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# Southeast Asia Report

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2 October 1984

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## DEVELOPMENTS OF PPP CONGRESS REPORTED

## PPP Congress Endorsed

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 12 Jul 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] The coordinating leadership of the all-Java PPP [United Development Party] DPW [Regional Executive Council] has agreed to work toward the smooth running of the upcoming PPP Congress and has requested that all sides guard themselves against attitudes and actions which might be disruptive.

The meeting took place in the residence of the chairman of the PPP DPW of Yogyakarta and was attended by the coordinating chairmen of the DPW of East Java, West Java, Central Java, and DKI [Special Capital Region] Jakarta, who expressed the hope that the organization of the congress would be in accordance with the provisions of Law No 3-1975 concerning political parties and the functional group, and the regulations which the PPP has delineated.

The coordinating chairman of the PPP DPW of East Java, KH [Honorable Pilgrim] Hasjiem Latief, who just returned from Yogyakarta this morning, stated that the five DPW coordinators also expressed thanks to the government, which has facilitated the organizing of the PPP congress.

"We express great happiness with the willingness of the president to attend the opening of the congress," continued Hasjiem, reading the result of the agreement from the above-mentioned Yogyakarta meeting.

As to the leadership of the PPP, it is hoped that a result of the congress will be the emergence of figures who are able to maintain continuity of development. This can happen if the future leadership are those who obtain support as broad as possible from the majority of the members of the PPP, through reflecting Pancasila democracy in the organizing of the congress.

## Syaiful's Manuscript

Making a statement in his house in Sepanjang, H [Haji] Hasjiem Latief stated that the original intent for the meeting was only to exchange information about the situation in the regions as the congress approaches. However, the Yogyakarta DPW coordinating chairman offered for discussion a rather long manuscript. As Syaiful's manuscript could not be discussed in a brief

period of time, the meeting ended with an agreement on the above three matters, i.e., the smooth running of the congress, thanks to the president, and the future leadership of the PPP.

Through the exchange of information, various negative-sounding reports were found to be untrue. "Eighty percent of the issues which are said to plague the PPP are false," said Hasjiem.

The agreement from the meeting of the all-Java DPW was submitted to the host and the representatives from Central Java to be put into finished form.

In attendance, among others, were the chairman of the DPW of DKI Jakarta, Dr H. Syah Manaf, the chairman of the West Java PPP DPW, H. Amien Iskander, deputy chairmen of the PPP DPW of Central Java, H. Karmani SH [Master of Laws] and Mustahal, and the chairman of the Special Region of Yogyakarta PPP DPW, H. Syaiful Mudjab. Also in the host's party were Dr Ali As'ad and Dr H.A. Tabriq Ali Maksum. All these figures come from the NU [Muslim Scholars Party].

According to Syaiful's manuscript, a further meeting including an all-Indonesian DPW should be planned as quickly as possible. But as this is too difficult, it was decided that the various DPW's in attendance would have meetings or consultations with the regions closest to them, for example, DKI Jakarta and West Java with the all-Sumatra DPW and East Java with parts of Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

So that there will be no incorrect interpretation, the all-Java DPW agreement is intended in essence to support the execution of the conference so that it can be organized in a smooth, safe, orderly, and democratic way. Thus, the decisions of the congress will be inspirational and receive the support of the entire membership of the PPP.

#### East Java

According to Hasjiem, the situation in the body of the East Java PPP is quite stable and there are no visible tensions yet. Concerning the report of Soelaiman Bihayimo who claims that there is a certain element which is attempting to form an opposition DPC [Branch Executive Committee] or DPW, he stated that this was the report of one PPP member but to date its realization remains unseen.

The chairman of the East Java PPP DPW explained that a member of the PPP did in fact state recently that he took part in a meeting in which was discussed the possibility of perombakan [translation unknown] several DPC. But as yet this group has not taken concrete steps toward carrying out perombakan. "God willing, nothing will happen," he said.

According to Hasjiem, whether the East Java PPP would hold a branch conference to select its delegates to the congress will depend largely on the PPP branch itself. Actually it would be enough to base the selection of delegates on a meeting of branch officers. If the meeting is not able

to reach an agreement, they can submit the choice to the highest body in the branch, a branch conference.

Asked about the possibility that the PPP DPP [Central Executive Council] would issue a SK [directive] determining the administrative or delegate structure at the branch level, Hasjiem quickly answered that it was absolutely impossible.

If anyone has the primary authority to intervene it is none other than DPW itself. Branch conference decisions are ratified by DPW, whereas decisions concerning the regional conference level and above are made by the DPP.

Still, Hasjiem affirmed that, as chairman of the East Java PPP DPW, he would allow the branch to be mature in establishing its political posture, with no need for DPW to take too much charge of branch affairs.

"Let them decide for themselves what they want. If we meddle continuously, we will waste a lot of physical and mental energy; besides, the DPW has enough problems of its own," he continued.

Answering a question on whether the agreement from the meeting of the all-Java DPW touched upon Naro's leadership, Hasjiem forcefully answered, "No."

"We did not touch upon individuals, but hope for a figure who is truly representative," said H. Hasjiem Latief.

#### Meeting Deplored

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 13 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] Member of the first PPP congress committee and deputy chairman of the PPP DPW of DKI Jakarta, Facrurazi, stated that the all-Java PPP DPW meeting is to be deplored, as such a meeting is not recognized in the AD-ART [statutes and by-laws] of the PPP organization.

He said to reporters in his office at the DPR Jakarta that the PPP DPP should straighten out provincial or factional meetings, so that the policies concerning party life thus far under the new order will not be destroyed.

In fact, the meetings which are recognized in the AD-ART are party congresses and party council sessions, neither of which have been held to date, and party DPP meetings. On the other hand, meetings between DPW are not recognized, meaning that such meetings violate Law No 3-1975 concerning political parties and the functional group.

"As a leader of the PPP DPW of DKI Jakarta I never gave Syaf Manaf orders for this meeting and as a member of NU I am embarrassed," he said.

As reported in the SURABAYA POST yesterday [12 July], the all-Java DPW meeting was attended by East Java DPW chairman Hasyim Latief, Central Java DPW Deputy Chairmen Karmani SH and Mastahal, West Java DPW Chairman Amir Iskandar, and Yogyakarta Special Region DPW chairman Syaiful Mujab.



According to Facrurazi, smoothing the execution of the PPP congress depends upon the attitude of the party leadership. The two congress delegates from the branches and regions will be determined by the various branches and regions themselves, with the advice of the party DPP.

The important thing is that the two delegates have the attitude of participants who truly understand the goals of the congress, to determine party policy and to take an active role in national development.

As the PPP is already 11 years old it should have a mature attitude and be able to think of the nation, and not advance the ideas of groups or factions. He emphasized that as a result of the regional working meeting of DKI Jakarta last 12-13 May, the DKI PPP DPW has endorsed and supported J. Naro SH for reelection as general chairman of the PPP for 1984-1988.

#### Meeting Praised

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 14 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] Treasurer of the NU PB [Muslim Scholars Party Executive Council] Chalik Ali feels that the 3-hour meeting of the all-Java PPP DPW in Yogyakarta was good, even though not recognized in the AD-ART, because its goal was to express appreciation to the government for the willingness of President Soeharto to attend the upcoming congress and make it a success.

Answering reporters' questions on Saturday [14 July] he admitted that the meeting was spontaneous and was not in fact in the AD-ART, but still was not an infraction. On the contrary, movements which arise at lower levels can be understood and cultivated, and as a spontaneous mechanism within the party can even strengthen the position of the PPP.

He recalled that PPP DPP meetings from 1981 to the present have always been incomplete, as people who occupy important positions in the party should have been invited.

For example, Party President Idham Chalid and Party Vice President and General Chairman of the Party Deliberative Council Kyai Masjkur have never been invited.

Further, the NU groups from Cipete and Situbondo have never been invited to PPP DPP meetings. It is logical, he said, that the 3-hour meeting in Yogyakarta thus strengthened the position of the PPP DPP in the upcoming congress.

Because, of course, the party DPP will be chosen democratically, either because it has the support of the membership or because it has the ability to cooperate with the government.

According to one source, it is supposed that the all-Java PPP DPW meeting will bring a delegation of the Situbondo group to prepare the names of possible future party leaders who will emerge at the congress.

Chalik would be critical if those who do not agree with the all-Java PPP DPW meeting were to use reasons such as that source. "If the above source is used, it would be difficult to understand the reason. They will probably agree to only those regional meetings which score for J. Naro," he said.

This is in spite of the fact, he said, that because of the meeting in Yogyakarta the PPP DPP can expect the congress to produce more stable and steady results, acceptable to the masses and the government, and not suspect as it is now. This means that the party DPP is chosen democratically.

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CSO: 4213/256

## SPLIT IN PPP LEADERSHIP IN EAST JAVA

## Rival East Java PPP Executive Committee Formed

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 25 Jul 84 p 2

[Text] Surabaya--A total of 16 members of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP [Development Unity Party] have formed a new provincial party leadership and have stated that they no longer recognize H M Hasyim Latief as party coordinator. At the same time they have stated that they no longer recognize the leadership group which he heads.

In their letter they stated that this reorganization of the party leadership was decided on in view of their responsibility to improve the development efficiency and growth of the party, aimed at achieving complete unity within the party and increasing its participation in national life, while stimulating national development.

Their reason for adopting this view was stated to be a certain "disintegration" which reportedly had taken place within the Provincial Executive Committee, whose impact has been felt in the activity of regency level executive committees, particularly in the course of arranging for the PPP provincial congress on 20 August.

## Five Factors

The letter mentioned "five factors" contributing to disintegration as a consequence of shortcomings in H M Hasyim Latief's leadership.

First, communications between H M Hasyim Latief and the Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, which should have been an absolute requirement for the development of the organization, turned out to be non-existent.

Secondly, during the period of Hasyim Latief's leadership it was felt that there were conflicts among the leaders of the Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP. This was a consequence of Hasyim's actions. He took action in the name of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, without previously consulting with or holding meetings with the members of the Provincial Executive Committee. This attitude certainly caused unrest among the members of the East Java Executive Committee and sowed the seeds of division among them.

Thirdly, Hasyim issued instructions for the holding of a provincial branch congress for the election of leaders of the executive committees in Tulangagung, Kediri, Pamekasan, and other regencies, without consultation with the East Java Provincial Executive Committee and in violation of Circular Letter No 180/1975 of the Central Executive Committee of the PPP.

Fourthly, he carried out changes in the membership of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP without discussing the matter at a meeting of the committee. The new members of the committee who were brought in had a certain historical background in connection with the formation of the PPP in 1973.

Fifthly, changes were made from time to time in the membership of the PPP Faction in the East Java Provincial Council, and the recall of previous members was never discussed in advance of this action at a meeting of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP.

The letter stated that the communications gap caused damage to the consolidation of PPP branch organizations. The provincial branch was unable to make any input in terms of guidance and instructions regarding the policies of the Central Executive Committee of the PPP. This was particularly the case in connection with the progress made by the organization toward complete unity.

Without an effective flow of information, the policies adopted by the central organization of the party could not be reflected by the East Java provincial leadership. As a result, when the party congress was being prepared, the party branches did not have clear guidance regarding the goals of the congress and the steps which needed to be taken to ensure the success of the congress in the near future.

After holding a number of consultations and meetings with leaders of party support organizations, it was with regret that they had stated that they "no longer recognized the leadership of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee, under Hasyim's leadership," the letter stated.

#### Regret

Hasyim Latief, who was contacted on 25 July, regretted the formation of the "rival leadership" because it could create unrest in the political situation in East Java and within the PPP itself. As soon as possible, he would hold a conference of the East Java branch of the party to discuss the matter. Meanwhile, at the forthcoming East Java provincial conference of the NU [Muslim Scholars], the status of NU members involved in the "rival leadership" will be discussed. Sulaiman Biahimo, Syumli Sadli, and Dr Mardjiin Sjam, whose names were included in the list of the "rival leadership," said that they knew nothing about the matter. As Sulaiman Biahimo said, he and two of his friends had clearly refused to be a part of the new leadership. He added: "I think that other friends of mine on the list also know nothing about the matter."

## Hasyim Latief's Rebuttal

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 26 Jul 84 p 2

[Excerpts] Surabaya--H M Hasyim Latief, chairman and coordinator of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, denied that there were "five factors" contributing to disintegration due to shortcomings in his leadership, which hampered the efficient development and growth of the party toward complete unity, as alleged by the "rival leadership."

Hasyim Latief said: "What they said was just something they made up. Their statement is completely wrong." He made this statement when he was interviewed on 25 July in the NU office at Jalan Darmo 96 in Surabaya.

According to Hasyim, if communications within the Central Executive Committee of the PPP can be described as inadequate, that is their own fault. As members of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee who are also members of the Indonesian Parliament, who are usually in Jakarta, certainly it is hoped that they would be regularly in contact with the Central Executive Committee. He declared: "In fact what they have said was just something they made up. There are no problems in the relations between the Provincial Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee."

### Those Who Are Members of Parliament

Among the 16 members of the Provincial Executive Council who formed the "rival leadership," those who are members of Parliament representing East Java include H Hisbullah Huda; Mohammed Thamrin, master of laws; Bachtiar Sutiono; and Abubakar, master of laws.

Indeed, after becoming members of Parliament in Jakarta, they have not been active in the Provincial Executive Committee and almost never come to the office. Hasyim said he never made decisions of any kind without consultation. They should prove their statement in a concrete way by indicating which decisions were made without consultation, he said.

He avoided mentioning that he had issued instructions to the regency level executive committees to hold meetings for the election of their leaders. In fact, the regency executive committees held their own conferences on their own responsibility and subsequently requested approval. This is confirmed in the constitution and by-laws of the organization, in accordance with the circular letter of the Central Executive Committee, which has urged the achievement of complete unity.

Regarding the replacement of members of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee without consultation, Hasyim said that this had never happened. He said that NU members had decided that one of their members should be replaced as chairman and coordinator of the Provincial Executive Committee by H Syafii Sulaiman because the chairman of the NU provincial branch could not also be chairman of the provincial branch of the PPP. The NU proposal was discussed at a meeting of the Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP held on 14 April at Jalan SMEA 53, Surabaya.

However, it turned out that members of the MI (Indonesian Muslim Community), and particularly Mohammed Thamrin, master of laws, were opposed to the replacement of the chairman-coordinator, with the result that this action was not taken. Meanwhile, all members of the committee also nominated replacements, but no action taken on this matter. Therefore, the statement by the "rival leadership" is incorrect.

#### Recall

Regarding temporary changes made in the membership of the PPP Faction of the East Java Provincial Assembly and the holding of a recall election without prior consultations, Hasyim said it was not necessary to discuss this matter at a meeting of the Provincial Executive Committee, because this action was in accordance with existing guidelines. He said: "In the regulations of the PPP regarding membership in provincial councils, it is provided that if someone resigns, dies, or is subjected to a recall election and so forth, this is a matter for the person concerned. If there is a letter from a member joining the assembly faction, only the validity of the letter is verified. If the letter is genuine, it is sent on to the East Java Provincial Council and to the governor, in the name of the Provincial Executive Council of the PPP."

