FORCE PROTECTION DOCTRINE: 
AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY

by

Douglas R. Cochran
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

18 May 1998

LtCol Peter Liotta, USAF
Faculty Advisor

Date
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LTC DOUG COCHRAN, USAF

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Abstract: Given the current world order with the U.S. as the only superpower, our level of global commitment remains high and as such the U.S. can expect its armed forces to be engaged in multiple MOOTWs worldwide now and for the foreseeable future. As we have seen in Beirut, Khobar Towers, and even in Somalia, these operations can be just as deadly as full-scale war. Force protection for all future military operations must therefore be seriously considered as a critical function at the operational level, not just as independent efforts at the tactical level as we have seen in the past. We must develop a joint force protection doctrine which is focused at the operational level and geared for MOOTWs. This doctrine should include the intelligence infrastructure necessary to best serve the CINCs. It should also include physical security precautions as well as education and training procedures. We will never be able to predict nor thwart every potential attack against U.S. forces conducting MOOTWs. However, it is apparent that our approach to force protection has to change, by first establishing an operational focus. We owe it to our troops and our country.
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Given the current world order with the U.S. as the only superpower, our level of global commitment remains as high as ever. The U.S. can therefore expect its armed forces to be engaged in multiple MOOTWs worldwide now and for the foreseeable future. As we have seen in Beirut, Khobar Towers and even in Somalia, these operations can be just as deadly as full-scale war.

Force protection for all future military operations must therefore be seriously considered as a critical function at the operational level, not just as independent efforts at the tactical level as we have seen in the past. We must develop a joint force protection doctrine that is focused at the operational level and geared for MOOTWs. This doctrine should include the intelligence infrastructure necessary to best serve the CINCs. It should also include physical security precautions as well as education and training procedures.

We cannot predict nor thwart every potential attack against U.S. forces conducting MOOTW. However, it is apparent that our approach to force protection has to change by establishing an operational focus. We owe it to our troops and our country.
The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

Joint Publication 3-0, Feb. '95

Introduction:

On 23 October 1983, a truck laden with the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the compound of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force at Beirut International Airport, Beirut, Lebanon, penetrated the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters Building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building resulting in the deaths of 241 U.S. military personnel.¹

On 25 June 1996 at approximately 2150 hrs, a sewage truck laden with the equivalent of over 20,000 pounds of TNT parked along the north perimeter fence of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, a facility housing U.S. and allied forces supporting the coalition air operation over Iraq, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. The perpetrators fled the scene and four minutes later the vehicle exploded. The resultant blast killed 19 U.S. military personnel and wounded more than 500.

Although these two unconventional attacks occurred under completely different circumstances, a commonality must be addressed if we intend to be serious about protecting our

military forces worldwide. These two situations involved U.S. troops conducting classic military operations other than war (MOOTW). Given the current world order with the U.S. as the only superpower, our level of global commitment remains high. As such, the U.S. can expect its armed forces to be engaged in multiple MOOTWs worldwide now and for the foreseeable future. These operations have become more prominent in the post-Cold War era as the possibility for near-term full-scale war becomes more remote. As we have seen in Beirut, Khobar Towers and Somalia, these operations can be just as deadly as full-scale war. Force protection for all future military operations must therefore be seriously considered as a critical function at the operational level, not just as individual unit efforts at the tactical level as we have seen in the past.

This paper will review the background and compare the facts of the Beirut and Khobar cases and will also examine some recommendations of the Long Commission and the Downing Report. Two subsequent investigations of the Khobar bombing were the Record Report and a separate AF/IG investigation and for the scope of this paper will henceforth be considered inclusive in reference to the Downing Report. Neither report offered much more than the Downing Report on findings and recommendations on force protection. It appears that some of the lessons of 1983 were not learned well and came back to haunt us in 1996. I will highlight that we have not embraced force protection at the operational level and have failed to incorporate recommendations from previous disasters. This is a trend we must reverse if the U.S. is to pursue successfully its global interests and responsibilities. As Secretary of Defense William Perry stated, "We cannot be a great power and live in a risk-free world."² Our troops will become even busier

²Wayne A. Downing, General, USA (Ret), Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers (Washington: August 30, 1997), 17.
and more vulnerable as the reduced military force strength is tasked with more contingencies in our ever increasingly volatile world.

