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**AN ANALYSIS IN COALITION WARFARE:
NAPOLEON'S DEFEAT AT THE BATTLE OF NATIONS-LEIPZIG,
1813**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Recent history indicates that, in most, if not all, future military conflicts, the United States will participate as part of a coalition. Examination of successful coalitions from the past may reveal precepts which can be applied in order to successfully approach participation in future coalitions. The Battle of Leipzig in 1813 is a superb example of successful coalition operations from early 19th Century. Its detailed study and analysis has led the author to the conclusion that, different principles apply to successful prosecution of coalition operations at each level of war. Understanding and orchestrating the precepts that apply at each level will give the United States the best chance for successful prosecution of its future strategic objectives during war.

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**An Analysis in Coalition Warfare:
Napoleon's Defeat at the Battle of Nations-Leipzig, 1813**

*"The study of history lies at the foundation of
all sound military conclusions and practice."*

Alfred Thayer Mahan

Why Study Coalition Warfare? Every war that the United States has fought in during the 20th Century, has been a coalition effort.¹ Our current National Security Strategy acknowledges that, in all probability, during future conflicts we will act as part of a coalition.² OPERATION DESERT STORM taught the value of effective coalition operations. Immediately after that conflict, a brief flurry of writings were published concerning coalition warfare, but interest has fallen off with time. Valuable doctrine has been drafted at both joint and army levels.³ We have attempted to describe our doctrine in broad terms, when, in fact, certain precepts may apply at different levels of war. An examination of the historical example provided by the 1813 Battle of Leipzig is used herein to demonstrate this concept.

If we accept the premise that we can learn from history, the Napoleonic Battle of Leipzig, also known as the Battle of Nations, is an obviously appropriate historic example of successful coalition warfare.⁴ At Leipzig, Napoleon's opponents beat him

with both a campaign of maneuver and the battle itself. That battle was one of the largest battles in European history as far as the number of troops engaged (and observable) on a single field.⁵

What made Europe's sixth coalition successful against the genius who kept his foot on the throats of European monarchs for a dozen years? A historical context is necessary before examining this question.

BACKGROUND:

Nineteenth Century Europe. The ideals of liberty and excesses of an arrogant French monarchy resulted in revolution in 1789. European monarchs were shocked at the execution of Louis the XVI in 1793.⁶ They were even more shocked in the following years by the armies of the French Republic and their leader, Napoleon Bonaparte. He rose to power in France through a combination of personal charisma, political savvy, military genius, and of course, luck.⁷ Napoleon won victory after victory against the nations of Europe. He eventually replaced the French royal family (Bourbons) by crowning himself emperor, and giving members of his family kingdoms of their own within his empire.⁸

By 1812, Napoleon controlled the vast majority of the continental Europe (less Russia) either directly through military

actions and treaties, or by alliances. During the preceding twelve years, European alliances had changed as needed to fit the moment as each of dozens of nation-states maneuvered in their own selfish interests. Austria, for instance, had fought France in five wars since the French revolution began. In 1812, however, Austria was allied with France on the eve of the invasion of Russia. Combat, disease, defection of allies and the Russian weather almost completely destroyed the Grande Armee during that campaign.⁹

Participants of the Sixth Coalition. The setback in Russia did not cause Napoleon's downfall, but it set the stage. Europe was ready for an end to what had been over 15 years of almost continuous warfare. Monarchs across Europe wanted to stem the spread of revolutionary ideas that accompanied Napoleon's armies. During the retreat from Russia, European monarchs sensed that the opportunity to end Napoleons' reign was at hand. By the time French forces reassembled west of the Elbe River in early 1813, Napoleon was almost without allies (map 1).¹⁰ By August, the nations in coalition against France were Austria, Russia, Prussia, Britain and Sweden. Each nation's interests are listed in Table 1.

Austria. Austria's empire had suffered most at the hands of Napoleon. The monarch, Francis I, was ably supported by the

genius of Prince Clement Von Metternich, a renowned diplomat who would later "win the peace" at the Congress of Vienna.¹¹ The field commander of Austrian forces and the officer to be designated as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces was Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg.

Schwarzenberg began his career at age 17 and went right to war (Austro-Turkish War, 1787-1791).¹² Like most successful European generals of the era, he had a great deal of combat experience, and he had distinguished himself by personal bravery and excellent leadership.¹³ He was instrumental in the reform of his nation's army and author of a plan to create a popular militia to supplement the national defense of Austria.¹⁴ His skill and patience as a politician and diplomat are evidenced by his service as Ambassador to Russia (1806-1809),¹⁵ and his negotiations for the 1810 marriage between Napoleon and Marie-Louise, Emperor Francis' eldest daughter.¹⁶ Even though Schwarzenberg was not thought of as a "great" general, Napoleon thought enough of him to select him to command the Austrian corps that accompanied the Grande Armee during the invasion of Russia.¹⁷

Because Schwarzenberg was the Supreme Commander, I will focus my examination of the management of the coalition on his actions (Chart 1).¹⁸ He is said to have been a soldier who

possessed the skill of conciliation. Unselfish and modest, it is also said that he may have been the only general who could have done the job he did as arbiter among the three monarchs who accompanied his headquarters to the field.¹⁹ While he was not a dynamic leader, he used goodwill, tact and diplomacy to overcome the challenges to the coalition from within.²⁰

Schwarzenberg's Chief of Staff was fellow army reformer Joseph Wenzel Radetzky.²¹ Radetzky, already a national hero, was held in high respect by fellow allies.²² He had the distinction of having served in every theater of war Austria had fought in during the last 20 years.²³ For his service at Leipzig he would be made a Count, and would serve Austria in both military and political capacities for another 44 years.²⁴

Russia. The Russians were led by an enlightened despot, Tsar Alexander I. The grandson of Catherine the Great, he earnestly desired to improve the lives of his subjects.²⁵ His relatively liberal ideas caused the other monarchs to dislike and mistrust him.

