Central Eurasia
Military Affairs

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21 October 1992

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The military oath has traditionally reflected to one extent or another the attributes of the state and the armed forces. The 1716 "Oath, or Sworn Promise, of Every Military Rank to the People," let us say, contained the vow "loyally and obediently to serve the Most Glorious Czar and Sovereign." The 1960 edition of the military oath affirmed the permanency of certain ideological postulates.

In reality, however, generations come, and generations go, but the land (we are referring to the great land of the Russians in this case) abides forever. An absolutely specific question: What dominant aspects of state ideology are reflected in the new draft, for eternity, so to speak, without the political emulation of the moment?

The text contains these words: honor and dignity... will serve as a guarantee of absolute observance of the oath. This was included for a reason, as you can understand. At a time when spiritual values have been degraded so much, when people are able to reject the formal oath of allegiance to the homeland, to exchange honor for tokens of honor with extraordinary ease, the document's moral foundation is immensely important.

Today, most unfortunately, there is an abundance of examples with a negative sign.

The oath contains an appeal for the primordial values—a multinational people and the freedom and independence of Russia—which have an enduring, universal connotation for all of us.

Now, permit me to ask about the procedure for taking the oath. Who will take it, when and where?

One has to assume that the "internal adjustment coefficient" will take effect in the parliament. I am convinced, however, that everything which has been reinforced by life and the unique nature of military service needs to be left in force. There is no logic in repeating the oath for those servicemen in Russia who have already taken the oath to the people and the nation, for example. I shall not try to predict how things will go, however. During the first reading in the parliament there were suggestions such as this. The oath should be given at the military commissariat the day before induction.
I want least of all to criticize anyone, but the army, with its history and its specific nature, needs to be treated with understanding and, if you like, with special tact. Administering the oath to a person “before he reports to the military commissariat” would be breaking the law.

The position of the Ministry of Defense is clear and precise. The oath should be administered only in the military unit. Common sense should be followed, and the moral, emotional aspect of the legal enactment should not be taken beyond the bounds of common sense.

[Semenov] Vladimir Antonovich, regrettably, public opinion has not been taken into account very much in our country. This time, was the “opinion of the millions” considered?

[Dzyuba] Yes, no one was satisfied with decisions made behind closed doors. Our efforts were regularly assessed. And adjustments were made in the work. We considered not the specifics but the spiritual substance of the future document. To sum it up, the prevailing conviction was that the text should be concise and expansive and should reflect the great meaning of service to the homeland and be free of ideological strictures.

Sadly, the oath is brought up in the routine, everyday life only when dealing with the remiss and, unfortunately, with criminals. This is obviously absurd. With respect to reflecting appreciation for those whose loyalty to the oath and whose selfless zeal in bearing the military burden deserves enthusiastic praise and material rewards, this was reduced to an insipid, descriptive statement. Even in the legal enactments the significance of the oath is described in such fragmented, amorphous, painfully paltry terms that one is simply amazed. It is as though someone had deliberately set out to degrade the formal promise of the man in shoulder boards to make it impossible to ask where he turns his weapon, against whom, and why....

[Semenov] And what is Russia's military department proposing?

[Dzyuba] Here is just one fact to help make things clear. Foreign countries relate the index of the level of a society's civilization to how it respects its constitution. Figuratively speaking, the oath is the first principle of military law, our code of honor. To prevent the considerations from being turned into verbal rubbish, it is proposed that an article in the Law “On Military Obligation and Military Service” describe the legal consequences of taking the oath. Also that the new Criminal Code (the “Military Crimes” section) regard such serious transgressions as betrayal of the homeland and desertion as violations of the military oath. And how could we fail to recall in this connection the words of the famous Admiral Fedor Ushakov, who said that a soldier who dares to call himself a defender of the homeland and then violates its laws, whose sacredness should be his main support, is beneath contempt?

There is also a proposal that a special list of benefits and allowances for irreproachable observance of the military oath be established by a law of the Russian Federation: to increase pay and allowances to the maximum for the position. And possibly, to double the one-time payment for exemplary first-term servicemen released into the reserve.

There is talk of establishing a medal “For Loyalty to the Military Oath,” three degrees, upon the awarding of which two, three and five times the salary for the position would be paid respectively. It is also proposed that the role of public institutions in this work be enhanced in the units and on the ships.

In conclusion I want to underscore once again the fact that the entire group of these and other measures has a single objective: to develop the fighting spirit and emotional strength of personnel in the Russian army, to bolster the status of the oath and raise it to a prestigious high with documents of large, state scope.

[Semenov] Are you counting on the support and understanding of the parliament?

[Dzyuba] It would not be worth starting all of this otherwise.

Career Profiles of Seven Leading General Officers

92UM1520A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Sep 92 p 7

[Article by Vladimir Zelentsov under the rubric “Your Honor, Lady Luck”: “Every Soldier Dreams...”]

[Text]

From the Service Roster of Generals

He dreams, of course, of becoming a general. We know, however, that far from all of them achieve this. The army and other branches of the military do have an abundance of these high ranks, though, which come with the right to wear trousers with piping. Incidentally, could this be why the generals sometimes catch it from those upon whom fortune has not smiled? This thought is the subject for a separate discussion. Let us try to imagine what luck means in the mind of a military man.

“A bullet can be a fool; a bayonet can be a gem,” Aleksandr Vasilyevich Suvorov wrote in his famous “Nauka pobezhat” [The Science of Conquering]. He had in mind the idea, simple to the military man, that what you have in battle is what you are worth; the rest is up to God. In the world as we know it, however, it takes more than just combat merit to make a career. You also need to “fit into the system,” as they say.

I wonder whether every general dreams of becoming one of the top men in the Ministry of Defense. There are no statistics on this, but I can say something else with confidence: that every military leader who has reached the level of the Ministry of Defense wants to see reliable
and tested people at his side. That is perfectly understandable. A team is a team. Today's team at the Ministry of Defense is an interesting example. Before we study the graph showing the ascent in the service of top men in the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, however, let us take a look at the minister's background.

From the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA file: Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev was born on 1 January 1948 in the village of Rvy, Tula Oblast. He completed the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School in 1969. His first position as an officer was commander of an airborne platoon at Kaunas. He then served as commander of a training company at the Ryazan school, battalion commander in Lithuania and chief of staff of a training division. He attended the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze from 1978 to 1981. He served as deputy commander of the 354th Airborne Regiment in Afghanistan in 1981-1982. Six months later he became commander of that regiment. He served as chief of staff of the 7th Airborne Division (VDD) at Kaunas from 1983 to 1985. In 1985 he became commander of the 103rd VDD in Afghanistan. (He spent a total of five years and three months in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. From 1988 to 1990 he studied at the General Staff Military Academy. In 1990-1991 he served as first deputy commander and then commander of airborne troops, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR and chairman of the State Defense Committee of the RSFSR. He became deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces in January 1992. He was appointed first deputy minister of defense of Russia on 3 April 1992 and minister of defense of the Russian Federation on 18 May. He was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for "executing combat missions with minimal human losses" in Afghanistan. The award was conferred upon him after the decision was made to withdraw the troops from the DRA.

When we look at the graph, [not reproduced] in which the dotted line indicates service in Afghanistan and the heavy line indicates training at the General Staff Military Academy, we are struck by the "close spread of advancement" of the six generals. They were students together at the academy, which is very significant in and of itself. Everyone knows that this educational institution "gives one that important start." But there is serious military training at the academy as well, and one establishes the contacts and connections there which subsequently play a substantial role. This was not typical just of the army, of course. "Outsiders" are not regarded with favor even in the most impoverished office. Even presidents select their own teams. Only their own....

A common feature can be detected also in the military careers of four deputy ministers of Russia's Ministry of Defense, coevals, one might say: generals Viktor Dubynin, Valeriy Mironov, Georgiy Kondratyev and Boris Gromov are united by the war in Afghanistan. They unquestionably form a combat fraternity, about which Pavel Grachev once said: "They know not so much how to talk as how to get things done."

From the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA file: Viktor Petrovich Dubynin was born on 1 February 1943 in the city of Kamenks-Uralskiy in Sverdlovsk Oblast. After graduating from the Far East Tank School he began his military service as commander of a tank platoon. He commanded a company, a battalion and a regiment. He completed the Military Armor Academy in 1978. He commanded a division and an army. He served three years in Afghanistan. In 1988 he was appointed chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Kiev Military District. In 1989 he became commander of the Northern Group of Forces (Poland). In February 1991 he refused to allow the Polish Ministry of Defense to inspect for chemical weapons in units of the SGV [Northern Group of Forces], asserting that there were none on Polish territory. He was the first to admit that Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed on Polish land, however, (they were removed in 1990). The withdrawal of our troops from Poland was begun in April 1991.

Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov was born on 19 December 1943 in Moscow. He completed the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Supreme Soviet USSR in 1965. He began his career as an officer in command of a platoon. He completed the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze in 1973. He commanded a regiment and a division, with which he went to Afghanistan in December 1979. In 1984, after graduating from the General Staff Academy, he was appointed first deputy commander of an army. In 1989 he became first deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. Prior to being appointed deputy minister of defense, he commanded the Northwest Group of Forces (the former Baltic Military District). In Russia's Ministry of Defense he has been involved in personnel work. The former Committee for Personnel of the CIS Joint Armed Forces was also under his command.

Georgiy Georgiyevich Kondratyev was born on 17 November 1944 in the city of Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast. He completed the Kharkov Guards Command Tank School with excellence in 1965. The first subunit he commanded was a tank platoon. He completed the Military Armor Academy in 1973, again with distinction. He served as chief of staff and then commander of a regiment. From 1973 he served as deputy commander and then commander of a division. He completed the General Staff Military Academy with a gold medal in 1985 and was appointed first deputy commander of an army in the Turkestan Military District. After that he commanded an army. In 1989 he became first deputy commander and later commander of the Turkestan military District.

While selecting for his team mainly war buddies, Army General Pavel Grachev stated that the selection was made on a competitive basis. The higher State Certification Commission, chaired by Yuri Shokov, selected four of the ten. General Boris Gromov joined the Ministry of Defense as a deputy almost a month later. Let us take a look at his biography.
From the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA file: Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov was born on 7 November 1943. He completed the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni S.M. Kirov. He fought in Afghanistan more than five years during three different assignments. We know that the 40th Army left the DRA under his command. He then commanded the Kiev Military District and underwent the notorious trial instigated by Colonel Martirosyan, who openly named Gromov among those who backed the attempted military coup in the nation. In a legal suit Gromov stated that the colonel’s statements were slander. While remaining on the staff of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Gromov served as deputy to Minister of Internal Affairs B. Pugo. In last year’s presidential elections in Russia Gromov was nominated along with N. Ryzhkov as vice president and was once again at the center of attention of the press. He finally went public, having signed the famous “My Word to the People” published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the eve of the August events. During the attempted putsch, however, he told Grachev by telephone that he “would not lead the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops anywhere.”

The appointment of Boris Gromov as the sixth deputy minister essentially completed the team of top men in Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Command of the Russian army was taken on by a group of combat-experienced generals, who rounded out their ranks with the only civilian deputy minister, Sr Lt (reserve) Andrey Koko-shin. There was debate about the ministry’s make up. A civilian minister would not succeed in the present situation of political and economic instability. Today we need decisive people knowledgeable in military affairs. Later, it was suggested that if the transitional period ended and stability were restored, a civilian minister of defense would obviously be appointed.

The dilemma was that, after the transfer of the ministerial portfolios to the ministry of Defense of Russia, it could not have been otherwise. (Although one can still argue...) When you read a summary of combat operations in various regions of the former Union, you see that we can hardly keep from sending decisive people with experience in the bold attack and the devastating defense to help. This has been their lot and is the guarantee of their success. Times of crisis call for crisis people, as it were. It is as though they were born for times of trouble.

For now, we can only wish them political wisdom and farsightedness.

“How fine to be a general, sire. I cannot name for you a better job.” You will smile at this old, roguish song from the times when our generals commanded platoons. Smile, but no more than that. After all, a bullet can be a fool, a bayonet can be a gem.

Possibility of Regimental Chaplains Considered

92UM1507B Moscow PATRIOT in Russian No 38, Sep 92 (Signed to press 22 Sep 92) p 7

[Interview with Father Superior Innokentiy (Pavel), secretary of the Bible Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church, by PATRIOT correspondent V. Osipov under the rubric “The Army and the Society”: “Are We to Have Regimental Chaplains?”]

[Text]

[Osipov] The institution of military chaplains has existed in the Russian army since time immemorial. Please tell us how it came into being and what created the need for it.

[Innokentiy] The positions of army and ship chaplains were first introduced by Peter I, father of the Russian regular army. At that time the Russian army was waging war outside the territory of its own state, where there were no Orthodox churches and, therefore, no way to meet the religious needs of the soldiers, who were all Orthodox at that time. It was the dominant position of Orthodoxy in Russia at the beginning of the 18th century which prompted the establishment of the institution of military clergy.

Later, when servicemen of other faiths—Lutherans, Catholics and Jews—entered the army, clergy of the corresponding denominations were invited to administer the oath to them.

You no doubt recall Count Uvarov’s famous saying, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality,” do you not? The Orthodox faith was thus regarded as an important component of state ideology. The main reason for establishing the institution of military clergy, however, was the fact that Orthodoxy was the faith of the people.

[Osipov] Could a military clergy come about in our time? One has to understand that there have been substantial changes in the army and the state from the past. But are these irreversible?

[Innokentiy] One has to consider the reality. According to sociological studies, around 30 percent of our nation’s population consider themselves to be members of the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite the fact that this constitutes a significant social group, it does not represent (or, if you like, does not yet represent) a majority of the population. It can be concluded from this that the establishment of such an institution as mandatory would be an artificial move and would not be a positive thing for the church.

The fact that even this 30 percent is a significant figure—and there are believers of other denominations in addition to Orthodoxy—is a phenomenon not limited to the military, but is another matter. Believers in the military must be able to meet their religious needs, and no kind of bans will help. I therefore believe that the command elements of units with churches or other
places of worship nearby should permit the military believers to attend them. We should also consider the matter of permitting unrestricted access to the units by the clergy. The prisons, colonies and hospitals have already been opened up to them, after all.

Osipov] And how do you envision the practical embodiment of your wish? Could churches be established at the large military formations, for example?

I know many enlisted men and officers who would like to see clergy in their units.

Osipov] In your opinion, what are the qualities essential to the modern soldier which could be strengthened in him by a clergyman?

I would not put it that way. The special purpose of the church is not that of resolving social matters. Its objective is the eternal salvation of man. The mission of the church lies within the boundaries of the historical battle in which states, armies, parties and so forth are involved. Right now the problem of faith is one of making it accessible to all whose soul is drawn to God, no matter where he works or serves.

Osipov] If we could move ahead slightly and imagine the institution of military clergy as something already existing in the army, how would you imagine the role of the regimental chaplain?

Innokentiy] In the American army chaplains have military ranks. There are colonels among their Orthodox clergy. In the old army of Russia the ship and army clergy did not have military ranks. I do not think that this is essential today either.

Protocol From CIS Sport-Technical Society's Tashkent Conference

The Council of OSTO [Defense Technical-Sports Organization] Chairmen of the Independent States, the defense technical-sports organizations (societies) of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, hereafter to be known as the parties, guided by the documents signed by the heads of state and government of the Commonwealth countries, considering the role and importance of the defense technical-sports organizations (societies) in preparing the youth for service in the armed forces, affirming their dedication to the preservation and continued enhancement of ties among the defense organizations within the framework of CIS, based on complete respect for the independence and observance of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and close cooperation in contributing to the defense of their states, in the preparation of specialists for the armed forces, industry and agriculture, and in development of the technical and practical sports, have agreed on the following statements of intent:

1. In order to support joint activities by the parties to accomplish the statutory missions, to continue the organizational reinforcement of the Council of Chairmen of Defense Technical-Sports Organizations (Societies) of the Commonwealth, headed by the chairman of the Central Committee of the Union of OSTO SG [Commonwealth of States], to instruct the Chairman of the Council, to work up a draft Statute on the Executive Body of the Chairmen's Council;

2. To organize the preparation of technical specialists for the armed forces of the independent states and the CIS on a contractual basis;
3. To coordinate the staging of regional and CIS championship competitions according to an overall schedule in the most popular technical sports, using the existing structure of sports organizations, sports training facilities, and equipment, and with a unified approach to the classification standards for sports activities; to organize an exchange of specialists during the period of preparing for and conducting important international competitions;

4. On the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements:
— to use the sports facilities and specialists to train composite teams for the Commonwealth states for European and world championships, and also to arrange activities to establish sports records;
— to assist by the established procedure with the acquisition of raw and processed materials and assembly parts for the operations of the enterprises of defense technical-sports organizations;

5. Those defense technical-sports organizations (societies) authorized by their governments to issue licenses to export to CIS states products produced at their enterprises, may sell them and also perform repairs on aviation and other equipment on a beneficial basis, with customs and transport costs covered by the client;

6. To coordinate efforts to study and disseminate advanced know-how of the parties in the main areas of the practical work; to arrange for an exchange of delegations during the period of preparing for and conducting state festivals and large-scale patriotic activities; to participate in assemblies, seminars, conferences and so forth, conducted by the parties;

7. During the transitional period, to coordinate the procedure by which officers serve in the defense technical-sports organizations of the independent states;

8. To set up a press service in order to maintain a single communication arena and to improve the publicizing of the patriotic activities of defense technical-sports organizations of the CIS through the publishing house, the newspaper, radio and television of the Union of the OSTO SG, and the central press, radio and television;

To take steps to provide social protection for the publishing house and press agencies, to provide financial support for their patriotic programs, to participate in the sale of their products on a contractual basis.

