


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15 DECEMBER 1987

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# ***JPRS Report***

# **East Asia**

***Korea***

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# East Asia

## Korea

JPRS-KAR-87-056

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### North Korean Maneuvers for Olympics Disruption Discussed

41070010 Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korean  
23 Oct 87 pp 1C-8C

[Article: "North Korea's Persistent Maneuvers To Disrupt the Olympics—Only Rehashing the Demand for 'Co-Hosting'"]

[Text] Seoul, NAEWOE—Recently, North Korea has, on two occasions, proposed direct bilateral North-South sports talks without the IOC in a persistent attempt to disrupt the Seoul Olympic Games.

In a (3 October) letter delivered to ROK Olympic Committee Chairman Kim Chong-ha on 12 October, North Korean Olympic Committee Chairman Kim Yu-sun proposed "bilateral talks" between Olympic representatives of the North and the South. This letter, not much different in content from North Korea's earlier 15 September letter calling for "bilateral talks" between the North and the South on the Olympics, repeated its call for "co-hosting" the Olympics. Expressing regret over ROK Olympic Committee Chairman Kim Chong-ha's rejection of the earlier North Korean call for "bilateral talks," the latest letter said: "There is no better way to promote interests in the Olympics and world peace than realizing the 'co-hosting' of the Olympics."

Criticizing the ROK rejection of the North Korean call made in September for "bilateral sports talks," the letter said: "In the final analysis, this lends itself to no other interpretation than that the South refuses to agree to co-hosting and intends to push ahead with hosting the Olympics alone." It then made this false charge: "You have turned out the so-call 88-Tank in honor of the Seoul Olympics and have stirred up military confrontational sentiments by saying you will have a showdown with us." Judging from the context of the letter, North Korea's real intention is to shift the responsibility to the ROK for scuttling the co-hosting plan, while rehashing its propaganda to justify its demand for co-hosting the Olympics. In brief, the letter gives the impression that in preparation for its boycott of the Olympics, North Korea is trying to lay the groundwork for giving plausible reasons for its action.

However, In response to North Korea's proposal for North-South bilateral talks, ROK Olympic Chairman Kim Chong-ha sent a reply to his North Korean counterpart, Kim Yu-sun, urging him to "accept the arbitration plan of the International Olympic Committee on the Seoul Olympics and take action designed to bring the Lausanne talks to a successful conclusion." Thus he made clear the ROK position against the bilateral talks.

The ROK is sticking to its position that basically, the question of hosting the Olympics comes under the jurisdiction of the International Olympic Committee (IOC); hence, the IOC should be consulted, as in the past, on matters relating to this question.

In the past, North Korea has used the tripartite Lausanne talks—participated in by the IOC, the ROK, and South Korea—as a channel for talks with the ROK. But, now suddenly changing its position, it has come up with the proposal for direct North-South talks without the IOC. What are its intentions?

In a nutshell, this is a last-ditch attempt on the part of North Korea, which has become fretful about the certainty that its maneuvers to abort the Seoul Olympics by demanding the co-hosting of the Olympic Games will prove futile.

At present North Korea is under pressure to accept the IOC arbitration plan (assigning table tennis, archery, women's volleyball, 100-km cycling road race, and one-group soccer preliminary to North Korea) which was decided upon at the fourth round of IOC-sponsored North-South talks on 15 July.

Originally, at the close of the fourth round of Lausanne talks, the IOC informed the North and South Korean sides of its plan to permit five events to be hosted by North Korea and requested that the two sides reply by 17 September. The IOC then made it clear that only when the two sides accepted the plan, would the fifth round of Lausanne talks be possible.

The ROK side accepted this mediation plan. But, at a press conference and on other occasions, the North Korean side, repeating its demand for co-hosting, insisted that six events, including the entire soccer events should be assigned to North Korea. Toward the end of August, following its earlier request for holding the fifth talks sometime before 17 September, North Korea even demanded that the date of dispatch (17 September) for letters of invitation to the 1988 Seoul Olympics be delayed.

However, the IOC brushed aside these unilateral demands of North Korea and sent out letters of invitation to the Seoul Olympics to 167 countries, including North Korea, on 17 September, exactly 1 year before the scheduled opening date. This definitely makes the Seoul Olympics official before the whole world. Seoul was chosen as the host of the 1988 Olympics at the 91st IOC general meeting held in Baden-Baden in West Germany in September 1981.

In fact, it was out of an ulterior motive to delay the issue of letters of invitation that North Korea sent its letter of 15 September proposing direct bilateral talks between the North and the South. Its second letter calling for direct North-South bilateral talks can only be construed as an attempt to dodge pressure for accepting the IOC arbitration plan and to lay the groundwork for using the Olympics for political purposes.

If North Korea accepts the IOC arbitration plan and participates in the fifth round of IOC-sponsored North-South talks, it will lose its rationale for demanding the

co-hosting of the Olympics, and if North Korea rejects the plan, its past political propaganda related to the Seoul Olympics will have been in vain.

Up to now, North Korea has made various arbitrary demands. It not only has demanded the assignment of six events to Pyongyang and has come up with an idea of jointly hosting the games in the name of "the 24th Seoul-Pyongyang Olympics" but also has demanded the right to manage games and TV coverage rights. But, while going through four rounds of talks, the IOC agreed to assign up to five events to North Korea, but completely ignored North Korean demands contradictory to the IOC principles, including the demand for jointly hosting the Olympics.

As a result, the question of whether the Olympics should be co-hosted or divided between the North and the South and the question involving the distribution of games—the key issues at the past IOC-sponsored North-South talks—have been settled for the time being to all intents and purposes. Thus North Korea now finds itself in a quandary because it cannot accept the IOC arbitration plan nor reject it.

When IOC Chairman Samaranch proposed at the Lausanne talks with North and South Korea and the IOC in October 1984 that some of the games be assigned to North Korea, it was interpreted as a move to counter North Korea's persistent agitation for boycotting of the Olympics and to forestall the possibility of North Korea taking any provocative action. That is why while the fourth round of the Lausanne talks was in session, North Korea, taking advantage of the IOC's patronage or tolerance, resorted to all kinds of obstructive tactics, direct and indirect, designed to bring about extraordinary change with regard to the opening of the Seoul Olympics. North Korea tried hard to push ahead with its schemes about the Olympics at the IOC-sponsored North-South talks, while seizing every opportunity and not hesitating to make threats to the South in connection with the Olympics.

For instance, at a welcome rally for Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in March 1986, Kim Il-song made provocative remarks, including the statement that "inasmuch as holding the 24th Olympics in Seoul is not merely an international sports meet but an acute and serious political issue on the Korean Peninsula, we will not watch it with our hands folded." Subsequently, in the 31 June 1987 NODONG SINMUN, the North Korean party organ, North Korea warned that "if all the games are to be held in Seoul, it would further aggravate the state of confrontation between the North and the South and heighten tensions, leading to an irreparably dire consequence and endangering the Olympics."

Similar threats were made by Chin Chung-kuk, vice chairman of the North Korean Olympic committee, at his recent press conference.

At every opportunity, taking great pains to try to justify its demand for a cosponsorship for the Olympics, North Korea has been engaged in obstructionist propaganda against the Seoul Olympics. Hidden behind this smoke screen is North Korea's ulterior motive to give the impression that it has some kind of Olympic card, although it has no interest in hosting the Olympics.

In fact, a general observation is that even if the North Korean side comes to agree to the IOC plan for allowing some of the games to be held in North Korea, in reality, it is not capable of hosting these games.

The primary reason is this: To host these games, North Korea will have to raise a minimum of \$2 billion, but North Korea is in such dire economic straits that it cannot even pay back the \$770-million loan from an international consortium. In addition, it will be confronted with a multitude of difficult problems, such as opening the door to the outside world, insuring freedom of travel for 20,000 to 50,000 visiting families.

North Korea, at heart, is expecting that East European countries and other countries friendly to it will boycott the Seoul Olympics, but Eastern bloc countries, including China and the Soviet Union, have already pledged this fall to participate in the Seoul Olympics. Therefore, it is certain that the scale of the Seoul Olympics next year will be the largest ever in Olympic history.

Furthermore, as part of his efforts to forestall North Korea's obstructive machinations against the Olympics and make the Seoul Olympics "perfect Olympics," IOC Chairman Samaranch recently announced a sanction against any country which refuses to participate in the Seoul Olympics. This would bar boycotting countries from attending the next Olympics opening in Barcelona in 1992, and at the same time put pressure on North Korea to accept the IOC arbitration plan. He made this announcement at his press conference on 9 October following the annual meeting of the European Olympic Committee in Sofia.

This sanction by the IOC provides a valid ground for any country to reject North Korea's moves to talk East European communist bloc countries and other pro-North Korean countries out of the Olympics. It also operates as a factor which increases pressure on North Korea to accept the IOC arbitration plan, which, in essence, allows five games to be held in North Korea.

Up to now, North Korea has engaged in an Olympic boycott campaign like a man attempting to spoil a meal on someone else's table out of spite, but this campaign has reached a point where it will get nowhere.

## POLITICAL

### Candidacy of Kim Tae-chung Examined

#### Symbol For Dissidents

410070003 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
28 Sep 87 p 3

[A continuing analysis of four front runners, No Tae-u and the three Kims, by a team of political reporters of TONG-A ILBO in a 12-part series. This section on Kim Tae-chung is contained in parts 7-9 of the series; edited by reporter Yi Nak-yun. Articles on No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam published in JPRS-KAR-87-954, 9 November 1987, pp 2-14.]

[Text]

#### Kim Tae-chung—A Symbol of Antigovernment Movements

"Ladies and gentlemen, here is Kim Tae-chung for whom you have been waiting for 16 years," said Advisor of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) Kim Tae-chung upon his arrival at the Kwangju station at 1:10 pm on 8 September. The crowd cheered.

Next, it was at the Mangwol-dong cemetery in Kwangju at 3 pm. "May your noble souls greet my return. I, Kim Tae-chung, have almost lost my life, but now have returned alive and well because of God's blessing and your help." At that moment, Advisor Kim and the Kwangju citizens who had gathered in crowds, sobbed.

"Ladies and gentlemen, if you care about me, please keep yourselves in order when returning home. Please promise me," Advisor Kim begged at the gathering in a public square in front of the provincial building of South Cholla Province around 8 pm. The crowd answered "Yes," and left without making any disturbance.

This is a story about Advisor Kim Tae-chung's visit to Kwangju on 8 September. Advisor Kim's visit to Kwangju, where some 500,000 people (or 1 million people according to the Kim Tae-chung camp) gathered, carries a significant meaning to Advisor Kim himself who is competing for the supreme power.

It was much more than just a homecoming. It seems to have served as an opportunity for him to confirm his reason for the "inevitable decision to run for the office" and his own confidence. His close associates say that it was a remarkable "event" which demonstrated that Mr Kim Tae-chung is alive and well. Such a demonstration was aimed at RDP Chairman Kim Yong-sam, Mr Kim Tae-chung's competitor within the party, in a narrow sense and at the general public and foreign countries in a broad sense.

According to the Kim Tae-chung camp, the significance of Advisor Kim Tae-chung's visit to Kwangju was reinforced by his visit to Taejon on 12 September and by his visit to Incheon on 26 September. I guess this means that the heated support for Advisor Kim is not geographically limited.

Apparently, his visit to Kwangju has raised Advisor Kim's status as a competitor for the supreme power. But since the seventh presidential election in 1971, where Advisor Kim earned 5.4 million votes, he has always been the "representative" or "symbol" of the opposition group. Thus, it can be said that his status as a competitor for the supreme power is rather deep-rooted. Maybe that is why he is still called "candidate Kim."

The people often ask "Has he ever been caught by tear gas?" In fact, Advisor Kim does not have a lot of "battlefield" experience. As indicated by his records including the 5 years of imprisonment, over 3 years of exile, and 6 and 1/2 years of confinement—all since the era of Revitalizing Reform—his struggle was rather of a symbolic type.

His existence itself could be regarded as an "open question" for all successive administrations. It was also the "reality" of Korean politics.

