


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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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27 May 1992

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Kokoshin on Army's Social Problems

92UM1014A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
No 16, 15-21 Apr 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with the Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin by Aleksandr Ruchkin: "Defense Is a Civilian Matter"]

[Text] The Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Deputy Director of the Institute for the U.S. and Canada, A. Kokoshin, by a Decree of the Russian Federation President, has been appointed the Russian first deputy minister of defense. It is very likely the first time in the history of our state that a strictly civilian specialist has held such a high military post. He is our interviewee today and answers the questions of our correspondent Aleksandr Ruchkin.

[Ruchkin] Andrey Afanasyevich, not so long ago in an interview, you spoke of the need to form the basic areas of Russian military policy "by the force of collective reason." But at that time you were the director of an institute, and now you hold one of the leading posts in the military department, one distinguishing feature of which is the traditional dislike of various types of debate. Does not your new position shake your convictions?

[Kokoshin] My convictions remain unchanged. I am certain that only a consolidation of the finest military and competent civilian forces as well as scientific soundness and balance in assessing our plans will allow us to elaborate and implement a military policy, to realize a system of orders for logistic support of the Russian Armed Forces, to provide the legal and social protection for the servicemen, as well as resolve other problems confronting the Russian Ministry of Defense.

[Ruchkin] The last is certainly the most crucial question as of now. The situation in the social sphere continues to deteriorate. Possibly we should take a more careful look at the experience of the Western states?

[Kokoshin] I feel that Western experience in this area is of limited value for us. Several years ago certainly its importance was quite high. Then began the unilateral reduction in the Armed Forces and the withdrawal of our troops from the Eastern European states. For me, it was clear that this process would be limited primarily by the Army's social problems. Generally any initiatives of ours in the disarmament area were linked precisely to this limiting factor. What is the general situation now? The economy is in a very grave, almost catastrophic situation. Unemployment has become an objective reality. The commercial structures and the new forms of entrepreneurship are not sufficiently strong to assume their proper burden of social concern involved in the cutback in the army, and clearly to no significant degree can this burden be placed on them.

[Ruchkin] But, if my memory does not fail me, you had a number of interesting plans which provided a solution to these most complex problems.

[Kokoshin] At present, time is moving faster and faster. Many plans and projects which were presented by my colleagues and myself 12-18 months ago at present require very serious changes. The basic ideas remain as before but the approaches are changing. Take, for example, the housing problem. This cannot be reduced merely to the construction of housing. In the present situation, it is essential to have a long-range program for the socioeconomic adaptation of an enormous mass of people who are fundamentally altering their way of life. It is essential to study this contingent, its attitudes and sore points. The officer corps is a specific part of society with its own value orientation. A large part of the officers see themselves as the defenders of the fatherland, people to whom society should show attention and respect. This is why even highly paid but not very prestigious work may suit far from everyone.

[Ruchkin] Nevertheless one often hears that in the current, very grave economic situation, one must be happy with any job.

[Kokoshin] I do not completely agree with that. This is why I feel it a prime concern to establish a detailed sociopsychological portrait of those who are leaving the Armed Forces. This will help us to clearly guide all strata of the officer corps into different types of work. Out of the general mass of persons being discharged, we must isolate those categories which require special attention. I feel that the most massive and certainly the most complex element is the commanders of the companies and battalions and their equivalent subunits primarily in the Ground Forces. They have already served enough, but they are still young and physically strong, and it is much harder for them to readjust in life than it is for lieutenants. We must not forget the officers with large families and for them help is simply essential. There is a good dozen or more of such categories and, respectively, social programs.

[Ruchkin] In real life instead of social programs we for now have only social problems. The decisions being taken are not carried out in practice, while the demands to repay the housing debt to the army are simply ignored. What way do you see out of this crisis situation?

[Kokoshin] It must be honestly admitted that the Army's social problems are now seemingly suspended in midair. Out of habit they are shifted off to the local authorities and then it is demanded that they return the housing which they owe. But it is simply very hard to achieve this in the traditional administrative procedures. The program for socioeconomic adaptation kicks in only when the local authorities and the enterprises have a vital interest in this. Naturally this interest should be encouraged and sometimes even fostered by the central government. Financial infusions, due to their acute shortage,

must be carried out following the principle of a point effect on truly crucial problems.

[Ruchkin] But for this it is essential to have a very good knowledge of acupuncture.

[Kokoshin] And that is the weakest point in this. Certainly there is a mass of opportunities. At present there is a departure of Ukrainians from Tyumen. Certain specialists have raised the question of establishing a special program with a regional-sectorial focus and aimed at attracting the officer personnel into the oil and gas industry. There are also very interesting farming programs. But what sort of farmer would an officer be, a person with a higher education and a modern view of the world? Certainly a well-equipped and thoroughly prepared one. For this he must master modern farming techniques and fully utilize the technological potential of agricultural production. In this area the Dutch and the Canadians are ready to help us.

[Ruchkin] How can one actually set this mechanism to work?

[Kokoshin] This is very great and labor-consuming work, including for the Ministry of Defense. I conceive of its strategy in abandoning any global or universal schemes whatsoever, and in close coordination with the requirements of the specific regions and industrial enterprises. But here as well serious difficulties await us. Even now it is clear that many enterprises will cut back on the number of employees and reduce employment for the sake of increasing production efficiency. The state should create incentives so that the officers discharged into the reserves could obtain worthy employment in the small and medium-sized enterprises, including those which are set up with the growth of the private or mixed sector. Finally, the officers should be given a large loan.

[Ruchkin] It is no secret that the reduction in the army provided an opportunity for the West to noticeably reduce their own armed forces and free significant financial and material means...

[Kokoshin] You want to say why don't they give us aid. I think that here we must not count on much. Certainly the United States has its own enormous deficit in the state budget and this is an important factor in the domestic political situation. The funds released as a result of the military cutbacks will be virtually unnoticeable there, and they will be claimed by American science, schools, medicine and others. Hence, we must count primarily on ourselves. The funds must be assembled literally piecemeal, they must be drawn in from the most different areas to carry out the social programs related to the army. Here very much will depend upon the interaction of the Russian Ministry of Defense with the Russian Supreme Soviet, the Russian Ministry of Finances and the Russian Central Bank.

Panichev Interviewed on Military Suicide

92UM0977B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Interview with Valentin Panichev, chief of the Main Directorate for Supervising the Carrying Out of the Laws in the Armed Forces, by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga: "Why Soldiers Die in Peacetime"]

[Text] Our newspaper (No 93) published material on events in Volgograd related to the death of the private from troop unit 6558, A. Gorkavyy. It was entitled: "The Parents Protest, But the Sons Will Weep." What has been done by the military procuracy bodies in this case? The Chief of the Main Directorate for Supervising the Carrying Out of the Laws in the Armed Forces Valentin Panichev, replied to questions of our correspondent Nikolay Burbyga:

[Panichev] It has already been established that after the death of Gorkavyy, the unit command in a telegram informed his parents that their son had died from a heart attack, but literally several hours later the Volgograd rayon military commissariat received a telegraph message that Gorkavyy had ended his life by suicide. Such an attitude on the part of unit officials to the parents whose only son had died caused legitimate indignation.

It must be said that the military procuracy bodies did not expect an action from the parents of the deceased. The criminal case was initiated on 25 March, immediately after the receipt of the message from the hospital on the sustaining of a fatal injury by Gorkavyy and was investigated by the military procuracy of the Sysoyevskiy Garrison. Then the investigatory group was strengthened by procuracy workers from the investigator department of the Military Procuracy of the Far Eastern Military District. Even the primary data make it possible to conclude that the soldier had been assaulted by fellow servicemen and he had reached the point of desperation. The suspects were arrested. We are confident that all the guilty parties will be punished.

[Burbyga] Why did the General Procurator of the Russian Federation Stepankov disregard the appeal from the parents of the deceased Gorkavyy?..

[Panichev] There are documents on this question. It was precisely the Russian Federation general procurator who, after investigating the essence of the problem, granted the request of Gorkavyy's parents and the representatives of the public in Volgograd, and after their appeal issued instructions on remanding all the materials from the investigation into the death of Gorkavyy as well as the physical evidence from the military procuracy at the Sysoyevskiy Garrison to Volgograd and the appointing of additional expert research there.

[Burbyga] What is being done now to prevent the death and injury of servicemen? Will crimes be ended in the Army?

[Panichev] The statistical data on the death and maiming of persons in the Army over the period from 1980 show that year by year, albeit insignificantly, the number of deceased servicemen has all the same declined. Thus, in 1991, in comparison with 1985, the total number of crime victims for the CIS Armed Forces declined by more than a quarter. Over the 2 months of 1992, the number of victims, in comparison with the same period of 1991, dropped by 100 persons.

In 1991, over 3,000 persons were held criminally liable and convicted for the committing of crimes involving the death and maiming of servicemen; this included over 150 persons in the category of officials.

We have prepared instructions to the subordinate military procuracies on cases involving the death and injury of servicemen. According to these the carrying out of the investigation on this category of cases is to be assigned to the most experienced workers, while the monitoring of the course of the investigation has been assigned directly to the military procurator. For the first time these instructions cover the questions of the collaboration of the military procurators and the committees on the affairs of servicemen and the members of their families on the spot. The possibility is provided of acquainting the parents of the deceased servicemen with the materials of the hearings and criminal cases.

Causes of Military Suicides

92UM0977C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Mukhin from the magazine ARMIYA and written specially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "The Military Have A Delicate Nervous System: In Hard Times They More Often Than Others Lay a Hand on Themselves"]

[Text] For a long time the USSR was one of the few states which refused to publish statistics on the suicide rate. In 1988, when the curtain of secrecy was lifted, it turned out that the Soviet Union was among the nations where the suicide level was judged to be "high." How actual is this problem for the Army? We hear from Lt Col Anatoliy Boyenko, graduate student on the Chair for Social and Military Psychology at the Humanities Academy of the Armed Forces.

"At present one out of five deaths in the Army and Navy is due to suicide. The basic reasons for suicide among our servicemen can be divided into two groups. In the first are the so-called 'love problems' (and for which reason, incidentally, a majority of civilians departs from this life); one out of every three officers, one out of every two warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and one out of every five servicemen in regular service kill themselves for this reason. Like the civilians, the servicemen commit suicide out of a fear of responsibility of a committed antisocial action and for the reason of poor mental health.

"The second group of causes is linked to strictly military problems. An analysis of the incidents has shown that the highest number of suicides and attempted suicides in the military occurs on the grounds of service hostilities and the hardships of military service. Among the officers and warrant officers this was basically due to service conflicts and injustice in resolving official questions, due to the loss of interest in service as well as sociodomestic problems. Among officers, for example, one out of every three suicides was committed for these reasons.

"Service hostilities impel many regular servicemen to take the fatal step. Difficulties in adapting to the conditions of military service with around 19 percent of the total number of suicides; service hostilities not related to improper relations with 18 percent; improper relations, humiliation and persecution with around 17 percent of the suicides.

"Unfortunately, in many troop units the problem of suicides among servicemen is not given proper attention. Over 70 percent of the officers queried by us about their readiness to work to prevent suicides gave a negative reply. Moreover, one out of every five of those questioned did not feel that such preventive work was his official obligation, considering this a matter for the medical personnel.

"Although suicide experts are not forecasting a sharp jump in suicides among the public, it must be considered that, for example, in the difficult times of the collapse of the Russian Empire and the Civil War, the annual average suicide level among the Tsarist officers, according to the data of the well-known psychiatrist L.A. Prozorov, was 50-60 fold (!) higher than the corresponding indicator among the civilian population.

"The current events related to the collapse of the USSR affect the psyche of people in no way less than what was happening 70 years ago. Political instability, the most profound crisis in the economy, the rashness of many decisions, including in the military sphere (the hurried withdrawal of the troops from the other states, the uncivilized splitting up of the army, the repeat taking of the military oath and so forth) substantially influence the attitudes and conduct of the servicemen. If the chaos continues, the suicide cases in the Army will increase significantly."

Suicide Problems in Armed Forces Examined

92UM1015A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 92 First edition p 4

[Article by Lt Col A. Kalita, candidate of historical sciences, in the column "No Secret Caveat": "Through a Resonant, Dirty Corridor: Suicide—More Than Personal Tragedy"]

[Text]

HOW MAJOR IVAN DEVYATOV DEPARTED THIS LIFE

Major Ivan Devyatov died at the age of 40, in early spring, when the sun was starting to warm the clay hills, when a haze of evaporating moisture was hanging in the air.

What did he see in the last few seconds?

Probably the same things seen by his brother officers, when they came upon him after extensive searching.

What they saw were the electric power lines sagging with their cable burden; a stand of birches on the edge of a ravine; patches of last year's brown grass jutting through the sinking snow. Instead of the hot fire, however, what remained were the black, slimy, smoldering ashes.

The major planned the taking of his life in a calculated and cold-blooded manner. He lit a fire, then poured gasoline over himself. He took into his hands a knife he had brought, a broad-bladed hunting knife fitted with a homemade handle. He thrust the knife into his chest, directly into his heart, then fell into the fire. The specialists believe that at that moment he could no longer feel the heat of the flames that had enveloped him.

The major departed this life, leaving the garrison with unanswered questions: Why did he do that? What was the reason?

Gossip later had it that he could no longer take the separation from his wife and children, for a year had passed since his wife had divorced him. It was also said that he had experienced unpleasant events in his assignment. However, all that amounted to no more than idle talk until they found something in the wretched thing that passed for a room he was renting. They found a notebook. Among the notes contained therein were some that read: "arrange for detail to unload coal"; "meet with commander on the 22nd"; and there were notes that were not of the usual kind: "I feel nothing but emptiness. I find that I am a stranger to myself. Like a person walking through a resonant, dirty corridor."

There were also verses. Chances are that the major wrote them himself:

Bespattered are valor and glory.
Madness is the country's lot.
Once again threatens a battue,
To consume and spare us not.

The major was given a quiet funeral. It was wordless and shameful. His former wife was notified, but she did not attend. The major's parents were no longer alive. It was soon after that that the garrison returned to normal. As time went on, cares and woes tended to erase the memory of the fear and terror of his death.

In 1991 in the Russian Federation, more than 40,000 persons committed suicide, with 77 percent of them males. Calculated per 100,000 persons of population, the

figure comes out as 24 cases of suicide occurring on the territory of the former USSR. This is twice as much as that of the USA. On the basis of 100,000 personnel of our Armed Forces and the USA, this figure falls out as, respectively, 21.9 and 11.9.

A MERE REFLECTION OF SOCIETY?

The Army is a reflection of society. It seems that this axiom is applicable also to suicides (suicides), which is the technical term used in the study of suicides.

For every 100,000 persons in the general population of the USA, there are 12 cases of suicide; in the U.S. Army, 11.9; in the CIS, 24, in the CIS Unified Armed Forces, 21.9.

A society produces the same kind of army. If a society is moral, its army is likewise moral. An admirable society, one which has faith in its future, integrates this feeling—so to speak—into the army environment.

The bitter science of suicide study employs a concept known as "peak suicide age." Research performed by both our specialists and those of foreign countries shows that the maximum number of suicides among the male population occurs between the ages of 17 and 24, then between 40 and 50.

There definitely is a reason for that. It is associated with the physiological and psychological peculiarities of certain ages. The first peak figure shows up in a period when a young man is searching for a meaning to life, for spiritual guideposts, a time when successes are displaced by disappointments, with hopes and youthful optimism becoming influenced by circumstances, perhaps while the young man's personality has not yet completely stabilized, with his being subject to depression, to destruction of his life's plans, to crushing of his spirit.

The second peak figure manifests itself in the time interval in which a man slips into assessing his accomplishments, a time when it dawns upon him that he has already lost much, possibly irretrievably; that his best years have passed, and, if he has not made his mark yet, if he has not been successful in life, it is too late to do anything about it. It is not difficult to imagine the crushing blows to the spirit suffered by a person undergoing that kind of severe self-analysis.

Well, imagination, scientists, and practitioners should produce definite conclusions. What do the Americans make of all this? This question is inclined to be merely rhetorical. The answer is obvious. All a person has to do is look at the age of American Army servicemen. We all know that the American Army receives its manpower on a volunteer basis. We are speaking here of men between the ages of 25 and 40, that is, of an age lying between the suicide peaks. Is that coincidental? I think not.

But what about our situation? With us, it is a different story. Our personnel are much younger: they are 18 to 20 years of age. This undoubtedly provides definite advantages. However, from the standpoint of the problem we

are discussing, this is the age of the first peak. Add to that the severe conditions of military life and service to which an inductee becomes subjected, usually without any choice on his part; consider how he is yanked out of his school seat, plus the fact that he must serve in a place located thousands of kilometers from home, from an environment to which he is accustomed, thus causing dozens if not hundreds of other problems related to his adaptability.

To put it briefly, the law permits a draft age of 18 to 27 years. And we call up a young man just as he turns 18. What happens is that the process of psychological readjustment of the lad from a position of being taken care of by his parents becomes one of a citizen who is supposed to fend for himself, a time that coincides with the factors associated with adaptability to military service. No wonder that this double burden - one psychological, the other physical - is something that not everyone can carry.

HAZING NOT THE ONLY CAUSE

The prevailing opinion is that the cause of suicide is hazing of younger recruits by men who have been in military service for some time. Yes, it often does happen that this is what pushes a person to take that fateful step. However, let us continue our discussion. Analysis of approximately 4,000 cases of suicide occurring in the period from 1985 to 1991 paints a picture which differs substantially from the one conventionally held. At an applied science conference recently held in Moscow, the hierarchy of causes of suicide fell out as follows.

Heading the list are duty-connected unpleasant events and conflicts tending to render military service a burden. This cause accounts for up to 32 percent of suicides among commissioned officers and up to 50 percent of enlisted conscripts.

Making up the second group are family troubles, jealousy, and infidelity. This can be fingered as the cause of 16 percent of suicides among conscripts, 35 percent among commissioned officers, and about 50 percent among warrant officers of the Army and Navy.

In third place is hazing, i.e., nonregulation treatment, mockery, and humiliation of younger recruits, with this accounting for up to 16 percent of suicides committed.

There has recently been published a large amount of statistical data dealing with this topic, with the data stated in plain numbers, thus introducing a definite bias into the way the problem is perceived. Thus, a look at these figures tells us that, of suicide cases, 14 or 15 percent are officers; 6 or 7, warrant officers [praporshchik]; about 80 percent, enlisted men and noncommissioned officers in conscript service. This creates the impression that suicide is a problem that affects largely the "lower grades." This is not so, as we can determine by looking at the share of suicides committed within each of these categories. It is approximately the same.

What must also be pointed out specifically here is that terminal behavior is especially attributable to "psychologically vulnerable" persons. Hence a requirement for extremely careful selection of men fit for serving in the Army.

What major conclusion is to be drawn?

LISTEN TO A CRY FOR HELP

There was a time when we put on a wry smile when told that some foreign country was setting up a system of psychological aid. We simply thought of that as being some kind of "bourgeois trick," something that had nothing to do with our healthy social body.

We would smile when there really was nothing to smile about. This especially in light of the fact that official statistics were hollow and unintelligible.

I have quoted quite an amount of figures. I ask for the reader's indulgence as I cite two more. Speaking internationally, for every "successful" suicide there are seven or eight unsuccessful attempts. In our case, for every 5 to 7 suicides, there is one unsuccessful attempt.

What do those figures tell us?

They tell us about the distorting mirror of statistics. And, as we said above, about the latter's incredible deafness. And about disregard for what a person thinks about himself.

An attempt at suicide is a cry for help. But who hears it?

Is the cry of an enlisted man or a sergeant heard by his commanding officer or the latter's deputy for work with personnel? Poorly. Hardly.

Do military authorities hear the cry of an officer? It would appear that their ears are blocked.

Does society listen to the Army? Or is it so preoccupied with itself, with its meetings and sovereignty, with its own problems, that the Army's groans never quite make it to the conscience of public officials?

What can ever be more important than keeping in mind an eternal truth: A human being is the measure of all values the earth possesses, the reason for being of all matters.

However, I do not intend to restrict myself to painting a sad picture. Recent signs indicate that the tenor of this picture can be improved. The openness of statistics is one of them. Would that they become ever more truthful!

An especially hopeful sign is the appearance of the institution of deputy commander for work with personnel. And of specialists in the area of psychology and sociology.

One thing however that must not come about is for them to become "paper" deputies and "paper" psychologists.

An ability to speak well - thankfully - is not being cited as a key determinant of the professional qualifications these specialists are to develop. An ability to listen to a person, to experience empathy with him, to share his pain and help him in a difficult situation - these are the things we all must learn to do.

Not of least importance in the resolution of these problems may be religion. Especially if we realize that believers also serve in the Army's ranks. We all have political indoctrinations, dogmatism, and formalism behind us. I believe that religion, with its traditional attitude toward a human life as the highest of gifts, as a God-given essence, is capable of unburdening the spirit and leading a person away from committing the sin of suicide.

Another factor to consider is the legal vacuum existing in any approach to solving this problem. I cannot recall a single case where anyone was declared legally liable for the suicide of a serviceman.

We speak of dignity, but how we are to promote dignity and work toward the establishment of a legal foundation on which to accomplish this are questions still left up in the air.

We speak of the impropriety of verbal abuse, but, as far as accountability for its commission is concerned, not a single word on this topic can be found in existing legislation.

The result of all the above is that a man's spirit becomes saturated with life's abominations, with affronts, but there is no one in sight other than the person affected. There are neither righteous nor guilty persons to be seen.

The individual finds he is on his own, in a quandary, sinking beneath his impossible burden.

So, a Major Ivan Devyatov decides to take that dreadful step.

And other persons such as he also depart this life.

What must be done is to shout: Stop! And we do shout, sometimes. But, in most cases, it is too late.

German Assistance in Retraining Retiring Officers
92UM0977A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 92 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Kim Serikbayev, staff executive under the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Col A. Ladin: "A Profession To One's Liking—Already Something"]

[Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written, Germany has allocated 200 million marks for the retraining of servicemen to be discharged from the Western Group of Forces. Special centers are to be set up for these purposes in Russia, Byelarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

The share of Kazakhstan in this program will be 3.6 million German marks. At the request of our correspondent, the Staff Executive Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kim Serikbayev described how the project is to be carried out.

[Ladin] Where are the training centers to be located?

[Serikbayev] One of them will be in the village of Turgen near Alma-Ata. Our German partners here are ready to begin training the former military from the Western Group of Forces in more than 100 professions, predominantly those related to the modern processing methods for agricultural productions. They plan to have highly profitable production, for instance, for manufacturing sausage products, and here the trainees will gain good practical experience. I feel that the special course for future farmers will also be popular with the young people.

[Ladin] Who is to teach all this?

[Serikbayev] Judging from everything, German specialists. Certainly for many areas which are offered by the program, for now there are no experienced instructors.

[Ladin] Can, for instance, young persons of induction age get into the training centers?

[Serikbayev] No, for now they will not have such an opportunity. The problem is that the money being allocated by Germany, according to the conditions of the contract, has been earmarked precisely for those who are being discharged from the Western Group of Forces.

Enrollment for studies is open to persons discharged into the reserves during the period from 1 January 1990 through 31 December 1994. At the end of this period, the centers will be used in the interests of the republics. Then they will admit all those who so desire.

[Ladin] What can be said of the second training center which will be located in Kazakhstan?

[Serikbayev] It will differ from the first in the fact that it will admit only reserve servicemen who already have a higher education. The center is to be organized on the basis of the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School. Here they will train specialists in two vocations: programmers, computer repairmen, managers, brokers and so forth.

At present, the Republic State Defense Committee together with the Ministry of Labor is studying the needs of Kazakhstan for the various professions. The first groups of trainees will soon begin to be organized.

I would like to draw attention to one detail which, in my view, is very important. Training in a favorite profession can be obtained not only by the officers, the "fathers of families," but also by the children of servicemen discharged into the reserves and over the age of 18, in

addition to the wives of officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and reenlisted personnel from the Western Group of Forces.

[Ladin] The shipping of equipment from Germany to Kazakhstan will cost a lot of money. How will the transport problem be solved?

[Serikbayev] It is certainly true that the shipping could "eat up" a significant part of the allocated funds. But, fortunately, good human relations and the tradition of cooperation have still been maintained as these were developed over the years between the Army and the people and the republics of the former Union. The Air Forces Command of the Western Group of Forces has offered Kazakhstan to carry the equipment for the training centers from Germany on military air transports on easy terms. Thus the problem is being eliminated.

Plea for Preservation of Military Economists

92UM0980B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel S. Vikulov, doctor of economic sciences; A. Pozharov, doctor of economic sciences; G. Zhukov, doctor of technical sciences; Colonel Yu. Tropin, doctor of economic sciences; Colonel N. Abrosimov, candidate of economic sciences; Colonel Ye. Babkin, candidate of economic sciences: "Russia Needs Its Military Economists"]

[Text] Russia is beginning to organize its own defensive structures. How can this be done with the least expenditure and the maximum efficiency? The answer to this complicated question should be provided by military economic science.

Unfortunately, until recently this science has been divorced from life. Even in the last decades ideas on military economics have continued to thrive which were formed in the 1920's, and new ideas meeting the demands of today were rejected. As a result, how many rash reorganizations from the economic viewpoint were carried out in the Armed Forces! Research on the systems approaches and on defense organizational development was carried out completely badly. For a number of the technical areas, the time required for the domestic research and development surpassed the foreign time by two and more fold, the types of articles were unjustifiably broadened, and the increase in expenditures significantly outstripped the product effectiveness. These and other flaws were visible to the naked eye.

The reason is to be found in the fact that among the superior leadership there was no demand for military economic analysis of the decisions to be taken. The decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the orders of the minister of defense spoke about the importance of developing military economic science, economic education and the training of military personnel, but in fact there was a reduction in the number of military economists. At present among specialists in the humanitarian

area they make up not more than one or two percent, while among the doctors and professors, their share is so small that they can all be counted on the fingers of one hand. This is inadmissible for a state with colossal military economic might.

In the process of reducing the Armed Forces, attempts have been seen to completely disrupt the system for training the personnel of military economists. Graduation from the Humanities Academy has been sharply limited, and the economic training courses at the military engineer academies have been cut back. Plans have even appeared to close and forcibly remove from the occupied quarters the Military Financial-Economics Faculty Under the State Financial Academy. For more than 40 years this faculty has been training military economists and in this area is the only academy-type institution of learning.

It is wise to recall that states with a developed military-industrial complex have long been carrying out thorough military economic research and the effective training of the military economist personnel. Thus, even in the 1960's, the Pentagon established a Department for the Analysis of Systems Programming and Budget Preparation, and with the aid of this agency provided analysis for all the military strategic programs and military political doctrines, making it possible for the U.S. to take optimum decisions in military organizational development.

It is easy to find other confirmation that the military economic problems have long gone beyond the quarter-master limits and have risen to the level of national and global security. At present they confront Russia with particular acuteness as 80 percent of the military production of the former Union is concentrated on its territory.

We are convinced that a center for military economic research is required for Russian defense policy. Its area of activity should include first of all the military budget and the economic aspects of systems programming for the organizational development of the Armed Forces. Other tasks are also arising which are unresolvable within the context of the old scientific research and training-pedagogical structures. Here is a simple listing of them: optimization of the strength and structure of the Armed Forces; the elaboration of special-purpose, regional and sectorial conversion programs for military production; adaptation of the support systems of the Armed Forces to market relations; the elaboration of urgent problems in the economics of military labor, economic security; and others. For solving these, it is essential to bring together the efforts of scientists and practical workers, primarily the military economists who have a good knowledge of the essence of these problems.

Their training in special institutions of learning must not be curtailed but, on the contrary, expanded without stinting on forces and money. This will provide a savings well beyond the expenditures. It seems to us that for

training military economists we must have a base military school like the Military Economics Academy. The currently existing Military Financial and Economics Faculty could become its base. Clearly we must not forget that military economic knowledge is an inseparable part of the professional training for the entire officer corps.

Military Commissariats Operating in Legal Vacuum

*92UM0980A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 92 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Major General S. Slobodyanik, military commissar of Tyumen Oblast: "The Military Commissariats Must Operate in a Legal Vacuum"]

[Text] In accord with the Decree of the Russian President and the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, work has been commenced everywhere to induct Russian Federation citizens into military service. At the request of our correspondent, Capt A. Venlich, the Military Commissar of Tyumen Oblast, Maj Gen S. Slobodyanik, described how the spring induction is being carried out in the Far North:

We have not been able to keep within those dates which were set for the induction. Scores of villages and settlements in the north of Tyumen Oblast, and particularly in the Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Districts are 500-1,000 km away from the rayon centers. Because of the absence of railroads and highways, we bring the inductees in for medical recertification by reindeer teams, if the nomad camps of the reindeer herdsman are scattered over the tundra, or by helicopter. For us this is almost the sole possibility to collect the draftees. And for the medics, the sole chance to make a thorough examination of the young men. Since other methods for monitoring the state of health of the future soldiers are virtually impossible. And this leaves much to be desired. Some 20 percent of the draft contingent is not fit because of state of health for peacetime service. We are forced to remove some of them immediately from the military rolls.

This is characteristic not only for Tyumen Oblast but also for other regions in the Russian Far North. The nomadic way of life for the reindeer herders deprives their sons of the opportunity to receive prompt outpatient care as juveniles. The only thing which we can achieve through the district public health departments is that during the sign-ups of the citizens for induction, all the specialist physicians are employed in the military commissariats. They not only establish the fellows who require inpatient treatment, but also send them to a treatment facility. But these are one-shot measures. The scarcity of qualified medical personnel both in the rural settlements as well as at the camps of the reindeer herders, where the young men spend most of their time with their parents, have nullified any effect from the preventive treatment work.