In the analysis of the Khobar Towers bombing, I will draw from my personal, on-the-scene experience. As Commander of the 58th Fighter Squadron, I was responsible for 274 maintenance, support and rated personnel. In the wake of the bombing, we lost 12 brave airmen and suffered 130 wounded. How could this happen again?

The broad concept of force protection is usually considered a subset of the principle of war, "security." For the scope of this paper the discussion will focus primarily on the security and protection of military personnel only during MOOTW.

**Background:**

**Lebanon Case Study**

U.S. military forces were sent to Lebanon on 29 September 1982 as part of a multinational force composed of U.S., French, Italian and British forces. The mission for the 1,200 U.S. Marine forces at the Beirut International Airport was to create an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese government and armed forces in reestablishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.

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3Long, 2.

This deployment was in response to increased tensions fueled by the assassination of President-Elect Bashir Gemayel on 14 September 1982 followed by the Israeli defense force occupation of West Beirut and the massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in refugee camps on 16-18 September 1982. The multinational force occupation was intended to be of short duration.

Hostilities continued in and around Beirut during the next seven months and on 18 April 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was destroyed by a massive explosion that took the lives of 17 U.S. citizens and 40 others. During the six months leading up to the devastating truck bombing, U.S. Marines would be victims of snipers, random car bombings and mortar attacks.

Lebanon, in 1982, was a small country consisting of 3,000,000 people, seventeen officially recognized religious sects, two foreign armies of occupation, four national contributors to a United Nations peace-keeping force and some two dozen extralegal militias. More than 100,000 people had been killed during hostilities in Lebanon during the preceding eight years; it was the battleground of virtually every unresolved dispute afflicting the peoples of the Middle East.

The initial Marine contingent (32 MAU) had helped supervise the successful evacuation of 15,000 armed Palestinians and Syrians from Beirut in July 1982. These forces were subsequently removed and the multinational force stood down shortly thereafter.

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5 Ibid, 29.
6 Ibid, 30.
7 Ibid, 24.
8 Ibid, 24.
Khobar Towers Case Study

By June 1996, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH had been in existence for nearly five years. A follow-on operation of DESERT STORM, its mission under the command of JTF-SWA was and continues to be the enforcement of the U.N. sanctions levied on Iraq after the Gulf War. Of the approximately 6,000 land-based U.S. forces in theater at the time, the majority were Air Force personnel providing air power to enforce the designated no-fly zone. The bulk of these air assets were based at Dhahran. All U.S. military services, however, had small contingents of troops deployed to the region which rounded out our forward presence posture.

U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia date back to 1945. Our presence in the region before 1990 was primarily advisory in nature. "The Kingdom was a benign environment in which tens of thousands of American civilians lived and worked, particularly since the oil boom of the 1970s." Saudi Arabia had never hosted foreign military bases of any nation during the Cold War and U.S. combatant forces were rarely deployed to the Kingdom. "The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 dramatically changed the security dynamics, and the U.S. presence, in the region." Primary U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region include access to the vast energy resources, peace and stability, protection of U.S. citizens and property and protecting our lines of communications.

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9Downing, 2.
10Ibid, 2.
11Ibid, 2.
12Ibid, 3.
Comparisons/Contrasts

General Peay, CINCCENT, stated in July 1996, "Understanding how and why the bombing at Khobar Towers occurred involves recognizing the changing nature of the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia." Many have attempted to compare the Khobar bombing to the Beirut suicide attack; the differences, however, are striking. Before the bombing of the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG) Headquarters in Riyadh in Nov 95, only one terrorist incident had been directed against Americans in the Kingdom. This event occurred in 1991 when three U.S. airmen were wounded. On the contrary, events leading up to the Beirut bombing involved violence directed specifically at Americans and U.S. forces. These actions included car bombings, sniper fire and mortar attacks.