Advisor Kim's movements were always in line with all the ups and downs of the political history of Korea. For example, some of the most recent such movements include the events since his return from the U.S. on 8 February 1985.

It can be said that his return ultimately caused a "gust of new parties" in the 12th general election which was held on 12 February—4 days after his return.

Meanwhile, he exercised his behind-the-scenes influence at his Tonggyo-dong home. But since his rights were restored on 10 July, he joined the RDP on 8 August and became actively involved in the front lines of current politics. And upon his visit to Kwangju exactly 1 month after this involvement, he actually rushed into the competition for the supreme power. At this point, Advisor Kim carries the burden of having to settle down the single-candidacy issue with Chairman Kim. The "fatalistic" relation between the two Kims, which is neither perfectly cooperative nor easy to break, immediately presents the most difficult task for Advisor Kim who is now running for the supreme power.

Individually, no other person seems to have established such a "clear-cut image" as a front runner for the supreme power.

Advisor Kim is often said to possess a keen insight, which is an important trait for all politicians. During the seventh National Assembly election campaign speech in 1967 in Mokpo, Mr Kim predicted, "President Pak Chong-hui will revise the Constitution to allow three

consecutive terms of the presidency." Two years later, the Constitution was actually revised to allow three consecutive terms for the presidency. And at the presidential election campaign speech in 1971, Mr Kim said, "If President Pak wins this election too, he will revise the Constitution for a new presidential system." The following year, President Pak declared the Revitalizing Reform.

Above all, the political conditions remained pretty much the same as the way Advisor Kim predicted until the moment of No Tae-u's declaration of 29 June, where the issues of Constitutional revision for the direct election of president became clearly realized. In private conversations, Advisor Kim used to joke, "Since my return in 1985, have my predictions ever failed?"

Advisor Kim also has his own policy ideas about politics, diplomacy, security, economy, society, culture, reunification, etc.

The basic framework of his policy ideas was established during the presidential election period in 1971, and has been continuously reinforced since then. Thus, his policy ideas are not only deeply rooted but also are reinforced by his strong logic.

His policy direction seems to carry his own conviction, and cannot be separated from his political image. Perhaps, that is why his policy direction frequently becomes subject to criticism.

It is often said that Advisor Kim is one of those rare readers and industrious people. In particular, his readings in broad areas during his imprisonment go far beyond compensating for the fact that he did not complete his college education.

His strong leadership, too, is a product of his emotions. But sometimes it appears to be authoritarianism.

It might be that memory of the 1971 presidential election campaign, the continuous hardships since then, and some of the positive stories just mentioned have an enormous power to make all his followers feverishly enthusiastic. But he also presents many negative images that are not insignificant.

While there is so much "wild enthusiasm" among his supporters, there are so many negative forces as well. Some people call them a "veto power."

Some political forces suspect that the Advisor Kim camp might commit political revenge. This suspicion comes from the reasoning that he could have accumulated a great many grudges from the continuous hardships.

Advisor Kim himself knows this better than anyone else. So he promises to rule out possibilities of any political reprisal. He often says "Chun-hyang's spite can be vented only through her meeting with bachelor Yi rather

than by revenging Lord Pyon." During his speech at the Mangwol-dong cemetery in Kwangju, he even repeatedly stressed his intent to eliminate all possibilities of political reprisal.

Furthermore, Advisor Kim's close associates say "The truly powerful person who can achieve political reconciliation is Advisor Kim."

It is also true that some people question whether Advisor Kim is "too violent" or whether he is a "demagogic politician."

With respect to the question of violence, Advisor Kim says, "Since I basically support the free economic system, I am not a reformist. However, I am very much interested in social justice, and I strongly sympathize with alienated peoples' pains. In other words, I am a moderate reformist"

With respect to the question of the image of a demagogic politician, Advisor Kim said, "I never oppose anything without an alternative plan. When struggling against the dictatorship, I do agitate. I agitate where agitation is needed, and I propose policies where policies are needed. But the dictatorship has lasted too long for me to speak of any policies. It is now time to talk about policies."

Some people ask, "Isn't he too attached to the idea of becoming the president?" Some people say, "He might have a problem of credibility because he often changes his words."

Advisor Kim spoke his mind, saying such an image was "miserably painful." He repeatedly said, "What is important is not what I say but how I live. That has been the basic philosophy of my life."

One such expression was his "declaration of willingness to forego the presidential candidacy." Some people say that the true meaning of his declaration has not yet been clarified.

In response to this, Advisor Kim said, "Considering it was one of the most urgent situations in the history of this country, I presented an emergency proposal to President Chon Tu-hwan, but the proposal was immediately turned down by the measure of 13 April." He asked, "Why is it so negatively understood?"

In fact, Advisor Kim's close associates explain that some of Mr Kim's "negative images" resulted from the fact that most of the information available about him was criticism, at least thus far since the era of the Revitalizing Reform. In other words, it is called the "controlled image of Kim Tae-chung."

We could say that there must have been at least some reason for the criticism.

What's important is the fact that he is alive and well even today despite the continuous spread of his negative images for the past 16 years.

In any case, Advisor Kim's camp is right now focusing its energy on establishing a "peaceful," "reconciliatory" and "moderate" image of Advisor Kim.

The idea that the presidential election will be a "more heated election" if Advisor Kim runs for the presidency and that the election will be a "less heated election" if Advisor Kim does not run for the presidency could be due to Advisor Kim's political image that reflects a strong "contrast." In a sense, his images might be related to the inside and outside of his life thus far.

### Meticulous Strategist

4107003 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
29 Sep 87 p 3

[Text] The Flowery House—Last year, Assemblyman Song Chon-yong of the Tonggyo-dong circle gave a controversial speech about the national polity in the National Assembly, and subsequently the standing committee skidded several days. At that time, some people said the speech was directed by Mr Kim Tae-chung. A nonparliamentary member of his group, who was angered, visited Mr Kim's residence at Tonggyo-dong. But Advisor Kim was reportedly picking petals from a flower pot as if nothing had happened. While the visitor stood idly by, Advisor Kim reportedly spoke to himself, "Why do you think I am doing this? I am lonely at the moment?"

Advisor Kim's residence at Tonggyo-dong (which consists of 40 pyong of floorspace, 40 pyong of yard, a detached two-story building for the secretary's office and a garage) is always full of flowers. Except the gateway, all sorts of flowers including orchids decorate the garden surrounding the yard and flower pots fill the living room.

He said that the gardening helps soothe his own agony that resulted from the 16 years of isolation ever since the era of the Revitalizing Reform and from the "one-sided criticisms." His habit of gardening has now become a part of his daily life.

He said that his only pleasure while imprisoned also was gardening.

Advisor Kim's daily life begins, immediately upon rising, with watering and cleaning the leaves of the orchids with a piece of cloth. From early in the morning, his home is frequently crowded with visitors. But most visitors must wait until Advisor Kim finishes watering the plants.

### Unusually Tearful Person

Although Advisor Kim's political life appears to be quite action-oriented, his "private" life is quiet. When he is in distress or at an important decision-making crossroad, he sits alone in his underground library and falls into a reverie. When he feels like refreshing himself or taking a nap, he goes out for a drive along the scenic route of the South Mountain or the Riverside Highway. When he has spare time, he listens to vocal music or attends the theater. Advisor Kim does not exercise. Perhaps the gardening and public speeches are all the exercise that he needs. With respect to this, Advisor Kim seems unconcerned, saying, "Mr Yun Che-sul (former vice chairman of the National Assembly) did no exercise at all, but he lived 83 years."

Advisor Kim, who in no way looks 65 years old, says the secret of maintaining good health is to "maintain good sleep, a good appetite and peace of mind."

It is often said that Advisor Kim is a "coldhearted strategist," but a lot of people say that he is unusually tearful and sentimental.

It was embarrassing when Advisor Kim's voice suddenly choked with tears during his interview with TONG-A ILBO just before the restoration of his civil rights in July. It happened when he was talking about his eldest son Hong-il's letter which was sent to Advisor Kim while he was imprisoned under a death sentence in 1980. At the end of the letter it said, "To the inspectors of this letter: I sincerely hope this letter be handled prudently so that my father can read it, too."

Advisor Kim's image as a "natural man Kim Tae-chung" can be seen from such activities as attaching his granddaughters' name tags on the jujube trees and flowers and from his feelings of happiness as an "ordinary grandpa" again visiting his granddaughters.

The fact that he has such an ordinary life as a private citizen, although he is not so ordinary in politics, is also well demonstrated in his eating habits. He likes broth-like foods, such as beef soup with rice, chopped beef soup with various relishes, and blowfish soup. Advisor Kim said, "I used to like dog-meat soup, but I have not been able to eat it since I was nominated as a presidential candidate in 1970."

Many people say that "the natural man Kim Tae-chung" is a person who "disguises" his feelings.

Even until the presidential election period of 1971, his emotions were relatively clearly displayed on his face, and he used to speak his thoughts first before listening to others. But such a behavior is said to have been completely changed since 1980. Some people call such a change a "civil maturation."

Anyway, it is necessary to review his past life in order to understand "citizen Kim Tae-chung," either as a politician or a natural man.

Advisor Kim's life is often symbolized by the "five deadly crises." According to him, the first occasion was when he was imprisoned in Mokpo during the Korean war when he was classified as from the rich class since he made some money from a shipping business at that time. The second occasion was when he was in a traffic accident during the eighth National Assembly election period in 1971, in which his hip was injured. He still uses a cane because of that. The third incident was when he was kidnapped in 1973, in which case the kidnappers attempted to cut his body in pieces at the Palace Hotel in Tokyo. The fourth incident was when he was almost buried at sea while being transported by ship. And the fifth case was when he was sentenced to death at the court martial after the incident of 17 May 1980. This is called an "escape from five deaths."

Advisor Kim says, "God saved me five times so that I can be used as his tool for this country's politics." Aside from any significance of such words in a political sense, it is obvious that such an extraordinary experience gave him a unique conception of life which is strengthened even further.

### Financial Management

In addition to the five crises, his life has been, in fact, full of ups and downs since his birth. He was born on 6 January 1923 (3 December 1925 according to the census record) on an island at Haui-myon, Sinan-kun, Province of South Cholla. His father, a middle-class farmer, is Kim Un-sik and his mother is Chang U-son.

He graduated from Mokpo Commercial High School with honors. He was admitted to Konkuk University, but he stopped attending the school because of the Korean war. He inherited the Mokpo Ilbo at the age of 26, and became president of the company. At the age of 29, he became president of Mokpo Shipping Company. He then became president of Hungkuk Shipping Company in Pusan, where he made a fortune. Even today, Advisor Kim says, "I would have succeeded in business if I had not entered politics."

With respect to money, Advisor Kim frequently says, "Don't try to get rich nor poor. Since a person only serves as a temporary stop for money, don't try to accumulate it." Although he has many secretaries, he does not have a secretary for financial affairs. He personally takes care of most of the financial work himself. The major reason for that is said to be "for protection of the source of funds."

It was once rumored that Advisor Kim was imprisoned while acting as a member of the leftist group "Reporters' League" in Mokpo before the Korean war.

With respect to this, Advisor Kim said that he once joined the National Foundation Preparation Committee and the then-New Democratic Party (a leftist party) after the nation's independence. Advisor Kim said that he joined the organizations without knowing what they were. Advisor Kim explained that he completely parted from the organizations when he became extremely disillusioned by the realities of communism. Advisor Kim reminds us of the fact that he was caught and imprisoned by the communists immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war.

Because of those incidents, Advisor Kim often becomes entangled in "ideology disputes."

Since 1954, he jumped into politics and lost three times consecutively in elections for the National Assembly. He barely won in a special election of the fifth National Assembly in 1961, but he had no chance to take the oath of the National Assembly because of the Military Revolution of 16 May that occurred 3 days after his election.

He was elected to the sixth and seventh National Assemblies in 1963 and 1967 respectively. He was nominated as a floor leader by the president of the then-New Democratic Party, Yu Jin-o, but lost the nomination to Assemblyman Kim Yong-sam (present president of the Reunification Democratic Party) during the confirmation process. After that, he immediately turned his goal to the "presidency." Then, he furiously traveled around the country, and he won a come-from-behind victory over Assemblyman Kim Yong-sam for the nomination as presidential candidate in 1970.