Hasyim said that the formation of the "rival leadership" had been expected for the last few days. According to information which he had received, there are members of the PPP who are also members of the Indonesian Parliament and who are manipulating letters from the Central Executive Committee of the PPP sent to them.

A letter regarding the registration of delegates to the conference was not forwarded to the East Java Provincial Executive Committee and to the regency executive committees, or to those to whom it should properly have been sent. Rather, it was forwarded to MI members in the province. Later, these members sent lists of names to the Central Executive Committee, without the knowledge of the regency executive committees. This was done with the intention of having these persons receive invitations and designations as participants in the conference. He said: "The members of the 'rival leadership' of the Provincial Executive Committee were involved in this maneuver. Wasn't this a terrible and brutal thing to do?"

Hasyim considers that the "rival leadership" of the Provincial Executive Committee was established to strengthen the position and support the actions of its members. This is so that the regency executive councils which do not agree with them will be replaced. He stated: "I have information that the NU membership of the East Java Provincial Council will be reduced by three seats and that these seats will be given to the MI, so that they will wind up with five seats."

The formation of the "rival leadership" was announced after holding consultations and meetings with the leaders of the support groups which have a strong interest in carrying out the complete unification of the PPP. Hasyim Latief replied to them by saying that if the support groups involved are members of the NU, they are not NU leaders in any case. Therefore, they have no right to call themselves NU representatives. Sulaiman Biyahimo, who accompanied Hasyim, said: "The procedure which they are following is really in violation of the regulations in effect." Hasyim added: "In fact we must try to make a success of the congress which

is now less than 1 month away. Indeed, we must try even if they have established a 'rival leadership.' As I don't trust them, doesn't this make sense?"

Biyahimo said that it was not true that they had designated the office on Jalan SMEA in the letter which the "rival leadership" had sent, because they had never come to that place or held a meeting there. He said: "I have gone to the office on Jalan SMEA every day but have never met them there. Doesn't this prove that what they say is not true?"

He also had doubts about the legitimacy of the letter which was sent in the name of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, because it had no reference number on it. It just had written on it: 1st/DPW/12-32/1984. If it had a seal and letterhead on it, perhaps they had it made up.

#### Not Recognized by East Java Authorities

Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 27 Jul 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] Surabaya, 27 July—Major General Soelarso, commander of Military Region VIII/Brawijaya and designated commander of the East Java Security and Order Command [KOPKAMTIB], has stated that his command and the East Java Provincial Executive Council [MUSPIDA] have agreed to recognize only the Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP under Haji Hasyim Latief as the legitimate representative of the organization, and not the rival Provincial Executive Council under His-bullah Huda.

The statement by Major General Soelarso was made to reporters on 27 July after he received the leaders of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, led by Hasyim Latief, who was accompanied by Sulaiman Biyahimo and Imron Hamzah. The meeting took place at the headquarters of Military Region VIII/Brawijaya in Surabaya.

The commander, who was accompanied by Major General Sudarmadji, the provincial chief of police, stated that he will call on the Central Executive Committee of the PPP not to confirm or recognize the rival Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, bearing in mind the security, social, and political situation in East Java, which is presently stable.

He hoped that the problem which occurred within the East Java branch of the PPP would be resolved through discussions and a consensus reached in a friendly way, in order to achieve a solution to the problem in the best and most harmonious way possible.

Major General Soelarso said: "The formation of a rival East Java Provincial Executive Committee is considered illegal because it did not follow the procedure set out in the constitution and by-laws of the organization. Therefore, no action taken by its members will be recognized by the Provincial Executive Council."

#### No Approval

He stated that, up to now, there has been no official approval given the formation of the rival Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP by the Central

Executive Committee of the party, although efforts to obtain this approval have already been made.

Major General Soelarso expressed concern that, if the leaders of the Central Executive Committee of the PPP should approve the formation of a rival Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, a political precedent will be established, and this could damage stability and security in East Java. Soelarso said that his office could approve the leaders now sitting in the rival Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP, but on a personal basis, and this could resolve the existing problem in a proper way.

Answering a question whether the Central Executive Committee of the PPP will approve the formation of the rival Provincial Executive Committee of the party, Major General Soelarso hoped that leaders at the central headquarters of the party would first study the situation in the province.

He said: "Invite us to talk to them first, because we know more about the political atmosphere in the province."

He hoped that the formation of the rival leadership of the party at the provincial level would not be an example followed by PPP leaders at the regency level. The commander said that at his meeting with leaders of the East Java Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP Chairman Latief had said that he would try to bring peace among party members at the forthcoming congress of the PPP and would ensure that all groups are represented, and not just the NU.

Regarding the East Java Conference of the NU, which is scheduled for 27 July in Probolinggo, Major General Soelarso said that it would be held as arranged and that it will not discuss the formation of the rival Provincial Executive Committee of the PPP.

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CSO: 4213/269



## REGULATIONS ON 'SPONTANEOUS' TRANSMIGRATION DETAILED

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 28 Jul 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] Jakarta, HARIAN UMUM AB--Provincial governments, private organizations, state-owned commercial companies, foundations, community organizations, and other bodies will be given an opportunity to carry out spontaneous transmigration projects, after obtaining a permit from the minister of transmigration.

This matter was referred to in Letter of Decision No Kep 163/Men/1984 of the minister of transmigration, which was issued in Jakarta on 21 May 1984.

In addition transmigrants who have already been resettled will also be given permission to invite or bring over spontaneous transmigrants from their villages after obtaining a special recommendation from the Department of Transmigration.

The overall target for transmigrants during the Fourth 5-Year Plan will be 750,000 families, while funds made available to finance this activity are expected to amount to not much more than were available during the Third 5-Year Plan. Therefore, the Department of Transmigration must work hard to meet the target for resettling transmigrants during the Fourth 5-Year Plan.

For that reason attention will be directed toward increasing the number of spontaneous transmigrants, whose resettlement costs are relatively less. Experience shows that more than 30 percent of the transmigration target for the Third 5-Year Plan, or 500,000 families, was met by spontaneous transmigrants.

#### Rights of Spontaneous Transmigrants

There is a relatively small difference between general transmigrants and spontaneous transmigrants, considered on an overall basis, in terms of the funds which must be spent by the government.

The rights of spontaneous transmigrants include one-quarter of a hectare of land for their home. They will obtain crop land in accordance with a planting standard to be developed, and they will receive help in building their homes. Subsequently, they will receive a guaranteed amount of food for a certain period of time; other assistance in the form of facilities, security, and assurances of obtaining land; moving and location expenses; mental, spiritual, and religious support; and

the right to support and assistance in the economic field from government officials.

One special obligation for spontaneous transmigrants is paying themselves for the cost of preparing land ownership certificates covering the land which they will farm.

Spontaneous transmigrants will be of two types: those who obtain no help at all from the government and those who are still helped by the government, with assistance in the form of transportation, food, and so forth.

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CSO: 4213/269

## RELIGION MINISTER WARNS OF ANTI-PANCASILA EFFORT

Jakarta SUARA KARYA in Indonesian 13 Jul 84 pp 1, 11

[Text] Religion Minister Haji Munawir Sjadzali hopes that the MUI [Indonesian Ulama's Council] will be more vociferous in reminding its community to be on guard against the danger of a small group of half-baked political adventurers who throw issues into the life of the community.

In a holy day reception and thanksgiving ceremony in remembrance of the ninth anniversary of the MUI in the Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta, Wednesday [11 July] evening, Religion Minister Munawir added that the MUI must be courageous and able to free itself of "egoism" for the good of the community.

He stated that there is a group of Islamic thinkers which is quietly suggesting that the MUI and other Islamic mass organizations reject the sole principle of Pancasila. These suggestions are linked to the presence of certain groups which, according to them, will oppose the sole principle, but in fact these groups have now already accepted the sole principle, Pancasila.

That fact, said Munawir, demonstrated how great the danger would be if the MUI and the Islamic community were to be influenced or carried away by the suggestions of that group of Islamic thinkers, whom he evaluates as nothing but adventurers, half-baked political leaders. "History will repeat itself, the community will become divided," said Munawir. He recalled that in the 1950's the potential of the Islamic community was obliterated because of these half-baked political adventurers.

#### The Politics of Divide and Conquer

Meanwhile, the religion minister also stated that there are certain people who claim that the government has carried out the politics of "divide et impira" (divide and conquer) between religious groups. They state that the result of holding government-sponsored consultative meetings between religious communities was a difference of opinion among religious groups. "That is untrue," Munawir declared. Those who make this claim are people who struggle outside the "fence." They are prejudiced and do not know the truth. "In the end they make up scenarios to their own taste. This is the misfortune if those people struggle outside the fence," said Munawir forcefully to reporters at the conclusion of the program.

In the meeting attended by the deputy chairmen of the DPR [Parliament] and MPR [People's Consultative Congress] Nuddin Lubis and Amir Moertono, Minister of Defense and Security Poniman, Pangdam V Jaya [Commander of Military Area V Jakarta] Maj Gen Try Sutrisno, the leadership of the MUI and a number of leaders of Islamic mass organizations, the religion minister explained that meetings between religious communities and the government were held at the request of certain religious bodies, and the religion minister welcomed this.

#### Appreciating the Ulama

The government, said Munawir, always approaches religious figures and teachers of Islam to ask for their opinions. This is in accordance with Pancasila, i.e., the principle of consultation and discussion. He recalled that in this nation of Pancasila there is no national law or ordinance which is in conflict with religious teachings and beliefs. In anything it does, the government pays attention to and respects the opinions, decisions, and judgments of the MUI.

As an example, he cited the fact that the government announced the method (the use of contraceptive devices) to be employed in the family planning program only after it had obtained the approval of the MUI. Also, when the government recently felt it necessary to announce proposed legislation concerning mass organizations which establishes Pancasila as the one principle, opinions were requested from religious scholars and ulamas as well as from other mass organizations. "You made a great contribution in the recent formulation of the proposed law," said Munawir.

He explained that the government never uses pressure. If a matter relates to the constitution and legislation, opinions are requested from religious organizations. That is the desired posture of the government. "We did not summon you, the religion minister himself came here," he said as an example of government appreciation for the ulamas.

#### Do Not Sacrifice the Community

The religion minister asked the Islamic leaders not to sacrifice the community because they cannot keep up with development. "Toward leaders who cannot accept new ideas, fine. But do not be led by the community," stated Munawir. He asked that the community itself determine its posture, and not be sacrificed due to political shallowness and ignorance.

Answering reporters' questions, the religion minister added that the MUI was quite strong and conscious of all upsetting suggestions and irresponsible claims. In his estimation, a group which makes up claims does not have a base, because they just begin to search for a base through their attempt to influence the community. "Are they from respected circles?" asked a reporter. "That is relative," answered Munawir. He admitted that there is a political element in the raising of these issues, especially to divide the community.

12671  
CSO: 4213/256

JAPANESE SOFT LOAN AGREEMENT SIGNED

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 14 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] The governments of Japan and Indonesia have agreed to a soft loan of 71.6 billion yen (286.4 billion rupiahs) for fiscal year 1984 to aid in increasing economic and social development efforts in Indonesia.

Notes concerning this aid agreement were signed and exchanged by Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe in the Foreign Ministry, Jakarta, Saturday morning [14 July].

According to the Japanese Office of Information and Culture, this financial aid fulfills a promise made by the Japanese delegation to the 27th IGGI [Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia] conference in The Hague last 4-5 June.

This year's soft loan is 6.1 percent larger than last year's and represents approximately 46 percent of all bilateral financial aid promised by donor nations at the IGGI conference.

According to the Japanese Embassy this increased soft loan is a realization of the desire of the Japanese Government to continue to aid the government and people of Indonesia in developing their nation.

The terms of this agreement are 3.5 percent annual interest payable over a period of 30 years, including a 10-year grace period.

Madiun and Brantas

This soft loan will finance 17 projects in the fields of agriculture and fisheries, energy, flood control, transportation, public service, telecommunications, and industry.

For flood control on the Madiun River there will be 6.4 billion yen, for Brantas River repair 6 billion yen, for expansion of the Jakarta telephone network 5.6 billion yen, for flood control on the lower Jeneberang River 5.3 billion yen, for construction of the Cawang highway 4.7 billion yen, for development of the Jakarta drinking water supply 4.5 billion yen and for rehabilitation of railroad track between Semarang and Surabaya 3.8 billion yen.

For the flood control project in the city of Padang there will be 580 million yen, for the rice seed production project 3 billion yen, for the ferry terminal extension project at Bakuhami-Merak 2.2 billion yen and for the electric generator project in Kotapanjang 1.1 billion yen.

For the Tabing airport extension development project in Padang there will be 780 million yen, for Pasar Ikan harbor development in Jakarta (a fish and shrimp refrigeration and technical services project) 372 million yen, for PLTD [gas-powered electrical generating stations] projects throughout Indonesia 9 billion yen and for drydock expansion in Ujungpandang 535 million yen.

12671

CSO: 4213/256

## QUINTALS OF BULOG SUGAR SPOIL IN WAREHOUSE

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 13 Jul 84 p 3

[Text] More than 10,000 quintals of BULOG [Bureau of Logistics]-owned sugar have been spoiled by dampness in the warehouse of PG [sugar mill] Kebon Agung as a result of having been too long in storage. Ten percent of the sugar which was produced in 1983 will be lost in reprocessing. BULOG's cost of reprocessing, 1,000 rupiahs per quintal, will be passed on to potential buyers and distributors.

The above was announced by the director of PG Kebon Agung, Hartolo BSc, in his office yesterday [12 July]. He emphasized that such conditions do not exist only in PG Kebon Agung, but in almost every PG in East Java. There are 33 PG's, meaning tens of thousands of quintals.

Hartolo stated that the PG was not able to afford the high cost of reprocessing the sugar, which would reach 4 million rupiahs. Yet there was no other way, he said; the government (BULOG) has made its decision. The consumer will pay the cost.

Indeed, the weakness in our sugar storage system is in the imbalance between production, capacity, and the distribution of sugar outside the warehouse. "The risk in storage is that it cannot be 'first in, first out.' In practice, overstorage occurs," said Hartolo.

This PG's sugar warehouse capacity is 250,000 quintals. Maximum production reaches 460,000 quintals per milling season, clearly out of balance with warehouse storage capacity. The spoilage of this BULOG sugar clearly will influence the market price. The farmer's sale price to BULOG through the PG is 40,000 rupiahs per quintal, and BULOG sells to distributors (after taxes, etc.) at 50,000 rupiahs per quintal. Now the price per quintal will be increased by 1,000 rupiahs to pay for the reprocessing of the spoiled sugar.

## More Than 3 Million Quintals

The 33 sugar mills in East Java produced 10,482,624 quintals in 1983. BULOG and BBD [Bank Bumi Daya] have purchased 10,383,141.09 quintals of this, as reported by the SURABAYA POST on 21 May 1983; BULOG purchased

6,349,224.09 quintals and BBD, as the banker for PTP's [estate agricultural companies] purchased 4,003,917 quintals.