Secondly, our attempts to explain to parents that a 7- or 8-year education is not enough to master a military specialty are often ineffective. Certainly it is a question of young men who in terms of their natural qualities such as endurance, innate sharpness of eye and efficiency could become snipers and crack gunners on tanks and combat vehicles. In the literal sense of the word, only individuals are fit for service in the line units. We are forced to send the remainder, because of their medical problems and due to the low general education preparation, to the military construction detachments and units of the Railroad Troops.

Clearly the efforts of the military commissariats alone are insufficient to resolve the problems of preparing the northerners for military service. Moreover, there are questions which they simply cannot solve. Recently, for example, there has been an increasing number of appeals to the oblast military commissariat from the parents of inductees of the small peoples of the North requesting that their sons not be called up for military service. The problem is that due to the small number, for instance, of Nenets, there is no one to work as reindeer herders, and this means that entire reindeer herds are on the brink of extinction. Here the parents refer to the legislative enactments approved by the members of parliament of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where certain categories of shepherds are released from induction. This same problem in terms of the nationalities of the Far North was raised, as is known, at the recent 6th Congress of Russian People's Deputies. However, there are still no legislative enactments on this question. This markedly complicates the situation and the work of the military commissariats. While over the last 2 years, Tyumen Oblast, the only one in the Siberian MD, has fully met its quota for dispatching the draft contingent to the troops, during the current spring it will be difficult to do this. I am not a fan of dramatizing the situation. In the oblast there have been no instances of an open boycott of induction. A predominant majority of the parents of the inductees understands the situation. However a new, very alarming trend has been spotted. The leaders of enterprises and organizations as well as certain parents have declared that since there is no Russian law on universal military service, they have the right to make their own adjustments in the spring induction campaign. In particular, the management of the Tyumen Battery Plant in a letter to the oblast military commissariat informed us of a reduction of the military registration desk and correspondingly in its staff. They reasoned that if such a subdivision is required by the military commissariat in the enterprise's structure, then let it pay for its upkeep. Some leaders have begun, in the absence of the above-indicated law, to present a bill to the oblast military commissariat for providing transport to deliver the inductees to the assembly points and for providing technical workers for the induction centers. While previously the corresponding decision of executive authority was accepted both in the oblast as well as on the spot, at present, due to the ambiguity in allocating the draftee resources on the CIS level as well as the flaws

in the budget, a hitch has developed. In truth, recently the induction and its financing in Tyumen, Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk and the autonomous districts have been put under the personal control of the heads of the administrations. But this does not mean that we should rely solely on the "kind uncle." We must have a legislative enactment which would not only systematize induction, but would also define the rights and obligations of all persons responsible for carrying out this state task.

Military Official on Planned Wage Increases

92UM1018A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 May 92 First edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel V. Rudik, chief of the Directorate for Labor and Wages of Blue- and White-Collar Workers of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin: "Wages Are Being Increased, but According to Different Schedules"]

[Text] B. Rudik, chief of the Directorate for Labor and Wages of Blue- and White-Collar Workers of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, comments on this matter.

[Altunin] Viktor Antonovich, on 15 April 1992 the President of the Russian Federation signed Decree No. 391, which increases the rates and salary scales for workers with budget-financed establishments and organizations in the 2nd quarter of 1992. Does this decree also apply to blue- and white-collar workers of the army and navy?

[Rudik] In accordance with the decree rates and salary scales are being increased for blue- and white-collar workers of military units and establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of the CIS Joint Armed Forces which are financed out of the budget.

[Altunin] What is the schedule for effecting these raises?

[Rudik] As of 1 May 1992 for workers (civilian) in the leading occupations at military medical establishments (subunits), military educational institutions, schools, boarding schools, boarding houses and adult-education facilities, as well as all blue- and white-collar workers with military units, establishments, enterprises and organizations with budget-estimate financing located within the Komi SSR and Kemerovo Oblast.

As of 1 June 1992 for the other workers (civilian) of military units, establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations, including agencies of military administration which are financed out of the budget.

[Altunin] Tell me, please, how will this be implemented on the practical level?

[Rudik] Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, issued Order No. 187 covering this matter on 7 May 1992. It specifies the requirements set for officials with respect to increasing

rates and salary scales. The order has been made public and sent to the troops in a telegram from the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

[Altunin] And what will be the situation of blue- and white-collar workers of economically accountable enterprises of the CIS Joint Armed Forces?

[Rudik] How this matter is decided will depend entirely upon the results of the performance of enterprises and organizations and the availability of their own funds for wages. The Law of the RSFSR on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity extends to them great authority to establish the forms, systems and amounts of wages, monetary awards, benefits, compensation, supplementary payments and the wage regulation system, based on price increases, inflation and so forth. All of these matters must be specified in collective agreements concluded between the workers, represented by their union, and the administration of the economically accountable enterprises (organizations).

In addition, economically accountable enterprises (organizations) may specify in their collective agreements better labor and socioeconomic terms than the standards and provisions established by law, taking their economic possibilities into account: additional leave, pension increments, early retirement, compensation for transportation and temporary-duty assignments, paid or partially paid meals for workers in production and for their children at schools and preschool establishments, and other additional benefits and compensation.

Since the minimum wage is now 900 rubles per month, the government of the RF [Russian Federation] has instructed three ministries—finance, economics, labor and employment—to work out the procedure for defining the standard amount of outlays for workers at economically accountable enterprises (organizations) to be used for calculating income taxes, or any other system for regulating the funds spent on wages (consumption). After a decision is adopted on this matter, the procedure will also be sent to economically accountable enterprises (organizations) of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

[Altunin] Incidentally, does the Law on Increasing the Minimum Wage apply to blue- and white-collar workers of the CIS Joint Armed Forces?

[Rudik] Yes, unquestionably. The minimum wage of 900 rubles per month (not counting supplementary payments and increments, as well as bonuses and other stimulatory payments) established by this law will take effect for workers (civilian) of military units and establishments, military educational (educational) institutions, enterprises and organizations with budget-estimate financing, simultaneously with the 1.8-fold increase in rates and salary scales. It will take effect for workers (civilian) of economically accountable enterprises and organizations beginning on 1 June 1992, as they come up with their own funds for these purposes.

Profile of Transcaucasus MD Deputy Commander Beppayev*92UM1027A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 May 92 First Edition pp 1, 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major P. Karapetyan: "The 'Hot Spot' General"]

[Text] The Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasus MD, Lt Gen Sufnyan Beppayev could not shift or particularly put off his trip to Abovyan. The explosions at the dumps in Balaovit had exacerbated the already complex situation in Armenia. There were politicians there who had rushed to accuse the military. The military supposedly had set off the ammunition in order not to leave it for the republic. There was an immediate investigation of the incident. Acts of provocation could not be excluded. The district command was particularly concerned by one other dump located not far from Abovyan. It was here that Beppayev went to supervise how the guarding of the dump could be strengthened. But ahead of him—and with the blessing of certain mass information media—ran the rumor: "The general is going to blow up the dump!"

...A bearded man in an Afghan jacket watched Beppayev from the territory of the unit, and several other men similar to him in appearance were positioned outside it, in a nearby forest. Sufnyan Uzenrovich "had their number" instantly, but did not given any importance to their obvious surveillance, as during the incomplete three years of service in the Transcaucasus in the position of deputy commander, he had grown used to such scrutiny. At a different time the general would have found the time to talk with that bearded man, as he understood that it certainly was not honest curiosity which brought him to the dumps, but time was short. Beppayev just had time to receive the reports, issue orders and supervise their execution. But the bearded man, in watching the general, interpreted everything in his own way, thinking that they were about to prepare an explosion. And the others in the forest received the signal... They were waiting for Beppayev on the road from Abovyan to Yerevan. The vehicle in which he was returning to the staff of the 7th Army, having traveled a couple of kilometers beyond the checkpoint, was hit by two bullets from a sniper rifle. The driver-reenlisted man hit the brakes. After recovering from what had happened an instant before, he merely said:

"Comrade General, I can't serve any more in this manner. I am going home to Vologda..."

The sniper knew his business. Beppayev was saved by chance as the Volga was traveling at a speed of 30 kmh while the lead was obviously figured for some 70 kmh.

Lt Gen Beppayev received his Transcaucasus baptism not on the Abovyan—Yerevan Highway, but a bit less than three years ago, when, having just assumed the post, he was sent for talks with the guerrillas who in Tbilisi had seized the SKA [Academy Sport Club] Stadium, the

building of the military hunting society and the administrative building of the Higher Artillery Command School. The starting point of the talks was set by the guerrillas: you are the occupier, and here everything is ours, and so no one is stopping you from going back to Georgia. This all was said with emotion. If it were not for the general's epaulets, they would have seized him by the lapels.

Incidentally about those epaulets... Once they did not even consider the age of Sufnyan Uzenrovich, and they disregarded the traditional respect in the Caucasus for older persons. With their automatic rifles slung at their sides, they said "General, accept our demands or else..." But he did not go back on his word, although he realized that anything could happen. He did not flinch, he did not deviate from what he had said—to return to the district all the illegally seized facilities, and the guerrillas could only accept his conditions. It was not more than two days after the talks when such an accident befell Beppayev that one wonders how he escaped. A truckdriver smashed headlong into his Volga and its front was cut off as with a knife...

Sufnyan Uzenrovich Beppayev had bid farewell to the Caucasus in 1977 and—as he thought at that time—forever. Behind him were eight years of service in the Transcaucasus MD and ahead was the General Staff Military Academy. Although the district to which he had given so much was never considered a prestigious one, he left it not without regret. Here Beppayev had moved up in service from battalion commander to the chief of staff of a division. Was it hard? Yes. Who has ever found things easy in the Transcaucasus? Whatever you take, you have to adjust to everything. To the mountains where they predominantly carried out the combat training programs. To the climate which was torrid in the summer and in the winter the wind and snow were the equals of Russian ones. And the garrisons? You could only reach them by horseback and even then not year round.

Returning a little more than 10 years later to the Transcaucasus as a general, Sufnyan Uzenrovich realized that it had grown even worse for someone serving here. The mountains? They now fired on you, and they had become the refuge of the guerrillas, but what sort of romantic life is it if an officer takes a car on a trip and does not know at what kilometer he will be fired on or taken hostage? And what about the constant worry for the family? It is a good thing if it is possible to send the wife and children to relatives. If there is no such opportunity, then you have to count on fate to keep you and your home safe from disaster. If it does not do this, then it is not fate. Like Maj Vladimir Berklov who was shot at the door of his apartment. Like Lt Col Oleg Larionov with a bullet hitting the battalion commander in Nagorno-Karabakh. Like Lt Oleg Babak, Hero of the Soviet Union, who fell in an unequal battle.

In Moscow, in receiving his orders for the new post, Beppayev heard:

"We are counting greatly on you, Sufnyan Uzenrovich, on your knowledge of the particular service features in the region."

You do not dismiss 8 years of your life, but he had to become reacquainted with the Transcaucasus.

With the roads of Nagorno-Karabakh with their crowds of refugees fleeing their homes, with the ruins of Stepanakert, with the blockaded Tskhinvali... Did he really know the Transcaucasus with its tight knots of contradictions, bleeding and with broken human fates? A military man never felt himself to be a stranger here. Even several years ago, if you went into a store in uniform, they would always let you go to the front, however long the line was. On the street you had merely to raise your hand and the driver of the very first vehicle would take you where you wanted and would not ask a kopeck. It was simply impossible to pass by the window of a house where a noisy meal was in progress as you would be invited in, wined and dined and sent off in peace with "Come again, dear!"

You would not forget this just as you would not forget the taking of hostages, the death of your comrades and the raids on the dumps with weapons, equipment and ammunition. You didn't know where to start...

There were those who shook their fists, the hotheads who let themselves go with the shout "What are we waiting for? Let us return fire for fire to teach them for the future!" But if the military had let themselves go, if they had given way to their emotions, then inevitably they would have been drawn into the fiery maelstrom. So they restrained themselves under the hail of bullets, lies and slander, they kept their neutrality, but not following the principle "I have nothing to do with this," but rather in the desire to more quickly put an end to the bloodshed and show that disputed questions could and must be settled differently. In truth, there was no instantaneous result. The provocations continued, and at present no one is protected against them, even the women and children. During a recent attack on the dumps in Gyandzha, the wives and children of the officers were taken hostage. And then everything was settled (how many times does this make?) by exhausting talks.

This was not out of weakness (the district was not afraid but only in exceptionally extreme cases did it show force). This is an example for other statesmen to be guided solely by reason and to measure any phenomenon by this. The knots of contradictions can be undone much more handily by the tongue and not the teeth. Of course it was no accident that Lt Gen Beppayev became the authorized representative of the district in such talks. Here they considered the personal qualities of Sufnyan Uzenrovich: his experience in life, the ability to hear out any viewpoint, even if this contradicted your own, and also his discretion.

In the district he was called wise Sufnyan to his face. Tskhinvali, Stepanakert, Baku, Yerevan, Sukhumi—this is a far from complete list of the "hot spots" where

Sufnyan Uzenrovich had to conduct talks and calm passions. How many times did his office become the meeting place for both state leaders as well as the representatives of the newly formed ministries of defense of the Transcaucasus republics. And the people who just yesterday considered each other to be implacable enemies, sought out and found certain points of contact. Then the weapons fell silent and the Caucasus took a rest from war.

How many times has he been phoned from the hot spots: "Sufnyan Uzenrovich, please get in touch with Tskhinvali (Yerevan, Baku, Sukhumi and so forth and so forth), and help settle a question." Sufnyan Uzenrovich called up, he persuaded and provided proof. Who now would take it upon himself to count up how many senseless conflicts had been prevented by Beppayev and how many lives he had saved!

The Caucasus is unpredictable. Here it is possible to fall painfully and it is also possible to soar high. As it was, Sufnyan Uzenrovich could have become neither more nor less than the president of a state. This is what happened. At the very peak of the well-known events in Tbilisi (if you wish to be more accurate, on 26 December of last year), Lt Gen Beppayev flew to Nalchik. Not to see his relatives and numerous acquaintances, although Sufnyan Uzenrovich was a native of Kabardino-Balkaria (he was born and grew up in the village of Verkhniy Chegem), as then it was not the most suitable time, as you understand, for courtesy calls.

He was called home for a reason and the reason was a pressing one: someone in the republic had started the rumor, and the people believed this, that Lt Gen Beppayev supported the desire of the Balkars for separation and had even agreed to become the president of the future Balkar Republic. This was an outright misuse of the general's name, a desire to purposely use his authority for encouraging the centrifugal processes in the republic. And his authority in Kabardino-Balkaria was very high. Just one characteristic feature: they knew of his arrival in the republic but the leadership in Nalchik kept the date of Beppayev's arrival secret. Thus, as they later explained it, they wanted to avoid a major stir.

Beppayev talked with the republic leadership and with those who were demanding separation from Kabarda. Had Beppayev said "Yes, I am in favor of separation," he would have been elected the first president in the history of the Balkars. (This was a great enticement. Our times know examples when the generals have said "yes.") But Sufnyan Uzenrovich directed the conversation to a different question, to the fact that here people over the ages had lived together and to separate would mean to cut to the heart and to move to bloodshed.

The talks were very grave and lasted an entire day and night with short breaks. Beppayev was as unyielding as, incidentally, his opponents. Later he spoke on television, he took part in a meeting of the leaders of the rural soviets and there again expressed his categorical protest

against the splitting of the republic. After this, he was accused of lack of patriotism, and the demand was made to repudiate his own words. But Beppayev remained Beppayev. Thus the circumstances can change for the "hot spot" general, but his principles of life—never.

And the Caucasus immediately tested them. With the whistle of bullets. With a difficult compromise. With suppressed hostility...

I shall not take it upon myself to judge how the fate of Gen Beppayev will develop in the future. It is an unreliable undertaking to guess the future in our complicated times. I know one thing. As long as Sufnyan Uzenrovich is here in the Transcaucasus MD, his peace-making mission will be continued. As before things are not calm in the Transcaucasus. Who knows how many lives the "hot spot" general will still save, how many tight knots of conflict he will unravel and how many tragedies he will prevent. I wish him success in this!

CIS: POLICY

Legal Official on Defense, Security Issues

924C1462A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 18, May 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with A. Kotenkov, deputy chief of the Department of Constitutional Law of the President of Russia in charge of questions of security and defense, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Uglanov; place and date not given: "On the Third Strategic Line"]

[Text] A decree on the creation of a Russian army has just been signed. But it will be some time yet before all soldiers and officers march under new banners and, perhaps, change uniform. Meanwhile the army lives in the present. Our correspondent A. Uglanov met with A. Kotenkov, deputy chief of the Department of Constitutional Law of the president of Russia in charge of questions of security and defense.

[Uglanov] Are you aware that our neighbors have begun to display concern in connection with the redeployment of forces from Germany toward their borders?

[Kotenkov] Until recently our defense was deployed fully westward and was constructed in echelonment in depth. The first attack echelon was deployed in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. It has now practically disappeared. This was followed by the second attack echelon. This was the Baltic, Byelarus, and Ukraine. It also, as is known, is being wound down. The third was on the territory of Russia and was held in reserve. It was contemplated deploying it in a period of the threat of or in the event of the commencement of war. We are not yet in a position to recognize that the border should be liquidated. And it is perfectly natural that the forces which are being withdrawn are being deployed evenly throughout the territory of the European part of Russia, starting from the Kola peninsula.

[Uglanov] In connection with the fact that the Caucasus has become an explosive region for Russia, is some armed barrier on the border of the southern part of Russia and the Caucasus being formed?

[Kotenkov] Undoubtedly. It is not a question, of course, of the purposive creation of some militarized barrier, as you put it. The forces being withdrawn from the West are being deployed more or less evenly from the Kola peninsula to North Caucasus. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that newcomer units will be deployed in Stavropol, Krasnodar Kray, and Rostov Oblast.

Point two: It is a fact that the situation in the Transcaucasus is not improving in the least. The forces (under Russia's jurisdiction) stationed there are in a very difficult position. Attempts to capture equipment and arms and attacks on the army units continue. Our people are dying. An officer of ours died quite recently in Tbilisi, as a result of which there was quite serious unrest among the students of an academy, of which he was a graduate. The question is: Unless the unlawful actions against our forces in the Transcaucasus cease, it will, most likely, be necessary to withdraw them. Not to Siberia or the Far East, naturally. The assignments confronting them would be the same. The forces would remain in the vicinity of the Caucasus.

[Uglanov] When, according to your forecasts, will the border forces from other republics be transferred to the borders between them and Russia?

[Kotenkov] I would like to specify immediately that we are not interested in Russia having full-scale, army-protected borders on our territory. It should not be forgotten that practically one-third of the Russian population lives in these republics, and drawing borders between us is, at the least, immoral. And economically disadvantageous besides. But, on the other hand, we are losing hundreds of millions of rubles on account of the fact that we lack full-fledged borders.

So we are currently confronted with four tasks. First, the immediate establishment of full-scale borders, guarded by troops and with customs posts and visa control, with the Baltic states. It is the absence of such borders which is causing us the greatest economic harm. It is because of the transparency of the borders here that what we could ourselves be selling overseas at world prices, the Balts are selling. And obtaining colossal profit here, and we are losing out.

The second task: a solution of the question with the states which have decided on the creation of their own border forces. These are primarily Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. They do not guarantee observance of common border practices. Azerbaijan, for instance, has established simplified passage across the border with Iran and Turkey. Moldova has established the same conditions with Romania. As a result the citizens of these states can get to the territory of Azerbaijan and Moldova freely, without any particular difficulty. Given the complete absence of borders with us, they are moving

further and doing as they please. We already have examples of citizens of Iran and Turkey having moved freely around the territory of the former USSR and, to our great regret, not always with peaceful purposes. Unless these states can guarantee observance of a common border regime, we must decide the question of its closure.

The third task is relations with the states which are forming their own border forces, but which agree to the establishment of a common borders regime. These are Byelarus and Uzbekistan. We have good enough relations with them, and, as far as I know, they are prepared under the leadership of some common coordinating body to establish and observe a single external border regime.

And, finally, the fourth task—our relations with states not forming their own border forces. These are at the present time Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

[Uglanov] Have tactical and other nuclear weapons been withdrawn from the Transcaucasus? I have information that they are still there.

[Kotenkov] No, these weapons were withdrawn from there long ago, last year. But there is no question but that they were there.

[Uglanov] You are aware, of course, that in Crimea General Kuznetsov, who disagrees with his dismissal, has declared a hunger strike.

[Kotenkov] We simply have no influence here, unfortunately. Only by way of negotiations. But from the purely human standpoint General Kuznetsov's behavior can only be welcomed. We have information that the question: "Are you prepared to fight Russia?" is standard at the time of officer certification in Ukraine.

[Uglanov] And is this question being put to Russian officers?

[Kotenkov] This is precisely the point, after all, Kuznetsov is a Russian officer. It is a provocative question. But such actions are not only being addressed to specific persons. The organ of the Ukrainian National Assembly, UKRAINSKI OBRIL, writes as follows about the role of the Andreyev flag, which is sacred for the Russian sailor: "For 200 years the Andreyev flag covered up the rottenness of the Russian Empire. Now they want it to cover up the cretinism of the CIS. Enough!"

But, generally speaking, I do not believe that the Ukrainian people are capable of adopting a hostile attitude toward Russia. We may speak, therefore, of a wholly negligible, reckless group of Ukrainian nationalists, chiefly of a Western Ukrainian persuasion. And unless there is a change in the very near future in the present policy course, I believe that big internal upheavals await Ukraine.

[Uglanov] Are conscripts being drafted for Russia from other republics?

[Kotenkov] Not as yet. Although at the recent council of defense ministers on 28-29 April, which was held in Moscow, it was a question of a number of CIS states being prepared to make their conscripts available for service in the CIS Joint Armed Forces, on the territory of Russia included.

[Uglanov] Will Cossack units be formed in the sphere of the Don Army?

[Kotenkov] There is no fully finished concept of the organizational development of the Russian armed forces as yet. A struggle of ideas is under way, and I would not care to dwell on this. But such an aspect of military organizational development is possible. It could be a question of professional reserves. Within the framework of such a professional reserve I wholly allow of the possibility of the existence of Cossack units. With the observance of Cossack traditions, sole responsibility, firm discipline and, possibly, paid service. Such a version is possible.

[Uglanov] And, finally, rumors, perhaps, have reached me to the effect that up until recently a number of top scientists had been enlisted in a study of UFO's at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense. I am talking about some fragments or whole "articles," which are being kept secret in hangars and undergoing tests.

[Kotenkov] Work is being performed on the global monitoring of space and the air space on the territory of the former Soviet Union. All unidentified flying objects are recorded. Any object entering the field of vision of our early warning stations is, of course, monitored. But I have not heard of any objects being stored and studied anywhere.

Readers' Poll Assesses Military Press

92UM1031A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank G. Loza, candidate of philosophical sciences: "How the Military Reader Assesses His Own Press"]

[Text] In March-April of this year, the Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research of the CIS Combined Armed Forces conducted several polls of servicemen in which questions were asked about the work of the military mass media. The polls were conducted in all services and branches of the armed forces on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The results of the polls show that although the military press recently has been reflecting increasingly more broadly and diversely issues associated with the life and activities of the armed forces, the attitude of soldiers of

the Army and Navy, above all regular servicemen, towards the work of newspapers and journals can be assessed as ambiguous.

Those polled believe the following have improved their work: the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (85 percent); the weekly SYN OTECHESTVA (74 percent); and the journals SOVETSKIY VOIN (93 percent), ARMIYA (65 percent), and TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL (60 percent). Those polled believe that the journal ARMIYA I KULTURA (60 percent) has worsened. Still, the majority of officers and warrant officers favored preserving only the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN in the future. The rating for the rest of the mass media was considerably lower. Only one out of every three polled favored retaining the journal ARMIYA; one out of every four favored retaining the weekly SYN OTECHESTVA. Servicemen polled feel the least demand for the journals ARMIYA I KULTURA and TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL.

Taking into account the specific nature and orientation of the publications of the services of the armed forces and also the fact that they are read basically by the representatives of these services, data from the poll of officers and warrant officers on their attitude towards "their" journals are revealing.

Among all those polled, the majority of the votes were cast for the journal VOYENNNYY VESTNIK (56 percent), 43 percent of aviators polled favored continuation of AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, 37 percent of the navymen favored MORSKOY SBORNIK, and only 27 percent of air defense servicemen would like to read VESTNIK PVO in the future.

Among regular readers of these publications, more than half of the servicemen note that only the activities of one of the journals—VESTNIK PVO—have changed for the worse. The rest, in the opinion of the majority of readers, have improved their work and the content of articles (MORSKOY SBORNIK—86 percent; AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA—78 percent; VOYENNNYY VESTNIK—77 percent).

What are the reasons for the dissatisfaction of servicemen with the work of central and service organs of the military press?

Two-thirds of the readers of newspapers and journals cited timeliness of the articles. Those polled gave low ratings to the language and style of the articles. One out of every five believes that there is a difference between word and deed. Readers of the journals VESTNIK PVO and AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA expressed many complaints about the presentation of materials, the line of reasoning of theses and facts, and the subject matter of articles.

Some 44 percent of the readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, up to 25 percent of the readers of VESTNIK PVO, and up to 40 percent of the readers of VOYENNNYY VESTNIK polled believe that the effectiveness

of the timely materials being published is low and that officials limit themselves merely to noncommittal answers to critical articles. On the average, only one out of every five readers noted that effective steps are taken based on articles in newspapers and journals, about which the editorial office informs the readers.

One out of every three KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers polled noted that the newspaper is inferior to a number of central publications (IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY) in objectiveness in covering events, practicality of articles, their relevant timeliness, and the form of presentation of materials.

The servicemen did not ignore the activities of district (fleet) newspapers and newspapers having a large circulation. Their attitude towards them is also quite ambiguous.

Thus, whereas nearly three-fourths of those polled consider the further work of district (group, fleet), army, and flotilla newspapers necessary, less than half of their regular readers displayed interest in publications having a large circulation (in addition, about one-third believe they are not necessary at all).

The data from the polls show that servicemen of the Army and Navy expect more aggressive actions from their press to protect the honor and dignity of officers. They note the influence of the press on forming a healthy public opinion regarding the armed forces is not identical to the existing capabilities. More than 80 percent of those polled stated this. In the opinion of 60 percent of the readers, the Army and Navy press does not propagandize sufficiently enough the best traditions of the Army and Navy and the heroic nature of military service.

Readers also believe that there should be more articles about events in regions of heightened social and ethnic tension. They suggest informing readers more extensively about the training of military specialists in foreign armies and telling about professional armies, about mutual relations between the army and local authorities, the army and the population, and the army and various informal movements and organizations, and about the armed forces' participation in carrying out national economic tasks.

Those polled recommend publishing more often letters from readers and letters from parents. They desire more text and fewer pictures and believe it is necessary to struggle for further extending the circulation among the local population.

Many servicemen propose taking steps to consolidate the forces of the public and the mass media for propagandizing the best traditions of the Army and Navy and to use preparations for the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War for this purpose.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Aircraft Shortage, Training Problems in Volga-Urals MD

92UM1020A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Vetakh under the "Problems of Our Time" rubric: "Waiting for an Aircraft: Combat Pilots Await Their Turn"]

[Text] The regular flight operations shift in Aviation Regiment X was getting off to a bad start. To be more accurate, it was experiencing all kinds of poor coordination and obstacles. Senior Lieutenant V. Kostenko was obviously taking the takeoff delay to heart. The flight was something he needed - his life's blood, to keep the interval between his flights from becoming too prolonged. If this would be the case, he would have to relearn his flying skills, starting from scratch. Something came up in the aircraft: The bombsight and navigation system had developed a failure.

It must be admitted that the situation in Kostenko's squadron had indeed become difficult. Quite a few pilots were not fully ready to carry out combat training missions. Three crew commanders had experienced lengthy flight delays at night and in the landing and takeoff minimums, and in individual types of combat flying.

"The aircraft situation here is really like a free-for-all," Senior Lieutenant Kostenko told me after the flight. "You should see how emotions flare up when we are preparing our little 'plan.' Every pilot and flight commander thinks that his problems are the most important; what happens is that everyone keeps 'pulling the blanket over to his side.' What else is there to do? All these gyrations are being caused by the growing number of pilots arriving from Air Force units undergoing reductions and, for other reasons, from various areas of the former USSR. The aircraft pool, however, remains the same."

All the above naturally exerts a negative influence on the level of professional training of flight personnel. Many pilots are put into the position of climbing aboard an aircraft only on an irregular basis, thus causing them to lose their skills and wind up at a lower level of combat readiness and flight safety.

In this connection, I recall a statement recently made by CIS Air Force Commander Colonel General P. Deynekin to the effect that we have taken the arms reductions down to the point where in some places one aircraft must suffice for five pilots.

Nevertheless, difficult as it may be, authorities of the Air Force and Volga-Urals Military District aviation, remembering the bitter experience of the 1960s, are taking all possible measures to retain aviators of all specialties on the rolls.

"That is quite a difficult thing to do," reasoned Colonel Ye. Yakovlev, senior check pilot of the District Air Force. "I have devoted many years to aviation and have seen quite a bit. But my heart bleeds when I see experienced combat pilots forced to take a discharge—experienced men whose training cost the state enormous amounts of money. To discard someone you need, to discharge people very much in their prime, or offer a helicopter commander to serve out his time in some kind of job in a support or communications battalion - Is that a solution to the problem?"

We of course do as much as our capabilities permit to maintain the level of flight training of crews, of teaching staffs in schools, and of experienced pilots capable of carrying out missions under the most difficult conditions of weather and tactics.

However, this, in my opinion, is a problem that cannot be resolved at the level of a regiment or district. If Russia does need professional, highly qualified pilots, then it is necessary to have a suitable state program, one which would make it possible not only to retain the flight cadre, but would also offer them the opportunity for professional growth and complete mastery of skills. As the situation now stands, many pilots have their wings clipped.