On the day he lost the confirmation of the floor leadership, Mr Yi Yong-hi (present vice president of the RDP and then chairman of the district party chapter) said to Advisor Kim, "Mr Yu Jin-o is no match for President Pak Chong-hui. Since you are good at dealing with the public, let's sharpen our knives while traveling outside." Advisor Kim was said to have "felt something extraordinary" as he was encouraged to run for the presidency.

Advisor Kim spoke of the roots of his ambition, saying, "Whether it is business or politics, I was very much interested in ways of extending my influence ever since I was young." But it was not until he was encouraged by Mr Yi that his real ambition turned to the presidency.

Even today, in private conversations, Advisor Kim jokes, "I wouldn't have had all this trouble unless he encouraged me to do it," pointing to Mr Yi. In fact, his troubles since the Revitalizing Reform of 1972 began from his fight for the presidency in 1971.

### The Unique Experience as an Asset

Advisor Kim's domestic life was not smooth either. In 1944 he married Cha Yong-ae, who was a sister of his classmate in junior high school. He had two sons from this marriage, but his wife died in 1959. In 1962, he married his present wife Yi Hi-ho who bore his third son.



Mrs Yi graduated from Ihwa Special School and from Seoul College of Education. She studied abroad in America, has taught at the Ihwa Women's University, and worked at the YWCA. Mrs Yi is rather Advisor Kim's political comrade than a simple housewife. It is said that Mrs Yi encourages her husband when he is in political trouble, and that she serves as a "counselor" when Mr Kim has trouble making a decision.

Advisor Kim's political view is said to depend on the "people's will." And his speech is said to capture the attention of the audience. All this could be due to his experience in adverse fortune. This is because only a person's direct experience could be the most effective force that can understand and move the public mind.

### **Politician for Masses**

41070003 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
30 Sep 87 p 3

[Text] The Constitution and Civil Rights Committee (CCRC), which is RDP Advisor Kim Tae-chung's general organization located on the 9th floor of the Taeha Building in Yoido, Seoul, is now in feverish activity. The office used to be a busy place anyway, but the key workers are now even busier than ever preparing for the competition for the supreme power.

The office is divided into Advisor Kim's working room, secretary's room, chairman's room, planning room, policy room, and public relations room; each office is divided by partitions. What is unique about this office is that every task in each office is performed so independently and secretly that the people in one room do not know what is going on in the other room.

The entire office atmosphere is one where all key workers are marching together toward the "supreme power" which Advisor Kim is aiming at. Everyone is showing an "absolute respect and obedience" toward Advisor Kim. They look somewhat tired of the hard work, but the office has a tense atmosphere.

### **Public Organization Structure Is the Strongest Point**

Advisor Kim has some very dedicated followers, but there are some seceders also.

With respect to some of the seceders among the close key officials, Advisor Kim says, "First, I have but myself to blame, and second, there is a persistent maneuvering behind the scenes." Advisor Kim says to the seceders, "Frankly, there is nobody I cannot forgive from a human perspective. It's just that I cannot support those who cannot tread the path of political virtue for his own good and for the public."

The present Tonggyo-dong camp includes a group of veterans who have remained since the presidential election of 1971 and a group of new members who have

joined since Advisor Kim's return in February 1985, and those who joined since the 12th general election. There is a certain amount of conflict, such as jealousy, between the two groups, but Advisor Kim accepts recruits mostly based on their "sincerity."

Advisor Kim's key staff includes Vice Chairman Yi Chung-chaeh, Yang Sun-sik, No Sung-hwan, and Yi Yong-hui, the national convention Chairman Yu Cheyon, Secretary General Kim Yong-pae, and Chief Secretary Cho Yun-hyong, who is an outside member, Deputy Chief Secretaries Pak Yong-rok, Kim Chong-wan, Pak Chong-tae and Kwon O-gap. Advisor Kim tends to listen to these people's opinions.

This organization is also characterized by its high "dependency" on Advisor Kim. Accordingly, the key staff's functions appear to be relatively weak.

The strength of the "Kim Tae-chung politics" is its public popularity rather than the organization itself.

Some people call it a "public incitement," "mobilization of people," or "windy politics," but its strength certainly rests with the people's organization.

It was and is precisely Advisor Kim's main weapon for the NDP's nomination of the presidential candidate in 1970, for the seventh presidential election of 1971, and for the present struggle for the RDP's nomination of a presidential candidate, which could be actually the presidential election campaign itself. Such a weapon serves as a tool to characterize "Advisor Kim's politics" which "looks better from a distance."

### **Carefully Prepared Speeches**

Such a strength could come from Advisor Kim's distinguished skills in speech and his systematic logic.

His ability in speech is often considered as a natural talent, but Advisor Kim explains it as a "result of hard work." In fact, he collects sufficient data and prepares notes 1 day or several days before any speech, regardless of the length. Before making a public speech, he uses a tape recorder while practicing and revising his speech in his underground library.

His "well trained" staff's careful preparations, too, make Advisor Kim's public speech an "interesting" event to watch.

However, Advisor Kim's supporters' hot concerns seem to be the greatest strength in enabling his public politics to put an end to the 16 year long break.

Neither Advisor Kim's political style nor his campaign strategy is tactless or one-sided. For example, speaking of his political style, Advisor Kim is often called a "tough

fighter." But in the early 1960's when there were disputes over ratification of the Korean-Japanese agreements, Advisor Kim chose a moderate side that "opposed but presented alternatives" rather than joining the unyielding groups advocating "resignation from the National Assembly" or the "absolute opposition." For this reason, he was also denounced as a "sakura" [pro-Japanese].

During the election period of the seventh National Assembly in 1967, a Republican candidate in Mokpo marked the voters' residential gates with "Republican," "Changeable," and "[O]pposition" signs in order to distribute envelopes containing money. During the night, Advisor Kim is said to have reversed the marks on the gates, giving an opposite effect to the Republican Party's money-driven campaign tactics. This is a well-known story.

In connection with such election strategies, he was criticized by his opponents that he is talented in "underhanded campaigning."

Since 1980, Advisor Kim is said to have placed more emphasis on "justice" and "the evaluation of history." Yet, Advisor Kim thinks strategies used by the "good and weak" to defeat the "bad and strong" can be justified. Advisor Kim often introduces the classic 'Pyolchubujon' and likes to compare the rabbit's wit to "the people's wisdom."

But his close associates say that such images of Advisor Kim do not surface and that he is only viewed as an extremist or as a tough fighter.

### **Calls To Put an End to the Abuse of Anticommunism**

In a way, it could be related to Advisor Kim's ordeals. It could be first because of the ruling circles' propaganda and second because of Advisor Kim's own self-discipline against oppression or conciliation.

We cannot leave out "policy" matters from Advisor Kim's strategies. During the presidential election of 1971, it is often said that he not only stayed ahead of the Republican Party's candidate Pak Chong-hui in confrontations concerning policy matters, but also led the entire aspect of the election toward policy debates.

At that time, he offered public pledges for: security provided by the four strongest nations, peaceful exchange between South and North Korea, new taxes on luxury items, and a double-tiered grain price system. These pledges became a sensational issue that threw the government party into confusion.

Among his public pledges, the issue of abolition of reserve troops brought about furious attacks from the government party because of the wrong timing. Advisor Kim, too, admitted his mistake of choosing a wrong time for the issue.

Advisor Kim says this election, too, must be a confrontation over policies, in which case he thinks the election war will take a favorable turn for him.

At a gathering in Incheon on 26 September, Advisor Kim suggested the following "seven tasks that the next democratic government must accomplish" a perfect democracy in which everyone can participate, an end to the abuse of anti-communism and security, a moral reform of politics, a free national economy, independence and autonomy in various areas of society, guaranteed earnings for laborers and peasants, and a three-step reunification plan. These can be considered as his policy or the skeleton of his campaign pledges. It is expected that these policies will be materialized and reinforced by Advisor Kim's own "brain," his policy teams and several professors.

The "Kim Tae-chung style policies" will be characterized by: "a democracy in which all political forces, including the conservatives and the reformists but not the communists, can enjoy a perfect freedom," "a moral reform of politics wherein the president himself serves as a model of integrity and all high-ranking government officials live by salaries alone," "search for a social stability that will guarantee rights and earnings for laborers, peasants and the low-income class," and "the three-step reunification plan."

In particular, Advisor Kim's approach is unique in that he shows an active position toward the reunification issues despite possibilities of some criticisms. Advisor Kim says, "Anyone without a special plan for reunification is not qualified to be president."

His three-step reunification plan is: 1) peaceful coexistence, 2) peaceful exchange, and 3) peaceful reunification. This plan has been continuously advocated since the presidential election of 1971.

Advisor Kim has recently issued an idea for the "federal republic system." Since this became controversial, he now says, "I don't care about the names." He says that although his idea was different from the North Korean "federal Koryo system," the similarity in names caused the controversy.

No matter what the true meaning of Advisor Kim's idea of reunification is, his opponents consider it "dangerous," and this idea is often evaluated in connection with his image.

During the election period, the disputes over the reunification issue could become a dispute over ideology.

### Confident in All Cases

Advisor Kim's camp strongly believes that he will definitely win the presidential election if Chairman Kim Yong-sam retreats in the nomination battle, but that Advisor Kim can still run for the office independently and win the presidency even if Chairman Kim Yong-sam does not yield. The planning office of the Civil Rights Committee has long ago calculated the expected vote counts based on the following four cases: 1) Kim Tae-chung vs. No Tae-u, 2) Kim Tae-chung vs. No Tae-u vs. Kim Chong-pil, 3) Kim Tae-chung vs Kim Yong-sam vs No Tae-u, and 4) Kim Tae-chung vs Kim Yong-sam vs No Tae-u vs. Kim Chong-pil. The planning office is said to have concluded that it is confident Advisor Kim can win the presidency in all cases.

It is also said to have established vote-taking strategies on each case. Although the vote-taking strategy is somewhat different depending on each case, in general, Advisor Kim's camp is aiming at the Honam and capitol regions geographically, the youth in their twenties and thirties, and the people in the low-to-middle income class.

However, in the case of the two Kims competing for the presidency, Advisor Kim will have to think about the aftermath, such as his image with the public.

I am sure that the political circles would be very much interested in how Advisor Kim would handle all the expected complications that might arise from the opposition's single-candidate issue, the nomination battle within the party, and an independent nomination along with separation from the RDP.

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### Kim Chong-pil Returns to Political Scene

#### New Beginning To Restore Honor

41070004 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 1 Oct 87 p 3

[A continuing analysis of four front runners, No Tae-u and the three Kims, by a team of political reporters of TONG-A ILBO in a 12-part series. This section on Kim Chong-pil is contained in parts 10-12 of the series; edited by reporter Kim Chung-sik. Articles on No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam were published in JPRS-KAR-87-954, 9 November 1987, pp 2-14.]

[Text] It was 10 am on 28 September; the place was the Dynasty Hall at the Hotel Silla in Seoul. Kim Chong-pil, former president of the long-defunct Republican Party, was there surrounded by some 100 domestic and foreign reporters flashing their cameras in unending salvos. A few more wrinkles on his face than he had back in spring of 1980, but his unique tone of voice—nearly hoarse yet full—was still the same. He spoke:

"You are looking at a man who has just made a second start. I was in my thirties, full of youthful vigor, when I got myself involved on the stage of politics; time has flown by since and, hard though it is to believe, I am now 60 years old. Through these years, either as a public figure or as a private citizen, I have experienced more than a fair share of human joys and sorrows, griefs and pleasures; at this stage of my life, would I possibly be harboring any smoldering grudge or selfish motive?"

Those were reflective words couched in a "declaration of return to politics" by a man reemerging on the stage of politics from which he had bowed out 7 years and 4 months ago, in May 1980. Someone who was on the scene remarked, "Looks like JP (pet name for Mr Kim, based on initials of his romanized name) [Kim's name is commonly romanized as 'Jong-pil'] is more than determined to rise again."

