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**NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY - HEADING THE RIGHT WAY?**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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- HEADING THE RIGHT WAY?

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ABSTRACT

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Termination of the Cold War faced Norway with a choice of way for her security policy. Her particular geo-strategic location implies that she - unlike her Allies - still have to consider that a regional conflict may affect her own territory. As NATO initiatives call for shift to flexible, multinational efforts, this leaves Norway with the dilemma of how to balance participation in new Alliance endeavors with traditional national defense exertion. Current development of the armed forces advises continued strong emphasis on the latter. Consequently, as a minor contributor to multinational military structures, Norway experiences decreased attention and influence in international cooperation vital to her own security. This study suggests that the military alterations made so far, as well as those officially proposed for 1999 - 2018, this way fail to adequately support future policy. Retaining main effort to territorial defense will increasingly prove counter productive to a well meant intention; a shift to international participation as main effort is urgent. Subsequently, the study identifies four basic requirements to a force structure that will support this. Based on these requirements, it proposes transition to a three tier force structure comprising Territorial Guard -, National Defense - and Multinational Employment Forces.

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NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

- HEADING THE RIGHT WAY ?

WAYS AND MEANS - THE EVOLUTION OF NORWEGIAN SECURITY

Time for change - again

Pursuit of national security requires consistent cohesion between the chosen political ways and the means to support them. The means embodies the ways. To most nations, the military represent the predominant security means. When altered surroundings call for shift of ways, the military tools must change accordingly. If the military means fails to support the desired policy, realities make the means drive the ways - not contrary, as intended.

Norway has on three occasions this century had to make principal choices of ways and means. Two of them worked well; one led to disaster. They were all affiliated with major international events influencing Norway's strategic posture.

The termination of the Cold War represented the *fourth* significant shift of international framework affecting Norwegian grand strategy. This paper suggests that though alterations of the military structure have been made during the 1990's, neither these, nor the proposed development for the next two decades

imply any principal change of Norwegian military means. It propounds that this solution may be feasible for the current transition period, but endangers cleavage between means and ways beyond the turn of the century.

Through discussion of the *present* and *proposed* future force structures, the paper displays that evolution of the armed forces is ensnared in a Cold War paradigm. Subsequently, it advises an *alternative configuration* of the armed forces, better suited to promote future ways to national security.

Security choices in the Twentieth Century - success and failure

Prior to disintegration of the Swedish - Norwegian Union in 1905, Norway chose the way of neutrality supported by comparatively capable armed forces¹. At the time, armed conflict with Sweden was imminent. The credible military deterrence proved sufficient to ensure peaceful cessation of the Union. A decade later, the still in place ways and means of armed neutrality also contributed decisively to keep the Norway out of World War I². During the inter-war period, however, Norwegian authorities chose to maintain the way of neutrality, but dismantled the military in the belief that political means were sufficient³. The German attack in 1940 and ensuing occupation was the disastrous result of this disconnection between well-intended ways and totally inadequate means⁴. By way of costly

experience, Norway post WW II chose to abandon neutrality and radically shift policy to firm alliance integration in NATO. This time, the way was again coherently supported by the means. Sincere adherence to the military cooperation of the Alliance and creation of considerable national military structures, was a radical change from the inter-war years.

Examination of these three notably different epochs of security postures, suggests that the chosen ways (neutrality / neutrality / alliance alignment) presumably were the best ones on all occasions. Concurrently, the cases strikingly demonstrate the urgency to support these ways with coherent, appropriate means.

Since joining NATO in 1949, Norway has experienced broad national consensus on both security policy (ways) and defense issues (means). However, this stable post WW II situation has also deprived two generations of politicians and military leaders of the need to consider other options than the one focused on a present, tangible threat. As a result, the post Cold War debate on Norwegian security issues appears to be stuck on the tracks of this period. Transition from a "digital" strategic thinking, where the nation faced either peace or an absolute war, to a "multiple choice" appreciation of military means that can handle a variable specter of security challenges, is hard but imperative.

SECURITY ISSUES INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The particular challenge

Today Norway enjoys a positive security environment, but an underlying uncertainty for the future remains. Armed conflict between major powers in Europe is at present a non-existent option, but new conflict dimensions have emerged. The Balkan situation signifies how ethnic, religious and historic differences can turn to conflicts in the absence of stability⁵. Current Norwegian security policy⁶ calls for concern both towards her immediate vicinity⁷, and for influence on international processes indirectly affecting Norwegian security.

Russia's geographical proximity and status as a major world power is still a considerable anxiety. The relative value of the Kola peninsula-based Russian Northern Fleet, especially the strategic submarines, is increasing as result of reduction in land-based strategic systems pursuant to the implementation of the START agreement. The gravity of this situation is further increased by this base complex now being the only remaining Russian major access to ice-free blue waters in the Western hemisphere. This development occurs parallel to significant general reductions of Russia's conventional forces, which leaves reliance on credible nuclear capability⁸ the far predominant military tool to back her fundamental political aspiration to

remain a major world power. Ongoing projects to commission next generation strategic submarines, built and based in the same area, tangibly illustrates this evolution. In this total perspective, Kola will be of strongly *increased* strategic importance to Russia. Militarily, it is about to become her strategic center of gravity. Realization of the huge environmental challenges⁹ in the same area also adds new dimensions to Norwegian security concerns for the region.