The Conference Protocol takes effect at the time of its signing.

Executed in the city of Tashkent on 11 September 1992 in a single original copy in the Russian language. The original copy is to be kept in the archives of the Central Committee of the Vatanparvar OSO [Defense-Sports Organization] of the Republic of Uzbekistan, with a certified copy sent to participants in the Conference who signed this Protocol.

P. Maksimov, For the Defense Organization of the Republic of Belarus
A. Blagovidov, For the Defense Organization of the Republic of Kazakhstan
M. Temirov, For the Defense Organization of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
A. Anokhin, For the Defense Organization of the Russian Federation
A. Shilin, For the Defense Organization of the Republic of Tajikistan
A. Kiselev, For the Defense Organization of Turkmenistan
D. Shakhmardanov, For the Defense Organization of the Republic of Uzbekistan
V. Donchak, For the Defense Organization of Ukraine
Ye. Krylov, Chairman of the Chairmen's Council of the OSTO of Independent States, chairman of the Central Committee of the OSTO SG

Security of Arms on CIS Base Worries Poles
93PS0005A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 16 Sep 92 p 6

[Anna Taukhert Warsaw dispatch: “Scandal: Nuclear Garrison”]

[Text] Nuclear charges and tactical missiles were located on the territory of the largest former Soviet Army base in Poland (in Borny-Sulimov). Even the Russian military command now admits this fact. Russian authorities assert that the missiles, along with their dangerous warheads, were removed in April and May of this year. And such declarations are so far the only clear guarantee of local "denuclearization": the garrison command did not permit Polish specialists to carry out an inspection of warehouses and storage buildings.

The Russians declared that their army has its own service arms capable of seeing to the security of all types of weapons still remaining on the garrison's territory. The command asserts that there are no chemical weapons or other types of dangerous substances on its "extraterritorial" land. However, it was precisely from this unit that, in June of this year, three capsules of cesium-137 were stolen. They were stolen by soldiers of the former Soviet Army who had been discharged into the reserves but nonetheless remained in Poland.

The garrison prosecutor reported the loss of the dangerous substance only eight days after the fact. The Polish police have as yet not found all the stolen material.
CIS: POLICY

Prospects for CIS Military Cooperation Weighed

21 October 1992

From the angle of the national interests of the two countries, the conflict over the Navy and the Crimea was most disadvantageous and potentially very hazardous from the very outset. The illusion of negotiation that sought rather to record stands than really evolve a mutually acceptable solution slowly but surely led to Moscow and Kiev relinquishing control of the situation in the Navy and simultaneously—for as will be known from fictitious to formal unification—created a fertile ground for sabre-rattling by sundry national extremists. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. So what options do the Yalta accords furnish? First, they signify time again. Indeed, apart from everything else the crisis was perilous insofar as it offered policy-makers hardly any time to work out well-conceived decisions. Over the transition period, that is up to 1995, the Black Sea Navy may be divided up, not be torn into pieces. In effect the question has long been one of the share the Navy and simultaneously—for as will be known from fictitious to formal unification—created a fertile ground for sabre-rattling by sundry national extremists. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. So what options do the Yalta accords furnish? First, they signify time again. Indeed, apart from everything else the crisis was perilous insofar as it offered policy-makers hardly any time to work out well-conceived decisions. Over the transition period, that is up to 1995, the Black Sea Navy may be divided up, not be torn into pieces. In effect the question has long been one of the share the Navy and simultaneously—for as will be known from fictitious to formal unification—created a fertile ground for sabre-rattling by sundry national extremists. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. So what options do the Yalta accords furnish? First, they signify time again. 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In effect the question has long been one of the share the Ukraine and two or three others republics, all CIS states would adhere to that stand, when spring came, formation of national armies became irreversible. The Rubicon was crossed on 16 March, when President Yeltsin signed an edict setting up the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Ever since the dimension characterized as the CIS Joint Armed Forces has continued to contract.

From fictitious to formal unification

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia have announced that they will form their own armed forces on the basis of the Soviet army units (under CIS joint command for several months) that are deployed in their respective territories. Otherwise the "joint" forces stationed within the conflict theatres as in Moldova, Transcaucasia and Tajikistan and also outside the CIS as in the Baltic states, Germany and Poland were placed under Russia's jurisdiction and control.

On 26 May the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces moved from Arbat Square to Leningradsky Prospekt, where the staff of the Warsaw Joint Armed Forces had been quartered earlier. Ever since, despite the series of military agreements signed and the drafting of more documents, the significance of the Joint Armed Forces continues to contract, while the uncertainty around its further lot continues to grow. In this sense the Black Sea Navy decision merely offers the latest pertinent confirmation.

The failures haunting the former Soviet republics in the area of integration are largely due to their seeking, as a rule, to build up their structures from top to bottom, instead of vice versa. The same holds true for the armed
forces, whose “unification” was initially sheer fiction, as in practice this concerned the USSR Armed Forces that by 19 December, 1991, had found themselves without a single command. By the middle of this year this “unification” was no more than formal, as the new states had organized their own armies, although they had still to make up their minds as to which forces would be integrated in their national armies and which would be subordinated to the joint command.

Nor has the 15 May Tashkent Collective Security agreement clarified the situation. By bringing Russia together with Kazakhstan and with the Central Asian states, that are increasingly distancing themselves from Moscow and that include Armenia, which to all practical intents is at war with Azerbaijan, the said agreement at once invoked questions with respect to the priorities of Russia’s policy in the military field and the likelihood of Russia’s embroilment in conflicts involving other countries.

Reaffirmed with the passage of time was what many had suspected from the very outset, to wit that the Collective Security agreement was as formal as the Joint Armed Forces, which incidentally Armenia’s President Ter-Petrosian had the chance to see for himself.

We most willingly allude to U.S. experience, forgetful though, that America knows what it wants, while we yet have to make up our minds. We energetically borrow from NATO experience, unmindful that such military alliances were built to face a patently formidable danger and that NATO’s real begetter was Stalin not Truman.

We note Western Europe’s military integration, but fail to realize that the joint Franco-German brigade comprises the nucleus of what may with time become a European army. So on and so forth.

To cut a long story short, we are still imitating what others have done, naively presuming that what we share in common is adequate to scale the peaks of integration, as long as there is a resolve to do so. However, that is delusion which must be shed as soon as possible.

180 cockpits of tension

For the time being no former Soviet republic has formulated its own national interests. Though there are more than enough of concepts, there is no conviction that state leaders have settled for one or another. Also non-existent is a common national consensus as to international issues, without which stable foreign policy is unthinkable. For that matter there cannot be a consensus in the meantime.

There inevitably follows from all this that attempts to instal a military and political alliance to replace the former USSR, will scarcely be successful thus far. Since they have but a poor understanding of their own national interests, the new states have but a hazy idea of points of contact and points of divergence.

Often mentioned as an incentive for unification are the 180 cockpits of potential conflict scattered around the former USSR. The problem though is that there are 180 such cockpits not just one. If there were but one equally imperilling all, the republics would most likely unite. But when there are more than a hundred, scarcely can that eventuate.

Yet it is highly probable that all these joint forces and military alliances are summoned to serve another, far more prosaic purpose, which is to alleviate the consequences that the USSR’s disintegration has entailed for the former Soviet army. We may note in this connection the circumstance that the reorganization of the USSR Armed Forces into the CIS Joint Armed Forces paved the way for an immediate solution in respect of the Soviet nuclear legacy and furnished breathing space for drafting, already at a national level, the basic principles of a military policy.

Hence the Tashkent Agreement could have been signed basically to reinforce the Russian-Kazakhstan union and ensure—for the time being—the normal operation of military structures in Central Asia and also in Armenia.

Do the “nuclear” presidents liaise?

Whatever the case, it must always be remembered that every agreement envisages links and commitments. As concerns the threat of the wholesale breakdown of the army, quite possible when the USSR disintegrated into the CIS, that is now not on the cards, with the exception of Transcaucasia. So what are the priorities in this connection for Russia’s military policy vis-a-vis the immediate abroad?

First the basic nuclear issue. Indeed, so long as Russia is not the only CIS country in possession of nuclear weaponry that will definitely remain a priority. Although Moscow’s desire to retain centralized control of nuclear armament and secure for Russia a full takeover from the former USSR in this field has the backing of the world community, Russia must not forget that 1994 is still round the corner, that not all of the former USSR’s nuclear weaponry is in her territory and that from the angle of formality at any rate, the Russian President is not as free as regards nuclear decisions as the previous Soviet leaders. That being so, particular tact has to be demonstrated vis-a-vis Kiev, Alma-Ata and Minsk.

Now we do not know whether there is a hot line for Russian, Ukrainian, Kazakhstan and Belarus leaders to confer in the event of crisis. We do not know to what extent representatives of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are involved in drafting and implementing nuclear strategy. Nor do we know how well concerted is the policy of nuclear weapon control.

Be that as it may, the lack of facilities for fast reliable liaison between the four presidents is simply impermissible. It would be absurd for the Ukraine not to be represented in the slated committee for nuclear strategy coordination, that is to be set up under the Collective Security Agreement, though the Central Asian republics party to the Tashkent Agreement are represented on it.
Finally, though the Kremlin’s resolve to cut down on nuclear arsenals is to be acclaimed, it would likewise be desirable for Russia’s President to rely on the patently expressed support of some of his colleagues when talking with the U.S. President, as that would also reinforce Russia’s own stance.

Aircraft must fly

Whereas with respect to strategic forces quadrilateral coordination represents the one and only acceptable option over the transition period, any desire for the broadest possible arrangement could prove erroneous in respect of conventional forces.

With the exception of Russia, each CIS state covers a more or less compact region, be this Eastern Europe in respect of the Ukraine and Belarus, Asia Minor and the Near East in respect of the Transcaucasian republics, the Middle East in respect of the Central Asian republics. Indeed, geopolitically, geostrategically and domestically, Belarus and Tajikistan are so different that any firm basis for military-political integration is out. Only Russia is in Europe, in the Caucasus and in Asia. Which significantly infers that while Russia wishes to fortify security along her entire perimeter, she must take a differentiated approach in each particular direction. Recent practice has incidentally demonstrated that this is most productive.

Sweeping cooperation with Kazakhstan, a republic of whose population two-fifths are Slavic, accords with the vitalmost interests of both Russia and Kazakhstan. Such cooperation must likewise have a military dimension in the form of a close military-political alliance and as far as we can see, it is this option that is currently being put into practice.

Minsk has repeatedly announced its firm resolve to denuclearize and stay neutral. This quite justified as expressing the basic national interests of Belarus. It cannot join the CIS military alliance that Russia is organizing without renouncing the basic principles of its policy of security. However, a bilateral agreement with Moscow presents quite a different picture. Such a mutually acceptable agreement was signed this summer.

Turkmenia has been unique in agreeing to have the Soviet military legacy within its territory divided in such a manner as to have part reorganized into a force that is to be subject to dual, that is Russian-Turkmenian, control.

There exists very tangible means and possibilities for purely military, military-technical, military-economic and of course, military-political cooperation between Russia and all other CIS republics. This could refer to the maintenance of an anti-aircraft defence system, arms production, specialist training, armaments engineering repair, joint combat training and finally military and technical facilities.

Incidentally, the relatively little experience amassed thus far in peace making and peace keeping in South Ossetia and Moldova demonstrates that armed contingents, in which individual states including Russia are represented, may be preferable to a special CIS force, at least nowadays as everyone will see who is actually responsible for the Russia, Georgian or Moldovan battalions. What though would this amount to in the case of a CIS force?

Finally, a few words as to local conflicts along the CIS’s external perimeter. Russia might find herself faced with a situation when her interests would necessitate decisive action including the use of force. But for such response to be swift, upon which its effectiveness will largely depend, Russia may have to ask for permission to overfly what is already foreign territory and to use airfields there. She will also doubtlessly stand in need of depots with heavy ordnance, materiel, fuel and lubricants, and it would also be much better to concretely specify such matters in advance.

To sum up, we have quadrilateral cooperation in the nuclear sphere and primarily bilateral cooperation as regards conventional armed forces and weaponry. We have an orientation on what it is essential to have not what would be desirable. What we have is the gradual gathering together of nuclear weaponry and the division of conventional arms. What we have is the renunciation of a maximalistic attitude which so often implies the loss of what one wants. On the other hand, we have a readiness to engage in tough bargaining and reach inevitable compromise which means that much could be kept. Does this mean divide and flourish? The Yalta accords on the Black Sea Navy demonstrate in part that this is quite feasible.

Debate Over Contract Service

[Article by Vladimir Zelentsov, deputy department editor, under the rubric “Urgent”: “The Experiment Is Costing Dearly”]

[Text] Aleksey Tsarev, chairmen of the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the Committee for Defense and Security of the Russian Federation’s Supreme Soviet, has spoken out against the experiment in contract service in Russia’s armed forces being conducted by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense in 1992 and 1993. Tsarev believes that the billions of rubles required for the experiment will disappear as though thrown to the wind, with nothing to show for it.

Aleksey Tsarev’s fears are not groundless, although he is not basically against a professional army and contract service. There is a time for every crop, though, as they say. And the time has not come to gather the harvest from the fields of contract service. If the decision to conduct the experiment passes, 7.8 billion rubles will be spent this year, 21.6 million next year. Where is all this money to come from?
Surveys of military personnel show that most of them are definitely in favor of a professional army. When they are asked whether they would like to serve under contract, though, the situation changes....

For four years in a row the Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological and Legal Studies in the Armed Forces has polled soldiers and draftees on the subject. The latest data were obtained from a poll taken among 1,200 enlisted men from 10 military districts in Russia in March of this year. Only 36 percent of the respondents would like to serve under contract. Even then, only if the contract contains certain provisions. Perhaps the main one is a high salary, 2-3 times the average monthly wage of a civilian employee. The 3,000 proposed by the experiment's authors, even with increments and other benefits, would hardly interest many of them. The second binding provision, indicated by 67 percent of those who would agree to become professionals was that they serve close to home. They would not go to the other end of the world to serve.

It was also interesting that 75 percent of the soldiers indicated they would not sign a contract for more than three years. Would this not be an extra burden on the military budget? Particularly, since 4 percent of the "volunteers" polled had only an incomplete secondary education. The "professionals" will have to be educated. The individual's personal qualities are also important to the modern army. Discipline, for example. And this, the survey showed, is also a problem.

One can refuse to accept the results of the surveys, of course. In that case, let us turn to the reality. Many units of the Moscow Military District, even in the central regions, are extremely short of warrant officers today. By stretching it a bit, one can consider this category of servicemen to be the prototype of the contract serviceman. In many radioelectronic subunits of the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] subunits many commanders are pulling their hair today, because they have an ever-increasing number of women under their command. This is not a bad thing in and of itself, but then there are so many things to do in the army: stand guard duty, perform housekeeping chores, harvest potatoes.... Incidentally, around 20,000 servicemen are engaged in the latter right now. It will be interesting to see contract enlisted men crawling around in potato and cabbage fields—not to improve their combat skills but to save hungry city dwellers. It seems that we shall never stamp out this "battle for the crops."

So we are going to experiment! A couple of years ago the navy tried it. It did not work out. The conditions were not right. But is the situation today any different?

Decree on Attachment of Officers to Government Agencies

92UM1521B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Sep 92 p 4


[Text] For purposes of regulating the procedure for attaching officers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and administrative personnel from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to higher government agencies and administrations, civilian ministries, departments and organizations, I hereby decree:


2. That the list of ministries, departments and organizations to which officers and chiefs who may be attached is defined by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, based on the need to ensure effective execution of the duties assigned to these ministries and is approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, with the exception of situations covered in special decrees of the President of the Russian Federation.