The Russian officer corps, as a body, came from all over Europe and, therefore, had no clear philosophy of war. The general staff was not well trained or organized, and it lacked internal procedures, a fact that led to frequent confusion within the headquarters during crises.²⁶ The Russian field commander

was Mikhail Bogdanovich, Prince Barclay de Tolly, a soldier of Scottish descent who had fought in every Russian war in the past 20 years. He was made a Count as result of the Leipzig victory.²⁷

Prussia. Prussia was located in what is modern day Northern Poland and Eastern Germany. The Prussian monarch, Frederick William III, another unwilling ally to Napoleon's invasion of Russia, was cautious after years of defeat by Napoleon. When the Grand Armee retreated in defeat, one of Prussia's corps, under Yorck von Wartenburg, defected from that alliance.²⁸ Frederick William signed the Treaty of Kalisch on 3 February, joining Russia in alliance, with the guarantee of restoration of the 1806 Prussian borders.²⁹

The Prussian field commander of the Army of Silesia was seventy two year old Blucher Von Wahlstatt, energetic, courageous and aggressive. Blucher began his military career in the Swedish cavalry. He was almost illiterate, addicted to drinking and gambling, and spoke no foreign languages,³⁰ but he possessed inexhaustible energy, common sense, unfailing courage, and the ability to inspire men to give their most during crisis.³¹

The perfect complement to the impulsive Blucher was his chief of staff, August von Gneisenau, reformer of the Prussian military and a brilliant tactician. When he was a baby, Gneisenau was found on the roadside during a retreat in the Seven

Years' War and was raised without parents, in the military.³² A lifelong, totally dedicated soldier, he is a German national hero, both then and now.

Great Britain. For all the glory that Wellington received for winning the battle of Waterloo in 1815, during the Battle of Nations, Britain was primarily an observer. Britain is one country that had continuously opposed Napoleon since 1803.³³ Wellington and Spanish patriots were expelling French forces from Spain, but in Germany, England's stake in the battle was the financial support it provided the allies³⁴, liaison officers, and a small number of troops including a rocket battery.³⁵

Sweden. The new participant among the allies was the Crown Prince of Sweden, Bernadotte, who was one of Napoleon's former Marshals. Initially an adequate performer, by 1809, Napoleon stripped him of his title for poor performance.³⁶ In January, 1813, after his return from Russia, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania.³⁷ Bernadotte pledged himself and 30,000 Swedish soldiers to the allied cause.³⁸ Swedish participation, however, came at a price. England subsidized him with one million pounds, sterling, and territorial acquisitions. The Russians promised 35,000 and the Prussians promised 27,000 troops to operate under his command.³⁹ This force was designated the Army of the North.

France. The mood in France after the Russian campaign was one of gloom and terror.⁴⁰ The nation was tired of war, and many generals wanted peace to enjoy the riches they had acquired, not another campaign.⁴¹ In truth, Napoleon had exhausted the resources of French talent to lead large formations of soldiers and act independently. After he abandoned his army in Russia to quell unrest in his capitol, Napoleon showed extraordinary energy raising a new army. The soldiers were young conscripts, with little training and no hardening or experience. Likewise, NCOs were inexperienced. Only the mid level officer corps was solid.⁴² Napoleon would enter the campaign short of cavalry which would hinder his ability to pursue and "finish-off" a victory.⁴³

Napoleon's strategy was to hold onto as much of his empire in central Europe as he could. The area and population of the non-French empire was still about equal to that of France.⁴⁴ While they provided resources to support his army, these nations were of little support militarily. Units provided by German allies proved unreliable at times, some defecting before or during battle.⁴⁵

THE CAMPAIGN:

Napoleon's Spring Campaign. Prussia signed the Treaty of Kalisch on 27 February 1813 and joined Russian forces on the offensive, resulting in an inconclusive battle at Magdeburg. This action forced Napoleon to leave Paris with his newly raised 225,000-man army. At Lutzen, Napoleon forced the Russo-Prussian forces from the field, but inadequate cavalry pursuit fumbled the opportunity for victory, while French losses were double that of the allies. Later, Napoleon struck the allies at Bautzen while they were bickering over strategy. Again, the victory was inconclusive, this time because of failure of a subordinate commander to properly execute a maneuver. This caused the allies to retreat toward the Oder River.⁴⁶

Armistice of Plaswitz. In a surprise move, Napoleon agreed to an armistice from 4 June through 20 July⁴⁷ (later extended to 10 August⁴⁸). His goal was to resupply, conduct training, raise more cavalry and attempt to convince Austria to rejoin him, or at least stay neutral.⁴⁹ Napoleon admitted (in exile) that this was one of the worst decisions of his life.⁵⁰

The coalition was truly born during the armistice.⁵¹ Britain, already at war with Napoleon in Spain, signed treaties with Russian and Prussia on 16 and 24 June respectively.⁵² By these treaties, Britain pledged financial support and trade subsidies,⁵³ but the near disasters of the spring campaign had

shown the allies that they needed Austria.⁵⁴ Years of war had the Hapsburg Empire under severe financial strain.⁵⁵ A decisive French victory at Bautzen may have kept Austria out of the war.⁵⁶ After Napoleon turned down Metternich's mediative offer for peace and French forces were defeated at Vittoria in Spain, Emperor Francis joined the coalition.⁵⁷ Britain pledged one half million pounds to help finance the Austrian effort.⁵⁸

Trachenberg Plan. The allies secretly met in Trachenberg, Silesia, in July, 1813, to formulate their strategy against Napoleon.⁵⁹ Although Tsar Alexander wanted to be supreme commander, he was convinced that a monarch should not "carry the burden of command."⁶⁰ They named Schwarzenberg instead, but Frederick William (Prussia's king), Alexander and Francis (and their courts) accompanied his headquarters during the ensuing campaign. While he had been given the responsibility, Schwarzenberg had very little authority.⁶¹

The consensus was that Napoleon himself was the major danger they faced.⁶² The Austrians understood that time was on the allies' side; as early as June, Radetzky had proposed a strategy of avoiding decisive engagement, and wear Napoleon down by attrition.⁶³ While no written agreement came out of the Trachenberg conference, the basic strategic idea was for all three armies to advance cautiously, take an easy victory when the

opportunity made itself available, and avoid engagement when Napoleon was present.⁶⁴ Later, Schwarzenberg's campaign orders stated that individual French corps should be engaged and destroyed before Napoleon could personally intervene.⁶⁵ Schwarzenberg determined that Leipzig was a decisive strategic point for French communications and movement throughout central Germany, and it was an early campaign focal point for the separate armies to drive towards.⁶⁶ The strategy, then, was portrayed as one of "...a pack of hounds bringing down a stag," in that rapid maneuver toward and away from Leipzig would be required.⁶⁷ As Napoleon was worn down by peripheral attacks, all the armies would concentrate for the decisive blow, when risk had been minimized.⁶⁸

The allies counted (including garrisons and forces laying siege to French fortresses) 860,000 soldiers. This was a titanic number of soldiers unlike anything in civilized European history.⁶⁹ In addition to being overall commander of these forces, Schwarzenberg also commanded the largest of the three main allied armies (230,000), the Army of Bohemia. Additionally, he commanded the Austrian portion of that army. This placed him at three simultaneous levels of command (Chart 1).⁷⁰ The Army of Bohemia approached Napoleon's forces from the southeast. Blucher commanded the Army of Silesia (Russian and Prussian: 95,000) and

approached from the east. Bernadotte, as mentioned, commanded the Army of the North (110,000) and approached from that direction.⁷¹

Meanwhile, Napoleon had a total of about 310,000 soldiers available, not counting garrisons in Stettin, Kustrin and Danzig (50,000) which he hoped to relieve from sieges. Operationally, he determined to defend in Saxony, west of the Elbe River in order to retain support from his Confederation of the Rhine.⁷² This is the start point (mid August) for the campaign analysis (Map 1).