CIS: NAVY

V-Adm Kuzmin on Naval Combat Training

92UM0997A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 3, Mar 92 (signed to press
27 Mar 92) pp 3-6

[Interview with Vice Adm A. Kuzmin, deputy commander of the Navy for combat training, by Capt 3d Rank Ye. Privalov, MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent; place and date not given: "Combat Training Today"]

[Text] No matter how events in the country and abroad develop, the Navy continues to protect the maritime borders of the fatherland, constantly maintaining its combat readiness at the proper level. Vice Admiral A. Kuzmin, deputy commander of the Navy for combat training, answers questions from our journalist on what problems are arising for the Navy in connection with the breakup of the USSR.

[Privalov] How do you see combat training of the Navy in today's conditions, and during the period of creating bodies of combat training and military and moral-psychological education?

[Kuzmin] In the present situation of profound reforming of the armed forces, their reduction, conversion of the defense industry, the decrease in appropriations for maintaining and developing the Army and Navy, and the deep economic crisis, it is becoming extremely difficult to resolve problems of combat training qualitatively.

However, despite this situation, combat training was and remains the basic form of activities of the naval forces during peacetime. Its main task, as before, is to prevent a decrease in their level of training, teamwork, and combat readiness.

Today, a great responsibility has been placed on combat training bodies in connection with the emergence of economic, financial, and other restrictions in conducting it. Taking these complexities into account, combat training for 1992 has been planned with special care. It calls for a considerable increase in an element such as base large unit exercises.

This form makes it possible to train the large unit command and staffs, ships, and their command departments at a base at multilevel exercises, and also (through operations groups) to organize cooperation with large units intended for accomplishing general combat missions.

Base exercises are planned to be conducted under the direction of senior chiefs both at the regular command posts of large units and ships and at training centers on simulators, using communications equipment and elements of battle management fully, beginning with the stage of preparing for combat operations and up to carrying out the assigned missions with subsequent building down of forces or their redeployment to other axes.

However, everything, naturally, cannot be studied at the base. Therefore, the basic goal of the base large unit exercises is comprehensive preparation of ships, staffs, and large units for carrying out missions at sea so as to achieve the maximum effectiveness of measures being conducted with the least expenditure of resources of ships and training time at two-sided tactical exercises with comprehensive use of the entire arsenal of weapons.

We consider a priority direction to be the training of groups, large units, and groupings in close cooperation with one another and with other branches of the armed forces, accomplishing a common mission in accordance with their combat or operational tasking. The basic form of combat training at sea will be a two-sided maritime battle using weapons in a duel situation by all opposing forces with their comprehensive combat support. All this will make it possible to concentrate as much as possible efforts on training the combat-ready forces of the fleets in the composition in which they are ordered to carry out combat missions. At the same time, it is planned to reduce individual training of ships and submarines to reasonable levels, and conduct it when they are brought into constant combat-ready forces and also when practicing individual operations in accordance with combat tasking.

In connection with the creation of bodies for combat training and military and moral-psychological education, our directorates and departments are charged with specific tasks for moral-psychological and humanities training. It should be noted that these tasks did not

emerge only recently. Even a cursory glance at military history shows that the moral-psychological factor and the level of education of personnel were also and remain very important component parts of the combat potential of any military collective. That is why moral-psychological training was conducted and is being conducted in close unity with military education and all combat training. In today's conditions, however, problems of moral-psychological education and humanities training are acquiring a new and very important significance. The ability to understand and analyze fundamentally new socio-psychological processes and phenomena in our country and Navy and to think creatively—this must be inherent in the new type of leader. In addition, we must not forget that responsibility for educating honest and dedicated defenders of the homeland, true fighters and patriots capable of enduring all the rigors of military service, must lie at the basis of moral-psychological training of all personnel. Therefore, work to strengthen the morale of personnel continues to remain at the forefront, and is one of the main criteria in assessing the combat capability of fleet forces. Humanities training is now becoming a mandatory subject of instruction for all servicemen regardless of their political views or religious and other convictions. It is aimed at forming in fighting men high moral-psychological and military-professional knowledge. The primary content of the new subject should be to form in-depth and sound knowledge on the history of the fatherland and combat traditions of the Army and Navy, increase the level of legal culture, and motivate servicemen towards irreproachable fulfillment of the requirements of the military oath, military regulations, and moral standards of behavior.

All of this is also the subject and concern of the combat training bodies in the new training year and particular features of work in conditions of reforming the armed forces and transforming the political structures of our society.

[Privalov] In connection with the formation of sovereign states, a question arises about the possibilities of using combat training ranges in the Baltic and Black seas. How will questions of combat training be resolved in these conditions?

[Kuzmin] The concept of a combat training range envisions special equipment in a specific area of water or land. The majority of existing ranges of the Navy are sea areas periodically used by ships and vessels of the Navy for conducting exercises and having no equipment at all. If the combat training plan calls for conducting firing exercises, a given area is declared temporarily hazardous for navigation by ships and aircraft in accordance with international maritime law. With the development of the Navy, the system of naval training ranges has also grown, and the various restrictions on navigation have also increased.

The Baltic and Black seas are important objects of industrial-economic and political-diplomatic activities

of the states. As the opportunities for using ocean resources have expanded and the socio-political activeness of the states has increased, the rules for mutual relations at sea have become more complicated. In this regard, a significant number of areas creating restrictions to navigation were eliminated by decision of the Main Staff of the USSR Navy in 1989.

Today, a system of combat training areas exists on the water areas of the Baltic and Black seas which calls for a minimum of restrictions on navigation and fishing. At the same time, most of these areas, on the Baltic Sea for example, most often used for conducting combat training of ships, are located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Baltic states or in waters adjacent to the territory of Russia. These combat training areas are used in accordance with generally recognized norms of international maritime law and legislative acts in force. Further use of them is linked primarily to resolving the question of the status of the Baltic Fleet and whether it will stay on the territory of the sovereign Baltic states.

During the upcoming talks on the basic issues regulating the stay of the Baltic Fleet forces at the existing bases, those questions associated with using the territorial waters of the coastal states for combat training needs near the base locations of the forces will also be resolved. But even if the Baltic Fleet forces are totally withdrawn from the territory of the Baltic states, the water area of the open sea and the waters adjacent to the territory of Russia will make it possible to organize full combat training of all fleet forces, naturally, with strict observance of generally recognized norms of international maritime law.

[Privalov] Today, ships are being deactivated from the Navy faster than new ships are being built, primarily due to a decrease in appropriations for development of the Navy. In this regard, how is it planned to maintain a high level of combat readiness of the Navy and what kind of missions (possibly altered) will arise for the fleets?

[Kuzmin] The effective combat strength of the Navy is being reduced by deactivating ships, submarines, and auxiliary vessels that have been in service for a set number of years and whose repair is not expedient, and also ships that have lost their value to the Navy for various reasons. Although the quantitative composition of the fleets is being reduced in connection with the decrease in appropriations for development of the Navy, the ships newly arriving from industry are considerably superior to their predecessors in combat capabilities. In addition, problems of logistical and technical support, particularly ship repair, earlier (prior to the reduction in effective combat strength of the Navy) were resolved with great difficulties, and basing of ships was very difficult. All of these are components of combat readiness of fleet forces, without which it is impossible to accomplish the missions qualitatively. Today, despite the fact that the problems of basing and logistical and technical support are far from fully resolved and, again, financing of these measures has been cut sharply, the

possibilities for improving support of ships are more realistic in connection with the reduction in their numbers (of course, unless financing is halted altogether or is reduced to unacceptable levels). Taking this into account, it is planned to resolve issues of maintaining the combat readiness of fleet forces at the required level along the following directions:

1. Increasing the combat capabilities of ships and submarines by upgrading the effective combat strength of the fleets with modern ships.
2. Modernizing ships during scheduled repairs.
3. Introducing into combat training practice new tactics for using the weapons and equipment of ships being accepted from industry and also entering the force composition of the fleets.
4. Improving the quality of combat training and reducing accidents.
5. Comprehensive support of combat training with simulators and training equipment based on personal computers and modern machine programs and methods.
6. Improving the system of basing, ship repair, and other types of support.
7. Strengthening military discipline and organizing duty in the process of combat, moral-psychological, and humanities training.

As far as the missions assigned to the fleets are concerned, they have changed significantly. The missions are defensive in nature and are aimed at defending and protecting our country from sea and ocean axes in order to repel possible aggression in cooperation with large units and units of other branches of the armed forces operating on maritime axes.

[Privalov] Good support is always necessary for full-value combat training: targets, missiles, aircraft, and so forth. However, these things are becoming increasingly fewer in number; there even is not enough fuel. What ways do you see of solving such problems?

Questions of supporting combat training measures today are seriously complicated, above all, due to the reduction in fuel allocations and shortages of various types of targets for weapons training. The ship repair shortage and restricting the limit of service life of ships, weapons, and equipment also make it difficult to conduct combat training using a large force, and force us to cut back on such measures. But there are no hopeless situations, and we will strive somehow to reduce the adverse effect of the lack of various resources and materials through qualitative planning, increasing base training, and making exercises at sea more complicated with mandatory use of weapons in a duel situation by all component services of the opposing sides. We allow ships to sea only after a thorough inspection of them on shore, practicing a whole series of tasks of combat employment of forces, their command and control, cooperation, and combat

support. We give the advantage to operations as part of groups, task forces, and groupings of forces, which makes it possible on one sortie to carry out a series of combat training missions, support one another, save fuel, conserve the service life of ships and aircraft, increase the effectiveness of using weapons, and at the same time not only not decrease but, on the contrary, increase the quality of the measures being conducted.

All of this is not as simple as it may seem, but the system we have selected for training fleet forces, taking into account the selfless labor of officers and all personnel, makes it possible to carry out combat training tasks at the proper level. There are problems here, too, particularly when individual commanders strive for high marks through oversimplification and decreasing the level of difficulty of combat drills at tactical exercises. But we know how to combat such phenomena and are taking appropriate steps.

The lack of the proper quantity and quality of naval and air targets is a serious shortcoming in combat training. Limited financing precludes not only the development and purchase of new targets but also the repair of targets damaged during weapons training.

One variant of solving the problem of naval targets may be the introduction of equipment for a programmed miss when performing practice missile firings, the development of which is in the final stages. A sufficient number of air targets can be ensured both by creating relatively inexpensive models close in characteristics to modern antiship missiles and by creating reusable air targets. Work is being done in these directions.

In conclusion, it can be said that despite the existing difficulties in supporting combat training measures, a rational solution can always be found by exerting the appropriate efforts. The main thing, thanks to the great desire to do everything as best as we can, is to find the correct way out of the situation that has been created.

In the final analysis, people solve everything. And we have people. And this means that the combat training tasks assigned the Navy for 1992 will be carried out.

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R-Adm Kharko on Goals, Operations of Submariners' Union

92UM0979A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Rear Adm (Res) V. Kharko, chief of the Presidium Staff for the new organization's Central Council, by Capt 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk: "So That The Number of Dives Equals the Number of Surfacing: The Navy Submariners Union Emerges Into the Real World"]

[Text] There is a toast among the submariners: let us raise our glasses so that the number of dives equals the

number of surfacings... The difficult and dangerous nature of submarine service is well known. But something else is also known, and that is, the level of the social protection is, as they say, below the waterline. At present, seemingly, the submariners themselves have come to their own defense.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice has registered a voluntary independent social all-Russian organization to be called the Union Of Navy Submariners and established by a congress of authorized representatives from the Navy units and facilities, the enterprises cooperating with the fleet and a number of social organizations. Our correspondent spoke with the chief of the Presidium Staff of the newly organized Central Council, Rear Adm (Res) V. Kharko.

[Pilipchuk] Vladimir Mikhaylovich [Kharko], what are the specific goals of your Union?

[Kharko] The pooling of efforts and resources on the part of its members for social, economic and legal defense of the submariners on active military service, in the reserves and retired, the officer candidates in military schools, the members of their families and the families of deceased submariners as well as the specialists and enterprises and organizations whose activities are in the sphere of Navy interests. Incidentally, each of them can become an individual member, while Russian organizations may be a collective member of the Union. The Submariners Union has adopted for itself the charter obligation to retrain and find jobs for submariners discharged into the reserves and the members of their families, assisting the Navy Command in special training and the patriotic education of the personnel, developing military science, implementing conversion programs, and recovering and processing wastes formed as a result of Navy activities. We feel it is also our job to propagandize service in the Navy and the submarine fleet.

[Pilipchuk] Such extensive activities will require enormous expenditures. Where is the money to come from?

[Kharko] For carrying out the obligations it has assumed, the Union has begun to set up public-supported and self-financing structures and enterprises which will implement the Union's social programs. In the future, the Union intends to establish an extensive network of production and trade enterprises, associations, stock societies, small enterprises and cooperatives and engage in foreign economic ties for achieving its charter goals...

[Pilipchuk] One can only wish the Union success in these areas. But to what degree do they conform to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces on banning commercial activities in the military administrative bodies, the units and formations of the Army and Navy?

[Kharko] The Submariners Union is a public organization. The Navy administrative structures and the regular

servicemen in the Navy will not be involved in the production and economic activities.

[Pilipchuk] How does the Union intend to provide legal defense? Certainly it is generally considered that any social organization is the most without rights...

[Kharko] The Union has obtained the right of legislative initiative and requesting the abrogating of administrative decisions which are contrary to the law. The specific mechanism for protecting the rights and interests operates through the Russian Parliament, its commissions and committees on the level of participating in the elaboration of all draft laws which in any way involve the submariners and the members of their families...

[Pilipchuk] What is the Union's structure?

[Kharko] The leading bodies are the Central Council and its Presidium. They have begun to set up the primary organizations. One of these is already at work in Paldiski (Estonia), where 85 officers of the CIS Navy have joined the Submariners Club. The Union is open for cooperation with all public and state organizations in Russia, the CIS countries and other states. Our contact telephone is: 204-38-77.

[Pilipchuk] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, the establishing of a staff also requires money. Obviously, as has long been the custom in our country, the staff will be supported by the membership dues.

[Kharko] This has been excluded. For several months now the reserve admirals and officers have been working on the staff on a voluntary basis. The question of paying them will be settled only after the Union begins receiving financial income from production and economic operations. The membership dues will go exclusively for the most immediate social programs and primarily for providing material aid to the neediest submariners, veterans and disabled.

Varyag, Ulyanovsk, Lobov: Will the Fleet Have the Ships?

92UM0998A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 3, Mar 92 (Signed to press
27 Mar 92) pp 66-70

[Round-table discussion with Capt 1st Rank G. Kurakov, N. Vdovenko, N. Serdyuk and V. Shchekin, and Capt 2nd Rank V. Ozerov, specialists with the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy, and Yu. Makarov, director of the Chernomorskiy Shipbuilding Plant, by Capt 1st Rank B. Tyurin, MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent, under the rubric "Equipment and Weapons": "Varyag, Ulyanovsk, Lobov: Will the Fleet Have the Ships?"]

[Text] The difficult internal political situation, the breakup of the nation's unified economic area, unclear prospects for military development, and a drastic cut in

military outlays are the main factors which have considerably exacerbated the problem of preserving and further developing our navy's capability. Everyone knows that "defense adequacy" for the navy means constantly replacing obsolete ships with updated ships more effective in modern combat. Capt 1st Rank B. Tyurin, MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent, discusses how this job is being accomplished today with Capt 1st Rank G. Kurakov, N. Vdovenko, N. Serdyuk and V. Shchekin, and Capt 2nd Rank V. Ozerov, specialists with the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy, and with Yu. Makarov, director of the Chernomorskiy Shipbuilding Plant Production Association (article was readied for the press in December 1991).

B. Tyurin: In the second half of 1991 a vigorous struggle was launched in the open press between proponents and opponents of building aircraft-carrying cruisers (aircraft carriers) in our nation. Openness permitted us to raise the curtain somewhat on what is being built here under orders from the navy. Aircraft carriers are something new for us. Their construction requires highly skilled specialists—both shipbuilders and sailors—and a powerful economic, scientific and defense base. One of our nation's leading shipbuilding complexes, one capable of building the most modern and largest combat ships, heavy aircraft carriers, is located in the city of Nikolayev. Tell us about it.

Capt 1st Rank G. Kurakov, authorized agent of the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy: Nikolayev has existed for more than 200 years as the center for the construction of surface ships in the southern part of our nation. Almost all of the ships built prior to 1917 were sailing ships. Then came steamships and ironclads of the Black Sea Fleet. Under Soviet authority, especially after the measures were implemented to industrialize the nation, Nikolayev shipbuilders not only restored ships and vessels of the young Red Navy most valuable with respect to combat capability, but also set about the construction of large and medium surface ships (light cruisers, destroyers and destroyer leaders) and submarines by way of implementing prewar shipbuilding programs. Construction of the battleship Sovetskaya Ukraina was begun here on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, as well as the hulls of several cruisers of different classes. The war not only thwarted our plans for building a powerful navy but also did great material damage to shipbuilding, most extensively to the shipyards at Nikolayev. In 1946 they had already begun the final construction of a number of ships which had been withdrawn to ports of the Caucasus before the town was abandoned in 1941, and then began building combat ships, initially with adjusted designs and then with new designs. After the mid-'50s the Nikolayev people mastered the production of ocean-going ships of the Soviet fleet; in the '60s, large ASW ships of the Komsomolets Ukrainy and Nikolayev classes and Moscow-class cruisers with plane and helicopter armament. Then cruisers became the "latest" product, as they say of the Nikolayev people: Slava-class missile cruisers and aircraft-carrying cruisers

of the Kiev, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Gorshkov and Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov classes. Construction of the first nuclear-powered aircraft-carrying cruiser Ulyanovsk was also begun here. In addition, one should not forget that the modernization and repair of existing ships and vessels of the navy are carried out here along with the construction. The building of gas-turbine engines for vessels is also developed here, which makes it possible not only to outfit the power units of the ships built, but also to repair power plants.

B. Tyurin: We are concerned about all the fleet's orders on which decisions have not yet been made, of course: whether to start or cancel their construction, whether to complete them or halt construction. Obviously the most "salient" matter, one which is drawing attention—and not just here in Nikolayev—are the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, the nuclear-powered Ulyanovsk and the steam-driven Varyag, which are presently under construction at the Chernomorskiy Shipbuilding Plant PO [Production Association]. How is their fate being decided?

Capt 1st Rank N. Serdyuk, head military agent for the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag: The Varyag is a ship like the TAKR [heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser] Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov, which has already gone on line. It was begun immediately following the completion of its predecessor. The "geography" of those involved in their construction shows that they include enterprises and organizations located in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova and other republics. These ships are truly being built by the entire country. The situation has deteriorated drastically in recent years, however, a fact clearly illustrated by the case of the Varyag. Until the end of 1991 its construction proceeded according to the previous general construction schedule, which was approved by the Ministry of Shipbuilding before it was abolished. What is the situation today? Construction is in full swing with respect to the ship's basic outfitting. Since its launching the ship has been anchored at the plant's finishing quay. This ship is at a high degree of technical completion: slightly less than 70%. There are substantial problems hampering further progress, however. The first is a disruption in deliveries of cable for the shipboard cable lines from the Amurkabl and Azovkabl enterprises, which have not received copper from Uzbekistan. The most alarming thing, however, is the fact that no agreements have yet been reached with them on deliveries for 1992. The second problem is price-setting and its effect upon the cost of a ship's construction and upon the formation of the wage fund for the personnel. The fact is that until recently there was no talk of turning the Chernomorskiy plant onto the "path of conversion." The "stress" was still the former: "priority for defense products." Since the plant's main orders, the Varyag and the Ulyanovsk, practically account for the bulk of the planned production volume, the plant has an interest in continuing their construction. This requires firm financial and economic

guarantees, however. But what is the situation today? Prices are rising. A comparison of the complete estimated cost of building a TAKR in various years shows that the cost of the Varyag (in 1992 prices) could reach 1.4 billion rubles, while the total cost of building the Kuznetsov, the same kind of ship, was around 650 million rubles (in 1991 prices). Our economists expect the cost of building this ship to increase again by a factor of approximately 2.5 by April 1992. At the time of our interview (1 Oct 91) payment by the fleet for work performed on the Varyag amounted to approximately 140 million rubles. The Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy required around 50-80 million rubles more in 1991 prices to pay for the work planned to the end of the fourth quarter of 1991. For practically all of the last quarter of 1991 the plant worked on the Varyag, paying the wages out of its own pocket and awaiting a decision "from above" which would enable the navy to settle up with the builder for work completed ahead of schedule.

Now for my own personal opinion. The Varyag must be completed, whatever the cost. This is to the advantage of both the navy and the plant. Without these orders or without preparing for conversion or for new orders, the plant will not last. The policy "above" is not clear from where we stand, however. What is to become of the fleet? Are we going to build ships? And what kind? A decision must be made on this matter as soon as possible.

B. Tyurin: And what is the situation with the construction of the Ulyanovsk?

Capt 1st Rank N. Vdovenko, head of the military representatives at the Chernomorskiy Shipbuilding Plant PO: The Ulyanovsk is the fleet's first heavy nuclear-powered aircraft-carrying cruiser, and the first nuclear-powered combat ship for the plant. This explains the attention which the cruiser has received up to now. It has already been said that the plant has only one building slip where such ships can be built. It was occupied by the Ulyanovsk following the Varyag. And although its degree of technical readiness approached 20%, work on it has been halted since November 1991, even though it was performed vigorously prior to that. The plant acquired new 900-tonne cranes and altered or set up new production sections. The work already completed cost the nation 170-180 million rubles at the 1991 rate. It is calculated that if the decision is made to scrap this ship it will cost around 80% of the ship's entire construction cost to dismantle the equipment, systems and pipelines and most important, the biological-protection shield. When construction was started the construction costs were estimated at 800 million rubles. I shall not even discuss the advantages of the aircraft-carrying cruisers of this design compared even to cruisers of the Kuznetsov class. I shall mention only its high degree of autonomy, its sailing range and traveling speed, the latest radioelectronics, its powerful antiship and antiaircraft missile systems, its means of self-defense against air attack and most important, the increased number of Su aircraft and "normal takeoff and landing" MiGs it carries compared with the Kuznetsov. The goal completely justifies the

funds invested. If its construction is halted right now, we shall inevitably return to this class of ships, but we shall return, as has been the case in the past, with additional outlays and the need to surmount difficulties created by ourselves. The Ulyanovsk, gained with much difficulty, promised to be a truly successful ship. Now we can only wait for the decision on what to do.

B. Tyurin: Yuriy Ivanovich, you are very familiar with the "position" of the navy's representatives at your plant, of course. But what does the plant management think? Is there a way out of the situation?

Yu. Makarov, director of the Chernomorskiy Shipbuilding Plant Production Association: The situation which had developed at the plant by the end of 1991 is very disturbing to us. Now it is exacerbated by the fact that the plant appears to have been left to face its problems alone. This occurred following the abolishment of the Ministry of Shipbuilding and as a result of a lack of coordination in the construction of ships.

Right now our building slips are tied up with orders for the navy. All of the production area is being used for the navy. At the same time the Navy was short by 200 million rubles in its payments for work performed by the plant over and above the agreement in 1991. This strikes at our ability to pay the wages of plant blue- and white-collar workers. The plant does not have the money to buy the equipment and materials for the ships. Inflation and the freeing of prices are exacerbating the situation. The plant lacks money for social needs: the construction of housing and workers' dormitories, the maintenance of kindergartens and summer camps, vacation centers and so forth. The workers have an acute sense that their efforts have no future and are losing faith in the usefulness of their work. Personnel turnover has increased drastically. This year the Black Sea Factory lost 2000 workers. Because of this the plant has been forced feverishly to seek new clients and to free capacities for civilian orders. It is therefore planned to begin the construction of three tankers for food products for Norway in January 1992 under contracts already signed.

Construction on the Ulyanovsk, interrupted at the end of November, will probably have to be canceled and the building slip freed as soon as possible. A final decision must also be made on the Ulyanovsk, particularly since there is a design for a civilian vessel to be built at this building slip, and a purchaser for such a vessel.

The TAKR Varyag must be completed in view of its high degree of completion (around 70%). A special governmental (inter-state) coordinating agency will have to be set up to direct its construction, however, one with extraordinary authority. Only this will make it possible to complete construction of this ship and turn it over to the navy within the years immediately ahead.

This is the opinion of our plant, and we expect some immediate decisions.

B. Tyurin: And what is the situation at other defense enterprises in Nikolayev?

Capt 1st Rank V. Shchekin, first deputy chief of the military representatives of the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy at the Shipbuilding plant imeni 61 Kommunar: Although our plant differs from the Chernomorskiy plant in the volume of its defense production, its field of production and its capabilities, our military output has also dropped by 20-22% compared with previous years. We are faced with increasing the output of civilian products—for export at that—and converting the operation from shipbuilding to ship repairs. The largest ships which the plant has built or is building are the Slava-class missile cruisers. The last of four ships in this series, the Fleet Admiral Lobov, is being completed. It is already at a high degree of technical completion, more than 74% (as of the beginning of December 1991). An oceangoing emergency rescue ship is also under construction, although it is not at a high degree of technical completion. It is our opinion that, given the developing situation, the possibility is not ruled out that the Lobov will be the last military ship built by us this decade. In addition to these orders, we are also working on several ships brought in for repairs or modernization. Their fate is also problematic. With respect to the Lobov, I would point out that we still have everything we need to complete its construction. And it could go on line in the future, in 1993. This will also require additional agreements, however.

Capt 2nd Rank V. Ozerov, assistant head engineer and military representative at the Zarya PO: I shall begin by stating that our enterprise is one of the nation's leading enterprises in the production of machinery for vessels, particularly gas-turbine engines for ships and vessels. At the present time we are greatly concerned about the uncertainty of the volume of actual orders up to the end of 1991. Another important factor affecting our operation is the absence of a specific shipbuilding plan, which actually means above all the absence of orders for designing and building new power units for ships. And the symptoms are alarming. A comparison of the amount of work performed for the navy in previous years shows that it dropped by approximately half during the period 1987-1989. And these are basic, leading orders for Zarya. We are still not discussing conversion, even though we are forced to fill civilian orders, including orders for export, in order not to lose skilled workers and not to let the operation, a truly unique one, deteriorate.

Right now Ukraine is setting out on a new, independent political path. This is already being reflected in our economic relations with enterprises producing parts for us. This brings up the question of whether we could build an enterprise like ours in Russia. In the opinion of the experts, we could, but... this would take years. The breakup of the nation and its economy caught our plant in the initial stage of reconstruction. Everything has come to a standstill today, however. We are alarmed by disruptions in deliveries of raw materials and assembly parts. Business ties established over the years with many

enterprises which work with us have begun to unravel, particularly in Russia (Kaluga, Saint Petersburg) and in regions where perestroika shattered and destroyed the state production sector, including the defense industry, earlier than in Ukraine. The matter of "intra-Nikolayev" cooperation has therefore become very urgent. One last thing. The officers representing the military—and probably not just in Nikolayev—are very concerned about their future job prospects. If there is a fleet, there will be ships. But if they are not built even for a time, what will become of the people?

B. Tyurin: We can sum it up briefly in this way. Nikolayev shipbuilding, rightly one of the leaders in the nation, is coming to the end of 1991 not in the best of condition. The main projects are not being completed. Plans for the construction of combat ships and support vessels are not being fulfilled on schedule. Schedules for adding them to the fleet are being put off into the "nebulous future," and the repair and modernization of ships on line are being disrupted. The causes are either the absence of timely, precisely defined, long-range state decisions or the adoption of on-the-spot, competitive decisions without assessing their serious consequences for the nation's defense and the navy's fate, and without concern for those who build the ships. I would like to have not just our readers but also officials of the Navy and other individuals involved in working out shipbuilding policy express their opinion on this problem. Speaking for *MORSKOY SBORNIK*, permit me to thank you sincerely for taking part in our round table.

From the editors: When the issue was being composed we received a report from Nikolayev, confirmed by specialists with the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy in Moscow, that the dismantling of the hull sections of the TAKR Ulyanovsk was begun on 5 February in accordance with Order No. 69-R signed by First Vice Premier of Ukraine K. Masik on 4 February 1992. This was a unilateral action taken by the Ukrainian government despite protests from the ship's requester, the Navy, and an appeal from it to the governments of Ukraine and Russia to reconsider the consequences of such a decision.

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Russian Naval Promotions

92UM0962B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 2, Feb 19 (Signed to press
2 Mar 92) p 18

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Official Department": "From Russian Presidential Decrees On Awarding Military Rank to Officers, Generals and Admirals"]

[Text] The President of Russia decrees:

To Award military ranks to the following individuals:

VICE-ADMIRAL

LYAKIN, Viktor Savelyevich
POLYANSKIY, Venomin Aleksandrovich
SVYATASHOV, Petr Grigoryevich

REAR-ADMIRAL

ZADORIN, Anatoliy Veniaminovich
TITARENKO, Georgiy Aleksandrovich
URYBSKIY, Vladimir Ivanovich
YURASOV, Nikolay Nikitovich
11 January 1992

ADMIRAL

SELIVANOV, Valentin Yegorovich

VICE-ADMIRAL

LITVINOV, Viktor Ivanovich

REAR-ADMIRAL

ILIN, Vladislav Alekseyevich
ISAK, Valeriy Vladimirovich
KORNILOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich
SVIRIDOV, Viktor Petrovich
SOKOLOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich
SUKHACHEB, Yuriy Aleksandrovich

MAJOR-GENERAL

BORZENKO, Aleksandr Nikolayevich

MAJOR-GENERAL OF AVIATION

BURACHUK, Nikolay Dmitriyevich
13 February 1992, Moscow, The Kremlin

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Development Process of Naval Carrier Vessels

92UM0962C Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (Signed to press
2 Mar 92) pp 33-41

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Captain 1st Rank V. Kuzin: "Aircraft-Carrying Cruisers: We Knew What We Were Doing"]

[Text] The article "Aircraft-Carrying Cruisers"¹ stated that the understanding of the need to develop ship-based aircraft for horizontal (as opposed to "normal") takeoffs and landings appeared as experience was accumulated on the mastery of vertical takeoff-and-landing aircraft (VTOL) on ships. We can consider this assertion to be correct, bearing in mind the evolution of the thinking of a wide circle of leaders, in both industry and in the Ministry of Defense, who were involved with the issues of the navy's structural development. From the very beginning of the development of aircraft-carrying ships, the professionals who were directly involved with working out the prospects for developing the naval complement understood that an orientation towards ships with VTOL aircraft was to a significant degree a forced step and they had to consider it as an auxiliary orientation.