Of that amount, 7,275,546.15 quintals had been logistics-ordered and allocated by last April. Stock remaining in PG warehouses was 3,107,594.94 quintals. Of the amount that was logistics-ordered, 6,667,042.15 quintals was delivery-ordered by last 30 April. This is the amount that had been dispersed to distributors by that time, leaving 3,176,098.94 quintals of sugar stock "just visiting" in PG warehouses.

The head of BULOG has stated that at maximum 30 percent of PG production may be stored in warehouses, a total of 3,144,787.02 quintals. At that time, therefore, the maximum (30 percent) was exceeded by 21,311.92 quintals.

There is as yet no firm data on how many quintals remain "visiting" in the 33 PG sugar warehouses in East Java.

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## BRIEFS

DUMAI HYDROCRACKER PLANT—Although it was officially dedicated in February 1984, the Dumai hydrocracker oil refinery is not yet operating normally because there are still technical difficulties to be resolved. Here and there in the plant there is still equipment which must be repaired and fully assembled. Engr Indra-man Akman, director of refining for Pertamina [State Oil and Gas Company], made this admission at the official opening of the Selat Lalang oil field on 25 July, commenting on a report published in KOMPAS on 21 July. The Selat Lalang field was officially opened by President Soeharto from the Bina Graha offices in Jakarta, 600 kilometers southeast of the oil field. Engr Indraman Akman said: "The hydrocracker in fact is now operating. However, there have been leaks here and there, and the operation cannot be forced. The leaks must be stopped before further repairs can be made." He stated that a hydrocracker does not consist just of the hydrocracker unit. Rather, it is composed of several units in a widely-spaced complex. Every unit must be properly operated. A unit which still remains to be completed at present is the hydrocracker unit itself. For that reason the equipment for processing LSWR (Low Sulphur Waxy Residue) oil is not yet fully operational. However, according to Indraman, he had just received a telephone call from Dumai today [26 July], stating that the hydrocracker unit was about to be tested. He added: "If this test goes well, we may say that the unit is now operating. However, if there are still leaks in the course of the test, or if pump connections have to be adjusted, then it will not yet be operational." [Text] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 26 Jul 84 p 1] 5170

CSO: 4213/269

EDITORIAL HAILS ARRESTS OF CPI ELEMENTS

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 12 Jul 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Do Not Trust Strangers"]

[Text] In the beginning, the government tried warfare to put a stop to the communist acts and to suppress the communist terrorists that have threatened our country for a long time by various means; finally, the government has used political principles to guide the military since 1980.

As a first step, the prime minister issued an order, number 66/2523 [66/1980], to lay out the principles for fighting to defeat the communists by attacking them politically.

Ultimately, those who erroneously cooperated with the communists in the jungle came out and turned themselves in, along with a lot of weapons and supplies. There were welcoming ceremonies in which these people who reformed were counted as partners in Thailand's national development.

When this policy or order was implemented, we expressed our opinion that even though implementing the policy would promote the birth of national unity and end the catastrophe that had occurred and that the government had had to waste a lot of funds in suppression operations, there was still a problem about how to prevent some groups of individuals who might have such deeply held faith in communism, or for whatever reason, that they would be unable to completely change their ways. Communist administration and rule has a very complex control system, so that it is difficult for its members to escape from its circle.

Or else, perhaps there might be some groups of individuals who still believe in and voluntarily are members of the Communist Party, who might adopt a cover as partners in Thailand's national development and take advantage of officials' good intentions to turn around and become a threat to the people and the government afterward.

At present, police authorities are arresting individuals who still believe in communist doctrine, including up to 16 high-ranking CPT officials, as we know. This confirms our opinion about the role and attitude of the communists, that they might create trouble for the people and Thailand through other kinds of secretive activities.

We congratulate the heroism and ability of the authorities who have been able to investigate, follow up and arrest terrorists who are attempting agitation that might develop into anything this time. We understand that all the communist terrorists have not been arrested yet. [We] hope for the future well-being and security of the nation and the people that the vulnerable condition of Bangkok--which they might sabotage and damage easily and which we can see already happening, such as [acts of] arson and the setting of bombs in various places--will not escape the control, inspection and surveillance of the authorities.

12597

CSO: 4207/188

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON GAG ORDER FOR OFFICERS ON POLITICS

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 7 Jul 84 p 3

[Editorial: "The Right Order"]

[Text] A news report has disclosed that the army deputy supreme commander, Gen Thienchai Sirisamphan, has ordered military men to completely cease from commenting on political issues because it is not appropriate for the military, the one component of the ruling institutions with the duty to protect and preserve the country's sovereignty. If soldiers express their opinions on politics, there might be some conflicts of opinion that will make the population misunderstand that there are splits in the nation's military circles. This would not be advantageous for the country.

We agree with the army deputy supreme commander's opinion, because soldiers as government officials should properly remain within the official rules and discipline of government service.

Even in developed countries, which are the originators of the democratic system, there still must be rules or regulations limiting the rights of their soldiers and government servants on active duty in political activities so that they do not go overboard, even though they also are fellow citizens of those countries. In politics, they only have the right to vote in the elections for [national] parliamentary representatives or for their local parliaments. There especially are regulations that absolutely forbid government officials from giving speeches in public places.

When opinions or comments on politics are expressed by military circles, there are likely to be differences of opinion, which is normal in a democratic system, so it creates conflicts of opinion and might directly lead to a shattering of unity in military circles, which would not in any way help the country.

As for our country, as far as what is happening now, active duty soldiers are now not inconsiderably involved in politics, as quite a number of them have been appointed as senators. In parliamentary assemblies, they have the right to express their opinions about politics within the limits of

their official privileges, so they should use their rights in those roles to perform their duties as provided by the constitution and for the progress of the country.

The most important thing is that the institution of the military is likely to have increasing importance for the survival of the nation in both defending and preserving its sovereignty, including its security, especially now when there is unrest along the border that will affect the state of the country. The army deputy supreme commander's order should be praised, and every active duty soldier should adhere to it strictly in the future.

12597

CSO: 4207/188

## KORAT-KAREN WEAPONS TRAFFICKER ARRESTED

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 24 Jun 84 pp 1, 20

[Article: "Transporting RPG Mortar Shells to Mae Sod"]

[Text] A truck driver seeking a fast buck, who hired on to transport government combat ammunition along with approximately 50,000 recoilless rifle bullets, was taking [his cargo] to Karen resistance fighters near the Thai border in the Mae Sod area. The police were setting up a check point, searched the truck and seized the ammunition along with two friends of the truck driver. [The truck driver] confessed to being paid 20,000 baht to transport the ammunition from Korat.

At 4:00 pm on 23 July, while Police Lt Prasit Klinhom, chief of the vehicle inspection station of Ban Houay Ya-u in Phavo Precinct, Mae Sod District, Tak Province, along with a police force were setting up a check point on the Tak-Mae Sod road, [they noticed] a suspicious six-wheel truck, Sukothai Province registration number 80-1066, coming from Mae Sod District. The authorities called out to them to stop for inspection. Inside on the top part, the truck appeared to be filled with chaff, but when the authorities dipped down below 1 foot, they discovered 10 K-81 mortar shells, 10 RPG recoilless rifle shells, 10 support rods for RPG recoilless rifles, two timers, 41,650 carbine bullets, 60 M-16 tracer bullets and 50 11m bullets.

The police arrested Mr Leuane Homchan, 55, the truck driver, who resides at 85 Group 3, Thung Luang Precinct, Khirimat District, Sukothai Province, along with the two men who were in the truck, Mr Insom Suwan, 42, who resides at 172 Group 2, Mae Pa Precinct, Mae Sod District, Tak Province, and Mr Prathit Saen-Euay, 25, who resides at 209 Group 7, Mae Tao Precinct, Mae Sod District, Tak Province. The authorities detained these defendants with the physical evidence and brought them to Police Lt Suraphon Sub-am, the duty officer at Mae Sod.

After questioning, Mr Leuane and his friends confessed that they were hired by a man who paid them 20,000 baht to transport the government combat ammunition from Nakhon Ratchasima to Mr Chanthip, a Karen at Ban Mae La in Mae Tane Precinct, Thasonyang District, Tak Province. They were mid-way when the authorities stopped and seized them.

12597

CSO: 4207/188

COLUMNIST ASSESSES MARCOS RULE

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 20 Jun 84 p 2

[Article: "Marcos' Unlimited"]

[Text] The wheel of events responsible for determining the Philippines' history is spinning and reaching its final destination in many ways.

From the national election of national congressional members on 14 February, it appears that most of the middle class was willing to jump together into "the political and economic swim of things."

The most important factor that pulled in the middle class was the cruel political assassination that took away the life of the former opposition leader, Benigno Aquino.

The next reason is the Philippines' economic depression, the worst ever in any period since World War II.

The collapse of the economy has affected the middle and lower classes the most. These social groups have each come to the same realization that if they ignore "politics" further, then surely....

....they will be ruined and completely destroyed.

During the entire 19 years of Marcos' rule, this is the heaviest opposition that he has ever encountered, and it has increased in intensity more steadily than ever before.

From January of last year to the present, the value of the peso has fallen tremendously, by 73 percent, while inflation will rocket up 50-60 percent by the last part of the year. If Marcos cannot solve these problems....

....next election, he will surely lose more heavily, because this time only the middle class came in to support the opposition. As for the common people, only a small group participated, as they were still boycotting the election.

If those who abstained from this election join in to support the opposition side in the next election....

...Marcos will dig up his schemes, such as "counting votes late" for how many more months or years, so that the outcome will be similar to this one?

Either way, do you believe that a panting, winded monster like this dictator will be cornered easily? If he sees that he really cannot survive, he might open the door to a military dictatorship because he thoroughly despises democracy!

[signed] Jupiter

12597

CSO: 4207/188



## AIR FORCE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF PROFILED

Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPPADA in Thai 29 Jul 84 p 42

[Text] Air Marshal Kaset Rotjananin, Air Force assistant chief of staff. Age 51; born 27 August 1933 in Saraburi, the second of 10 children of Mr Serm and Mrs Arun Rotjananin.

He was nominated to hold the post of Air Force assistant chief of staff to replace Air Marshal Chamnan Phatarayothin, who was promoted to be the Air Force deputy chief of staff on 17 July 1984.

He graduated from 10th grade at the Saraburi Boarding School in 1949, then continued his studies at Phyathai Secondary School and graduated from 12th grade in 1951. He was in the same class as Dr Sansiri Sommani, MD, the dean of the Faculty of Tropical Medicine of Mahidol University.

He continued his education in the Faculty of Medicine of Chulalongkorn University. After 1 year, he left and entered the Air Force Officer School, Class 1, the same class as Air Vice Marshal Kan Phimanthip, the head of the Air Force Intelligence Department.

He graduated from Air Force Officer School in 1957. His first post was as a pilot with the 52nd Squadron, 5th Group, at Prachuab Khirikhan, where he was stationed for 6 months. He was then transferred as a pilot with the 12th Squadron, 1st Group, at Don Muang. In 1961, he became the head of an F-84G flight unit with the 4th Squadron at Takhli. In 1962, he was in combat in Korea.

In 1963, he became the assistant operations officer of the 61st Squadron, 6th Group. In 1964, he was in combat in Vietnam as the head of the 2nd Victory Flight Unit. He was promoted to operations officer and then to deputy commander of the 61st Squadron. In 1972, he was in combat in Kampuchea as the chief of Air Force Supply Operations. In 1973, he was nominated to be commander of the 62nd Squadron, 6th Group.

In 1975, he became chief of staff of the 2nd Group at Lopburi. In 1976, he became the deputy and acting commander of the 2nd Group. In 1977, he was the deputy and acting commander of the 6th Group and then was nominated commander of the 6th Group in 1978.

In 1980, he became deputy chief of the Materiel Department. In 1982, he became chief of the Materiel Department. He held this position until he was nominated to be assistant chief of staff.

He is a graduate of the Air Force Command and General Staff College, class 15; Air Force College, class 13; and the Defense College, class 26.

His wife Watana and he have three daughters, Kasinee, 25, a civil servant with the Department of Tropical Medicine and a Bachelor of Science graduate of Chulalongkorn University and holder of a Master's Degree from Mahidol University; Kasama, 23, in government service with the Department of Continuing Education and holder of a Bachelor of Education (second class honors) from Khon Kaen University; and Kanittha, 21, a fourth-year student in the Faculty of Business Administration at the College of Commerce.

12587

CSO: 4207/196

## FARMERS SAID TO FACE GROWING PRICE SQUEEZE

Bangkok PATINYA in Thai 6 Aug 84 pp 15-18

[Article: "Farmers: A Problem Waiting to Explode"]

[Text] Production problems of farmers is another problem area that every past government has tried to help solve by [piecemeal] price supports, guaranteed prices, interfering with rice prices or other ways. Even the present government (Prem 4) also has policies to help farmers, which can be seen from its announcements guaranteeing rice prices. In addition, it has also decreased the premiums for rice exports (50 percent), to boost rice prices so that farmers' incomes would rise.

But the actual situation is that farmers are unable to sell their rice in accordance with the prices announced by the government; they can sell at only around 2,300-2,800 baht per cart [2,000 liters]. For this reason, around the beginning of 1984, farmers from around the country joined together and sent representatives to meet with Gen Athit Kamlang-ek, the Army commander and the supreme commander of the armed forces, to request assistance. But nothing improved, which made the farmers join forces again to lay out systematic plans for bringing farmers to Government House, with farmers from Uttaradit Province as the leaders. However, news leaked out and reached government officials first, so [the demonstration] was stopped ahead of time. Around the middle of last June, farmers from Suphanburi Province and Chainat Province quietly instigated a mob scene by taking 14 June as their D-Day. But they were unsuccessful because they were totally stopped in line with the government's policy of making the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives responsible.

Nevertheless, even though farmers now seem to be quiet and peaceful as if there were no problems, the problems of farmers have not been solved at all.

#### The Suffering of Farmers

Because our country is still underdeveloped, the majority of our farmers lack land and modern technology for making their living. Because of that, the initial investment for production is very high compared to that in developed countries. The average production from such investment per rai is very low, approximately 30-50 barrels [600-1,000 liters] or 70 barrels [1,400 liters]

of lowland rice per rai. In short, initial investment for production is around 3,150 baht per 2,000 liters of rice, but it can be sold for only around 2,300-2,800 baht per 2,000 liters at a time when the government has announced guaranteed prices for 100 percent grade 1 rice of 3,600 baht per metric ton; for 100 percent grade 2 rice of 3,500 baht per metric ton; for 100 percent grade 3 rice of 3,400 baht per metric ton; for 5 percent rice of 3,300 baht per metric ton; for 15 percent rice of 3,100 baht per metric ton; for 25 percent rice of 3,000 baht per metric ton; for 10 percent glutinous rice of 2,900 baht per metric ton; and for 10 percent glutinous rice of 2,800 baht per metric ton.

Concerning this matter, one leader of farmers from Nakhon Sawan stated to PATINYA that, "The price that the Department of Public Relations announces daily is the going price among merchants, not the price that farmers can sell at. I would like to confirm this, because the data collected by government units comes from the same sources, namely commercial ones in each province. Consequently, the prices [quoted] constantly conflict."