Opening Moves. Napoleon believed that he was positioned right where he wanted to be. By using small forces to counter two encircling armies, he could strike with his main army at each allied force and eliminate them one at a time (map 101). This strategy might have worked in 1806, but Napoleon's current subordinates did not have the skill to operate independently.⁷³ Marshall Marmont warned that by splitting his forces, Napoleon might win one battle (because of his presence) and his subordinates lose two at other locations.⁷⁴ This is just what happened.

Napoleon opened with an effort to drive toward Berlin; but movements of the other allied armies caused him to leave that action to Marshal Oudinot. Bernadotte promptly defeated

Ouidinot (using Prussian troops) at Gross Beeren (map 102). Much additional maneuvering continued on both sides.⁷⁵ This plan by Napoleon has been criticized in that the Emperor Napoleon was concerned about the Prussian capital whereas the Marshal Napoleon would have sought a decisive battle with the Army of Bohemia and its three monarchs; a big victory there would have probably dissolved the coalition.⁷⁶

Blucher was not happy with the indirect approach of the strategy; he wanted an immediate decisive battle.⁷⁷ When Schwarzenberg sent Barclay to explain the strategy, Blucher argued and ended with a compromise that allowed him somewhat more aggressive authority than was Schwarzenberg's intent.⁷⁸ This caused dissension between Blucher and his Russian corps commanders. Unaware of this amended approach, Langeron felt that Blucher was being too aggressive, overstepping his authority, and Yorck did not understand why all the marching and counter-marching; however, when it came to time to fight, these differences went by the wayside.⁷⁹ The result of this was when Schwarzenberg moved toward Dresden, Blucher defeated Marshall McDonald at the battle of Katzbach.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Schwarzenberg struggled with his burden of three monarchs. After initiating a drive toward Leipzig, Alexander insisted that the force be redirected towards Dresden. This

change was required in the middle of a complex march through Bohemian mountain passes, and caused great anguish within the army.⁸¹ Nonetheless, the army emerged before the relatively small garrison at Dresden with an opportunity to score a big victory. Indecision and interference by the monarchs, prevented timely attack, and the opportunity was lost when Napoleon arrived with enough of his Army to defeat the allies. The retreat was not in good order, but by good fortune, a pursuing French corps was surrounded and forced to surrender at Kulm (map 105).⁸² Napoleon had left this pursuit to his subordinates while he responded to the defeat at Katzbach.⁸³ It allowed the allies to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, even though they continued to retire southwest away from Dresden.⁸⁴

The near disaster for the allies can be blamed upon the supreme headquarters: multiple chains of command, inefficient organization and constant interference by the sovereigns and their advisors. "It is unbelievable how I suffer," Schwarzenberg wrote his wife.⁸⁵ At Dresden there was a lack of unity of effort, but the victory at Kulm made everyone realize that Napoleon could be defeated.⁸⁶

Schwarzenberg and Radetzky also knew that the constant maneuvering and combat was having a destructive effect on Napoleon's army.⁸⁷ There existed the danger that Blucher would,

in his over zealous manner, fall into a trap and get defeated. Schwarzenberg wanted to combine armies with Blucher, but Blucher pressed for independent action. Schwarzenberg relented. After detaching additional troops to support the Army of Bohemia, Blucher made a bold move west. As he moved out on 9 October, Napoleon struck out in attack, but missed the Army of Silesia entirely (map 107). Throughout this process Schwarzenberg was incredibly flexible, guiding rather than ordering, achieving unity through tact.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, a frustrated Napoleon considered falling back to the Saale River for a winter defensive line (map 108). He declined this option because it would be admission of allied victory and the loss of Saxony. Witnesses recorded that in spite of this frustration, he was overconfident throughout this period.⁸⁹ Word that the Schwarzenberg was moving north again diverted his attention there.

On 10 October, Blucher proposed to Bernadotte that they combine their forces, drive toward Leipzig, and accept decisive battle. Bernadotte refused, and Blucher attempted to subvert the Russo-Prussian corps in the Army of the North to join him. Fortunately for the coalition, Bernadotte relocated his army before his allied subordinates could seriously consider the proposal.⁹⁰

The Battle of Nations. Unable to focus on either of the three allied armies, Napoleon decided to rapidly concentrate at Leipzig and fight a decisive battle there (map 108). "I shall fight only as and where I feel inclined. They will never venture to attack me," he proclaimed.⁹¹ Yet this is exactly what Schwarzenberg had in mind. By 12 October, Schwarzenberg and Blucher had established communications west of Leipzig, and the grand opportunity to trap Napoleon's entire army was at hand.⁹² On the 14th, Schwarzenberg ordered Blucher to advance toward Leipzig from the west; unfortunately, perhaps in his hurry to get the battle started, Blucher took a more direct route that had the result of blocking Bernadotte from direct march on Leipzig. The three armies were directed to concentrate with a general battle to begin on the 16th.⁹³

On the 14th, as the allies' concentration was being executed, there occurred a great (but inconclusive) cavalry clash southeast of Leipzig at Lieberwolkwitz.⁹⁴ The allied attack was piecemeal due to inexperience at working together. Losses were about equal on both sides, but the French could ill afford to lose any cavalry.⁹⁵

On the 15th, there were more personality problems between Bernadotte and Blucher. Bernadotte promised to maneuver in such a way as to be in position to attack Leipzig on the 16th. Based

upon faulty scouting, he did not execute the move, or inform Blucher to the contrary. He obviously was concerned about his own force protection but appears to have neglected the fact that he was part of a larger effort that must be coordinated. While Napoleon did not take advantage of this, it did keep Bernadotte's army out of the battle until the 18th. Schwarzenberg's strategy was working, but at the operational level, there were problems.