3. That attached military personnel should as a rule be employed as experts, consultants and assistants in areas directly related to the functioning of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Matters pertaining to the filling of administrative positions with officers and chiefs to be attached to higher state agencies and administrations and to civilian ministries, departments and organizations is decided in each specific case by the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with the laws in effect.

Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, is to prepare a draft law defining the procedure for attaching officers and chiefs, as well as measures of social protection, including the provision of all forms of pay and allowances and corresponding rights such as pensions and benefits.


6. For the purpose of distributing administrative personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, including civilian specialists, the Higher Certification Commission is to review previous normative legal documents on the attachment of officers of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and administrative personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to higher state agencies and administrations and to civilian ministries, departments and organizations, and to prepare proposals for revising and supplementing them.

7. The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation is charged with monitoring the implementation of this Decree.

[Signed] President Russian Federation
B. Yeltsin
Moscow, Kremlin
16 September 1992
No 1078

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Adm Aleksin Comments on Naval Accident Rate
92UM14804 Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 7 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by journalist Aleksandr Mozgovoy: "A Tragedy Not Counted—How the 'Musson' Perished"]

[Text] The CIS naval command recently promulgated statistics on accidents of the ships of the USSR Navy for 1987-91. But a tragic incident that occurred with the small missile surface combatant (MRK) Musson on 16 Apr 87 in the Sea of Japan (39 sailors were lost) was not included on the list. Why?

They explained to me at the Main Staff of the Navy that incidents that occur through the fault of crew members, the incorrect operation of hardware or its disabling are included in the category of accidents in our fleet. The Musson and the people that were on it were the victims of unforeseen circumstances of force majeure,—that is, a fluke.

The Musson was taking part in exercises as part of a formation and was under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Viktor Rekish (the first deputy commander of the Primorye Flotilla, Captain 1st Rank Renat Temirkhanov, and several staff officers were also on board the MRK). They had to carry out the task of repelling an "enemy" missile attack. A target missile was launched in the direction of the Musson from an "attacking" craft. The first air-defense missile from the MRK did not hit the target, which was flying at low altitude, but the second hit it at a distance of about 2.5 kilometers... And then something unforeseen occurred: the damaged target, instead of dropping into the sea, took a sharp left and tore into the wheelhouse of the Musson MRK.

The housing of the target missile broke up from the impact. Unused fuel and oxidizer spewed from it. A fire burst out instantly and engulfed the superstructure, and then spread across the deck. Rekish, Temirkhanov and the other sailors in the wheelhouse were killed almost instantly by the fire.

Those who were still alive did not waver. The personnel, under the leadership of ship's assistant commander Senior Lieutenant I. Goldobin, whom the sailors pulled out of the wreckage, courageously battled to save the ship. But the elements proved stronger.

Other ships in the formation immediately came to the aid of the burning Musson. Sailor Antonov and Senior Lieutenants Ivanov and Levchenko rushed into the water to aid their drowning comrades. They were able to save 37 sailors from the Musson in all.

The Musson, four hours and fifty minutes after the hit by the target missile, went down 33 miles south of the island of Askold at a depth of about 3,000 meters after the explosion of the artillery and missile magazines.

The circumstances of the catastrophe were analyzed by a special commission. Various versions were advanced. One in particular was that the homing head on the knocked-out target was somehow activated, and it guided even the damaged missile to the ship. But the commission established that the homing unit had not only been disconnected, but also cut off from the target's control systems.

And what is the overall accident rate in the Navy? Our military correspondent Nikolay Burbyga asked that question of Navy Chief Navigator Valeriy Aleksin.

Today we evaluate the effectiveness of the work to prevent accidents in the fleet not according to the quantity of measures taken, but rather according to the ultimate result—the absence of accidents and crashes. Their quantity did not exceed 0.7 percent of the actual strength of the fleets for 1988-91, that is, 99.3 percent of the ships and naval support vessels were accident-free for
The average annual quantity of accidents with ships and support vessels has decreased by three times over the last five years (1987-91) compared to the prior five years (1982-86) as a result. Instances of running aground have decreased by four times (and by six times compared to 1977-81), and collisions of ships—which, as a rule, led to serious accidents—have decreased by six times. No other fleet in the world has such results over the last 10—15 years. It is especially important that not a single ruble of the people’s money was actually spent to achieve these appreciable and steady results. The accident rate of naval vessels in 1992 is almost no different than that for 1990-91.

However, despite the fact that the quantity of technical accidents with ships (explosions, fires, floodings) has been reduced by 1.5 times over the last five years, it is namely the technical accident rate that has been more than half of all accidents in the fleet in recent years and, as a rule, leads to the gravest consequences. It was namely for technical reasons that three of our nuclear-powered submarines were lost over the last 30 years—in the North Atlantic in 1970 and 1986, and the Komskomlets in the Norwegian Sea in 1989.

A profound analysis conducted after the loss of the Komskomlets showed that the causes of accidents with naval ships in recent years (especially submarines) can be grouped into three principal areas:

— the insufficient quality of design engineering and construction of new ships;

— the exceptional complexity, lack of standardization and poor reliability of some models of the weapons and hardware being installed on the ships; and

— shortcomings in the training of the personnel and maintenance of the hardware.

True, a new reason appeared in 1992. The commander of one of the naval bases in the Black Sea Fleet, Rear-Admiral B. Kozhin, was distracted by the political squabbles, with the goal of crossing over to the Ukrainian Navy. His staff, drawn into the political battle and having lost naval organization and vigilance, did not carry out the stipulated measures for storm readiness announced by the fleet command. The PZhK-70 fire boat split its side and went down during a storm right at the mooring, in full view of the commanders of the naval base, as a result.
The development of new, more effective and reliable systems for ensuring the fire safety and damage-resistance of ships is currently underway in the Navy in conjunction with industry, and the training of damage-control crews has been organized in a new fashion. The elimination of a major fire on the Admiral Zakharov large ASW ship in the Pacific Fleet was a visible result of that work. And although a sailor was unfortunately killed fighting the fire, they were able to avoid significant casualties. By way of comparison, the Otvazhnyy large ASW ship burned up completely and sank with the loss of 24 men in 1974 in the Black Sea Fleet with the same kind of fire.

The fleets of all countries, including the best developed in a technological sense, run up against the problem of accidents. According to data from Greenpeace, some 27 submarines have been lost in the postwar period, including five Soviet (of which three were nuclear), four American (two nuclear), three British and four French. There were 56 collisions, 113 fires, 12 instances of running aground, 85 explosions and 48 floodings of internal enclosures and compartments on U.S. Navy submarines over the five years from 1983 through 1987. There were 71 ship accidents in the U.S. Navy in 1989 alone, including 34 with nuclear submarines (of which eight were nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and 26 were attack submarines).

The accident rate for the submarines of the U.S. Navy and a number of other NATO countries over the last five years, in the evaluation of their leaders, continues to remain considerable, and has even increased for subsurface [as published] ships and support vessels.

U.S. Navy specialists have expressed a readiness to collaborate with the Russian Navy on the issue of preventing accidents. The mutual exchange of positive experience in the resolution of this difficult problem could save many priceless human lives for both fleets, and would preserve ships and save many millions in expenditures that are made to eliminate the consequences of accidents.

Some journalists are convinced to this day that “every accident is the result of someone’s incompetence, sloppiness or negligence among the personnel of the Navy.” The main purpose of an investigation, in their opinion, is to seek out and punish the guilty (“low man on the totem pole”), take responsibility away from someone and cover up the true causes of accidents from the public. This last is altogether an absurdity, since it is impossible for us to conceal anything from anyone now. All secrets are being concealed about under the slogan of glasnost. Generals in the U.S. Army, not to mention ordinary civil servants, are dismissed the next day for this.

The strictest and most irreversible punishment has followed for accidents in the Russian Navy even as early as the times of Peter I. That rule remains unchanged today. But you cannot stop accidents through the severity of disciplinary, material and other liability. No one intentionally wants to cause an accident for his ship and perish with it. The main thing in an investigation is to establish the true causes for an accident, and to devise and incarnate concrete measures not to permit the causes of such accidents.

A special, authorized commission is created to investigate each accident in the Navy, and it includes the most competent, experienced and principled specialists of the fleet, as well as industry and science where necessary, right up to academics known around the world. No one can deceive them. These commissions analyze the ship’s documents, the readings of recording instruments and the testimony of participants and witnesses to the accident. Analytical computations and graphical constructions are performed, along with the modeling of events in real time and using simulators. This aids in making a sufficiently precise recreation of the circumstances of the accident situation, filtering out stress and other distortions in the testimony of people and establishing violations by officials of their specific regulation duties and the requirements of international and domestic guiding documents on ensuring the safety of navigation.

The military procurator is notified of every accident with ships, their arms and hardware. The guilty are subjected to disciplinary, material and criminal responsibility under stipulated legal procedure.

Despite the appreciable and steady positive results in the fight against accidents that were presented above, no one in the Navy should have a feeling of tranquility or complacency. The work to prevent accidents with ships and their weapons and hardware remains, as before, one of the main areas of activity of the command, staffs and special directorates of the Navy, the fleets, formations, task forces and crews of ships.

Major-General Rogov Interviewed on Naval Aviation
92UM1491A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 8-9, Aug-Sep 92 (signed to press 28 Aug 92) pp 3-5

[Interview with Major-General Avn Nikolay Andreyevich Rogov, first deputy commander of Naval Aviation, by Colonel Yu. Morozov; place and date not given: “Russia’s Naval Aviation: What Kind Should It Be?”]

[Text Naval Aviation, organizationally consisting of the fleet air forces, is experiencing a period of reform today just like the armed forces as a whole. It will not be easy to do this; the country is in the grips of an economic crisis, social tension, and political and interethnic contradictions. How is this process going? How is Naval Aviation seen in the structure of the Russian Fleet? Major-General of Aviation N.A. Rogov, first deputy commander of Naval Aviation, answered these and other questions from MORSKOY SBORNIK.
Without rejecting as a whole the idea of unifying long-range and naval missile-armed aviation and considering that today formations of long-range aviation perform a considerable share of their missions in sea and ocean theaters in the interests of the fleets, it would be feasible to subordinate them to the Navy. This would make it possible to train the flight personnel of these units purposefully for the specifics of combat operations at sea, simplify organization of command and control, and improve conditions for coordination with fleet forces and combat, technical, and logistic support.

[Morozov] Nikolay Andreyevich, what tasks and deadlines have been given the Staff of Naval Aviation for reorganizing Naval Aviation?

[Rogov] The tasks and deadlines for reorganizing Naval Aviation stem from the overall concept of forming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outlined by General of the Army P. Grachev at a recent scientific conference at the Military Academy of the General Staff, calling for radical reforms of the existing structures of the Armed Forces before the year 2000 with a simultaneous reduction in their personnel strength.

The reforms will take place in phases, taking into account the country's economic capabilities. This process is labor-intensive, requiring considerable efforts and caution. It is planned to have small but powerful troop groupings able to operate where a real threat arises. Proceeding from this, the Staff of Naval Aviation has been tasked to form an organization and establishment of fleet air forces, taking into account the considerable reduction in personnel strength and number of aircraft, associated not only with the reduction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation but also with the restrictions concerning the understandings reached on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe. The deadline for reorganization of Naval Aviation is 1 January 1995.

[Morozov] What contacts have been set up between the State Commission for Creation of a Ministry of Defense of the Army and Navy of the Russian Federation and the Staff of Naval Aviation?

[Rogov] There is no direct contact between the State Commission and the Staff of Naval Aviation. We report all materials concerning the future of Naval Aviation to the Main Staff of the Navy, which represents the interests of the Navy as a whole. The Staff of Naval Aviation prepares the necessary reference materials and participates together with the Main Staff of the Navy in drawing up the concept of forming a balanced Navy, defending the interests of Naval Aviation.

[Morozov] Nikolay Andreyevich, what quantitative and qualitative changes will Naval Aviation undergo in the near future?

[Rogov] First of all, there will be a considerable reduction in personnel by approximately 30 percent and in the aircraft fleet by 20 percent. We well retain the basic
strike force—naval missile-armed aviation—the air forces of the Northern and Pacific Ocean fleets and somewhat reduce the units of attack, ASW, and reconnaissance aviation. At the same time, we plan to form shipborne fighter aviation for operations from heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers.

Of course, these organizational and establishment changes during Russia’s difficult economic situation cannot help but affect the combat potential of Naval Aviation. Reducing the fleet of aircraft and the considerable difficulties with deliveries of new aviation equipment to support daily activities of the forces will slow down somewhat the growth of combat capabilities of fleet air force units. But we are hoping for a recovery of Russia’s economy and balancing of the financing of military orders, and we have a scientific reserve in creating new aviation equipment and experience in training flying personnel.

[Morozov] As far as the CIS Combined Armed Forces are concerned, are there plans to have naval aviation in them? If so, how will questions of centralized command and control, subordination, and unity of command be resolved?

[Rogov] I think that these aspects have been outlined in general terms in the statement by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on priorities of military policy of the Russian Federation of 1 April 1992. It has been determined that strategic nuclear forces are the means of preventing world wars directed against Russia and the other member-states of the CIS. Forces possessing high-precision weapons and delivery vehicles for them should become the main deterrent against the unleashing of large-scale conflicts and local wars.

As we know, naval aviation is an integral part and one of the main component services of the fleets, and the fleets, in accordance with the 1991 Minsk Agreement, are part of the strategic forces and must be subordinate to the commander in chief of the CIS Combined Armed Forces. However, the staff itself of the Combined Armed Forces, its role and tasks are being reevaluated today. In addition, now only Russia has a navy. Time will tell what the Combined Armed Forces will look like in the near future.

[Morozov] Nikolay Andreyevich, Russia’s Naval Aviation is acquiring increasingly distinct contours, and its strength may be its training. What difficulties in conditions of economic and social tension do the command authorities of Naval Aviation encounter when conducting combat training and what is being done to keep combat readiness of formations and units at the necessary level?

[Rogov] Yes, there are problems. Combat training has been made considerably more difficult by the reduction in the limits of fuel and lubricants and disruption in their deliveries, and also by the reduction in capabilities for repairing aviation equipment, servicing equipment, and flight support equipment. Moreover, there is a considerable personnel shortage in support units, which has decreased their capabilities for flight support. What is more, in many regions we have been virtually deprived of the possibility to use training ranges that were in operation before. They either ended up being foreign (Baltic region, Crimea, Ukraine, Kazakhstan), or, at the demand of the public and local administration, combat training at them has been restricted or terminated completely for reasons associated with ecology or even peace and quiet of the population living nearby. Due to worsening of the material living conditions and the lack of social protection during the transition to a market economy, there is also a decrease in the psychological stability of personnel, and this also complicates the entire process of combat training.

In these conditions, besides the additional measures for organizing deliveries of fuel and spare parts, to maintain the combat readiness of aviation units and formations, we are forced to concentrate the basic material supplies and aviation equipment service life on maintaining combat-ready those flying personnel who with minimum expenditures will be able, if necessary, to carry out the combat mission. We use the rest of the service life for maintaining the professional skills of the rest of the flying personnel. In so doing, we make maximum use of comprehensive and special simulators available in the units, which make it possible to practice and maintain a certain portion of professional skills. Therefore, the units are switching to two and even three shifts using these simulators. To reduce the consumption of service life of flight-support equipment, we consider it possible to switch to reducing the number of flight shifts by conducting the flights as part of the regiment and, where possible, the formation as a whole. Steps are being taken to increase the effectiveness of the flight shift and each flying hour, including by integrating flight assignments. A thorough analysis of each flight also contributes to this.

The problem of ensuring flight safety is especially critical in these conditions due to irregularity of flights and as a result of losing previously acquired skills. Therefore, we are increasing and toughening monitoring at all levels of supervision to ensure that we do not launch a crew that has lost skills or is not mentally ready for the flight.

On the whole, both the command of Naval Aviation and most flight personnel understand the situation, are soberly evaluating the realities at hand, and are trying to do all they can to ensure the required combat readiness in these conditions.


Discussion of Decommissioning of Ships

92UM1501B Moscow MORSKOHY SBORNIKH
in Russian No 7, Jul 92 pp 60-63

[Interview with Capt 1st Rank Ye. Bolshakov and Capt 2d Rank A. Bykov, officers of the Main Staff of the
Navy, by Capt 1st Rank B. Tyurin, MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent: “Ships Are Abandoning Formation”]

[Text] As we know, surface ships, submarines, combatant craft, and support vessels whose capabilities no longer meet current requirements are inactivated from the Navy each year. This is one of the aspects of the natural process of renovation of the Navy’s fleet in active service. After appropriate technical preparation, the ships being decommissioned are stripped for subsequent remelting at metallurgical enterprises or are sold abroad as metal afloat. Our correspondent Captain 1st Rank B. Tyurin talks with officers of the Main Staff of the Navy, Captain 1st Rank Ye. Bolshakov and Captain 2d Rank A. Bykov, about how the process of decommissioning obsolete ships is accomplished in the Navy and how its fleet in active service changes in doing so.