Stability in this area is vital to Norway, and she pursues an active role in institutions¹⁰ promoting this. In spite of mainly positive development of Russian affairs over the last decade, certainty of favorable evolution can not be taken for granted. Any change of regime in Moscow can create undesirable ripple effects affecting Norway.

Consequently, it is of decisive importance to *keep her NATO allies focused on her situation.*

Future Security Framework

Contrary to predictions just five years ago, NATO remains the unmatched cornerstone of European security structure. The Alliance has adapted rationally to the dramatic changes in Europe. Further adjustments are imminent. The flexible and mobile force concept is well suited to react to new challenges. Norway is modestly represented in the immediate reaction force

structure¹¹, but still maintains emphasis on her *national defense forces*¹² and is so far absent from the most important new formations of the rapid reaction forces¹³. At present she is integrated in the command structure through AFNORTHWEST¹⁴. As NATO is changing and American presence in Europe is decreasing, it is of utmost importance for Norway to maintain and further develop bilateral relations with the United States. The increased Russian military importance of areas adjacent to Norwegian territory is predominantly a matter of concern for the US, as it represents a potential future challenge to the overall strategic balance between two major world powers. Additionally, Norway's geo-strategic position remains crucial to trans Atlantic links of vital importance to the USA in any conflict contingency on the Eurasian continent.

The EU countries have agreed to establish a closer cooperation on foreign and defense policy questions¹⁵. The Western European Union is the core of the emerging European defense identity and the European pillar of NATO. Norwegian non-membership of the EU, merely an associate membership of the WEU and reduced NATO attention to the northern region, implies that her potential for influence on own security is rapidly diminishing. This unequivocally indicates that NATO and bilateral relationship with the USA must be given main attention in future security policy matters for Norway. Fortunately in

this respect, recent development (e.g. NATO success in Former Yugoslavia) propounds that trans Atlantic security cooperation is reaffirmed as the only really credible instrument to handle European and Eurasian security concerns. The shift towards focusing EU and WEU as important security means just a couple of years ago, has been alleviated by renewed attention to the tangible instruments of NATO.

A core of this matter is that the *strength of NATO as a political tool rests upon its military credibility*. Officially, Norway has endorsed the proposed enlargement of the Alliance. However, her military leadership¹⁶ has strongly opposed this, based on the view that any expansion inadvertently will weaken the military strength of the Alliance, and subsequently decrease its political vigor¹⁷. This stance is of course deep-seated in the continued Norwegian dependency on NATO Article V¹⁸ assurance, which to most other members today represents a contingency of the past

Norway actively supports the Partnership for Peace¹⁹ program. In line with the military's view on NATO enlargement, their perception is also that Norwegian interests would be better served by enhanced PfP cooperation than Alliance expansion. Foremost because PfP includes Russia, while the enlargement excludes and unfavorably strengthens the historic East-West antagonism. This is especially important to Norway,

since it is vital that her relationship to Russia does not become a bilateral issue between a major power and a small neighbor. The PfP program is a functional means to keep this relation an integral part of Russia's conjoint associations with Western Europe and NATO.

Adding to this expanding European security network, is rapidly increasing inter Nordic security and defense cooperation. Changed parameters for Swedish and Finnish security policies²⁰ have made them far more involved in all European security collaboration. Following this, a Nordic initiative²¹ is taken to establish a framework for integrated participation in multinational peace operations. This enterprise will likely serve as a vehicle for enhanced efforts on other defense related areas in the future.

A quest for the right balance

Subsequent this general picture, Norway will at least for the two first decades of next century be left with the dilemma: How balance national strategy²² efforts between perceptible contributions to international security initiatives and own territorial security? What makes this especially intriguing, is that both issues are mutually dependent on each other. It is not a question of either/or, but of deciding where to put main effort in order to achieve the overarching end of national

security. All instruments of power²³ will increasingly be affected by this predominant security challenge.

Most substantially it implies *choosing direction for the Norwegian military establishment*. This is obviously a political decision to make, but professional military guidance is an indispensable perquisite to select a workable direction. Point being; it is not achievable to develop a force structure that provides main effort in both directions. The military leadership must advice how the different ways can be supported by military means.

The geo-strategic situation does not invite responsible Norwegian authorities to make hasty changes of the defense posture.

On the other hand, when parameters are changing radically, it is time to ask if it is sufficient to "rearrange the deck chairs when you really need a new ship"?

PRESENT DEFENSE MEANS - SUPPORT OF A WELL KNOWN WAY

Current structure of the Armed Forces

By 1998 the basic foundation of Norwegian Armed Forces remains consistent with the structure developed through the initial years of the Cold War. Extensive national expenditure²⁴ has over the years been utilized to build a traditional military

organization consisting of three primary services and a Home Guard. The cornerstone has been to maintain and develop a strong - relative to the population - national force, linked to firm integration into the NATO command and control system and comprehensive military cooperation with Allies. General conscription has provided the personnel base. Overall ambition has been *invasion denial* by credible military deterrence. These fundamentals remain valid today. However, following reduced budgets the defense structure has over the last five years undergone significant reductions in all services. Subsequently the anti invasion ambition now applies to only one region of the country at the time, currently Northern Norway²⁵.

The Army has been hardest hit, resulting in a draw down of the wartime structure from 13 to 6 brigades. During the same period though, rearrangements has increased the relative combat power of the remainder of the fighting force. Main element of this is a new cost effective division structure in Northern Norway. This reconstruction²⁶, however has been done without notable major equipment acquisitions, and Army weaponry is aging. A larger part of the inventory is late 60s, early 70s vintage. Increased procurements is urgent to make this new structure work as intended.

