



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**CRISIS RESPONSE: ADEQUACY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
SEALIFT POLICY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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This study examines the ability of the National Security Sealift Policy to generate the necessary **Ways** and **Means** to respond to the two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTW) strategy. The thesis of this study is that strategic sealift is crucial to the U.S. ability to project military forces to protect its vital interests abroad. Therefore, a sound and workable National Security Sealift Policy is not only necessary but also essential in moving U.S. military forces in a power projection strategy. The National Security Council has used the National Security Sealift Policy as the blue print for developing concepts and procedures for deploying sealift assets to meet the requirements as specified in the Mobility Requirement Study Bottom-up Review. This study reviews the adequacy of the National Security Sealift Policy and its capability of meeting the sealift needs for the Defense Transportation System.

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The single most important enhancement the nation needs to meet our two MRC contingency strategy is strategic lift.

General John M. Shalikashvili,

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As a world power with global interests, the United States must be able to protect its interests and those of its allies worldwide. When diplomatic, political, and economic instruments of power fail to protect vital American interests, our leaders may choose to use military force to protect these interests. In a statement at the White House on the U.S. National Security Strategy, President Clinton declared:

When our national security interests are threatened, we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can, but force if we must. We will act with others when we can, but alone when we must... We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake.¹

In such a necessity, the only way to execute this strategy is through quick movement of military forces to areas where our interests are affected. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has shifted its military strategy from that of forward based-forces to one of power projection from the Continental United States (CONUS), thereby greatly increasing our reliance on mobility forces. Since 1989 the

U.S. has reduced its military overseas presence by 32 percent and has reduced its major ground forces to the equivalent of four heavy armored divisions.² This shift in military strategy has prompted the National Command Authority (NCA) to reconsider how best to exercise the nation's military presence abroad with smaller CONUS based forces.³

To protect its interests abroad, the U.S. must now respond to crises across sea-lane distances as great 8700 miles from the CONUS. To ensure that the nation is capable of meeting its mobility requirements, the National Security Council (NSC) issued national transportation guidance and policies (sealift, airlift and general transportation) regarding the Defense Transportation System.⁴ These policies set broad guidelines, fix responsibility, and offer courses of action to protect our national security interests. The following analysis reviews one of those policies, the National Security Sealift Policy (NSSP).

The NSSP is analyzed in the context of its aim to provide adequate means to support the current strategic mobility requirements to respond to the two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs) strategy. This analysis assesses **ways** used to implement the policy and considers available **means**, citing shortfalls and attendant

risks. It concludes with recommendations for strengthening NSSP.

BACKGROUND

The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) completed in 1992 established U.S. mobility requirements for the post-Cold War era.⁵ It succinctly quantified DOD's lift requirements and made formal recommendations on strategic mobility enhancements to ensure a deployable mobility force.⁶ The 1993 Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) national defense strategy affirms the strategic mobility requirements as determined in the original 1992 Mobility Requirement Study. BUR-93 directed a shift in the National Security Strategy (NSS) when it established the requirement to provide forces for two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) in such widely separated areas of operations as Korea and Southwest Asia.⁷

The 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS-BURU) subsequently detailed the requirements necessary to meet a nearly simultaneous two-MRC scenario. The MRS-BURU analyzed the mobility resources and force structure projected for fiscal year (FY) 2001 in the FY-1995 presidential budget-particularly noting airlift, sealift, and prepositioning resources, infrastructure capabilities, and requirements to deploy U.S. forces overseas. The MRS BURU recommended surge sealift capacity of ten million

square feet and afloat prepositioned equipment capacity of four million square feet. To meet these requirements, we need 19 Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR), ships and 36 small-medium Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ships.⁸

In defending its vital interests and principles, the U.S. must be prepared to use decisive force.

Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY SEALIFT POLICY (NSSP)

The National Security Council released the approved unclassified version of the NSSP in October 1989. Although the NSSP is a Cold War document, it has proved to be highly applicable in addressing future policy needs. The Clinton Administration embraced the NSSP as its own. The Administration then strengthened NSSP under BUR-93. It sponsored and Congress enacted legislation to ensure that NSSP would meet its overall objectives. BUR-93 called for a strong sealift capability, essential both to executing the country's forward-defense power projection strategy and to maintaining a viable wartime economy. The U.S. NSSP objective is to ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources are available to meet defense deployment requirements and to provide essential support of our domestic economy. The broad purpose of the sealift policy

is to ensure that the US maintains the capability to meet sealift requirements in event of crises or war. To support this policy, the President issued the following specific guidelines:⁹

1. The U.S.-owned commercial ocean carrier industry, to the extent it is capable, will be relied upon to provide sealift in peace, crises, and war. This capability will be augmented during crises and war by reserve fleets. The Department of Transportation is responsible for determining whether adequate merchant marines are available to support the operation of the reserve ship fleet.

2. The U.S. must be prepared to respond unilaterally to security threats in geographic areas not covered by alliance commitments. Sufficient US-owned sealift resources must be available to meet requirements for such unilateral response.

3. In addition to the US flag fleet, we will continue to rely on U.S.-owned and allied shipping resources to meet strategic commitments to our established alliances. The DOT is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate legal and procedural mechanisms for exerting effective control over U.S. ships are in place. DOD shall also continue to seek commitment of sealift resources from NATO allies to meet alliance requirements.

4. The DOD will determine the requirements for sealift for deploying forces, follow-on supplies, and for sustainment, shipbuilding, for and ship repair. In

coordination with the DOD, DOT will determine the capability of our merchant marine industries to meet these requirements and to provide the sealift required to support essential industrial activity during wartime. Both Departments will promote the incorporation of national defense features in new and existing ships.

5. The Departments of State, DOT, the Special Trade Representative, and other appropriate agencies shall ensure that international agreements and federal policies governing use of foreign flag carriers protect our national security interests and do not place US industry at an unfair competitive disadvantage in world markets.

6. Development and implementation of specific sealift and supporting programs will be made with full consideration of the cost and benefits involved. New programs to enhance our ability to meet national security requirements shall compete for resources with other national programs.¹⁰

**ANALYSIS: DOES THE NSSP PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WAYS AND
MEANS?**

The National Security Sealift policy is **feasible, suitable, and acceptable**. It serves as the President's published road map for obtaining required sealift capacity within the Defense Transportation System. Because responsibilities are carefully specified in this important document, DOT and DOD have developed a tightly woven

strategy to meet the nation's NSSP objectives. The NSSP policy objective is to ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources are available to meet defense deployment and essential economic requirements in support of our NSS. The NSSP identifies the concepts (**ways**) to achieve the policy objectives. Programs instituted or used to provide the **means**: the Afloat Prepositioning Programs, Ship Introduction Program and, the National Defense Reserve Fleet Programs (consisting of the Surge Sealift Program and Sealift Sustainment Program). Sealift capacity provides the **means** for achieving the policy objectives; this sealift capacity (**means**) comes from three sources: government owned ships maintained in reserve status, commercial ships under long-term charter to DOD, and ships operating in commercial trade.¹¹

Afloat Prepositioning Program

The Afloat Prepositioned force provides the NCA with means for immediate response around the world.¹² The fleet consists of 33 strategically located ships laden with military equipment and supplies for the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Forces.

- Thirteen ships comprise the Army Preposition Afloat-3 Force (APS-3). These ships carry enough supplies to support elements of two heavy brigades-up to 10,000

personnel-for up to 30 days. Military Sealift Command (MSC) stations the APS ships near Diego Garcia and in the Arabian Gulf. These two strategic locations allow for quick response of the APS ships.

- Thirteen special ships transport supplies and equipment for the U.S. Marine Corps. Known as the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), the Marine Corps divides the MPF ships into three squadrons (MPSRON) located in the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and western Pacific. Each squadron is within a five-day cruise of potential contingency sites. Each squadron supports one Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 16,500 Marines for 30 days.

- Three ships make up the Air Force contingent of the Afloat-prepositioning program. These ships carry critical ammunition necessary to conduct large-scale sustained operations.

- Four other vessels comprise the final major component of the Prepositioning Program. These ships contain medical supplies and bulk fuel for the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), Defense Fuel Supply Center, and Navy.