In some sense, it can be said that the occasion marked the first stir in the process of a once-powerful ruling party (former Republican Party), which had swayed at will the politics of South Korea for a period of 18 years, trying to reincarnate itself in effect as a modest opposition party.

Perhaps that explains why there is so much heated controversy over the return to politics by Mr Kim, a man who once boastfully credited himself as being "the bastion of 'Yusin'" [the term "Yusin," meaning "restoration," was the symbolic catchword of the Pak Chong-hui regime—the "Yusin Constitution," the "Yusin Order," etc.]. Polemics against him are abundant: some are voicing their sense of incredulity about the audacity of the comeback attempt by a man who was in the thick of the old Republican Party responsible for 18 years of oppressive rule including the enforcement of the so-called Yusin Order; others point their accusatory fingers at the man's specific background—the fact that he was the nucleus of the "16 May" military coup which marked the beginning of a military regime, and that not only did he create the KCIA, the hotbed of the intelligence-for-politics concept, but he also served as its first director.

The atmospheric are reflected in such polemics seem to be further reinforced in no small measure by the current frenzy toward democratization.

As a matter of fact, Mr Kim himself seemed to be mindful of these factors when he was making the declaration of return to politics. He made a point of stressing the words "the second start."

In his declaration he said, "Having already subjected myself to a period of atonement with every inch of my flesh and bones feeling the pains, and with a deeply-felt sense of stern dictate of history that I shall have to bear a cross of indemnification...." Also of note was his

repeated use throughout the declaration of such expressions as "sense of guilt," "sense of regret," "shortcomings," "repentance," "earthly passions," and "sense of shame."

At any rate, there is little doubt that Mr Kim's reemergence on the political scene is creating a stir—however small or big aside—in the political arena of today when the race for the supreme power is slowly but surely heating up.

That is correct. There does not seem to be much disagreement over the analysis that he could very well become a force challenging not just the ruling DJP but the opposition as well and that, in effect, he might emerge as the variable that could erode the votes for both camps.

Mr Kim's declaration of returning to politics is being met by a sarcastic retort on the part of those opposition members of the National Assembly who vaingloriously claim to have inhaled a healthy dose of tear gas during the period prior to the "29 June" declaration: they were saying, "Why the grand reappearance now? Where have you been all this time? We suppose your reappearance more or less confirms that there will be an election."

That precisely is the point which is likely to linger on as a point of contention.

Anyone can take part in politics, but it seems only logical to assume that the forces opposing Mr Kim are still formidable.

Although the other two Kims seem to be keeping mum, at least for now, about JP's return to the world of politics for they figure that it would erode the DJP's power base, a widely held observation has it that they will commence firing the minute JP shows signs of mustering threatening forces.

Mr Kim's return to politics, although concretized only recently by his declaration, had in fact been anticipated for some time. The truth is, there have been some "tremors" in the past foretelling his eventual return to politics.

That is why those close to him are saying that it is unfair to accuse Mr Kim's return to politics as a totally "opportunistic" move.

Looking back, there was one such movement in June 1984—the formation of "The Korean War Combat Veterans Society" with the participation of a large number of ex-military members of the old Republican Party who had held seats in the National Assembly. Mr Kim was one of those who joined the society. At that time, the general political atmosphere was still very frosty toward not only the opposition but the old ruling circles as well.

That move was followed 4 months later—in October 1984—by another, more visible development: the formation of "The National Revival Comrades Society" by ex-members of the old Republican Party and the Restoration Political Society who had served in the National Assembly.

From its inception, despite the claim by those who organized it that it was purely a convivial organization, the Comrades Society was viewed as having a strong potential of eventually evolving into a political group at some point.

Outwardly the group identified its objective as that of promoting commemorative projects in respectful and affectionate memories of the late President Pak Chong-hui.

Behind the formation of "The National Revival Comrades Society" was a role played by JP. In July that year, before leaving for the United States ostensibly to be an observer at the U.S. Democratic Party convention, JP had told his close associates of his desire "to have a group organized for the purpose of seeing to it that the fifth anniversary of the 26 October event (assassination of the late President Pak) be commemorated in a meaningful manner."

Up to now Mr Kim has made conscious efforts to keep himself out of politics both within and outside the country.

In retrospect, it seems fair to say that JP, in his own hesitant way, has been assessing the changing state of affairs.

During the 18-year reign of the late President Pak Chong-hui, JP was mentioned as a possible "successor" on numerous occasions but it always ended as just a "rumor." With that background, JP should be more up on the physiology of power politics than anybody else. That is why, some say, he has been maintaining a low profile while waiting for an opportune moment.

Being a man who learned all about the "omnipotence" of power at first hand while holding such key positions as director of KCIA, chairman of the Republican Party, and prime minister of the Yusin cabinet, it is possible that he was all the more fearful of the kind of harsh, oppressive measures likely to be taken against him if he were to make any political move.

On the other hand, in the opinion of some, he is by nature incapable of quickly adapting himself to a changing situation, even when his immediate personal interests are involved. In his defense, those close to him point to the fact that never once did he attempt a "direct challenge" all the while he was kept in the shadow of the

late President Pak and being subjected to painful experiences such as his house being searched on a number of occasions; they say that another man like him would be difficult to find.

After he returned from abroad in 1986, he began participating in the gatherings—some small, some large—of such groups as the Association of the Kimhae Line of the Kim Clan, the Ginko-nut Tree Lovers Society (the gathering of the former staff members of the old Republican Party secretariat), the Blue Cloud Alpine Club, and the alumni meeting of the Military Academy Eighth Class; in so doing, although he still refrained himself from making political statements openly, he managed to establish, albeit cautiously, a natural pattern for his comings and goings. He even appeared unexpectedly at places such as local wedding halls in rural areas and expressed his views by holding round-table discussions, debates, or lecture meetings.

Still, while he was doing all these things, whenever he was asked about his intention to make a political comeback, his pat answer was "It may be spring but it is not,"—an answer suggestive of a passage in a dialogue between Zen monks. This could have been part of his strategy to guard himself against a serious attempt by the present regime to rein in on him. In any event, never once had he given a clear-cut indication of his political comeback intention.

Mr Kim admits that he has learned a lot through round-table discussions, especially dialogues with college students, he had in Seoul and rural areas. By his own admission, he was even abused face-to-face by some students, who told him, "This is no time for you to reappear; you should be more discrete and circumspect." He confesses that, although he anticipated there would be many controversies over his involvement in the "16 May" coup and the "Yusin" government, he had no idea that he would be facing such a frontal attack.

There are many people who are curious about Mr Kim's "true motive" for having declared his return to politics and thrown himself in the race of the supreme power.

In the first place, his resolve may be motivated by a desire to redeem his honor soiled in "the event of 1980" or to exonerate himself from all charges against him in connection with that event.

"Being a human creature, I am not entirely free of the urge to settle old scores,"—these are his own words, but he quickly emphasizes, "but, above all, I am coming out again because I have firmly made up my mind to offer my whole being as a cornerstone of democracy by devoting myself in some small way to the good of this country, even if this meant my having to fight the likely attempts by those now in power to stop me and foil me." "Nothing is uglier than the slight of a half-burned piece of wood,"—that is a line out of a poem which he likes to quote from time to time.

A key person in his closest circle openly declares, "Win or lose, should the coming election prove to be fraudulent, JP is even prepared to die." What he means is that JP is making a new start not for reasons of self-interest but with a sense of mission.

One story has it that at the background of his resolve was the exhortation by former cabinet members and ex-Assemblymen from the days of the Republican Party who had been renegated to "the ranks of the high-class jobless" under the circumstances beyond their control.

About a month ago, there was a gathering of some 100 classmates of Mr Kim's from the Military Academy eighth class at a hotel in Seoul. According to a later gossip, those who were there, in the course of sharing their views regarding the state of affairs, reportedly urged him on by saying, "We want you to know, JP, that just having you around gives us the strength."

Although the event of 1980 resulted in "loss of power" to the politicians of both camps—the ruling party and the opposition of the Yusin era, there was a distinct difference in the countenance. Those of the old opposition showed no signs of strain and looked quite healthy—perhaps because they had started with nothing and therefore had little to lose. Those of the old ruling party, on the other hand, looked suddenly aged. They have had to live these 7 years in that state of despair....

According to one analysis, those in the JP camp are counting on two things: by thoroughly exploiting the inherent weaknesses of both the DJP and the Reunification Democratic Party, they figure that at the minimum they could forge themselves into a strong opposition party and that, if all goes well, they may even be able to look toward the possibility of their coming into power the next time around. In other words, what they are banking on is their conviction that, pitted against the "failed policy" image of the ruling party and the "no policy" image of the opposition, the image of the old Republican Party can be made into "something" if tenderly cared for.

Along a similar line, it can be said that what JP is aiming at now is not so much the "supreme power" itself but rather the possibility of the new party he is organizing at present emerging as the principal opposition party in the event of a power shift as a result of this round of power struggle.

It is said that someone recently told Mr Kim, "If you become a candidate for the presidency, it may be possible that someone will drag you down from the podium on your first public appearance on the first day of your campaign." Responding to this, Mr Kim reportedly said, "I won't be in the race if I were not prepared to face such an incident. Something much worse than that could happen, but I am ready for it." From this, one can surmise the resolve of a man who, in his own words, is making a "second start."

### Political Soldier of Fortune

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[Text]

### The Vicissitudes in the Life of a Political Soldier of Fortune

"I did not think there could be a counter current."

Even nowadays, those personages of the old ruling circle, who have been leading a life of rustication during these past 7 years since 1980 when their ride with the now-defunct Republican Party ended abruptly, are said to be often lamenting their hard lot saying, "We were the victims of JP's indulgence in 'romantic politics'."

What is really in the minds of those people is the notion that things could have been different if only had JP, immediately after the event of "26 October" [the assassination of President Pak] in 1979, taken the steps to make himself the interim president in accordance with the provisions of the Yusin Constitution. To put it another way, those same people may be saying that even JP, who knows all about the physiology of power, might have lost his mind—stupefied by the turn of events—momentarily at that particular time.

These are the very kind of tales from which one can gain a glimpse of the personality, perhaps, or demeanor of Kim Chong-pil the man, who was chairman of the old Republican Party.

In this connection, Mr Kim himself is heard saying reflectively that at that time his own intention was to have the Yusin Constitution buried in history together with the "26 October" event and to have himself face the people's judgment in dignity and without apology.

When a reporter discreetly asked whether the way he handled the situation was not a "mistake" from the standpoint of power politics, he professed that he "did not think" there could possibly occur a counter-current movement to the rushing torrents of public sentiment at that time.

That kind of thinking—it is "JP all over," and it is precisely what makes him vulnerable but also appealing as a human being, according to his long-time close associates.

"A man who seems to be extremely pragmatic and yet romantic; seems to be driven by power motives and yet as prone to sentiment as a delicate maiden...."—these are the kind of descriptions that had always followed Mr Kim through-out the 18 years of the Republican Party regime.

As a matter of fact, another politician like Mr Kim about whom there are so many humane episodes would be hard to find. This is because Mr Kim is a man of such wide interest in so many different areas that he generates topics worthy of being talked about.

On the 29th of last month, a rally welcoming his return to politics was held in the town of Puyo along the banks of the Paekma River; on that occasion, he demonstrated a remarkable skill in playing a gong instrument. He attributed it to his rural upbringing, but it showed what a refined sense of tone and beat he has.

### A Skilled Hand in Painting and Music

In old days his knack for accordion playing was widely talked about; more recently, he has been seen playing electronic organ and mandolin.

He is also a first-rate painter (oil painting). In his high-school days he had done some water-color painting—that was all the basic training he had had. He was past 40 when he began dabbling in oil painting; now, he is reputed to have attained the status of a bona fide painter. He was once a key member of the Sunday Painters Club.

There is an anecdote related to his painting skill. During the height of a severe drought that struck the South Cholla region in 1986, he held a private exhibition of his paintings and sent the proceeds amounting to 4.5 million won to the people of Sinchon-Ri, Tonggang-Myon, Naju-Gun for drought-relief purposes. The following year, when he received two sacks of rice from that village as a token of appreciation, he donated the rice to an old people's home in Seoul. In short, he was a politician who enjoyed idyllic, poetic pursuits—almost to a fault.