The Navy is enduring reductions of peacetime organization, but generally maintains its main war time structure. Half of the

submarine fleet is recently replaced by new state of the art inventory, and the mine / counter mine capacity is significantly increased by new hi tech vessels and equipment. New light missile torpedo boats are budgeted and projected. This suggests that the capability to control the crucial SLOC²⁷ along the Norwegian coast by active and passive means will be maintained. The ability to protect blue water SLOCs in to the country through international and extended territorial waters, is however marginal. A handful of aged frigates²⁸ and coast guard vessels with limited combat capability are utterly insufficient tools for this vital task. The Navy's overall contribution to the anti invasion defense is reduced²⁹.

In Norway, coast guard tasks are also performed by the Armed Forces. Modernized vessels, maritime aircraft and helicopters make the capacity to enforce sovereignty in territorial waters and authority in fishery/economical zones satisfactory.

As the Navy, the Air Force also endures peacetime organization draw-downs, while sustaining key war time mission and structure. The F-16 fighter squadrons remain the core of the force. An ongoing mid life update program will secure combat endurance for twenty more years. In support of the anti invasion concept, the fighter fleet is numerically marginal to deny enemy air control by defensive counter air operations. Allied

augmentation is crucial. Ground to air missile capacity is satisfactory. Offensive counter air operations is hardly a relevant ambition for the national forces alone, but there is a continuous effort to train this alongside Allies. A major present deficiency, is the lack of means to fly air to surface missions. Air transportation assets, fixed and rotary wing, as well as maritime air, remain in almost same numbers as over the last twenty years. Modernization programs provide an inventory of fairly good condition.

The Home Guard comprises some 80,000 personnel. Primary missions remain protection of main force mobilization, and in place defense of vital infrastructure and institutions. Equipment is simple, but by keeping their personal weapons at home, the Home Guardsmen still portray a certain "minuteman" threshold to counter surprise actions against key elements of the society.

Revised doctrines

Changes in operational and tactical doctrines are being implemented in all services. Main effort is a shift from GDP³⁰ based attrition warfare to flexible, mission oriented, maneuver warfare³¹. For the Navy, and especially for the Air Force, this transition is predominantly a matter of changing the mindset and adapt to new concepts. These services have by nature an

inventory, and to a certain extent a culture, that facilitates such change. For the Army the distance between ideas and implementation is much longer. The inherited culture from 2-3 generations of officers trained to do thorough deliberate planning focused on fires and terrain, is hard to eliminate. But most importantly, the equipment base has over the years been procured to enforce a strong defensive. Adequate means that favor speed and maneuverability are not at hand in the present Army structure.

Alterations, but no real change

This depicts an overall picture of an Army cut by almost 50%, flanked by somewhat reduced maritime and air capacities. Peacetime consequences of these changes have been highly visible through the last five years. Most Norwegian military personnel have in one way or another been affected, and several local communities have been faced by profound challenges following base reductions. The public, politicians included, is left with the impression of a fundamentally transformed military establishment. This is however a *false conception*. Neither the structural alterations nor introduction of fresh doctrines imply any fundamental change in defense policy or general operational concept - military strategy. It is merely a structural adjustment - "a rearrangement of the deck chairs" - to meet

reduced resources³². The all in all concept for deterrence, crises management or war fighting is supposed to be carried out in a traditional pattern, but with reduced means and thus in a more limited scope of time and space. Bearing in mind that the background studies³³ for this reorganization were initiated before the fall of the Berlin Wall and completed during the very early stages of transition from the Cold War, it is fully understandable that the outcome did not represent any major shift of strategic thinking. For continued security policy reasons, determination to maintain war-fighting capability for high intensity conflict on own territory³⁴ - anti invasion - still make sense. An anti invasion capacity comprising only one part of the country, however, does not. A nation state either has an anti invasion ambition, or it has not. The present structure has left southern parts of the country, where the population centers and economic resources are located, with practically no national land forces less Home Guard. Consequently, at present there is a major disconnection between ends, ways and means in Norwegian security policy.

DEFENSE STRUCTURE TOWARDS 2018 - STEADY COURSE

The 1996 Defense Study

The 1991 Defense Study was recently succeeded by a new study³⁵. Given a clearer picture of future European security issues in general, and challenges in the northern region in particular, this was expected to suggest a more mature connection between ends, ways and means. To those who anticipated the upcoming of major structural change of the armed forces in order to adapt to a post-post Cold War era, the Study was a disappointment. The Study advises a steady extension of the lines from previous studies and political decisions³⁶. There is good reason to question if this is the only, or even the most rational way to meet future challenges.

The 1996 defense study is a recommendation to political authorities of how best to balance military structure evolution to anticipated resources. It is a major contribution to the government's proposal for a 1999-2002 long-term defense plan³⁷, to be decided by the parliament late 1998. To facilitate this purpose, the study has focused beyond that time window, aiming at a recommended general defense structure for 2018 and a specific force goal for 2006. Three levels of possible economic development are discussed, with emphasis on a predicted level slightly below recent budgets³⁸. The 2006 goal is on the hardware

side by large constrained to existing inventory and contracts already signed. The 2018 perspective was implemented to identify predominant trends of future security issues and technological development. Lifetime expectancy for some crucial weapon systems implies that important decisions on future acquisitions will have to be made just beyond the turn of the century. This makes the 2018 perspective important already by now.