Already at that time, that is, in the mid-1960's, it was obvious that no matter how much VTOL aircraft were improved, they would never be able to attain the perfection of ordinary aircraft "even in principle", and eliminating the gap in the combat capabilities between these and the others was a utopian fantasy.

In the 1960's, the integrated scientific-research work that was dedicated to this problem was begun with the goal of comprehensive substantiation of the ways to develop a ship with aircraft weapons in the USSR Navy. Scientific-research institutes and design bureaus of the Navy, Air Force, shipbuilding, aircraft and other sectors of the defense industry participated in this work. Thus, a scientifically-substantiated and, the main thing, a collective viewpoint on the problem was developed. The most general conclusions of this work that was completed by 1972, were reduced to the following:

- aircraft support to the Navy is a paramount, urgent mission since it affects the issues of developing naval strategic nuclear forces; without air cover under conditions of the supremacy of the probable enemy's anti-submarine warfare [ASW] aircraft, we will not be able to ensure not only our ability to resist the enemy, but also the deployment of our own submarines, both ballistic missile and attack, which are the Navy's main strike force;²
- the successful operations of naval shore-based missile, reconnaissance and ASW aircraft, the second most important Naval strike component, are impossible without fighter aircraft cover; and,
- the ability of surface ships to resist the enemy is more or less impossible without fighter aircraft cover.

In other words (more specifically and definitively), we could sum up as follows: "The structural development of a navy that is not covered by an aircraft, first of all fighter aircraft, 'umbrella', is a futile expenditure of the people's money." Unfortunately, this was not expressed in that context at the time. And still the revival of shore-based fighter aircraft in the Navy should have become the first and simple reaction to these conclusions. However even this step, which did not require fundamental changes or large expenditures, was not done at that time. It is also true that this half measure would not have totally eliminated the problem.

Detailed research and calculations have shown that, for the creation of the permanent in time and needed in space aircraft support, even in the coastal zone and to a depth of 200-300 kilometers, would require an aircraft fleet and the creation of an infrastructure (in addition to what already existed) with such expenditures and labor-intensity that their size would exceed all conceivable bounds. Besides, mankind had still not conceived of aircraft with unlimited flight times and, the main thing, had not produced a new generation of pilots capable of gripping the controls of supersonic aircraft for days at a time. There was one conclusion, "we need a mobile, floating airfield", that is, an aircraft carrier capable of supporting the conduct of aircraft combat operations around the clock in any area of the Navy's zone of operations, with minimal dependence on weather conditions.

Already based on the results of preliminary studies but prior to the total completion of the research mentioned

above, Naval scientific-research institutes developed the TTZ [tactical-technical specifications] for the development of an aircraft carrier with the code name Orel, and it was passed to a Leningrad Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] PKB [planning and design bureau] for further design. The development of a nuclear-powered ship with a standard displacement of a 75,000-80,000 tons with an aircraft fleet of "no less than 70 LAK [carrier-based aircraft]", which included fighter aircraft, ground attack aircraft, and ASW, RTR [radio-relay support], REB [electronic warfare], and RLD [radar picket] aircraft and various types of helicopters. Four steam catapults were envisioned for aircraft take-offs. While carrying out the orders of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov, they slightly decreased the aircraft fleet and added anti-ship missiles installed in underdeck launchers.

We need to point out here that missiles, in contrast to aircraft, have the extremely valuable characteristic of practically instantaneous employment and are significantly less dependent upon weather conditions. But, was it advisable to install them on an aircraft carrier which must be accompanied by escort warships?

Without dwelling at length on an examination of this issue, we must point out that it remains in the category of those under discussion until the present time. We had "big ideas" (and fully realized) that the proposed Orel design was to be precisely an aircraft carrier no worse than the American Aircraft Carrier Enterprise. It was characteristic that then Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko (the only one of all the ministers of defense, in my opinion, who understood the problem and decisively supported the development of aircraft carriers) said about the report on the Orel design: "Why, you are splitting hairs here! Make an aircraft carrier like the Americans have, with that kind of an aircraft fleet". And right then and there he wrote on the blueprints its approximate composition, which was close to the aircraft carrier Nimitz's aircraft wing (In this regard, the dedication of a Naval Academy to the marshal does not seem so absurd.)

In 1973, the Orel's preliminary design (Chief Designer A.B. Morin-Prokopovich) was approved by the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and Air Force and by the shipbuilding and aircraft industries. It seemed that everything would proceed according to the developed plan: the conceptual design, the detail design, the contractor design, construction, turn over, etc. But, numerous levels of command authority began to interfere with the procedures that had been developed over decades.

At first, CPSU Central Committee Secretary D.F. Ustinov's instructions followed "to examine the issue of building a third ship, a modernized variation of the Kiev Class (we developed it with catapults and MIG-23A aircraft) as an alternative to the Orel Class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. They studied the design

"upstairs" for a month. They became convinced that the Kiev was not suitable for that, we needed "a totally new design." They made their report. The reaction from upstairs was: "Develop a new design for 36 aircraft with a catapult takeoff, but with Kiev's dimensions. The result was the same: "This cannot be done, we need a fundamentally new design". Then, a new level of authority, the Military-Industrial Commission under the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers. It "approved" and authorized the design of a ship with the new dimensions. It was assigned a new design number, but it retained the code name Orel. A.B. Morin remained as chief designer and Captain 2nd Rank Yu.P. Bobarykin was designated as chief observer from the Navy. The technical specifications for the ship were approved by the commander-in-chief of the Navy in June 1974.

At the beginning of 1975, D.F. Ustinov again interfered with the development of the ship: "We need to determine just what is being developed: aircraft carriers with catapult-launched aircraft or aircraft-carrying cruisers with VTOL aircraft?" Ustinov was inclined toward the latter. He was not confident in Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry's or Ministry of the Aviation Industry's production capabilities and, besides, construction of the former would require additional capital investment.

Time passed and we were "marching in place" (or, more precisely, "running in a closed circle"). Finally, in April 1976, a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council Ministers decree was published on developing ships according to the Orel design in which these ships are called large cruisers with aircraft weaponry and construction of two was envisioned in the 1978-1985 period. In August 1976, the commander-in-chief of the Navy approved the new technical specifications for the ship, since the first ones were already obsolete. In it, the ship was given a standard displacement of nearly 60,000 tons with an aircraft fleet of 50 carrier-based aircraft (primarily ship-based fighter aircraft), with two catapults, with a triple-shaft nuclear power plant, and, of course, with anti-ship missiles.

Essentially, it was "the smallest" and, consequently, the least effective version of the Orel design in a combat sense, which at the preliminary design stage was immediately proposed in five versions. One reason for this decision was that the construction of a large aircraft carrier was being delayed at that time by the dimensions of the construction sites and the lack of docks with adequate capacity at the shipbuilding enterprises. Indeed, I dare say that these questions might have been resolved in a practical manner during the time that was wasted and it was subsequently confirmed—they still conducted the redesign of the building slips at the Nikolayev Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant and suitable docks were acquired.

Simultaneously with development of the ship's conceptual design, work was begun at the appropriate KBs [design bureaus] to develop catapults, aircraft arresting gear and other aircraft equipment. A month after the

technical specifications were approved, D.F. Ustinov once again had his doubts: "Are we planning to build it there? Maybe it would be better in Leningrad? Well, work this issue out for me!"

A new blow against the ship came from an unexpected quarter. General Designer A.S. Yakovlev, as it turned out without adequate grounds or extensive research, proposed equipping the Novorossiysk (the third Kiev Class ship that was laid after the launch of the Minsk from the TAKR [aircraft-carrying ship] boat slip) with so-called "gas-exhaust devices" [gazootvalnyye ustroystva] which are huge (with a graduated diameter of from 3-5 meters) shaft in the deck and installed in the side of the ship which exhaust the gaseous jets from the VTOL aircraft to improve their take-off characteristics. The already assembled corps of designers did the work over again and "disfigured" the ship, but the "technical adventure" (I would not select another word) burst like a soap bubble and the ship was returned to its initial state. As a result of this experiment, the date it was to be turned over to the navy was delayed from 1979 to 1982. The Orel's construction period was postponed once again.

But at that time, in 1976, the Orel's conceptual design was being completed and the results of the work of the 66 organizations and 13 ministries and departments was being reported to the very highest level. An unexpected decision followed: "The conceptual design is approved. Cease further design of the ship." Just who made that decision has remained a secret...

Thus, the independent policy for developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in our country was interrupted and they decided to improve elements of the Kiev Class cruisers that were already being built by introducing catapult-launched aircraft on them. So, in 1977, we returned to what we had already been doing in 1973.

I remember: the TAKRs Kiev and Minsk were already in the navy's inventory by that time; the Novorossiysk was under construction and clarifications to the design for the Baku (now Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union C.G. Gorshkov) were being completed. Therefore, they had to introduce catapult-launched aircraft on the fifth ship. The task for its design was approved by the commander-in-chief only in January 1979. In contrast to the last approved Orel version, they proposed decreasing the displacement, rejecting a nuclear power plant, and reducing the number of carrier-based aircraft to 42.

During the development of the conceptual design for "Number five", which we began to call the fifth cruiser in everyday life, the ship acquired one more "powerful enemy", now in the person of Admiral N.N. Amelko, Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (prior to that he had held the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Antisubmarine Warfare Defense). In essence, Nikolay Nikolayevich began opposing our (as well as foreign) military science, considering the construction of aircraft-carrying cruisers and aircraft carriers as a futile expenditure of the people's money and the concentration of colossal efforts in an unneeded direction.

At his initiative, when he was still in the capacity of deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy, scientific-research work was begun on the development of a comprehensive anti-submarine warfare system, the primary components of which were to be ASW helicopter carriers, developed based on civilian ships. The design of this helicopter carrier (Khalzan) began to be developed at a TsKB [central design bureau]. Ultimately, practically nothing remained of the civilian container ship upon which Khalzan was developed. For all practical purposes, a special military ship of a new design was developed. But this "was not taken into consideration", just as the issue of who would cover these ships from air strikes on the open sea did not trouble the proponents of the this ship.

Thus, Number 5's former conceptual design was essentially "buried" but the next CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers decree proposed making a new one, as if the completed one did not exist. In April 1980, S.G. Gorshkov approved for the umpteenth time (!) the technical specifications for the construction of a ship with a restricted displacement of up to 45,000 tons. However, something fundamentally new appeared here—they proposed studying ski-jump ramps to launch aircraft.

I foresee the reader's weariness from the repetition of the term "conceptual design", but what can I do, there's no getting around it. I would like to point out that all of these guiding directives cost the enormous collectives, not only nerves and time, but also tangible monetary expenditures. Navy scientific-research institutes assessed the ship according to the new task as "30 percent worse than the previous one". Despite that, the second conceptual design for Number 5 was begun. In contrast to it, the General Staff (that is, "N.N. Amelko's staff") began to promote the implementation of the Khalzan design which, according to cost and the labor-intensity of construction, was a bit less than the Number 5 design. And all of this with just one building slip which should have inevitably closed the path to the latter. Admiral N.N. Amelko did not hide the fact that he sought just that.

The author, anticipating the question of the motivation for the admiral's conduct, thinks it is advisable to note that, in his opinion, the underlying cause of the conflict was the mutual hostility between S.G. Gorshkov and N.N. Amelko and, furthermore, the latter's ambition. However, the minister of defense also understood that Khalzan was not a gift (to no degree did it satisfy the Navy's requirements, especially with regard to survivability, noise level, and ability to resist the enemy), and ordered further work on that ship ceased, having reduced it to the stage of completing the technical design. But, a new directive was received from him with regard to Number 5: "I prohibit you from increasing its dimensions when compared to the fourth ship, but build it with the needed improvements".

In the Summer of 1981, Dmitri Fedorovich visited the cruiser Kiev during the exercise "Zapad-81" [West-81]. After hearing the reports on the ship's combat capabilities, "he was deeply moved" and decided "so be it", and increased Number 5's displacement by 10,000 tons. By that

time, the catapults had disappeared from the ship and only the ski-jump ramp remained. The word "catapult" was "anathematized" and was not used, but when needed, the term "boost device" [razgonnoye ustroystvo] was used.

So, what was accomplished in ten years? Having begun with 80,000 tons standard displacement, they arrived at 55,000 tons; they began with an AEU [nuclear power plant] and ended up with a boiler-turbine device; they began with four catapults—not one remained! Today I will not dare to unambiguously judge why scientifically-based and progressive views and "approaches" did not win out. Nevertheless, I categorically assert that there were no technical or economic reasons at all here. If only because the catapult was manufactured and installed at the land-based test facility and the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Kirov had already been in the Navy's inventory for a year and gigantic docks had been purchased abroad. At that time we already had the potential in our hands to permit us to accomplish the task to develop nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with aircraft catapults.

Returning to the question: "Just why did it turn out like this?"—while not claiming to thoroughly disclose the causes, I think it would still be useful to express a few thoughts. As I have already mentioned, the navy's structural development system that operated then and, unfortunately, is still preserved today, permits numerous influential levels of authority and various leaders "to interfere and to determine its fate", most often those having very imprecise notions on the subject, but completely without a clue as to their level of incompetence. At that time, generals, party workers, technical component designers, plant directors and even experts from NII's [scientific research institute] civilian departments interfered. Indeed, while the military tandem of "Grechko-Gorshkov" and Butoma's "industrial support" existed, we worked with relative confidence that the barrier was quite solid. However, the situation became extremely complicated after A.A. Grechko's death. The commander-in-chief of the Navy once again became incapable of breaking down the resistance, say, of Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov and of Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov or GPU [Main Political Directorate] of the Soviet Army and Navy Chief General Yepishev—also a "major" expert on aircraft carriers.

I need to say that there were few professionals on Sergey Georgiyevich's "team" who were fanatically dedicated to the cause of "aviationizing the fleet" and they held relatively minor posts. I can name Rear-Admirals B.A. Kolyzayev and Yu.V. Dmitriyev, Captains 1st Rank I.V. Chistozvonov, O.T. Sofronov, I.S. Platonov, A.A. Borisov, and V.M. Kolesnikov. From the industrialists—A.M. Vasilyev (TsNII [Central Scientific-Research Institute] imeni A.N. Krylov), well and of course Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry B.Ye. Butoma. The remaining "allies" supported the ship, so to speak, based on the situation or, more accurately, while proceeding from the situation that was developing.

The Ministry of Defense also jealously followed all of the zig-zags of this struggle, obviously seeing in the appearance of aircraft carriers a potential threat of the reallocation of

resources in the primarily ground forces structure of military expenditures that had developed over the decades. Somehow or other, specific people decided and determined everything and military science, technical axioms, and common sense were frequently ignored. Here is an example: a catapult provides a high rate of takeoff and the capability to simultaneously receive aircraft which permits a significant increase of their combat workload, but the main thing—is use under difficult weather conditions (crosswinds, pitching and rolling, and wettability). A takeoff from a ski-jump ramp does not provide these qualities. It is useless to argue and prove the advantage of the catapult.

Simple logic and common sense have suggested: if you introduce nuclear power engineering into surface ships, then it should be primarily into aircraft-carrying ships. The reserves of aircraft fuel drastically increase, aircraft landing conditions improve—there is no thermal plume and corrosion on the upper deck is reduced. The reader knows the result: "Everything is the opposite!" There is no great difference in construction between major and medium aircraft carriers from the point of view of expenditures and labor-intensity. However, on a larger and longer ship you can provide better design protection, increase the aircraft fleet, fuel reserves and ammunition, improve navigability, especially pitching—the most important safety parameter for receiving aircraft. And from us they demanded the "development of a ship that was as small as possible" and, consequently, shorter.

And I also want to add that, while introducing aircraft onto ships with great difficulty, we did not sense any special support from the pilots or aviators themselves. And where could we obtain support if the cadres for fleet aviation are still being trained at Air Force schools that, incidentally, are located hundreds of miles from the sea and that same Air Force orders aircraft for the Navy: ship-based aviators even have ground forces military ranks even though they do not leave the decks of ships for months at a time.

I recall S.G. Gorshkov's sagacity with gratitude. At one time he said after the "latest arm-twisting from above" with regard to the catapult on Number 5: "History will not forgive us if we do not install them later."

Number 5's final new detail design was approved in July 1982. I have to point out that a number of preparatory steps that included redesign of the building slip at the Black Sea Plant in Nikolayev and the construction in the Crimea of a shore-based training and aircraft equipment test facility with a ski-jump ramp, aircraft arresting device, and catapult were also being conducted in parallel with the design work on the ship. In general there should have been two catapults but after the work of numerous commissions, including Admiral N.N. Amelko's, we only managed to defend one and that was because it would have been impossible to conduct testing of the aircraft arresting device without it because only the catapult could produce the required speed for the aircraft load mock-up on the ground.

February 22, 1983 is considered to the official date that the ship was laid, although its first section had already been installed in the building slip in September 1982. Initially, the ship was named the Riga and then renamed the Leonid Brezhnev, however, it underwent state testing with the name Tbilisi but once again (I want to believe, finally) was renamed Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov.

Chief Designer V.F. Anikiyev conducted the work on Number 5 from the very beginning. Captain 2nd Rank (currently Captain 1st Rank) A.M. Smirnov remained the primary observer from the Navy during all the stages of the ship's development, right up to its testing. During that same 1983, a decision was made on the construction of a sixth aircraft-carrying ship—the second according to this design but with some improvements.

Number 5, although they have preserved the number of the design of the first aircraft-carrying ship (Kiev) has little in common with it, perhaps only the power plant. Its architecture has acquired a "more aircraft carrier appearance": a thin flight deck with a ski-jump ramp and on-board aircraft elevators. The frame has remained practically the same as on the ship Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov. Basic information about our aircraft-carrying ships is listed in the table.

Primary Technical Specifications	Kiev	Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov	Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov
Displacement, in Tons	41,400	44,500	55,000
Number of Carrier-Based Aircraft	36	36	50
including:			
—Fighter Aircraft	—	Yak-41M (VTOL)	SU-27K, MIG-29K, and may receive YAK-41M (VTOL)
—Ground Attack Aircraft	YAK-38 (VTOL)	May receive YAK-38	—
—Helicopters	KA-25 (ASW and Passenger)	K-27 (Radar Picket, ASW, and Passenger)	K-27 (Radar Picket, ASW, and Passenger)
Missile Weaponry	8 Anti-Ship Missile Launchers	12 Anti-Ship Missile Launchers	12 Anti-Ship Missile Launchers
Surface-to-Air Missile Weaponry	4X2 Launchers	4X1 Launchers	8X1 Launchers
Artillery	2X2—76 mm, 8X6—30 mm	2X1—100 mm, 8X6—30 mm	8X6—30 mm
Propulsion Plant	Boiler-Turbine, Total Capacity Approximately 200,000 Horsepower		

Furthermore, underwater and surface design protection on Number 5 was fundamentally improved and its endurance was increased. Number 5 certainly became a significant step forward in the cause of creating aircraft-carrying ships in our country.

I would also like to mention other important stages that accompanied the development of this fundamentally new ship for us: Summer 1982—the first takeoffs of SU-27 and MIG-29 aircraft from a ground-based ski-jump ramp; September 1, 1985—the first landing of a SU-27 on an aircraft arresting device; November 1, 1989—the first SU-27 (V. Pugachev), MIG-29 (T. Aubakirov) and SU-25 (A. Krutov) landing and takeoff from a ship. For 20 years, we “literally forced our way” toward this event, 20 years of struggle and all possible tricks, digressions, and losses. N.G. Kuznetsov, S.G. Gorshkov, B.Ye. Butoma, A.V. Marinich, O.T. Sofronov, V.F. Anikiyev and many others have died without seeing the results of their own efforts. The overwhelming majority of the other active participants in the development of aircraft-carrying ships have been released into the reserve, have retired, or are on pension. Only a few have waited for the embodiment of their ideas while remaining in the ranks. But even they did not have complete satisfaction. They knew that we could have developed this ship much earlier and with significantly better parameters.

I need to say that, while attempting to untie the knot of the various causes that influenced the ship's fate, the author, while not claiming complete knowledge of the issue, still attempted to rely on documents and actual events of which he had the opportunity to be a witness and to participate in. And here I need to touch upon one other aspect of the matter. We constantly and carefully track the development of foreign naval equipment. We need to give our foreign colleagues their due and they did not lose sight of our activities. However, their interest also had one “specific” direction. The foreign publications of those years which touched upon the issues of aircraft carrier development “nearly synchronously” tracked our developments, as if prompting us away from the general course which they themselves were following. So, with the appearance of VTOL aircraft in our country, the West's naval and aircraft magazines were nearly immediately breathless with delight with regard to the prospects that encompass the development of this direction which nearly all military aviation allegedly should follow. We began to increase aircraft carrier displacement—articles immediately began to appear in their countries about the inadvisability of developing those super-giants, like Nimitz and that is was preferable to build smaller aircraft carriers, and all the more so not with nuclear but with ordinary propulsion. We undertook the catapult—they began to praise ski-jump ramps. Information often also flashed generally about the cessation of aircraft carrier construction in their country. And I need to admit that these actions were not always unsuccessful. They gave rise to certain vacillations in the

upper echelons of the leadership. Although, as we can now see, the Americans themselves did nothing of the kind.

So, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov did not totally achieve what we wanted to obtain from this class of ships. And, naturally, this dictated the need for its further improvement. We have begun the practical realization of the majority of the provisions listed above in the seventh, finally, nuclear-powered, increased displacement, catapult ship (Ulyanovsk) which we began to build. However, as has happened many times in the history of our navy, internal convulsions in the country have interfered with this. Our descendants will provide an objective assessment of them. But today we more and more frequently have the opportunity to hear the following from the rostrums of congresses and rallies, from the pages of printed publications, and on radio and television: “Why do we need aircraft carriers?, or categorically: “We do not need aircraft carriers!” And they have bestowed this characteristic on this ship: “A monster that is consuming a large portion of the budget!”. Recently new aircraft carrier experts have arrived to replace the previous ones. I will name just a few of them—the Arbatovs, Filshin, Khasbulatov, and Khrushchev's son. They most frequently cite the allegedly “excessive cost” of these ships and they do not trouble themselves with evidence while restricting themselves to emotions and primitive populism, although it has been proven long ago that, based on “cost-effectiveness” criteria, the aircraft carrier is the most advantageous and economical weapon system, especially under the conditions of the quantitative reduction of the complement of ships.³

Taking advantage of this opportunity, the author considers himself to be justified to express his own opinion on that score, even though many of his colleagues have already done this. It is an indisputable fact and no one doubts that it is impossible to get by without aircraft in a modern war at any level. Moreover, all wars and conflicts of recent decades have convincingly demonstrated the definite and decisive role of air superiority and the recent events in the Middle East are the apotheosis of that. It has finally been confirmed that a navy that is “not covered by fighter aircraft” is not combat capable. But let us allow for a minute that we have totally refused to build it. Then we need to develop coastal defense components in order to “cover” the country from the sea and ocean axes, including from air strikes. If we stand on this position, then we need a nearly “continuous airfield” along our entire coastline to carry out this task (and this has been unambiguously proven). The European countries, like Sweden, Germany, England, and others, actually have it in the form of first-class highways with runways, special pads, caponieres, and so forth. This is unrealistic for us in the foreseeable future with our size and infrastructure, especially in the Northern and Far Eastern theaters. Therefore, no matter what we do, we will not get by without floating airfields.

Now, if we discuss this logically, we need to strive to make sure that this mobile airfield has the maximum all-weather capability both as a ship and as a platform for aircraft operations. But this is attainable only with large displacement and with a catapult. Furthermore, of course, it must have the maximum capability for endurance, albeit for operational delivery of aircraft to an assigned region or to change position for tactical considerations or because of unfavorable weather conditions (by the way, ground-based aircraft have been deprived of this advantage but the American Nimitz can support the operations of its air wing on an average of 342 days per year). Nuclear propulsion promotes fulfillment of this requirement to the greatest degree: only it is capable of supporting a prolonged and uninterrupted full speed mode and practically unlimited sailing range within its endurance and maximum aviation fuel reserves depending on displacement. Indeed, other solutions are also possible. They are well known: our Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov, the French Clemenceau, the British Invincible, the Spanish Prince Asterisk, and the Italian Guiseppe Garibaldi, but all of them, I dare assert categorically, are not optimal according to the summarized or integral technical-military-economic indicator. And is it not because, besides the Americans, only the French plan to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers?

Now some comparisons. An aircraft carrier is the most multi-purpose system of naval weapons. It, in contrast to, for example, an SSBN [Ballistic Missile Submarine], is identically suited for participation both in a general nuclear and in a conventional war, and also in local conflicts and, incidentally, it is frequently very convincing even for targets of a military-political show of force. In so doing, while effectively resolving both defensive and strike missions, it can also carry out, it would seem, missions that are not appropriate for it, such as, for example, placing or sweeping for mines (using helicopters), landing troops, and transporting equipment. In a word, the aircraft carrier is capable of carrying out missions that practically any ship can do but no ship is capable of replacing the aircraft carrier. Let us take the already mentioned Nimitz, the air wing of which includes 40 ground attack aircraft (there can also be more of them), let us determine the average combat load of each ground attack aircraft as four tons and let us send them to strike a maritime target that is 500 km away, instead of Tomahawk anti-ship missiles. To carry out this mission, you require 320 Tomahawk anti-ship missiles that have, as we all know, a warhead weighing 500 kilograms each (more accurately 454 kilograms).

Here we have simplified a very complicated process to the maximum extent possible and we are reducing it to elementary arithmetic for clarity. And if you consider that the Tomahawk anti-ship missile combat load on a Ticonderoga Class Guided Missile Cruiser is 24 missiles, then, as you can see from simple division, the ground attack aircraft from one Nimitz can replace 15 such cruisers in one strike which is more than half the number

which they propose having in the inventory of the U.S. Navy. And that is not all. We must not forget that the Nimitz can repeat these strikes many times over and at significantly greater distances but the cruisers need to be reloaded, fine, if it was at sea, but they also need to return to base.

Of course, the conduct of a strict comparative calculation of the combat capabilities of any combat system presents a great difficulty and requires the use of a special mathematical device and consideration of a significant number of factors and the diversity of their manifestation, and in various combinations and interrelationships. And these calculations have been conducted both to determine the effectiveness of mission accomplishment, like the one conducted above, and also for other missions (Air Defense, ASW, etc.). These calculations convincingly demonstrate that there simply is no alternative to aircraft carriers in the majority of combat situations.

So, the construction of aircraft-carrying ships is necessary for our navy, not only for purely military considerations, but also for economic considerations, especially under conditions of a significant quantitative reduction of its complement of ships. They can object to me that the aircraft-carrying ship is not used alone and that it needs an escort force and logistics support. This is actually so. I will add that the multi-purpose capability of aircraft-carrying ships does not at all exclude the need for construction of ships of other classes and not only for combat escort. Missions and situations exist in which the use of an aircraft-carrying ship is simply disadvantageous (using means that are disproportionate to the goals) and, furthermore, since their number will always be limited, they will not be able "to embrace the unembraceable". We must recognize the number of ships of various classes present today in our Navy as adequate to support the combat escort of existing aircraft-carrying ships and those under construction. It is very important that they still are a unique regulator when determining the required number of ships of other classes. This thought is neither new nor original. Russia's last military shipbuilding programs provided for the development of the nucleus of a navy that is balanced by combat squadrons and yes, they are following this principle abroad. But that is already a separate topic.

I cannot judge how convincing the arguments I have cited are, but I can unambiguously assert that the "destruction and loss of what has been created through decades and generations are irretrievable". I once again repeat the quote I cited earlier: "History (I will add, and our descendants) will not forgive us for this."

FOOTNOTES

1. See MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 7, 1991.
2. Grand Admiral K. Demid, a zealous apologist of "underwater war", considered "its lack of support with air cover, reconnaissance, target designation, etc.," to be

the primary cause of the German submarine fleet's reverses during the Second World War.

3. MORSKOY SBORNIK, [Issue and date illegible].

4. For more detail, see MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 1, 1991.

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Russia and the Kurils

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No 3, Mar 92 (signed to press 27 Mar 92) pp 7-11

[Article by Rear Adm V. Virkovskiy, candidate of military sciences: "Russia and the Kurils"]

[Text] The splash of confrontation around the problem of the future of the Kurils late last year also had positive consequences. Above all, many in our country learned more about the history of the discovery and development of the islands, and also about the agreements between Russia and Japan regarding sovereignty over them. The most important thing is the fact that it began to destroy the delusion painstakingly maintained by some that it involves four sparsely populated, small, rocky islands. It turned out that many of our officials and public figures also considered them to be that. However, as was often the case earlier, today they also prefer to keep silent about delicate issues.

So, the topic of our conversation is the so-called Southern Kurils. But in order to dot all the "i's" and cross all the "t's" from the very beginning, look over the diagram shown below [not reproduced].