He is the fifth of six sons fathered by Mr Kim Sang-pae who once was the village head of Kyuam-Myon, Puyo, South Chungchong Province. His second elder brother is Mr Kim Chong-ik, who was a member of the seventh, eighth, and ninth National Assembly. His third elder brother is Mr Kim Chong-nak, chairman of Korea-Tacoma Boat Building Company.

Upon graduating from Kongju Public Middle School shortly before the end of the Pacific War, he went to Japan and enrolled himself for the preparatory course of Chuo University but soon withdrew at his father's urging to come home. Back in Korea, he attended Taejon Normal School and became a teacher upon graduation. After 2 months of teaching at a small village school in Ponyong, he enrolled at the Teachers' College, Seoul National University, only to quit in his second year to "start a new career" in the military. At that time, the Korean society was engulfed in a violent struggle between the right and the left; it was in that atmosphere that he first joined the army as an enlisted man but soon he changed his mind and entered the Military Academy and completed its cadet training course—the eighth

class—in 1948, which marked the beginning of his professional military career. In 1951, he married Ms Yong-ok, the late President Pak Chong-hui's niece.

His being the husband of the late President Pak's niece had played both ways throughout the 18-year rule of the old Republican Party—sometimes to his advantage; other times to his disadvantage.

Although he was the driving force behind the "16 May" revolution and was always labeled as the Republican Party regime's "second in command," few if any had had as much of the vicissitudes of power as he had.

He was the key player in the creation of the Republican Party, and yet he was forced to "go abroad" just 1 week before the party's inauguration in February 1963. On that occasion, explaining his reason for leaving the country, he said, "Half of it is my own decision; the other half is not." Actually what drove him abroad was a "backstage feud" within the power circle. Later, in June 1964, he made his "second trip abroad" under similar circumstances.

There were many more incidents involving him either directly or indirectly. For instance, the scandal over the "National Welfare Society"—the group rumored to have sought the promotion of succession to power by JP—put him in an awkward situation. Each time an incident of this kind occurred, it eroded his political standing as well. This explains why he even had to give up the chairmanship of the Republican Party.

### Close Ties With Men in the Entertainment World

By and by there emerged anti-Kim forces within the power circle. One such group, the so-called "Gang of Four" (Paek Nam-ok, Kim Song-kon, Kil Chae-ho, and Kim Chin-man), gained influence. President Pak's power play in ramming through the constitutional amendment (in September 1969), which allowed him a third term, was in some sense a political sleight of hand in which the very same "Gang of Four" was utilized.

The so-called "2 October rebellion" (of October 1971), which occurred 1 year before the Yusin Reform and was an event significant enough to command a chapter in the political annals of the Republican Party era, was also touched off, albeit remotely, by the strife between Mr Kim and the anti-Kim forces.

In retrospect, it may be said that Mr Kim's political standing was swayed at the mercy of President Pak's "plot."

That, despite the never-ending stream of rumors naming him as Pak's "heir apparent," he failed to succeed Pak to the end is a clue to the realities of his political vicissitudes.

Undoubtedly complex internal factors within the power circle prevented Mr Kim from ever becoming the "successor," but there are also some anecdotes having to do with his personality which are believed to have had a bearing.

On one occasion, that late President Pak was visiting the South Chungchong region accompanied by a key member of the Republican Party who was also a member of the National Assembly. When the two were alone, Pak quietly asked the Assemblyman, "Whom do you consider as the right man to succeed me?" After momentary hesitation, the Assemblyman reportedly gave this cautious answer: "All things considered, how about JP?" It is said that Pak's reaction was swift: "But that fellow Chong-pil is wanting in...."

It seems that many of Mr Kim's penchants apparently did not please President Pak's fancy. In old days, there were times when even those closest to Mr Kim were heard lamenting, "The trouble with JP is that he tends to act too much like a fragile maiden...."

Many a time Mr Kim had to distance himself from President Pak on account of personal frictions within the inner sanctum; on such occasions, he invariably indulged himself in painting pictures while enjoying a boat ride with artist friends of his, in contributing articles to Sunday papers, or in driving his car around at a fast speed. It is being said that such tendencies of his were another thing that displeased President Pak.

Any any rate, one look at the front cover of the first edition of his book "JP Columns" is enough to get the feel of his romantic disposition. On the cover is a large picture of him taking a solitary walk into the wind in an open field—he looks more like a movie star.

About 10 days ago there was a social gathering held in Inchon with Mr Kim's presence; among the guests attending the function were such notable performing artists as Ch'oe Mu-yong and Yang Hun, who came to express their "support" for Mr Kim. It turned that these men were Mr Kim's friends of long standing. Speaking of Mr Kim's friends among this genre, motion-picture director Sin Sang-ok used to be a "JP fan"; Mr Kim presided over the wedding ceremony for Kil Ok-yun and his bride Patty Kim. What's more, Mr Kim is said to have even helped wrestler Kim Il's gymnasium project.

He even had a hand in organizing the band "YE-GREEN."

Simply put, Mr Kim is a man of great versatility. Whether it is good or bad for a politician—this is another matter.

"Politics is art"; "politics with poetic sentiment"; "politics of detachment"—these are Mr Kim's pet phrases, which seem to indicate that he is self-confident about his "disposition."

Those close to him argue that Mr Kim deserves high marks for his range of humanity, so to speak, or magnanimity. They even call him a complete man—as well-rounded as “an edgeless jade ring.”

### **A Man of Thorough, Deliberate Nature**

They say that he used to read one book a day when he was in his third and fourth year at middle school; he is said to be quite an avid reader even now.

For a politician, an ability to coin fashionable phrases is a strength. He is credited for having coined such phrases as “half voluntarily, half involuntarily”; “two-way governance” (i.e., governance responsive to the will of the people); and “the second opening of the port” (i.e., an open-door policy in foreign affairs).

More recently, in criticizing the deployment of riot-control police around the DJP headquarters, he declared, “A political party is a passageway linking the people and power.” Also, while trying to persuade a group of college students, he used such expressions as “History is a mixed weaving of errors” and “Yesterday is today’s father.” This is unmistakably the JP-style rhetoric.

He has a reputation of being an outstanding speaker in the round-table kind of situation, although it is problematic whether his speech is powerful enough to grip the audience in a mass rally.

On one occasion back in 1963, the students of Seoul University invited Mr Kim over to their school. He showed up alone at the auditorium of Seoul University’s School of Humanities and Sciences, which was located at Tongsun-Dong at that time. There, a debate unfolded between him and the student audience regarding the nation’s state of affairs. He was bombarded with a barrage of tricky questions. By the time the session ended and he was leaving the auditorium, a loud applause followed him, contrary to a stormy reception he had anticipated before coming.

Even some in the ruling party concede that “JP will look good in the round-table kind of debate.”

Those close to Mr Kim point to his thorough and deliberate nature as his strength, but what they emphasize more than anything else in his “experience” in running the affairs of the nation.

That certainly is his strength despite the shadow cast on him and his soiled image resulting from involvement with the Republican Party regime. He had had personal experience in diplomatic dealings with Japan and the United States; having served as a prime minister, he has a good grip on domestic affairs; on top of all that, he has had more experience than anyone else in running a political party.

The bottom line is, how will a great many people now view the multifaceted profile of a man from the yesteryear—Mr Kim?

### **People Will Judge**

414070004 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
3 Oct 87 p 3

[Text]

### **Putting the “18-Year Record” Up for the People’s Judgment**

#### **Too Many Big Shots**

The private residence, located at Chonggu-Dong in Seoul, of Mr Kim Chong-pil, ex-chairman of the old Republican Party, has become a hub of activities befitting the “temporary headquarters” of a new political party yet to be formed: a lot of people are going in and out of the place; lights are burning late into the night.

Especially since Mr Kim issued his declaration of returning to politics on the 28th of last month the flow of visitors to the house has increased to a point of congestion. These days, unlike in the past, there is a tense look on the faces of these visitors.

That is to be expected. They must feel tension—after all, their man is in the race for the supreme power. And, more immediately, they have a lot to do including the chore of organizing a new political party.

Many of the visitors to Mr Kim’s residence are readily recognizable. The reason is simple: these are the men who used to hold “important positions” in the old ruling circle.

Spotted among the more frequent visitors to the house of late area such notable personages as Choe Yong-hui, O Chi-song, Yi Pyong-hui, Ku Chach’un, Kil Chon-sik, Kim Yong-tae, Kim Yong-hwan, Choe Kak-kyu, and Yi Hui-il.

A key individual involved in the work of organizing the new party was heard remarking, “It is nice to have so many men of stature, but having too many of them is going to make my job difficult.” First of all, there is the question of who should get what position in the party; the difficulty of “traffic control”—this is the kind of things he was talking about.

One organization man was heard boasting: “We have 78 former cabinet ministers alone; if former vice ministers are counted, the number goes up to 200, who comprise our high-caliber human resources. If we include those who are former members of the National Assembly or retired general officers of the military, the number swells to 2,000.”



All that may be good news, but some are saying that the emergence to the forefront of too many personages from the old ruling circle is posing a problem as it leaves less room for the up-and-coming.

Although "Republican Party" is the tentative name picked for the new party, the fact is that a considerable number of those pushing the formation of the party are displeased with the choice—so much so that some are even saying they would refuse to participate if it means simply rejoining the old Republican Party.

### **Betting on the Up-and-Coming**

Mr Kim's original intention was, as reflected in his own words "I shall build a bridgehead in the interest of the next generation," to bring in just enough "old force" necessary to help foster a fresh, up-and-coming force. But when his old mess-mates—those who had shared with him the same political vicissitudes—expressed their desire to rejoin him, there was no way for him to turn them away—there lies the problem.

An influential figure in the established opposition camp offered the following prognosis on the outlook for the new emerging party tentatively named as "The Republican Party": "An attempt to inherit only the merits and discard the demerits of the 18-year legacy of the old Republican Party was already tried by the Korea National Party. The outcome is well known: it failed in the course of the general elections for the 11th and 12th National Assembly. Now, another attempt is being made to resurrect the party—this time by installing a giant named Kim Chong-pil as its chairman in the place of the failed one named Yi Man-sop but, just the same, it will not be any easier this time to restore the party strength to what it once was."

There seems to be a tinge of uneasiness even among those who are promoting the new party. Given the reality that the people, in terms of their political preferences, have already become polarized—one group supporting the ruling party, the other supporting the opposition camp, the question is whether there is room for a new party. Another question is, what if the new party is completely ignored by the people? These questions seem to be the causes of their uneasiness.

On top of all that, there seems to be another major worry for Mr Kim and others who are putting the new party together: it is the question of how to achieve a balance between the veteran politicians and the new faces. The dilemma is this: putting the veteran politicians in the forefront of the party is risky because of their soiled image and lack of enthusiasm; on the other hand, the new faces have the problem of lacking in name-recognition, thus putting them in the leadership positions is likely to be rebuffed both within and outside the party.

Be that as it may, Mr Kim himself seems to be of the mind to anchor his hope for victory in the strength of the new faces. He is boasting that he has already secured the support of a considerable number of mainstay people in the academic, cultural, art, and religious sectors, and that he has also corralled many businessmen of high repute in small- and medium-sized cities. He is also claiming that the participation in his political campaign by the youth and female sectors is on the high side.

Changing the perspective from the intraparty matters to external impact, a popular analysis has it that Mr Kim's participation in the race for the supreme power is having the most negative impact on the DJP. The reason is that the organizational base of the DJP and that of the old Republican Party are overlapping with other at the grass-roots levels—the further away from the center, the more overlapped they are.

For that very reason, according to one report, some within the current ruling circles had recommended to their higher-ups that "the most urgent task for now is to bring JP into the fold."

As a matter of fact, certain core members of the ruling circle did approach Mr Kim to "make him change his mind"—a fact that both sides have acknowledged. As to the outcome, Mr Kim reportedly rebuffed the approach in no uncertain terms.