Also on the 15th, Schwarzenberg issued words of inspiration and unity in his dispatches to the commands;⁹⁶ however, the three-headed Hydra of political control (the monarchs) disapproved of his battle plan for the Army of Bohemia for the 16th. Alexander demanded that his soldiers would attack where and when he thought they should.⁹⁷ Schwarzenberg adjusted his plan, and a bloody battle near Wachau (south of Leipzig) was fought on the 16th (map 110). The cannonade was so heavy that veterans remarked afterwards that one could not distinguish individual cannon shots.⁹⁸ In spite of Napoleon's presence on the field, and about even numbers of troops, this fierce battle ended in a draw, which, under the circumstances, was a big victory for the allies. Within a day, they would receive reinforcement by Bennigsen with 60,000 Russians, while Napoleon would receive only a few thousand French.⁹⁹

North of the town, the Army of Silesia bludgeoned the French economy of force corps (Marmont). To the west, the entrapping corps (Gyulai) was too weak to seal the escape route but was still on the field and had to be contended with. Schwarzenberg thought that a corps from the Army of the North would be in that location to assist in this action.¹⁰⁰ Across the battlefield, at the tactical level, the allied soldiers fought as one army.

Why didn't Napoleon decide to retreat on the night of the 16th? Perhaps it was the 130,000 French forces trapped in garrisons to the east.¹⁰¹ Perhaps Emperor Napoleon was in conflict with general Napoleon. At this point the battle was almost certainly lost.¹⁰² Napoleon did seek an armistice by sending a captured Austrian general to Emperor Francis to establish terms. The proposal was all but ignored as the allies sensed victory.¹⁰³

Meanwhile, problems continued between Blucher and Bernadotte. Blucher continued to inform Bernadotte of his position, urging the commander of the Army of the North to join the attack. Horrendous rains on the 17th slowed down arrival of additional troops and caused somewhat of a lull in the battle.¹⁰⁴ Blucher decided to travel to Bernadotte's headquarters to discuss the attack face to face. So contentious were the discussions, that the Prussian element of Bernadotte's army would have been

withdrawn, if Bernadotte had not conceded to attack.¹⁰⁵ By offering to attach another corps from the Army of Silesia to Bernadotte, Blucher demonstrated the depth of his concern that a full attack should be conducted, on the 18th.¹⁰⁶

On the 18th, the attack was pressed on all sides, but Bernadotte did not get his troops into the battle until 4:00 P.M. (map 111). This delay probably prevented the complete collapse of the French line, and it allowed the eventual escape of a sizable portion of their army.¹⁰⁷ In general, the allies won victories all around the town but did not crush the line anywhere.

During the day, Schwarzenberg had dispatched 60,000 soldiers to block Napoleon's retreat, but during the night, he changed the orders. Was this an error? More realistically, this was politically motivated by Metternich who was not convinced that Napoleon had to be deposed to achieve victory conditions.¹⁰⁸

Napoleon realized he had no choice but attempt to fight his way out for a retreat to France. Efforts started before dark on the 18th. His rear guard forces fought hard on the 19th but were pushed back from every direction. The retreat route was easily opened, but it depended on a single bridge out of Leipzig. By mistake, the bridge was demolished too early, and most of three French corps were trapped.¹⁰⁹ The retreat was so frantic and

chaotic that the "Old Guard" had to be used to halt the stampede.¹¹⁰

After the Battle. Immediate pursuit was impossible because of intermingling of units and confusion of urban fighting.¹¹¹ The carnage was so heavy that it was said that there was no spot for ten miles around Leipzig without a corpse.¹¹² When the allies did get reorganized, the pursuit was conducted methodically, aimed at further attrition of Napoleon's force.¹¹³ A Prussian soldier wrote in his memoirs that it seemed that the French lost as many soldiers during the retreat as during the battle. After dodging some potential disasters, the remnants of Napoleon's army reached the Rhine river, and he went about raising his army for the defense of France. Metternich offered, one more time, to broker peace, if Napoleon would restrain his endeavors to within France's natural boundaries, but he refused. Because of his refusal, the allies agreed that no country would accept a separate peace. The combined winter-spring offensive into France forced Napoleon's abdication on 4 April, 1814.¹¹⁴

Napoleon's defeat was unparalleled; he was clearly beaten at all three levels of war. Napoleon's inability to focus his power on any individual allied army, and his dissipation of power in the effort, allowed the allies to concentrate their combined

strength into a gargantuan battle, larger than any man, even Napoleon, could manage.¹¹⁵

ANALYSIS:

Definitions and Concepts. Our developing doctrine differentiates between a coalition and an alliance. "A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common actions."¹¹⁶ It is "...usually for a single occasion, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest."¹¹⁷ An alliance, on the other hand, "...is the result of a formal agreement ...with long term objectives...."¹¹⁸ This was the sixth in a series of international alignments against Napoleon, and clearly meets our definition of a coalition. Study of this campaign and battle has yielded an unwieldy list of twenty-one concepts of coalition warfare operations (see Table 2). They apply at a mixture of strategic, operational and tactical levels, some at one, others at all three. Almost all seem to apply at the operational level, where politics and warfighting interface. These precepts are organized into four categories: Coalition Goals, Command, Vulnerabilities, and Skills.

Coalition Goals. A coalition is drawn together by a mutual cause or purpose. This unity of purpose is a strategic precept that holds the coalition together.¹¹⁹ It is a political responsibility

to determine what the end state for the coalition is to be; if different nations have different end state desires, this should be resolved.¹²⁰ In this campaign, unity of purpose came from the universal desire to end Napoleon's empire. The coalition did not, however, adequately discuss or agree upon what the details of post war Europe should be. Consequently, unity of effort at the operational level suffered. This unity of effort is best achieved by agreeing on clearly defined campaign objectives and military end states. It is achieved at operational and tactical levels through cooperation and coordination of the partners executing agreed upon plans.¹²¹ In spite of daily disagreements, even Blucher showed an exceptional degree of cooperation by detaching several corps to other armies. Unfortunately, no written Trachenburg Plan was ever produced. Clear objectives and an end state were not identified (other than to defeat Napoleon's army). Fortunately, the general strategy was agreed upon, that being the foundation for action.

Because each nation in this campaign did have its own interests and somewhat divergent political end states, there were examples where risk was avoided to posture for a position of strength after the campaign. Bernadotte was the most obvious example. Loss of a large portion of his army might cause his loss of the throne of Sweden, so he avoided combat with his

Swedish troops.¹²² Even Schwarzenberg was accused by some historians for being overly cautious because he knew that Austria did not have the ability to raise another army, should his be destroyed.¹²³ Obviously, each member of a coalition wants to minimize risk at the strategic and operational levels; however, at the operational and tactical levels, it can have a devastating negative influence, detracting from the achievement of operational goals and endangering other members of the coalition.