The MRS set the Army's requirement at two million square feet for its prepositioned equipment afloat program. The MSR-BURU validated this requirement making it half of DOD's total APS requirement. This requirement will not be meet until FY 1999.¹³ To meet the Army's afloat

prepositioning objective, DOD is acquiring a fleet of Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels. This program will ultimately provide the Army's APS program with eight newly constructed LMSRs to satisfy their two million square feet requirement.¹⁴

Ship Introduction Program

The Ship Introduction Program (SIP) is responsible for overseeing the Navy's ship acquisition program, including conversion and construction. Under SIP, 19 LMSRs (this includes the eight LMSRs for the Army's APS program) will enter service during fiscal years 1996-2002. These LMSRs will provide an additional five million square feet of sealift capacity for the Surge Sealift Program. In 1995, Congress appropriated \$2.4 billion to fund the SIP program.¹⁵ With the addition of the new LMSRs, the Army's surge sealift requirement will still fall short of the minimum requirement specified in the MRS BUR. Additionally, the requirement for five medium RO/ROs (550,000 square feet) remains unfulfilled. Congress continues to turn down requests to buy available foreign-owned vessels. Congress has not authorized acquisition of any RO/ROs during the past two congressional sessions. Instead, Congress has opted to fund enhancement of U.S. Commercial military lift capacity through National Defense Features Program.¹⁶

National Defense Features (NDF) Program

The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act provided \$50 million to install defense features on some commercial ships. Defense features are items such as reinforced decks, cranes and RO/RO ramps. The purpose of the NDF program is to ensure that DOD could obtain militarily useful commercial cargo ships in times of a national emergency. The NDF funds installation of militarily useful features on U.S.-built vessels during construction or conversion. NDF funding also pays for any increased operational costs the owning company may incur during commercial operation that are directly attributable to the NDF program.

Commercial shipping companies that accept NDF funds must make their vessels immediately available to DOD during a military contingency. Congress believes the NDF program will be a cost-effective means (instead of buying additional RO/RO vessels or LASH ships) to provide later deploying surge sealift to meet ammunition resupply and other DOD requirements.¹⁷

Surge Sealift

For surge sealift, DOD first surveys the U.S. market to charter ships. If insufficient numbers of suitable U.S. commercial ships are available; MSC will use

government-owned Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) or Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships.

Fast Sealift Ships

The FSS are the fastest cargo ships in the world; they are essential to meet rapid surge capability. The eight ships combined can carry nearly the equivalent of a full Army mechanized division.¹⁸ The FSS can travel at a top speed of more than 30 knots; they provide excellent capability to position the force in a short time. They have a larger capacity than breakbulk ships, require less time to load, and unload. MSC keeps the FSS fleet in a reduced operating status. When required, MARAD can activate and move the FSS fleet to ports designated for loading in 72-96 hours.¹⁹

The FSS fleet proved to be extremely reliable during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although only seven of the eight FSS ships were available during the Gulf War crisis, they validated the need for immediately available DOD surge ships. The *Antares* suffered mechanical failure off the East Coast. This ship was then towed to Spain for off-loading. (Before the war began, MARAD had scheduled the *Antares* for a major overhaul, but this was delayed because of the crisis. Thus, DOD accepted a degree of risk in the decision to use the *Antares* to speed the deployment. Due to the severity of the repairs, the *Antares*

was loss for the rest of the Gulf War.) The remaining FSS fleet delivered 13 percent of the total unit cargo and equipment deployed for the operation.²⁰ The FSS carried the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at average speeds of 27 knots. The typical FSS load includes more than 700 Army vehicles such as M-1 tanks, M-2 fighting vehicles and fuel trucks. By comparison, it would require 116 World War II Liberty Ships to move the same tonnage in the same period.²¹

National Defense Reserve Fleet

The Ready Reserve Fleet (part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet) consists of 94 reserve ships maintained and crewed by the Maritime Administration (MARAD). Depending on the type of ship, MARAD can activate and have the ships ready to sail in 4, 5, 10 or 20 days.²² The fleet consists of 35 breakbulk ships, 31 RO/RO vessels, three heavy lift ships, nine auxiliary crane ships, four LASH ships, ten petroleum tankers and two troop ships. When deployed, RRF ships come under the operational control of MSC. By FY 2000, the RRF will increase to 100 ships with the addition of five more RO/RO vessels and one auxiliary crane ship.²³