Proposed Defense Structure towards 2006 and 2018

The 96 Study states that national defense strategy will be based on continued NATO commitments, but also take into consideration the possibility of unexpected security policy development. National requirements will anyway remain basis for the defense structure, though certain means for participation in international operations should be integrated in the national defense organization³⁹. The proposed 2006 force goal delineates Army and Navy structures in line with present organizations, based on the 1993 Parliament decision. Particular elements of hi tech weaponry are suggested to enhance combat capabilities meeting potential threat development. Major investments in this period will be directed to the armor structure of the Army, and to new frigates in the Navy. For the Air Force the 2006 goal outlines a hi tech fighter aircraft force, as well as state of the art land based air defense, although the total fighter force

will see a slight decrease in numbers. The study does not propose any significant changes to the Home Guard missions or organization. Continued implementation of maneuver warfare doctrines, as well as improvement of joint C2 structures both technically and organizationally are urged. Continued conscription versus transition to a professional force is an important issue addressed by the Study. Consequent the small population and the ambition to persevere a force size not very different from today, it does however not find any alternative to the draft.

The 2018 perspective is portrayed as a linear extrapolation from the present structure through the 2006 force goals. The basic army configuration - with relevant technological and organizational adjustments - will remain. Increased strategic mobility for certain formations will be required, and c2 structure must meet information technology innovation. Also the navy and the air force are pictured as technologically improved extensions of their present and their 2006 structures, with some minor numerical reductions.

Two time perspectives - right way for both ?

This study is a proposal, not a decision. However, the CHOD⁴⁰ Defense Studies over the years have had crucial impact on the outcome of subsequent political decision making. Political

processing rarely questions the general concepts, but merely discusses economic consequences and usually ends up reducing the budgets while maintaining the objectives and missions.

Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the Norwegian "Next Forces" will be structured, with some adjustments, along the lines of the 96 Defense Study. Critics of the study highlight that a linear extension of structures developed to counter Cold War threats at least is not the only possible way ahead. They call for more innovative ideas to deal with changed surroundings, reduced resources and different means available.

In this discussion, three points should however be noted: First, evolution of defense structures must be consistent over time, since both equipment acquisition and personnel training programs by nature are long term processes. In this case, inherited hardware, ongoing investment programs and signed contracts by large commit the Armed Forces through the next long term planning period 99 - 02⁴¹. Second, military potential should not be solely judged from organization charts and inventory status. Successful implementation of new maneuver oriented operational and tactical doctrines will enhance operational flexibility and tactical efficiency significantly. Third, it is reasonable to believe that the conservative development this Study suggests, will contribute to the overall objective of stability in the Nordic region. These points are valid through the first section

of the Study's perspective. A 2006 force goal based on ongoing organizational and doctrinal restructuring will provide a sensible and necessary consolidation period. After all, 99-06 is a shorter interval than between the Gulf War and today.

For the 2018 perspective, on the other hand, it is relevant to ask whether it is wise to continue "rearranging the deck chairs". Obviously, observance of own territorial virtues will continue to be fundamental to Norwegian ways and means as long as Russia's main element of national power is her naval nuclear inventory. Subsequently - contrary to all present and likely new Allies - Norway also in 2018 and beyond, still have to handle a *balance* between sufficient attention to self defense and participation on the international arena with security partners. A four million person nation will neither have the personnel nor the economy to completely fulfill both these tasks. However, main effort has to be given to one of them, which consequently implies taking risks in the other. The way embodied by the present as well as the proposed defense *means*, demonstrates a strong main effort to defense of own territory at the expense of multinational commitments⁴². The risk accepted by this, however, is to be marginalized in security partnerships that are crucially vital to Norwegian national security interests. Signs of this effect are already visible in current Alliance

cooperation. This might in the long run be a very dangerous development, counter productive to a well meant intention.

TIME TO CHANGE MAIN EFFORT

Reasons for change

The nation clearly *has to choose* between two different strategic ways beyond the turn of the century. One alternative is to pursue a national territorial defense force as the main effort. The other is shifting thrust to participation in multinational arrangements aimed at favorable development outside the country. It is imperative to observe that "main effort" implies that both ways also will have to include considerable elements of the other. Each way however, requires different sets of military *means* - different force structures. The way to choose, must be the one that overall best supports fundamental national ends of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The 1996 Study has chosen the first alternative way for both the 2006 and 2018 perspectives without discussing other "courses of action"⁴³. Again, this may be a sensible - and inevitable - bearing towards the 2006 goal. But in the 2018 perspective there is every reason to question the validity of conserving this direction.

As by the three previous crossroads of this century, the most decisive issues concerning national security will also in future be determined outside the country. Consequently, presence of adequate Norwegian means on these arenas will provide greater influence on domestic security matters than traditional concentration at home. Two main arguments support this.

First, Norway - even as a small state - can really make a difference in a coalition effort to solve a problem at hand, if able to provide specially needed tools. Such participation may be important to national interests for reasons of international stability in general, e.g. presently the Balkans⁴⁴ and Lebanon⁴⁵, or may even function as an "advance guard" in a conflict in Norway's own proximity - for example in the Baltic region.