The same farmer leader revealed more about the schemes of rice mill owners: "Based on information gathered from some rice mill merchants, at the beginning of this year--because they surely know which information is advantageous and which disadvantageous for themselves to give--when a government [official] inquired (one minister telephoned to ask for the price of rice from the village chief of Song, the major rice merchant in Nakhon Sawan, in front of reporters the beginning of 1984) [a merchant] immediately replied that the price of rice was very high, around 3,100 baht. When [the merchant] gave that information, the official channels released it and the newspapers published it. The following morning there was plenty of rice for sale to [that merchant], but the truth is, he bought only some at the price he had quoted; the rest he bought at low prices, approximately 2,300-2,800 baht, the same as [he had done] previously. No one follows up what prices those rice mills give. Farmers themselves are forced to sell because when they are that deeply committed, they can't back out of the deal." In addition to these pressures, some farmers need payments long in advance of their harvests. When they bring their harvests in, they still remain in debt [because the prices they receive do not cover their advances].

Because of that, an idea developed that farmers should join together to set up cooperatives and to export themselves (in order to decrease the trading profits of the middlemen merchants). However, they are stymied by the rice reserves regulations that the government has established, which require rice exporters to have huge stocks. Consequently, solving the problem by setting up cooperatives to export themselves is impossible.

#### The Government and Solutions to the Problem

When farmers were unable to sell rice at the prices fixed by the government, leaders of farmers throughout the country held a joint meeting and concluded that they should have some sort of demonstration to make the government see the difficulties of farmers. Because in the past the words of farmers had carried little weight, they arrived at two methods. The first method was to

gather farmers from around the country to march into Bangkok, with each farmer bringing one barrel of rice paddy for making a bon fire at the statue of King Rama VI. But this method was very difficult because government officials have better equipment and communications. [If they] merely ordered them to stop, the farmers would be completely blocked from entering [Bangkok]. The second method was to have farmers gather in every province simultaneously for separate provincial protests. If that was really impossible, they could meet with their leaders again and lead a protest march into Bangkok.

Consolidating the forces of farmers is truly quite difficult because farmer groups are so scattered about that it is difficult to disseminate information about what to do, where to do it and how to do it. This makes it difficult to keep information from leaking to the government officials preparing to stop them. In addition, farmer forces have an overabundance of ideas, with some relying on political parties and on other special interest groups, so it is difficult to coordinate their thinking and interests to make them into a unified movement. All these are obstacles to quickly consolidating [farmers] into a large force.

In addition to that, the government itself has a policy for obstructing farmer forces by making the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives responsible for regularly following up their actions and the market situation in each province. Concerning this matter, the same farmer leader revealed to PATINYA that, "The Ministry of Interior issued orders to the governors of every province that they must not allow any protest marches. If there were any demonstrations and [farmers] were allowed to enter the central region, it would be a violation. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives issued orders through the Department of Agricultural Extension down to provincial agricultural units to be watchful and not allow farmers to join forces."

This policy made the responsible parties, especially the governors and provincial agricultural units, try everything [they could] to put a stop to the problems. They were able to solve or mitigate some problems, such as finding land for farmers who had no place to make their living. But they could not solve certain problems, such as when selling their production does not cover their investment. These [problems] hurt a lot of farmers and make them unite to protest. But these district protests about various problems have not received any action at all; [government officials] have just blocked them, so that they will not spread into the central region. The strategy for obstructing [farmers] has been improved from previous ones. Instead of suddenly intervening as in the past, the strategy now is to make a request or plea based on relations built previously. Similarly, just before a movement develops, [officials] invite farmers to seminars in different locales to divide and conquer their forces. In addition, the police are actively moving around such areas as a threat to the birth of a [farmers] force. Consequently, by obstructing with such methods, even farmers who are backed by political parties are not able to move because the influence of government civil servants is greater.

## Conclusion

Even though these government methods have successfully stopped farmer forces at one level--so that if you look at it superficially, the situation might appear peaceful and free of problems--in reality, the problems of farmers have not been solved at all. On the contrary, obstructing them is just a way for shoving the problems way out of sight. When farmers cannot tolerate their troubles anymore, we likewise do not know what is going to happen.

12587

CSO: 4207/196

RAIN-INDUCING ROCKET INVENTED

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 21 Jul 84 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Thailand Has Invented a Rain-Inducing Rocket"]

[Text] The Ministry of Science has invented a rain-inducing rocket. The test results are very good. It is thought that this will be put to use to help the farmers next year.

In his capacity as the chairman of the Subcommittee for Research and Development of Rockets for Scientific Research, National Research Council, Professor Sanga Sapsi, the undersecretary of state of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy, was interviewed by reporters at the minister yesterday morning. He said that we have done research and developed rocket technology for scientific purposes. In this, we have scored good results for national development since we have been able to build a rocket to produce rain artificially.

Dr Sanga said that the rocket project to produce rain artificially is one of the projects whose purpose is to help solve the drought problem for the farmers in order to satisfy the needs of the farmers for water for cultivation. The people responsible for this project have succeeded in building rain rockets 1 and 2. These have now been tested and satisfactory results have been achieved. The final results of this project will be known next year.

This rocket development operations subcommittee is composed of specialists from various government units and the military. It has been carrying on activities since 1981. The objective is to do technical research on rockets so that rockets can be put to use in developing the country.

As for the development, or construction, of this rocket, in his capacity as subcommittee chairman, the undersecretary of state of the Ministry of Science said that an effort has been made to build the rocket in accord with the needs of various units using raw materials produced domestically as the principal materials used in construction. Most of the tests have been ground tests. But in the near future, tests at sea will be conducted.

Dr Sanga said that in carrying on this project, the subcommittee is ready to make use of the knowledge and talents of various specialists in both military and civilian units. It will use their talents to do research that will benefit the nation. He would like to ask scholars at the universities to contribute ideas to this project, too.

11943

CSO: 4207/197



THAILAND

EDITORIAL CLAIMS DISPUTED VILLAGES ARE THAI

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 26 Jul 84 p 3

[Editorial: "The Incident On the Thai-Lao Border"]

[Text] Concerning the negotiations between Thailand and Laos on the three border villages in Uttaradit Province, even though the two sides are negotiating peacefully in conditions in which the two countries have friendly relations with each other and in which the people of Laos regard the people of Thailand as older brothers, news reports state that the matter has not been settled.

What we mean by this is that the two countries have not been able to reach an agreement on which country holds sovereignty over these three border villages.

Laos is responsible for having caused this, or it was the fuse. Because these three villages have been in Thailand for a long time. The people who live there are Thais, and the Thai government has had administrative control over these villages ever since Laos was a democracy with a king at the head. All during those 100 years, those three villages never had any problems at all.

But then Lao troops took control of these villages, claiming that they belonged to Laos. This happened after Laos changed its administrative system, turning from a democratic system to another system.

Thailand feels that the seizure of these villages inside Thailand by armed Lao forces was an intentional violation of Thailand's sovereignty. The Thai people will not stand for this.

We have now learned that the negotiations have failed to achieve anything since the Lao side, which has sent a negotiator at the ministerial level, cannot reach an agreement by itself. It has to wait for orders from Vientiane. And we have no way of knowing who is really issuing the orders.

An important problem in these negotiations is that Laos is trying very hard to get Thailand to withdraw the forces that Thailand has stationed in that area to preserve peace and ensure the well-being of the people in those three villages. They are asking us to withdraw our forces even though Lao troops are still present in the area. We do not think that this is very proper, and Thailand will certainly refuse to do this.

We feel that this request by Laos to have Thailand withdraw its forces is a trick. Because if Thailand withdrew the forces that are protecting our sovereignty and ensuring the well-being of the people in those villages, it is our understanding that Laos would immediately send in forces to occupy the villages.

Thus, we feel that the Thai negotiators have taken a firm stand in the negotiations. They have agreed to a mutual troop withdrawal and things are being discussed based on the terrain, maps and history. All of this is quite proper.

We don't want to talk about the tricks and stratagems that Laos is now using against us. Because in the past, Laos never employed trickery in dealing with Thailand since Thailand always supported and aided Laos and the Lao people, particularly on the economic and communications fronts. And even now, the Thai and Lao people still consider themselves to be brothers. Thus, we don't understand why the present government in Laos is playing such a role and trying to change people's feelings and alter our friendly relations. The only explanation seems to be that the present Lao government is not the real government of the Lao people.

Thais feel that the three villages belong to Thailand. We ask the Thai government to remain firm and act in accord with the wishes of the Thai people in this matter. We ask the government not to change its position in any way.

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CSO: 4207/197

THAILAND

TRADE FUTURE WITH PRC DISCUSSED

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 1 Aug 84 p 11

[Article: "China Tells Thailand That It Must Help Itself and That, In the Future, China May Not Purchase Large Quantities"]

[Text] China has warned Thailand that it must make a greater effort to help itself in selling agricultural goods and that it cannot expect China to buy goods since China, too, is an agricultural country. The Department of Foreign Trade has made plans to send a representative [to China] this October to set short and long-term targets.

Mr Somphon Kietiphaibun, the deputy director-general of the Department of Foreign Trade, announced the results of his recent visit to the People's Republic of China, when he accompanied Air Chief Marshal Sutthi Sawetsila, the minister of foreign affairs. He said that he met with Mrs Chen Muhua, the Chinese minister of foreign economic relations and trade.

The Thai party asked China to step up the purchase of goods in accord with the targets set by the two countries. China said that there would not be any problem in purchasing the goods in accord with the targets set. But at one point, Mrs Chen Muhua warned Thailand that:

"In the next 2-3 years, trade between Thailand and China will be more difficult, particularly concerning agricultural goods, since China, too, is an agricultural country. If Thailand wants China to purchase more goods, the amount will be very limited. Thus, Thailand should make a greater effort to help itself."

Mr Somphon also said that Thailand has made plans to send a representative from the Department of Foreign Trade to China this October in order to discuss Thai-Chinese trade targets for 1985. Besides that, they will also discuss 3-year trade targets. Thailand will propose [selling] raw materials that China lacks. Also, an effort will be made to get China to purchase larger quantities of goods in accord with Thai export rates.


11943

CSO: 4207/197

CARTOON NOTES PRESS CENSORSHIP

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 8 Aug 84 p 3

[Text]



Key:


1. Matichon
2. Naeo Na
3. Matuphum
4. Khlet Lap

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CARTOON SPOOF ON U.S., JAPANESE DOMINATION

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 30 Jul 84 p 3



- Key:
- 1. First Olympic medal
  - 2. War devil
  - 3. Economic devil

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CSO: 4207/197

THAILAND

BRIEFS

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY PARTY ELECTION--Khlaeo loses bid for position as party leader and secretary-general of the Social Democracy Party. The leader of the socialist political part in Thailand is still Colonel Somkhit Sisangkhom. The Social Democracy Party, which holds two seats in parliament, held a general meeting to elect a party executive committee. The meeting was held at the Thai Hotel on 5 August. Two people ran for party leader: Colonel Somkhit Sisangkhom, the present party leader whose term had expired, and Mr Khlaeo Narapati, an MP from Khon Kaen and the secretary-general of the Party. The result was that Colonel Somkhit was overwhelmingly elected to continue as party leader even though he is not an MP at present. In the election for party secretary-general, Mr Khlaeo ran against Mr Suthi Phuwaphan, an MP from Surin and the deputy party leader. Mr Suthi was elected to the position of secretary-general in place of Mr Khlaeo. The candidates for the position of deputy party leader were Mr Khlaeo Narapati, Mr Wichit Wongsanuthat, Mr Prasoet Loetyaso and Mr Phu Sakmangkon. The candidate for party spokesman was Mr Sin Ratsari. [Text] [Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 7 Aug 84 pp 1, 12] 11943

CSO: 4207/197

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REPRESSION OF SOUTHERN WRITERS, ARTISTS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS DENOUNCED

Gennevilliers (France) QUE ME in Vietnamese Jul 84 pp 40,41

[Article by Tran Pho Minh: "Doan Quoc Sy and Other Southern Writers and Artists Arrested"]

[Text] After announcing Doan Quoc Sy's arrest in the recent May and June issues of QUE ME, today we are adding the latest news received from Siagon about the raids on South Vietnamese writers and artists.

At 2 am on 2 May 1984, six municipal public security agents broke into Doan Quoc Sy's private house in Siagon. They awoke all members of his family and compelled them to sit down in the living room and hear them read an indictment charging Doan Quoc Sy with "acting as a spy and counter-revolutionary against the government." Afterward, a public security agent stood in the living room to keep the whole family under guard while the other five searched the house completely, mixing up and scattering books, paper, pens and clothes. They attentively looked for writings, letters, photographs and any proof of connections with overseas relatives and friends. They took pictures of these bundles of paper with the intention of using them later on, when necessary, as evidence of the clamourously boasted "booties" which were usually planted by them during their calumnious raids. They also seized and took away the cases used to contain gifts sent home from abroad.

The search went on until 8 am. After forcing Doan Quoc Sy to sign the search report, they led him to their car and carried him away. According to some witnesses, Doan Quoc Sy walked out very calmly and haughtily without a touch of bewilderment or panic.

According to the latest news received by us, Doan Quoc Sy is not being detained in Phan Dang Luu.

Raids similar to the above-mentioned one were conducted at the same time on the houses of a number of Siagon writers and artists such as Hoang Hai Thuy, Duy Trac, Duong Hung Cuong, Thanh Tam Huyen, Nha Ca, Hguyen Dinh Toan, etc., but according to well-informed sources, the arrested and detained persons included Doan Quoc Sy, Hoang Hai Thuy, Duy Trac and Duong Hung Cuong.

In the past, Doan Quoc Sy had been detained in a reeducation camp for 5 years during which he always behaved as an indomitable scholar of strong character who was never frightened by the communist threats, repression and bribery. Thanks to the campaign by the intervention of international organizations such as Amnesty International, Pen Club and so forth, Doang Quoc Sy was set free in early 1980. Recently, Doan Thi Ngoc Thanh--Doan Quoc Sy's daughter--had fulfilled formalities to enable him to go to Australia under the "family reunification" program but his recent arrest has obstructed--if not smashed--his plan.

The communist state believes that by detaining religious leaders, writers and artists, it will lull the masses to sleep, thus soothing in some measure the deep discontent which is spreading from the people to cadres. But the communists have forgotten a lesson which is as great and old as the earth and which teaches that the people are the water and the government the boat and that it is the same water that floats or sinks the boat. Religious leaders or writers and artists come from the people; in addition to providing spiritual and moral guidance, they have to shoulder societal affairs according to the people's wishes.

At present, noncommunist overseas Vietnamese movements must promptly devise a long-term counterpolicy and an effective plan for the /struggle to defend human rights in Vietnam/ [in boldface] instead of reacting temporarily only in case of need and in a separate and lonely fashion--which amounts only to a short-lived opposition which is as ephemeral as the flame of a burning straw.