Now, let us hope that everyone has restored in his memory the necessary information about this region, and has a clear idea that there exists here one group of islands called the Big Kuril Chain and another called the Small Kuril Chain. Dividing all the islands into Northern and Southern is arbitrary, since it is not determined by natural geographic conditions, but is historical and political in nature. Today, the boundary between them runs approximately along the parallel of 45 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, but with the change in political conditions it has been moved with ease. We examine the historical aspect of this division below, and we will consider the geographic aspect closed.

MORSKOY SBORNIK covered the discovery and development of the Kurils and the process of the division of Russia and Japan in this area in a fairly detailed manner in February 1991. Nevertheless, we will take a short trip back in history to recall the main events associated with these islands.

No reliable data have been found that the Cossacks of Semen Dezhnev first discovered the Kurils in the mid-17th century; however, there is confirmation that the Russians already knew of the existence and location of these islands at that time. A search of the archives so far

has not provided information about who settled them and when during those years.

Russian navigators began systematic exploration of the islands in the early 18th century under Peter I and quickly reached the Island of Hokkaido. Reports from the earliest explorers during those years give convincing evidence that "only Matmai Island (the name of the island of Hokkaido at that time) was under the dominion of the Japanese khan, but the other islands were under no one's dominion...and did not belong to the Japanese khan."

In the mid-1760's, the inhabitants of the Kurils already considered themselves subjects of Russia. They accepted orthodoxy and paid tribute to the Russians. What is more, in the 18th century, the inhabitants of the northern coast of Hokkaido pledged allegiance to the Russian autocrats.

In 1773, Catherine II sent volunteers and exiles there to settle the Kurils. They developed the islands and formed Russian settlements there. The government of Russia knew that since 1637 Japan had a strict ban on subjects abandoning the empire. But since the Japanese themselves at that time considered the Kurils to be beyond these boundaries, there were no legal obstacles whatsoever for them to become part of Russia. At the same time, despite the allegiance given by the inhabitants of Hokkaido, the Russians made no claims to the island whatsoever, justly considering it a part of the Japanese state, and, on the contrary, tried to establish trade relations with its neighbors. The reaction to this on the part of the Japanese was the first, including government-sanctioned, visits by their emissaries to the nearby Kuril Islands. True, this did not happen until the second half of the 1780's. Later on, loyal to their isolationist policy, the Japanese forbade the Russians to visit Hokkaido.

Two factors in development of the Kurils by the Russians were unfavorable. The first was Catherine II's decree, earning approval, on exempting all inhabitants of these islands from paying taxes. However, it caused the loss of the only system of monitoring set up on the islands at that time, which was implemented in the newly acquired distant lands during those years primarily by tax collectors. The second factor was that the attention of Russian merchants was concentrated on developing the vast territories of Kamchatka and Russian America. They did not show much interest in the Kurils, as a result of which our settlements on the islands did not receive the proper development.

Nevertheless, the embassy of N. Ryazanov, sent to Japan in the early 19th century, was commissioned to declare Russia's rights to all the Kurils and to conclude a treaty on the borders. Although a treaty was not concluded at that time, no one ever communicated any information about Japanese objections to Ryazanov's declaration that all lands to the north of Hokkaido were Russian possessions. True, maybe the Japanese were intentionally silent so as not to alert the Russians, since during

those years they had already begun secret colonization of the islands near Hokkaido, including Sakhalin.

Striving to resolve the dragged-out issue of demarcation even in conditions of war with England and France, in 1855 the government of Russia transferred the islands of the Small Kuril Chain and two southern islands of the Big Kuril Chain in exchange for the right for Russian ships to use the ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki (Japan still remained a closed country for other countries). But there was another point in this agreement that is very important for consideration in today's situation, but stubbornly suppressed. Back then we came to an agreement with the Japanese on joint possession of Sakhalin! But what became of that?

A decade had not passed when it became obvious that the idea of joint possession of any territory was faulty at its very basis, for in addition to all the other negative phenomena, it did not eliminate the problems, but, on the contrary, aggravated relations between the co-possessors. In our view, one female resident of the Far East expressed the opinion of the majority most clearly during a sociological survey in 1991 on this issue. She said: "To permit foreigners on our territories is like letting a second housewife into your kitchen." And here supporters of joint possession of the Southern Kurils want very much to remind us that our forefathers, having tasted in full the fruits of such an agreement, even wanted to transfer all the Kurils to the Japanese in 1875, if only to expel them from Sakhalin! Why do some people cover their eyes to the feverish attempts to solve today's problems and not see the most obvious historical parallel?!

Such is the history prior to the second Russian-Japanese agreement. But the contradictions between the two countries were not eliminated completely and, as was the natural result for the policy of that era, led to war. The Portsmouth Peace Treaty gave Japan all of the Kurils and half of Sakhalin as well. Quite interesting in the context of today's disputes is the statement by the Japanese in 1905 that war abolishes all previous agreements. But this was after the victoriously concluded war, and today for the nation that lost the last war this thesis has become unfavorable, and Japan's leadership rejects it...

Relations between the two countries up to 1945 also contain the following facts: Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East; provocations on our borders, Khasan, and Khalkhin-Gol; and as the final result of the policy of those years—another war.

A fair amount has been written about the reasons for our country's non-participation in the signing of a peace treaty with Japan in 1951. However, this non-participation does not diminish the significance of the fact that this treaty was signed by 49 countries. The most important thing is the fact that the document bears the signature of the authorized representative of Japan. And this document states in black and white in Article 2:

"Japan renounces all rights and legal grounds and claims to the Kuril Islands and that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it, the sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth dated 5 September 1905."

Nevertheless, in 1956, striving to normalize relations with its Far Eastern neighbor, our government expressed a willingness upon signing a peace treaty to transfer to Japan the islands of the Small Kuril Chain. Negotiations on this issue were progressing successfully. However, the initiator of the 1951 document—the United States of America, having begun the "cold war," abruptly changed its position and sent Japan a note in which it threatened that if Japan were to renounce its claims to the two southern islands of the Big Kuril Chain (Iturup and Kunashir), the United States would not return the Ryukyu Islands, with the main island of Okinawa, to Japan. This interference by our former ally in the war with Japan also predetermined the dispute that has dragged on to the present time with the Country of the Rising Sun due to the territorial claims of the latter.

What is the situation today?

The position of the Japanese side is that to achieve full normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations and to give them a qualitatively new nature, it is necessary to resolve the territorial question, that is, "restore Japan's sovereignty over the four (more precisely eight) northern islands"—Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai, and conclude a peace treaty on this basis.

Arguing this position, the Japanese side states that these islands are ancient Japanese lands, discovered and developed by the Japanese. These territories were recognized by the Japanese under the first Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1855. They were "illegally occupied" by the Soviet Union in 1945. The Soviet Union has no right to cite the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951), which talks about Japan's renunciation of rights and claims to the Kuril Islands since it is not a party to that treaty. The Japanese side advances the thesis that the territorial question is a legacy of the the "Yalta system," which has already been "destroyed" in Europe, and also the consequence of "Stalin's expansionist policy" and, therefore, the Soviet Union should reconsider its position and agree to settling the issue on Japanese terms.

Until recently, the Soviet position has been that the treaty must be based on the results of World War II, that is, it must fix the Soviet-Japanese state border taking into account that the Southern Kuril Islands belong to the Soviet Union.

The line of reasoning on the Soviet side comes down to the following. The priority in discovering, exploring, and developing the Kuril Islands, including their southern portion, belongs to Russia. Japan's perfidious attack on Russia in 1904 and the annexation of the southern portion of Sakhalin Island under the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty deprive Japan of the right to cite the earlier

concluded Russo-Japanese treaties. The Yalta Agreement of 1945 is absolutely mandatory for Japan in light of the norms of international law. The USSR's non-participation in the San Francisco Treaty does not lessen the fact that Japan renounced rights, legal grounds, and claims to the Kuril Islands. Under international law, the treaty is absolute in nature and goes beyond the limits of its participants. The territorial decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences with respect to Europe not only have not been annulled but, on the contrary, have been confirmed both in the Helsinki Final Act and in treaties associated with the German settlement.

Today, the policy of the Soviet side is determined by the leadership of Russia, which in the territorial question adheres to the five-phase plan for its settlement advanced in January 1990 by B. Yeltsin, which calls for the following phases:

- our official recognition of the existence of a territorial problem in Soviet-Japanese relations;
- demilitarization of the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai;
- declaring these islands a free enterprise zone with corresponding preferential treatment for Japan. Conclusion of a treaty between Russia and Japan on questions of developing cooperation in trade and economic, scientific and technical, cultural, and humanitarian spheres;
- conclusion of a peace treaty between our country and Japan;
- resolution of the territorial question by a new generation of politicians in 15-20 years. Among the possible solutions are: "a joint protectorate of Russia and Japan;" giving the islands the status of "free territory;" and transfer of the islands to Japan.

In connection with official recognition of the territorial problem in Soviet-Japanese relations, the need arises to examine, if only briefly, its economic, military, social, and political aspects.

The economic potential of the islands and adjacent sea areas is distinguished by its wealth, diversity, and high concentration per unit of area.

The total value just of natural resources explored in the southern portion of the Kurils, which include vanadium, iron, gold, copper, lead, sulfur, silver, titanium, zinc, and so forth is more than \$88 billion. Their value will increase, since prices for natural resources have a stable tendency to rise in the world economy.

The biological resources of these islands are also unique, particularly of the waters washing their shores. The Southern Kuril fishing area is considered one of the largest and richest in the world. Natural reproduction of biological resources takes place here, and artificial breeding of them is quite promising. Practically all species of crabs, echinoderms, and mollusks known in

the seas of the Far East are caught in this area. Migration routes of salmon and other types of fish and also seals pass through the island straits into the Sea of Okhotsk and further to Sakhalin, Magadan Oblast, and Khabarovsk Krai.

The total catch of all valuable fish and invertebrates in the southern portion of the Kuril Islands in recent years is about one million tonnes, and this volume may be increased considerably. Already now, fishermen of Sakhalin and the Kurils supply 5 out of every 18 kg considered the norm of annual consumption of fish and fish products. We do not have the ability to increase the fishing and fish product industry either by expanding the catch in the world oceans or by developing fish breeding in internal reservoirs in the next few years. Therefore, our loss of this region will inevitably result in the need to increase spending for purchasing these products abroad. In addition, such a step would deprive us of billions in annual revenue (in freely convertible currency) both from the sale at home and abroad of the fish caught there and fish products and also from licensed fishing by foreign fishermen.

In examining the military aspects of the problem, it should be noted that the Kuril Chain as a whole has a substantial importance in the military-strategic context, since it represents a natural boundary on the approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Primorye. Furthermore, the island of Hokkaido is still viewed by U.S. and Japanese military-political leadership as the main bridgehead for escalation of military operations in the Far East in the event of a military conflict with our country. In this regard, more than 50,000 Japanese troops are stationed on Hokkaido, including 3 infantry divisions and one tank division, possessing about 700 tanks and 800 artillery and mortar systems, and having up to 90 combat aircraft and about 40 antiship missile launchers. What is more, there are plans to relocate the U.S. Navy's amphibious forces to Sasebo in 1992. One also should not forget that the tunnel built between Hokkaido and Honshu is capable of handling 3-5 divisions in 24 hours.

At the same time, the grouping of our troops on the Southern Kurils is about 10,000. It consists of one division, one fighter regiment (just over 30 aircraft), and 4 antiship missile launchers. Nevertheless, despite the reduction of 120,000 in the number of our troops in the Far East conducted in 1989-1991, Japan's military-political leadership continues to push our country for a further reduction. Not making any reductions of its own, the leadership intentionally overstates the personnel strength of our troops in the press, including in the calculations not only forces stationed on the Kurils, Sakhalin, and the Primorye, but also their entire grouping from the Urals to the Kurils.

One can assume that if Japan gains sovereignty over the southern portion of the Kurils, at first it will not, for political reasons, place a considerable contingent of its troops and naval forces there, but will limit itself to

introducing defense forces and weapons and setting up signals intelligence collection equipment. In the future, no doubt, the grouping on the islands will be increased.

In the event of a conflict situation in the Far East, up to one infantry division on Iturup Island, one mixed brigade on Kunashir Island, an air wing (about 50 combat aircraft), and also a number of other combat support and service subunits and units can be additionally deployed on the Southern Kurils. In the event of military operations, these forces and assets can be used for defending the islands, blocking the strait zone, and operations by individual combat groups in the direction of the northern portion of the Kuril Chain. Such an assumption is based on military-historical experience.

In 1945, prior to the war with Japan, a grouping of more than 20,000 Japanese troops was stationed on the Southern Kuril Islands. Engineer preparation of the islands was a powerful complex of fortifications. The entire coastline accessible for an assault landing was covered by permanent-type and earth-and-timber emplacements linked by underground passages and trenches.

Based on the above, it follows that our country would suffer considerable military damage if the Southern Kurils were transferred to the sovereignty of Japan. A forward line of defense would be lost, and favorable conditions would be created for the passage of naval and air forces of both Japan and its allies into the Sea of Okhotsk, which would worsen considerably the entire operational-strategic situation for us in the Far East.

An analysis of the social aspects of the problem of Japan's territorial claims to the Southern Kurils shows that it has caused tension among the population of the Far East in connection with the uncertainty of ways to solve it.

An expanded sociological survey conducted last year by the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences on this question in regions of the Far East (Kurilsk, Severo-Kurilsk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Kholmsk, Aleksandrovsk, Okha, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Yelizovo, Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Khabarovsk, and Komsomolsk-na-Amure), Eastern Siberia (Chita, Baley, Irkutsk, Bratsk, and Cheremkhovo), and Western Siberia (Megion, Kuybyshev, Kemerovo, Belovo, and Omsk) showed that out of 7,000 people surveyed, 8.2 percent had no specific opinion, 5.4 percent favored the transfer of all the disputed islands, 8.4 percent believe it possible to transfer only a portion of the disputed islands, and 77.7 percent were opposed to satisfying Japan's territorial demands. Furthermore, 48.6 percent believe that the anticipated compensation for the transfer of the islands would not solve our problems and would not be of any appreciable benefit; therefore, it is impractical to approach the fate of the islands merely from the positions of the problems and difficulties of today.

However, it should be noted that the farther those surveyed were from the Kurils and the Kuril problem

(both territorially and from the standpoint of knowledgeability of the essence of the dispute), the more radical the nature of the statements on the essence of the matter. Such radicalism is explained to a certain extent by the distorted notions many people have about the disputed islands—like they are four bare rocks which are of no benefit other than international complications. For the majority of the respondents of Siberia, it was a revelation that it involved eight islands whose area is more than half of the entire area of the Kurils. The population of the islands themselves are very interested and participated actively in the survey, hoping that publication of its results will help break through the blockade of indifference (or silence) with respect to their problems. Some of the inhabitants of the islands expressed a willingness to oppose by any means both the Soviet and Japanese sides in solving the territorial problem without their involvement. At the same time, some people also had the opinion that the question has already been decided beforehand.

Inhabitants of Sakhalin are also concerned by the probable ways of solving the problem. Here there is concern that after the transfer of the Kuril Islands, the question of Sakhalin will inevitably follow. The same view was also dominant among the population of the mainland of the Far East.

There was another result of the survey. There often are rapturous articles in our press concerning the "Japanese miracle"—the country's fantastically high level of economic development. It would seem that this should create a positive attitude towards the Japanese nation among our fellow countrymen. This attitude is inherent to a greater extent in the young people, while middle-age and older people react towards the Japanese with great reserve and often with distrust. A question about foreign assistance in developing the eastern regions of our country evoked different reactions. Here, too, the opinion that we cannot pick up our economy (including in the Far East) without foreign assistance is prevalent among the young people; conversely, middle-age and older people believe that we must do everything on our own. Differences in opinions of people of various ages were also displayed in responses to a question on the possible consequences of creating free economic zones in the Far East, although it should be said that the population does not have any specific understanding at all of what a free economic zone is. Young people are inclined to see this basically as something positive; conversely, older people fear serious negative consequences such as loss of their national dignity, loss of independence, and high unemployment.

In concluding the examination of this aspect of the problem, it must be said that during the course of the survey, the impression is created that unless there is an increase in the population's standard of living, the number of those supporting the transfer of the islands to Japan may increase.

In examining the political aspect of the problem, it must be noted that transfer of the islands creates a precedent for reviewing existing borders, which may be taken advantage of by Germany, having made claims to Kaliningrad Oblast; Finland—for Pechenga and Karelia; China—for the areas of the Amur River region, the Primorye, and the Transbaykal region; Japan—for the rest of the Kurils and Sakhalin Island; and the Baltic states—to part of the territory of Leningrad Oblast and the northwestern oblasts of Russia.

Transferring the islands to Japan will not bring international prestige to our state as a country making territorial concessions in a dispute. The policy of reexamining postwar borders and territorial claims in our time should be considered unconstructive and capable of causing a chain reaction throughout the world. This is particularly unacceptable today for Russia, which is in a deep economic crisis and has just embarked on the path of radical reforms. Such a policy is a preservation of old approaches in international relations and does not correspond to the new thinking widely supported by the world community.

The southern portion of the Kuril Islands is the territory of Russia, belongs to the Russian people, and only the people living there have the right to decide the fate of the islands.

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CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Slight Improvement in Housing Situation Noted

92UM1012A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Manushkin and Lieutenant-Colonel S. Fedorov: "They Are Giving House-Warming Parties at the Garrisons, but the Housing Situation for Military Personnel Continues to Be Acute"]

[Text] It is with good reason they say that man lives on hope. The military man as well. Once he takes the oath of loyalty to the homeland and vows steadfastly to withstand all the hardships and deprivations of the military service, he hopes that sooner or later his family will live in decent conditions. Worn out from endless long trips and life in "government" housing, he is happy to have a place of his own. It is twice as gratifying and pleasant to receive such an apartment at the Shaykovka Air Garrison, as an example, which a group of journalists visited the other day.

The Finnish-Turkish consortium PEM developed a housing area with 1,056 apartments in less than a year.

We have to give the foreigners credit. They do know how to build. Officers and warrant officers of a fighter regiment which flew in from Germany on MIG-29s have

already made themselves at home in these fine apartments. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported on this on 11 April 1992. The second section of apartment buildings will be released in a few days. They are designated for the old-timers at the garrison, officers and warrant officers of the long-range air force, many of whom are also without apartments. The editors are also receiving reports of new construction and house-warmings at other garrisons. At last the authorities have begun devoting closer attention to the housing problems of the military. The Air Force, for example, plans to build 5,600 apartments with state funds this year. And this does not include housing construction by foreign companies, its acquisition with earnings (from commercial transport operations and so forth) and income from the sale of aviation equipment. The Air Force will acquire an additional 2,600 apartments from these sources.

Is that a little or a lot? In view of the fact that all of this housing will be allocated for Air Force personnel, 8,200 apartments is a generally impressive figure. A comparison makes everything clear, however. A report received by the editors from Air Force Headquarters shows that 19,487 military families in the Air Force stationed in Russia did not have apartments as of 01 May 1992. (The figure stands at around 200,000 for the CIS Armed Forces.)

Speaking of the Air Force alone, graduates of military schools and personnel withdrawn from Europe and other areas are expected to increase the number by at least 11,900 families. That is, the increase considerably exceeds the number of apartments it is planned to build. And so, the housing situation in the Air Force (actually in all branches of the armed forces) will not improve by the end of the year but will no doubt further deteriorate. The number of families without apartments at air garrisons in the Russian Federation is expected to exceed 23,000 by the end of the year. In short, the house-warmings which we are reporting are not enough to solve the problem.

A breakthrough in solving the housing problem for military personnel could come during the period 1993-1995. Those are the plans at least. It is difficult to believe even in this, however. The nation's treasury, as we know, is empty. There is some hope that we can construct apartments with funds we earn and what we receive from the sale of military equipment. It is planned for the Air Force to acquire 16,000 apartments in this manner in two years (1993-1994), for example. If only these plans are realized. Life is constantly making its adjustments, however. Will we be able to earn the necessary housing funds? How will sales of weapons and equipment go? These are far from idle questions. For now contracts for the sale of equipment amount to considerably less than the planned amount, after all.

In general the situation is not as bright as one might imagine when looking at these photographs [photographs not reproduced]. A house-warming is a house-warming

though. And we offer our heartfelt congratulations to those who have finally received the right to live under their own roof.

Rodionov Proposes Russian Federation National Security and Defense Academy

92UM1000A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 May 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col Gen Igor Rodionov, chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff, by Lt Col O. Vladyskin; place and date not given: "National Security Means More Than Just the Country's Defense"]

[Text]

[Vladyskin] Igor Nikolayevich, in late January you expressed your support in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to transforming the Military Academy of the General Staff into the Academy of National Security and Defense of the Russian Federation. Can anything be said about any practical steps in this direction yet?

[Rodionov] Unfortunately, no. If you recall, in my last interview I said that no reaction to our proposals had come from Gorbachev—he was president of the USSR at that time. And in the Russian leadership, Burbulis, Kokoshin and many others were acquainted with these proposals. In principle, they approved of the idea of establishing the ANBO [Academy of National Security and Defense of the Russian Federation], but no official decisions have yet been made.

Practical efforts to establish the Ministry of Defense and the army and navy of the Russian Federation are beginning. This is extremely complex, far-reaching and important work. And it must be done by sufficiently competent people who have been appropriately trained.

[Vladyskin] But aren't there such people in Russia?

[Rodionov] You see, in the recent past it was generally believed that anyone who occupied a high post was, just by virtue of the position he held, the top specialist in the given area. Regardless of education and practical experience. But you yourself know the principle that was followed in making appointments.

But even in those cases where a person appears to have risen to the post of a top executive quite deservedly, this does not at all mean that he is able to do an adequate job in organizing defense.

[Vladyskin] Why? Your academy has been training people to carry out such tasks for many years.

[Rodionov] That's true. But many of our ideas about how defense should be provided for have undergone change in recent times.

Specifically, we now need to consider national security, which is a far broader and deeper concept. Before, it used to be artificially divided into individual components, into

spheres of absolute influence and responsibility of different union departments. Military security was wholly within the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense, state security was under the KGB, and internal security was under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And only one organization—the CPSU Central Committee Politburo—maintained all-embracing control over them, though on the basis of its own political and ideological aspirations exclusively. As a result decisions on matters of vital importance to the state were made in secret, without deep scientific analysis, and often not so much for the sake of the country's real needs as to the benefit of political competition. And when it came to directions of state activity that are so important by today's yardsticks—providing economic, information and ecological security, they did not enjoy any significant development at all, or they were considered too one-sidedly, once again for ideological reasons.

In view of this state of affairs, specialists were trained for each separate area of security only within a single narrow profile. This was the task of our academy as well. We trained personnel for command and control at the operational-strategic level of the armed forces, though they were trained primarily to organize combat activities in a major war.

[Vladyskin] Does this mean that personnel of this sort will be unable to carry out the new tasks? Whom do you suggest teaching in the future, and what do you intend to teach them?

[Rodionov] National security is interpreted in the law of the Russian Federation adopted in February 1992 as a state of protection of vitally important interests of the individual, society and state against domestic and foreign threats. This means that the people who will be carrying out this task, even some small parts of it, will still require a diversity of views, a broad understanding of the problems of security, and consequently, the corresponding knowledge. It's just that there is no place that such knowledge could be acquired in its entirety today.

I am referring here not just to people occupying high positions in the armed forces. Consider how many committees and commissions have arisen under government organizations, and the various sorts of departmental organs called upon to deal with different aspects of security.

Some people take pleasure in deriding the fact that certain executives—no matter whether they are civilian or military—suffer a shortage of competency. But we simply don't have any other personnel. The people we have are the ones that we trained over all those years. And the best solution to this situation is to provide new knowledge and lacking knowledge to those who are to determine the strategy of national security in the immediate future.

This is why we proposed establishing the ANBO out of the Military Academy of the General Staff under Russian jurisdiction. It would be suitable for it to have two faculties—a national security faculty and an operational-strategic faculty.

The program of the former would be based on the general theory of security, geopolitics and international relations, general and military economics, economic security, law, military development, a required course in military art and in internal political, information and ecological security. These courses would be taken by students primarily from among civilians sent to the academy from the administrative staffs of the president, the government and the committees and commissions established under the latter.

The latter faculty could admit promising senior and general officers, as before. Only now in addition to military (operational and strategic) training per se, they would also get the needed amount of knowledge in many other aspects of national security.

And in addition to deep theoretical training, the students could be taught the practical habits of using various resources to predict, contain, weaken and eliminate arising threats and all kinds of conflicts having a bearing on security.

[Vladykin] What do you feel, Igor Nikolayevich, is the greatest hindrance to adoption of a decision to establish the Academy of National Security and Defense of the Russian Federation?

[Rodionov] There are many causes. But one of them is quite clear to me. It is the willing or unwilling mistrust of the military leadership on the part of administrative organizations of the supreme organs of Russian government. The origins of this mistrust are generally explainable. An attempt was made to involve the army in the events of last August. But it would not compromise itself in any way! On the contrary it showed that it had no desire to oppose its own people. And if it did have to take to city streets, it did not do so on its own initiative.

However, many generals and officers continue to feel that they are somehow suspect. We are reproached for conservatism, for a reluctance to accept the changes that have occurred in the country. This is despite the fact that we ourselves are suggesting radical transformation of the academy. In support of the needs of a renewed Russia and its national security.

[Vladykin] What in your opinion are these needs today? In general terms, of course.

[Rodionov] It would be very difficult to answer this question even in general terms. Because we naturally understand things in our own way, while the point of view held by some scientific organization or some state organization might differ significantly from ours. On the other hand an unjustifiably long time is being taken to develop the official positions on the national interests of the Russian Federation, which is resulting in a slowdown of state activity in the most diverse directions, including in the military area.

After all, we haven't even fully developed our ideas as to what the goals of the armed forces will be. What tasks are they to carry out? Should they be oriented on restraining

the armies of clearly identified countries, and on maintaining an influence in some specific regions? These questions are not simple. In the absence of answers to them, we have to use abstract indicators, based on world averages in the best case, to determine the numerical strength of the armed forces, their structure and the level of their armament. Such that the political leadership of the state must clearly formulate, and announce to the country and to the world community, what we define as our national interests in the present stage.

What we need to do here in general is learn from other countries, and primarily from America. Take for example a document such as the "National Strategy for Security of the United States," and the reports on national military strategy given on its basis to Congress by the chairman of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In one of them he stated: "We need an approach to the problems of security which would be sufficiently broad to preserve the basic sources of our might, while being sufficiently focused to permit action against the very real threats that still exist." A special attachment based on it, incidentally, considers the possible variants of wars and arms conflicts in which the U.S. Armed Forces might participate in 1994-1999. One of the variants is this: "The possibility of a war against Russia, which has inherited the armed forces of the USSR and which still has the possibility for destroying the United States with nuclear weapons, is not excluded."

Imagine the way it might have been in our country if a document of similar content came into being! First of all it would certainly have been stamped "Top Secret." Second, if it were suddenly to be made public, its authors would have been immediately accused of aggressive aspirations. But we have nothing even remotely recalling such a thing. And yet, a document defining the national interests and strategy for Russia's national security is of course necessary. The ANBO could participate in its writing.

[Vladykin] So what is required today for establishment of the Academy of National Security and Defense?

[Rodionov] A presidential ukase transferring the academy to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and awarding it a new status. Also, approval of a statute on the new VUZ. And to the extent possible, increasing the maximum time of service of our instructors, because in view of the unique nature of the academy, their age—and that of the students as well—is an average of 10 years more than the age of people who teach and study in ordinary military academies. At least we need to allow instructors discharged into the reserves to remain in their positions at the same salaries as civilian professors. Their experience is very valuable to the academy.

[Vladykin] What financial outlays will such a transformation incur?

[Rodionov] Practically none. We will fall within present estimates. We intend to create the two faculties, you see, out of the presently existing operational-strategic faculty, which has been twice larger than the real demand for it in

recent years. I think that in the conditions of reduction of the armed forces, this is an attractive feature.

Dutch Foundation to Build Housing for Airmen

92UM1026A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 May 92 First Edition p 4

[Article by Special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yelena Agapova: "The House is Dutch, the Tenant from Monino"]

[Text] The Dutchwoman Marlis ter Borg has never been in the Moscow suburb of Monino. But here for some time they have heard about her, the president of the Construction for Peace Fund. Of course, they have also heard of the 50 cottages which Ms. ter Borg has offered to build for the apartmentless military airmen with the help of Dutch technology and building materials. The approximate cost of the 50 cottages is about 100 million rubles. As has been announced, the Dutch side will assume one-half the expenditures on construction.

Here, I assume, certain explanations are required. Actually, everything started in October 1991, when Ms. ter Borg for the first time visited our Air Forces High Command and told of the desire of the Dutch Construction for Peace Fund to help the apartmentless military airmen and of the specific project for building 50 cottages employing the modern terrablock technology.

Incidentally, if one were to be militarily precise, then one must recall 1990 and our first article "Guilders for the Apartmentless Offered by Dutch Women." It was precisely then that our readers learned of this indefatigable woman, the public fund set up by her and the first acts of aid to our apartmentless servicemen who, let me point out, were also supported by the Dutch Minister of Defense A.L. ter Beek [transliteration]. Let me recall that he allocated 30,000 guilders for purchasing construction equipment that was so scarce in our country.