Second - and far most important; active, relevant and visible participation in coalition efforts abroad will serve fundamental national interests by providing support to the same partners Norway herself is vitally dependent on for own security. At the 2018 milestone, the armed forces of those partners will be led by a generation of leaders who have only historical appreciation of the engagement their Cold War predecessors put into intimate military cooperation for defense of what used to be NATO's vital Northern flank. They will judge their partners by the contribution and support they experience in contemporary contingencies. Just as mutual knowledge,

confidence and friendship were developed through extensive NATO teamwork of the past, similar relationships will be built within future Alliance activities. Presence at all levels of these activities is therefore crucial. This is also a vital precondition to acquire positions of influence. In future as in the past; insignificant contributors will get insignificant influence. As attention to the northern region diminishes, it will be increasingly important to Norway to pursue new ways of cogent participation. The only workable way to achieve this is to share burdens with partners elsewhere in an active and convincing manner. The Norwegians must accept to put their personnel in harm's way on other arenas, if they expect that others should do the same for them.

Consequently, this calls for a shift of balance towards significantly increased out of territory participation, - an altered way that requires different means. An objective approach to some of the inherited fundamentals of Norwegian defense culture is necessary to meet this goal.

BEYOND 2006 - OTHER MEANS FOR A DIFFERENT WAY

Main effort to international commitments

The imminent challenge then, is to suggest a force concept that inside anticipated budgets will shift the overall main effort to *whole-hearted participation in multinational training and operations, while maintaining a reduced but sufficient national deterrence*. This can not be achieved by simply increasing the present number of units for multinational missions at the expense of the anti invasion force structure. That would leave the nation with a non-credible protection of the territory and offer irrelevant contributions to the international community.

A sketch of *four major requirements* to a structure that would support this alternative way may provide some ideas for a feasible concept to be developed in the 2006 - 2018 time frame.

First requirement - a tripwire effect

A consequence of neighboring a major power nation, strongly enhanced by being located next to its military geo-strategic center of gravity, is the exigency to have a military "alarm system" in effect at all times. This must in addition to give warning, include assets that throughout the territory instantly will legitimate any military violation as a hostile act

according to international law - a tripwire effect. Such threshold capacity does not need to be capable to engage in counter actions of any magnitude, but must be sufficient to make any aggressor aware of the inevitable legal as well as the military consequences. This capacity must be carefully linked to subsequent escalation of national and multinational military means. A number of traditional peace time functions also adhere to this requirement, such as border control, air- and sea space presence and surveillance as well as others. The key to avoid a fait a compli situation in any part of the country remains with this requirement.

Second requirement - immediate protection

Closely related to the tripwire effect is the need for immediate protection of indispensable elements of the society. Traditionally this has referred to vital institutions and key infrastructure. In future, this will additionally comprise other objects, systems and organizations than today. Increased attention must be given to information systems vital to all functions of society, locally, nationally and internationally. It will be equally important to safeguard the computer systems that controls the flow of gas in pipelines on the ocean floor from hostile hackers, as it will be to guard the gas production installations with traditional military tools. Significantly

increased attention has also to be given to possible military consequences of environmental threats, predominantly from nuclear waste and unreliable civilian and military structures in Russia, but also related to Norway's off shore industry and frequent natural disasters. A very different aspect is protection of cultural icons of crucial value to national sentiment. Such intangible values have been given little or no attention in Norwegian defense planning to date, but will in time of crises represent significant symbolic importance⁴⁶.

Third requirement - decisive defense of national integrity

The ambition of meeting violation of national integrity with decisive counter measures will have to remain cornerstone in Norwegian defense posture also the next couple of decades. In essence, this constitutes a continued anti invasion requirement. This can however *only be acquired by an Alliance or coalition effort*. As Norway reduces her own forces, dependency on foreign assistance increases. Prerequisites to achieve such support, and subsequently to meet this third requirement, are twofold. First, Norway must herself contribute forces as substantial as can be reasonably expected to the united effort. Second, she must facilitate reception and support of partner forces convincingly. As for the latter, Norway has a well-reputed host nation tradition that should be reinforced. Concerning force

contribution, expectation will be that national force ratio compared to population exceeds any other in the coalition. Urge for quantity must however not lead to deterioration of quality. When fighting alongside Allied information age "Force XXI" type formations⁴⁷, it is imperative that national forces emerge as genuine enhancement of the mutual effort and not embodies the weakest link of the chain that hampers operational efficiency. In a four million population nation, such forces have to be call up formations. It is of course desirable that the numbers of national formations are as high as possible, but such desire will easily deteriorate true capability. Realizing that Norway never will have the base for a mass force, it is not a crucial factor whether she can raise ten or seven brigades. The reality that mass is a quality in itself must be met by the united coalition effort. National forces must offer capabilities that not, or barely, can be provided by foreign partners; proficiency must be predominant to mass.

The shift of doctrines to mission oriented, maneuver warfare is a good conceptual starting point for development in this direction. A tangible further step should be to define an "area of excellence" where national formations can provide unique proficiency. The Northern Theater presents a challenging topographic and climatic environment both at sea, in air and on land. An obvious potential "area of excellence" is to master

this environment superior to any partner - or adversary. This implies enhanced capability to fight under climatic conditions where others strive to survive, as well as operational superiority in utilizing the topographic features of the region. The Norwegians have a rich cultural and military tradition in this area rooted in natural necessities, but these virtues are today somewhat overshadowed by the urge to keep up with international technological and cultural trends - both within the armed forces and in society at large. Operational and technological innovation in this niche should be a conscious exertion aimed at excellence, in order to make Norway contribute forces that can make a difference in defense of her territory. The deterrence effect will improve accordingly.