[Tyurin] In the article “The Navy: Problems of Reduction and Development”1, the commander of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, briefly described the dynamics of change in the Navy’s fleet in active service since the mid-1980’s and its expected prospects until the year 2000. In their letters, readers ask us to cover this problem in more detail. Therefore, I am asking you to tell us how the process of bringing new ships into the Navy is now going and what can be expected in this context in the near future.

[Bolshakov] Commissioning of new ships today is accomplished with extreme difficulty. Military shipbuilding programs have been suspended. This is caused, on the one hand, by the lack of financing and, on the other, by the lack of an answer to one of the main questions: What is the required numerical strength of the Navy? As you will remember, the commander’s article stated, in particular, that Sovremenny-class destroyers will be commissioned. One of them—the “Bespokonyy”—joined the fleet in late February of this year. In addition, the following are in a high degree of technical readiness: the nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser “Yuriy Andropov”—now the “Petr Velikiy” (Kirov-class being built in Saint Petersburg) and the gas-turbine guided-missile cruiser “Admiral Flota Lobov” (Slava-class built in Nikolayev). At the same time, construction of the “Varyag” and “Ulyanovsk” heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers was halted in November 1991. By unilateral decision of the government of Ukraine, they were stopped. This was the result of the political-legal situation. At the same time, construction of the “Varyag” and “Ulyanovsk” heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers was halted in November 1991. By unilateral decision of the government of Ukraine, they were stopped. This was the result of the political-legal situation. These decisions take on force of law after their approval by the commander of the Navy or the commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces (as in the case of decommissioning an SSBN), after which directives are sent to the fleet. Professor A. Bykov, in his book “The Future of the Navy,” wrote about very little in the civilian mass media.

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[Tyurin] The uncertainty of ways to solve the problem of replenishing the fleet with new ships, like a whole series of other problems of the Navy, is obvious. Let us talk a little about decommissioning obsolete ships, which is written about very little in the civilian mass media.

[Bolshakov] Decommissioning of obsolete ships has always been done and been planned in nature. All classes of ships are being removed from the active fleet too, ships that are both part of the maritime strategic nuclear forces [MSNF] and of the general-purpose forces.

However, whereas decommissioning nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines [SSBNs] that are part of the MSNF is the prerogative of the top leadership of the armed forces, ships are decommissioned from the general-purpose forces based on orders of the commander of the Navy, and support vessels are decommissioned based on orders of the chief of rear services of the Navy.

[Tyurin] What is the procedure for withdrawing such ships from the active forces of the Navy?

[Bolshakov] First of all, it must be noted that according to the regulations currently in effect, “combatant ships, special-purpose ships, auxiliary ships, launch and roaders that have lost their original specifications and performance characteristics are subject to exclusion from the Navy’s active forces and scrapping if it is impossible to use them further and their restoration is inadvisable...” This process is accomplished in accordance with documents drawn up annually by the Main Staff of the Navy based on proposals of the fleets, separate flotillas, and naval bases. The basic or more precisely the fundamental document for decommissioning a ship that has been in service for the set time periods is a report on mechanical condition prepared by specialists of the formations and approved by the Main Directorate of Maintenance and Repair of the Navy. Next, the finding of the Main Directorate of Maintenance and Repair of the Navy goes to the Main Staff of the Navy for consideration, where the appropriate draft decisions are made, taking into account the situation taking shape in the Navy with regard to combat-ready active fleet forces and expected replacements by new ships being commissioned and orienting themselves on the prospective plan of withdrawing ships from the ranks of the Navy and also on newly arising circumstances. These decisions take on force of law after their approval by the commander of the Navy or the commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces (as in the case of decommissioning an SSBN), after which directives are sent to the fleets, separate flotillas, or naval bases direct specific actions for preparing and decommissioning specific ships.

[Tyurin] What are the dynamics of reducing the seagoing forces of the MSNF or general-purpose forces?
[Bolshakov] In accordance with the plan for implementing the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, it is planned to eliminate more than 30 missile-carrying submarines from the MSNF by the year 2000.

[Bykov] The dynamics of withdrawing ships from the general-purpose forces can be illustrated by the following figures: 91 submarines, 88 surface ships, and 34 boats were withdrawn in 1990; 33 submarines, 50 surface ships, and 27 boats were withdrawn in 1991. This year, preliminary plans are to withdraw another 12 submarines, 35 surface ships, and 24 boats. I fully agree with the assertion of the commander of the Navy, cited in the above-mentioned article, that "decreasing the numerical strength of our Navy's seagoing forces is irreparable in nature. Of course, we must strive to build and commission new combat ships that meet the highest modern requirements, but the rate at which we are receiving them from industry is EXTREMELY LIMITED."

[Tyurin] Our readers, especially those who were once on active duty aboard ships in the Navy, are constantly concerned about the fate of their ships and whether or not they are in service or have already been decommissioned. Could you dwell in more detail on the list of ships that have been withdrawn from the seagoing forces of the Navy recently?

[Bykov] Among them are nuclear- and diesel-powered submarines of various classes. Most of them are diesel-powered submarines of the first Soviet postwar projects: torpedo-armed submarines—projects 613 and 633, and also missile-armed submarines—projects 629 and 651. Also considerable is the proportion of first-generation nuclear-powered submarines created under Project 627 (known to readers as torpedo-armed submarines of the Leninskiy Komsomol-class) and missile-armed submarines, Project 658, and also a number of submarines of later projects. Surface ships created between the mid-1950's and the mid-1970's represent a more extensive group.


We will add to the above that all conventional gun-armed cruisers, command ships, guided-missile and ASW cruisers, and also large ASW ships of Project 1134-a are considered classification 1 ships; the large ASW ships of other projects and destroyers listed above are considered classification 2 ships. Patrol escort, small ASW, and guided-missile ships and ocean minesweepers are considered classification 3 ships. But let us continue our list...

A large group of the escort ships being decommissioned are Project 50 escort ships ("Pingvin", "Los", and "Irkutskiy Komsomol")—all of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, decommissioned 1987-1989; "Bars", "Kugur", "Norka", and "Arkhangelskiy Komsomol"—all of the Northern Fleet, decommissioned 1986-1991; "Kobchik", "Tuman", and "Komsomolots Litvy"—inactivation from the Baltic Fleet began in 1987; "Rys", "Volk", "Kunitsa", "Gornostay", and "Voron"—all of the Black Sea Fleet, decommissioned 1988-1989) and escort ships of a later generation—Project 35 ("Ivan Sladkov", "Gangutets", and "60 Let Komsomolu Belorussii")—all of the Baltic Fleet with inactivation beginning in 1989). Only "named" ships have been given here, but so-called "numbered" escort ships of projects 50, 35, 159, and 159-a are also being or have already been inactivated.

Project 204 small ASW ships, Project 266 ocean minesweepers, Project 257 coastal minesweepers, Project 1252 harbor minesweepers, Project 205 missile boats, and ships and auxiliary vessels of certain other projects, submarine tenders in particular, ("Dmitriy Galkin", Project 310). Of course, the scale of inactivation of ships of these projects differ both in number of the ships being decommissioned and in classes, formations, and time.

[Tyurin] Thank you for such complete information. Undoubtedly, many of our readers, with a quite understandable sense of sadness, will see among these ships listed those with which their youth in the Navy was associated. Is it possible to obtain similar data on submarines?

[Bolshakov] In 1991, six first- and second-generation nuclear-powered submarines of various projects were inactivated in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. In addition, two Project 641 diesel-powered torpedo-armed submarines were decommissioned. During that same period, submarines of basically the same projects were inactivated in the Northern Fleet: nine nuclear-powered and six diesel-powered submarines. The Baltic Fleet decommissioned four diesel-powered submarines (projects 641 and 651), and the Black Sea Fleet decommissioned four diesel-powered submarines (projects 613 and 633).

With reference to submarines, there will not be a detailed list of those being decommissioned, since although the displacement of modern submarines often exceeds that of many surface ships having their own names, submarines rarely have personal names.

[Tyurin] Explain to readers why, when they talk about specific surface ships, combatant craft, and submarines, besides the name or class of this combatant, they often refer to its project number?

[Bykov] In the Navy, particularly in regulations and technical documents of the Navy's Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and other directorates and services, in matters in which "combatants"—surface ships, special-purpose ships, craft, submarines—are examined, it is customary to refer to them by the numbers of their projects in order to avoid incorrect interpretation. Civilian vessels, as well as support vessels or other auxiliary ships, depending on the "designers" of their projects, may be called according to the type ship in a series or also by "project numbers." If you can put it this way, "in the Navy, it is just like in aviation," where the make of the aircraft ("Su-", "MiG-", "Be-", or "Tu-") already speaks for itself. So, let the readers correctly perceive the "barrage" of project numbers in this article—they stand for ships. It is my opinion that it is also time to begin talking about them on the pages of MORSKOY SBORNIK.

[Footnote] Thank you for the interview. I hope that next time we will talk a little about the fate of these decommissioned ships. Why are so many of them "idle"? Is the practice of selling decommissioned ships for scrap metal abroad so great and sound, as some of the mass media write, accusing the Navy of trading in ships?

FOOTNOTES


Professional Service by Contract

92UM1501A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 7, Jul 92 p 59

[Article by Lt Col S. Chuprov, candidate of historical sciences: "Service in the Navy by Contract (According to Sociological Research Data in the Armed Forces)"]

[Note] A study of the basic documents for transition to Army and Navy manpower acquisition on a contract basis is nearing completion. One of the documents is "Conditions of Voluntary Performance of Military Service in Positions of Soldiers, Sailors, Noncommissioned Officers, and Petty Officers by Contract."

The Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research of the Armed Forces used an opinion poll of 1200 compulsory-service personnel and persons subject to military service in nine military districts and in the fleets to study their attitude towards contract service and the proposed conditions. The results show that a social base exists for manpower acquisition on a contract basis. However, it has tended to narrow in recent years. Thus, whereas 67 percent of those surveyed expressed a desire to serve under contract in January 1990 and 47 percent in September 1991, only 36 percent express such a desire today. The Airborne Troops enjoy the greatest popularity among the services and arms. Of those expressing a desire to serve on a contract basis, the Airborne Troops accounted for 30 percent, followed by the Air Force at 23 percent, and in third place is the Navy at 18 percent.

The motives are also changing. Whereas in January 1990 the desire to test and thoroughly harden oneself was the predominant motive (50 percent of those surveyed), the
desire to provide for oneself materially moved into first place beginning in 1991. In September 1991, 43 percent stated this, and now one out of every two say this. At the same time, motives brought on by the romantic appeal of the sea are also fairly pronounced—the opportunity to see the world and expand one’s outlook (24 percent).

All this also predetermined the attitude towards the proposed draft of the “Conditions.” Basically, it satisfies more than 60 percent of those surveyed, including 74 percent of those expressing a desire to serve in the Navy under contract. However, it is completely acceptable for only 13 percent of the total number surveyed and for 24 percent of those expressing a desire to perform military service voluntarily.

In addition, free clothing and gear, food rations, and a number of other benefits were received favorably, depending on the benefit being offered, by 75 to 98 percent of those surveyed from among those expressing a desire to serve under contract. It is interesting that this part of the conditions received greater approval by those expressing a desire to serve in the Navy than by those wishing to serve in other services and arms. The only exception is the question on duration of leaves. Annual leave of 30 days with up to 10 years of service did not suit 50 percent of the future professional seamen, and leave of 35 days at 10-20 years service did not suit 52 percent. They consider leaves of at least 40-45 days, not counting travel time, to be acceptable.

Those wishing to serve in the Navy expressed considerable complaints on the question of housing. For example, whereas on the average one out of every ten wishing to serve under contract agreed to live in a barracks as a bachelor, for seamen it was only one out of every 12. Residing in a private flat would suit them best, provided they were paid monetary compensation corresponding to the actual costs (43 percent).

The overall level of the initial monthly pay and allowances (depending on the conditions of service in the Navy—up to 6,580 rubles [R]) satisfies 81 percent of those expressing a desire to serve in the Navy under contract. The additional monetary payments (according to results of the year, when extending the contract, for years in service, for level of proficiency rating, and so forth) are also acceptable. Depending on the specific paragraph of the draft “Conditions,” 60 to 90 percent of those wishing to serve in the Navy agreed with them. However, the proposed pay according to position occupied (for sailors—up to R1,570; for petty officers—up to R1,780; for petty officers assigned to warrant officer positions—up to R1,920) suited considerably fewer than those expressing a desire to serve in other services and arms. Whereas on the average the pay for similar positions suited 60 percent of those surveyed, for seamen this figure was 10-20 percent lower. As far as base pay according to military rank is concerned, it is clearly set too low and satisfies less than half of those expressing a desire to serve in the Navy under contract—29 to 45 percent.

So, the opinions on the “Conditions of Voluntary Performance of Military Service in Positions of Soldiers, Sailors, Noncommissioned Officers, and Petty Officers by Contract have been determined. They indicate that after putting the finishing touches on and giving the "Conditions" legal force, we will find people wishing for military service under contract.


Interview with Su-27K Test Pilot
92UM15004 Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 7, Jul 92 pp 43-48

[Interview with Viktor Georgiyevich Pugachev, Hero of the Soviet Union and Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, by Yu. Morozov, MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent; place and date not given: "This Is Our Life"]

[Text] On 1 November 1989, events took place on the Black Sea which opened up a new phase in the development of domestic carrier aviation. For the first time in our country landings were made on a ship and takeoffs were made from a shipborne spring board by conventionally configured aircraft. The first pilot to make this unique landing was Hero of the Soviet Union and Honored Test Pilot of the USSR Viktor Georgiyevich Pugachev. Taking into account readers’ wishes, our correspondent met with Viktor Georgiyevich Pugachev and asked him to answer questions most often encountered in letters to the editor.

[Morozov] Viktor Georgiyevich, the work of a test pilot is always infused with romantic appeal and mystery, and many of our readers are interested in learning how your formation took place and how you ended up in this group?

[Pugachev] Like most of my friends, I yearned to fly back when I was a young boy. I lived and went to school in Taganrog essentially right next door to the airfield of the Yeysk Aviation School and together with my peers spent all my free time, which was quite a bit at that time, at the airfield. In 1966, after graduating from school, I entered the Yeysk Aviation School, which until 1956, incidentally, was a naval school. I graduated in 1970 and was assigned as an instructor pilot at this same school. I served there seven years. Being a person who always wants something more, in 1974 I began knocking on the doors of the test-pilot school of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, which also opened for me in 1977. After school I worked for two years at the Flight Research Institute and then was invited to work at the experimental design bureau.

[Morozov] That is how you began, as a military pilot?

[Pugachev] Yes, of course. at school I had the military rank of captain, but one of the conditions of enrollment in the test-pilot school of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry was discharge into the reserves. True, there still exists the school of the GNIKI institute which trains
military test pilots for the Air Force and series plants, and its graduates continue serving in the armed forces.

[Morozov] Viktor Georgiyevich, the name Pugachev is well known not only in aviation circles but also among seamen. Where and at what time did your work come up against the maritime elements?

[Pugachev] This happened during the period when the Experimental Design Bureau [OKB] imeni Sukhoy was tasked to create carrier-based aircraft with a spring board takeoff and an arresting gear landing. My arrival at the OKB coincided with the technical assignment for creating such an aircraft. A group of people was specified to conduct this work from the very beginning. I was included in that group. So, in addition to tasks for creating the Su-27 aircraft, the Sukhoy OKB was working in parallel on designing the Su-27K ship-based aircraft.

The Su-27 was created as a new, fourth-generation air-superiority aircraft able to conduct both long-range target intercept and highly fluid close combat.

The aircraft is created according to the so-called statically unstable configuration, which distinguishes it from aircraft of earlier generations. To ensure the necessary stability and control characteristics, an electronic remote control system is used on the aircraft, that is, a computerized control system. It was installed in Su-27 aircraft for the first time in our domestic combat aviation. The aircraft proved to be very effective. To this day its maneuvering characteristics are competitive with all characteristics of western aircraft.

[Morozov] The appearance of the Su-27 at the Le Bourget Aerospace Show in July 1989 became a sensation, and the aerobatic maneuver that was demonstrated—the Pugachev Cobra, named after the first person to execute it—still cannot be done by any foreign aircraft. What is the story behind this maneuver?