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CSO: 4209/435



## MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

### CADRE SHORTAGE IMPEDES BUILDUP OF MEKONG DELTA'S ARMED FORCES

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 84 pp 27-37

[Article by Major General Ho Ba Phuc: "Some Matters Regarding Mobilizing the People To Participate in the Buildup of the Local Armed Forces in the Mekong Delta"]

[Text] I. The Position of the Mekong Delta and the Task of Mobilizing the People To Participate in the Buildup of the Armed Forces

The Mekong Delta consists of the nine provinces of former Nam Bo: Long An, Tien Giang, Dong Thap, Ben Tre, Cuu Long, Hau Giang, An Giang, Kien Giang and Minh Hai. It measures 39,876 square kilometers. Its population stands at roughly 12 million (nearly 5.2 million laborers), about 10 million of whom (with more than 4 million laborers) live in the countryside. The coastline, which extends for 786 kilometers from the mouth of the Soai Rap River in northeast Go Cong Dong District in Tien Giang Province around Cape Ca Mau all the way to Ha Tien in Kien Giang Province, is interrupted by the mouths of many rivers. In addition to the Soai Rap River and the five branches of the Mekong River, there are the Ganh Hao River, the Bay Hap River, the Ong Trang River, the Ong Doc River, the Cai Lon River and many large and small rivers, canals and ditches that crisscross the entire delta like a spider web. Along the coastline are bands of cajuput and mangrove forests, which are tens of kilometers wide and cover a total of roughly 500,000 hectares. Each year, additional alluvial soil is deposited along the coastline by the Mekong River, especially along the western continental shelf of the peninsula, thereby creating a natural fortification, one very well suited to protecting and developing natural resources, to building and defending our Vietnamese fatherland. The continental shelf in this region is the scene of many petroleum and natural gas potentials with very promising reserves. At sea are hundreds of large and small islands, particularly in the west, which combine to form an effective defense network and encompass rich sources of marine products of high export value.

Down through the several centuries of its development, as a result of unity among the nationalities and the blessings with which it has been endowed by nature, the delta has become increasingly strong and rich and life there has generally been more prosperous than elsewhere in the country. Today, the

Mekong Delta, together with its rich and diverse potentials in agriculture, fishing, forestry and industry, has a very convenient network of water and land communications-transportation routes as well as airports, seaports and warehouses located throughout the delta. In particular, the delta, as one of the two rice bowls of our country, supplies grain and food products to the entire country and supplies an important portion of export goods.

Lying on the piece of land that juts out into the South China Sea like a staircase facing the vast ocean and blocking the vital maritime routes from the west and southwest to the eastern and northeastern Pacific Ocean, the Mekong Delta occupies a special geographic position in the southeastern portion of the Indochina Peninsula.

Due to its economic, political and geographical position, the French imperialists and the U.S. imperialists, that is, both the old-style colonialists and the neo-colonialists, first stepped foot in Indochina at this bridgehead of strategic importance. A review of ancient history shows that virtually every time they sent forces to invade our territory, the northern feudal dynasties never overlooked this vital region; they considered it to be one of the two most important strategic fronts. And, more recently, in their scheme to annex the three countries of Indochina, Vietnam is the first objective in the strategy of the great Han expansionists of Beijing to expand down into Southeast Asia and was their first target when, also from Kampuchea, they used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal clique to attack our fatherland's southwestern border. They coordinated with remnant U.S.-puppet forces in the hinterland in a vain attempt to retake this final piece of land they held in order to create a strategic position that would enable them to threaten us from both the north and the south. Although this malicious scheme was defeated and despite the fact that the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists were taught an unforgettable lesson by the armed forces and people of both regions of our country during the first months of 1979, they still have not given up, rather, they continue to collaborate with imperialism, led by the U.S. imperialists, and the other reactionary powers, are waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage against us and are ready to carry out a war of aggression to annex our country. The U.S. imperialists, although tragically defeated and forced to withdraw from Indochina, still have not abandoned their desire to reimpose the yoke of neo-colonialism in one form or another upon the necks of the peoples of the three countries of Indochina. They have been and are supporting the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and the reactionaries in a number of Southeast Asian countries in a crusade against Vietnam and the two fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea in every field, from economic encirclement to diplomatic isolation, psychological, cultural and ideological sabotage, military intimidation...

The Mekong Delta, a part of the strategic rear area of southern Indochina, a region of abundant manpower and materiel and the immediate rear area of the Kampuchean revolution, is a target that the U.S. imperialists and the international reactionaries have their eyes on, a target for which they are awaiting a favorable opportunity to grab with all their claws bared. We cannot relax our vigilance for one moment and cannot have one weakness of any kind in our preparations for fighting to maintain the territorial integrity of the fatherland.

In recent years, clearly aware of the importance of the Mekong Delta, the various party committee echelons and local governments there have closely coordinated with the military command echelons from the military region to the provinces and districts and gained an increasingly deep understanding of the two strategic tasks set by the 5th Party Congress: "Successfully building socialism and being ready to fight to defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland." The localities have made many efforts to build up the local people's armed forces and contribute manpower and materiel to the revolution in a manner closely linked to building the locality in every respect. They have achieved good results and made practical contributions to the victory of our armed forces and people on the southwestern border as well as in the defense of the fatherland, in general.

However, the building of the local people's armed forces in the Mekong Delta is still limited in many respects compared to the requirements and capabilities of the localities within the area. Militia and self-defense forces, although they have recorded a number of noteworthy achievements, still constitute a low percentage of the population (6 percent). The distribution of these forces among the various provinces and districts is very uneven. In some provinces, such as Ben Tre and Cuu Long, these forces constitute a high percentage of the population; however, in other provinces, they only constitute a very low percentage. Deserving of attention is that the activities of the militia and self-defense forces show signs of weakness and deficiency. At some places, social order within the locality is not being maintained well. Attempts to flee the country by sea still occur. Episodes of randomly firing weapons, rusted weapons that have not been cleaned or cared for, an attitude of arrogance and threats against civilians are sometimes still seen.

Weak militia and self-defense forces also make it impossible to create good conditions for building strong and solid local forces. One of the causes of this situation has been the failure to establish a movement among all the people to participate in the buildup of the armed forces. Propaganda and agitational work designed to make the masses conscious of their obligation to defend the fatherland and encourage them to display a high spirit of responsibility toward building the armed forces has not been conducted in a positive, meticulous manner. The thoroughness needed to educate the masses and give them an understanding of the situation is usually lacking. There is still some degree of bureaucracy, authoritarianism and pressure and a failure to uphold the right of collective ownership of the masses, especially among the laboring people and revolutionary families. Local military agencies and units stationed within the locality usually do not fully research every aspect of the situation, from the economy, politics, society and culture to the history of the locality, in order to mobilize and organize the masses through suitable measures, raise their level of awareness and lead them in implementing the positions and policies of the party and state so that they improve the face of the locality, improve their old way of life and way of thinking, work hard, actively participate in the building of their birthplace and be ready to defend the fatherland, defend their hamlets and maintain political security and social order and safety.

Therefore, to strengthen the buildup of the local people's armed forces, we must develop upon strengths, overcome weaknesses and, in particular, make every effort to mobilize the masses, to launch a widespread movement to encourage and organize all the people within the locality in participating in the buildup of the armed forces.

## II. Some Characteristics of the Mekong Delta that Must Be Understood when Mobilizing the People To Participate in Building the Local Armed Forces

The Mekong Delta was once the deepest area within the zone occupied by the Americans and the puppets. Although it has been liberated for more than 9 years, the cultural and ideological influences of colonialism, both old and new, still have an impact upon the way of life and thinking of a considerable number of the people, an important portion of whom are party members and revolutionary cadres. The economy still consists of many different segments. The majority of production is private production. As of the end of September, 1983, only 36.5 percent of the farm families throughout former Nam Bo had joined production collectives and low level cooperatives, bringing with them 29 percent of farmland. Of the population of the delta provinces, approximately 70 percent consists of middle farmers who control 80 percent of farmland, more than 70 percent of small machines and 93 percent of draft buffalo and cattle. More than 3 million persons in the other middle strata are private handicraftsmen or small merchants... Laborers who work for hire, state personnel and the workers at enterprises and state-operated worksites and farms constitute a very small percentage.

With such a socio-economic makeup, the trend of development would naturally be toward capitalism without the leadership provided by the party.

We have been urgently building the base of the party, the government and the mass organizations within the Mekong Delta ever since liberation day. Generally speaking, however, the basic level is still weak at many places. Appropriate importance is still not being attached to a number of strategically important areas along the seacoast and the border and urban areas or areas inhabited by many ethnic minorities or religious followers. In the delta are hundreds of thousands of officers, enlisted men and personnel of the former puppet government together with their families and relatives. Reactionary political organizations and intelligence networks established by the imperialists that we have yet to completely break up together with hoodlums, vagrants, persons who earn their livings illegally and so forth are cancers that continue to cause acute pain to the body of our society and impede the mobilization of the masses in each revolutionary movement, which includes the building of the armed forces.

The Mekong Delta is home to many ethnic minorities that live as ethnic groups within certain areas. Vietnamese of Khmer ancestry, who number about 800,000, live primarily in Soc Trang (Hau Giang), Tra Vinh (Cuu Long) and Chau Doc (An Giang). Persons of Cham ancestry, who number about 11,000, live in Tan Chau District in An Giang Province. Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry, who number about 238,000, live throughout the delta but are concentrated mainly in the cities, where their main livelihood is commerce.

Religions in the Mekong Delta occupy an important position on the spiritual front among virtually every segment of the population. There is hardly anyone who is not a follower of some religion. The largest religious group is the Buddhist, with more than 1 million followers; Catholicism: about 580,000; Cao Daiism: more than 370,000; Hoa Hao: more than 1 million; and Tin Lanh: nearly 20,000.

In addition, there are many other sects, sects that have been established by a priest or monk proclaiming himself to be the disciple of some saint or god, that have attracted a considerable number of followers and monopolized the thinking and spirit of the masses, thereby creating a tendency toward pessimism, superstition and negativism in production and combat. This also provides very fertile ground for the reactionary lackeys of imperialism and Beijing expansionism to oppose and undermine the building and defense of our fatherland.

The several characteristics described above must be given attention when encouraging and persuading the masses to carry out the two strategic tasks of the revolution that have been set by the party.

However, of utmost importance is the need to fully recognize the characteristics regarding the revolutionary tradition and fine virtues of our compatriots in the Mekong Delta.

The compatriots in the Mekong Delta are persons who have a history of struggling against the oppression of the Trinh and Nguyen feudal lords from the late 17th to the early 18th century. The national community there stubbornly clung to the land, land that was still wilderness then, to build the delta of today. In the 19th century, in the face of aggression by the French colonialists and despite the fact that the Nguyen Dynasty surrendered and gave the six provinces of Nam Ky to the aggressors in tribute, our compatriots in the delta refused to yield and frequently arose armed with swords and bamboo staffs against the foreign aggressors. One after the other, patriotic scholars such as Doc Binh Kieu, Truong Cong Dinh, Nguyen Trung Truc, Thu Khoa Huan, Thu Khoa Nghia, Nguyen Dinh Chieu and others recruited persons of talent and arose to defend the country. The people of this area wholeheartedly responded to the "loyalty to the emperor proclamation" movement and the "go east" movement.

Ever since our party raised the banner of national independence and socialism, the people of the Mekong Delta, along with the working class and laboring people of the entire country, have followed the party's lead in the struggle and written brilliant chapters in the golden history of the entire nation. Following the more than 30 years of the two wars of national liberation and before the joy of peace that came with the total independence and reunification of the country could be completely realized, the fight had to be resumed, this time against foreign aggression on the southwestern border. Ever since then, in the face of the aggression by our new, dangerous and cunning enemy, the compatriots of the delta have again constantly stood ready to contribute manpower and materiel to the fulfillment of our national task and sacred international obligation without one moment's hesitation.

Blessed by nature, life in the delta is somewhat more comfortable, work is not as difficult or strenuous as in other regions of the country and the climate is moderate, consequently, the people there are independent, brave, frank but sincere and rarely stubborn, prejudiced or narrowminded. They do not tolerate injustices when they see them, never submit or withdraw in the face of tyranny, are loyal and determined once they see the truth, tenaciously do battle with the enemy and are prepared to endure every sacrifice, even the loss of their own lives and the lives of their families.

Diligent workers, they perform every job they undertake thoroughly and with a full spirit of responsibility but when they play, they truly go out to have a good time. In the resistance against France as well as during the resistance against the United States for national salvation, to the citizens of the Mekong Delta, the word of the party was the word of Uncle Ho, Uncle was their father, their mother, their revered uncle, an uncle who was to be obeyed by every nephew and niece. In the hamlets, elders often counselled the younger generations: do what the party chapter tells you to do, think of the party chapter as a leader, a leader to whom you would give the full measure of your respect and love.

We must fully recognize and utilize this spirit and strength of the people of the Mekong Delta in the work of mobilizing and organizing the masses to perform each revolutionary task, in general, and build the national defense system, build the battlefield deployment of the people's war within the Mekong Delta and, in particular, build the local people's armed forces.

### III. Some Matters of Primary Importance in Mobilizing the People of the Mekong Delta To Participate in Building the Local People's Armed Forces

1. It is first of all necessary to develop the role played by the party organization and government in the various localities. The party organization and local governments, from the provincial to the village and hamlet levels, must truly begin to closely guide the buildup and management of the militia, self-defense forces and local forces in a planned manner, considering this to be an indispensable part of government management within the locality. Every aspect of the present work of the locality, especially within the scope of the districts, such as reorganizing production, carrying out economic and cultural development, redistributing the population, building villages, towns and fields, stepping up production, restoring the new order on the distribution and circulation front, building roads, building water conservancy and communication projects, building post-telecommunication projects, building wired radio networks and so forth, must be closely coordinated with establishing the battlefield deployment of the people's war and building the people's armed forces within the locality. The tasks of building the party organization, building the government and building the mass organizations on the basic level must be closely and smoothly linked to the task of building the local people's armed forces into a united entity and neither task can be given light attention.

It is necessary to see the close link between the local armed forces, in general, and the militia and self-defense forces, in particular, and the overall situation within the locality, from the economic, political, cultural

and social situations to the customs, habits, thoughts, feelings, viewpoints and aspirations of the people within the hamlets and villages. The militia, self-defense forces and local troops come from the people and live close to the people on the same piece of land. They are close to their families, close to their hamlets, consequently, what their families and hamlets think, are concerned about and want directly affect their thoughts and viewpoints. The militia and self-defense forces are both soldiers and citizens, are armed citizens, not regular troops. Main force troops also come from the people but they regularly live within a highly organized and disciplined collective, leave their locality and move about a large area of operation. This distinction must be made in order to adopt measures, policies and requirements regarding the buildup of forces that are consistent with the nature of each type force, consistent with militia and self-defense forces. Because, to date, in the political education and military training of the local armed forces, or in the training of local military cadres, we have tended to lump everything together and not clearly distinguish between that which is general and that which is peculiar to each type force, as a result of which the majority of local military cadres, upon their return from a long-term or short-term class, feel somewhat unsatisfied, feel as though there is still something else they need to perform their task.