The location of the U.S. Marines in Beirut was among the many warring factions, whereas the troops based in Dhahran were 175 miles south of the declared hostile zone. Many years of civil war, destruction and chaos had plagued economically deprived Lebanon prior to the devastating attack; the Saudi Kingdom, on the other hand, had always been considered a prosperous and stable country.

The Marines did not have a definitive mission or specific military objectives when sent into Beirut; they considered anyone not part of the multinational force a potential adversary. For the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, the mission was succinct and focused. The only clear-cut threat was considered the Iraqis to the north. Following the car bombing of the OPM-SANG Headquarters, a potential terrorist threat began to emerge for the first time within the Kingdom.

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Lastly, in the Beirut disaster the terrorists were able to penetrate the perimeter defenses during daylight in a suicide attack by driving the truck bomb into the Marine barracks. The terrorists in June 1996 may have attempted, but were unable to get the truck bomb into the heavily fortified housing compound. In contrast to the Beirut attack, the truck bomb was parked outside the perimeter fence at night near the closest building to the fence line and was detonated within minutes.

Comparisons/Similarities

Although General Peay felt that the two terrorist attacks were strikingly different, there were nonetheless many similarities. First, both of the attacks were targeted against U.S. forces housed in urban areas, which inherently are difficult to defend. Second, both massive bombings followed within six to eight months a similar attack of much lesser magnitude that also targeted U.S. forces in the region. Third, the sizes of the truck bombs were comparatively similar. The Beirut bomb was the largest seen to date by the FBI, estimated at 12,000 pounds of TNT equivalent. The Khobar Towers bomb also became the largest seen to date, estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 pounds of TNT equivalent.

In both cases, U.S. troops were dependent on coalition partners and the host nation for some portion of force protection. The Marines depended on Israelis in the south to protect that

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14Long, 63.

flank (until the Israelis left) and to a lesser degree on the Lebanese armed forces to maintain some stability in the nearby neighborhoods. In Dhahran, the U.S. forces were dependent entirely on the Saudi forces and police for security outside the perimeter of Khobar Towers. Random twenty-four hour patrol coverage was provided for this area. U.S. forces were responsible for security within the fenced perimeter, supplemented by Saudi forces. The housing compound was surrounded by a chain-link fence with barbed wire and constantina wire enhancements. Concrete barriers were placed inside and outside the entire fenced perimeter. There was only a single, heavily fortified entry point that required 100% personnel identification and full inspection of vehicles. Rooftop sentries rounded out the area patrols within the compound area. It was a rooftop sentry who spotted the suspicious truck as it pulled up to the north fence line and who initiated the alarm. Four minutes into the evacuation of the building nearest the truck, the bomb exploded.

Lastly, there was some breakdown in both cases with the collection, assessment and dissemination of intelligence. In neither case was information adequate for the local commanders to assess the threat accurately and predict the magnitude of each attack.

**Analysis/Discussion**

The DoD Commission headed by Admiral Robert L. J. Long (Ret) examined the circumstances of the Beirut terrorist attack and identified two operational shortcomings:

1) Commanders lacked accurate and timely intelligence, and 2) Security was not commensurate
with the threat level.\textsuperscript{16} In an effort to prevent similar occurrences, the Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense take the following corrective action: 1) Improve the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, particularly human intelligence, by developing all source intelligence fusion centers, and 2) Enhance the defensive capabilities of forces against unconventional attacks through the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training.\textsuperscript{17}

For the Khobar Towers attack, the Downing investigation identified 26 detailed findings from their assessments of U.S. military facilities at Khobar Towers and other locations in the region. Among those are two findings also identified by the Long Commission in 1983: 1) The ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient and, 2) The commander, 4404\textsuperscript{th} Wing (Provisional), like the MEU Commander in Beirut, did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{18}

Likewise, many other recommendations made in the Downing Report resembled those of the Long Commission. One suggestion common to both reports was to improve the intelligence process. This resulted in the creation of the DIA Counterterrorism Center as a DoD focal point for fusion and distribution of all-source intelligence and counterintelligence information.