Fourth requirement - multinational participation

Forces for international contingencies will be the core of military means to support a more relevant security policy. Development of such assets must however not unacceptably jeopardize the domestic anti invasion ambition, and must be intimately connected to creation of more adequate forces for territorial defense. These forces must therefore also possess roles in the national war structure. For professional as well as constitutional reasons, they must be manned with full time personnel, qualified for their actual multinational echelon. As

today, future multinational forces will constitute several levels of readiness, as e.g. immediate, rapid reaction or augmentation forces. To achieve the desired effect by influence, Norway should aspire to offer relevant forces to all levels. Most importantly they must be committed to formations where they get training opportunities with partners linked to own area contingency plans. Consequent their national defense roles, war fighting must be their ultimate proficiency ambition. Their multinational roles may though require emphasis on training for peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions. The Norwegian military establishment has rich traditions for all these levels of conflict handling, which should be nourished by future professional forces.

The share of forces Norway can provide to multinational formations will for obvious reasons have to be limited. Parallel to the national defense forces, this calls for pursuit of an "area of excellence". The goal should be to make Norwegian contributions *special force multipliers*, rather than merely force augmentations. There are two good reasons to make superiority in mastering extreme Nordic natural environment such an area also for these forces. First, most potential future conflict regions⁴⁸ include geographic characteristics reassembling the northern region. This suggests that forces developed and trained for such environment will constitute much-

needed tools in these theaters. Second a common main effort for both professional and call-up forces will provide a synergetic economic and professional effect by rationalizing doctrine, education, training and equipment.

Consequently, a 2020 vision for Norwegian international employment forces should be that they *spearhead international competencies in their area of excellence*⁴⁹. A well-marketed vision for these forces is of utmost importance to enhance the desired political effects of having them. Primarily to visualize to the international community that these assets with desirable competencies exist. Secondly, to enforce the self-esteem and drive towards excellence for the forces themselves⁵⁰. As "role models" for their parallels in the national call up forces, they will also constitute vehicles for operational and technological innovation for the total national defense force.

HOW TO GENERATE A RELEVANT FORCE STRUCTURE

Approach to a three-tier force structure

The four discussed requirements are mutually dependent, and constitute a holistic strategic idea with main effort to quality participation in multinational initiatives. To generate appropriate means for this, a radical approach is needed. An unbiased attitude towards present institutional restraints is

necessary. A major issue will be the general conscription. The dogma of this as an untouchable foundation must be reviewed, however attention must also be given to political realities and Norwegian military tradition. The discussed requirements do not call for abandoning conscription, but for substantial revision.

Transition to a *three-tier* force structure; comprising *Territorial guard forces*, *National defense forces* and *Multinational employment forces* - with deliberate resource priority to the latter - will be a good way to support this strategic idea.

Territorial guard forces

This tier of forces should be developed to meet the two first requirements; the tripwire effect and means for immediate protection. They will comprise the most extensive variety of sub functions. Tasks presently performed by the Home Guard will predominantly adhere to this category. However many missions traditionally associated with the three main services will qua their functional area also belong to this tier. Static defense assets⁵¹ as well as police-like guard functions⁵² - full or part time - are some examples. Generally, all military tasks connected to national territory that are not comprised by one of the two other "purified" tiers of forces will cohere to the *Territorial guard forces*. A broad specter of inventory and

competencies are required. These forces will naturally be divided into one active and one call-up part. The active functions must be highly professional. The call-up categories⁵³ on the other hand will need modest tactical skills, but have extensive demand for manpower with specialized competencies. Training for those must be focused purely on designated tasks, and only limited - but sufficient - general military training can be offered⁵⁴. They must be designed and equipped for their specified mission, which in many cases most rationally will be to earmark personnel handling key objects of the society on daily basis. Their primary "personal weapon" may well be a crises management software program rather than a rifle.

National defense forces

This tier will aggregate Norwegian war fighting capability, together with the Multinational employment forces. To facilitate main effort to multinational participation, they will however have to face reduced resources compared to present concept. By way of example; if the Army trains one combined arms formation - preferably brigade size - of conscripts⁵⁵ a year, this personnel should face a twelve year potential call up period and preferably receive one short mid term refresher training call-up⁵⁶. Reliability of this concept requires enhanced simulation training of command functions, which for key officers of all sub

units should be carried out annually. The Navy would have to find similar ways to maintain its part of the National defense forces, keeping costs down while retaining sufficient combat potential. The Air Force, as a professional service, should principally generate its war fighting capability as Multinational employment forces.

Multinational employment forces

This will be main effort of a chanced concept. To achieve the desired effect, it is important that all services and branches are shareholders in this common effort. Experiences from current multinational structures indicate that formations commanded by a one-star General officer or higher are necessary to obtain influence. For the Army this should achievable comprise an entire brigade size formation with separable elements of all branches. The Navy should provide a broad formation of fleet and coastal defense assets relevant for multinational employment. The entire Air Force structure should be internationally deployable in adequate packages, given a necessary redesign that transfer present peacetime functions to the Territorial guard forces.