2. In the propaganda and educational effort directed toward the people, youths and the local armed forces, special importance must be attached to teaching to them and propagandizing the positions and policies of the party and state so that they understand them clearly and, on this basis, eagerly and voluntarily fulfill their military task, become the nucleus in the implementation of these positions and policies and encourage their families and the other people of the locality to implement them as well. It must be viewed as important to give the local armed forces a thorough understanding of such major policies of the party as the redistribution of cropland; the redistribution of labor; the transformation of production relations in the Nam Bo countryside; the introduction of farmers, handicraftsmen and persons in small industry to collective production through solidarity teams, production collectives, cooperatives and so forth; the strict implementation of the regulations on the revision of industrial and commercial taxes; the new regulations concerning agricultural taxes; the grain obligation, the military obligation, the international obligation to the fraternal people of Kampuchea, etc. In addition, through the mass media, a constant educational effort must be mounted to provide a deeper understanding of the current international situation and domestic situation and expose the reactionary face of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists to our country and to the two fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea.

It is necessary to adopt plans and programs that are suited to production and work conditions and necessary to regularly have the local armed forces study the fundamentals of socialism.

Importance must be attached to teaching tradition so that everyone learns about the nation's history of resistance against foreign aggression and the revolutionary tradition of the locality.

Lecturers must be carefully trained, have a full grasp of each subject and combine this knowledge with the actual situation of the locality by means of flexible methods. They must also present their lectures in a manner suited to each audience. As regards the majority of the youths in the delta, whose cultural level is generally still low, who have been either directly or indirectly influenced through their families and hamlets by the backward political, cultural and religious philosophies and viewpoints of the old system that still linger in society, who still lead the convenient, disorganized and undisciplined style of life of the small-scale producer, who drink and eat to excess, are superstitious and so forth, it is necessary to patiently employ spirited and simple but interesting forms of learning and gradually instill the positions and policies of the party in their consciousness by delving deeply into the life of the locality. It must be remembered that the farmers of Nam Bo have great confidence in their ability to deal with every hardship and deprivation, with every catastrophe that befalls them. In ancient times, using nothing more than their bare hands, they joined together to claim land from this wilderness. In the two recent wars of national liberation, these virtues were clearly displayed in very many examples very worthy of mention. Therefore, in education and propaganda, it is necessary to cite examples of actual persons and actual deeds; criticism of things bad must always go hand in hand with praising that which is good, with primary emphasis given to praising the good aspects of the model units within the locality about which they have heard. Attention must be given to avoiding rudely attacking their customs, habits and religious beliefs as this will quickly anger them, especially members of the ethnic minorities and religious followers. Of utmost importance is the need for patience in mass propaganda and education. Experience has clearly shown that it is difficult to achieve success in enlightening and persuading the masses if we are impetuous and want to achieve results immediately or if we go about things in a simplistic fashion.

In propaganda and educational work, it is necessary to make use of demobilized military personnel, retired cadres, persons who participated in combat but have now returned to the locality, elders whom the people trust and so forth. Constant attention must be given to propagandizing and enlightening the families and relatives of militia and self-defense troops so that they provide ideological support and assist members of the militia and self-defense forces in resolving the difficulties and problems encountered in their personal lives. The impact of the family always plays a vital role in every change in the attitudes and thinking of militia, self-defense and local troops, be it for the better or the worse.

3. An indispensable requirement in building a militia and self-defense force that is truly strong and solid, is capable of completing each task in the maintenance of combat readiness and combat and can maintain political security and social order and safety well is that the political base within the infrastructure must be solid, that is, the organization of the party, the government and the mass organizations on the basic level must truly be pure, solid and strong in every respect and operate effectively.

In the new situation, all types of installations must more clearly define what their responsibility is toward the two strategic tasks, strengthen their



leadership of military and public security forces, build up reserve forces, implement the army's rear area policies, raise the level of revolutionary vigilance and put dependable key cadres who have been challenged in charge of militia, self-defense, reserve and people's public security forces, thereby insuring the maintenance of combat readiness and insuring victory in combat.

It is necessary to strengthen the party base, help installations define their tasks, targets and methods, help party chapters and party organizations successfully build a contingent of core cadres through socialist transformation and the strengthening and improvement of the new production relations and build the mass organizations, especially the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, while intensifying the preparations that must be made for the maintenance of combat readiness. Hamlets that do not have a party chapter or party cell absolutely must establish loyalty teams and assign to these organizations the same responsibilities of a party cell in the spirit of the resolution of the 5th Party Congress on party building.

4. In conjunction with building and solidifying the party base, the government and the mass organizations so that they are pure, solid and strong from the district to the village levels, special attention must be given to strengthening the command system and the military agencies on the various levels. At present, we are still experiencing many shortcomings in this area. The various command levels have not received the training needed to constantly raise their qualifications in every respect and enable them to meet the requirements of their task. Their understanding of the political and military lines of the party as well as their knowledge of modern military science and technology are low compared to the requirements of a local people's war waged under the circumstances of a modern war to defend the fatherland and compared to the present equipment capabilities of our army. Their organization and staff, especially on the district level, are either of inadequate size or adequate in size but lacking in the ability or strength needed to complete tasks. Within the district and village military agencies, it frequently occurs that competent cadres who possess good personal qualities and have received advanced training at a military school are transferred to other jobs in the various sectors of government or on the party committee echelons or spend a long amount of time in jobs that are not part of their function (collecting taxes, procuring grain and so forth) at a time when the people's movement or armed forces of these districts and villages are very weak, the political and social situations have yet to be stabilized and so forth. Although the leadership apparatus of the party organization and government have been strengthened within a number of localities, importance has not been attached to making the military and security agencies at these places strong enough to complete combat missions and maintain security and order. As a result, it is also impossible to insure the well coordinated performance of economic, national defense and security tasks.

The training of a corps of command cadres and specialized professional cadres for the local armed forces, both centralized forces and militia-self-defense forces, demands that we take urgent action, adopt a specific plan and organize its strict implementation. In addition to the training subjects and programs that have been established for all armed forces, for the local armed forces, in general, it is necessary to develop more specific subject matters and

programs for each area and sector through the military administration schools and the training classes of the various military regions. Even between the 7th Military Region and the 9th Military Region, training subjects and programs must be concretized in order to be consistent with the population distribution, the administrative and economic geography and the political-social situation within each area. On the other hand, cadre assignments must be stabilized instead of constantly transferring cadres from one place to another and assigning them one task today and another task tomorrow, especially those cadres who are fully familiar with the local situation and have the trust of the masses. In the promotion of local military cadres, it is best to select persons who live and work within the locality, have played a positive role in the mass movement and possess good political skills and qualities. At present, there is a gap in the sources of military cadres for the district level: village unit cadres cannot be moved up to the district level because they are not military personnel, rather, cadres must be sent down from the upper level or brought in from other places at a time when cadres are inadequate and in short supply on every level and at every place. This situation can be corrected by boldly transferring cadres in main force units who come from the locality or once worked and fought within the locality to supplement the district military command agencies or by promoting cadres from village units under the induction policy based on the Military Service Law and Vietnam People's Army Officers Service Law.

5. One matter of extreme importance in the building of the local armed forces in the Mekong Delta is that of strictly complying with each nationality and religion policy of our party and state. As pointed out above, the Mekong Delta is home to many ethnic Khmer and religious followers. Almost all of them live in the localities along the seacoast and the Vietnam-Kampuchea border or along main water and highway routes of strategic significance. Reactionaries regularly operate in these areas, where they are waging a psychological and propaganda war to divide the ethnic minorities, divide the non-religious and the religious by many different clever and sophisticated methods. Sometimes, they hide behind public and legitimate forms and endorse a policy of "acclimating to the times" to rally the masses while actually establishing reactionary political organizations to oppose and undermine the revolution, thereby posing obstacles to the implementation of the policies of our party and state and causing political and social instability on the basic level.

Ethnic minorities are still participating in the local armed forces in small numbers, even in highly ethnic areas. The number of ethnic minority cadres within the armed forces can be counted on one hand. Why is it that many ethnic cadres hold key positions within the agencies of the party and government, within the Youth Union and the Women's Union but hardly any can be found on the various levels of the armed forces, especially the basic level? This is truly an abnormal situation that must be corrected at an early date. The nationalities policy of our party and state, which reflects the spirit of equality among the nationalities and the unity of all the people within the great family of Vietnam's nationalities working together to build and defend the fatherland, must be fully and strictly implemented. Of course, due to the circumstances left behind by history and colonialism, certain unsuitable philosophies still exist among ethnic and religious compatriots, which,

combined with the continuous psychological impact of reactionaries, have thwarted the quick acceptance of the lines, positions and policies of the party and state. Therefore, the task of each one of us is to be positive, steadfast and sincere and employ every possible measure to bring these strata into harmony with the common life of the entire nation, beginning by respecting their right of collective ownership. The armed forces must attach importance to training minority youths so that when they return to their locality after fulfilling their military obligation, they become a corps of challenged and dependable cadres and serve as the nucleus of the movement within the various localities. We did this during the wars of resistance against the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists and, as a result, have developed the corps of party, government and scientific-technical cadres from ethnic and religious backgrounds that we have today.

The full and timely study of the issues of pressing importance in building the economy and national defense system, building the armed forces in the Mekong Delta demands the participation and investments of many sectors, especially the social sciences and military sciences, and must be given much time. Within the scope of this article, we have only touched upon the experiences in rallying the masses of a number of cadres engaged in local military work and presented a few thoughts in the hope of making some contribution to the research conducted by the functional agencies in order to achieve higher effectiveness in local military work.

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CENTRAL HIGHLANDS CLAIMS GAINS AGAINST FULRO

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 84 pp 18-26

[Article by Major General Le Thanh Van: "Wiping Out FULRO(1), Winning Victory Over the War of Sabotage in the Central Highlands"]

[Text] The Central Highlands, which consists of the three provinces of Gia Lai-Kontum, Dac Lac and Lam Dong, was a strong base of our people in the two wars of resistance against France and the United States. The Central Highlands not only possesses large economic potentials but is also a base of strategic military importance to our country and the entire Indochina peninsula.

For this reason, the Central Highlands has always been an area with which the imperialists and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists have been very concerned, an area that they have kept a close eye on and in which they have vigorously pursued many perfidious and clever schemes. In the present wide-ranging war of sabotage, the reactionary powers are closely collaborating with one another to bring together, support and supply weapons to FULRO for acts of sabotage, provoke national antagonisms and coordinate with the remnants of the Pol Pot army in a vain attempt to turn the Central Highlands into a single counter-revolutionary base within the tri-border region.

Using FULRO forces to sabotage us is a part and the distinctive characteristic of the strategy behind the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists within the Central Highlands. Therefore, fully recognizing the true face of the so called FULRO(2) and taking determined steps to wipe it out are a foremost task of the armed forces and people of the Central Highlands in the fight against the present wide-ranging war of sabotage of the enemy.

Following the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, the U.S. imperialists kicked the French colonialists out of South Vietnam. Although defeated, France continued to have much influence in the Central Highlands and still had a strong presence in Laos and Kampuchea. The French colonialists took advantage of the opposition by ethnic minorities to the fascist, dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem regime, the lackey of the U.S. imperialists. They provoked Montagnards into struggling for the establishment of the "BaJaRaKa" movement (the first syllables of the names of the four major ethnic groups in the Central Highlands: the Bahnar, Jarai, Rade and Kaho) with a view toward maintaining the role and interests of the French colonialists in South Vietnam

and remaining in the Central Highlands in order to maintain and spread their influence to Laos and Kampuchea.

The position of the U.S. imperialists at that time was to try to win over the pro-French Montagnard lackeys and control this force themselves, to control these lackeys and their accomplices while further tightening their control of the Central Highlands in order to oppose the revolution over the long range. Consequently, they supported the BaJaRaKa movement.

The Ngo Dinh Diem puppet regime, unwilling to share power in the Central Highlands, demanded that the United States merge the "civilian combat forces" of the Montagnards with the puppet army. In view of the disastrous situation surrounding the "special war" of the Americans and the puppets in South Vietnam, the United States was forced to accede to this demand and allow the puppet government to suppress the BaJaRaKa movement.

Following the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem (1 November 1963) and under the guidance of the United States, Nguyen Van Khanh (the new lackey of the United States) was forced to release the BaJaRaKa leaders who were imprisoned during the Diem period. Then, U.S. intelligence, in collaboration with French intelligence, sent agents to establish contacts with the BaJaRaKa, Champa and Khmer Krom reactionaries and establish the FULRO front (20 April 1964). Because there were deep internal antagonisms among its various factions, FULRO was once again suppressed by the Saigon puppet government.

From 1968 to 1972, as the Vietnamese revolution continued to win large victories, the U.S. imperialists were forced to de-escalate the war and implement the "Vietnamization of the war" strategy; at the same time, they quickly reorganized and built up the forces of FULRO in an attempt to deal with us. By 1973, under their post-war plan, the U.S. imperialists had built FULRO into a reactionary organization with its own government and army for the purpose of opposing the Vietnamese revolution, the revolutions of Laos and Kampuchea on a long-term basis.

Following the liberation of the South and taking advantage of the instability of the revolutionary government on the basic level, they expanded their forces and generated international opinion to bring pressure to bear upon us, demanding the eventual establishment of a country called "De-ga" in the Montagnard region and a country of the Cham called "Champa" in order to implement the strategy of the United States. They brought reactionaries and remnant Montagnard forces together, organized them into the skeleton of a government and army and established armed groups within the mountain villages. They intensified the psychological war; provoked bigoted nationalism; deceived the ethnic minorities; distorted the lines, positions and policies of our party and state; sowed divisions between ethnic Vietnamese and Montagnards; bought the allegiance of, won over and controlled the masses; ambushed and assassinated cadres of ours on the basic level; fomented local rebellions... However, as a result of being continuously pursued by us, two-thirds of their forces were routed and they were forced to disperse, to go into hiding in order to avoid being wiped out.

In 1977 and 1978, taking advantage of the war on the southwestern border, FULRO looked for ways to restore its forces, intensify its activities and make preparations for instigating an insurrection when the opportunity arose. Since 1979, when the Chinese reactionaries unleashed their war of aggression against our country's northern border, FULRO has strengthened its collaboration with the remnant forces of Pol Pot, with the Thai reactionaries, linked up with the Lao bandits and accepted additional guidance from the Chinese reactionaries acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists. The activities of FULRO have been incorporated in the wide-ranging war of sabotage of the Chinese reactionaries in the Central Highlands.

They have revamped their organization and consolidated their forces; intensified their psychological warfare, making it more comprehensive and insidious in nature; resorted to deception and threats to draw youths into the jungle and send them for training at "secret bases" in Kampuchea and Thailand to train them to be core cadres in advance of establishing a government and army in exile; built Pol Pot style refugee camps in Thailand; sought aid from China and the other countries; and stood ready to serve as a tool of China in its schemes to sabotage and annex our country. They have reoriented their activities by strengthening the armed groups within the mountain villages, establishing underground bases, sending a number of agents who pretended to surrender into activity at necessary places and times to control the masses, assassinate cadres and core cadres of ours and so forth.