[Pugachev] In the process of testing an aircraft, new programs are always being created to build up its potential. One such program was the study of the aircraft’s characteristics at angles of attack significantly exceeding the permissible, a so-called super-maneuverability study. In the process of simulating the programs, it was disclosed that the aircraft could quickly turn itself around the lateral axis at high pitch angles practically without a change in trajectory. There appeared a possibility of attacking targets in close combat with the use of the aircraft coming out at a high pitch angle of a brief turn of the axis of his own weapons on the enemy aircraft, making a lock-on, and launching a missile without giving the enemy a chance to evade. A large amount of calculations were made and computer simulation was done to be convinced that the aircraft would not stall, since the angles of attack in this maneuver exceeded the permissible angles of attack considerably and were 100-120 degrees. Tests showed that in the process of reaching these angles, the aircraft retained considerable stability and, after reaching them, strove to return to the starting flight position.

In 1989, when we were tasked to demonstrate the aircraft at the International Air Show in Le Bourget, a question arose about preparation of a demonstration program, and we naturally wanted to look on the level not only of our models and foreign models, such as the F-16 and F-18, but even somewhat better. Therefore, during the course of working out the program, we decided to use a dynamic braking maneuver to recover to minimum flight speed with a simultaneous demonstration of the aircraft’s capabilities for stable flight at angles of attack of approximately 120 degrees. A great deal of work was done on studying the maneuver itself at various altitudes, the aircraft’s spin characteristics were studied, and, in general, the aircraft was “taught” to execute the “cobra.” After we began to have complete confidence in the safety and reliability of its execution, we decided to demonstrate it at the aerospace show.

[Morozov] Who came up with the idea to call it the “cobra”?

[Pugachev] When it came to naming it, everyone involved in developing the program participated in the discussion, up to and including the general designer. I cannot remember who first called attention to the fact that the aircraft looked like a cobra making a strike when executing the figure. That is how it was represented and was picked up by the press.

[Morozov] In recent years there has been a good tradition of exchanging familiarization flights at international air shows. In the fall of 1990, the chief of staff of Great Britain’s Royal Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Peter Gardin, made such a flight with you at Farnborough. What are foreign pilots’ impressions about our aircraft and have you had the opportunity to fly foreign aircraft of a similar class?

[Pugachev] I will answer the second part of the question right away. I have not yet had the opportunity, but some of our colleagues have. For example, Igor Votintsev, a pilot at one of our design bureaus, flew a Mirage-2000 this year. True, it was from the rear seat, and perhaps he did not get the entire picture, but he flew nonetheless. Other pilots—one or two people—have flown in the F-18, but also not in all modes. Such an opportunity has not yet presented itself to me. Unfortunately, as soon as the conversation turned to such flights, and of course I want to fly modern aircraft, all sorts of organizational difficulties immediately arose. Either the State Department does not authorize it or it is the base, or the aircraft was broken. They all generally promise it, so I am still hoping. I would very much like to fly in the F-18 and F-14 aircraft, since these are carrier-based aircraft and, therefore, would be of the greatest interest for me.

As far as the impressions of foreign pilots who have flown in our aircraft are concerned, they all say that our aircraft are some of the better, if not the best. As a rule,
off the record they all note they have never flown on aircraft of this class. The aircraft is very simple to master in all its characteristics, and especially entry in the control loop. In essence, pre-flight preparation is done by an experienced pilot in half an hour, after which he get in and flies. With respect to the aircraft's characteristics: any pilot that has been able to reach the level of performing complex maneuvers in his training noted that he had never executed such a bank, such a loop, or such a maneuver in anything.

[Morozov] There have been reports in the press recently that we will no longer exhibit aircraft at international air shows since we have nothing more to show.

[Pugachev] The notion that we have nothing more to show is wrong. Every design bureau, including ours, has a serious potential and something to show and demonstrate. The very nature of the organization of shows is simply changing, since this involves certain costs. Whereas before we came under the flag of an aircraft exporter, now it is possible that we will come under the flag of "Sukhoi", and this requires a certain transition process and, accordingly, financing. But since difficulties are now arising with finances, participation in one or another show will be stipulated somehow. But our firm naturally considers participation in the shows to be absolutely necessary, since this is both a demonstration of our achievements on the world market and a way to establish new contacts, study the demand for the purpose of sales, and determine the directions of joint activities with representatives of other countries.

The experience of world shows is such that the leading firms, both foreign and ours, do not present a new aircraft every year. As a rule, the firms demonstrate aviation equipment that is already in series production. They may present their developments in the form of models, diagrams, and also development of some equipment or system or further modifications of their aircraft.

Thus, we have a whole series of future modification developments based on the Su-27 and Su-25 aircraft which make it possible to present them in an even more improved form.

[Morozov] I have also heard said that the computers being introduced for the fourth-generation aircraft sometimes take the place of the pilot so much that he is no longer always able to intervene and adjust the computer in the event of its failure. This supposedly was even the cause of certain aircraft accidents.

[Pugachev] Still, the times are such that aircraft will be increasingly computerized—both in terms of controlling them and in terms of weapons control. Aircraft of simple control configurations have already exhausted themselves, since such combat conditions are being created and such means of jamming and protecting against attack are being used that it is too much for a pilot to perform operations manually. Another thing is that the composition, reliability, and organization of aircraft and weapon control systems must be such that the operator can always make corrections to the aircraft's actions. That is, the pilot-aircraft system must be very precise. When malfunctions occur, there must be redundancy. So, the development of aviation will, apparently, proceed along this path.

[Morozov] Still, in my opinion, man's psyche is such that he must have confidence that at any moment he can disconnect the automatic system and assume control of the aircraft.

[Pugachev] Modern aircraft, among which we include the ship-based Su-27K aircraft, or advanced aircraft are all actually statically unstable, and the mechanical control system does not enable the pilot to control an unstable aircraft. Therefore, whether we like it or not, if we build aircraft of this configuration, they can only be computer-controlled. It may be redundant: three or four main control computer channels and then a back-up control channel, but all computerized. The pilot has the same control stick, throttle quadrant, and pedals, that is, everything is the same for the pilot as in a regular mechanical aircraft. The only difference is that everything that the pilot does with his hands, feet, and head is relayed to the controls by wire and not by linkage, and the computer ensures only the set characteristics for aircraft controllability.

[Morozov] One of the problems of our industry is that despite the splendid things designers think up, the quality of materials, component parts, and electronics sometimes does not make it possible to make a reality of a wonderful idea.

[Pugachev] Certainly, that problem does exist. But it is no secret that at a certain stage our electronics, if not in terms of the tasks to be accomplished then in weight characteristics, is inferior to foreign electronics. And excess weight is a serious problem for an aircraft. But there is hope that now in the era of restructuring all economic mutual relations it will be possible to make a jump forward, if only for individual directions of creating aviation systems. Obviously this will take time, since it is not all that easy to do.

[Morozov] In the future of creating new aircraft will there be anything to rival the "Pugachev Cobra"?

[Pugachev] I am absolutely sure of that. Such work is under way, and the "cobra" will be a tactical element for new aircraft.

[Morozov] In your opinion, will we develop carrier-based aviation further?

[Pugachev] As far as development of aircraft like the Su-27K is concerned, there are prospects for this from our viewpoint. A ship should carry not only combat vehicles but also aircraft which would make it possible to train a pilot and be put back into service after some interval, that is, trainer aircraft, but simultaneously fulfilling the functions of a tanker for example. On the high seas far from airfields, it is necessary to have an
aircraft that can refuel in the air aircraft returning from a mission when there is a delay in landing. We believe such an aircraft is needed, and we are working in this direction.

As far as the development of aircraft-carrier aviation in general is concerned, this will depend on whether or not we build aircraft carriers, since the requirements of one ship is determined by the number of aircraft on board and on land for training and maintaining flying personnel at constant combat readiness. For the time being it is hard to say what the fate of aircraft-carrying ships will be.

[Morozov] Viktor Georgiyevich, how long does it take for an Air Force pilot to convert to ship-based aircraft?

[Pugachev] You will not have to go far for an example. If you take the first pilots of Naval Aviation, T. Apakidze and A. Yakovlev, having experience in flying the Su-27 aircraft, they completed the training for conversion to the Su-27K in just over three months. However, one must push off here from the training level of the pilot. For Apakidze and Yakovlev, we set up a training program of approximately 50 flights, from the beginning to landing on a ship. This is roughly the same number of flights as the Americans use when training for landing on an aircraft carrier. I had the chance to meet with American instructors and as a result of the conversations, we learned more about how they train pilots, how much time is required to do this, and how they approach this, and our training plans roughly coincide. Just how long the conversion itself actually takes will depend to a greater extent on organization and how effectively it is worked out. With effective organization, if you take the rate of 50 flights per pilot and have him make 15 flights per week, training will take about one month.

[Morozov] The future of the OKB imeni P.O. Sukhoy is not just aircraft and surface-effect vehicles, but also hydrofoil craft. How did an aviation OKB get involved in the shipborne theme?

[Pugachev] If you look at the experience of foreign firms, such as Boeing, for example, they are involved in more than building aircraft. For our aviation industry and aviation OKB’s, building aircraft exclusively for decades was the priority. But that was the result of the system in which we lived. Now life is putting forth new tasks on the agenda which are associated both with conversion and simply with survival. Therefore, it is improper and inadvisable to be involved in developing only aircraft, the demand for which may be temporarily down right now. A design bureau has a very powerful scientific design potential that can work in fields close to aviation, say, aerodynamics and aerohydrodynamics. Our designers are capable of designing vessels. Against the background of the appearance of new mutual relations in society and the decrease in orders for combat aircraft and appropriations for them, much work is being done to create executive and passenger aircraft and passenger ships needed by the national economy. An example of this is the joint development of a supersonic executive aircraft by our OKB imeni P.O. Sukhoy and the American firm Gulfstream. The market is very big now, and to saturate it we need to create competitive aircraft and vessels and thus maybe become a leader in this direction.

We are already building prototypes of vessels which use new configurations and hydrofoils and surface effect, and have high speeds, comfortability, and reliability. There is enough work in this direction for everyone and possibly of some mutual interest.

[Morozov] The work of a test pilot involves increased risk. Have you found yourself in emergencies?

[Pugachev] The aircraft malfunctions which I have encountered perhaps cannot be considered to be out of the ordinary, although I sometimes had to make instantaneous and only correct decisions in order to keep out of a critical situation and to successfully complete the flight. But cases involving the loss of aircraft have avoided me, or I have avoided them.

Perhaps Nikolay Fedorovich Sadovnikov had the most difficult and trickiest instances during flight testing, which can be entered in the Guinness Book of Records. A fracture of the surface occurred during strength tests of an Su-27 aircraft. In essence, one-third, if not half, of the plane was torn off in the process of executing a maneuver, and pieces hit the vertical stabilizers, partially damaging them. Nevertheless, the aircraft remained controllable. One hydraulic system turned out to be undamaged, which enabled the pilot to bring the aircraft to the airfield. This is a unique case in the field of testing.

[Morozov] Viktor Georgiyevich, high-rated masters simply must leave apprentices to come after them. How do things stand with test pilots concerning this?

[Pugachev] We have no problem with this. Even using the tests of the Su-27K as an example. Originally, I was involved in this problem with N.F. Sadovnikov. Then, as aircraft appeared and as we moved to the ship, we trained three more pilots, who last year successfully carried out a testing program on the ship and are now ready to continue training flight personnel. So, the continuity is preserved—this is our life.

[Morozov] Viktor Georgiyevich, do you have any free time and how do you prefer to spend it?

[Pugachev] I can always find some free time if I wish, although the bulk of my day goes to work, particularly if I have to work away from the main base: on the Volga, in Crimea, and now probably in the North. Therefore, the day is spent basically performing those tasks which we are assigned. The time that is called leave, when officially given, I have devoted to skiing in the mountains. True, I have not had such an opportunity the last two years. So, there are difficulties both with daily life and with rest.
On the eve of Air Fleet Day, what would you like to wish naval pilots who are mastering ship-based aircraft?

Above all, I would like to wish that we be able to train a good group of carrier-based naval pilots. This task is very complex, since the demands placed on a pilot when making an approach and an arresting-gear landing and on the ship itself are very rigid. Therefore, the selection and training of pilots for a ship must be very serious in nature. For those whom we will teach, I want to wish a high degree of discipline, to always be in flying shape, and good luck.


Will Russia Remain a Great Maritime Power?
92UM1499A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 7, Jul 92 pp 3-8

[Article by Rear Admiral L. Belyshev, acting chief of shipbuilding and armament of the Navy and candidate of technical sciences: "Will Russia Remain a Great Maritime Power? (Military-Technical Policy and Shipbuilding)"

[Text] The historical orientation of domestic military shipbuilding has always reflected the political goals of our state and its economic capabilities.

Peter I was the first to understand the true role of the navy in ensuring the development of the economy and accomplishing political tasks of the Russian state. Subsequently, our history repeatedly confirmed the fact that without a strong navy, Russia could not have become one of the great powers of the world. However, development of our navy at all times was accompanied by aggressive propaganda by maritime states hostile to Russia with the idea that it was not advisable for such a large continental power also to have interests at sea. At the same time, it was during the periods when the navy was in a crisis state or was used insufficiently effectively due to underestimation of its importance and Russia experienced military defeats and often suffered defeats in wars, and its policy during peacetime did not achieve the necessary goals. Having learned another lesson, the Russian government took steps for most rapid development of a navy.

In the early 1950's, interpreting the experience of the recent war and taking into account the launching of the so-called scientific and technical revolution, the four main activities of which in military shipbuilding were nuclear weapons, 'missilization', nuclear energy, and wide-profile electronics, an attempt was undertaken in our country to justify a balanced composition of the Navy meeting the requirements of that time. At that time, in October 1955, a meeting of the members of the government and top-level personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy was held in Sevastopol under the leadership of N.S. Khrushchev to develop a concept of development of the navy for the coming decade.

In the candid exchange of opinions proposed by N.S. Khrushchev on problems of "What kind of a navy should there be?", at this meeting they planned to determine the prospects of its organizational development, as they say, from a "clean sheet" based on the premise that "past experience of forming the navy's combat assets is useless in the new conditions." The dynamics of discussion of individual fundamental tenets is interesting. In the beginning, N.S. Khrushchev stated his vision of the problem:

"...With modern means of detection, communication, and powerful missile weapons, can surface ships, given their large size, carry out their combat missions? Will surface ships become a burden?...

"The importance of artillery is changing with the development of missile weapons. Therefore, it is not advisable to develop shipborne and shore-based artillery...

"Modern armor does not protect against missile weapons...

"I believe in submarines. The submarine fleet and naval aviation must be made the main force for fighting at sea...

"Covering lines of communication requires creation of aircraft carriers for accomplishing anti-air warfare [AAW] missions. But this is not a near-term mission. It is possible and feasible to design and build for a start one aircraft carrier in order to gain experience to determine the procedure of their further construction, when this is required...

"We need seagoing antisubmarine warfare [ASW] ships equipped with sonar detection gear and rocket-propelled ASW weapons. We need to improve the ASW weapons of destroyers. These ships should have the ability to accomplish ASW and AAW missions effectively...

"We must resolve the question of building bases to accommodate ships with the necessary infrastructure to provide repair shops, power facilities from shore, and so forth. Special attention should be given to building an auxiliary fleet to support a dispersed basing of ships...

"Basic work to create new high-strength construction materials is of great importance...

"We need to build new dockyards. Then we will be able to create a strong navy in a short period of time..."

The USSR minister of defense at that time, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, expressed the following views:

"...In a future war, we will have to encounter an enemy who is strong at sea...

"Operations of fleet aviation and powerful missile weapons will be of decisive importance in war at sea..."
"We do not need to engage in a quantitative competition with a potential adversary for surface ships. The enemy is dependent on maritime transport movements..."

"We need a powerful submarine fleet to disrupt shipping..."

"Our submarine forces have still not been given the proper development. We must correct this situation immediately. The new submarines should have nuclear propulsion plants and powerful naval weapons...

"We must not entrust these missions to the surface fleet. It is unwise to set the task of reinforcing the surface fleet... Construction of new surface ships should be aimed at supporting the submarine fleet and cooperating with the ground forces... Preference should be given to building light high-speed cruisers armed with missiles, destroyers with short-range missiles, patrol combatants, submarine hunters, and minesweepers.

"We must have AAW ships for open theaters. We do not need to build aircraft carriers in the near future. Our strategic position is different compared to the potential adversary, for whom aircraft carriers are a vital requirement...

"We should not develop construction of amphibious warfare vessels. Their use may be auxiliary in nature..."

Other proposals expressed by representatives of the Navy participating in the meeting are also of interest:

"...The composition of the navy should be such that it corresponds to the missions assigned. It must comprehensively accomplish these missions through diversity of the classes of ships being created and the general-purpose nature of their armament...