MARAD currently moors the RRF ships at three strategic reserve fleet sites in CONUS: the James River complex at Fort Eustis, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and the Suisun Bay Facility in California. MARAD has wisely distributed its vessels to strategic fleet sites to accommodate the rapid

loading of mobility forces. The fleet sites are close to designated military out-load points, positioned for quick response to military force requirements.²⁴

Surge Sealift Proves Its Worth

Since the Gulf War, RRF ships have activated for several crises. In November 1992, three RRF ships responded to duty to support the United Nations' humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations in Somalia. These ships included two petroleum discharge vessels and a troop ship used in the repatriation of United Nations' troops from Somalia. From August through October 1994, seven RRF ships participated in the Persian Gulf operations VIGILANT WARRIOR and VIGILANT SENTINEL. In late fall 1995 during operation QUICK LIFT several RRF ships participated in the movement of U.S. and U.K. supplies and equipment to Bosnia and Croatia for peacekeeping operations. In September 1995, five RRF ships participated in Operation BRIGHT STAR 95, delivering equipment and supplies to Egypt.²⁵

Sustainment Sealift

As proposed in the NSSP, commercial sealift capacity is the cornerstone of the sustainment sealift program. The principal means for meeting our sustainment requirements is our cooperation with the maritime industry.

The U.S. cannot meet its wartime sustainment requirements without full cooperation from civilian maritime industry. Our commercial fleet is the backbone of our nation's lift capacity. We use business incentives and subsidies to sustain wartime capacity and ensure readiness within the civilian sector. Further, we frequently conduct exercises to test procedures for fluid transition to support contingencies.

The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

Using USTRANSCOM as its executive agent, DOD worked with MARAD and the U.S. maritime industry to develop a program to enhance our commercial sealift forces. The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) will provide DOD with time-phased contingency access to commercial capacity through pre-negotiated agreements. Under VISA, U.S. flag carriers contractually commit to provide contingency ship and intermodal resources in return for DOD peacetime business. When fully implemented, VISA will ensure our access to required sealift capacity to meet DOD's global contingency needs. VISA offers powerful incentives: participation in VISA is a condition for doing peacetime business with DOD; the pre-negotiated rates will facilitate rapid transition to war; and carrier coordination agreements may protect market shares of VISA participants. Lieutenant General Roger Thompson, Deputy Commander in Chief,

USTRANSCOM, in a 15 October 1997 speech to the Propeller Club of the United States, described the VISA program as:

A win-win construct...DOD gains capacity-access to actual real capacity-intermodal capacity-vice specific hulls. Contracts are being pre-negotiated: We will know what we have to pay; carriers will know what they will get. We are not getting access to specific ships, as I mentioned earlier, we are getting access to a worldwide intermodal system capacity and its expertise.²⁶

Maritime Security Program

Congress recently enacted the Maritime Security Act (MSA) into law. It provides an important underpinning for VISA and helps to preserve wartime sealift capabilities.

At the signing of the Maritime Security Act, Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena observed:

With the stroke of a pen today, President Clinton ensured America's future as a maritime nation. The Maritime Security Act will enable the United States to continue as an active participant in its own maritime future and ensure that American ships, crewed by loyal skilled American civilian seafarers, will continue to be able to support our armed services.

The MSA created the Maritime Security Program to provide financial incentives to help maintain the U.S. flagged fleet and preserve the required base of merchant mariners to operate the National Defense Reserve Fleet and DOD-owned sealift vessels. The MPS

also transcends shortcomings of past incentive programs by having the carrier delivery fully crewed only vessels vice ships only. It allows DOD to use not only the Carriers' vessels but also their entire transportation system (to include hardware and electronic data interchange systems). In return for the financial incentive, carriers agree to participate in VISA.²⁷

"Strategic Sealift is critical and requires additional attention. Over 95 percent of our equipment during a major conflict will be lifted by ships."