Coalition Command. Clausewitz planned to write a separate chapter on structure for supreme command for a coalition; unfortunately, he died before its completion.¹²⁴ Even without knowing his thoughts, it is apparent that the concept of clearly defined and empowered warfighting structure was violated at Leipzig. As discussed, Schwarzenberg did not have the authority to freely direct operations. His charter was to command what appeared to be a "lead nation" command structure, since all armies were to be under his command;¹²⁵ yet, during actual maneuvering, sovereigns and generals alike were apt to counter his orders to their nation's troops.¹²⁶ He was supposed to be the interface between political leadership and military structure;¹²⁷ however, the presence of three monarchs in his camp precluded a clean interface.

Schwarzenberg was selected partially for his political sensitivity,¹²⁸ composure around royalty, tact, and conciliatory demeanor; he frequently demonstrated the ability to deftly set aside extraneous plans developed around royalty.¹²⁹ This political sensitivity and peer leadership ability was the key to success for keeping the alliance focused upon its plan.¹³⁰ Blucher understood the problem; years later he proposed a toast to Schwarzenberg which went, "... (to) the Commander-in-Chief, who had three monarchs in his headquarters, and still managed to beat the enemy!"¹³¹

Another trait needed at all levels is patience.¹³² Schwarzenberg demonstrated this trait frequently. An eyewitness reported that Councils of War with the monarchs present were never completed with agreement.¹³³

Schwarzenberg did not solve the problem of commanding three echelons of structure simultaneously (single echelon of command). While trying to direct the Army of Bohemia, his headquarters was inundated with trivial matters from the Austrian component.¹³⁴ Our current joint doctrine warns against this, especially at higher levels of command.¹³⁵ This multi-level responsibility interfered with Schwarzenberg's ability to synchronize operations.¹³⁶ This means (at operational level) getting all armies acting in concert. Actually, this concept which applies

at all three levels was relatively effective in spite of personality clashes.

Schwarzenberg did recognize the benefits of integration of forces of the several nations in each army, to allow them to fight side by side.¹³⁷ This was already a reality with the Army of the North, but was insisted upon for the Army of Bohemia, too.¹³⁸ Also, units mixed below corps level made it difficult for a general to pursue his nation's special interests.¹³⁹ Integration developed esprit, friendship and unity at tactical level, and it was workable, albeit tense at times, at operational level.¹⁴⁰ It would possibly have worked better if a combined staff had been organized at supreme command level. After all, many of the officers were of different nationalities than the armies in which they served; this would not have been as difficult from the language standpoint as from the doctrinal.

The use of liaison officers to assist in information exchange was common practice. A coalition requires extra effort to ensure that allied partners understand each other's position, intentions, problems and capabilities.¹⁴¹ There may be times when some information is not shared with partners because of national security,¹⁴² but this should be minimized. Liaison officers were usually militarily proven, reliable, diplomatic, language skilled officers, in line with what our evolving doctrine calls for.¹⁴³

The Austrian army used bright, daring young officers in a courier service, organized under the General Staff, to deliver orders and messages across the battlefield.¹⁴⁴ Basic leadership techniques cannot be forgotten or ignored during coalition operations; leaders must keep all their (especially allied) subordinates thoroughly informed.¹⁴⁵ Within the capabilities of the era, the tools for communication were available, but not always used.

Vulnerabilities. The challenge of every coalition is to hold the coalition together until victory is achieved. Schwarzenberg was blamed for caution during some parts of the campaign, but he understood that, with three monarchs in his camp, defeat of his army would probably unhinge the coalition and could result in their deaths or capture. He knew that he must protect the coalition center of gravity.¹⁴⁶

Napoleon planned to attack individual allied armies and destroy the allied force piecemeal. Early defeats would destroy allied mutual confidence.¹⁴⁷ He failed to inflict those defeats, and instead, allied armies won victories over his subordinates. This instilled a sense of confidence in the allied army that, together, they could defeat Napoleon. After W.W.II, Eisenhower said, "mutual confidence (is the) one basic thing that makes allied commands work."¹⁴⁸

Along with that shared confidence is the sense of shared burden and risk. All allies must provide their share of help and have something to lose. Pride will not allow for a partner to be delegated to meaningless missions. Nor will excessive risk of a partner's forces.¹⁴⁹ Missions at all levels must be assigned according to each nation's special capabilities,¹⁵⁰ thereby providing meaningful participation. At this time, Britain was capable of providing funding; Russia large armies; Sweden, only a small force. As long as allies believe that their efforts are meaningfully advancing their national interests, the coalition will remain intact.¹⁵¹

A coalition's opponent may attack one of the concepts above to adversely effect perceptions of coalition members, but interoperability problems are of the coalition's making. Interoperability is a concept wherein equipment, procedures, language, supplies, etc., are shared/interchangeable.¹⁵² Napoleon had the advantage that he had, essentially, one system within his army, and he had standardized calibers of weapons.¹⁵³ The allies had to deal with interoperability problems from logistics to staff procedures. These problems can be somewhat negated by assigning discrete missions or geographic areas exclusively to a nation's forces,¹⁵⁴ but this loses the advantages of integration

and gives up flexibility. Interoperability will almost always be a challenge to coalitions.

Skills. With any coalition, you must use simple plans to achieve coalition goals. This common military principle¹⁵⁵ applies to all types and levels of military operations, but is even more applicable for coalitions operating with several languages and cultures.¹⁵⁶ The Trachenberg Plan, as it was executed, honored this principle, and was justly rewarded.

Though the allied armies were integrated long before battles, they still did not operate as well together as the army of a single nation. This was partially due to lack of interoperability, but was mainly due to a lack of training together. Failure to practice battlefield tactical maneuvers together caused flaws in timing and execution during combat. Positive results of the professional training of the officer corps was demonstrated during the actual fighting within Leipzig when units became intermingled in the urban terrain. If it were not for the professional knowledge of the junior and mid level officers, the allies would have suffered considerable fratricide for lack of recognition of allies' uniforms and unit colors.¹⁵⁷

Other desirable skills and traits, especially at tactical and operational levels, include efforts to establish rapport¹⁵⁸ with allies and respect their customs.¹⁵⁹ At soldier level, most

allies got along very well, united in the cause; Russian soldiers were somewhat less respected, but basically, they cooperated very well at lower levels of command. To focus on commonalties was another important concept. Cultural and language differences tend to drive a wedge between people and an effort should be made to prevent this. Within the officer corps, most officers spoke several languages and that eased this problem. The common cause against Napoleon so permeated the ranks that it was easy for the allied soldiers to see what they had in common.

CONCLUSION: The list of concepts established by this analysis is in no way complete. It does provide a logical point for continued analysis of other coalition warfare campaigns for validation and additional concepts. Numerous precepts, principles and concepts identified by examination of this campaign match similar concepts in our evolving doctrine. Our likelihood of participation in coalition warfare in the future demands that we continue to examine any information that may be relevant toward gaining the knowledge that just might make that future coalition successful.