In that connection, Mr Kim is saying publicly, "It is a simple matter: they (the DJP) should, on their own, face up to the people's judgment—that's all."

It looks like Mr Kim has managed to patch things up with his old nemesis Mr Yi Hu-rak: not only were these two perpetual rivals during the days of the old Republican Party, Mr Yi severely criticized Mr Kim at the time of the so-called "rice-cake dressing" controversy. On his part, Mr Yi is said to have indicated willingness to serve as one of the promoters of the new party. The two men have been seen together several times recently on golf outings.

### **Claim That New Party Movement Being Stymied**

Mr Kim's group is claiming that "the effort to stymie the new party's formation is proving to be unexpectedly serious." The group is even planning to issue a statement of protest in a day or two. The owner of a five-story detached building (with a floor space of some 300 pyongs), located behind the consolidated headquarters of the government ministries and agencies in the Kwanghwamun section of Seoul, had agreed to donate the building to the new party for use as its headquarters; recently, however, he has suddenly become reluctant to go through with it. This, Mr Kim's camp insists, is the result of certain pressure of "restraints" put on the owner of the building.

The Kim camp also claims that some Korea National Party members of the National Assembly, who are planning to join the new party, and certain pro-Kim entrepreneurs are being pressured as well—directly or indirectly. There is even a report that Mr Kim's relatives and friends in the financial sector, too, are being subjected to similar pressures.

Regarding this situation, Mr Kim was heard expressing his displeasure, saying "Why would those who purport to be in favor of democracy do such things is beyond me."

Mr Kim seems to be concerned about the possibility that his colleagues might be covered by such a "threatening" atmosphere. His concern is understandable for those of the old ruling circle are known for their constitutional weakness in withstanding difficulties.

Obviously aware of this situation, Mr Kim is trying to urge his men on, telling them "Only by enduring the difficulties can the roots settle firmly."

At any rate, now that Mr Kim has issued his declaration of returning to politics, some in the current ruling circle are reportedly crying over spilt milk, saying "Had we only had direct negotiations with Mr Kim as late as 2 years ago, we still could have won him over; it is too late now."

That kind of remark can also be taken as a sign of introspection on their part—wondering about the wisdom, or lack thereof, of their having given the "cold shoulder" to those of the old ruling circle during all these past years.

The ripple effects of Mr Kim's move to form a new party are apparently creating a havoc in the Korea National Party. Already six members of the current National Assembly, including Choe Chae-ku, Kim Hyo-yong, and Kim Yong-chaeh, and more than 30 nonparliamentary members of the party, including some who had served in the 11th National Assembly and some who are leaders of the party's local chapters, have declared their intentions to withdraw from the party.

Those close to JP are claiming that nearly all National Assembly members of the Korea National Party with the exception of one or two, such as the party's chairman Yi Man-sop, have already promised to join the new party. They confidently predict that all these matters will have been settled by the end of October, by which time the new party will have been officially inaugurated and the regular session of the current National Assembly concluded.

There is even a rumor that some members of the DJP and of the Council for the Promotion of Democracy are quietly conveying their desire to join the new party as well.

Those of the Kim camp are the first ones to admit their being "the late starter" and also the weakest in terms of organization and funds; nevertheless, they are also vainglorious about their being the most formidable "dark horse" for these very reasons. There are indications that even the DJP and the other two Kims apparently concede on this point.

Of the possible matchup combinations of 1) a four-way race involving No Tae-u, Kim Yong-sam, Kim Tae-chung, and Kim Chong-pil; 2) a three-way race involving No Tae-u, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-pil; and 3) a three-way race involving No Tae-u, Kim Tae-chung, and Kim Chong-pil, those of the JP camp figure that the second matchup would work in their favor, relatively speaking. Factored into this line of thinking is the fact that the Ch'ungch'ong Province, which is JP's home base, is traditionally grouped together with the Cholla Province [which is Kim Tae-chung's home base] under the historical classification of "the Paekche Region" [the domain of the old Paekche Kingdom]—a fact which the JP people are quietly counting on to help them.

Be that as it may, the JP camp, too, views the four-way race—the first of the three contingencies mentioned above—to be the most realistic prospect; they are proceeding on that assumption. Their strategy is to win over the people of the "non-mainstream areas" such as the provinces of Ch'ungch'ong, Kyonggi, Kangwon, and Cheju; to revive their old organizations in the Cholla and Kyongsang regions; and to rekindle, if possible, a sense of "nostalgia" for the Republican Party among the voters who are in their forties and older.

Those of the JP camp also insist that in the "12 February" general election it was the old Republican Party organizations that worked hard for the then New Democratic Party and, as a result, must have contributed some 20-30 percent of the total votes gained by that party—this is a matter of much interest to the JP people. Their thinking is that with JP himself in the race this time those votes will revert to where they would have gone to in the first place.

The JP people are also very much counting on the protest votes against the two other Kims for their fratricidal fight between them over the candidacy and on the voters who are skeptical about the record of the DJP administration. One close associate of JP's had this to say: "JP's remarks that if he were to become the opposition party he would try to be a good-wife-and-wise-mother type of opposition are being misinterpreted by some as evidence that he is running with the expectation of losing, but this is not the case at all. First of all, the DJP candidate cannot escape from becoming the target of concentrated attacks by all three other candidates; secondly, the so-called middle-class votes Mr Kim Yong-sam is talking about are more likely to swing toward JP."

### In the Main, His Popularity Is Rising

The JP people are also planning to point to JP's proven political ability, his "statesmanship," and his personal magnetism as part of the vote-getting strategy. They are saying that, despite a recent incident of "frontal abuse" hurled at Mr Kim during a get-together with a group of students, the drift of a survey they conducted has shown that Mr Kim's popularity curve is on the rise.

Speaking on the premise that future political trends are firmly on the track of democratization and any reversal is unlikely, JP's close associates observe that there is a possibility that many voters might choose JP over the other two Kims, both of whom have the image of the politicians who have habitually set a higher precedence on "fight rather than policy" and on "opposition rather than counter proposal."

They are also posturing toward policy confrontations with the rival candidates over the question of how to turn the workers and farmers into middle classes and of how to achieve the reunification. Basically they intend to win over the voters by highlighting the Republican Party administration's achievements in fostering economic growth and, in addition, by presenting to the voters their recipe for democratization, internationalization, and humanization.

A new course of political endeavor has now begun for Mr Kim—a man with these hardening resolves. His first, concert hurdle is likely to occur on 5 October, when the new party's inaugural promoters' meeting is scheduled to take place.

9977/9738

### Poll Reflects Unfair Campaign Practices

SK020055 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
1 Dec 87 p 1

[Text] While the government and the opposition parties are presenting instances of corrupt and unfair campaign practices as the ever heating presidential election campaign reaches its peak, 6 out of 10 eligible voters in five major cities across the nation have been found to perceive that public officials or tong and pan [lowest administrative units—fbis] heads are involved in the election campaigns.

Of 10 eligible voters, 3 to 4 stated that they know of family members or neighbors who have gone on group sightseeing tours, who have received cash or other possessions, or who have been treated to free meals. All this leaves the fairness of the current presidential election campaign open to question.

On the evenings of 28 and 29 November, TONG-A ILBO conducted a telephone opinion poll (through a team led by Korea University Professor Hong Ki-son) of

1,300 eligible voters (650 males and 650 females) who reside in five major cities across the country—seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju and Taejon.

According to the poll, in response to the question, "To what extent do you believe public officials or tong and pan heads are involved in the presidential election campaigns now under way?" a total of 24.2 percent replied, "I believe they are involved to no small extent"; while 33.4 percent said, "They are more or less involved." Thus the poll indicates that 57.6 percent of all respondents believe that either public officials or tong and pan heads are intervening in the presidential election campaigns.

Although it is impossible to put public officials, who are prohibited from joining political parties, and tong and pan heads, who are authorized to join parties, in the same category, since it is judged highly possible that tong and pan heads intervene in election campaigns, which is illegal in their status, tong and pan heads were included in the question.

Meanwhile, only 18.6 percent replied, "I do not believe they are particularly involved," and 9.2 percent said, "They are almost not at all involved." Those replying, "I do not know," accounted for 14.6 percent.

To the question, "Do you know of family members or neighbors who have gone on sightseeing tours, who have received cash and other possessions or who have been treated free meals in connection with the election?" a total of 33.4 percent of all the respondents replied, "Yes," and 63.9 percent answered, "No," while 2.7 percent did not reply.

Breaking this down by area, Taejon registered the highest with 54.1 percent, followed by Seoul with 38 percent, Kwangju with 31.3 percent, Taegu with 30.4 percent, and Pusan with 17.8 percent. It is thought that Taejon showed a high percentage because the candidates of the four major parties are concentrating efforts on Taejon, where those hailing from other provinces including Cholla and Kyongsang provinces and North Korea reside in large numbers.

Asked, "To what extent do you believe the election pledges, being announced by the candidates of the government and opposition parties, are trustworthy?" an overwhelming 73.7 percent replied, "There is nothing particularly trustworthy." Only 19.4 percent answered, "There are many that are trust worthy," and 6.9 percent said, "I do not know."

To the question, "Do you believe that the television reporting on campaigning by the presidential candidates is fair?" A total of 44.7 percent of the respondents replied, "It is more or less unfair," while 15.0 percent said, "It is very unfair." Thus, those who viewed it as unfair accounted for as much as 59.7 percent. Meanwhile, 30.4 percent replied, "It is relatively fair," while

only 3.5 percent said, "It is very fair," showing that 33.9 percent believe that it is fair. Those who replied, "I do not know," accounted for 6.4 percent.

By age and irrespective of provinces, the younger the respondents, the more critical they were. Of those who responded that the television reporting is unfair: 36.6 percent were in "the 50's and older" group, 54.3 percent were in "the 40's" category, 60.5 percent were in "the 30's," and 72.9 percent were in "the 20's," or twice that of the "50's and older" group.

### **Kim Tae-chung Calls for Active Participation in TV Debate**

*SK020220 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
1 Dec 87 p 2*

[Text] Kim Tae-chung, presidential candidate of the Party for Peace and Democracy, during a press conference with foreign reporters at the Press Center in Seoul at noon on 1 December, claimed that he is the unquestionable front runner in the presidential election campaign, adding that he "arrived at this conclusion based on his campaigning in major cities across the country and in Kyonggi Province and Inchon over the last 2 weeks, particularly the number in the audiences gathered at the Yongdong Bridge, Chungnangchon, and Yoido in Seoul, the enthusiasm shown by the audiences, public opinion, the commentaries of the mass media, and the statements supporting him."

Candidate Kim Tae-chung expressed confidence that this election campaign is developing in favor of his victory. Expressing his view on TV debates, he said that "this is an excellent way for the people to practically compare the candidates and enable them to choose whom to vote for." He then called on all candidates to actively participate in TV debates in the spirit of fair play.

Candidate Kim Tae-chung stressed that "a guarantee for fair election is more urgent than the single candidacy of the opposition camp," and criticized the government and the ruling party for continuing unfair, illegal acts of controlling the press, blocking the sources of opposition parties' political funds, administrative intervention in the election campaign by the heads of neighborhood associations, and giveaways of gifts.

### **Daily Comments on Violence in Kwangju Campaign Rally**

*SK012339 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
1 Dec 87 p 2*

[Editorial: "The Best Way To Vent Bitter Feelings—reflections on the Violence that Disrupted an Election Campaign Rally in Kwangju"]

[Text] Every phenomenon has its cause. Lurking behind the violence that turned a rally of Candidate No Tae-u's election campaign in Kwangju into a scene of utter

confusion is the enormous cause called the Kwangju incident. Attempting to paint it as having been caused by provincialism alone makes no sense.

This being the case, we should impartially approach and understand the violence, without exception, with two things in mind. First we should remember to understand what made the Kwangju citizens do what they did in the election campaign rally in Kwangju—vent their bitter feelings concerning the Kwangju incident. Something else we should keep in mind is related to the process of handling the consequences of the Kwangju incident—whether it is right and desirable for the Kwangju citizens to vent their resentment and bitter feelings in such a manner during the election period for their own sake and for the sake of the country.