General John M. Shalikashvili,
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Statement before Congress in 1997

OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The U.S. now possesses the Strategic Sealift capability to respond to the two Major Theater Wars scenario-but with some risks. (We can not meet the required force closure timelines without the new LMSRs causing us to rely on some foreign ships and the Army's requirement for five medium-size RO/RO ships will remain unfulfilled for the near future²⁸.) Nevertheless, using the NSSP as their guideline, the Departments of Defense, Transportation, State, Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative and Congress have together

developed programs to produce a capable, responsive sealift service within the Defense Transportation System.

As evidenced during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. demonstrated an immense capacity for projecting military power abroad. The keys to this ability were U.S. strategic sealift forces, both organic military and commercial, and the contracted foreign sealift assets. Table 1 below provides a breakout of support by sealift shipment mode:

TABLE 1. MODE OF SHIPMENT DURING THE GULF WAR

MODE OF SHIPMENT	PERCENTAGE
Fast Sealift	10 percent
Military Postal Service	7 percent
US-Flagged	15 percent
Ready Reserve Force	21 percent
Foreign-Flagged	22 percent
Special Middle East sealift Agreement	25 percent

Note: Information taken from report on the Persian Gulf War

As seen in the table above, foreign charter vessels transported 22 percent of the equipment and supplies for the

Gulf War.²⁹ This is a significant fact. DOD planners should keep this in mind (the lack of foreign vessels on the open market and our ability to control these vessels in future crises may affect our force deployment schedules). This fact alone demonstrates the extent of U.S. dependence on foreign carriers immediately after the Cold War for power projection assets.³⁰ Military planners view this as the "old power projection challenge" before the MRS-BURU. Figure 2 illustrates the time in days and the strategic lift assets needed to move the force during Desert Shield up to the closure date, the arrival of the last combat unit of 7th Corps. The old challenge still haunted military planners.




Figure 1. The Old Projection Challenge

Strategic Sealift Forces delivered 95 percent of the equipment and sustainment supplies to Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War.³¹ However, since the Gulf War our

sealift capabilities have continued to improve. Congress has allocated funds to purchase 19 LMSRs for the APS and Surge sealift programs. In addition, the Army has expanded its APS ashore prepositioned program. One of the luxuries afforded MSC during the Gulf War that may not be available in future crises is time. MSC had the good fortune to take six months to transport the forces necessary to conduct Desert Storm. Today's military planners envisage the deployment of a similar Desert Shield/ Storm size force that must close with the enemy rapidly, using all available strategic lift assets. Surge sealift assets and the preposition "afloat" vessels will lift 90 percent of the forces beginning at C-Day and continuing through C+150.

Figure 2 illustrates the new force projection challenge which NSSP has address in structuring the strategic lift forces for crisis response as mandated by the MSR-BURU. The short reaction time for sustainment assets into theater has increased USTRANSCOM and DOT coordination with MARAD to ensure that sufficient commercial container ships are available.




Figure 2. The New Force Projection Challenge

The timeline for placing Army forces in the first theater for a single MTW is 75 days for one contingency corps. This equates to 5 1/3 divisions with Corps support troops traveling sea-lanes up to 8700 miles. The requirement for force closure in the second MTW is 125 days from the original C-day, deploying an equal number of forces (5 1/3 divisions) with Corps support troops. It is thus easy to understand the need for a functional NSSP that provides a robust sealift program.³²

The collective requirements for the two MTW scenarios call for recycling the same sealift assets to transport the CONUS based forces with sustainment supplies. But will our sealift forces (commercial and military) and policies support this challenge? Probably yes, but there are risks as

noted earlier. The Mobility Requirement Study and The Bottom-Up Review Update have set the basic requirements. Through its funding and legislation of the APS and MSA programs, Congress has almost guaranteed that the U.S. will possess a strategic sealift force capability that is much greater (4.5 million square feet more) than the one that supported Desert Shield/Storm.

Table 2 itemizes the transportation lift requirements for similar Army divisional units broken out by C141/C17 aircraft and LMSRs sealift vessels. Recall that Congress funded the 19 LMSRs and the APS ships, once discharged these ships will join the surge sealift fleet for use. This capability, along with the remaining RRF assets, provides MSC with sufficient vessels to meet DOD's needs.