(Word Count 5,987)

ENDNOTES

¹ Terry J. Pudas, "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders," Joint Force Quarterly 3 (Winter 93-94): 40.

² Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: May 1997), 2.

³ Those documents are Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16 (draft) and The Army in Multinational Operations, Field Manual 100-8 (24 Nov 97).

⁴ Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson and David L. Bongard, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography (New York: Harper Collins, Publishers, 1992), 170 and 380. Both Clausewitz and Jomini were on this battlefield. Clausewitz was an observer on the Prussian staff and Jomini served as aide de camp for the Russian Emperor, Alexander I. It was a veritable "who's who" of military men of the era. More importantly, the battle showcased what was perhaps the world's greatest Great Captain and is the most demonstrative example of a personal defeat that he suffered. In Russia, he was not defeated in battle, but lost the campaign. At Waterloo, he fought more a battle of desperation than one of objective planning.

⁵ Count Yorck von Wartenburg (assembled under direction of COL T.D. Stamps, U.S. Army), Atlas to Accompany Napoleon As A General (West Point, NY: August 1942), map 111. Map 111 on 18 October, 1813, shows Napoleon with a field strength of 150,000 men against the combined allied armies with 312,000 men. While more soldiers than this began the campaign to invade Russia, no other single battlefield contained 462,000 men. During earlier European wars, professional armies were not that large. Since the Napoleonic wars, armies began to spread across wider expanses, dissipating the density of soldiers on the battlefield.

⁶ Carl L. Becker, ed., A Survey of European Civilization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 590.

⁷ R.B. Mowat, M.A., The Diplomacy of Napoleon (London: Edward Arnold & Company), 20. Napoleon positioned himself in favor with the French government by his actions during an insurrection in Paris in 1795 which, combined with other shrewd political moves, gained him an appointment as commander of the French Army of Italy. Napoleon used this opportunity to build popular support as a military leader by defeating a much larger Austrian army in the ensuing campaign, and as a political leader in concluding the Treaty of Campio Formio in 1797. This treaty significantly expanded French power and influence in Europe.

⁸ Becker, 603.

⁹ LTC Albert Sidney Britt, The Wars of Napoleon, vol. II, The Resurgence of Europe (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Department of History, 1972), chap. 6 passim. Much of what is now Germany was allied with France as the Confederation of the Rhine. Even Switzerland was obligated to supply soldiers to the impending effort. The Grande Armee that Napoleon assembled for his invasion of Russia consisted of troops from all over Europe. In fact, only about half the army of 550,000 was French.

¹⁰ German states such as Saxony, from the Confederation of the Rhine, and some provinces in northern Italy remained nominally loyal to Napoleon.

¹¹ Alan Palmer, Metternich (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), 132-149. At the Congress of Vienna the victors against Napoleon divided Europe into spheres of influence and established the European balance of power that more or less lasted for fifty years.

¹² Dupuy, 665.

¹³ Antony Brett-James, Europe Against Napoleon, The Leipzig Campaign, 1813 (London: Macmillan St. Martin's Press, 1970), 79.

¹⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Schwarzenberg."

¹⁵ Dupuy, 665.

¹⁶ Prince Richard Metternich, Memoirs of Prince Metternich, 1773-1815, vol. I, trans. Mrs. Alexander Napier (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1881), 73-74.

¹⁷ Brett-James, 79.

¹⁸ Ironically, Schwarzenberg's name appears in military bibliographic research material immediately ahead of the leader of another great and successful coalition-Norman Schwarzkopf!

¹⁹ Avalon Hill Game Company, The Struggle of Nations, article taken from The Leipzig Campaign, by F.N. Meade, 1908 (Baltimore: Avalon Hill Game Company, 1982), 32.

²⁰ Brett-James, 79-80. He seems to have had many personality traits similar to Dwight Eisenhower in this regard.

²¹ John Keegen and Andrew Wheatcroft, Who's Who In Military History-From 1453 to the Present Day (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1976), 272.

²² Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Radetzky," 884.

²³ Britt, 7-8.

²⁴ Dupuy, 620.

²⁵ Britt, 6-4.

²⁶ Britt, 7-9, 10. Part of this confusion is also due to the fact that Alexander surrounded himself with numerous experts and advisors (such as Jomini and Count von Toll) that frequently disagreed and offered conflicting advice.

²⁷ Dupuy, 4. It was he that initiated the scorched earth concept that Kutusov made the basis of success during the French invasion of Russia.

²⁸ Britt, 6-30, 31.

²⁹ Alistair Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? Napoleon 1805-1815 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 330.

³⁰ Britt, 7-14.

³¹ Brett-James, 297.

³² Britt, 7-15.

³³ Mowat, 274.

³⁴ Horne, 336.

³⁵ Brett-James, 76.

³⁶ Dupuy, 5. Shortly thereafter, he was elected by the Swedish States General as heir to the throne of Sweden!

³⁷ Avalon Hill, 21. This area is southwest across the Baltic Sea from Sweden, on the German coast in north Mecklenburg.

³⁸ Britt, 7-11.

³⁹ Ernest F. Henderson, Ph.D., L.H.D., Blucher and the Uprising of Prussia Against Napoleon, 1806-1815 (London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1911), 119.

⁴⁰ Horne, 325-327.

⁴¹ Brett-James, 98-99.

⁴² Ibid., 99.

⁴³ Britt, 7-4.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 7-2.

⁴⁵ Napoleon had previously consolidated hundreds of German nobles and their holdings into the Confederation of the Rhine. This act, designed to facilitate administration, actually had the effect to encourage nationalism among the Germans and Prussians.

⁴⁶ Brett-James, 22-26. During this battle, the French lost 20,000 men and achieved nothing of importance. It did excite fear in Barclay who wanted to retreat further east than the Oder, but he was convinced not to do so.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 26.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 28.

⁴⁹ Britt, 7-5.

⁵⁰ Brett-James, 26.

⁵¹ Per-Eric Jansson, Leipzig, The Battle Of Nations (London: Almark Publishing Co., Ltd., 1975), 5.

⁵² Colonel the Honorable George Cathcart, War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813 (London: John Murry, 1850), 185-186. A treaty signed on 16 June promised Russia 1,333,334 pounds, sterling, to support a Russian army of 160,000 men. On 24 June, Britain pledged 666,666 pounds to support a Prussian army of 80,000 men. Britain attached liaison officers to each army.

⁵³ Mowat, 275.

⁵⁴ Brett-James, 26.

⁵⁵ Avalon Hill, 31.

⁵⁶ Horne, 336.

⁵⁷ Mowat, 277. Metternich's offer was for Napoleon to withdraw behind France's natural borders and give up France's hold on northern Italy, the German states and the lowland states.