"We need fast nuclear-powered submarines armed with missiles and long-range torpedoes and a large submarine fleet. Of the surface ships we must build light aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers and provide for specialization of ships for ASW and AAW... It is impossible to imagine the navy of the future without aircraft carriers and carriers of fighter and strike aviation...

"Power for submarines should be supplied by nuclear propulsion plants; gas-turbine plants and missiles, and ASW helicopters...

"Among the promising types of weapons that should be developed are sonar detection gear, navigation systems, ASW torpedoes and missiles, and ASW helicopters...

"We must retain the ships with existing artillery, work on the possibility of refitting conventional gun-armed cruisers in order to install missile systems...

"There is a serious gap between the pace of building submarines and other ships compared to the construction of bases and ship-basing infrastructure...

"Development of new equipment and armament changes the nature of future maritime operations. We must conduct serious research and studies..."

Subsequent experience of building and developing our navy, as well as the navies of the leading NATO countries, showed the fairness and farsightedness of the collective wisdom of naval experts. Already then the concept of creating aircraft-carrying ships as the most effective combat assets for ensuring combat stability of naval forces and accomplishing other specific missions was making its way into the world.

However, this period was also characterized by many voluntaristic actions. Decisions concerning the surface fleet and shipboard gun armament and the halting of work to improve ship armor and underwater protection had far-reaching negative consequences for the Navy. By decision of Khrushchev and the military leadership at that time, they began destroying earlier built ships, aircraft, combat equipment, and weapons because they did not correspond to the assumed scenario of a future war. This was exacerbated by the dissipation of skilled personnel and the loss of experience and many technologies. Attempts to justify other positions were abruptly cut short.

It is significant that the United States resolved a similar problem of qualitative renovation of its navy in the late 1950's and early 1960's in a more weighted manner.

Nevertheless, by the early 1960's we had begun building an ocean-going navy with priority on nuclear submarines with missile and torpedo armament. Somewhat later we formulated the concept of building new surface ships, in particular, guided-missile and aircraft-carrying cruisers, destroyers, ASW and patrol ships, minesweepers, and others. The first of them were the Leninskiy Komsomol class Project 627 nuclear submarines (1958), Groznyy class Project 58 guided-missile cruisers (1962), Komso-molets of Ukraine class Project 61 large ASW ships with gas-turbine propulsion plants (1962), Moscow class Project 1123 ASW cruisers (1967), Project 56 destroyers, certain classes of patrol boats (Project 35 and 159) and small ASW ships (Project 204), and also Project 266 and 257 ocean and coastal minesweepers, and others.

The need for our Navy to go to the oceans was caused by the appearance of the potential enemy's nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines and modernization of his aircraft carriers, making it possible to make strategic nuclear strikes against our country from unprecedented distances of several thousand kilometers; keeping disruption of enemy maritime shipping as an important mission; and also the ability to accomplish independent missions in a general nuclear war.

The United States constantly tried to surpass us in the use of nuclear technologies. Thus, the first nuclear-power submarine entered service in the United States in 1953 and in our country in 1958. In 1967, when the first nuclear-power missile-armed submarine was built in the USSR, comparable in characteristics to the American..."
George Washington class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines [SSBN's], the U.S. Navy already had several submarines of this class. Similar ships were built in Great Britain and France. The exertion of our entire country was required to eliminate this lag, when, as we know today, “peace was hanging by a thread.”

By having means of nuclear deterrence, including nuclear-powered missile-armed and attack submarines, the USSR prevented escalation of conflicts in the cold war and halted implementation of plans by the United States to use nuclear weapons during the war in Southeast Asia.

Our Navy reached its greatest might by the early 1980’s. At that time the construction programs of the Navy called for creating ships of virtually all classes and types being developed in the West. However, unlike the navies of NATO countries, which were developed on the base of integration and cooperation between nations (in particular, the United States builds only an ocean-going fleet; Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium ensure development of ASW forces; Germany, Turkey, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal specialize in ships for closed theaters of military operations and so forth), within the framework of the former Warsaw Pact we were forced to be “responsible” for everything by ourselves. Therefore, achieving actual parity in the 1970’s with the combat potential of the navies of the NATO countries required significant spending by our country. But, in the final analysis, it was the presence of that parity that was the incentive to search for paths towards mutual understanding and agreements on arms limitations and later reductions and conclusion of peace treaties on security and cooperation. And this should not be forgotten.

There is an opinion being spread that we had unlimited financing, first-class technology, the best personnel, and the highest organization in creating ships, armament, and military equipment. In actuality, this is far from true. First of all, there were strict limitations on budget appropriations, and the shortage of production and technological capabilities of our industry was keenly felt. Therefore, the military-strategic parity achieved was ensured by: unified state organization of work being conducted; strict and systematic control of deadlines and quality of the work being performed; the civil and patriotic duty of the creators of the ships, armament, and military equipment; close cooperation of scientists and engineers of industrial organizations, the Academy of Sciences, military institutes, and testing ranges; and a system of state incentives and recognition in society of the accomplishments and labor of those involved in this work.

At this stage of development of shipbuilding, we were in the lead in questions of creating and building comprehensively automated high-speed nuclear-powered torpedo-armed submarines; building the world’s largest amphibious and skag surface-effect ships; and creating combat nuclear-powered submarines with a diving depth of up to 1000 meters. We were the first to introduce a gas-turbine propulsion plant on ships. Type “P” supersonic cruise missiles, large high-speed ASW hydrofoils, and amphibious and guided-missile surface-effect vehicles. These levels have still not been achieved abroad in some areas. Our ships traditionally have the world’s highest combat payload, that is, they have a greater saturation of weapons and armament than foreign analogs.

Thus, military-strategic parity of naval arms was achieved not by “gross output,” as some would have you believe, but by the high qualitative parameters of our ships, which on the whole conformed to the highest world standards.

At the same time, we began to lag behind world achievements for a number of parameters, primarily in the area of electronics and automated systems, in the production of nonmetallic materials, weight and size characteristics of individual shipboard systems, and silencing our nuclear-powered submarines.

We entered the 1980’s with a fairly logical and relatively balanced program of military shipbuilding. However, certain difficulties arose during its implementation. The main one was the worldwide trend of a sharp increase in the labor-intensity and cost of building ships. As a result, our Navy had an increase in the percentage of aging ships with a decreased combat effectiveness. Nevertheless, they required considerable expenditures to keep them in service, in some cases even comparable to the costs of creating new ones.

Another thing characteristic of the 1980’s was the need for massive withdrawal for salvage of ships built in the 1950’s and 1960’s, when the Navy was energetically replenished with them after its huge reduction during the Khrushchev period. This was a distinctive “demographic echo,” since ships serve 20-25 years. Both of these circumstances served as reasons to reduce the number of ships in the Navy. In addition, the political and economic events in our country in recent years to a considerable extent influenced the intensification of this process.

Today the average age of the forces afloat is about 15 years, that is, 60 percent of the ships are in the second half of their life cycle. Therefore, the slowdown and in a number of cases the refusal to build ships make the prospects of preserving the combat readiness of the Navy in the near future problematic.

It was always difficult, but in the current period of radical reforms it is especially difficult to forecast what the world will be like in 10 years, much less in 20-30 years. The ships being built today are to serve until the year 2020, and the large ships (like aircraft-carrying cruisers) until the year 2030. However, it is clear that although the elements of domestic and foreign policy and the economy change, the strategic goals of states generally remain the same. And war has still not been excluded from the arsenal of political means. Therefore,
it is necessary to be prepared for it and not be deluded by some statements by today's political leaders about the desire for peace. An example of that is the orderliness and consistency of implementation of the shipbuilding program of leading countries of the West, which are making up for the certain quantitative decrease in the number of new ships being commissioned by increasing their combat capabilities considerably.

At all times, ensuring national security, including from maritime axes, was one of the most important directions of the activities of any state. Significant in this respect is a statement by a representative of the U.S. military-political leadership, made after a collision between an American and our nuclear-powered submarine in the territorial waters of Russia in the Barents Sea in February of this year. He noted that despite the significant changes in the military-political situation in the world and the development of a new stage of mutual relations with CIS countries, conducting reconnaissance and monitoring the activities of CIS armed forces continue to remain one of the basic tasks facing the American Armed Forces in the interests of ensuring U.S. national security.

It is assumed that the increase in the role of naval forces in the system of armed forces of many states will also influence the views of the leadership of our state.

In the former state formation, the USSR had planned, for the 13th Five-Year Plan and up to the year 2000, to build ships under a reduced shipbuilding program while retaining the pace of creating a scientific and technical reserve for development of the forces afloat through qualitative improvement. However, lately a trend has developed in Russia towards decreasing appropriations for defense, including for the Navy, by an average of 8-10 percent during the first years. This corresponded to the new thinking in the area of defense and the assessment of a decrease in the threat of war, and also made it possible to conduct a planned restructuring of the defense industry to produce civilian products. But, as both our and western experts estimate, 8-10 percent conversion of military industry per year is the maximum amount, without noticeable detriment to an enterprise's economic indicators, that one can restructure its production lines, ensure a supply of raw materials and documentation for the new product, train personnel, and adjust an enterprise's technical services. With reference to shipbuilding, at a conversion rate of more than 15 percent a year there occurs a "closing" of shipways by the ships being built in them, collapse of production, loss of produced technology, and a breakup of labor collectives. On the other hand, there are maximum amounts of reducing appropriations for shipbuilding in a long-term cycle of their creation, taking into account the ratio of expenditures for their completion to the expenditures for salvaging the process stock if construction is halted. Here the maximum permissible decrease in expenditures for construction is also 15 percent.

However, despite this, already in 1992 the amount of financing of military shipbuilding is already decreasing at a rate exceeding these permissible limits severalfold. In these conditions, we will be able only partially to finance the delivery program for the next few years, considerably limit the amount of work on ships to be delivered in subsequent years, and actually stop work on a number of important projects and directions. Today it is hard to predict the consequences and damage suffered by the shipbuilding sector, the Navy's combat effectiveness, and the fate of professional cadres of science, industry, and the military.

You see, just the shipyards building submarines, in order to switch to civilian production, must tear down the existing industrial equipment for making cylindrical hulls and installing systems and mechanisms in them and in their place create new equipment for planar structures. This will take not only years but also huge amounts of money. However, conversion is particularly hard on enterprises that make naval weapons.

On the whole, conversion, like any kind of restructuring, requires well thought-out and weighed decisions based on design studies and research. For the time being, we do not have such a balanced program in the area of shipbuilding, but voluntarism and the "voice of destruction" are dominant and can throw us back decades. At the same time, in the United States there is some planned reduction of the Navy, but by active commissioning of qualitatively new ships—nuclear-powered attack aircraft carriers, Arleigh Burke class destroyers, Sea Wolf class nuclear-powered submarines (new generation), and others—the total combat potential will increase 1.5-fold by the year 2000. Overall, American policy in the area of national defense is still based on the principle of strength. Following in the course of the American policy, the military-political leadership of England and France is also showing the intention to have highly effective naval forces by the year 2000.

The attempts to divide our Navy and the progressive collapse of the established cooperation and integration in construction and maintaining its combat readiness are very alarming against this background. Although about two-thirds of the shipbuilding potential of the former USSR is concentrated on the territory of Russia, turbine construction has basically developed in Ukraine, the production of ASW weapons in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, navigation equipment in Azerbaijan, and so forth. Therefore, even a temporary breakdown of this cooperation will lead to the collapse of both civilian and military shipbuilding. Consequently, it is in the national defense interests of each CIS member to preserve this cooperation.

It must also be noted that the Navy's share of the Ministry of Defense budget in our country has not exceeded 12-15 percent, while in the United States and England it is 2-3 times higher. But even in today's situation of a sharp reduction of budget funds for defense and removal of army units transferred to the jurisdiction of the republics from unified financing, this percentage has remained unchanged, which does not
The formation of the Navy of Ukraine will not be the Transitional Period, to set about establishing them. We believe that this process will take until mid-1993. Following the signing of the agreement in Yalta I would like very much for everyone to understand that each of us, regardless of where he works or what he does, has been given the opportunity to build our home without clarifying who won and who lost. The main victory lies in the fact that such an agreement has been signed, one in conformity with the situation which has developed in Ukraine and in the Crimea and in the Black Sea Fleet. The agreement needs to be worked out in detail and requires well-conceived, specific mechanisms for its implementation, clarification and the establishment of intermediate target dates.

We consider Article I of the Agreement to be the most important. In it the parties to the agreement affirm the decision to create the Navy of Russia and the Navy of Ukraine out of the Black Sea Fleet. This has provided broad possibilities, beginning on 1 October of this year following the signing of the Agreement on the Status of the Transitional Period, to set about establishing them. We believe that this process will take until mid-1993. The formation of the Navy of Ukraine will not be completed until the end of 1995. This is of fundamental importance, since it conforms to the Dagomys and Yalta agreements and to the concept for building the Navy of Ukraine.

The joint command element which has been established will create realistic possibilities for establishing the command and control posts, command posts and headquarters for directing the forces and setting up the two autonomous structures of command and control.

What sort of transitional period is envisioned? It can be broken down hypothetically into three phases.

The following is to be accomplished during the first phase (from 1 October of this year to 1 July 1993):

- ascertainment and confirmation in separate agreements of the list of forces to become a part of the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation (by 1 January 1993);
- the creation of a joint command element in the Black Sea Fleet, which will include fleet command posts, command and control components, departments and command posts of the tactical formations;
- the transfer of forces to the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation, and a decision on personnel transfers (by July 1994);

The second phase (from 1 July 1993 to 1 July 1994) will involve the following:

- refinement of the operations of the command element, staffs, command posts, command and control components, departments and personnel in the day-to-day functioning and in the process of preparing to go to sea;
- the formation and development of the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation.

The third phase (from 1 July 1994 to 1 July 1995) involves the following:

- refinement of the functioning of commanders, staffs, command posts and personnel for achieving the highest level of combat readiness and executing missions at sea, independently and jointly;
- working out the command and control missions peculiar to the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation by the forces and the command and control elements.

A commander must be appointed by consensus of the presidents to command the forces during the transitional period. He will be subordinate to the two presidents. The military council is to include an equal number of representatives from both parties. It is also important to fulfill the article which states that at the time the agreement is signed the Black Sea Fleet is withdrawn from the CIS OVS [Joint Armed Forces] and is placed under the immediate command of the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
It is essential during the transitional period immediately to begin working out the operations involved in command and control of the forces, setting up an information exchange system, compiling and implementing the appropriate documents.

The manning of the units and ships is an important element during the transitional period. It has been decided to do this on an equal basis: 50 percent from one side, the same from the other. Officers and warrant officers will themselves decide which fleet they want to serve in. Workers in the fleet's personnel system will handle the selection of servicemen, taking into account their decision to continue serving either in the Navy of Ukraine or in the Navy of the Russian Federation. The procedure for transferring must be as simple as possible: a request, a recommendation, a commission and the order. It is important to note that the organic structures of the Navy of Ukraine correspond to the organic structures of the Black Sea Fleet.

The question of the oath immediately arises. The procedure has been defined for recruits. They take an oath to the state of which they are citizens. But what about the officers and warrant officers?

We feel that during the transitional period servicemen may take the oath after they become members of the Navy of Ukraine and are assigned to units or ships. Each of them can make a voluntary choice until the end of 1995. The individual must have the right to choose and must be protected from reprisals. That is why the transitional period is being introduced. If a serviceman goes against his conscience and takes the oath under duress and not out of personal conviction, he will not be a better soldier for it and will not be ideologically persuaded. There is no question about that. The natural desire of the individual deciding to serve the people of Ukraine must be the only source of compulsion.

What is to become of those who have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine but are still not members of the independent state's armed forces? This must be resolved in a separate decision defining the status of those taking the oath. What will that status be? It is our profound conviction that the rights of those who have taken the oath must not be infringed upon in any way and they must not be assigned to the Navy of Ukraine without coordinating it with the parties involved. It is also important to note that the laws of the independent state extend to personnel of the Black Sea Fleet serving in Ukraine as citizens of Ukraine during the transitional period, since this is the territory of a sovereign and independent state.

What is the main principle underlying the manning of the Navy of Ukraine? It first of all involves a willingness to serve the people of Ukraine, professional expertise and organizing skills, and not a knowledge of the language. The fact that this is so is demonstrated by the composition of our organizing group for the Navy of Ukraine, in which there are many Russians, some who still do not have an adequate mastery of the Ukrainian language. The transition to the use of the Ukrainian language will be effected in the process of the combat training. We have set up special courses to help servicemen learn it. We believe that a knowledge of the language is first of all a path to self-improvement and not to the stricturing of different ethnic groups, and that it will have a positive effect upon the personnel work. And so, even if an officer decides to continue his service in the Navy of Ukraine, no one will force him to speak Ukrainian right away.