The following table more specifically indicates mobility requirements for various kinds of Army contingency forces:

TABLE 2. LIFT REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMY CONTINGENCY FORCES

<u>Notional Army Unit</u>	<u>Number of Unit Weight</u>		<u>Airlift Sorties</u>	<u>Number</u>
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>(Tons)</u>	<u>(C141/C-17 mix)</u>	<u>of LMSRs</u>
Airborne Division	13,242	26,699	1,101/78	2.8
Air Assault Division	15,840	35,860	1,412/195	3.9
Armored Division	17,756	110,431	1,761/1,274	6.2
Mechanized Division	17,982	109,116	1,708/1,275	6.2
Light Infantry Division	11,036	17,092	769/41	1.8
Corps-Support Command	22,410	98,717	3,599/500	8.5

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office: Moving U.S. Forces: Option for Strategic Mobility February 1997. ³³

To fulfill the strategic mobility requirements as outlined in the MRS-BURU, Congress has appropriated over \$18 billion from 1995-1999. Congress authorized over \$5 billion to purchase the required LMSRs and additional tankers, to fund the MSP, and to support the APS programs. The principal critics of the NSSP have come from the Heritage Foundation, Free Traders and the some staff of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). These critics believe either that the President has not allocated sufficient funding to meet all of our security needs or that the U.S. is spending too much for the protection of the U.S.-owned Merchant Marine Industry.³⁴ Additionally, the Association of the United States Army has expressed concerns that Congress may delay the purchase of two LMSRs beyond FY 2001, thereby limiting the Army's Power Projection capability.³⁵

Congress enacted new legislation and increased funding to alleviated many of the problems associated with the NSSP "Old Power Projection Challenge." The MSP addresses concerns about crew availability for the RRF and the competition from foreign nations for mariners during surges for crisis or war.³⁶ Additionally, to improve the readiness of the RRF, Congress provided MARAD a limited funding increase for the operation and maintenance accounts. To test its ability to respond to crises, MARAD conducted over forty unannounced exercises. MARAD designed these exercises

to improve its readiness, crew responsiveness and to test compliance with DOD readiness requirements.³⁷

NSSP agents currently confront two major questions: Will scheduled assets be available on time? Will funding continue to support the projected programs? Today, the U.S. possesses approximately 67 percent of the 10 million square feet required by MRS-BURU. The shortfall limits our ability to meet contingency force closure requirements. For RO/RO ship capacity, DOD currently has 3.9 million of the 8.3 million square feet required, leaving a shortfall of 4.4 million square feet (53 percent short).³⁸ The LMSR program will eventually eliminate this shortfall (all except the 550,000 square feet that Congress did not fund).

MSC expects commercial ships to make up the differences in square footage until all the LMSRs are in service. However, MSC must remain active in forcing the shipyard to meet scheduled deliveries of the LMSRs and to stay within budget. A recent GAO report has expressed concern over shipyard delays in meeting the LMSR delivery schedule and cost over runs.³⁹ Either factor could cause Congress to limit future vessel purchases.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is critical that we continue to use the NSSP as the blueprint for strategic sealift coordination among the

Departments of Transportation, Defense, Commerce, and U.S. Trade Representative.

2. The President, Congress, and DOD must keep the APS and LMSR programs on schedule. Congress should allocate additional funds to purchase the five remaining small Roll-on/Roll-off ships that the Army requires. Congress must fund the operations and maintenance account to maintain the existing RRF vessels at a high level of readiness to maximize their current capability and offset risk until the LMSR and RRF RO/RO acquisitions are completed.

3. DOD and MARAD must develop a modernization plan to replace the World War II vintage ships early in the next century (many vessels are over 45 years old and beyond their intended operational life span). We should replace existing aged ships with new vessels with a common hull design that meet DOD and commercial requirements.

4. As an interim measure to reduce the shortage of square footage required in the Surge Fleet program, DOD should establish additional equipment sites ashore in the Far East or Persian Gulf regions. DOD should use the excess storage capacity available in the U.S. Army-controlled depots in Japan or contract facilities in Bahrain. These additional storage facilities would facilitate the

prepositioning of critical equipment destined for Korea until the additional LMSRs come on line in FY 2001.