\textsuperscript{18}Downing, xviii.
concerning terrorist threats against DoD interests. Another similar recommendation was to establish training qualification and certification procedures for all units and individuals prior to deployment that included force protection measures.

What did we learn after the Beirut bombing? We often emphasize problems immediately after a catastrophic event, but as time goes on we tend to migrate back to the previous routine of operations. Reluctance to change is a common human tendency. Improvements were made after the Beirut attack. However, emphasis on worldwide U.S. force protection may have faded and temporarily peaked again with Somalia, then again with Khobar Towers.

Each incidence of unconventional attack on U.S. forces had its own unique circumstances when threat levels were assessed. The Marines in Beirut were in the midst of a hostile fire zone, whereas the troops in Dhahran were hundreds of miles to the rear of the declared hostile zone. Although life in Saudi Arabia was harsh compared with western standards of amenities and climate, it was generally free from the threat of crime and terrorism. This closed, strict Islamic society did not tolerate otherwise. By no means had complacency set in on the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia after five years of supporting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. In fact, the attitude of commanders and their personnel was one of increased vigilance and security. During my first tour in Saudi Arabia (Jan - May 1994), the terrorist threat was negligible and security measures were somewhat relaxed. By April 1996, however, security was tight, travel restrictions were imposed and the climate of safety present two years prior was gone as a result of the car bombing of the OPM-SANG headquarters in Riyadh eight months before. All reasonable efforts to prevent a similar attack on Khobar Towers were carried out and acknowledged in the Downing Report.

19Record, 13.
As in Beirut, there was no way for the local commander to predict an attack with weapons a hundred times more powerful than the ones used in each theater just months before. The common link was the lack of an effective theater-wide intelligence network, that is, a conduit for information passing to and from the national and tactical levels. This weakness was in fact recognized by the intelligence community in one of their publications titled, "An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide." Here it states that there is a gap between national intelligence programs that encompass and are funded by all U.S. government agencies and those at the tactical level funded by DoD only. There is no mention of the intelligence processes at the operational level. Communication and coordination occur between the two levels, but are not set up to best serve the CINC in his AOR. After both attacks it was determined through investigation that more information was available or could have been provided in various forms to give the local commander a better assessment of the threats facing his units. In both cases, intelligence assistance was provided in varying degrees, but each commander was left to decipher and assess the bulk of the information on his own.

Security responsibilities were confusing because separate U.S. government agencies were involved. Marines at the Beirut airport were operating under DoD guidelines, while the Marines at the embassy worked for the Department of State and followed a different set of rules. This situation also occurred in Saudi Arabia, as the force protection responsibilities for the OPM-SANG bombing fell under the Office of the Secretary of State but under DoD for Khobar attack.

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The classification of this paper precludes detailed specifics about the intelligence process for in-theater support. For more information, refer to the classified portion of the Downing Report.

Another similarity of both cases that warrants examination is the placement of U.S. combat units among the local urban population. Two major concerns surface with this issue. First, the proximity of others (noncombatants, terrorists, etc.) gives little warning to an unconventional attack making security precautions extremely difficult, if not impossible. Second, it usually requires the reliance of the host nation to provide security for areas immediately surrounding designated areas of occupation. This can result in a security arrangement that cannot be altered as was the case in Dhahran. The Saudis were responsible for all security outside the compound fence as cultural sensitivities precluded otherwise. Commanders are usually uncomfortable with an arrangement that requires reliance on forces not under their control. The best option is to place the concentration of forces in remote locations with long, open avenues of approach. In MOOTW situations, this is not always going to be feasible or possible.