A little later we described the unusual terrablock technology and equipment capable of turning ordinary dirt into excellent quality brick. In one hour there were 500 bricks which could be laid immediately without mortar. It was precisely such construction proposed by Marlis ter Borg. In the opinion of the Chief of the Air Forces Main Engineer Directorate [GIU], Lt Gen Avn Vladlen Kaydik, the results of building the 50 cottages will make it possible to judge the opportunities for the further use of the terrablock technology also in other regions. Incidentally, recently the chief of the Air Forces GIU, a representative of the joint Moscow Terrablock Firm, and your correspondent were invited by the Construction for Peace Fund to visit The Netherlands. There were many meetings: with the Deputy Minister of Defense for

Construction, Lt Gen De Vos [transliteration], members of Parliament, representatives of the major construction firms and even at the EC in Brussels... But the subject of discussion was just one—the possible prospects for collaboration in building for our military. There, in The Netherlands, an agreement was signed on building the 50 cottages and this was recently started in Monino.

I feel that this time Ms. ter Borg cannot imagine what confusion and disquiet she has introduced into the ranks of our apartmentless servicemen in Monino. The Dutch-design cottage home, also with a plot of land and gratis, would be something out of the realm of the fantastic for our impoverished officer who has been deprived of elementary utility services. Moreover, all this has been against the background of well-known chaos, including in the privatization area. And so there have been all sorts of rumors abounding over this construction. At the same time, the lists of applicants for these cottages have already been drawn up and I have seen them with my own eyes. They are still to be confirmed by the Air Forces Commander, Col Gen Avn P. Deynenin. But among the first on the list are the large families of Cols A. Kozlov, V. Lesnykh, V. Belov and others.

Here in Monino, where the well-known Air Force Academy imeni Gagarin is located, there are more than 500 apartmentless servicemen. Some of them, according to the admission of the Chief of the Academy, Col Gen Avn B. Korolkov, must wait for better times while staying at...a ski camp. One has only to sell one MIG-29 which is worth about 25 million dollars and there would be no problem with housing in the Monino Garrison, said the academy chief. But these are merely noble wishes. There is a decree on the sale of military aircraft but there is still no foreign exchange. At the same time, serving in Monino are pilots who in their majority have flown under maximum conditions and have been shifted into instructoral work. Many of them have one hope: if peace does not break down, then 50 of them with their families at the end of this year will move into new quarters in the Dutch cottages. Incidentally, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent has already been invited to the first housewarming.

One last thing. Recently in Monino an officer initiative group was organized for assisting this construction. They asked me to pass on their gratitude to the Dutch women from the Construction for Peace Fund, but in saying farewell all of them expressed the doubt: "We have no confidence that these cottages will come to us, the ordinary apartmentless personnel..."

For this reason we want to reassure the Monino apartmentless officers through the newspaper that the questions of allocating the housing in the Dutch cottages will not be disregarded by the Air Forces Command and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

UKRAINE

Accidental Launch of Helicopter Missile in Zhytomyr Oblast

92UM1019A Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 14 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by M. Sydorzhkevskyy, Visnyk Information Agency: "The Price of a Shot"]

[Text] An extraordinary event occurred in one of the rayon centers of Zhytomyr oblast: an unauthorized launch of a missile from a helicopter. The missile flew a few meters and hit the outer wall of a factory, leaving a hole measuring 250-300 millimeters. Fortunately, there were no casualties or equipment damage.

The subsequent investigation named eleven servicemen among those involved in the unauthorized launch ("NP"). They were, of course, punished. However, as opposed to the female private first class and the lieutenant, last year's military school graduate, who were dismissed from the ranks of the Armed Forces, captain U., who was directly responsible for this launch, was merely stripped of one star on each shoulder tab.

Such is the long "trail" left by the stray missile launched by a captain, who is not likely to ever become a major.

Ukraine Military Editor on Status of Newspaper

92UM1017A Ashkhabad FRUNZEVETS in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Lt Col Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Bilan, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian military newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA, by Aleksey Cherechin and Sergey Basarab, officer candidates of the Lvov Higher Military School: "Prove Your Fitness for the Newspaper"]

[Text] The newspaper of the Kiev Military District LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA has recently come out under a new title. Now it is NARODNAYA ARMIYA, the central organ of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Not only the name of the newspaper has changed. There have also been changes in the life of the editorial staff itself. These are described by the Editor-in-Chief, Lt Col Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Bilan.

[Correspondents] Vasiliy Aleksandrovich, you have already been working over a year on the editorial staff. What changes have occurred in the life of the newspaper since it changed its subordination to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense?

[Bilan] New tasks confronting the editorial collective and a new focus have been set out. New departments have been organized such as the organizational development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, sociodomestic and historical. They set the main line for our newspaper.

[Correspondents] We know that the work of the editorial staff starts with the drawing up of plans...

[Bilan] No plans. Experience has shown that this is a futile waste of time and paper.

The editorial collective lives under the motto "A newspaper for the sake of a newspaper." But plans, let my colleagues forgive me, are all sham. There are no hacks left on the editorial staff. The recruitment of candidates for the new staff was carried out following the principle "Prove your fitness for the newspaper." If you are actually a professional and provide interesting materials, then you have nothing to worry about. We need such persons.

The collective of journalists is the founder. This means that each member of the editorial staff as well as the officials are carefully selected. Everything is settled by collective voting, the candidacy is discussed by the assembly, and only after this, I, as the editor-in-chief, write a request directly to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense on the necessity of appointing such and such a candidate to an editorial position. I myself followed this entire path. So we will not take a "pig in the poke," as was the case before.

[Correspondents] The readers have noticed that recently the newspaper has become more relaxed and interesting. What, in your opinion, is the source of success?

[Bilan] The circle of readers has increased significantly because for the first time NARODNAYA ARMIYA is for sale retail in all the oblast centers of Ukraine. The interest in the newspaper is also explained by the informative materials, by the high professional level and by the experience of the correspondents.

[Correspondents] Vasiliy Aleksandrovich, what difficulties does the editorial collective encounter?

[Bilan] As throughout society, to the numerous problems in converting to the market, I would add one more. You have already guessed that this is the paper crisis. It has also touched us. It is no joking matter that the cost of paper and typographic services have risen by 10 fold. With such a situation, we were forced to increase the price for NARODNAYA ARMIYA.

[Correspondents] Not so long ago, the newspaper was under the Main Political Directorate. Who at present is your immediate superior?

[Bilan] No one. The minister of defense calls me the "independent editor of an independent newspaper."

[Correspondents] What are the problems related to the switch to the official language?

[Bilan] Presently the newspaper publishes materials in Russian and Ukrainian. This is convenient for the readers as representatives of various nationalities are still serving in Ukraine. It takes time for a complete transition to the Ukrainian language.

We have already assembled a staff of translators and proofreaders. But there is also the problem of the Ukrainian alphabet. At times we must improvise. But I feel that these are temporary difficulties.

From the Editors. We feel that the interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Lt Col Vasiliy Bilan, not only reflects the changes in the life of the editorial staff, but also contains constructive proposals on reorganizing the entire military press of the CIS Armed Forces. In fact, the military correspondents at present are in particular need of professionalism, dedication to the job to which they have devoted their lives, profound competence, and a creative zeal.

Cadres Chief Answers Questions on Transfers, Pensions

92UM1004A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 May 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondents Lieutenant Colonels Nikolay Gorenko and Valentin Dmitriyev and Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "Direct Line: NARODNAYA ARMIYA Readers—The Editorial Staff—The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate": "Personnel Directorate Chief Major-General Aleksandr Ignatenko: 'Patriots of Ukraine Can Be Certain: The Homeland Is Waiting for and Will Receive Each of its Sons...'"]

[Text] On April 18, it rained all day when the direct line was working. We jokingly suggested to General Aleksandr Stepanovich Ignatenko: they say, be a success... And then the first phone call rang out—from a woman. Everyone cheered up simultaneously, despite the dismal weather: both the rain and the female attention since early morning—we were bound for success!

And it actually accompanied us: both to the "line's" work, and to many of those who appealed through the editorial staff to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate Chief. We received a total of 46 phone calls and there were somewhat more questions...

The issue of the transfer for service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces was indisputably the main topic of conversation.

So, calls, calls...

[Galacha] Is this the direct line?

[Ignatenko] Yes, this is General Ignatenko speaking...

[Galacha] I am a mother of a serviceman. How can I get my son transferred from Estonia to Ukraine? I was at the personnel directorate and they received me well, but they refused to...

[Ignatenko] One moment please, let's do this properly... What is your son's name?

[Galacha] Yuriy Georgiyevich Galach, birth date 1968, graduated from Tartu Aviation School...

[Ignatenko] It's very pleasant for me to hear that you were at the directorate and it's even more pleasant that you were received well. But the fact that they did not assist you is bad. I am interested in who answered you in that way and why. But now, to the point. We want your son. Right now the directorate is conducting negotiations with the command authorities in the Baltic region and with the leadership of Estonia, in particular. We are planning negotiations with Mr. Ruutel' on the issue of the exchange of officers. A directorate representative, who is compiling lists of all those who desire to serve in the Ukrainian Army, is there right now. Our task and goal is to transfer all cadets, junior officers, and academy graduates. This is the future of our army. Your son will certainly end up on these lists...

[Galacha] Thank you for giving me some sort of hope...

[Ignatenko] Not some sort but it must be complete hope...

[Galacha] Oh, you have reassured me as a mother...

[Ignatenko] Tell your son: neither he nor others should be upset. Ukrainian patriots can be certain: the homeland is waiting for and will receive each of its sons...

Approximately this same sort of optimistic, reassuring conversation occurred with the mother of Captain Arkadiy Anatolyevich Shevchenko.

[Shevchenko] My son is serving near Kiev and in October he submitted a request for a transfer to the capital due to my illness: I have had a cancer operation. I am alone...

[Ignatenko] Valentina Nikolayevna, I cannot unambiguously answer right now, but I will write down your name and will attempt to assist you. All the best and I hope everything turns out well...

Major Vladimir Vasilyevich Dvinyaninov called in with a "painful" question and it seemed to us that he also obtained support and assistance.

[Dvinyaninov] I have served for 24 years and six months, 15 of them at a voyenkomat [military commissariat]. Now, the President's representative in the rayon, to whom lists of military commissariat workers were submitted, opposes letting me serve the six months until my full pension since I am in Baryshevka and I have an apartment in Kiev...

[Ignatenko] How old are you?

[Dvinyaninov] I am 44 and a half years old with 24 and a half years service...

[Ignatenko] Who is the President's representative?

[Dvinyaninov] Leonid Vasilyevich Boyko...

[Ignatenko] Vladimir Vasilyevich, you have been of great service to the Homeland. We will absolutely strive for you to serve that six months. I will get in touch with and talk to the representative. As they say, if worst comes to worst, you will be transferred to the military district commander and will serve out that period. No one will sink your fate or be permitted to...

General Ignatenko immediately made decisions on the most troubling calls.

Major Aleksandr Grigoryevich Mazur from the city of Brody is worried. I serve in a RVSN [Strategic Rocket Forces] division which is being reduced. The process is proceeding: They are preparing us for evacuation. So, the Moscow personnel people told us, the officers: none of you will remain in Ukraine, all of you will be transferred to Russia. I consider myself to be a Ukrainian and I want to serve in the Ukrainian Army. I have two and a half years left until I'm eligible for a minimum pension...

[Ignatenko] You must serve out those two years. And as for the Moscow personnel people, they are incorrect, they do not have any relationship to you whatsoever. You—are under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, and everything that is on Ukrainian territory, including specialists, is her property. Your desire to serve Ukraine is your legal right and no one can flaunt it. On your side are the Ukrainian laws of which there are none in Russia. And as for the situation that has developed at your unit, this is the solution: a directorate officer will arrive at your unit in the next few days to study the situation and to report to me. Calm down, I assure you: there are no grounds for worry, everything will be fine...

There were also quite a few calls with requests for assistance and protection.

[Myagkiy] Comrade general, this is Captain Nikolay Fedorovich Myagkiy from the city of Smela... Our unit is being disbanded and the commander has decided "to settle scores" with me. A year ago, I found protection from him at the military district rear services political department: at that time, he humiliated me and insulted me in front of soldiers. Now I have made contacts in a neighboring unit for a transfer to it in the post of food services chief. The commander learned about that, drove over there, and now they won't take me... But can it really be that a man who has always been good can suddenly become bad?

[Ignatenko] It doesn't happen...

[Myagkiy] Until recently, I was among the candidates for entry into the academy and now the commander tells me: I will release you. I am an Afghan veteran, I fought there for two years, I have awards, and all of this has embarrassed me in front of my comrades and fellow servicemen...

[Ignatenko] Obviously, if you are speaking the truth, that is objectionable...

[Myagkiy] My conscience cannot be quiet...

[Ignatenko] That's good. But I will get in contact with the personnel people at the military district rear services personnel directorate on your question and we will restore justice. You report to your commander that you called me and that we are going to sort out this situation...

Among the questions posed to General Ignatenko were quite a few of a problematic, production nature. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Borisovich Kamenskiy formulated two of them.

[Kamenskiy] How will the fates of former political workers, who find themselves not in positions, be resolved?

[Ignatenko] They will serve! If you cannot find employment in the socio-psychological structures, you will have to find yourself a place while proceeding from the specific nature of your own branch of service...

[Kamenskiy] Will ethnographic roots impact the prospects for service?

[Ignatenko] There is no and there will not be any discrimination on racial grounds in the Ukrainian Army. We are being accused of an ethnic policy and that is gossip: an unofficial institute of rumors, created by those who want very much for Ukraine not to have its own army and navy, is giving rise to them. Today, 75 percent non-Russians are serving on the territory of the republic and 15 million Russians reside here—and there is no animosity whatsoever. What kind of discrimination can it be a question of if, for example, of the nine generals who have just been appointed to posts as the first generals of the Ukrainian Army: one is Ukrainian, one is Armenian, and seven are Russian? I recently returned from Sevastopol. There I became acquainted with the Air Force leadership. One hundred percent—Russians. Forty percent Ukrainians serve in the Northern Fleet and not one admiral is Ukrainian. There it is—the old personnel policy. Henceforth, no one will be able to impose upon us. Just like they will not succeed in causing a quarrel between the Ukrainian people and the great Russian people.

[Kamenskiy] Thank you...

[Ignatenko] Best of luck to you!

Reserve Officer Leontiy Grigoryevich Ivanchenko raised two urgent and valid questions.

[Ivanchenko] My son served for 19 years. He became ill and is a Class II disabled person. He receives a 150 ruble monthly pension. But besides his calendar years of service, he has seven years of the Suvorov School, that is, service at an early age. Is it really just that the law does not consider these years in the calculation of total years served?

[Ignatenko] I agree with you... Right now a provision is being developed on performance of military duty—a document to amend the Law on Universal Military

Obligation. I will note your suggestion, Leontiy Grigoryevich. It will be sent to the appropriate working group...

[Ivanchenko] And the second question: why are pensions for pensioners not recalculated while considering the new, higher military ranks that have been conferred on reserve officers by military commissariats?

[Ignatenko] And I agree with that, it is a valid point... Unfortunately, Leontiy Grigoryevich, there is enough incomplete work of the past style of work with reserve personnel, it is alive and well. But we will correct the situation. I will send your comment to the appropriate ministry directorate...

[Ivanchenko] Thank you...

[Ignatenko] Thank you for raising these problem issues...

And once again questions with a request for a transfer to Ukraine...

[Tochalnyy] Aleksandr Stepanovich, I am Army Veteran Vasiliy Stepanovich Tochalnyy and I am worried...

[Ignatenko] Hello.

[Tochalnyy] My son is serving in the Northern Fleet, has an apartment in Sevastopol, and wants to return to Ukraine and serve the Ukrainian Navy...

[Ignatenko] We do not have any problems at all with that: We are taking all seamen. He must sign a request addressed to the minister of defense in which he briefly talks about himself, tells us the address of his housing in Ukraine, and writes his autobiography. These documents are sent to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in the prescribed manner. Our address is: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, No 6, Vozdukhoflotskiy Prospect, Kiev...

[Tochalnyy] Thank you...

[Menzhinskiy] Comrade major-general, Captain-Lieutenant Yuriy Yuryevich Menzhinskiy appeals to you. My documents on a transfer to Kiev Military District have been at the Main Personnel Directorate of the former Ministry of Defense of the former Union for a year. I have just arrived from Moscow where the people at the GUK [Main Personnel Directorate] told me: if you do not bring a memorandum from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in a week—we will send the documents back to the fleet. And is this tantamount to another year-long delay with the transfer...

[Ignatenko] In what post are you serving?

[Menzhinskiy] Nuclear submarine missile group commander...

[Ignatenko] Wonderful... How long have you served in the navy?

[Menzhinskiy] Five years...

[Ignatenko] You need to go to the Black Sea Fleet. You do not need to go to Moscow right now. Call this telephone number on Monday. That is the personnel directorate duty officer. Tell him that I told you to call. They will prepare the appropriate memorandum for the Main Personnel Directorate, take it with you to go after your documents...

[Menzhinskiy] Thank you, comrade general...

[Ignatenko] Are you Ukrainian?

[Menzhinskiy] Yes.

[Ignatenko] Serve. We are in dire need of seamen who are devoted to Ukraine, all the more so missile submariners...

General A. Ignatenko immediately made one more specific decision on an officer's fate during the course of the direct line.

[Buydenko] This is Major Sergey Yakovlevich Buydenko calling...

[Ignatenko] Hello... Who are you by position and where are you serving?

[Buydenko] I am senior assistant for personnel to the chief of staff, I serve in Poland, which is where I am driving to right now...

[Ignatenko] How old are you?

[Buydenko] 32...

[Ignatenko] How many years service do you have?

[Buydenko] 15 years...

[Ignatenko] What positions have you held in the service?

[Buydenko] I was an aircraft technician. I have been in personnel work for the last nine years...

[Ignatenko] Do you have a large family?

[Buydenko] A wife and son...

[Ignatenko] Do you have an apartment in Ukraine?

[Buydenko] I have a house in Lebedin and I am on the list for a cooperative in Sumy...

[Ignatenko] I understand that the line has not moved. Maybe you won't have to wait for it. Sergey Yakovlevich, as you will see, if we select you for the Ministry of Defense personnel directorate, will you go serve there?

[Buydenko] With pleasure, if I come...

[Ignatenko] We will verify this. Come to Kiev and we will resolve this issue...

During the course of the direct line with our readers, Major-General A. Ignatenko gave exhaustive answers on a series of issues associated with the transfer of officers

to the CIS and those who have not taken an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. For example, the wife of Senior Lieutenant Panferov from Mariupol received the following explanation on the procedures for transferring officers to the CIS.

[Ignatenko] You do not need to worry. We have prepared lists of everyone who has not taken the oath and they will leave for Moscow on Monday. They will call you and they will resolve the issue locally at the Main Personnel Directorate...

The general added to Major Sergey Konstantinovich Sushkov's similar question:

[Ignatenko] According to the agreement, you know, the Protocol between the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Personnel Directorate has been signed—you will be transferred to the Main Personnel Directorate according to branches of service and Armed Forces components. Obviously, your fate will be resolved in the future by the appropriate personnel organs. From our, the Ukrainian, side, the issue will be efficiently resolved. I do not know how things will unfold in Moscow...

[Sushkov] One more question: How will it be with the exchange of housing? Is this possible: Will I, say, exchange housing with someone who is being assigned to Ukraine?

[Ignatenko] Yes, that variation can occur...

This issue is certainly among the urgent: how will the fate of an officer who has taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine but who has now "rethought" and wants to serve in the CIS be resolved? Specifically, an officer's wife made this phone call came from Kotovsk.

[Ignatenko] Has your husband taken our oath?

[officer's wife] Yes...

[Ignatenko] I am afraid that he will be labeled persona non grata in Russia for completely understandable reasons...

[officer's wife] But his replacement is already coming....

[Ignatenko] We will accept the replacement and we will determine the duty...

[officer's wife] But what kind of laws are these? What, does he have to serve Ukraine for the rest of his life?

[Ignatenko] We will not impede his transfer: let your husband write a request through the team for a transfer to the CIS, we will complete the transfer documents, and I repeat, we will not impede it. But how they will handle it there...

[Ignatenko] Hello, I am listening...

[Sherstyuk] This is Lieutenant Vasiliy Petrovich Sherstyuk calling. I have this question: Why is my transfer to Volga-Ural Military District being delayed?

[Ignatenko] This is the matter here, Vasiliy Petrovich. We immediately sent all the documents for assignment to other CIS states that came to us at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate to the Main Personnel Directorate in Moscow. There have been no delays due to us. If there's a hitch, then the cause is only there. I promise you that I will duplicate it once again: I will send one telegram to Volga-Ural Military District and a second one to the Main Personnel Directorate. The only thing that I can recommend to you right now is to drive to Volga-Ural Military District Personnel Department and ask if a telegram has arrived for you from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate. Call me tomorrow and I will give you the date-time group of that telegram.

[Sherstyuk] Very good, I am interested in another issue. Why are officers, who have decided to leave the army, not being released?

[Ignatenko] Whom are you talking about specifically?

[Sherstyuk] For example, Senior Lieutenant Biryukov, Senior Lieutenant Volovik, and a number of other junior officers... They have submitted their requests.

[Ignatenko] What military district is that?

[Sherstyuk] Kiev...

[Ignatenko] There will be no problems with that. No one will attempt to convince lieutenants to serve. That is their right, their choice. I will verify your information. It cannot be that their requests have not been signed.

[unidentified caller] Hello, General Ignatenko?

[Ignatenko] Hello, how are you? Who is this? From Goncharovsk? So, I cannot cheer you up. Right now we are urgently carrying out the transfers of officers and personnel from so-called "hot spots" in execution of the Presidential Decree. We have from 220,000 to 250,000 officers serving outside the borders of Ukraine. Of them, 50 percent desire to return to Ukraine. In Ukraine, those of the officers who have served in Ukraine have primarily taken the oath. Only 10,000 of them have not taken the oath. Therefore, right now it is practically impossible to be restored to regular active duty from the reserve. Why? Well, because the people who are returning to the homeland do not have either shelter or work. Therefore, even from the humanitarian, human point of view, we need to define them so that sooner or later they will obtain housing.

[Sabirov] This is Captain Ilgiz Bakeyevich Sabirov from Belaya Tserkva. I am serving in the Air Force. This is my question, comrade general. Will ethnic minorities in the Ukrainian Armed Forces not be oppressed? And will

they not end up being reduced? It is especially troubling that nepotism and matchmaking are continuing during appointments to posts.

[Ignatenko] Well, I don't agree with you here. As for the Ministry of Defense, as of today there is no nepotism or matchmaking in this structural element. Of course, we need to create a new team in order to pilot this ship across the ocean of our stormy lives. But we are conducting the most aggressive work with these negative phenomena. Right now, we are certifying the personnel organs, that is, officers of personnel organs. We are studying how they have performed their service and if they correspond to their positions. And, naturally, we will attempt to place officers in personnel organs who have performed good service and who have completed a good service school, who know life and the service, and who love people. Those are the kinds of people that we will choose for the personnel organs.

Furthermore, I would like for you to tell the officers: Let them not worry about their future. In Ukraine, as in no other CIS state, laws have been adopted that socially protect officers. That is—first of all. Secondly, we need flying personnel very much. And we are taking every possible step to preserve them. This is the primary direction.

[Sabirov] You understand that we have a very difficult situation right now in the regiment. A number of officials from the leadership are leaving to serve in the CIS...

[Ignatenko] That is not so terrible. The command staff is coming apart and young, intelligent, energetic officers must themselves assume the command. And they must grow. There is no tragedy in this. This is even pleasant—the people have made their choice and have implemented it. Let them go. We will promote worthy people to higher posts, let them work, grow and receive satisfaction from their work. What else? Is that all? Goodbye.

[Ignatenko] Hello, Aleksandr Stepanovich Ignatenko is speaking with you. What is your question? With whom am I speaking? So. Illegally released from the Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Dmitriyevich Tverdun. When did that occur? You say you were excluded from the unit rolls on April 6? Where did the documents go, to which military commissariat?

[Tverdun] The commander made an unfounded decision and sent my documents to Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi instead of to Kharkov. And now I am in a difficult situation. Please help me...

[Ignatenko] I know that commander. It's nothing, we will correct it so that this Nikolay Alekseyevich does not act up like an appanage prince. He has set himself up in Kiev with all of the truths and untruths, at the Armed Forces Training Directorate and inspectorate. I do not understand the psychology of such commanders. Well, we will be compelled to revoke his assignment. And not only because you called, I myself already have a definite opinion about this man. What else can I do to help you?

[Tverdun] Comrade general, I want to serve. Help me to return to the ranks!...

[Ignatenko] Do you have a right to a pension? Do you have an apartment? Are you provided for? You have housing. Then it is impossible to change anything. I will be concerned that the documents are returned from Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi and they will be sent to Kharkov. Just like you want. Will this satisfy you? Fine, good luck.

[Ignatenko] Hello, where are you calling from? From Belaya Tserkva? Your name? Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Viktorovich Gunaza? What is your question?

[Gunaza] I am interested in the structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces socio-psychological service. When will it be developed?

[Ignatenko] It is at the stage of completion. I think that the appropriate documents will arrive in the troops in May. Do you have any other questions?

[Gunaza] Another officer is standing beside me. He is interested in how they will treat him...

[Ignatenko] Give him the telephone...

[Ustyugov] Lieutenant Colonel Ustyugov. I am a political worker and I have not been in an authorized position for seven months. I have 20 and one half years service. I have not taken the oath. When will they transfer me to a new duty location in the CIS?

[Ignatenko] It would be better if you personally come to Kiev and meet with Colonel Vladimir Savvovich Mulyava. And you will receive an exhaustive answer to that question from him. That will be better. Do you agree? Goodbye.

[Ignatenko] Hello. Introduce yourself.

[Sviridov] Captain Aleksandr Viktorovich Sviridov, I am serving in Goncharovsk.

[Ignatenko] How old are you?

[Sviridov] I am 29 years old...

[Ignatenko] How many years of service?

[Sviridov] 11 years...

[Ignatenko] I am listening to your question.

[Sviridov] I decided to transfer to Volga-Ural Military District. I announced this long ago. But there has not yet been a decision about me...

[Ignatenko] Fine, Aleksandr Viktorovich. You acted properly by calling. I have signed many telegrams this week that are addressed to the CIS Main Personnel Directorate with regard to officers who desire to be transferred to other states. Now this entire matter is with

the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Personnel Directorate. As soon as they give the "O.K." for the assignment—we will immediately issue the appropriate documents to people.

I want to inform you that we are sending lists of 9,000 men to Moscow literally in two days. No one intends to delay anyone and there is no need to do that. Maybe there were some problems previously. Right now we are resolving them. You can speed up the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Personnel Directorate. Address your complaint to Colonel-General Yuriy Nikolayevich Rodionov in Moscow.

Previously, in our country horizontal ties existed between military districts. And we could immediately send you to Volga-Ural Military District. But a meeting took place on April 2 at which a document on the mechanism for transferring officers was jointly developed and signed. With the goal of carrying out monitoring of officer transfers from one side or the other in order to not lose their personal folders. This somewhat delays in time. But then it is reliable. Therefore, right now everything is being done in an organized manner. Do you understand? Are you satisfied with the answer? Fine.

[Ignatenko] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate Chief General Ignatenko, hello. With whom am I speaking?

[Sushinskiy] Valeriy Anatolyevich Sushinskiy. I did not take the oath and I am being released from the Armed Forces. Who should issue the appropriate order?

[Ignatenko] If you haven't taken the oath, then they will send your documents to Moscow. You will be quartered and released there. This decision was made as a result of the fact that there is an agreement with the CIS states. Good luck.

[Ignatenko] Hello. Who is speaking?

[Glebov] This is from the urban village of Mankovka in Cherkasskiy Oblast. I am Warrant Officer Vladimir Mikhaylovich Glebov. I have this question. My mother lives in Ordzhonikidze in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. I want to be transferred there to serve. They are offering me a position in an internal troops brigade. Do I have the right to be transferred there?

[Ignatenko] No one will prevent you from going. You must obtain a memorandum of concurrence to accept you in that position from the brigade and present it to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate.

[Tkachenko] Hello, Private Nina Nikolayevna Tkachenko is troubling you from Cherkasskiy Oblast. A very difficult situation has developed right now at our communications hub: bribery and other violations of the law. For example, I was illegally released after completing my leave. I want to be transferred to serve in another unit. How can you help me?

[Ignatenko] What is the call sign at your unit? So. Fine. I myself will sort out what is happening there. Don't worry, we'll correct it. Later, we will be able to talk about the transfer. It is possible that you will not need to do this. Are we agreed? Fine. Goodbye.

[Yastrebov] Comrade general, Captain Valeriy Vladimirovich Yastrebov is disturbing you. I have a difficult situation. Please help me. I have long ago gone beyond all time periods for conferring the next military rank. But now they say that my documents have been returned from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense without the appropriate order...

[Ignatenko] Don't worry, Valeriy Vladimirovich, I promise that we will find your documents and the next rank will be conferred on you...

Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Yakovlevich Manachinskiy had a similar request:

[Manachinskiy] Comrade general, I am 54 and a half years old and I have 37 years of service. I have served in the rank of lieutenant colonel for 17 and a half years. I have been repeatedly nominated for colonel. Obviously, the fifth column did not suit the personnel workers in Moscow...

[Ignatenko] What do you mean by the fifth column?

[Manachinskiy] I am Ukrainian...

Understand me: it is justice that must triumph, I am a candidate of sciences and I had a complete legal right to the rank of colonel...

[Ignatenko] Unfortunately, Aleksandr Yakovlevich, you are not alone. Until recently, a gift determined the situation. That formula made fully-qualified people unqualified. You are an intelligent man and you could not resort to degradation... We have fought and we will fight against such phenomena. And I think that we will hand you colonel's shoulder boards...

[Manachinskiy] Thank you...

Quite a few questions were posed to General A. Ignatenko. The answers to them certainly did not totally resolve the majority of problems that trouble servicemen and their family members. But still, we think that direct line played a definite positive role and helped both people and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate associates to some degree because General Ignatenko's answers contained quite a bit of information which will once again certainly eliminate many questions that arrive at the personnel organ today.

