouse and unit. Few spouses said that “high tech” means of communication (e.g., e-mail, Internet) were helpful. One of the problems was that much of the “exotic” communication equipment was not available to soldiers (particularly enlisted soldiers), spouses, or both.

Spouses strongly supported R&R policies that allowed them to be with their soldier, whether the time was spent at home or elsewhere (e.g., government-sponsored recreation area or “vacation”). However, some spouses said that R&R created additional stress by disrupting newly established routines, requiring another painful goodbye, and increasing spouse depression once the soldier had returned to the Bosnia region.

**FIGURE 16** *Percentages of spouses of soldiers deployed to the Bosnia region who...*

	<i>used each of the following services</i>		<i>said each of the following services (if they had used the service) was somewhat/very helpful</i>	
	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>
	Military postal service .....	96	98	97
Rear detachment commander .....	72	80	76	89
Military banking services .....	71	72	93	94
Housing engineers (DEH) .....	58	59	80	84
Vehicle registration office .....	46	49	88	90
Legal assistance office .....	37	50	89	95
Post recreation facilities .....	36	53	83	86
Army community services .....	36	44	89	91
Auto crafts shop .....	36	33	84	85
Child development center .....	31	33	76	76
Family assistance center .....	28	38	76	88
Post youth activities programs .....	26	32	77	80
Medical patient liaison .....	26	22	78	74
Military Air Command (MAC) flights .....	21	24	78	78
CHAMPUS advisor .....	21	18	83	84
Chaplains .....	20	38	82	96
United Service Organization (USO) .....	19	27	80	90
American Red Cross .....	15	12	81	85
Social work services .....	7	6	61	86
Army emergency relief .....	7	3	67	100

**FIGURE 17 Percentages of spouses of soldiers deployed to the Bosnia region who said...**

	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>
<i>They had made contact with their FSG since December 1, 1995</i> .....	82	90
<i>They had made contact with their FSG and they were satisfied/very satisfied with the way it had worked since December 1, 1995</i> .....	48	66
<i>They had made contact with their FSG and they frequently participated in their FSG when their spouse deployed</i> .....	46	71
<i>They participated in the Army Family Team Building (AFTB) Program</i> .....	12	34
<i>They had participated in the AFTB Program and it was extremely/moderately helpful in preparing them for the OJE deployment</i> .....	48	63
<i>Each of the following provided helpful information about what was happening to their spouse and/or their spouse's unit:</i>		
telephone calls from spouse .....	93	95
letters from spouse .....	90	86
<i>Stars and Stripes</i> .....	67	78
Armed Forces Network (AFN) television .....	64	58
Family Support Group (FSG) Newsletter .....	50	61
CNN or other television news (not AFN) .....	43	50
command briefings for family members .....	38	54
friends/acquaintances not in their FSG .....	36	51
AFN radio .....	29	42
FSG telephone tree/chain of concern .....	28	44
Rear Detachment Command staff .....	26	48
FSG members (not chain of concern) .....	25	35
unit chain of command .....	16	34
unit videotapes .....	16	26
<i>Army Times</i> .....	14	21
other newspapers .....	7	12
e-mail from spouse .....	4	26
magazine/books .....	4	13
community/"town hall" meetings .....	4	9
installation Family Assistance Center (FAC) .....	2	8
Internet .....	1	6
Army public affairs briefings (PAO) .....	0	2
"Hot line" phone assistance .....	0	1

# FAMILY ATTITUDES ABOUT OJE

Family support for sending American soldiers to Bosnia and for Army involvement in future peace operations was weak (see Figure 18). Some felt the U.S. government should focus more on domestic problems than problems of European nations. However, the vast majority of spouses who expressed negative feelings about OJE focused on the length of the deployment.



Over half of the spouses reported that they felt they were prepared to handle separation from their soldier when the OJE deployment began, with more officer than enlisted spouses saying they were prepared. However, many spouses commented that they were actually prepared for a 6-month deployment rather than a 1-year deployment. Further, spouses of soldiers who had recently completed a lengthy deployment prior to the OJE deployment feared separations of up to 24 months. The fact that they did not know return dates added to the problem.

The great majority of spouses who addressed the issue of deployment length were concerned more for their children than themselves. Most felt the OJE deployment negatively impacted their children more than either themselves or their spouse. They did not feel that the OJE mission justified keeping the family apart for so long and feared the impact of the extended absence of a parent on the children.

In interviews, many of the spouses who felt that the burden of frequent or lengthy deployments was the future to be expected in Army life said that leaving the Army was their only option. Those spouses who intended to remain an "Army family" said they needed clear and consistent deployment and return dates to help to reduce uncertainty, thereby allowing them to "get on with their lives" while their soldiers are deployed.

Despite tepid support for the OJE mission, most spouses felt that their soldier was well trained for the mission and that the Army was doing all it could to keep the soldiers safe. The majority also thought that their soldier was making a significant contribution to the mission. Over half of the spouses believed the OJE deployment was the most dangerous deployment in which their soldier had participated; this belief was most prevalent among new spouses who probably have not experienced other deployments with which to compare.

Overall, few spouses were satisfied with the amount of recognition and attention given to the soldiers deployed for OJE (see Figure 19). Over half were satisfied that the U.S. military would meet the goals of the mission. Spouses aired concern that once U.S. troops pulled out of Bosnia, the civil unrest would reignite, thereby negating the sacrifices of soldiers and their families.