This then leads to another dilemma — cost versus benefit. How much are we willing to spend to protect our forces in a given scenario? Obviously, the National Command Authority needs to assess each situation for the validity of national interests before committing military forces. Then the risk has to be weighed in each case. Is a particular national interest worth the lives of American service members? In the Beirut case, the answer was no, because we pulled our troops out shortly after the bombing. In the Saudi incident, the answer was yes — but at what cost? Given the American adversity to casualties, how much are we willing to spend to protect our troops? The price to move the 4404th Wing (Provisional) from Dhahran to a remote desert location was estimated at hundreds of millions. Would this money have been spent before the
Khobar Towers bomb? It's doubtful; the threat assessment at the time did not support it. Even after the OPM-SANG bombing in Riyadh, the U.S. Secretary of State would not implement recommendations that Mylar coating be put on other U.S. facilities in the city. This bombing was treated by many U.S. government officials as a one time occurrence since before this there was no terrorist activity in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

**Recommendations**

The concept of force protection has not stood alone in its own right. To date, its connotation is immersed within the general principle of war “security.” We must be more specific concerning force protection when conducting MOOTW. The U.S. needs to establish a joint operations doctrine that embraces all aspects of force protection and focuses it at the operational level (theater CINC). As recently as the last printing of the Joint Publications set in 1995, we still had not given force protection an appropriate focus. There is no reference in Joint Publications 2-0, 3-0, 3.07 or Joint Publication 1 to force protection as a separate principle, only as a minor reference to protection of forces in other subject areas. This doctrine should task theater intelligence organizations to more effectively support the CINC and subordinate commanders for all aspects of war fighting, MOOTW and AOR threat assessments. The operational level intelligence apparatus needs to be structured to support both the mission and force protection. Unlike the Long Commission, many recommendations of the Khobar Towers investigations are being implemented. These must also, however, be incorporated into a joint force protection doctrine, especially for MOOTW. Refer to Appendix A for the 26 findings and recommendations of the Downing Report. If left as is, many of these proposals will be
incorporated at the strategic and tactical levels but will not be focused at the operational level. The key areas involve intelligence support, physical security and training. An outcome of these findings was the creation and publication of DoD Directive Number 2000.12, “DoD Combating Terrorism Program,” September 15, 1996. This directive delineates command relationships and commander responsibilities in dealing with terrorism, but reference to operational level force protection is mentioned only in paragraph nine of the eleven page document.

The recommendation for separate force protection doctrine is not new. James F. Lindner suggested this in his NWC JMO paper, “Force Protection: A Critical Function During Military Operations Other Than War,” written one year prior to the Khobar bombing. However, three years later we still have not seen force protection doctrine geared to the operational level. Each CINC is responsible for force protection efforts within his AOR, but many personnel conducting MOOTW are OPCON/TACON to the CINCs on short term TDY rotations. It is imperative that force protection doctrine be ingrained throughout each AOR and that an effective intelligence, physical security and training infrastructure be in place. This requires planning and direction at the operational level.

Another recommendation suggests that U.S. forces should not be allowed to deploy to urban areas. Given the nature of many MOOTW contingencies, this cannot be considered a realistic option. However, if our military presence is required in an urban area, the proposed doctrine would include how to establish cooperative and interactive intelligence processes and mutual security programs with the host government. The situation in Saudi Arabia faces many challenges in this area because of cultural sensitivities, but nonetheless these functions are critical to protecting our forces and to successful mission accomplishment.
Conclusion:

We can neither predict nor thwart every potential attack against U.S. forces conducting MOOTW. However, after reviewing the issues of these two examples where force protection failed, it is apparent that our approach to this subject must change. Concerns brought out in the aftermath of Beirut also surfaced during the Khobar investigations. We may miss the boat again because the primary focus of all three Khobar investigations seemed to focus on determining culpability, not fixing the process at the operational level. The threat is real and it is everywhere. Let us stack the deck in our favor and incorporate force protection doctrine at the operational level. We owe it to our troops. We owe it to our country.