And we think that the main thing is that those people who called personally could and you, dear NAROD-NAYA ARMIYA readers, can, having read this account, become convinced: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate's position in the resolution of all possible issues and problems is positive. This is the basis

to suggest that all of us will manage to build a professional, strong, morally healthy Ukrainian Army...

NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondents Lieutenant Colonels Nikolay Gorenko and Valentin Dmitriyev and Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov manned the direct line telephones.

Lt-Gen Avn Vasilyev Named Aviation Commander

92UM1017B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY
in Russian 6 May 92 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Baras: "Air Forces Organized in Vinnitsa"]

[Text] Lt Gen Avn V.A. Vasilyev held his first meeting in the rank of Commander of the Ukrainian Air Forces with representatives of the military formations quartered in Vinnitsa and with the leaders of the local state administration and correspondents.

The appointing of the 46-year-old general by a Decree of the Ukrainian President to such a high post was scarcely unexpected for anyone. A professional officer, with experience running from the Air Forces Academy imeni Yu. Gagarin, the Academy of the General Staff, Afghanistan and the command of one of the most powerful aviation formations in the republic, the Vinnitsa Air Army, V.A. Vasilyev could do no better in assuming the role of the organizer of the Ukrainian Air Forces. Certainly not the last role was played by the fact that the leadership of the air army was one of the first in the republic, on 11 January, to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. This confirmed not only its attitude to the idea of the new independent state establishing its own army, but also supported a readiness to take an active part in this process. The logical consequence of all these steps was the decision to organize the Ukrainian Air Forces precisely on the basis of the Vinnitsa Air Army. The headquarters of the republic Air Forces is to be located here, in Vinnitsa.

Such a decision, in the opinion of V.A. Vasilyev, on the one hand, makes it possible to use the already established command mechanism formed from the Air Army Staff, and, on the other, creates many problems. Certainly aviation is a complicated and highly technical organism requiring increased attention and concern, and the natural diverting of the qualified personnel from the command of the army could not help but tell on its viability. All the same, the first commander of the Ukrainian Air Forces is confident that these difficulties are completely surmountable and the republic Air Forces being organized will become a dependable guarantor for the young state's independence.

Actions of Commanders Halt Harassment in Military Units

92UM1002B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
6 May 92 p 2

[Article by Captain Sergey Korneyev, under the rubric: "The Roots of 'Dedovshchina'": "Not Those Songs of the 'Varangian' Guests"]

[Text] Demonstrably prolonging each movement just like an emperor driving under the arches of the Triumphal Arch, Private A. Dunduk threw an empty pack of cigarettes onto the floor of the drying room. Private V. Roshinets froze in place due to this wild lack of culture.

"What are you looking at, boy?", said Dunduk with a menacing look. "I asked you, what are you looking at? Well then, pick it up..."

"We don't do things that way," Vladimir answered as calmly as possible. "The person who throws something also picks it up."

"You say you don't do things that way?", the "worldly-wise soldier" uttered angrily through clenched teeth. "Let's go into the washroom and sort this out..."

The finale of this story turned out to be sad for the "dedushka" [from dedovshchina—hazing of conscripts]: Private Dunduk has been sentenced to the stockade, as they say, for the maximum sentence.

The traditions of the regiment, where Lieutenant Colonel V. Osiychuk is the assistant commander for personnel, were famous throughout the entire military district for a long time. And not so much past traditions as current traditions. The missileers were favorably differentiated from certain other units by the atmosphere of friendship and brotherhood, mutual assistance, purposefulness for the resolution of the primary missions—vigilant performance of alert duty, and heightened combat readiness—which reigns in the multiethnic subunits. Conflict situations between servicemen of different drafts, derision, and harassment were practically absent at their units. Of course, tiffs between soldiers sometimes took place. But on the whole everything was calm. And not because commanders, staff officers and the former political department hid these cases. There was another reason: here they had managed to create an atmosphere of intolerance toward those who attempted, under any pretext, to violate regulations, to humiliate and insult the dignity of a comrade, or to transfer on his shoulders the load of his own obligations. They constantly monitored the state of personnel mutual relations and made timely adjustments to them to improve the moral climate through a continuous system of analysis of the individual and collective moods of soldiers and sergeants. And if accidents occurred, they were of another magnitude—highway accidents associated with the performance of guard duty.

While realizing their intended plans, the unit confidently moved from point to point. People sensed a return from

their work and lived with confidence in the future. The missileers reacted with great hope to the news that the regiment would begin to be manned by native Ukrainians. The officers and warrant officers in their souls hoped for positive changes and felt disposed toward them—still a high general educational level, single ethnic-psychological specific features, language, and adaptation to local climactic conditions of the expected contingent permits them to avoid many obstacles in the training process. But problems of strengthening military discipline were generally soon seen as illogical. And in reality: who, other than a native with a native, will rapidly find a common language between them and will establish normal mutual relations? What can rally people better than the presence of a common noble goal—defense of the interests of the Ukrainian State and the peaceful lives of its people? Especially when, I remind you, the “traditions” of relations at variance with regulations were absent in the missile battalions.

However, these speculative conclusions did not consider life's entire variety and its multifaceted nature. Since the summer of last year, the situation with military discipline in the regiment has actually begun to change, but not for the better as the missileers had hoped. Tensions and conflicts on an interpersonal level began to appear here and there. And a boom of barracks hooliganism generally began in December—and in the first months of this year.

No, the personnel did not get carried away. And the officers and warrant officers did not sit idly by. The deserters who were assembled at the unit from the various corners of the former Union engendered the problem of relations at variance with regulations, with its psychology and ideas on service. Especially those who were absent without leave in the Transcaucasus, MVO [Moscow Military District], and PVO [Air Defense]. It is they who also began to instill negative traditions in military units, who attempted to seize leading positions in them, while destroying the optimists' rosy predictions that the commonality of language, manners, customs and traditions would create optimal conditions for normal relations among servicemen.

So, for example, Private N. Ryaboy, who ran off from a unit deployed at Pitsunda, forced Private N. Khmara to wash his clothing and to clean his room. Private B. Vashchuk, who deserted from Armenia, gave a slap in the face to Private V. Korol only because the young soldier refused to clean the room of his fellow serviceman. And Private V. Yatchuk, while undergoing “army tempering” in Gomel Oblast, decided to place the “education” of new recruits on a firm methodological foundation: he set down on paper all of the forms of relations at variance with regulations (the “Dedushka's Code”, “speeches”, and “advice”), which, in his opinion, had to be urgently introduced into the battalion. Then, after the all-clear, he put the young soldiers in ranks and began to tell them how, in his view, they should conduct themselves. The “worldly-wise” soldier

especially stressed “fine sanctions” which must follow for a refusal to obey a senior conscript.

I will only point out that the majority of “Varyags” have already been to the stockade. However, as it has turned out, it is an extremely difficult task to send a violator of military discipline there.

A similar situation has developed at the radio-technical unit which Lieutenant Colonel V. Vorobyev commands. Viktor Viktorovich told me bitterly that Privates V. Chuchko, A. Nikitin, V. Marushchak, O. Vlasov, and others, who were absent without leave from units in other regions of the CIS, serve unconscientiously on Ukrainian soil, violate military discipline, attempt to attain certain relaxations of discipline for themselves, and avoid fulfilling some types of economic work.

But let's return to the missileers. Obviously, they will object: can random people really disrupt normal mutual relations among personnel that have been formed over the years? I have become convinced: they can. Especially when there are sufficient material carriers of destructive trends—5-6 deserters in each battalion. I also need to note that they, as a rule, have more than a year of service left. And some of them also do not even hide that they are experts of “army procedures and rituals”. Moreover, they are aggressively attempting to instill the negative traditions of relations at variance with regulations in the collectives that have given refuge to the deserters. And it doesn't bother the barracks hooligans at all that their conduct runs counter to the interests of combat readiness, to the ideas on the image of a defender of sovereign Ukraine, or to the laws of military brotherhood. “We have ‘plowed’ ours, now let the young soldiers exert themselves,”—that, strictly speaking, is their entire morality.

A characteristic detail: Practically all of the deserters were motivated to be absent without leave from their units by their unwillingness to suffer from the “dedovshchina” of ethnic microgroups. But once they have settled in at a new duty location...

Let's take Private A. Doroshchuk as an example. Having passed through the regimental KPP [entry control point], he immediately stated: he deserted because Uzbeks and Azeris had beaten him at his previous duty location. However, as soon as they entered him on the unit rolls, the first thing he did was not to apply himself to training but to the “education of young soldiers”: he forced Private V. Korol to make his bed. Private A. Dunduk also complained about the oppression of “dedy” at Yaroslavl with a description of the disgraceful conduct with which this article began.

Of course, the regimental command authorities and personnel are not reconciling themselves to the “Varyags” claims to a special situation and are rebuffing them. But still barracks hooligans are managing to get theirs in some places. In particular, at Lieutenant Colonel V. Taratynov's battalion, deserters do not only themselves violate regulations and ignore the sacred concept of army

friendship but they have also managed to "convert to their belief" other conscripted soldiers who have served for a long time who have supported the negative initiatives.

While touching upon the problem of the service of deserters, I think it is advisable to dwell on this aspect of it. As a rule, they arrive at the new collective without any clothing whatsoever, they look shabby, and they are generally wearing civilian clothes. Naturally, the command authorities request their service record cards, pay, clothing, and food vouchers, personal effects, and are interested in whether criminal charges have been filed against them at the units from which they left without authorization. In response, papers arrive, which are certified with stamps bearing the coat of arms that the soldiers have been removed from all types of allowances and have been totally issued the clothing and related gear which is assigned to them. But on what grounds can a unit clothe a serviceman? And you cannot dismiss this issue—clothing and related gear is not being sent from the soldier's previous duty location.

By way of illustration, according to the documents sent from Leningrad Oblast, a double-breasted quilted jacket, an overcoat, a tunic, part-wool and dress trousers, a service cap, two towels, shoes, boots, a duffel bag, a tie, and many other things have been listed for Private P. Stetsyuk. But he deserted in civilian clothes. Stetsyuk also arrived at the unit in that state. Then, tell me, on whom does all of this equipment listed above hang? On the master sergeant at the subunit to which he arrives?

Further. Another of the deserter's vouchers states that he has been provided with food rations in kind until February 8, 1992. Meanwhile, this entry, certified by a round stamp, does not correspond to reality. Suffice it to say that Stetsyuk was issued the order to the surface-to-air missile regiment on December 10, 1991. But he was already on the run for some time prior to this date and was at a transit facility.

Well it turns out that someone is getting ahead at the expense of the deserters and someone else is racking his brain over how to clothe them, provide them with shoes, and feed them at their new duty location.

But now one more phenomenon that is new and emerging for us for the time being. It can also promote instilling barracks hooliganism. And obviously, in the absence of the appropriate work, it will become the main culture medium for it in the near future. And you will make that conclusion if you examine the problem in its historical retrospective. I think that an analogy is appropriate in this case.

In fact: what alarmed commanders and political workers most of all a year or two ago and has resulted in the forceful resolution of urgent issues and conflict situations? How can you not recall—microgroups of fellow countrymen that have been formed according to ethnic origin. It is they who were frequently becoming the fertile soil for the emergence and cultivation of relations

at variance with regulations, sentiments of covering up for each other, the ideas of uncomplaining submission to negative traditions, false models of friendship and comradeship. And here you will agree that there is no thickening of colors whatsoever.

Right now the situation is somewhat different—the Ukrainian Armed Forces are primarily manned with local conscripts. However, informal interrelationships have remained in units. They have not disappeared along with the collapse of the former army. Only the principle of narrow group cohesion has changed: instead of corporate allocations on ethnic lines, today servicemen are beginning to be united along territorial-regional lines.

By way of illustration, three primary groupings, that are competing among themselves for influence in the subunits, have already practically been formed in Lieutenant Colonel V. Vorobyev's radio-technical brigade: Galician, Carpathian, and Bukovinian. And a number of soldiers and sergeants have united along religious affiliations.

Everything has occurred according to the Hegelian law of negation of the negation, according to which any development follows the correct path associated with the return to the previous but at a higher level. Only another thing has remained unexplained for now: will these microgroups get along peacefully with each other? Will destructive trends not obtain development in them in the future? Will they not provoke the next wave of negative interrelationships?

I will not dare to answer affirmatively here. I am only convinced of one thing: we should not be silent about the phenomena described above as we were in previous years. We need to take an active, constructive position with regard to them which are growing into trends. Otherwise, barracks hooliganism will acquire a permanent pass in military collectives.

BYELARUS

Byelarus Defense Ministry Decision on Pensions

92UM1030A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 92 First edition p 1

[Article by Col P. Chernenko: "Ministry of Defense Pensioners Have Received Specific Guarantees"]

[Text] A law on pensions for servicemen has still not been passed in Byelarus; it is in the stage of being drawn up.

That is precisely why the Supreme Soviet of Byelarus has established new standard amounts when granting pensions to servicemen for all Ministry of Defense pensioners.

Now, upon discharge from the armed forces into the reserves, officers and warrant officers will be granted a

pension for 20 years of service in the amount of 55 percent of their pay and three percent for each subsequent year, but not more than 75 percent of pay.

Servicemen discharged into the reserves in connection with reductions in the Armed Forces of Byelarus and having served from 15 to 20 years are granted a pension in the amount of 40 percent of pay and three percent for each year of service over 15 years.

BALTIC STATES

Butkevicius on Success of First Call Up, Other Defense Issues

92UN1292B Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
16 Apr 92 p 3

[TIESA correspondent Arnoldas Caikovskis interviews Audrius Butkevicius, Minister of Defense for the Republic of Lithuania: "The Country Needs a Defense"]

[Text]

[TIESA] As in Lithuania, a call-up of new recruits for compulsory military service has also taken place in Estonia. Estonian youths did not show as much enthusiasm as had been expected: the required contingent was not assembled right away. What was the outcome of the first call-up of young Lithuanians to serve in their country's defense? What awaits these recently called young men?

[Butkevicius] 7,000 youths were called to serve. They supplemented border defense forces and subunits of the Interior Ministry, joined the honor guard company, the rapid reaction unit, and other units. Civil defense is an alternative work service that is intended for youths who are ineligible for regular military service. Alternative service is service in the Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry, Transportation or Health, as well as elsewhere. It will also be performed by youths whose pacifist convictions prevent them from bearing arms. The period of service in the defense forces will be 12 months; for the time being, it is postponed for graduates of institutions of higher learning. The alternative work service will be for 24 months.

[TIESA] How much of the Republic's budget is earmarked for national defense?

[Butkevicius] Approximately 8 percent, which, at present, is 1 billion rubles. In addition, approximately 500 million rubles are needed just for the defense of Lithuania's borders and for equipment to accomplish this task adequately.

[TIESA] Perhaps you would be able to tell us something about the structure of the national defense and what directions its activity may take?

[Butkevicius] A structure is being created. The geopolitical situation is not favorable, and therefore a special

system of defense is required. Several of the component parts of the system of national defense are of primary importance. These are border defense, i.e. land and sea borders, control of air space and the economic zone, and, secondly, territorial defense, including training and preparation of the inhabitants, protection of communications and of especially important objectives, military administration, a national guard operating on the basis of mobilization, and a volunteer national defense service. The creation of a regular army is the embryonic form of a professional army. The civil defense system has subunits of rescue professionals who will work during catastrophes and natural disasters. The means to combat disinformation are also required, an informational and psychological defense system. An army staff is being created. There will not be a separate military prosecutor's office; the affairs of servicemen will be handled by the civilian prosecutor's office. Training abroad for Lithuanian military officers is being arranged. We are receiving inquiries from individuals of Lithuanian extraction who intend to come to Lithuania once their contracts with the U.S. armed forces have ended. We are also receiving inquiries from servicemen in the former Soviet army who want to serve in our army. Lithuania continues to be of interest to Moscow, which, one would have to believe, will try to infiltrate some of its people into the national defense structures. So counterintelligence and intelligence is functioning in Lithuania. This is very important.

[TIESA] You visited Brussels and met there with NATO General Secretary M. Woerner and his assistants...

[Butkevicius] I spent some time with the members of this organization's political, defense, and nuclear planning committees discussing Lithuania's problems. The NATO countries may help us prepare economic specialists by paying for the internships of young scholars abroad. This organization is not concerned solely with military matters, but with economic, cultural, and political issues as well. We anticipate our initial cooperation with it to be in economic and cultural areas. The West is interested in us because we are a convenient transitional territory into the Eastern market. I believe that it is essential to seek opportunities to integrate ourselves into the defense and economic systems of Western Europe and to create systems of cooperation with the NATO countries.

[TIESA] A traditional question which has stymied many: do we need an army if we are not readying ourselves to fight anyone?

[Butkevicius] It's simply nonsense to argue that a national defense is unnecessary. Every country needs a defense. It is needed so that adventurists would not suppress the legal government of the Republic of Lithuania, so that they would not invade our country and wreak havoc. What we have in mind is a model of total defense: during a crisis, the entire nation resists, every citizen knows his place in the common struggle and defends Lithuania in any way that he can, whether with a

weapon, or with the publicist's words, preventing the institution of political control in Lithuania by a foreign government. I emphasize again that we need to orient ourselves into a system of collective security, into Europe's system of security.

[TIESA] Your position on the presence in Lithuania of the foreign army?

[Butkevicius] Conflicts have to be avoided between a Lithuania that is still establishing itself and Soviet military forces. We hope that this is how it plays out, although anything can be expected to happen. Ties to the Russian Ministry of Defense have been established. A commission consisting of representatives of the Lithuanian Government and the leadership of the Russian army should help untangle conflict situations and avoid bloody clashes. A conflict resolution center is being established. The armies of two different lands cannot be in one country. The foreign army has to be withdrawn. I would think that this is not a matter of one day or one month, possibly not even of one year. Whether we want it or not, we are nevertheless going to be the neighbors of CIS military bases. All we can do is hope that they do not do anything negative to us, even though forces that are opposed to our country—a political underground, terrorists, saboteurs—may be concealed under the cover that these bases provide. I know that there are Russian officers who are loyal to the Republic of Lithuania, and, what's more, are prepared to share their knowledge and experience in creating our country's defense. But we cannot rely on those others who have tarnished their honor and their uniform. Our national defense has not been in existence long, and, of course, is not yet able to defend Lithuania. There are shortfalls in both personnel and in equipment. One radio locator costs about 15 million rubles! Everything will be decided pragmatically and in a way that is useful to both Lithuania and the CIS.

[TIESA] The military and politics. Are military service and membership in a political party compatible? What I have in mind is the depolitization of the military...

[Butkevicius] I believe that this is essential. Your use of the concept of depolitization was apt, in the sense that even if a person does not belong to any particular party, in one way or another he has particular ideological convictions. Regardless of whether a person was formerly a member of the Communist Party and worked in the former Soviet army, or whether he belongs to new party structures, I believe that everyone should feel a great responsibility and should understand that a soldier serves his country, and that this country is the only god to whom he must be faithful. If we do not succeed in instilling this kind of attitude then I do not believe that we will have the kind of army that will be acceptable to all the people of Lithuania. Depolitization is essential not only as a sign of democracy. It is also essential as an element of defensive consciousness so that the nation, the country, the citizens will find their army acceptable. The military has to represent everyone, and very strictly. This is an extremely broad topic.

[TIESA] In the past, when you would invite us journalists to a news conference to exchange opinions on the activity of the Defense Department, we expressed to you our hope that you would be Lithuania's Minister of Defense. Why was this post assigned to you, specifically, and not someone else?

[Butkevicius] I would think that my previous and ongoing efforts played a role in my being considered when candidates were being chosen. On a number of occasions since I began working in Sajudis, I had to deal with the practical as well as the theoretical aspects of organizational matters, and I was involved in creating various organizational structures. In the course of my participation in political affairs, I adhered to the principle that an idea, that a plan can only be implemented if it is supported and backed up by an ordered force, by a functioning structure. This is what I attempted to create. It is always necessary to plan out the work, to anticipate goals, to prepare people. If something is happening somewhere at some point in time, then someone laid the groundwork for it and it is of use to someone. Nothing happens by itself in politics. What to others is a "state of mind" is for me a concrete organizational task. I try not to make decisions before consulting on the issue with others.

[TIESA] Of late, we have heard some reproaches of the defense minister by certain deputies, namely that he is not taking care of matters with sufficient effectiveness. Thus, according to those making the reproaches, the guarding of KGB headquarters was not organized in an appropriate fashion, services are being armed poorly, and so forth. How much truth is there to this? Perhaps this is related to your disagreements with Deputy Prime Minister Zigmas Vaisvila?

[Butkevicius] There is some truth in every criticism. I would only hope that there would also be some consideration given to the complex circumstances which I face in my work.

[TIESA] You are an alumnus of the Kaunas Medical Institute, and worked as a physician. How do you explain your bent toward military matters?

[Butkevicius] I have always been interested in military science and history. I look at the current situation more as a historian than as a soldier.

[TIESA] Thank you for the interview.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Kazakhstan Appoints Deputy Defense Chairman

92UM1009A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by A. Omarova: "Tokhtar Aubakirov to Move: Appointed First Deputy Chairman of RK State Defense Committee"]

[Text] They found that they had entered the Assembly Hall of the State Committee of Affairs of Youth unnoticed. And the boisterous crowd of students, making noise and grasping large and small calendars issued by the small firm of Kulager and showing pictures of the cosmonauts, did not notice the presence of the persons in whose honor they had come. Franz Viehboeck and Tokhtar Aubakirov, accompanied by Imangali Tasmagambetov, chairman of the republic's Committee on Affairs of Youth, and Nurlan Omarov, chairman of the Republic Union of Youth, all arrived on stage almost simultaneously. The hall suddenly fell silent, then burst into applause in welcome of the "space brothers."

Yes, the space heroes, the same as flights into space, beyond the limits of our Earth, have become commonplace for us. It is not often that you can see this kind of "ordinary heroes" up close. They are the kind of people who do not consider their feats to be heroic. Nevertheless, until the flights and weightlessness become as common as walking, the conquerors of the skies will remain heroes to us.

The meeting with the capital's students marked the end of Tokhtar Aubakirov's and Franz Viehboeck's week-long stay in Kazakhstan. Franz Viehboeck came to us on the personal invitation of Kazakhstan President N. A. Nazarbayev. In company with his colleague, he had been a guest of the villagers of Taldy-Kurgan Oblast and workers in a rug factory, visited the Theater of Opera and Ballet imeni Abay and the State Museum of Art, and had a look at the Alma-Ata area. The cosmonauts had quite a fascinating conversation at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences.

All in all, the most memorable event took place right here, in the State Committee on Affairs of Youth - something quite understandable. The cosmonauts are themselves still young, with vivid memories of their student years, so they had things to say about those times and the present. Students are people who are not awed by personages. Because of that, the questions they asked were inclined to be tricky. However, the cosmonauts - to their credit - were able to come back with answers, patiently dealing with the youthful extremes.

Many students expressed an interest in Tokhtar Aubakirov's thoughts about the problems of the Aral and other ecological disaster areas. His answer: It is necessary to do things that will save the people living there. Our fellow countryman, in the experiments he performed in space, had the Aral in mind specifically; the results of his work are being processed and will be employed in programs designed to save the Aral.

Tokhtar Aubakirov, incidentally, is about to change his address. He has been appointed first deputy chairman of the State Committee on Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and, as such, will soon take up his new duties. His rank will be that of major general of aviation. One of his tasks will undoubtedly be training new cosmonaut personnel. Already located at Baykonur is a

school to train young cosmonauts. Recently opened is a branch of the MAI [Moscow Aviation Institute], which may develop into an independent institute.

Chances are that not everyone knows that our fellow countryman is a specialist of the highest order, one of the 10 best test pilots of the world. He has completely mastered more than 50 pieces of military equipment. On top of that, he is an interesting conversationalist, a charming person, and handsome to boot, qualities that are markedly evident. This is another example of the adage that, if nature is generous, she can endow a person with everything: intelligence, talent, and good looks.

His space brother, Franz Viehboeck, is a computer specialist. He joined the cosmonaut corps by accident. He read an advertisement placed in a newspaper, sat down and wrote a letter indicating his interest, received a reply of acceptance, and started to take flight training. He has conducted 15 experiments during flight, the purpose being to apply the results to Austria's economy. Franz became the father of a daughter during his flight.

The newspapers have already written about the above. But it is one thing to read something in a newspaper, another to enjoy the opportunity of asking questions and shaking a person's hand. The students were interested in what the Austrian cosmonaut thinks about our President, how he liked Alma-Ata, and the possibility of other Austrian citizens flying into space. Well, for the President Franz has a great liking, believing him to be very intelligent and a good person, one who will raise Kazakhstan to the level of a developed country. His feelings about Alma-Ata he expressed with the interjection "Oh!" As far as new flights are concerned, they will take place, if Austria can find the foreign exchange.

The talk would have gone on for a long time, were it not for the fact that the cosmonauts were expected elsewhere. But the students would not let them go. There were more questions, there were autographs, and each student wanted to step up and shake hands with the cosmonauts. The cosmonauts took a great liking to the students, too. Franz Viehboeck remarked that he was pleased that the students were concerned about problems of ecology and the economy, for, after all, they are the ones on whom the future depends. And he wished all success in their studies, so that they can apply their knowledge to their work.

In addition, Tokhtar Aubakirov said that, even with all the difficulties, the students can gain access to him personally or contact the Kazakhstan imeni T. Aubakirov Fund, which has been set up in the Republic. The fund's certificate of registration was handed to Tokhtar Ongarbayevich—as the fund's president—at the meeting. The new organization will be involved with searching for new talent and the education and training of new specialists.

Given the cosmonauts as mementos of the meeting were cloaks, headgear, and leather pouches for holding liquids.

MOLDOVA

Future Plans for Moldovan National Army

92UM1021A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The National Armies: A Look Inside": "Beneath the Emblem of the Eagle and the Zimbru Moldova's Armed Forces Are Being Formed"]

[Text] Chisinau-Moscow—Chintesti Street in Chisinau is famous, among other things, for the fact that the headquarters of the Southwest Sector of the Soviet Armed Forces was located here, a fact known to one and all, as they say. Until recently strategic operations were planned here. The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Moldova has now moved into the fashionable building designed in "military classical," with its modern communication center and its ASU [automatic control system] center. The Commander-in-Chief's office, which is on the second floor (its last occupant was Colonel-General Vladimir Osipov), has been taken over by Lieutenant-General Ion Kostas. From there he directs military development in the republic and the military units which have come under Moldova's jurisdiction.

The 48-year-old Minister of Defense is a graduate of a Soviet military school. His background includes the Kharkov Higher Military Air School for Pilots, the Military Air Academy, service in units and staff work. Kostas has commanded an air regiment and served as Chief of Staff of an air division and Deputy Commander for Aviation of a combined-arms army.

The Ministry of Defense is still operating at less than full strength, I understand, under a lot of pressure. The pressure is generated by the rate at which the army is being developed. Formally, it exists, having administered the oath to the personnel. The regiments, battalions and companies are not yet united into a single system, however. Units under the authority of the Odessa Military District and of Headquarters, and directly subordinate to Moscow were deployed in the republic. They were all nationalized in a single day. The ministry administration is therefore in a hurry to sculpt a smoothly functioning military machine out of these units.

In the meantime personnel on military posts in Moldova live according to the regulations of the armed forces of the former USSR. Enlisted men and officers wear the uniform of the Soviet Army, with all its features. This is dictated by circumstances, we believe. The new uniform is not ready. But then it could not be otherwise. I was told that the republic does not have large sums of money to infuse into the military. For the next two or three years Moldova's national army will apparently have to be satisfied with what it has inherited (and possibly what it will inherit).

Certain changes have already been made, to be sure. The units have new fighting colors: the national tricolor flag with a depiction of the state emblem. Tentatively, the units may receive another national symbol in June or July. Artists are already at work to come up with "simple and well-defined" symbols. The work is being performed in secret, however. At least I was never shown any drawings. Nor do officers with the ministry with whom I spoke know what symbols await them. One thing is certain. The servicemen will not avoid the main symbols on the state emblem: an eagle and a zimbru (a wild ox once found in the plain between the Dniester and the Prut).

Military development is being carried out in accordance with existing laws. Moldova set out on the path of establishing its own army in September of last year.

The main legislative acts having to do with defense were recently passed. On 17 March Alexandru Mosanu, Chairman of the Parliament, signed decrees putting into effect these laws on defense: the Law on the Armed Forces, the Law on Military Duty and the Military Service, the Law on Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen and Their Families and for Citizens Undergoing Military Training. The laws state that defense of the Republic of Moldova is among the state's most important functions and the cause of the entire nation in case of armed aggression. Moldova's military capability, the numerical strength, structure and equipment, and the orientation of the training of its armed forces are commensurate with the character of its external military danger, and are shaped in accordance with the state's military doctrine. Incidentally, Ion Kostas declared that the army has not participated in and is not now taking part in the conflict in the Dniester region.

The units are being manned today on the basis of compulsory service and under hire by contract. Male citizens are drafted at the age of 18 years. The service term is 18 months. Those who have completed a military educational institution [VUZ] will undergo only the compulsory military training.

With respect to the contract, lower-ranking personnel may sign a contract for a period of three, five or 10 years; NCOs and officers, five or 10 years. Furthermore, the contract is initially signed with lower-ranking personnel for three years; NCOs, five years; officers, 10 years. By mutual agreement of the parties it can be extended for three or five years for lower-ranking personnel, five or 10 years for NCOs and officers, taking into account the maximum age for serving in the military. Lower-ranking personnel may serve up to 30 years; NCOs and junior officers, up to 45 years; senior and higher officers, up to 50 and 55 years.