CONCLUSION

The NSSP is a feasible, suitable and acceptable policy. The key actors in the inter-agency (DOD, DOT, DOS, and U.S. Special Trade Representative) processes have designed procedures that work. They provide successful ways and means to deploy U.S. forces when necessary to support the two Major Theater War scenario. No other nation has a comparable capability to respond to global events, either on the same scale or with the same speed.

Key NSSP actors must not become complacent and lose sight of the declining U.S. maritime industrial base. Closings of U.S. shipyards, the decline and migration of the U.S. merchant marine fleet, and the loss of skilled mariners may significantly affect our ability to surge to meet future demands in a protracted conflict. Nevertheless, The U.S. is still the the only nation with the strategic sealift capability to deploy forces world wide in a major gobal crisis. The NSSP today and in the future will continue to support our nation's super power status.

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ENDNOTES

¹ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement THE WHITE HOUSE February 1996. Available from <<http://www.Whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/1996strategy.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 February 1998.

² Gordon R. Sullivan, General, US Army. "Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power " Joint Forces Quarterly, summer 1993, pp. 8-9.

³ John H. Tilelli, Jr. Lt. Gen., US Army "Force Projection: Essential to Army Doctrine, p. 1.

⁴ National Security Sealift, Policy, National Security Council, Washington, D.C., 5 October 1989, p. 1.

⁵ Mobility Requirements Study (Volume I) "Executive Summary", Department Of Defense, 23 January 92, p. ES-1

⁶ Ibid., p.ES-1

⁷ Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom up Review," Department of Defense, October 1993, p.7.

⁸ Bruce K. Scott and Robert M. Toguchi, Strategic "Dominant Maneuver'" Army, September 1997, pp. 20-26.

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¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

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¹⁵ Moving U.S. Forces: Option for Strategic Mobility February 1997. Congressional Budget office. Available from

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¹⁸ Ibid.p 2.

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²⁰ Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Appendices A-S. Washington, D.C.: Department Defense, April 1992, F-35.

²¹ Ibid. F-34.

²² Maritime Administration Annual Report 1995. Available from <<Http://mard.dot.gov/chptocl.htm>>. Internet Accessed on 8 February 1998.

²³ US Transportation Command-Public Affairs. "Strategic Sealift." Available from <<http://ustcweb.af.mil/mission/mscfact5.html>>; Internet; accessed 17 September 1997, p. 3.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 4.

²⁵ Maritime Administration Annual Report 1995, p. 3.

²⁶ Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, F-34-36.

²⁷ RSO&I Briefing, U.S. Transportation School, Fort Eustis, VA. December 1997.

²⁸ Until all 19 LMSRs are delivered, (GAO reported that the shipyards are over two years behind schedule on delivering four vessels; they will not make-up this time lag.) the U.S. must rely on the current aged ready reserve fleet assets. These ships lack the necessary equipment and cargo carrying capacity required in meeting MRS-BURU. Additionally, there is no congressional funding for the required five medium-sized RO/RO ships and the National

Defense Feature Program (NDFP) cannot make up the short fall (550,000 square feet.) in surge sealift in the near future. It may take over ten years to obtain this level of square footage through the NDFP.

²⁹ Moving U.S. Forces: Option for Strategic Mobility February 1997. Congressional Budget office.

³⁰ The new NSSP programs under the MRS in long term will cut our dependence on foreign carriers by seventy-five percent.

³¹ RSO&I briefing, U.S. Transportation School, Fort Eustis, VA. December 1997.

³² Ibid., p. 7.

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³⁴ Spring, Baker. "Will Clinton Pay the Price for America to Remain A Global Power? The Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder No.1083, 16 May 1996. Available from <<http://www.townhall.com/heritage/library/categories/natsec/bg1083.html>>; Internet; accessed 30 September 1997.

³⁵ "Army's Power Projection Fleet may be Torpedoed." AUSA NEWS, Volume 19, number, 12 (October 1997): 4.

³⁶ Ferris, Stephen P. "Crisis in Strategic Sealift"

³⁷ Posture Statement, p. 6.

³⁸ Ibid., p 7.

³⁹ Government Accounting Office. STRATEGIC MOBILITY. Late Deliveries of Large, Medium, Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships, Report to the Secretary of Defense, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., June 1997, p. 9.

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