Since 1981, following the various operations we have mounted to track them down, they have been dealt heavy defeats in their attempt to win over youths in Lam Dong. FULRO forces have continued to suffer losses and grow weaker, their activities have declined and they are beset by internal antagonisms and divisions. However, they still have forces in hiding at "secret bases" and "training camps" in Kampuchea and Thailand and are ready to send them back here to conduct activities. Although the scope of FULRO's activities has been greatly reduced, they still control a portion of the masses. With the tacit consent of the U.S. imperialists, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists are making every effort to control and guide FULRO and are supplying FULRO with aid through the Thailand and Pol Pot reactionaries. This situation has made the struggle against FULRO by the armed forces and people of the Central Highlands a more complex and urgent struggle.

FULRO is a very dangerous, armed, reactionary organization that was established by the French and American imperialists and is being supported, equipped and guided today by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists for the purpose of carrying out their scheme to oppose the Vietnamese revolution on a long-term basis. However, FULRO, hiding behind the signboard of "autonomous nation" and doing its best to use religion and divine power, to exploit racial and tribal relations, has deceived and gained control over a portion of the ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands. Consequently, the FULRO problem is not simply a military problem, rather, it is primarily a political problem. A basic, long-range solution to the FULRO problem must be closely linked to the implementation of the nationalities and religion policy of the party, to socialist transformation and socialist construction in the Central Highlands. We must closely coordinate political, military and economic measures, with mass

agitation as the basis of our effort, in order to win victory over the enemy in this complex struggle.

In keeping with this thinking, the armed forces of the Central Highlands have made very large efforts in the struggle against FULRO and contributed along with the other forces in the Central Highlands to successfully meeting the following common requirements:

1. The intensification of the mobilization of the masses must be conducted in conjunction with rooting out the FULRO forces among the population, especially their core and skeletal forces of all types, and breaking up their forces at each installation, within each area and within each district. It is necessary to pursue and launch political attacks against the armed groups that cling to the mountain villages in order to rout them, necessary to kill and capture many of their leading commanders in conjunction with continuously attacking their important bases and corridors.

2. While mobilizing the masses and launching political attacks to rout FULRO forces, every effort must be made to build the party base, the government and the mass organizations so that no village is controlled by the enemy and every village has a revolutionary government, a party chapter and a Youth Union chapter headed by core cadres, cadres and party members who are members of the local ethnic minority. We must expand and strengthen the militia, self-defense and public security forces in the villages and bring about a fundamental change in the comparison of forces on the basic level, with the most decisive area being the role played by such key cadres as village secretaries and chairmen, village military unit commanders, village public security heads, cooperative directors, Youth Union secretaries and so forth. Together with training young cadres and female cadres who are minority members, measures must be taken to protect the corps of basic level cadres in order to prevent the enemy from assassinating them, from winning them over and using them, from dividing and sabotaging us internally.

3. The task of mobilizing the masses to track down and wipe out FULRO must be closely coordinated with solving the problem posed by other reactionaries, strengthening political security and social order and providing security for agencies, warehouses, air fields, economic installations, strategic main roads, cities, towns and the border areas.

4. Accelerating production and virtually achieving the settlement of nomads in coordination with building new economic zones, with stepping up production within the locality and performing cultural, educational and public health work with a view toward stabilizing and partly improving the standard of living of the ethnic minorities.

In the recent past, in the effort to meet these requirements within the Central Highlands, important victories have been won in the task of wiping out FULRO and building the political base. The majority of FULRO's forces have been routed; their plan to foment armed insurrection has been effectively thwarted; political security and social order and safety within the locality have been firmly maintained; production has been developed and the living conditions of the ethnic minorities have been stabilized and partly improved.

Important improvements have been made in our political strength and the strength of our armed forces on the basic level; the revolutionary movement within the various localities of the Central Highlands has developed in every respect. The scope of FULRO's acts of sabotage has been markedly reduced.

From the realities of the part that the armed forces of the Central Highlands have played in the struggle to resolve the FULRO problem, a few important experiences can be drawn:

First, it is necessary to correctly evaluate the enemy and ourselves and see that the struggle against FULRO is a complex, protracted, bitter and constant struggle that takes places on the basic level.

The so called FULRO that the imperialists and their lackeys established 20 years ago is nothing more than a tool of its bosses, than a fraud upon the ethnic minorities of the Central Highlands. Their strengths, which are only temporary, are tied to support from external reactionary powers, to the use of deception and coercion against a portion of the Central Highland minorities. As a result, in past years, although supported by France and the United States, they never became anything more than a group of lackeys and were not a rival of the Saigon puppet government, were not able to erode Saigon's power in the Central Highlands.

Since the liberation of the South, in order to build the Central Highlands and safeguard the quiet and happy life of the Central Highland minorities, the people of the Central Highlands, together with the army and other forces, have punished many dangerous and ruthless commanders, have wiped out or routed many FULRO networks engaged in clandestine activities.

However, with the assistance and support of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, the remaining leaders of FULRO have continued to sabotage us in many different ways and continue to look for every way and every opportunity to coordinate with external reactionary powers to disrupt political security and social order. Although their forces are not large, because their methods are clever and because they hide behind a misleading "national" banner, they continue to deceive a number of politically disoriented persons and control a portion of the ethnic minorities. Therefore, the struggle to wipe out the remnants of FULRO continues to be a complex, arduous struggle, one that we must wage in a steadfast and constant manner, one in which we cannot relax our efforts for one moment.

FULRO is an armed reactionary organization headed by very obstinate leaders. The armed activities conducted to wipe out FULRO occupy a very important position. We must kill their commanders; continuously attack their important bases and corridors; destroy the armed groups of the enemy that cling to the mountain villages; prevent an insurrection and support the mobilization of the masses; root out the enemy within and intensify the political attack to rout their forces. However, of primary importance in resolving the FULRO problem is political agitation, is mobilizing the masses, beginning on the basic level. To build its forces and survive, FULRO must infiltrate the basic level to deceive and coerce the masses. Therefore, the struggle against FULRO is a



struggle that takes place constantly on the basic level, within each mountain village, within each family. The effort to wipe out FULRO and resolve the problems caused by FULRO must be tied to building the basic level, most importantly to building it politically and fully implementing the nationality and religion policies of the party. Wiping out FULRO must be closely linked to socialist transformation and socialist construction in the Central Highlands. The resolution of the FULRO problem must be under the centralized, unified and constant guidance of the various party committee echelons, primarily those on the basic level, must involve the coordinated participation of all sectors and circles and must be carried out in a determined, steadfast manner.

Secondly, mobilizing the masses to wipe out FULRO must be closely coordinated with implementing overall economic planning in order to create a combined strength that will enable the FULRO problem to be virtually resolved.

As mentioned above, the FULRO problem is not simply a military problem. Therefore, to resolve this problem in a fundamental way, the activities conducted to wipe out FULRO must be accompanied by efforts to promote the settlement of nomads, build new economic zones, develop communications and water conservancy, accelerate production and stabilize and partly improve the material and cultural lives of the minorities. This entails thoroughly understanding and applying the viewpoint concerning coordinating the two strategic tasks of our country's revolution at this time to the conditions of the Central Highlands.

The realities of the past several years have shown the results of looking after the daily lives of the masses, providing them with medical care and hunger relief and providing them with food, shelter, clothing and education; the settlement of nomads, the building of new villages, the reorganization of production and so forth have given the Central Highland ethnic minorities confidence in the line and policies of the party. These efforts have also laid a very important foundation for refuting each distorted argument advanced by FULRO and creating the necessary conditions for drawing those persons who have mistakenly joined FULRO back to their families and villages. At many places, on the basis of the realities of the situation, the members of the ethnic minorities have said: "The revolution is of and by the people. The revolution has brought food, clothing, shelter and education to the people. FULRO is nothing more than a band of traitors, lackeys of the imperialists and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists who bring starvation and death to the people..."

Lac Duong District in Lam Dong Province has begun to coordinate its plan to wipe out FULRO and its combat defense plan with the production guidelines established for each area. The settlement of nomads campaign and the relocation of more than 3,000 persons from Da Long Village to Dam Ron caused FULRO to lose an important base. The district's large agricultural area has been politically strengthened and the destruction of the district's forests has been reduced to slightly more than 300 hectares per year. In 1982, the three villages in Dam Ron sold 100 tons of grain over and above their obligations to the state. The district has achieved success in encouraging the ethnic minorities in Bang Tieng and Da Long Git to settle near the two

villages of Ta Nung and Di To, thereby establishing a centralized production area and a tightly structured combat cluster while severing the enemy's corridor. Through these efforts, four-fifths of the district's villages have completed the settlement of nomads; through the settlement of nomads, a number of enemy bases have been eliminated, many enemy forces have been persuaded to surrender and the district has made much progress in building the basic level.

Krong Na District in Dac Lac Province was only established in 1981; however, its party committee and government quickly conducted planning, established production guidelines and intensified the settlement of nomads and solved the FULRO problem in coordination with bringing about the settlement of nomads. In the past, the state had to annually provide the district with hunger relief; today, the district has achieved success in all three areas: yield, the amount of area under cultivation and output. Per capita grain output exceeds 360 kilograms per year. In 1982, the quantity of grain mobilized exceeded the quota by 1,500 tons and the commerce sector exceeded its plan by 2,950,000 dong. In coordination with reorganizing production, the party committee has attached importance to mobilizing the masses, solving the FULRO problem and building the mountain villages. Militia and self-defense forces are operating on a regular basis and have killed FULRO armed forces; the masses have discovered and rooted out many underground FULRO agents and conducted successful political attacks to persuade FULRO forces to surrender and return to their villages.

Dac To District in Gia Lai-Kontum Province has organized 90 percent of its population in collective production and settled more than 60 percent of minority members. Production has developed and the per capita output of grain now stands at 400 kilograms per year. New victories have been recorded in cultural work, education and public health. Because the party committee intensified its guidance of the work of mobilizing the masses and launching continuous political attacks against the enemy in exact accordance with policy, FULRO forces emerged from the jungles one after the other and surrendered. As of March, 1982, not one local person anywhere in the district was a member of FULRO.

Thirdly, accelerating the building of the basic level and building strong revolutionary forces right on the basic level are of decisive significance in achieving a basic solution to the FULRO problem. Recently, the provinces of the Central Highlands assigned thousands of cadres of the various sectors, including many cadres of the local armed forces, to organize many work units that went to build and strengthen the basic level, thereby bringing about a new change in the situation on the basic level.

Experience has proven that those places that have achieved relatively comprehensive success in attacking the enemy and stabilizing the lives of the people are places that have built solid and strong basic party organizations that truly serve as the nucleus in building the government, the armed forces and the mass organizations, thereby making the basic level strong politically and strong in terms of security, national defense and living standards.

In the building of the basic level, efforts must be focused on successfully and completely building weak, deficient installations and key installations.

The building of installations must be closely tied to the political task on the basic level and the results of the building of installations must be examined and evaluated on the basis of how well the political task is performed. At this point in time, the building of the basic level in the Central Highlands must competently support the mobilization of the masses, the elimination of FULRO and the stabilization and gradual improvement of the standard of living of the people.

The work units have assessed guidelines, clearly defined responsibilities and remained in mountain villages and at installations to guide and work with the people in fighting the enemy, maintaining security and accelerating production, consequently, they have won the full trust of the people. As a result, important strides have been made in the building of the basic level: the masses have joined organizations and villages have party chapters and Youth Union chapters as well as dependable militia and self-defense platoons and public security forces. All cadres in charge of the various sectors and circles, from the hamlet to the village levels, have been selected from within the local movement and are local people themselves.

While building the village base, positive steps must be taken to strengthen the district so that it is fully capable of managing and guiding the villages in every respect. A strong district must be strong in every area. The same applies with regard to solving the FULRO problem. The district must focus on guiding the key villages; at the same time, it must guide all villages within the district and establish a chain of positions in order to completely resolve the FULRO problem in each area and support the continued, steady improvement of the key villages. The situation on the basic level in the Central Highlands varies widely; therefore, the district must be very flexible in guiding the building and strengthening of installations and cannot apply the same methods to each place. Some places must begin with strengthening the party base, the government and the corps of management cadres; other places must proceed from settling nomads and developing production in close coordination with strengthening the party base, organizing forces and fighting FULRO; still other places must mobilize the masses to resist the wide-ranging war of sabotage and, through this effort, eliminate negative phenomena, wipe out FULRO, purify the area, strengthen their forces, etc. Although the approach taken by each village can differ, all must meet the common requirements of upholding the right of collective ownership of the masses, wiping out FULRO, stabilizing and improving the life of the people, building a basic level that is strong in every respect and steadily developing the movement. As a result of concerning themselves with building the basic level, the situation in a number of districts and towns in northern Gia Lai-Kontum, in Lac Duong in Lam Dong and in Lac and Krong Na in Dac Lac has become increasingly stable and is gradually improving. Many areas, many large villages and some district have achieved thorough, basic solutions to the FULRO problem within their locales.

Fourthly, methods of fighting must be employed that are suited to each objective on each line, with primary emphasis upon the inner line among the people and the outer line on the edge of the population; leading FULRO commanders must be killed and the armed groups that cling to the mountain villages must be killed and routed; and the mass movement to persuade FULRO

forces to surrender and return must be intensified, thereby completely smashing FULRO forces. FULRO's main tactic is to employ small forces in hit and run and harassing operations but they do everything possible to avoid our pursuing forces, consequently, we must employ suitable methods of fighting.

On the inner line, that is, among the people, our efforts must be based on the mobilization of the masses. In weak and deficient villages, we must use the work units, rely upon the people, select and train core cadres and organize secret units in order to find agents engaged in underground activities. The mobilization of the masses must be coordinated with security and administrative measures to root out agents among the people, especially FULRO skeletal forces serving as double agents in the villages, FULRO leaders and FULRO forces that have only pretended to surrender. We must mobilize the masses to launch political attacks, to appeal to relatives who have joined FULRO to return in order to establish villages in which no one belongs to FULRO. The policy on persons who surrender and return to their villages must be properly implemented. When punishing FULRO leaders, we must seek the highest possible level of support from the masses.

On the outer line, we usually find armed groups in villages that are controlled by commanders on the enemy's district and provincial levels. These forces, the core of FULRO, engage in small-scale, scattered armed activities in the villages and also constitute the main means by which they intimidate and control the masses and attack us on the basic level.

To rout and destroy these forces, it is necessary to develop upon the role played by the militia, self-defense and public security forces, by secret units, reconnaissance units, local forces and the work units, most importantly the forces on the scene, in order to accurately identify and promptly retaliate against FULRO forces. We must make widespread use of ambushes, raids, reinforced attacks, successive attacks, appeals to surrender and many other resourceful and creative methods of fighting.

The line deep within the jungles is usually the hiding place of the leading agencies of FULRO. The purpose of attacking this line is to destroy command centers, corridors, resupply bases and so forth, consequently, this effort is of very important significance, especially now in view of the fact that these bases have corridors linking them to bases outside the country. Only by hitting their leading command agencies can we have an impact in persuading their forces to surrender and break up their forces on the lower level. This is painstaking work. Therefore, we must constantly assess the enemy by many different methods, by interrogating prisoners and forces that surrender, by exploiting enemy documents, etc. The majority of the attacks on FULRO that are timely and hit their target, that result in FULRO leaders being killed, that hit their corridors and bases are the combined result of mobilizing the masses and taking decisive, resourceful and brave military measures.