The government, the ruling party, and the entire population must clearly remember before anything else that without understanding the bitter feelings and resentment that burn in the hearts of the Kwangju citizens, the act of unilaterally denouncing the unfortunate incident that has cropped up in the election campaign rally in Kwangju based on the judgment of its results lacks persuasiveness and the principle of equality.

The violent act of throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails and of brandishing clubs can never be justified. Nevertheless, there must be agony over the tragic cause and effect that made the Kwangju citizens do what they did in the election campaign rally and over the bitter historical facts, as indicated by public reaction to the incident, that makes their violence understandable.

What we would like to share with the Kwangju citizens in the process of agonizing over such things is the questioning of ourselves whether it is best to use rocks, clubs, and the violent disruption of a stumping rally to vent their bitter feelings and resentment, something that must be given some kind of outlet. One thing we can be sure of is that the majority of the Kwangju citizens would agree with us that such is not the best way to vent their bitter feelings and resentment. The one and only way and the only perfect way to do so is to vent their bitter feelings and resentment with their votes in the election. There is no other perfect and fair, as well as clear-cut way to vent their bitter feelings and resentment than this. If we do this, the election should be allowed to take place and we must take appropriate measures to have the election conducted in a completely fair manner. Over this course, we can, as we please, be critical and oppose candidates we find unpalatable and heap acid political remarks on them without worrying about the consequences. This is natural. Such things as raising voices to express one's opposition to some candidates and protesting against them by handing out leaflets critical of them can take place to a degree.

However, such things as breaking up stumping rallies by turning the site of the rallies into scenes of utter confusion, hurting people by throwing rocks and wielding

clubs, manhandling people, burning things down, and creating wild scenes to make the candidates find it impossible to continue speaking in the rallies are in no sense a good strategy.

One must not seek to have those who caused the suffering forced on them pay for their sufferings by avenging wrong with wrong, no matter how much the evil in the beginning. One can express his bitter feelings and resentment by voting out those who are responsible for one's sufferings in the election, while keeping a peaceful atmosphere for the expression of opinions. This, in fact, is the best way to vent one's bitter feelings and resentment. All the people in the country are urged to once again remember that the Kwangju citizens' bitter feelings and resentment can be avenged only through democratization and democratization can be achieved only through proper procedures, such as allowing the candidates to campaign and the election to take place.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

### Investigation of KAL Passenger Jet Crash

#### Police Probing North Link

SK020920 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0906 GMT 2 Dec 87

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 2 (YONHAP)—The South Korean police have begun an investigation into the possible crash of a Korean Air (KAL) passenger jet based on the judgment that it is highly probable that North Korea was behind the incident.

The National Police Headquarters (NPH) will conduct the investigation through the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), foreign diplomatic missions stationed in Seoul and NPH officers stationed abroad.

The police judgment that North Korea might have engineered a terrorist bombing of the plane was based on the fact that unlike other terrorist bombings, no terrorist group has claimed responsibility.

Police sources said the reports from Bahrain that a Japanese couple suspected of links in the disappearance last Sunday of the Korean Air jet and who took poison shortly after they were arrested by Bahraini authorities, were believed to have connections with Chochongnyon [ROK usage for DPRK term "Chongnyon"], a pro-Pyongyang Korean residents' organization in Japan.

The couple—a 69-year-old man and a 27-year-old woman according to their passports—attempted suicide Tuesday after they were caught trying to leave Bahrain with forged passports.

The man, identified as Shinichi Hachiya by his passport, died at a hospital in Bahrain while the woman, Mayumi Hachiya, survived.

The pair swallowed poison pills concealed in a pack of cigarettes while under guard and awaiting interrogation by immigration officials at the Manama airport.

The NPH instructed officers in Tokyo to report on recent Chochongnyon developments and progress in the investigation of Osamu Maruoka, a leader of the Red Army, a Japanese radical terrorist group, who was recently arrested by Japanese police.

Meanwhile, the NPH predicted a slim likelihood that Bahrain would hand over the suspect in the KAL plane crash to South Korea because there is no extradition treaty between Seoul and Manama.

At present, the Bahraini authorities are investigating the woman's possession of a falsified passport.

If the Bahraini authorities determine that the Japanese woman attempted suicide to conceal the pair's terrorist bombing of the KAL jet, the matter over which country should exercise jurisdiction over the Japanese woman will emerge as a diplomatic issue between Korea, Japan and Bahrain.

Political observers said there is no problem for Korea to insist on jurisdiction if the results of the investigation into Mayumi prove that she was involved in the bombing of the KAL plane.

However, Bahrain is investigating her on charges of possessing a forged passport and if the Bahraini authorities conclude that Mayumi is a simple passport forger, the jurisdiction will be out of Korean hands and become a matter between Japan and Bahrain.

Meanwhile, authorities at Seoul's Kimpo International Airport have sharply reinforced security checks on incoming and outgoing passengers in order to prevent the possible entrance of terrorists.

The measures followed the recent arrest of the alleged Red Army leader Maruoka who reportedly was carrying an airplane ticket for a Dec. 7 flight to Seoul from Osaka.

Airport authorities are training airport police and customs officers in skills to detect the so-called composition explosives which have high explosive power and in skills for using x-ray equipment.

Airport officials have also reinforced the inspection of both hand-carried luggage and large-sized cargoes.

Police and security personnel with airline companies have also strengthened searches for possible time bombs installed in aircraft cabins, including rest rooms, when planes are on the ground.

### **Bahrain Extradition Talks**

*SK021110 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
2 Dec 87 p 1*

[Text] The government is cautiously negotiating with the Bahrain Government for the extradition of Mayumi Hachiya, the woman who was arrested on the suspicion of being involved in the Korean Airline crash. However, it does not appear that the extradition will come about easily because, in the most basic international usage over criminal acts, territorial jurisdiction is applied most preferentially.

Revealing precedence in investigations and jurisdiction over international criminals, Pak Su-kil, assistant foreign minister for political affairs, said today that, in the case of an international crime, the competence of the country which arrested the criminal takes effect most preferentially, followed by the country to which nationality the criminal belongs, and the custodial jurisdiction of the country whose national interests were damaged.

Pointing out that there is no criminal extradition agreement between Bahrain and the ROK, which would make it possible to mutually extradite criminals, the assistant foreign minister said: "If the Bahraini Government claims not only investigative rights but also jurisdiction over Mayumi, we have weak grounds to refute it."

However, citing the Montreal Agreement and the Tokyo Agreement, the government is continuing negotiations with the Bahraini Government for the extradition of the criminal in accordance with the stipulation that "The country with which an aircraft is registered may exercise jurisdiction over crimes and acts committed aboard the aircraft." The Montreal Agreement is "an agreement for controlling illegal acts against the safety of a civil aircraft," and the Tokyo Agreement is "an agreement concerning crimes and other acts aboard an aircraft."

The government is also examining a plan to ask that the Bahraini side extradite the criminal in the form of an expulsion after all criminal procedures against her have been completed in Bahrain.

Meanwhile, the National Police Headquarters on 2 December made an emergency request to 142 member countries of the Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) to provide the Korean police with all information pertaining to the Japanese man and woman, who took poison after boarding and then deplaning the KAL plane in question.

The police have also decided to launch their own investigations of the couple by making the most of Interpol, the ROK Embassy in Bahrain, and foreign missions in Seoul.

## POLITICAL

**Local Government Initiative, Creativity Stressed**  
*41100035 Pyongyang MINJU CHOSON in Korean*  
*6 Oct 87 p 1*

[Editorial: "Let Us Actively Display Local Initiative!"]

[Text] Today functionaries of local government organizations are faced with a militant task of displaying initiative more highly, of organizing national livelihood more efficiently, and of carrying on the work of improving popular livelihood in accordance with plans.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught as follows:

"As it is of importance that the state's assistance be stepped up in organizing a county, so it is of importance that the initiative of local areas be actively displayed. Functionaries of the county must render active efforts in order to organize their county with their own compliance with the principle of self-reliance." ("Works of Kim Il-song" vol 29 p 628)

Highly displaying initiative is an important requirement for materializing the *chuche* ideology in revolution and construction.

Man is an entity equipped with creativity. He is a creative social being.

Initiative is a revolutionary disposition of a creative man. Revolution is a struggle designed to change old things, to produce new things, and to transform nature and society into entities more useful and profitable to him. In that stupendous struggle, functionaries are in the driver's seat. Although it is imperative for every one to display initiative, displaying initiative is a more essential demand on the part of functionaries in terms of the importance of their position.

Highly displaying initiative in local areas is very significant in developing all local areas evenly, and in accelerating the overall social construction of the country.

In our country, the county is a comprehensive unit in the development of the local economy.

Functionaries of local government organizations are masters who are responsible for the livelihood of local areas and concerned with the local population.

Work in developing the economy of local areas and of improving the people's livelihood there are primarily being planned, organized, and carried out by functionaries of local government organizations.

In order to develop the local economy to a higher level and to improve the epoch-making people's livelihood in local areas, it is imperative that a great deal of personnel and material resources be mobilized in local areas under

various local conditions and circumstances. Therefore, only when functionaries use their heads and highly display initiative, can given conditions and capabilities be effectively mobilized and utilized to their maximum, can the local economy be developed, and can popular livelihood be improved more quickly.

Practical experience clearly shows the importance of highly displaying local initiative.

Putting trust in county functionaries, our party has left the livelihood of regions that occupy 1/200th of the country in trust with them.

Today each county has great production potential and resources with which the local economy and people's livelihood may be developed and expanded epoch-makingly.

However, each county has a rate of development that is not exactly the same as that of the others.

Many cities and counties throughout the country, including Chongju County, Kumya County, T'ongch'on County, and Najin City, made achievements, during the recent 1 year period, which are equivalent to those made during the past few years. They are moving ahead of other counties.

There are various factors working in effecting these differences in the development of counties. However, major factors are to be found in how hard functionaries of local government organizations and functionaries in the concerned fields are meditating, and how highly they are displaying initiative in carrying out works designed to implement the party policies. Functionaries of local government organizations must have a deep self-consciousness of the importance of duties they are charged with in developing the local economy and improving the people's livelihood, they must constantly display initiative, and thereby fulfill their role.

In order to display initiative, functionaries of local government organizations must be equipped with great political insight and practical technological capability.

Only when they have knowledge, can they carry out work creatively based on their own views.

Staunchly arming oneself with the party policies and equipping oneself with high level practical technological capability mean the equipping of oneself with the resources and knowledge with which one can carry out work creatively and actively.

Work of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and the party documents concretely enunciate the directions and methods of developing the local economy and improving the people's livelihood.

All functionaries must become hard working scholars and men of passion who deeply study the policies of our party systematically and in all aspects, who make the policies their flesh and bones, and who creatively carry out works with their unique standards. Initiative is needed to successfully implement the party policies unconditionally.

Moreover, functionaries must make a concentrated study of the work in their own field, must make themselves well versed in it, and thereby equip themselves with high level resources and competence.

In order to display initiative, they must know the reality of their local areas just as they know of palms of their hands.

Today, in order to mobilize and utilize local conditions and all the productive potential there, it would be insufficient for one to have a simple understanding of labor conditions, equipment conditions, and the commitment. Only when one knows not only those things which are visible but also those things below the surface, in the sea, and deep in the mountains, can one display initiative and thereby boldly and dauntlessly mobilize and utilize all the resources and potentials in one's local area.

In many counties, including Yomju County, Ongjin County, and Kumya County, functionaries again conducted overall surveys of mountain, river, and sea resources. On the basis of those surveys, they organized and launched the struggle designed to improve the people's livelihood and increase local income. Thus, they almost doubled their local income, during only a 1-year period, compared to that of the preceding period.

Functionaries of local government organizations must get complete understanding of details of the productive potentials and resources of their local area through their innovative insight. They must use their heads and thereby rationally mobilize and utilize those potentials and resources.

In order for functionaries to highly display initiative, it is imperative for them to thoroughly implement the mass line as shown by the party.