New military ranks have been instituted for personnel of Moldova's army. The lower ranks will be soldier and corporal; the NCO ranks, junior sergeant, sergeant, senior sergeant, platoon sergeant (plutonyer), senior platoon sergeant (plutonyer), platoon (plutonyer)-adjutant;

junior officers, lieutenant (lokothenent), senior lieutenant (senior lokothenent), captain; senior officers, mayor, lieutenant-colonel (lokothenent-colonel); higher officers, brigadier general, division general, corps general. The last two ranks are awarded by the President.

The existence of well-balanced, one might say, legislation does not relieve the ministry's administration of difficulties in developing the military. The following concept for the operational arrangement was suggested to the experts (one of them is Senior Deputy Minister Nicolae Turturian). The army will consist of four groupings. A motorized infantry brigade and a helicopter squadron will form the basis of each. The groupings will be subordinate to a territorial command element, which will be under the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief (the President). Their recommended numerical strength is 14,000, although other figures are being mentioned: 20,000, 16,000, 12,000.

Where does Moldova intend to get its military personnel? Some Soviet Army officers serving in Moldova have already taken the oath and now make up the backbone of the military collectives. Others have not taken the oath but have signed a contract. Incidentally, it differs from the contract of officers who have taken the oath, initially being signed for only a 6-month period and then extended by only a year. It is possible that a contract will be abrogated after the 6 months. Today there is a shortage of specialists in the fields with a scarcity. On Chintesti Street they are therefore counting on the return of officers who have left Moldova and are serving in other states of the Commonwealth. According to the republic's military department there are 2,750 of them.

Chisinau is also thinking about the future. Georgiy Muntian, Chief of the Ministry of Defense's Press Center, reported in an interview that the leadership is counting on the cadets studying at CIS military educational institutions joining the republic (approximately 1,500). More than 100 people are studying at military VUZs in Romania. The establishment and development of the military language in Moldovan units, where this is not occurring today, is tied to their return. There are offers from France and the USA to accept up to a dozen students at military colleges.

Provisions have also been made for the military specialists to have their own training. For example, the lower-ranking personnel, after entering the military under contract, will be trained at training centers of the Ministry of Defense; NCOs, at NCO schools. In time officers will begin to emerge from the walls of the republic's military school (college). It has been suggested that they open their own military academy. Calculations show, however, that it will be far more economical to train senior and higher officers at academies of Russia, Romania or Ukraine.

The emphasis is on the nationalization of armaments for providing the armed forces with weapons. According to Lieutenant-General Ion Kostas, they will be used

directly to arm the units and possibly to exchange for other weapons which the republic needs more. In mid-April, for example, the report circulated among the newspapers that the 86th Air Regiment was to be privatized. It has modern MIG-29 aircraft. It was reported at that time that due to the impossibility of arranging for the maintenance and operation of the modern aircraft, it was planned to exchange them... for helicopters. The minister of defense gave a different reason, however. The republic does not need so many MIG-29s, and the possibility of an exchange is being worked out: "We are forming the kind of army we need." Well, one has to look at things soberly. More than just highly rated pilots and ground specialists, fuel and spare parts are needed for those MIG-29s, let us say. They also require proper air space. What does Moldova have? A pilot takes his MIG-29 up. To the right and to the left are the borders of contiguous states, and he is going to violate them without fail. How is the flight training going to be conducted?

I was permitted to visit a security and support battalion of the Ministry of Defense manned almost entirely with natives of the republic. I got to know Captain Nirchel Bessarabov, commander, there. I consider him to be a typical representative of Moldova's army today. He has not been in Chisinau long, but fate, so to speak, had to bring him here. His father, a Russian by nationality, was a career military man. Nikolay Bessarabov served in Romania at the end of the '60s, which is where he met his future wife, Margarita. It was not easy to marry a foreigner at that time, but Bessarabov won her hand and took her to the North Caucasus. Nirchel was born and grew up there. His father commanded a battalion in the North Caucasus Military District for 10 years. The boy frequently went to Romania to visit his grandmother. He learned the language, which comes in handy to him now.

After graduating from the Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined-Arms Command School he served in Tiraspol, Niolayev and the Western Group of Forces. He married a nurse in Germany, a Moldovan who worked at a Soviet military hospital. Last year the unit was withdrawn from Germany, and they began looking for a position for Bessarabov in the Odessa Military District. At this point the idea struck them of sending an application to Chisinau, where Moldova's army was already being formed. His wife was Moldovan, after all, and he knew the Romanian language....

The battalion commander has big plans. He wants to enhance the combat readiness and continue the training at a military academy, Romanian. The first task is to man the subunit with officers and warrant officers, however. The personnel table calls for 64, but only eight officers and 15 warrant officers have taken the oath. The others preferred to seek positions in other CIS states. A short time, 2 months, has been set for this. And this includes leave for 1992. This "haste" upsets the regular military men, because in Russia an officer can remain off the official roster for a year, and in Ukraine until the end of the year. But here.... The battalion commander is

waiting for Moldovan officers from other CIS armies to replace the "2-month men," pinning great hopes on existing legislation.

Citizens of the same republic serve in the battalion today, but nonregulation relations, late returns from leave and drunkenness all occur just as before. Capt Bessarabov told how just recently some of his men were settling differences among themselves. The number of cases of being absent without leave has increased. Some of the soldiers feel that since home is nearby, why not drop in there? Around 20 men were given 24-hour leaves

to visit their parents for Easter, for example. Five of them were sent to the guardhouse for returning late. Capt Bessarabov noted that his dream is to establish order like that in the Bundeswehr. He would like to permit almost the entire battalion to go home on days off, but without a single late return—even by a minute. This is an object of concern today and a task for the future.

For now, however.... For now the battalion of Moldova's army is like any other battalion of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. The Romanian language, new traditions and customs are only just beginning to be established.

ARMS TRADE

Russian Resolution Alters Licensing Requirements

92UM0981A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Apr 92 p 6

[Unattributed article: "The Government Has Decreed:
The Codes Are Changed, The Licenses Lifted"]

[Text] According to the proposal of the Ministry of External Economic Ties, the Ministry of Economics and the State Customs Committee, the Russian Government has adopted a Decree (of 21 March 1992, No 188 "On Incorporating Amendments in the Decree of the Russian Federation Government of 31 December 1991, No 90") on lifting licenses on a number of imported and exported goods indicated in Appendix No 1 and on amending the TN VED codes for the goods indicated in Appendix No 2, the importing and exporting of which are carried out by licenses.

Appendix No 1. List of Commodities Which in 1992 Are To Be Imported and Exported Without Licenses:

Firearms, sporting and hunting, air, spring-operated, gas-driven and others for noncombat purpose—(TN VED code) 9303, 9304; cartridges for riveting tools and shotguns, cartridges, bullets, shot and casings for sporting, hunting and air guns—930610000, 930629100, 930629300, 930629500, 930630910, 930630930; hunting, black, nitro-cellulose smokeless powders—3601; swords, daggers and analogous weapons—9307; precious and semiprecious stones, man-made or reclaimed—7104; aggregate and powder from man-made precious or semiprecious stones—7105 (only from man-made stones); vessels—8906 (except 890600100—military ships).

Appendix No 2. Change in Commodity Nomenclature Codes (TN VED) for Commodities Which Are Imported or Exported Under Licenses:

Styrenes and phenols—(TN VED code) 290711—instead of 390711; medicinal raw materials of plant and animal origin—020622100—instead of 020522100; weapons, ammunition, military equipment and special preassembled parts for their production—880211100—instead of 880110; children's food, including food concentrates—200510000 (only children's and dietetic food)—instead of 200510000; 200710 (just children's and dietetic food)—instead of 200710; wild animals (including live crustaceans), wild plants, the bones of fossil animals, ivory, horn, hooves, corals and analogous materials—0301 (just decorative fish)—instead of 0301 [as published]; 030621—030629 (just wild animals) instead of 030221-030629; 0407 (except the eggs of domesticated fowl)—instead of 0407 [as published].

Commentary on German Decision To Buy EFA over MiG-29

92UM1025A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Maj M. Zheglov: "Did They Decide To Save Money?"]

[Text] The FRG's new minister of defense, F. Rue, made a sensational statement. In his words, the Bundeswehr's Air Force is to receive the "European fighter of the 1990's" by the end of this decade. I would remind you that several years ago Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain began developing a new combat aircraft which was to replace the American "Phantoms," which have been the basis of the air forces of these countries. It was planned to build a total of 800 of these aircraft, with 250 earmarked for the FRG.

However, the expediency of creating the new aircraft was placed in doubt from the very beginning by the opposition parties, and there also was not unity on this issue in the ruling coalition itself. This was primarily associated with the high cost of the project. After the unification of Germany, the Bundeswehr acquired 24 MIG-29 aircraft that were in the inventory of the National People's Army of the GDR. After flying in them, the German military pilots concluded that the aircraft had high flying qualities: good maneuverability, simplicity of control, and reliability.

As a result, the MIG-29 came to be regarded in Germany as a rival to the "European fighter," especially since the cost of MIG-29 was considerably lower than its competitor. Fears arose in the industrial circles of the FRG that they might lose orders for the new aircraft.

This forced representatives of the German military-industrial complex to apply pressure on all levers. Reports appeared in the mass media that the MIG-29 had poor electronics and a short engine life. Then arguments came into play about Russian industry's inability to support technical maintenance of the MIG-29's and supply them with spare parts. As far as we know, these problems were never discussed with our specialists. It is not by chance that a representative of the foreign economic department of the plant making the MIG-29 stated in a telephone conversation that the problem of supplying spare parts was artificial and the necessary parts would be delivered to Germany at any time.

We do not have enough information at the present time to draw a conclusion about the final decision by the FRG government on this matter. It is not ruled out that this is merely an attempt, as they say, to bring down the price and save a little money. After all, the German military also has problems with finances today.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Dmitriyev on Current Significance of Defense Sufficiency*92UM0978A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Apr 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Col (Res) V. Dmitriyev: "Defense Sufficiency. What This Means for Russia"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction.] Over 50 doctors of sciences and a hundred candidates of sciences are presently working in the 8 centers and 4 institutes of the Russian-American University [RAU]. This independent nongovernmental international organization was established in 1990 by a number of domestic and foreign commercial organizations for studying the historical legacy, for analyzing the development prospects of society, and for broadening contacts between Russia, the U.S. and other countries in the political, economic, humanitarian and other areas of science and practice.

Today we are giving the floor to Valeriy Sergeyevich Dmitriyev, the director of the Modeling Program under the RAU Center for International and Military-Political Research. For about 20 years he has been studying the questions of national security, and he was a member of the group of experts at the START talks in Geneva. The material offered to the readers, in the author's assertion, fully reflects the position of the university specialists on the given problem.

The key element in the concept of military security for any state is the question of the level of defense sufficiency, that is, the quantity and quality of the armed forces. At present two possible approaches to solving this can be seen in Russia. The first was dominant in our country in recent decades and consists of defining the combat tasks for the Army and Navy. Here seemingly everything is simple. The "probable enemy" is determined and proceeding from this, the groupings are deployed which make it possible to maintain a military equilibrium. However, inherent to such an approach were many shortcomings of a fundamental nature.

First of all, the official proclamation of some country or group of countries as the "probable enemy" is nonsense from the viewpoint of the standards of international relations, and in and of itself creates real enemies and engenders suspicion and tension. The choice of the "probable enemy," as a rule, is linked to political factors, it has a subjective nature and permits the possibility of justifying the most absurd decisions in the military sphere. Thus, having actually accepted almost the entire world as the "probable enemy," we established a military machine of unprecedented scale, we pushed the arms race and brought the economy to a complete collapse. Understandably, under the effect of the hysteria of a military threat, consideration of the nation's economic capabilities was inevitably shifted into the background. Later on, the virtual lack of "brakes" in the build-up of

military might did not create incentives to seek out allies or compromises in domestic and foreign policy.

A variation of the first approach is the notion of ensuring the possibility of causing "unacceptable harm" to the aggressor state as a result of the retaliatory actions by the strategic nuclear forces (SNF). The subjective and moral-psychological nature of the notion of "unacceptable harm" makes it impossible to determine its precise quantitative value and, consequently, allows the proving of the advisability of maintaining a very diverse structure and composition of the SNF, including clearly redundant ones. In following such an approach, it is necessary to constantly keep the sights of the nuclear forces on the cities and the economic facilities of the "probable enemy." This creates the real threat of mutual annihilation even in the event of the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

The second possible approach to determining the level of the sufficiency of the armed forces (this has been adopted in a majority of the developed democratic countries) is the choice of a level which would simultaneously make it possible for the state's economy to provide comfortable circumstances for the population. With such an approach, the military expenditures, as a rule, do not exceed 1-6 percent of the gross national product (according to the estimates of American specialists, at the end of the 1980's, the Soviet Union was spending 15-17 percent of its GNP on defense). The amount of the aggregate indicator can be viewed as a criterion for assessing the degree of a state's militarization or peacefulness.

Naturally, the question arises: how with an orientation to such an approach can one ensure a military equilibrium in the event of the outbreak of a confrontation? The reply is obvious: in the same manner that this is done by a majority of the nations in the world—to acquire allies, to rely on the support of the peace-loving countries and the collective security system, and establish a definite mobilization potential. It is essential to bear in mind that it is difficult to equip an enormous army with modern weapons even with very high military expenditures and it is impossible to provide high-quality training for the personnel.

An acceptable level of military outlays for Russia would be to reach 5-6 percent of the gross national product by approximately 1995 (subsequently, these figures can drop). The quantitative parameters of the armed forces, in my view, should be determined proceeding from the possibility of equipping them with modern weapons and providing proper material conditions for the servicemen. Such an Army and Navy would scarcely have a strength of over one million men. In line with the significant reduction in the armed forces, the role rises for the nuclear weapons as an effective means of preventing war. The level of SNF clearly will be determined by the conditions of the corresponding international treaties.

A successful solution to the tasks of building up such forces is possible only with complete glasnost and the holding of independent expert evaluations for all the decisions to be taken, including on the questions of weapons control. We feel that the ideologized and sensational views and approaches should be discarded, for instance, the approach of a strictly defensive focus in the organizational development of the formations and units. This runs contrary to the very nature of armed combat. The politicians must not force the Army to live according to laws which might lead to a decline in its combat readiness.

The armed forces should be professional and manned on a contractual basis. Of course, they should also be released from harvesting work, construction, participation in settling interethnic conflicts and so forth.

Provision should also be made for an extensive training network for the reserves including the formation of a National Guard and Cossack troops on a territorial-militia basis. Such units in Russia have long excelled in their high fighting qualities.

In a word, the following definition can be offered for the principle of the organizational development of the armed forces in a renewed Russia: ensuring the maximum level of combat capabilities within the limits of the economic expenditures accepted in the world for military needs.

Proposals for Military Force Generation

92UM0989A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 May 92 First edition pp 1,2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "Experts, Predictions, Percentages... An Attempt to Analyze Opinions on the Prospects of Military Structural Development in the CIS"]

[Text] A military doctrine has essentially emerged in Russia. I have in mind the Supreme Soviet Presidium statement on the priorities of Russian Federation military policy which noted the contours of the Russian Armed Forces. Specifically, it determined that the Strategic Nuclear Forces are a means to prevent world wars directed against Russia and the other CIS member-states. Their composition must be regulated on a treaty basis while considering the need to maintain forces which respond to the greatest degree to the requirements of nuclear security and minimal cost. It declared that forces that have precision-guided weapons and delivery systems for them must become the primary factor that deters the unleashing of large-scale conflicts and local wars against Russia and the other CIS member-states. The document states that the creation of highly mobile General Purpose Forces consisting of several ground forces and naval formations are required for the effective neutralization of possible military conflicts.

Military experts have been waiting a long time for this approach to Armed Forces organizational development. But they did not expect another variety of expert. Judging by some experts statements in the press, they intend to implement the provisions of the previously mentioned document, as they say, on a level site. They suggest, in particular, the creation of a new military department, a new military-administrative division and operational troop formation (to have three instead of seven military districts, i.e., the Western, Siberian, and Eastern), and a new structure for the General Purpose Forces (ground troops) consisting of small, mobile units, etc., without the support on the commands of the former Ministry of Defense and General Staff.

We think that we should at least look closely at the experience of the military structural development in the foreign countries nearest to us, in the Commonwealth countries, before advancing this type of draft. By way of illustration, let us see what the Ukrainian Army will be in the near future.

It is envisioned that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will consist of three branches—ground forces, air forces and a navy, the division-sized and smaller units of which will be subordinate to three strategic (operational) commands formed in place of the military districts—Carpathian, Odessa and Kiev. Ukraine will also have border troops, a republic guard, railroad troops and civil defense troops at its disposal.

Structurally, the ground forces will consist of army corps (7-8 divisions, 6-7 motorized rifle and tank brigades, 6-7 artillery brigades, and 2-3 army aviation brigades). The Air Force will consist of three land-based and one naval aviation groups, subordinate to the three strategic commands and to the navy. It is assumed that fighter aviation will also carry out air defense missions. By the way, all PVO [air defense] units, including surface-to-air missile and radio-technical units, will be a component of the Air Force and will be called air space defense troops. They plan to create the navy based on Black Sea Fleet ships and units which will be transferred to Ukraine. Structurally, the navy will consist of brigades of ships, an aviation formation and shore defense troops.

Ukrainian experts have developed this concept. So it is clear that these people are competent and are firmly standing on our sinful land. In their elaborations, they rely on the military infrastructure created through the immense efforts of the former USSR. What will it cost Ukraine to create, say, three strategic (operational) commands? Well, in round numbers, nothing, because Ukraine just has to transform the troop formations and administrative and functional structures of the Carpathian, Odessa and Kiev Military Districts. The existing air armies are being transformed into aviation formations which once again are being based on existing air bases and those same commands. But how did they skillfully take command (more precisely, do they plan to take over) the units of the 8th Independent PVO Army. As a component, it is a part of the Air Force, that is, the

created system for command and control, air information collection and warning, and bringing units to alert status remains. But there will not be the very enormous administrative apparatus. That is economical for the country and rational for defense.

The concepts for creating armies, that have been proposed by the military experts in Azerbaijan and Moldova, are realistic. So, the Baku military thinks that their army must primarily consist of ground forces (formed on the mixed principle: professional subunits and self-defense detachments), military air and naval units. The Army of Moldova must consist of four formations. A motorized infantry brigade and a helicopter squadron will be the basis of each. The formations are subordinate to territorial commands. As we all know, Byelarus is also structuring its army based on the military district.

But here in Russia the army, if we follow the precepts of some experts, must be structured on the well-known principle—"tear everything down to the foundation and then..." Actually, can we imagine General Purpose Forces (ground troops), as they are suggesting, as small mobile units? Of course, mobile units themselves are possible—these are subunits armed with light small arms based on the UN infantry battalion type. Only these battalions, as we know, do not conduct aggressive combat operations. But that is not even the main thing. In general, the essence of a good idea that has been recently produced through our military practice is being distorted. It consists of the following. Mobile defense and the creation of mobile forces to conduct it must become the operational basis of military organizational development because today we recognize that a surprise attack against our country from several directions is unlikely. The primary characteristic of mobile defense is the capability to conduct the appropriate regrouping and advance of mobile reserves in a short period of time to change the men and equipment in some region or other in our favor to repel aggression.

Of course, Russia already cannot and should not maintain major combined arms formations on all strategic axes which could pose a threat for our neighbors and could also force them to arm themselves. However, military experts note that we need to maintain a definite number of combat ready division-sized and smaller units on the most dangerous axes in any case so that no one is tempted to provoke a crisis situation or a military conflict. And to have the capability to reinforce a formation using a mobile reserve.

Only dilettantes can rely on the "universal mobility" of division-sized units, say those people who are directly involved with military organizational development and who have attempted to airlift units and subunits to one region or other during maneuvers. How, say, will we be able to rapidly reinforce the Far Eastern formation using troops deployed in Siberia or in the Urals? One railway branch is momentarily put out of commission in the event of a military conflict and Russia's air power is inadequate to the USSR's air power. Those same reasons

will not permit us to reinforce our southern axis using troops deployed in the East. So, do we need to tear down what we took decades to build before erecting the new one?

But are the formulas of the new military administrative division and the operational subordination of troops that have been expressed by some experts really distinguishable by their carefully thought-out quality? We have already talked about one: to create three military districts—Western, Siberian, and Eastern. A totally new command and control system will be required under that division. And this with the current wretched communications systems?

This formula of the operational subordination of troops is also being expressed: a general staff—command of the strategic axis—military district (army), etc. There is the opinion to have four strategic commands—"West", "Southwest", "East", and a reserve command. But here the authors are not original: four strategic commands were created in our country already under Brezhnev at the beginning of the 1980's. How effective did they turn out to be? How much were they adjusted to Russia? We think that these issues also require painstaking elaboration.

We can also say the same thing about the proposal to eliminate the PVO Troops as a branch of the Armed Forces. These are the arguments. There is no such branch in the majority of foreign armies. The military district commander (of the strategic axis) must carry out ground and air defense, that is, to be responsible, as they say, for everyone and everything. That is reasonable. The only thing is that a different armed forces structure than in ours was initially created in those states to which the experts refer. They built their own army from sight. Secondly, we already conducted a similar experiment at the end of the 1970's when the PVO Troops were dismembered into separate formations and resubordinated to the military district commanders. Later, we had to reject that. Billions of at that time already not supplied rubles were required for the reorganization. Furthermore, the PVO Troops were short by nearly half of the generals and officers of the operational element.

Questions also arise with the cited strength of the future Armed Forces. Different figures are cited—from 1 to 1.5 million men. This is the calculation. A strong, prosperous state can permit itself to spend 5-7 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on defense as many Western states do. With such expenditures, one can maintain a combat capable army with a strength of 0.8 percent of the population. There are 150 million people in Russia, hence—1.2-1.3 million men. However, Russian legislators think that expenditures for defense should not exceed 4.5 percent of GNP with the country's current economic situation. Proceeding from this, the army's strength—is approximately one million men.

If you look at these opinions as at purely theoretical opinions, then it is difficult to object to them. If they are

starting points for tomorrow's and the day after tomorrow's practical organizational development, then concern will appear. For 5-7 percent of the U.S.'s GNP, you could maintain not only a million-man army but a two or three million-man army equipped with the most modern weaponry. On our 5-7 percent and, all the more so, on 4-5 percent, only a half-starved army with yesterday's weapons, but not professional and modern, like we want it to be.

In a word, common sense suggests that the initial concept of Russia's military organizational development must rely on the existing Armed Forces. Already today (tomorrow may be too late) we need to precisely and on a treaty basis determine our position with regard to the facilities, the radar missile attack warning sites, the electronic space monitoring system complexes, and the test ranges that have ended up outside Russian borders but that by right can belong to Russia—the other republics simply will not be able to utilize them...

Lately substantial changes have been noted in military policy—practically all of the CIS states are creating their own armed forces. But this process does not exclude and rather suggests a more aggressive solution of problems in the sphere of joint defense. Therefore, we do not need to let the chance slip by to establish close cooperation. We think that the impending Tashkent meeting of the CIS heads of state, at which nearly two dozen documents of a defense nature will be submitted, can promote this.

SECURITY SERVICES

Romania-Ukraine Border Troops Chiefs Meet

92UM1002A Kiev *POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY*
in Russian 24 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by the Ukrainian Border Troops Press Service: "Negotiations Between Ukrainian and Romanian Border Guards"]

[Text] Negotiations between Ukrainian border guards headed by State Committee for Ukrainian State Border Matters Chairman—Ukrainian Border Troops Commander Colonel-General Valeriy Aleksandrovich Gubenko and the Romanian delegation headed by Border Troops Commander Major-General Dumitru Luka took place for three days in Odessa.

During the negotiations it was noted that a fundamentally new situation has developed on the state border of the two countries as a result of the formation of the sovereign state of Ukraine and the adoption of legal acts on the Ukrainian Border Troops. Proceeding from this and while guided by the need for a successful solution of tasks that face the Border Troops, the parties agreed to form expert commissions for the elaboration of a draft treaty "On the Ukrainian-Romanian State Border Regime and Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on Border Issues."

At the negotiations, the principles of cooperation between the border guard troops of the two countries were agreed to and issues were examined to improve the entry system.

Border Troops Chief on Reports of "Tanks" Along Moldovan Border

92UM1005A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
5 May 92 p 2

[Article by Majors Aleksey Trubitsyn and Mikhail Kaminskiy: "Why Are Motorized Riflemen on the Border?"]

[Text] We need to speak about the fact that for many decades borders did not exist between the former republics of the Union—Ukraine and Moldova. No, of course, this border was examined on geographical maps at school, but it really did not exist. As First Deputy Chief of Staff—Ukrainian State Border Defense Directorate Chief Major-General Vladimir Mikhaylovich Bondar noted in a conversation with us, local authorities—the chairmen of Councils, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes—defined the administrative border here through mutual agreement of the parties.

And Ukraine borders Moldova for a distance of 1,200 kilometer. But until recently, the territory of the bordering republics was guarded by border guards only at those places where they bordered third states. And when the need arose for reliable protection of the entire border, the President and the Cabinet of Ministers simply did not have adequate numbers of available border troops at hand. This and only this explains the appearance of motorized rifle subunits, naturally with their authorized equipment, instead of green service caps on Ukraine's border with Moldova.

Moscow journalists have assessed the appearance of BTR's [armored transport vehicles] on the border as the buildup of Ukrainian "armored columns". As for tanks, Guards Motorized Rifle Regimental Commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Lavnichenko immediately refuted the idleness of the conjecture. "There are no tanks in the special operating zone," said Aleksandr Vasilyevich.

So, this is a fabrication on the conscience of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondents who we think are incapable of distinguishing the barrel of a PKVT [Kalashnikov machinegun] from a tank cannon.

We will immediately point out that it is difficult for the motorized riflemen to carry out their assigned mission. Judge for yourself: the regiment "is holding" nearly 30 kilometers of territory. Tell me, which Military Regulation or other document defines a similar formation of pre-battle order disposition? Alas, everything here is new and unusual. And so there are slip ups, blunders, and ChP [extraordinary events] here. In our opinion, this is additional evidence of the fact that calling in Ukrainian Armed Forces subunits to protect the state borders is a forced, temporary measure.

We will tell you more. At the present time, the formation of the Kotovsk Border Control Detachment is being hastily conducted adjacent to the motorized rifle regiment's command. With each passing day, there are more and more green service caps on the garrison's streets.

We managed to meet with Border Detachment Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel P. Ushkalov.

"Today we simply could not get by without the assistance of the internal troops, the National Guard, and the motorized riflemen," stressed the officer.

Let's note that the formation of the detachment is being conducted under very difficult conditions. As Pavel Dementyevich admitted, "We have to run ahead of the cart..."

The border guard with many years service complained about the fact that the issues of the detachment's authorized structure, its location, etc., have still not been totally resolved, but everyone is hurrying to more rapidly begin the practical work on the border.

And we were not offended when he responded to our request for a meeting over the telephone with a soldier's frankness: "We don't need journalists..."

But Guards Lieutenant Colonel Lavnichenko had something to talk about and to show to the journalists. He noted with a smile that the majority of his subordinates have grown into their new roles to such an extent that the *POGRANICHNIK* newspaper boldly calls them its own.

Well, of course, the regimental commander was not in the mood for jokes today. He practically hasn't left his UAZ vehicle for days, while driving to the locations of his subunits and helping local commanders to set up duty and daily life.

By the way, you simply don't have a chance to talk about daily life. If the regiment's command lives and works in the cramped rooms of a soldier's barracks, then the commands of the battalions, companies, and soldiers is in the kolkhoz club, in the hospital building, and on the premises of construction offices...

"And still this is better than living in tents," admitted Aleksandr Vasilyevich. "The local authorities have met us halfway."

We will especially stress such a fact as the attitude of local residents toward the military. "They turned out to be higher than all of our expectations," said Assistant Commander for Personnel Guards Major S. Oleynikov.

"The people receive us so cordially that I honestly admit the excessively warm reception presents great concern for the commanders..."

We already knew that there was a ChP [extraordinary event] in the regiment that was associated with the consumption of alcohol. And there is wine at the posts in practically all cases which the civilians have provided to subunits free of charge, so to speak, from friendly motives. Unfortunately, they have resulted in sad consequences in some cases...

We need to bear in mind both the hospitality of Ukrainian and Moldovan peasants and the fact that the regiment is deployed in areas of long-standing renowned winegrowing. There are vineyards at every peasant homestead here.

But that is not even the main thing. The primary cause of violations of discipline consists of the lack of proper control by commanders over their subordinates. But this is not their fault but their misfortune. Imagine that a company is deployed in three to four villages and a platoon, as a rule, is deployed in two. A battalion is strung out over more than 70 kilometers, etc. Where can you get enough officers and warrant officers in order to keep an eye on the soldiers? Yes and not all of the officers have turned out to be on top of the situation...

In a word, it is difficult for commanders to work under such conditions. But their spirits are not falling, they are extracting experience from their errors, and they are working with the population. We saw fatigue on almost all of the faces of the people with whom we managed to speak: from sleepless nights, long commute distances, and the cold in the unheated rooms. But the servicemen are standing firm and the main thing—they are successfully carrying out the missions with which they have been tasked.

We need to say that the motorized rifle regiment has fine combat traditions. Recently redeployed from the Central Group of Forces, it rapidly adjusted to the new location near Kharkov and became involved in combat training. We think that it is no accident that it was sent to carry out this responsible government task.

What are the motorized rifle regiment personnel doing in the special operations zone along Ukraine's state border with Moldova?

"Tomorrow I am driving out to the most remote battalion," said Guards Lieutenant Colonel Lavnichenko, "I request that you leave with me in the morning from the headquarters building. Why talk about it when you can see it for yourselves..."

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