Attacking the bases and corridors of the enemy is the main task of the provincial and district local forces; when necessary, main force troops can participate on a suitable scale. Recently, a rather high percentage of FULRO forces has been surrendering. This is because we have coordinated political attacks with military operations and used the results of military operations

to intensify our political attacks. In Thuan Hai, taking full advantage of the apprehension of Huynh Ngoc Sang, the Cham FULRO "chairman," the people went into the jungle and persuaded FULRO forces to return, bringing with them a number of other Cham FULRO "central committee" members, whom they used to expose the crimes of FULRO and appeal to FULRO forces engaged in underground activities to surrender. The close coordination of combat measures with political attacks smashed the Cham FULRO force. This is an experience that the Central Highlands has studied and appropriately applied. District A. in Gia Lai-Kontum, after tracking down and killing Nay Phun, FULRO colonel and "central committee member," continued to mobilize the masses to attack the enemy, as a result of which hundreds of additional FULRO forces were persuaded to surrender. Gia Lai-Kontum has applied the experience of coordinating political attacks with military operations to wipe out FULRO in many villages. In 1977, Village C. in Dac Lac Province was tightly controlled by FULRO. In the mobilization of the masses, thanks to the people, we apprehended a FULRO village chairman who turned out to be a village chief of ours. Subsequently, the masses were mobilized to go into the jungles and appeal to FULRO forces to surrender, bringing back with them 190 other members of FULRO.

In the face of the new enemy of our country, the reactionary group of Chinese expansionists and hegemonists acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, the struggle against FULRO in the Central Highlands is closely tied to the struggle against the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the enemy. During the past several years, under the light of the resolution of the Political Bureau, the party organizations, governments and people of the three Central Highland provinces and the armed forces of the 5th Military Region have achieved many good results and gained valuable experience in their task of mobilizing the masses, building the basic level and wiping out FULRO. Although difficulties and complex problems remain, by applying and developing upon the experiences that have been summarized, by relying upon the people of the Central Highlands who are rich in patriotism and love the party and with the wholehearted assistance of the entire country, the Central Highlands will surely win basic victory in its efforts to resolve the FULRO problem, contribute along with the entire country to winning victory over the enemy's war of sabotage and build a Central Highlands that is economically prosperous, politically stable and strong in terms of national defense.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. FULRO: the French abbreviation for the so called "United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races."
2. Ibid.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

BRIEFS

DONG THAP ECONOMIC GOALS--The principal economic goals of Dong Thap Province in 1984 are as follows: In agriculture, the gross grain output will be 650,000 tons, grain procurement will reach 190,000 tons and the output of all kinds of export industrial crops will be 140,925 tons; in animal husbandry, there will be 160,000 hogs, 38,000 bovines and a flock of 1 million ducks; the total value of industrial, small industry and handicraft production will be 750 million dong; and the export turnover will be 7.7 million rubles/dollars. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Jul 84 p 3] 9332

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## AGRICULTURE

### HIGH WINTER-SPRING CROP OUTPUT IN NGHIA BINH REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jul 84 p 1

[Text] Nghia Binh Province has sown and transplanted the winter-spring rice crop on 84,600 hectares fulfilling 99.6 percent of the plan norm. The area of all cultivated crops shows an increase over that in last year's winter-spring season. To date, all production installations have completely harvested all winter-spring crops. The average per hectare rice output of the whole province is 27 quintals--an increase of 8.7 quintals per hectare over last year's winter-spring season. By properly implementing intensive cultivation technical measures, certain districts and cooperatives have obtained a fairly high output from the winter-spring rice crop. Tuy Phuoc District has yielded more than 40 quintals per hectare, followed by An Nhon District with 39 quintals, Mo Duc District with 33 quintals and Tu Nghia District with 32 quintals. In the past, Duc Pho District never yielded 20 quintals from any winter-spring crop; at present, it has reached nearly 24 quintals per hectare.

According to initial statistics, throughout the province, there are 196 cooperatives with an area of 41,987 hectares which have obtained an output of 23 to more than 40 quintals [per hectare], 52 ones with an area of 8,755 hectares and an average output of 23 to 26 quintals, 65 ones with an area of 12,932 hectares and an output between 26 and 30 quintals, 66 ones with an output of 30 to 40 quintals and 13 ones with an area of 4,800 hectares and an average output of over 40 quintals. A high output has been obtained by the following cooperatives: Phuoc Tang 1 with 53.5 quintals and Pho An 2 with 41 quintals (Duc Pho District); Nghia Hiep (Tu Nghia District) with 38 quintals; Nghia Chinh (Quang Ngai City) with 39 quintals per hectare.

Though failing to fulfill the planned area norm but by investing in intensive cultivation, the entire province has yielded 228,420 tons--an increase of 20,420 tons over the plan norm and 50,000 tons over last year's winter-spring crop. Nghia Binh Province has attached importance not only to rice crops but also to subsidiary ones. Its output of potato has reached 95,400 tons, that of cassava 194,400 tons and that of other fairinaceous plants about 20,000 tons.

The entire province has performed sowing and transplanting on 54,876 hectares of summer-fall rice, surpassing last year's summer-fall season by more than 25,000 hectares. Transplanting has been completed by 30 April on nearly 30,000 hectares. A number of districts are starting the summer-fall rice harvest. Tay Son District has obtained more than 30 quintals [per hectare] from a harvested area of 160 hectares and An Nhon District has yielded over 40 quintals on the average from a harvested area of 300 hectares. The districts of Hoai Nhon, Hoai An, Son Tinh and Duc Pho and the city of Quang Ngai are harvesting the summer-fall crop with an estimated output of 30 to 35 quintals per hectare.

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## AGRICULTURE

### AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF DONG GHAP PROVINCE SINCE 1975 REVIEWED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Tran Anh Dien, secretary of Dong Thap Provincial Party Committee: "Strive to Develop Agriculture a Further Step"]

[Text] Dong Thap had great potentials residing in its land, work force and water sources but alkaline soil occupied a rather large area and many regions were unexploited. Every year, ricefields were immersed in 1- to 3-meter deep waters for a period of 6 months. The age-old one-rice-crop system was not yet abolished and industrial crops represented only 4.5 percent of the total cultivated area. The work force and population were distributed unevenly and concentrated mostly in regions bordering on the Tien and Hau Rivers and in cities and towns while the Dong Thap Muoi region was thinly populated.

After the liberation day, the Dong Ghap [Provincial] Party Organization determined that the province's strong point lay in its agriculture the main component of which was rice crops; it formulated specific policies aimed at rapidly overcoming difficulties in the grain problem. The first measure taken was the shift from the habit of growing only one long-term low-yielding 10th-month (floating) rice crop to the production of two short-term high-yielding rice crops in the winter-spring and summer-fall seasons in which the winter-spring crop became the main one; water conservancy was then considered of prime importance. All districts launched a broad water conservancy movement among the people. Level 1 and 2 canals were dug across and along many regions and far into the Dong Thap Muoi region to draw out waterloggings and bring in fresh water to wipe out soil acidity; at the same time, the ricefields' surface was leveled, embankments were built round each plot of land and canals dredged. The area cultivated with two rice crops has been expanded continuously; from 11,000 hectares in 1975, it has risen to over 65,000 hectares in the 1984-84 period. The summer-fall rice area has increased from 5,000 hectares in 1975 to 45,000 hectares in 1984.

Through its export activities, the province has endeavored to import more gasoline, oil and fertilizer to promote intensive cultivation. As a result, the high-yielding winter-spring rice area has risen from a few thousand hectares in 1975 to 33,000 hectares with an output of nearly 60 quintals per hectare per crop (in 1983).

In Dong Thap, the rice output rose from 250,000 tons in 1975 to over 550,000 tons in 1983 and the average per capita norm rose from 220 kgs in 1976 to over 400 kgs in 1983.

Beside increasing the rice output, Dong Thap has attentively modified the crop cultivation pattern to rapidly develop industrial crops and to step up animal husbandry in order to create conditions to expand local industry, small industry and handicrafts.

Along with the intensive cultivation of various crops in fertile areas and adjacent to the Mekong River, the province has planned the exploitation of the Dong Thap Muoi region and cooperated with central-level scientific-technical institutes and with the colleges of Ho Chi Minh and Can Tho Cities in carrying out pedologic, geologic, topographic and geomorphic surveys and researches and in formulating a plan and project on the gradual transformation and building of Dong Thap Muoi into a prosperous and beautiful region with a rich agro-forestry-fishery economic structure.

Based on the result of scientific surveys and researches and on the people's practical experiences, the province has advocated the use of acid soil in growing and raising suitable crops and animals. Cajeputs will be planted in areas where the highly alkaline soil is unsuitable for rice cultivation; the area for concentrated planting of cajeputs may reach 25,000 hectares approximately; and lotus will be grown in all ponds (hollow grounds) scattered throughout the Dong Thap Muoi region with a total area of about 1,000 hectares. Moreover, the cultivation of timber and firewood producing trees such as guavas, [traam baauf], Tamarinds [me nuwowcs], bamboos and "caf-na" and of fruit and nut trees and fibrous plants will also be developed. Good local varieties of 10th-month (floating) rice which have been selected and can resist alkalinity and drift with the current will be grown intensively. Advantage will be taken of the low soil-alkalinity period to grow short-term industrial crops--such as kenaf, sesame, green beans, watermelons, sugarcanes, cassava and vegetables--on 10th-month ricefields after the harvest time.

Water conservancy must provide enough water to irrigate cultivated crops and maintain soil moisture during the dry season. To this end, it is necessary to build canals with dams to retain water during the dry season (reservoir-canals) and also to build enclosing embankments to retain water for cajeput forests (forest reservoirs), to breed fish and to prevent and control forest fires.

Animal husbandry is considered to be an important sector in the Dong Thap Muoi region. It is possible to develop the raising of bovines and small ducks (after the 10th-month rice harvest) and to breed alkaline-water-resistant species of fish such as osphromenus [cas sawtj], fresh water gobies, anabases, yellow catfish and various kinds of eel, turtle and snake; honeybees can be kept in the shade of cajeput forests.

Over the past few years, progress has been evident in developing the cultivation of industrial crops. From 1976 to 1983, the cultivation of soybeans increased from 300 to 5,400 hectares, that of sugarcanes from 1,100 to 2,600 hectares and that of tobacco from 450 to over 900 hectares. Various localities and state farms in the province have grown cajeputs on more than 5,000 hectares, lotus on nearly 10 hectares and kenaf and sesame on 500-odd hectares of fields usually reserved for the 10th-month rice crop and have obtained a fairly high output. Though the result of the initial exploitation of the Dong Thap Muoi region is still at a low level, it nevertheless permits us to conclude that the province's policy of developing agriculture and exploiting Dong Thap Muoi has proven to be sound.

In conjunction with production development, the new agricultural production relationships have been established and gradually developed. By the end of April 1984, Dong Thap has set up 1,685 production collectives, collectivized 46.3 percent of the ricefield and land area and admitted 66.15 percent of the total number of peasant families into the collective working system. Almost all peasants have participated in production solidarity teams. Of a total 94 villages in the province, 39 have basically completed agricultural cooperativization. Large-sized tractors have been supplied to mechanical tilling collectives.

The province is setting up models of joint production collectives; coordinating agriculture with small industry, handicrafts and trade; suspending [zuwngf] the application of the method of joint venture between production, investment, purchase of goods, control of their sources, and distribution and consumption within each rural economic unit; and broadening the scope of two-way economic contracting relationships according to which the state supplies materials in advance to peasants in production collectives and to individual peasant families and, on this basis, collect agricultural products and goods after the harvest time. The grain procurement norm of the province rose from 34,000 tons in 1976 to 160,000 tons in 1983. The socialist commercial forces have been developed and strengthened and have expanded their commercial activities and established economic alliances with the friendly provinces and Ho Chi Minh City in order to obtain an increasingly great volume of staple commodities to promote production, to meet the daily needs of the people, cadres, manual and office workers and the armed forces and to manage the market and stabilize prices.

Priority of capital investment in material-technical base construction will be given to key projects and to installations designed to process agricultural products and repair machines used in agriculture, water conservancy and communications; under the "joint action by the state and people" motto, social welfare works will be built in the rural areas with attention to be paid to the former resistance base areas and to the Dong Thap Muoi region.

The tasks remaining to be done by Dong Thap Province in 1984 and 1985 will be very heavy and require that the Party Organization firmly struggles against all conservative and sluggish tendencies; brings into play the creativeness, shrewdness and initiative of the grassroots level; urges on the revolutionary mass movement; widely applies scientific-technical innovations to exploit the great labor and land potentials continuously and satisfactorily; and strenuously advances the province's agriculture a further step in order to provide a basis for building and developing an agroindustrial economic structure in various districts and an industrial-agricultural structure for the province.

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HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

PRERETIREMENT VACATION FOR CADRES, MANUAL-OFFICE WORKERS ORGANIZED

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 19 Jul 84 p 8

[Unattributed article in "For the Readers' Information" column: "On the Organization of Rest, Recuperation and Summer Vacation for Cadres and Manual and Office Workers before their Retirement"]

[Text] To organize a rest and recuperation period or a sightseeing and summer vacation for cadres and manual and office workers prior to their retirement according to a regular pattern and with good result, on 27 June 1984, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation issued Directive No 145-TCCB calling the attention of all sectors and levels to the need to implement the following instructions:

1. It is necessary to ensure that prior to their retirement, each cadre and each manual and office worker are allowed to go to some place for rest and recuperation or for sightseeing and summer vacation for a period of 15 to 20 days (excluding the departure and return days); the sightseeing and vacation locations will be chosen according to circumstances. If the cadres and manual and office workers are to be sent for vacation at installations subordinate to units of the sector concerned, contact must be established in advance with these installations to enable them to plan the reception of the vacationers. The units concerned must arrange for vehicles to send off and pick up the cadres and manual and office workers and to carry them to destination during their round trips.

2. Allowances for medicines, food during the travel and other expenses are uniformly fixed as follows:

--50 dong per diem per capita to cover the cost of food during the round trip.

--100 dong per diem per capita to cover boarding and lodging at the rest area.

--10 dong per diem per capita to cover the cost of medicine for convalescents.

--The cost of transportation by train or vehicle for the round trip will be calculated on the basis of the actual cost of each particular trip.

The cost of rest, recuperation, sightseeing and summer vacation will be uniformly charged to the welfare fund (the unit head will consult the trade union chapter at the same level about appropriations from the expenditure plan).

3. The units concerned must play an active role in arranging the rest, recuperation, sightseeing and summer vacation of cadres and manual and office workers.

As for beneficiaries such as cadres holding the post of deputy bureau chief in various departments and joint enterprises and those at an equivalent level--if the latter do not hold such functions, they must be specialists of grade 2 upward and workers of grade 6 upward or have been holding the "labor hero" or "emulation combatant" title for 5 consecutive years--a proposal must, if necessary, be submitted to the ministry for their inclusion in the rest, recuperation, sightseeing and summer vacation program organized by the ministry (the name list and proposal must be made at the beginning of each year).

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END