What flag will the fleet fly when it goes to sea? There are various suggestions. I shall not enumerate them. I believe, however, that during the transitional period the former naval flag should be retained or the ships should fly the flag of the state of their port of registry.

Now a few words about the basing of the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation. Article 8 of the Yalta Agreement states that during the transitional period the parties to the agreement will jointly use the existing basing and material support system. This reflects a gesture of good will by Ukraine. The rights of and respect for the sovereignty of the independent state of Ukraine, which has a right to the infrastructure and territorial integrity, must be observed.

The fact that the provision in Article 9 of the Yalta Agreement which states that the parties to the agreement are to ensure the civil, political, economic and social rights of servicemen, is not being fully observed today is a cause of special concern. Officers, warrant officers and extended-duty personnel who have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine or who support Ukraine's position with respect to the establishment of its own Navy continue to be transferred to the authority of the commander of the Navy of Ukraine. This creates additional tensions and does not promote observance of the provisions contained in the agreement. More accurately, it is a violation of the latter.

In order to prevent the social rights of servicemen of both the Navy of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet from being infringed upon, we are therefore proposing the following:

—a halt to all personnel transfers until the agreement on the status of the transitional period is signed;

—the establishment of permanent commissions to monitor the observance of social and legal standards for servicemen during the establishment of the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation, which would include representatives of law-enforcement agencies;

—the establishment of interaction with public organizations, primarily the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen under the Cabinet of ministers of Ukraine and the officers' unions of Ukraine and the Crimea:
—the joint development and implementation of measures to stabilize the social and psychological climate;

—holding strictly accountable those commanders and chiefs who violate the agreement adopted.

There is no doubt that these measures would provide legal protection for the servicemen and help to create a normal situation in the Black Fleet and the Crimea.

This is only a small part of what is being proposed by way of implementing the Yalta Agreement. One may accept or reject the proposals, but today we must cast aside petty peeves and emotions and take a constructive approach to the possibility of continuing to cooperate in the area of establishing the Navy of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet, where the main focus must be concern for the people and the achievement of a peaceful life for the fraternal peoples of Ukraine and Russia. Only this approach will enable us to resolve all of the problems facing us today in the spirit of the Yalta Agreement.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Yeltsin Ordinance on Social Protection

92UM1457B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep 92 p 6

[Text]

RUSSIAN FEDERATION PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCE

Measures for Social Protection of Servicemen, Enlisted and Command Personnel of Internal Affairs Agencies, Pensioners and Individual Categories of Citizens

1. Hereby declared is extension of the provisions of RSFSR Presidential Ukase No 298 of 18 December 1991 and Russian Federation Ukases No 208 of 29 February 1992, No 321 of 31 March 1992, and No 515 of 21 May 1992, on social guarantees and population protection for commissioned officers; warrant officers of the Army and Navy; servicemen in conscript service; enlisted and command personnel of internal affairs agencies and persons who served in their ranks and are now on pension; unemployed family members of the indicated categories of servicemen; laborers and white collar workers of military units, institutions, military schools, enterprises and organizations; secondary-level students and students (nonmilitary) enrolled in vocational and technical schools and specialized secondary schools of the Russian Ministry of Defense located on the soil of the Russian Federation; the Russian MVD, Russian Ministry of Security, FAPSI [Federal Agency for Governmental Communications and Information], Russian SVR [External Intelligence Service], Main Security Administration of the Russian Federation; military units, institutions, military schools, enterprises and organizations of the Russian Ministry of Defense located on the soil of states that previously were USSR Union republics and are not now a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States; and Border Troops of the Baltic and Transcaucasus Border Districts under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

2. Eligible for monetary benefits are the following categories of women in military service:

—those on partially-compensated leave; entitlement is for the receipt of monthly payments for care of a child until the latter attains the age of 18 months, with the amount of payment as set for working mothers credited with one year of work;

—those on leave granted for care of a child until the latter attains the age of three years; monthly compensation is to be paid in the amount set for mothers at the entry level into enterprises, institutions and organizations, with leave granted for care of a child until the latter attains the age of three years.

3. To be instituted, beginning with 1 January 1992, for the benefit of unemployed wives of servicemen (with the exception of conscripted servicemen) stationed on hardship posts and locations characterized by a lack of employment opportunities, is a system of monthly compensatory payments in amounts set for unemployed wives of enlisted and command personnel of internal affairs agencies.

The criteria for listing military units, subunits, institutions, military schools, enterprises and organizations as hardship posts characterized as lacking employment opportunities for wives of servicemen and of enlisted and command personnel of internal affairs agencies are to be determined by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian MVD, Russian Ministry of Security, and the FAPSI, working in concert with the Russian Ministry of Labor and the Russian Ministry of Finance.

4. The Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian MVD, Russian Ministry of Security, FAPSI, Russian SVR, and Main Security Administration of the Russian Federation are to provide financing of the measures called for by this Ordinance, within the limits of the general appropriations earmarked on the basis of estimates derived by the above-mentioned ministries and departments.

[Signed] B. YELTSIN, president of the Russian Federation

2 September 1992

No 481-rp
Russian Resolution on Military Housing
92UM1457A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep p 6

[Russian Federation Decree No 604 dated 20 August 1992: Urgent Measures for Provision of Housing to Servicemen and Persons Discharged from Military Service and Their Dependents]

[Text]

DECREE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION GOVERNMENT

No 604, 20 August 1992, Moscow

Urgent Measures for Provision of Housing to Servicemen and Persons Discharged from Military Service and Their Dependents

To provide servicemen and persons discharged from military service and their dependents with housing in 1992 and to fulfill Russian Federation Presidential Ukase No 796 of 21 July 1992, On Additional Measures for the Financing of Construction and Availability of Housing for Servicemen, the government of the Russian Federation does hereby decree:

1. To declare that the construction and availability of housing for servicemen (commissioned officer personnel, warrant officers of the Army and Navy, and extended-duty personnel) presently serving on active duty or discharged from military service into the reserve or into retirement for reasons of illness, manpower reduction, or poor health, and for persons subject to resettlement from limited-access and special-purpose military installations, are to be made on the basis of monies set aside for capital investment for these purposes in the budgetary system of the Russian Federation, by non-budgetary funds generated by the use and sale of military equipment and combat materiel taken out of service by the Armed Forces in the reduction process or generated by other economic activity carried out by enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, and by other sources, to include personal funds of citizens.

2. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy are to make available to Russian Federation republic executive organs of state authority of krays, oblasts, autonomous areas, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, funds in addition to those designated in the Russian Federation republic budget for 1992, to accomplish the following:

—to erect new housing for servicemen discharged from military service into the reserve or retirement, and for persons undergoing resettlement from military installations; and to cover existing indebtedness, in the amount of 16 billion rubles;

—to accomplish the 1992 task of provision of the planned amount of total housing accommodation to border troops personnel in accordance with Addendum No 1, in the amount of 0.6 billion rubles.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy are to make available, on an annual basis in the 1993-1995 period, to Russian Federation executive organs of state authority of krays, oblasts, autonomous areas, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, capital funds for the construction of housing for border troop personnel in the total amounts required to provide housing in accordance with Addendum No 1 to this Decree.

3. That Russian Federation executive organs of state authority of krays, oblasts, autonomous areas, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, are to provide, by means of the established procedure, housing for the following military personnel:

—those discharged from military service into the reserve or retirement for reasons of illness, manpower reduction, or poor health, in the volumes specified in Addendum No 2;

—those on active duty and part-time duty, in accordance with Addendum No 3;

—border troops, by request of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, in accordance with Addendum No 1 to this Decree.

It is declared that at least 60 percent of the total housing space specified in Addendum No 2 to this Decree will be ready for occupancy in 1992, with 40 percent to be made available in the first six months of 1993.

4. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russian Federation Ministry of Security, Russian Federation External Intelligence Service, Federal Communications and Information Agency at the President of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation Main Security Administration, Russian Federation Ministry of Architecture, Construction, and Communal Services (Main Administration of Railroads), assure in 1992 the construction and availability for servicemen on active duty and persons subject to resettlement from limited-access and special-purpose military installations, housing in the total spatial amount specified in Addendum No 3 to this Decree.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy are to make available in 1992 the funds indicated for ministries and departments as called for in the Russian Federation republic budget for this year, to be used for the construction and availability of housing and personal service facilities for servicemen, in the amount of 26.5 billion rubles, to be distributed as specified in Addendum No 4.

5. That the assignment in 1992 of 43.1 billion rubles for the express purpose of the construction and availability of housing and personal service facilities as called for by this Decree are to be financed by additional application...
of revenues received by the Russian Federation budgetary system as a part of housing construction, as provided for in the Russian Federation 1992 republic budget.

6. To recommend that the Russian Federation republic executive organs of state authority of krays, oblasts, autonomous areas, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, working in concert with the Committee on Social Security for Servicemen at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, undertake the following:

—measures relative to receiving, land allotment, and resettling of troops undergoing withdrawal from Eastern Europe, Mongolia, the Baltic states, and the Transcaucasus;

—assistance to servicemen in locating schools and preschool facilities for children and employment for wives of servicemen and of persons released from active military duty;

—provide temporary housing for homeless servicemen on active duty or those released from active duty into the reserve or retirement for reasons of age, illness, manpower reduction, or poor health who are not assigned housing within three months following their request for housing in their chosen area;

—pay compensation on a monthly basis to servicemen discharged into the reserve or retirement for reasons of age, illness, manpower reduction, or poor health, and who are not assigned housing in their chosen area within three months following their request, with the monies to come out of the respective budgets, in an amount not less than 350 rubles a month, to cover the cost of subrental (rental) of temporary housing.

7. That the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, working in concert with the Committee on Social Security for Servicemen at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, take into account, in the process of determining a line of credit, aspects of social protection and resettlement of servicemen on active duty or those discharged from service for reasons of age, illness, manpower reduction, or poor health, and for these servicemen's dependents.

8. RSFSR Council of Ministers Order No 333-rs of 27 March 1990 is hereby declared to be null and void.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

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The amounts of housing space assigned for use by military personnel, and the attendant funds for special financing, are specified in Addenda Nos 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Addendum No 1 calls for making available in the period 1992-1995 housing space for Russian Federation Border Troops personnel in the amount of 51,200 square meters.

Addendum No 2 stipulates that, in the period 1992-1993, servicemen (commissioned officer personnel, warrant officers of the Army and Navy, and extended-service personnel) discharged into the reserve or retirement for reasons of age, illness, manpower reduction, or poor health, be provided with a total of 2,097,900 square meters of housing.

Servicemen on active duty and persons subject to resettlement from limited-access and special-purpose military installations are entitled to the provisions of Addendum No 3, which sets the amount of housing space to be made available on the basis of centralized financing (in accordance with the plans drawn up by ministries and departments of the Russian Federation, Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian MVD, Main Directorate of Railroad Troops at the Russian Minstroy, Russian Ministry of Security) and part-time service, in the amount of 3,798,040 square meters.

It is planned (Addendum No 4) to make available to servicemen in 1992 additional monies for construction and assignment of housing and personal service facilities, in the amount of 23.3 billion rubles.

The above-mentioned program is to be carried out by action of ministries and departments of Russia, the Russian Federation republic, krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The process of establishing an army and navy continues in Ukraine. One of the most important aspects of the development of the armed forces is that of creating a military training system. This is being done by restructuring the present military educational institutions in Ukraine.


Until August 1991 the military schools in the city of Sevastopol were subordinate to the commander in chief of the Navy of the USSR (Article 3 of the Statute on VUZs established by Order No. 350 in 1983). These schools were never a part of the Black Sea Fleet and were not subordinate to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, by his own decision assumed command of the Sevastopol VVMIU [Higher Naval Engineering School], the Black Sea VVMU [Higher Naval School] imeni P.S. Nakhimov and the 55th Naval Officers’ School in Izmail in July 1992, however. As a result, Order No. 123 was issued by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on 15 July 1992, declaring the actions of Admiral I.V. Kasatonov to have no legal force and the Sevastopol VVMUs and 55th Naval Officers’ School to be subordinate to the Director of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has financed these schools since January 1992. Cadets admitted in 1992 are mainly citizens of Ukraine (more than 80 percent).

Under a decision of the Defense Council of Ukraine of 4 June 1992, Decree No. 490, passed by the Cabinet of Ministers on 19 August 1992, and Order No. 133, issued by the minister of defense of Ukraine on 25 July 1992, the Sevastopol VVMUs are presently included in plans for restructuring the military training system in Ukraine.

Under this plan commissions have been sent by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to the Sevastopol VVMUs to do the certification and verify their readiness for the new academic year. They are headed by V.L. Pilipchuk, deputy chief of the Military Training Directorate, and Colonel V.V. Leonov, chief of the 1st Department and deputy chief of the Military Training Directorate.

The work has been started and is proceeding in a calm and businesslike atmosphere at the Sevastopol VVMIU. At the Black Sea VVMU imeni P.S. Nakhimov Rear Admiral V.A. Denisenkov, chief of the school, is creating obstacles to the commission’s functioning in violation of regulations of the armed forces, the order of the minister of defense of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine.

This illegal action was supported by Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. He rudely demanded that Colonel V.L. Pilipchuk report to him immediately. Colonel V.L. Pilipchuk, commission chairman, refused, declaring that he was subordinate to the minister of defense of Ukraine and was on the territory of his own native Ukraine. Admiral I.V. Kasatonov responded with verbal abuse and threatened physical reprisal. This tense atmosphere is complicating the commission’s functioning and disrupting the plan for the restructuring of military training in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Officers’ Union appreciates the restraint and legal actions of Colonel V.L. Pilipchuk and believes that the command element of the Black Sea Fleet is continuing the anti-Ukrainian policy with respect to the fleet.

Here we have a flouting of international standards and the insolent ignoring of interstate agreements signed by Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian Officers’ Union regards the actions of Admiral I.V. Kasatonov as a crime against the people of Ukraine and its state structures.

We consider it our duty to speak out in defense of the Ukraine’s state interests and of our comrades, and we therefore appeal to the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, the minister of defense of Ukraine and to all political parties and public organizations of Ukraine resolutely to rebuff the instigative and adventuristic actions of Admiral I.V. Kasatonov and those around him, which are destabilizing the situation in the fleet and the Crimea and are an attempt to set the Ukrainian and Russian peoples against one another.

The Ukrainian Officers’ Union feels that competent bodies must assess these events in accordance with the laws of Ukraine and demands the removal of Admiral I.V. Kasatonov from his position and rapid development of the procedure for appointing a commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

Hurrah for Ukraine!
Withdrawal of Russian Troops Remains a Sticky Problem in Dniester Region

92UM1468A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Valentin Stebelev: "The Tiraspol Mousetrap; The 14th Army is the Cornerstone in Relations Between Chisinau and Moscow"]

[Text] Moldova is demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops. In the Dniester Region they are collecting signatures for a petition to the Russian leadership not to pull out the troops from their territory. Some 64,000 persons have already signed.

At the same time, the Chief of the Defense Directorate of the Dniester Region, Maj Gen Sh. Kitsak has stated that if the withdrawal of the 14th Army starts, Tiraspol will be abandoned by only a portion of the staff officers as their documents have not been moved. About 1,000 families of officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] reside in Tiraspol alone.

At present one must not speak about the 14th Combined Arms Army as a viable organism. As a result of the "dividing" of the USSR Armed Forces, only one-third of it remains, and this previously was stationed on the left bank of the Dniester and in Bendery. The units include: the Staff of the 14th Army itself, the 59th Guards Antiaircraft Missile and a helicopter, were shifted from Kramatorsk Motorized Rifle Division, a missile brigade and separate different units for combat and rear support. The total size of the army is a little more than 5,000 men.

In truth, with the arrival of Gen A. Lebed the situation in the troops has begun to change. Two regiments, an antiaircraft missile and a helicopter, were shifted from Ukraine to the territory of the Dniester Region. In addition a battalion of airborne troops arrived from Belgorod. In considering that previously an antiaircraft missile regiment with Osa and Kub systems had been stationed in Tiraspol and that many of the officers from it have served in Syria, it can be said that at present a highly effective air defense system has been created on the Left Bank.

It is no accident that the Dniester Region residents link their security with just the 14th Army.

Moscow more and more is inclined to the notion of withdrawing the army. But, in speaking about withdrawal, the politicians understand a mechanical transfer of equipment and men from one place to another often unprepared to receive the troops. There is already the lamentable experience of the withdrawal of the armed forces from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary and Poland. Now this flood is coming from the countries of the former USSR.