APPENDIX A

DOWNING REPORT FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ABSTRACT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING

The Findings and Recommendations of the Assessment Task Force are extracted from the Report and presented here in summary format to assist the reader in obtaining an overview of the Assessment and in identifying specific areas of interest. Detailed explanations of each Finding and Recommendation are contained in the basic Report which follows.

DoD PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 1: There are no published DoD physical security standards for force protection of fixed facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 1:

Establish prescriptive DoD physical security standards.

Designate a single agency within DoD to develop, issue, and inspect compliance with force protection physical security standards.

Provide this DoD agency with sufficient resources to assist field commanders on a worldwide basis with force protection matters. Consider designating an existing organization, such as a national laboratory, Defense Special Weapons Agency, or the Corps of Engineers, to provide this expertise.

Provide funds and authority to this agency to manage Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts to enhance force protection and physical security measures.

DoD FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 2: Force protection requirements had not been given high priority for funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 2:

Establish priorities for force protection requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance and, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force report, include force protection as a Defense-wide special interest item.
Coordinate DoD priorities for force protection of noncombatant forces with the Department of State (See Finding 16).

Address force protection in the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process.

Implement the recommendations of the Antiterrorism Task Force on establishment of a separate Office of the Secretary of Defense-managed program element to fund high priority antiterrorism requirements.

Encourage combatant commanders to articulate and prioritize force protection requirements in their Integrated Priorities List.

**DoD REVIEW OF JOINT TASK FORCES**

**FINDING 3:** Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units in the region were not structured and supported to sustain a long-term commitment that involved expanded missions, to include increased force protection from an emerging and viable terrorist threat.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 3:**

Review the composition of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units to insure that they are structured and have resources appropriate for the mission and the conditions.

Review current manning and rotation policies, to include tour lengths for key leaders and staff, with the aim of promoting continuity in the chain of command and unit cohesion.

**U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

**FINDING 4:** Current U.S. Central Command command relationships do not contribute to enhanced security for forces operating in the region.

**RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 4:** Assign operational control of all combatant forces operating in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region to one headquarters.
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND SECURITY POLICIES

FORCE PROTECTION PRACTICES

FINDING 5: Force protection practices were inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 5:

Develop common guidance, procedures, and standards to protect the force. Assigning operational control of all combatant forces to one headquarters (Finding 4) will facilitate a common approach.

Closely coordinate all antiterrorism countermeasures with host country agencies.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION POLICIES

FINDING 6: There is no theater-specific training guidance for individuals or units deploying to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 6:

Establish training qualification and certification procedures for all units, individuals, and civilians prior to deployment to and after arrival in the Area of Responsibility. This should include force protection measures and be applicable to service members on both permanent change of station and temporary duty assignment.

Conduct mandatory force protection and risk management training for all officers and senior noncommissioned officers deploying to high threat areas. Integrate this training into officer and noncommissioned officer professional military education to assure long-term development of knowledge and skills to combat terrorism at all levels.

Support development of antiterrorism training and education supporting materials, using innovative media methodologies, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force and directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Conduct refresher training for installation/unit antiterrorism officers immediately prior to assignment in the theater, as outlined in DoD Instruction 2000.14.
WARNING OF THE TERRORIST THREAT

FINDING 7: Intelligence provided warning of the terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

FINDING 8: This finding and its recommendation are classified in their entirety.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

FINDING 9: The ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 9: Allocate sufficient analytic resources to conduct in-depth, detailed analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists.