Manpower

This three-tier structure calls for a three-tier manning. For two reasons, general conscription must be retained as recruitment base, but in an altered fashion than the present. First, as long as a territorial defense posture must be maintained, the limited populace does simply not offer sufficient potential to pursue an all voluntary structure⁵⁷. Second, conscription constitute a certain nation building effect that remains valid for an exposed state, but more tangibly it introduces the youth to prolonged military opportunities necessary to make the three-tier force concept work: "Everybody"⁵⁸ will have to endure a short⁵⁹ but intensive general boot camp type basic training. With added training on assigned task, this will qualify for serving in the call up functions of the Territorial guard forces. Short refresher training - individual or by unit - in designated positions every other year must then be provided for those. The National defense forces demand substantial soldier and weaponry proficiency. Based on Norwegian experiences⁶⁰, one year of service produces such skills convincingly. That implies additional 8-10 months voluntarily training for a selected segment of the conscripts in semi-professional Army and Navy formations⁶¹. This must be facilitated by a certain monetary compensation, but mainly by enhanced value related to subsequent educational and job preferences. From this

base personnel to the full time Multinational employment forces should be contracted. In this tier of forces specialized soldier functions must be trained, treated and paid as employees of any other enterprise, compatible to the general labor market⁶². How to functionally design this undertaking obviously has to be subject to thorough discussion of alternative concepts.

UNBIASED DEBATE - PREREQUISITE FOR CHANGE

Viable national security demands a coherent connection between political ways and military means. When altered surroundings call for shift of ways, the military tools must change accordingly. A redesigned defense development as delineated in this paper is one broad proposal of how to meet the particular Norwegian dilemma of being a visible and significant actor on the international arena, while retaining sufficient stamina at home. There are certainly alternatives to these ideas. Most important now is to generate discussion on evolution of suitable Norwegian armed forces for first part of the twenty-first century. The approach suggested in this paper should be regarded as a vehicle to promote such debate.

ENDNOTES

¹ Olav Riste, «Forsvar og Nøytralitet under 1. Verdenskrigen» in Forsvarets rolle i Norges Historie, ed. Bjørn Christophersen, (Oslo, Norway: Fabritius & Sønner, 1968), 56.

² Ibid. Referring to Norwegian territory; the merchant marine suffered heavy losses in international waters during WW I.

³ Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, «Krigen i Norge 1940» in Forsvarets rolle i Norges Historie, ed Bjørn Christophersen, (Oslo, Norway: Fabritius & Sønner, 1968), 23.

⁴ Ibid., 27.

⁵ Safeguarding stability, predictability and peaceful coexistence between states and national groups are major goals for European security policy. Norway strongly supports this policy.

⁶ MOD Norway, Long Term Proposal for the Armed Forces (1994-98) and Defense Budget 1998 (St. prp. nr.1 1997-98).

⁷ I.e. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Northwest Russia and the Baltic states.

⁸ Russia will retain more than 3000 strategic nuclear weapons beyond 2000 even if proposed reductions are implemented

⁹ MOD Norway, Declaration on defense related environmental cooperation in the Arctic between Russia, The United States and Norway, Press release 050/96, 26 Sept 1996.

¹⁰ Predominantly NATO and the OSCE, but also through a number of Nordic and bilateral (Russia) initiatives concerning challenges in the Barents region

¹¹ William T Johnsen, «Reorganizing NATO Command and Control Structures: More work in the Augean Stables?» in Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National and Multinational Considerations, ed. Thomas-Durell Young, (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1997), 21. Norway is presently represented by one infantry battalion in the AMF(L).

¹² MOD Norway, Long Term Report for the Armed Forces (1994-98) and Defense Budget 1998 (St. prp. nr.1 1997-98).

¹³ Thomas-Durell Young, «Chart 1. NATO and European Bi-/Multinational Corps/Division Formations» in Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures, (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, 1997)

¹⁴ Allied Forces North Western Europe, High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

¹⁵ The 1994 European Union «Maastricht Declaration» calls for enhanced security efforts by means of the WEU.

¹⁶ Arne Solli, «NATO Enlargement» in The Armed Forces towards 2000 - new missions in a new Epoch, Posture Statement by Norway's Chief of Defense presented to The Norwegian Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, Bolkesjø, Norway, 7 March 1996.

¹⁷ Howard Baker Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye, «NATO: A Debate Recast», New York Times, 4 February 1998, p. 15. This article supports the view of the Norwegian military leadership by e.g. stating, «But a military alliance is not a club, and the (Clinton) Administration's rhetoric and policy risk converting NATO into an organization in which obligations are diluted and action is enfeebled.»

¹⁸ NATO Office of Information and Press, «Appendix VIII, The North Atlantic Treaty» in NATO Handbook, (Brussels, Belgium, 1995), 231.

¹⁹ Ibid., 50.

²⁰ Both countries are members of the EU, observers of the WEU and partners of the PfP program.

²¹ NORDCAPS; Nordic co-ordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support; Norway has a moderate role.

²² I.e. The employment of the instruments of power to achieve the political objectives of the state, in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives; US Army War College definition.

²³ I.e. Economic, informational, diplomatic and military means; US Army War College definition.

²⁴ Norway currently allocates approximately 6.5 % of the national budget to defense, about 3.2 % of the GDP.

²⁵ MOD Norway, Stortingsmelding nr 16 (1992/93): Hoveretningslinjer for Forsvarets Virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1994 - 1998.

²⁶ This reorganization will be complete by 2000.

²⁷ I.e.: Sea line of communication.

²⁸ The "Oslo Class" frigates, commissioned by mid 1960's.

²⁹ E.g., the number of coastal defense artillery batteries, defending sea approaches to all operational key areas from excavated locations, will see a 70% reduction.

³⁰ General Defense Plan, the traditional Cold War hierarchy of NATO Article V plans to meet major attack.

³¹ Chief of Defense Norway, Forsvarssjefens Grunnsyn, (Oslo, Norway, 1995). Widely distributed doctrine document comprising all services, especially inducing change to military educational institutions.