It is the consistent mass line of our party to render faithful service for the popular masses, to receive resources and wisdom from the masses, and to launch revolutionary tasks by mobilizing broad masses.

The masses are teachers. Their resources and wisdom are inexhaustible. There would be no insoluble problem as long as one relies on the masses.

In many units, such as Tongdaewon ward and Songchon ward, it seems that there is no great resolve in them to develop the local economy and improve the peoples livelihood since they are located within a city. However,

functionaries found an excellent methodology in the process of meeting the masses to seek clearly established objectives. Thus, today, they have become units which are advancing ahead in the production of "3 August Mass Consumption Goods" and in commercial services activities.

All functionaries must clearly understand that methods of solving problems and initiative can be discovered only when they look to the masses. They must let the habit of looking to the masses and living and working among them grow.

A prerequisite for displaying initiative is the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle in carrying out revolutionary tasks.

The revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle is a decisive source of power for leaping forward, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Both the grand march of Chollima of the 1960's and the revolutionary march of speed battle of the 1970's took roots in the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle.

As shown in practical experience, only when one is equipped with the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle, can one display initiative to create things from nothing and to effectively utilize both small things and large things.

In many counties, such as Maengsan County, Yodok County, and Chorwon County, functionaries launched an intensive struggle with a view and attitude that the task, set forth by the party, of developing the local economy and improving the people's livelihood must be carried out without fail. As a result, they transformed counties into a people's paradise, comfortable to live in.

All the functionaries of local government organizations, following the example of the anti-Japanese revolutionary patriots, must carry out duties assigned to them by displaying initiative, and thereby launch better work in greater quantity for the sake of the fatherland and the people.

The initiative of functionaries is also displayed in launching work unceasingly. Initiative is based on the high sense of responsibility for revolutionary duties, a dauntless fighting spirit, and persistent revolutionary power in launching work.

Only when functionaries are equipped with the initiative-oriented power of launching, can they produce a product and unceasingly increase the quantity of that product.

In many cities and counties, including Kaechon County and Tanchon City, functionaries, after establishing sodium hydroxide plants, built on the basis of that



establishment various small and medium chemical plants. Then they established various plants which use products of those chemical plants as raw material; thus they effected a great advance in developing the local economy and improving the people's livelihood.

Reality demands that those functionaries be equipped with such initiative and launching power. None other than such functionaries as these are servants of the people and patriots.

Functionaries of local government organizations must highly display initiative with an attitude befitting the masters of revolution, must organize a national standard of living more efficiently, must effect greater successes in improving the people's livelihood, and thereby must meet the confidence and expectations of the party and the people.

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## ECONOMIC

### **Collectivism Seen Basic to Economic Management**

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[Article from Political Economics Lecture at Research Institute of Kim Il-song Advanced Party School]

[Text] It is an important requirement arising from displaying the superiority of the socialist system to establish an economic management system based on the principle of collectivism and to control and manage it in a collectivist method.

Comrade Kim Chong-il, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) and a secretary of the Party Central Committee, pointed out as follows:

"Since a cooperative economy is a socialist economic system based on the collective ownership of production means, the corresponding management method should also naturally be based on the principle of collectivism."

The economic management method based on the collectivist principle is the basic method of economic control and management based on socialist ownership of the means of production.

In general, control and management of the economy are defined in terms of the form of ownership of the means of production. If the means of production is under private ownership, an individual, who is the owner will apply a management method to utilize the means of production for his own interest. On the other hand, if the means of production is under public ownership, the collective body, the owner in this case, will apply a management method which utilizes the means of production on behalf of the group's interests.

The socialist economy, therefore, which is based on a collective ownership of the means of production, must be controlled and managed, based on the collectivist principle.

To control and manage the socialist economy using the collectivist method is an inevitable requirement arising from a man-centered philosophical principle which firmly guarantees the producing masses the status of master of production and management and enables them to fulfill their responsibilities and roles as such.

The philosophical principles of the *chuche* ideology which identified the fact that man is the master of the world, and of his own fate, and is the reformer of the world, and the pioneer of his own fate, are the principles that shed light on the development of his fate. In view of the fact that human beings are social beings, mankind's fate is basically not the individual's but the society's or the social group's. Human beings can live and develop to their potential only as members of a social group united by certain social relationships. Only if the independence and creativity of each member of the group are better supported and highly displayed, can the vitality of the group as a whole be strengthened.

The basic principle of the *chuche* philosophy requires the progress of the socialist economy's management as a means of supporting the independence of the producing masses, and highly displays their initiatives. It also demands that the vitality of the group as a whole be strengthened.

Only if the economy is controlled and managed by a method based on the collectivist principle, can the interest of each member of the group be considered precious, all the problems arising from the production and management be solved by helping each other, and by enhancing their roles under the responsibilities of the producing masses, the vitality of the whole group can be strengthened. It is here that one of the justifications for an economic management method being based on collectivism becomes the basic means of the socialist economic management.

It is a demand originating from the socialist system's natural requirement that we should control and manage the socialist economy by using the collectivist method.

The socialist system is a social system, where people can fully enjoy their independent and creative life with an immortal socio-political life. The social system's superiority depends upon whether it satisfactorily guarantees an independent and creative life, which is man's basic necessity. The socialist system is the most advanced social system in which its members are united as a socio-political organism, and every member of the society can lead a life which fits man's independent nature. It is the fundamental demand of the working class that enables everyone to live as a socio-political organism, sharing joys and sorrows free from exploitation and

oppression. The society in which this demand has been materialized is a socialist society. Only the socialist system can guarantee the people a social condition under which they can fully enjoy an independent and creative life. The socialist system is different from the capitalist system, which is based on individualism in which an individual's demand and interest come first. Since the socialist system is a superior social system based on collectivism, where a social group's demand and interest come first, socialist management, which is based on collective ownership, should necessarily be controlled and managed by a collectivist method. If, under the socialist system, the economy is controlled and managed by a method based on individualism, not by a collectivist method, which is suitable for the demand of the socialist system's original nature, the superiority of the socialist system cannot be fully manifested, because the system is a socialist one, but its management is the same as the capitalist one. It is because there is an inseparable mutual relationship between the socialist system and the order and method of its management.

In general, the characteristics of a social system define the characteristics and management method, and the management method influences the social system. Therefore, if a social system changes, the management method also changes. If the management method changes, the characteristics of the system also change gradually. If the socialist economy is controlled and managed by a method based on individualism, not by a system based on collectivism, egoism will develop among the people; and in the long run, capitalism will be restored just like the fact that if man is sick and his organs do not properly function for a long time, a change will occur in his body system. This will put the socialist system itself in danger.

The socialist system's economic management method is not only the socialist society's characteristic demand, it also depends on the inevitability of the socialist society's developmental process. The inevitability of the socialist society's development reflects the expanding and strengthening process of the communist characteristics, following the transient characteristics of the socialist society. If the socialist society's communist characteristics are strengthened, the socialist society's collectivist characteristics are strengthened even more, and the economic management progresses more strongly on the basis of collectivist principles. In this way, the collectivist method of economic management in a socialist system is the socialist system's characteristic requirement, and it is also perfectly suitable for the inevitability of the socialist society's development and for the communist society's characteristic demand as well.

The fact that the socialist economy must be controlled and managed by a collectivist method is related to the fact that the collectivist method is also an original communist work method.

It is characteristic of the communists' work method to highly display the working masses' zeal in the revolutionary struggle and construction work, to solve problems by

organizationally mobilizing the popular masses' collective wisdom and power, by delving deeply into the popular masses, and believing them. The working class' revolutionary struggle to thoroughly materialize the popular masses' independence cannot be advanced by a few communists' efforts. It can be successfully materialized only when the infinite power of the vast popular masses is organizationally mobilized to the maximum.

The reason why the collectivist method in economic management is the communists' original work method is that collectivism is a superior method which can display the workers' zeal to the maximum in production and management, and also can advance economic construction by mobilizing their collective wisdom and power. The economic management method in the past was, however, of the hands on type in which a manager is responsible for production, and the plant is controlled and managed by his personal judgement and decision. Therefore, under the manager's unitary management system, it was not possible to fully display the popular masses' revolutionary zeal and collective wisdom.

The new economic management system that the great leader has established completely overcame the limitation of the old economic management method. It has enabled the socialist economic development to forcefully push ahead by taking collectivism as the basic management method.

Collectivism in economic management enables workers to possess status as masters in production and management, to demonstrate their lofty revolutionary zeal by fully performing their roles as masters, and to demonstrate the power and wisdom in the production development by guaranteeing unity and cooperation, which are not possible as individuals. Since the subject of history is popular masses, not individuals, only when the popular masses' creative power is fully displayed, can the progress of history be forcefully advanced, and socialist economic construction be accelerated.

The popular masses' lofty revolutionary zeal and united power can be displayed to a different extent depending upon how the economic guidance and management are advanced. Since the control and management method based on individualism is a means based on an individualist philosophy of life, it cannot rationally utilize public labor, nor can it make the people voluntarily participate in a cooperative work.

Only the collectivist method based on collectivist philosophy of life can make the workers consider the interest of the collective group to be more precious than an individual reward or honor and make them struggle devotedly for the nation's prosperity and the people's happiness. In a socialist society, unlike a class society, the people's labor directly has socialist characteristics and makes the purpose and interest of the society and individual workers identical. Only if the economy is managed by the collectivist method, which is the lifeline of

socialism, will producers fulfill their responsibility and role as masters in production and management by highly displaying their revolutionary zeal and thus smoothly solve all the problems arising from production and management by reinforcing the unity and cooperation among producers. When we rely on the relationship between the working masses' lofty revolutionary zeal and the cooperation of comradeship, we can successfully solve any technical problem arising from the production process, no matter how difficult it is. We can guarantee the normal production by actively mobilizing internal reserve and also can permanently guarantee the rapid speed of the socialist economy by scientificizing and rationalizing the economic management. Therefore, the collectivist method in the socialist economic management becomes the communists' original work method.

Our party has been progressing only ahead by firmly maintaining the collectivist method in the socialist economic management, by fully displaying the superiority of the socialist system without knowing any vicissitudes in the construction process of socialism and communism. It is our party's firm position to strongly maintain the collectivist method in economic management and to manifest its superiority and vitality in the whole construction process of socialism and communism.

An important problem which arises as a priority in the process of firmly maintaining the collectivist method in economic management and of fully displaying its superiority is to strengthen the indoctrination work to arm the workers with a collectivist philosophy of life. The work of arming the workers with a collectivist philosophy of life is the first process of all, and the success of practicing economic management depends on this. In indoctrination of collectivism, it is important to clearly teach the workers the basic nature of individualism and egoism and the harm they cause, and to make workers always struggle devotedly for the benefit of the collective group and society.

It is also important in firmly maintaining the collectivist management method in economic management to further develop the relationship between the producing

masses' unity of comradeship and cooperation. In a socialist society, even though the means of production is owned by the workers themselves, the condition in which cooperative ownership, which is a lower form of socialist ownership remaining for a certain period of time, is weak compared to a perfect socialist society or communist society, based on ownership by the entire people, where the relationship of cooperation among producers is unitary. Therefore, the problem of expediting the development of ownership by strengthening the unity of comradeship and cooperation in economic management, and further developing the socialist system solidly is arising as a basic problem in the process of socialist construction.

The problem of indoctrination work for the working masses, or of developing the cooperative relationship among them can be successfully solved when the party's leadership is firmly guaranteed. It becomes, therefore, a firm guarantee to fully display the superiority of the socialist economic management system, which is based on a collectivist principle of thoroughly maintaining the collectivist leadership principle of the party committee, which is the basic core of the Taean work system.

Today, our country's socialist economy, which is developing at an unprecedentedly large scale requires that the party secretary, manager, and chief engineer form a three-way management of plants and enterprises. When the party secretary, manager, and chief engineer harmoniously manage the enterprises as a unit, the superiority of the party committee's collectivist leadership system can be even more highly displayed.

We will forcefully and continuously accelerate the construction of socialism and communism even in the future by thoroughly maintaining the collectivist management method in economic management according to the party demands.

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