THREAT LEVEL ASSESSMENTS

FINDING 10: The Department of State and elements within the DoD ascribe different Threat Level assessments for countries of the same region, causing confusion among recipients of this information.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 10: Institute one interagency methodology for assessing and declaring terrorist Threat Levels, allowing commanders to determine Threat Conditions in a local area.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SECURITY POLICE

FINDING 11: The lack of an organic intelligence support capability in U.S. Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

FINDING 12: This finding and its recommendation are classified in their entirety.

U.S. AND SAUDI COOPERATION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

FINDING 13: This finding is classified in its entirety (there was no recommendation for this finding).

COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE TO SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE

FINDING 14: While the communications architecture in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility supported the flow of intelligence throughout the upper echelons of the chain of command, field units had limited access due to classification restrictions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 14:

Make collateral communication systems available to the lowest appropriate level.

Distribute appropriate information to all key force protection officials, as well as coalition partners.

CLARITY OF THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY BETWEEN HOST NATIONS AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

FINDING 15: The division of responsibility between U.S. and host nation police and military forces for security at facilities throughout Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf is clear.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 15:

Promulgate memorandums of understanding (MOU) between host nation and U.S. forces, delineating responsibilities for protecting U.S. operated facilities, to include procedures for upgrading security when Threat Levels change.

Increase the number of interpreters available to security forces.
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR OVERSEAS SECURITY IN THE REGION

FINDING 16: (a) U.S. Embassy security resources are insufficient to adequately protect
large numbers of noncombatant military forces in selected countries.

(b) The U.S. Defense Representative has insufficient resources to adequately protect large
numbers of noncombatant military forces in selected countries.

(c) The U.S. Defense Representative does not have directive authority over selected
"stovepipe" organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 16:

Assign all DoD personnel to the unified combatant commander, except those whose
principal function supports the Chief of Mission.

Provide the U.S. Defense Representative directive authority for force protection matters
over ALL DoD personnel not assigned to the unified combatant commander.

Provide the U.S. Defense Representative with appropriate staff to assist the Chief of
Mission in the execution of force protection responsibilities, to include conducting
vulnerability assessments, identifying funds for force protection, and developing force
protection standards.

SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES AND FACILITIES IN THE REGION

FINDING 17: U.S. forces and facilities in Saudi Arabia and the region are vulnerable to
terrorist attack.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 17:

GENERAL SECURITY

Conduct vulnerability assessments for every site within the Area of Responsibility and
repeat them on an appropriate schedule. Each site must be examined individually and in-
depth.

Locate facilities in secluded areas, wherever possible.

Assign all security force members a weapon. Rifles and machine guns must be zeroed
and fired for sustainment training. Identify special weapons requirements early and train to
meet requirements. Stress weapons maintenance.
Examine and prioritize terrorist threats for both potential of occurrence and degree of vulnerability at each site. Prepare defenses accordingly.

Coordinate with host nation police and military forces to develop and maintain a combined ability to counter the surface-to-air missile threat from terrorist elements.

**PHYSICAL SECURITY**

Employ integrated technology, including intrusion detection systems, ground sensors, closed circuit television, day and night surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, perimeter lighting, and advanced communication equipment, to improve the security of all sites.

Employ technology-based explosive detection and countermeasure devices.

Physically harden structures based on the threat.

Develop guidance on required stand-off distances and the construction of blast walls and the hardening of buildings.

Relocate and consolidate units at vulnerable facilities to more secure, U.S.-controlled compounds or bases.

Reinforce the entry control points to U.S. facilities and provide defense in depth.

Cable single rows of Jersey barriers together.

Use enhanced barriers, similar to those designed by United Kingdom and Israel, to shield and protect vulnerable compounds and structures. *(See Finding 26)*

Establish threat based stand-off or exclusion areas around compounds and bases.

Procure personal protective equipment suitable for extreme hot weather operations.