**FIGURE 18 Percentages of spouses of soldiers deployed to the Bosnia region who said...**

	ENLISTED	OFFICERS
<b>They agree/strongly agree that:</b>		
The Army should continue in the future to be involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions .....	30	42
The decision to send American soldiers to Bosnia was appropriate .....	25	41
<b>In general, they were prepared/very prepared to handle the OJE separation when the deployment first began .....</b>		
	49	67
<b>The OJE deployment negatively/very negatively affected:</b>		
their child(ren) .....	71	71
their spouse .....	63	54
themselves .....	62	58
their role as a parent .....	29	32
their relationship with their child(ren) .....	25	24
their marriage .....	21	21
<b>They were favorable/very favorable about their spouse's:</b>		
Operation Joint Endeavor service, now .....	28	44
servicing in Operation Joint Endeavor, when it first began .....	22	38
<b>They think each of the following statements is quite/completely true:</b>		
I am confident my spouse has made a significant contribution on this mission .....	78	92
When we PCS'd to Europe, I never expected my spouse would be deployed for a year .....	78	77
My spouse had been well trained for this mission .....	69	81
I am confident that everything possible had been done to keep my spouse safe .....	63	77
I feel this mission is more dangerous than others in which my spouse has participated .....	54	56
When you marry a soldier, you have to accept mission requirements without complaint .....	54	54

**FIGURE 19 Percentages of spouses of soldiers deployed to the Bosnia region who said...**

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	ENLISTED	OFFICERS
<i><b>They have been satisfied/very satisfied with each of the following during the Army's deployment to the Bosnia region for OJE:</b></i>		
ability of the US military to meet the goals of the mission .....	52 .....	57
level of support soldiers received/felt from the American people .....	45 .....	46
amount of coverage of OJE provided by the American media .....	36 .....	22
recognition given for the performance of soldiers serving in OJE .....	32 .....	26
recognition given for the performance of soldiers in Europe supporting OJE .....	30 .....	28

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# Summary and Conclusions

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The purpose of this report is to (a) provide an overview of the OJE research project; (b) provide a reference list of the research products resulting from the project; and (c) describe ARI's key findings regarding soldier and family attitudes toward their experiences in the OJE deployment. Through surveys and interviews, soldiers provided their opinions about preparation, leaders, work, quality of life, and impact of their OJE deployment. Spouses provided their opinions about the Army's support for families, and family support for the mission.

The findings presented in this report should be helpful to Army leaders as they plan and participate in future deployments. Key findings of this research on OJE include:



## **AC soldiers who deployed to Bosnia:**

- felt they were well prepared for their OJE deployment, but would have liked a bit more culture-specific preparation.
- cited many examples of poor leadership they experienced in Bosnia.
- felt that some of their leaders cared more about their careers than the mission or troops.
- questioned why they were required to perform many of their non-MOS tasks.
- were generally satisfied with many quality of life factors, but wanted more clarification and standardization of the R&R policies. In addition, some objected to the stringency of force protection rules.
- saw positive consequences of the OJE deployment in terms of their financial situation, future promotions, and civilian job/career.
- saw negative consequences of the OJE deployment for their children, their marriage, and the likelihood of volunteering for a similar operation. Further, a number of soldiers believed that Army attrition might increase as a result of the long OJE deployment.



### ***RC soldiers who served as backfill in Germany:***

- felt they were well prepared for their OJE deployment.
- did not feel that the leadership in Germany respected them or treated them as equals. They felt AC soldiers treated them as lower status and less competent soldiers.
- felt that some of their leaders cared more about their careers than the mission or troops.
- said they spent most of their time performing their primary MOS/Specialty.
- wanted the opportunity to deploy to Bosnia rather than serve as backfill in Germany.
- were generally satisfied with the quality of life in Germany.
- tended to report positive consequences of their OJE deployment in terms of their Army career, physical health, financial situation, future promotions, and level of commitment to the Army.
- tended to report negative consequences of their OJE deployment in terms of their civilian job/career.

### ***USAREUR-based spouses of soldiers who were deployed to the Bosnia region:***

- relied heavily on various Army family support services. In particular, spouses turned to the rear detachment and FSG for help.
- gave high marks to the family support services that they used.
- were not very supportive of the Army's participation in OJE, but said that their soldiers were well prepared and would make valuable contributions to the mission.

Both soldiers and spouses clearly and strongly objected to a 1-year deployment, particularly because OJE was peacekeeping, not war. Many were concerned about the possible negative outcomes of a long deployment. Some concerns focused on possible effects on the soldier, such as decreased morale and increased boredom resulting from doing the same tasks over and over. Other concerns focused on the family, such as potential negative effects to children and increased rates of divorce and infidelity. Many felt

that retention would suffer if soldiers assume that long deployments will become the Army standard.

The degree to which soldiers are satisfied or dissatisfied with their deployment experiences can influence morale and support for a mission. Much rests on soldier and spouse perceptions of the efforts the Army makes to solve or lessen operational and personal problems that go with deployment. And these same perceptions influence soldier career intentions.

The deployment experiences of spouses and families warrant separate consideration, apart from what is happening to the soldier. These "Army families" must cope with disruption of normal family life. Support from the Army needs to be both effective and flexible, not only to help solve spousal problems but to assure the deployed soldier that assistance is available to the family left behind. Previous research suggests that spouses influence soldier retention, and spouses can be counted on to affect soldier attitudes by conveying satisfaction or dissatisfaction with deployment experiences.

Soldiers and families have dealt with the issues presented in this report in previous deployments and will likely face similar issues in future deployments. Awareness of the areas of success and the areas needing improvement addressed in this report gives Army planners an additional tool as they continue efforts to cope with the challenges of future deployment.

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