³² Reductions in Defense budgets over the last decade have been substantial, but not dramatic. But consequent the approach of decommissioning age for key inventory in all services, a considerable effort has been made to increase investment budgets by reducing running costs. General structure reductions have been necessary to facilitate this.

³³ Chief of Defense Norway, Forsvarsstudien 1991, (Oslo, Norway, 1992) and The Parliament of Norway, Forsvarskommissjonen av 1990, (Oslo, Norway, 1992). These two studies produced the foundation for the post Cold War reorganization of the defense structure carried out 1992-1998.

³⁴ An ambition most other Allied nations now for obvious reasons have canceled.

³⁵ Chief of Defense Norway, Forsvarsstudien 1996, (Oslo, Norway, 1997)

³⁶ MOD Norway, Stortingsmelding nr 16 (1992/93): Hoveretningslinjer for Forsvarets Virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1994 - 1998, (Oslo, Norway, 1993).

³⁷ MOD Norway, Stortingsmelding nr 22 (1997-98): Hoveretningslinjer for Forsvarets Virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1999 - 2002, (Oslo, Norway, 26 February 1998).

³⁸ Chief of Defense Norway, Forsvarsstudien 1996, (Oslo, Norway, 1997), Section 2.4.2.1.

³⁹ Though Norway for 40 years has been a considerable contributor to international peacekeeping operations, the concept has till now been to arrange ad hoc formations for each individual mission.

⁴⁰ Chief of Defense Norway delineates besides the Chief in person, the national joint headquarters of the armed forces.

⁴¹ I.e. political "long term", a four year period which for military planning purposes provides a rather short perspective.

⁴² Current proposals suggest continued modest contribution to the NATO Immediate Reaction Forces and no commitments to the increasingly important Rapid Reaction Forces, e.g. the ARRC (ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).

⁴³ Whether this is a premeditated choice or not, can not be read from the published material. Only discussion of alternatives is over how the basically same structure will differ by varying budget levels.

⁴⁴ Norwegian participation in Bosnia; UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR, + Macedonia and Croatia.

⁴⁵ Norway has provided one infantry battalion to the UN Peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon since 1978.

⁴⁶ This a deliberate concern in other European nations. E.g. the Swiss armed forces have an extensive plan for safeguarding precious cultural icons in times of crises or armed conflict, that should be studied.

⁴⁷ Department of the Army, «Future Land Operations», Force XXI Operations - A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, VA, Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1994), Chapter 3.

⁴⁸ Department of the Army, «A Geostrategic view of 2025», Knowledge and Speed - The Annual Report on The Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army 1997, Memorandum from Chief of Staff of the Army, (Washington D.C.: US Department of the Army, 1 August 1997), 8.

⁴⁹ To include doctrinal, technological and training innovation, in addition to combat superiority.

⁵⁰ Today, other allied formations present themselves as "mountain" forces, e.g. Italian and US, and receive attention accordingly while Norwegian forces do not make any note of having this special capability. From experience of long lasting cooperation, the Norwegians know that even without adding this prefix, or making deliberate efforts to pursue excellence in fighting under extreme conditions, they perform just as good or better when the natural environment gets really rough. It should be an eye opener when Danish armor units are winter trained in Norway and receive positive public attention when they perform well in Bosnia. Point being; the Norwegians must let "the world" know that they are very good at this, and can get even better. Reinforcement of success is a sound military principle; this is a valid case to put it into practice

⁵¹ E.g. static air defense presently incorporated in the Air Force, remaining non mobile coastal defense artillery, and similar assets of all services linked to protection of infrastructure or permanent installations.

⁵² E.g. protection of The Royal Family, border patrolling, naval and air coast guard tasks, anti terror capacity, search and rescue capacity and alike.

⁵³ I.e. functions traditionally associated with Home Guard; trigger effect and immediate protection not in place.

⁵⁴ Limited but sufficient should be to meet a "boot camp" standard.

⁵⁵ Age group 19-20; before starting studies after High School.

⁵⁶ Implies National defense reserve components with soldiers 20-32 years old; mid term training approximately by the ending of senior education.

⁵⁷ Advocates of transition to an all voluntary Norwegian structure advice other European nation's canceling of conscription as models. The weighty difference is however that neither of those nations face any possible conventional threat to their territories.

⁵⁸ According to the Norwegian Constitution all male citizens are subject to conscription. This is an excellent general rule that not under any circumstances should be changed, since it retains the Government's lawful right to dispose over the populace as the national security situation over time may change - also unforeseeably. However, it does not imply that the authorities have to draft every male for military service. I.e. the Constitution provides an instrument with wide reaching flexibility not yet fully utilized. Given this flexibility, connected to the prevailing development of Norwegian society, there are good reasons to promote debate on why female Norwegians should not also be eligible for conscription. At present, females have principally equal opportunities in all services and branches of the armed forces, less the mandatory draft.

⁵⁹ Subject to deliberate study, 10 - 16 weeks suggested.

⁶⁰ Compulsory military conscription has since the 1960's been reduced from 18 to 12 months. One year service has proved to give sufficient and necessary training for the call up combined arms formations. In addition to provide the required professional skills, this duration has given the conscripts appreciation of the strength that comes with a coherent unit and long lasting comradeship. Also specially important to Norwegian soldiers and units is the possibility to train during all seasons of the year; which in their part of the world expose them to extremely different conditions.

⁶¹ Comparable to present general conscription service.

⁶² US Forces provide relevant experiences and pursuable concepts of all services that should be studied.

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