**The last recommendation of this section is classified.**

**TRANSPORTATION**

Harden or procure armored buses to transport service members between housing areas and work sites.
Provide armed guards, at a minimum in pairs, on buses and provide armored escort vehicles.

Ensure host country military and police are actively involved in securing routes of travel.

Provide and maintain communications for all modes of transportation and centrally control and monitor transportation movements.

TRAINING

Provide personal protection antiterrorism training to all deployed service members and their families.

Conduct training exercises to rehearse responses to a terrorist attack, including building evacuation and re-assembly procedures.

Develop and use an extensive list of potential terrorist scenarios to assess force protection measures at each site in the Area of Responsibility.

FOLLOW-ON ASSESSMENTS

The Task Force could not physically survey all locations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility within the time frame of this Report. Locations in the theater which the Task Force did not survey should be assessed as soon as possible. These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Oman, Sudan, and Yemen. The Task Force had only a limited opportunity to assess force protection in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. Urgent priorities to improve force protection have been identified at U.S. facilities in these countries. A follow-on assessment team should conduct a more in-depth survey of these sites.

INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF ATTACK ON KHOBAR TOWERS

FINDING 18: While intelligence did not provide the tactical details of date, time, place, and exact method of attack on Khobar Towers, a considerable body of information was available that indicated terrorists had the capability and intention to target U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, and that Khobar Towers was a potential target.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 18:

The first two recommendations for Finding 18 are classified.

Provide commanders of units operating in a high threat air base defense environment direct access to a dedicated intelligence analytic capability. (See Finding 11)

FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE BOMBING

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

FINDING 19: The chain of command did not provide adequate guidance and support to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 19: That the Secretary of Defense take action, as appropriate.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF KHOBAR TOWERS

FINDING 20: The Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 20: Refer to the Chain of Command for action, as appropriate.

ADEQUACY OF FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 21: Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional).

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 21: Separately identify force protection requirements in budget submissions and assign them appropriate funding priorities.

SAUDI RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY

FINDING 22: (a) The division of responsibility for the protection of Khobar Towers was clearly understood by both U.S. and Saudi officials.

(b) Saudi security forces were unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 22:

Establish and maintain regular working relationships between senior commanders and appropriate host nation officials.

Raise critical force protection issues to the chain of command, if unable to solve them at the local level.

MEDICAL CARE AT KHOBAR TOWERS

FINDING 23: The medical care provided to the victims of the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was outstanding; however, mass casualty procedures could be improved.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 23:

Continue emphasis on first aid, bandaging and splinting, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training for all individuals. Initiate similar training for all services, where appropriate.

Continue emphasis on realistic mass casualty training and exercise scenarios, and increase Advanced Trauma Life Support training for medical providers.

Provide an increased number of ambulances in Saudi Arabia.

Make the wearing of identification tags mandatory in contingency operations.

Provide a patient on-line data base at all medical facilities to assist in identification and treatment of patients.

Include requirements for patient administration in contingency plans for mass casualties.

Establish contingency contracting for local translator support in a crisis.

FINDING 24: This finding and its recommendation are classified in their entirety.
APPLICATION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES TO FORCE PROTECTION

FINDING 25: Technology was not widely used to detect, delay, mitigate, and respond to acts of terrorism.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 25:

Provide professional technical assistance and information on force protection from the DoD to units in the field.

Designate a DoD element to rapidly acquire and quickly field integrated force protection technology to deployed forces.

The third recommendation for Finding 25 is classified.

Train military leaders on an integrated systems approach to physical security and force protection technology.

ALLIED FORCE PROTECTION EFFORTS

FINDING 26: U.S. allies have extensive experience and have accumulated significant lessons learned on force protection applicable to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINDING 26:

Develop and implement an integrated systems approach to force protection planning, using lessons learned from U.S. allies.

Strengthen cooperative efforts between the United States and allies on terrorism and force protection matters.

Develop a means of sharing information obtained during cooperative exchanges with other force protection professionals in the United States.