⁵⁸ Brett-James, 26-28.

⁵⁹ Jansson, 6.

⁶⁰ Britt, 7-12,13.

⁶¹ Jansson, 6.

⁶² Avalon Hill, 32.

⁶³ Britt, 7-9.

⁶⁴ Henderson, 118. Schwarzenberg correctly determined that the French center of gravity was Napoleon himself. It was said that

Napoleon's presence on the battlefield was worth 100,000 soldiers!

⁶⁵ Ibid., 152.

⁶⁶ Baron Antoine de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. CPT G.H. Mendell and LT W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), 78-79. Reprinted and ed. Colonel Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvaas (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, n.d.).

⁶⁷ Horne, 337.

⁶⁸ Britt, 7-12.

⁶⁹ Henderson, 114.

⁷⁰ See Task Organization Chart.

⁷¹ Wartenburg, map 100. Note: the remaining allied troops were in garrisons, guarding key locations and laying siege to French detachments east of the Elbe River.

⁷² Britt, 7-17.

⁷³ Ibid., 7-17.

⁷⁴ Avalon Hill, 33.

⁷⁵ Britt, 7-21.

⁷⁶ Count Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as General, vol. II, trans. and ed. Maj Walter H. James (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, Department of History, 1955), 307-309.

⁷⁷ Henderson, 118.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 122.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 122-124.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 129-131. Allied losses were 1,000; French losses included over 18,000 captured.

⁸¹ Britt, 7-18, 19.

⁸² Ibid., 7-20.

⁸³ Henderson, 138.

⁸⁴ Britt, 7-20.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 7-20.

⁸⁶ Henderson, 137, 142.

⁸⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 323-324. All of the marching and counter-marching was attriting all forces. Yorck's corps of the Army of Silesia lost 16,000 of 40,000 troops to fatigue, injury and desertion from the end of the armistice in July through the end of the battle at Leipzig.

⁸⁸ Britt, 7-26, 27.

⁸⁹ Wartenburg, Napoleon As A General, 323, 336.

⁹⁰ Henderson, 158-161.

⁹¹ Brett-James, 107.

⁹² Wartenburg, Napoleon As A General, 344.

⁹³ Jansson, 7-9.

⁹⁴ Henderson, 154.

⁹⁵ Jansson, 14. Apparently, even though they marched to battle together, they had not trained together; when time came to execute, confusion reigned.

⁹⁶ Brett-James, 114.

⁹⁷ Avalon Hill, 42.

⁹⁸ Henderson, 168. Between 1800-2000 pieces of artillery were engaged (Brett-James, 180).

⁹⁹ Henri Lachouque, Napoleon's Battles, A History of His Campaigns, trans. Ron Monkcom (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1967), 372. During the four days of battle, the French alone fired 200,000 cannon-balls (376).

¹⁰⁰ Jansson, 43.

¹⁰¹ Henderson, 172.

¹⁰² Wartenburg, Napoleon As A General, 352-355.

¹⁰³ Britt, 7-29.

¹⁰⁴ Jansson, 38-39.

¹⁰⁵ Henderson, 176.

¹⁰⁶ Jansson, 39.

¹⁰⁷ Henderson, 182. Charges that Bernadotte avoided combat are validated by review of allies' casualty figures after the battle: Prussian-16,033; Russian-22,605; Austrian-14,958; Swedish-169.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 190. This action and lack of an all-out pursuit allowed Napoleon to return to France, raise one more army, fight one more hopeless campaign, and drag out the war another five months. Remember, however, that Napoleon was married to Marie Louise, the daughter of the Emperor of Austria.

¹⁰⁹ Camille Roussit, ed., Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, trans. Stephen Louis Simeon (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892), 74-84. Corps commander, Macdonald, swam the river to safety. On 20 October, he had fewer than 900 men left in his corps.

¹¹⁰ Lachouque, 377.

¹¹¹ Brett-James, 269.

¹¹² Henderson, 186-187. There were over 148,000 casualties during this battle (Brett-James, 237). Contrast this to the greatest American battle at Gettysburg that had about 50,000!

¹¹³ Britt, 7-31.

¹¹⁴ Mowat, 295.

¹¹⁵ Jomini, 112.

¹¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center/Doctrine Division, draft), vii.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., I-1.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., vii. In this paper, the term "allies" is used frequently to refer to coalition partners, not to imply an alliance.

¹¹⁹ Pudas, 45.

¹²⁰ Department of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, Field Manual 100-8 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 24 Nov 97), A0.

¹²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center/Doctrine Division, 1 Feb 95), IV-2.

¹²² Jansson, 6. See also footnote 112.

¹²³ Henderson, 118.

¹²⁴ Clausewitz, 633.

¹²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, II-11.

¹²⁶ Henderson, 161-162. The example given here, Russian Emperor Alexander gave Bernadotte a letter of assurance on 11 October, that he (Bernadotte) would command all operations north of Leipzig. This was not coordinated with either Schwarzenberg, Blucher or Frederick William. pp. 161-162.

¹²⁷ Department of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-7.

¹²⁸ A characteristic called for in: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center/Doctrine Division, 10 Jan 95), III-13.

¹²⁹ Brett-James, 12.

¹³⁰ Britt, 7-18. Attuned to the need for harmony, he held a combined ceremony for the Army of Bohemia on 19 August, and dedicated the colors of an Austrian regiment, presented by the Tsar of Russia's sister.

¹³¹ Brett-James, 80.

¹³² A characteristic called for in Department of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, 1-4, 1-5.

¹³³ Brett-James, 82.

¹³⁴ Britt, 7-20,21.

¹³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center/Doctrine Division, 24 Feb 95), IV-5.

¹³⁶ This concept is described in: CPT John Fenzell III, " Five Imperatives of Coalition Warfare," Special Warfare Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul 93): 4.

¹³⁷ Pudas, 44.

¹³⁸ Britt, 7-9.

¹³⁹ Clausewitz, 631-632.

¹⁴⁰ Many of these professionals knew each other from years of war with or against each other.

¹⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), I-9.

¹⁴² Pudas, 42.

¹⁴³ Department of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, B-1 thru B-3.

¹⁴⁴ Brett-James, 194.

¹⁴⁵ Britt, 7-24. Because Blucher never fully explained Schwarzenberg's strategy to his corps commanders, Yorck and Langeron eventually began to resist orders forcing them to march and countermarch. In reality, this was to part of the strategy to threaten Napoleon but avoid decisive combat with him.

¹⁴⁶ Pudas, 42. Concept discussed therein.

¹⁴⁷ Trust and confidence are recognized in: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), I-9.

¹⁴⁸ Department of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations, 1-4.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 1-6, 1-7.

¹⁵⁰ Ideas expressed in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, III-1, III-2.

¹⁵¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, IV-1.

¹⁵² Pudas, 45.

¹⁵³ Horne, 331.

¹⁵⁴ Pudas, 42.

¹⁵⁵ Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 Jun 93), 2-6.

¹⁵⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, III-14.

¹⁵⁷ Brett-James, 221.

¹⁵⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, I-8, 9.

¹⁵⁹ Department of the Army, The Army in Multinational Operations,
1-5.

Allied Task Organization




Chart 1

TABLE 1: NATIONAL INTERESTS - LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

- AUSTRIA:**
- 1) Destruction of the French Empire (but not necessarily removal of Napoleon) (note 1)
 - 2) Austrian hegemony over areas of Poland, Northern Italy, and the Balkans
 - 3) Containment of Russia
 - 4) Lack of Unity among German states and Prussia
 - 5) Stability among lower classes and ethnic populations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
- RUSSIA:**
- 1) Acceptance by Western Europe
 - 2) Hegemony in Eastern Europe (Poland and Balkans)
 - 3) Removal of Napoleon
- PRUSSIA:**
- 1) Revenge for past defeats and subjugation by Napoleon (removal of Napoleon)
 - 2) Containment of Russian and Austrian expansion
 - 3) Recovery of Polish territories
 - 4) Establishment of a greater union of Germanic people
note 2)

TABLE 1: NATIONAL INTERESTS - LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN (Cont'd)

GREAT BRITAIN:

- 1) Freedom of trade
- 2) A vast overseas empire
- 3) Hegemony in Holland/Belgium
- 4) Removal of Napoleon
- 5) Balance of power on the continent (stability)
- 6) A peaceful France within her natural boundaries

SWEDEN:

- 1) Return of Swedish Pomerania
- 2) Acquisition of Norway (and Guadeloupe Island)
- 3) Adequate military power to retain the monarchy
(Bernadotte)

Note 1: Napoleon was Emperor Francis' son in law

Note 2: This was a period of rising German nationalism and patriotism. Unfortunately, many German states such as Saxony stayed loyal to Napoleon, and this was a good excuse for the major powers during the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to postpone dreams of German unity for many years to come.

TABLE 2: COALITION WARFARE CONCEPTS

<u>CONCEPT</u>	<u>STRATEGIC</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>	<u>TACTICAL</u>
<u>Coalition Goals</u>			
Unity of Purpose	X		
Unity of Effort		X	X
End State	X	X	
Minimize Risk	X	X	
<u>Coalition Command</u>			
Clearly Defined and Empowered Warfighting Structure	X	X	X
Political Sensitivity and Peer Leadership Ability	X	X	
Patience	X	X	X
Single Echelon Command	X	X	
Integration	X	X	X
Synchronize Elements	X	X	X
Information Exchange	X	X	X

TABLE 2: COALITION WARFARE CONCEPTS (Cont'd)

<u>CONCEPT</u>	<u>STRATEGIC</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>	<u>TACTICAL</u>
<u>Vulnerabilities</u>			
Protect Coalition Center of Gravity	X	X	
Mutual Confidence		X	X
Shared Burden and Risk	X	X	X
Meaningful Participation	X	X	
Interoperability		X	X
<u>Skills</u>			
Simple Plans	X	X	X
Training (and Common Doctrine)		X	X
Rapport		X	X
Respect		X	X
Focus on Commonalties			X

TABLE 3: LISTING OF IMPORTANT EVENTS

1812

22 June 1812 Napoleon begins the invasion of Russia

15 September Napoleon enters Moscow

24 October Napoleon begins retreat from Moscow

5 December Napoleon abandons army to return to Paris

1813

January 1813 Napoleon orders Davout to occupy Swedish Pomerania

27 February Treaty of Kalisch: Russia and Prussia vs. France

2 May Battle of Lutzen

21 May Battle of Bautzen

10 Jun-10 Aug Armistice of Pleiswitz

16 June Treaty: Britain pledged 1,133,334 pounds
sterling to support a Russian army of 160,000

24 June Treaty: Britain pledged 666,666 pounds
sterling to support a Prussian army of 80,000

27 June Reichenbach Convention: Austria pledged to join
allied coalition if Napoleon failed to agree to
peace terms by 20 July

29 June Armistice of Pleiswitz extended to 10 August


9 July Trachenberg Protocol: strategy agreement among
Russia, Prussia and Sweden

TABLE 3: LISTING OF IMPORTANT EVENTS (Cont'd)

19 July	Reichenbach strategy agreement: Trachenberg protocol with Austrian amendments to avoid decisive battle, harass communications, wear the French down
6 August	Schwarzenberg appointed allied supreme commander
8 August	Metternich presented allied ultimatum to France (Blucher began movement violating the armistice)
11 August	Austria declared war on France (received on 12th)
23 August	Battle of Gross Beeren-Ouidinot defeated by Bernadotte
23-27 August	Battle of Dresden-Napoleon defeated Army of Bohemia
26 August	Battle of Katzbach-Blucher defeats Macdonald
30 August	Battle of Kulm-Vandamme's French I Corps destroyed
6 September	Battle of Dennewitz-Bernadotte defeated Ney
16-19 October	Battle of Leipzig


1815


9 March	Treaty of Chaumont signed by Austria, Prussia, England and Russia (no separate peace)
4 April	Napoleon abdicated



All maps from :
Atlas to Accompany Napoleon
as General by Count Yorck
 von Wartenburg. Prepared by
 the Department of Military Art
 and Engineering, United States
 Military Academy, West Point,
 N. Y., 1942.


GENERAL MAP
 EUROPE IN 1795
 SCALE OF MILES






LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Situation 26 August, 1813




102



LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
 Pursuit After Battle of Dresden, and Situation
 Afternoon of 30 August, 1813, During Battle of
 Kulm


SCALE OF MILES



NOTE: The line Napoleon's army occupied the situation of the Prussian army at the battle of Leipzig is shown by the dotted line. The line of the Prussian army at the battle of Leipzig is shown by the solid line.





LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN


Situation Evening of 30 August, 1813, After
Vondamme's Defeat at Kulm



Magdeburg (18000) in vicinity of Dömitz.

Hamburg (18000) in vicinity of Hamburg.






LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN


Situation 13 October, 1813, and Concentrations Prior to the Battle of Leipzig





LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF LEIPZIG
 Situation Early Afternoon of 16 October, 1813,
 Just Prior to Napoleon's Counterattack

SCALE OF MILES



LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF LEIPZIG
 Situation Morning of 18 October, 1813, and
 Allied Advance Prior to Dark.

SCALE OF MILES

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