A majority of the Slav officers who were servicemen in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and also Moldova have been guided strictly by "apartment" interests and not by any notion of a local national idea. What can one say in such an instance about the personnel of the 14th Army and which in its predominant majority consists of natives of the Dniester Region or persons who have no place to go? They certainly will not move anywhere but will take the oath of loyalty to the Dniester Republic, as was mentioned by Sh. Kitsak. Certainly it was this that caused the officers of the 14th Army to turn to the Russian President with a request that the army be left at its former place.

In seeing the army as their protector, the people of the Left Bank try not to allow its departure. If the order is issued to the troops for withdrawal, then they will not be able to take the equipment with them.

The women's committees of the Left Bank have repeatedly stated that they will block all roads leading to the military airfield on the outskirts of the city as well as to the rail station. These are far from idle threats. The women have already cut the rail line twice in demanding the carrying out of political slogans. If one looks at things in a completely realistic manner, then it must be admitted that all the combat weapons will remain in the Dniester Region. The troop units are constantly picketed by the local population which is perfectly informed on the movement of each unit of combat equipment.

In Tiraspol among the officers of the 14th Army, the sad joke is making the rounds: If Russia intends to withdraw us, then the Dniester Republic will receive an entire Dniester Division instead of the Dniester Battalion which it has. There is a grain of truth in every joke. How much here is humor and how much harsh reality is up to the politicians and the military to figure out. But if the Russian Army leaves the Dniester Region, the situation possibly in time and possibly immediately can be exacerbated. This circumstance must be considered by all the principals and forces interested in peace in Moldova.

Status of 201st Motorized-Rifle Division

93UM0009A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Anatoliy Ladin and Aleksandr Pelts and Valeriy Zhukov of the KhOVAR Agency under the rubric "Hot Spots": "Tajikistan: The Accusations Against Servicemen Continue"]

[Text] As we could have predicted, one of the opposing groupings in Tajikistan only has to achieve the slightest "success," and the blame is immediately placed upon... the Russian military.

This is exactly what happened following the Sunday clashes in Kurgan-Tyube.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported the details of the latest seizure of equipment from one Russian regiment.
Nonetheless, the accusations against Russian troops continue. On 28 September the Presidium of the Republic of Tajikistan issued a resolution on the formation of a government commission to investigate the seizure of military equipment from units of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, signed by Akbarsho Iskandarov, speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Tajikistan. The resolution states that the commission is to thoroughly investigate cases of the theft of combat equipment and the circumstances surrounding them, and, if there is evidence that servicemen are to blame, they are to be held accountable under the law.

We can see that the situation of division forces is growing increasingly worse. The armed groupings are not abandoning their attempts to capture equipment and weapons from the two regiments stationed at Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube. They operate brazenly, using the threat of death for hostages they have taken. All indications are that the official authorities are unable to control the situation in the areas of the military clashes.

At the headquarters of the 201st motorized Rifle Division it was reported to our correspondent that the overall situation in the deployment area of the Russian regiments was calm during the morning and afternoon of 29 September. The servicemen taken hostage by the Kulyab home guard (backers of the former president) have been freed, along with the weapons and ammunition they had on them at the time of their capture.

**Russian Indebteness to Latvia for Dependent Education**

93UM0011A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Modris Ziyeminsh under the rubric “From Riga”: “A Children's Census Shows That Russia Owes 105.5 Million Rubles for Them”]

[Text] Figures were never kept on how many children of servicemen were studying at republican schools and how many were enrolled in kindergartens. Simply put, there was no need for this. Times have changed, however. The Latvian Republic considers the children of servicemen to be “foreigners” and has announced that it is too expensive to finance their education at schools and their upkeep at kindergartens in the present difficult economic situation. What is the solution?

The Russian ministries have agreed to pay the cost of educating their citizens and for their upkeep at preschool facilities. The number of students at schools of the Latvian Republic and the total costs are presently being calculated. The average cost of educating one child is 7,092 rubles at a general education school; 17,300 at a higher school (uchilishche); 16,700 at a tekhnikum; and the upkeep of a child at preschool facilities is 10,600 rubles.

According to preliminary figures, there are 13,352 children of servicemen in the Russian army enrolled at general education schools, 213 at higher schools and 106 at specialized secondary educational institutions and tehnikums. A total of 878 children are enrolled at kindergartens under self-governing bodies. Russia therefore owes 105.5 million rubles for the second 6-month period.

**UKRAINE**

**Officer Union Members Denounce Candidate for MD Post**

92UM1357C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 29 Jul 92 p 2


[Text] “The cadres will decide everything!”. In recent years we have heard and read quite a few ironic, sarcastic words with regard to Stalin's famous statement. However, having dug into the historical analogies, we can find similar expressions from both Cicero, Napoleon and Suvorov. Yes, it is also understandable that the acuteness of the problem of competent, highly-educated cadres did not abate in all times. It is no less acute today for those people who are building the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And that is why who will assume the leadership of the troops or who will head some military collectives or other sounds like far from a rhetorical question.

At the same time, the questions of the moral purity of applicants for leadership posts in the same rank with the problems of the competence and the preparedness of army cadres. Primarily the lower regional sections of the Ukrainian Officers' Union [UOU] are called upon to keep out of the structures of the young Ukrainian Army unscrupulous officers who have compromised themselves. That is how Union officers of the Kiev Higher Tank Engineers School [KVTIU] define one of their tasks. A letter which they directed to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and to NARODNA ARMIYA was dictated by these same considerations. We considered it necessary to publish it in a somewhat abridged form.

No matter how bitter it is to admit, we increasingly have the opportunity to encounter the critical remarks of officers and warrant officers addressed both to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense staff and to UOU itself. They accuse us (although not always justly) of inactivity that borders on criminal connivance to those reactionary, corrupt and mercenary generals and colonels who served and continue to serve only themselves but not Ukraine, while forcing their way using all truths and untruths, while covering themselves with modern phraseology and, at times, national origin, to responsible posts in the Ministry of Defense staff. While proceeding
from the situation that has developed, the Minister of Defense and the UOU leadership have the right to demand from us the submission of objective information on such false-patriots and unscrupulous careerists who think only about their own personal benefit at the expense of their subordinates and of all the long-suffering people of Ukraine.

In this regard, the KVTIU UOU leading organization persistently suggests that attention be directed to the candidate for the position of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Weaponry Directorate Section Chief Colonel Anatoliy Anisimovich Chizh, who served in the position of deputy chief of KVTIU from 1989 through 1990 and then left for the post of chief of the Turkestan Military District Tank Service.

The following facts attest to the moral unscrupulousness of this officer, his flaunting of all standards of decency and officer honor and his immodesty and careerism.

Having been placed on the list to receive housing at the school on September 7, 1989 at number 103, this man, moreover having been subsequently elected chairman of the Officers' Assembly (that is, being a model of decency, it would seem), while using his official position and personal contacts with Moscow and Kiev Military District KEU [Housing Operation Directorate], bypassed the entire list during the course of a year and received a four-room apartment with 53.6 square meters of living space at the following address: Apartment 91, Building 21, Uborevich Street, Kiev (KVTIU Housing Commission session of 31 October 1990, Protocol No 8—a copy is attached). Prior to that, Colonel Chizh, with his “quite large” family (he, his wife, and two daughters) using his official position, occupied two well-appointed one-room apartments in the school’s dormitory at a time when some officers-teachers were driven out of them by him, while looking toward winter, from the official apartment (having immediately received serious official reprimands for insufficiently rapid execution of illegal orders to move out) and they were compelled to take shelter in private apartments.

By the time Colonel Chizh received an apartment, the housing list at the school totaled 197 people and the ones who were at the head of the list had been on it since 1986. Using his personal connections, he obtained the allocation to the school of three four-room apartments (two for beneficiaries and one for himself), although the accounting of housing allocated for the year, as we all know, is conducted in square meters, that is, instead of these apartments, the people who were standing in line from 1986-1987 could have received in line approximately six two-room or four three-room apartments. However, Colonel Chizh had calculated everything. If Colonel Kotelnikov, who received a similar four-room apartment, was, as the head of a family with many children, first in the preferential line and, Colonel Grachev, who had been in line for a larger apartment since 1988, had a family of six, Colonel A.A. Chizh, having a family of four, decided to also obtain for himself the allocation of a four-room apartment ahead of schedule. Let’s point out that school officers, candidates of science, who have two children of the same sex, receive three-room, and of late, two-room apartments at the school on a list with an approximately five-year long waiting list. Despite this, the work begun by Colonel Chizh to obtain his own housing conditions and the correspondence conducted at his initiative to obtain an additional four-room apartment at the school (at the expense of housing designated for people who had been on the list since 1986-1987) was successful, although it also skirted the list and the law. Incidentally, the Military District Housing Operation Directorate Commission that subsequently worked at the school recognized the allocation of an apartment to Colonel Chizh as illegal, and an appropriate act was compiled on it that is kept in that organization’s case files. At the school’s housing commission session that was conducted prior to that—its chairman—school Deputy Chief for Material Support Colonel Mazurenko, insistently recommended that commission members sign a commission session protocol, without in the process reviewing the issue of giving an apartment to Colonel Chizh because it had been assigned to him based on a mission-related assignment. Of the four commission members present, three refused to sign it (Colonel Uskov, and Lieutenant Colonels Kovalenko and Bekish) as a sign of protest against the illegal allocation of an apartment to Colonel Chizh, although the latter subsequently signed it after the fact under pressure from Colonel Mazurenko.

Having obtained an apartment in that unscrupulous manner, Colonel Chizh decided not to stop at what he had received and he contrived, having served a little more than a year at the school, to obtain the order “For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces” 3rd Class. Without wasting time, he, for these not two full years, repeatedly used vehicles and equipment from school funds for personal goals. He even managed to exchange a horse from his father’s farm for a mare from the school’s private plot. He simply didn’t manage to do more—after two years of service at the school, he had to urgently leave for a higher position in Turkestan Military District—chief of the tank service which was greeted by school personnel with a feeling of “deep satisfaction” because he exceeded all of his predecessors with his boorishness, haughtiness and incompetent leadership.

He had to work quite hard to increase his personal welfare throughout 1991 and at the beginning of 1992. He even managed to use an aircraft to transport to Kiev his “Zhiguli” and UAZ automobiles that had been acquired in hot Turkestan Military District (we’d like to believe that they were purchased in the general line and with his own hard-earned money) closer to his apartment that remained in the capital. We would also like to believe that all this time the military district’s BTS [Tank Service] chief did not have an apartment at his new duty location and, if he did have one, that he turned it in when he left.
Having learned that he couldn’t get general’s striped pants in the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] and that he could count on something in Ukraine while considering his Ukrainian ancestry, he decided to rush back to the homeland toward which his patriotic feelings had suddenly awakened and find himself a position in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (no, not in the troops!), but in Kiev—in the Weaponry Directorate.

In our view, the facts listed above are quite adequate for the Ministry of Defense staff, the Ministry of Defense Weaponry Directorate, and that directorate’s UOU leading organization to more carefully review Colonel Chizh’s personality before approving him for such a high position or to let him remain in the Ukrainian Armed Forces cadres. If we don’t purge ourselves of corrupt and dishonest careerists, no matter what rank they hold, we will never (and that would be horrible!) be able to build an Armed Forces that is combat capable and dedicated to the people of Ukraine and we will never be able to revive in hundreds and thousands of officers-patriots of Ukraine a feeling of faith in justice and in the ability of the Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Officers’ Union to qualitatively carry out the tasks to create a Ukrainian national army.

We are confident that a fundamental solution of the issue on the candidacy of Colonel A.A. Chizh will have great moral significance for the restoration of social justice and will promote an increase of the prestige of the Ukrainian national army. We are prepared to render assistance in submitting objective information on this issue and also on the issue of information on the candidacies being reviewed for other posts on the Ministry of Defense staff.

Chief Of Social-Psychological Administration Interviewed
92UM1447A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 28 Aug 92 p 1

[“First Interview with Colonel Serhiy Budko in His New Position as Chief of the Social-Psychological Administration of the Ukrainian Air Force”: “Our Service is Complex, but Extremely Necessary”]

[Text]

[Lysytsya] Colonel, first of all, it will be interesting for the readers of our newspaper to become acquainted with you, to learn about a few facts from the pages of your life and service.

[Budko] I was born in Voronobtsi, which is near Vinnytsya. To the point, Mozhayskyy lived here, and the school that I graduated from carries his name. This is in some measure symbolic in that my fate became tied to aviation. True, the road to this destiny was not very straight. At first I tried to enroll in the philosophy department of the Kiev State University, but I was lacking one credit. Therefore I had to work for a year as a laborer in a sugar plant, after which I was called up for military service. I was a soldier for two years and later as a sergeant I served in the aviation division of the former group of soviet forces in Germany.

I decided to extend my service in the Army—in 1969 I entered into the Krugan higher military-political school, from which I graduated with distinction.

My service as an officer was spent in Novhorod-Volyn and Ovruch. From the position of propagandist for an aviation regiment I was fortunate enough to enter into the military-political academy in the department of pedagogy. During the course of my studies I worked on my dissertation, which is titled “Military questions in the works of G.V. Plekhanov (the philosophical-psychological aspect)”. This thesis was difficult to defend, because Plekhanov was considered to be an enemy of the Bolsheviks. It was only on the third try, when “perestroyka” had already begun, that my defense took place and it lasted no more than ten minutes.

After the academy I was assigned as an instructor in the Irkutsk higher aviation-engineering school to teach students philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, and even scientific communism. However, I taught these subjects in my own way.

In 1989, the students of the school nominated me as a candidate for national deputy of the USSR, and after that of the Russian Federation. And not only did the students support me, but also the workers of five large enterprises in Irkutsk. And throughout the city I virtually won during the elections. In spite of this the former defense minister Marshal Yazov was dead set against seeing me in Parliament. He therefore gave the appropriate orders to the commanders of the armed forces located in Mongolia, which were included in the Irkutsk voting district, and they performed the necessary work. In this manner, because of the vote of the military, stationed in Mongolia, I was beaten by my rival.

However, my defeat in the election so to say, was insufficient for the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR. They decided to deprive me of the possibility of working with students. In March of 1990 I was expelled from the party “for activities which were counter to the general line of the CPSU during the period of perestroyka”, and soon after came the minister’s order to transfer me into the reserves.

[Lysytsya] What were their reasons for this?

[Budko] First that I, in their view, stood on the positions of the social-democratic party. But this was not so. The principal reason was that I was elaborating the concept of a professional army and was criticizing Yazov’s articles.

However, there is always some good in every bad situation. Thanks to my being separated from the service, I was able to return to Ukraine, to the fatherland. Here I
found a position, although it was not easy, as an instructor of philosophy in the Vinnytskyy Pedagogical Institute.

When construction of the Ukrainian armed forces began, and it was decided to create a social-psychological service as part of these forces, I was called by Colonel (today Major-General) Mulyava and invited to enter into the structure of their service. I agreed to accept the position of chief of the social-psychological administration of the Ukrainian Air Force.

[Lysytsya] Serhiy Oleksandrovych, the matter which you chose to concern yourself with is yet new, the service is just now being created. For that reason we would like to learn from you its goals and missions, about the specialties which will be in the Air Force.

[Budko] First of all it is the social-psychological security of the Air Force during its development, its perfection. Secondly- the social-psychological security of military training, the strengthening of military discipline. Thirdly, the social-psychological safeguarding of humanitarian training, cultural-education work and the organization of free time for members of the service. The specialties of our type of Armed Force are quite considerable. Aviation is the most intellectual part of the army. Because, in the aviation regiments, officer-pilots, engineers and technicians constitute the majority, and they have quite good educations and high skill levels. It is necessary to take this into account in their jobs.

Our branch of the Armed Forces, it can be said, is the most technically equipped, and service in it is tied to risk, to psychological and physical overload of the aviation personnel. Therefore our service should be directed in such a way so as to reduce the negative influence of these phenomena on people.

Naturally, in aviation the pilot is the central figure. However, technicians, engineers, other professionals who insure the safety of flights, also require considerable attention. Our task is to create the collective moral-psychological climate so that all would equally selflessly work at the execution of their military learning assignments.

Based on what was said earlier, there should be created an absolutely new structure. It has nothing in common with the previous political directorates. The social-psychological service is composed of professionals from various branches. These are sociologists, psychologists, psychophysicologists, mathematicians-programmers, and even physicists.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, I would like to invite officer-sociologists, trained psychologists, and also enlisted-sociologists to fill the vacant positions. The requirements, which we shall make known during the competition selection, are high competence in the field of one’s specialty, a thorough knowledge of the history of Ukraine, its Armed Forces, and the ideological, legal, and historical basis of the sovereignty and independence of the Ukrainian state. Also, naturally, an excellent command of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. And so, professionals, if you wish to join the ranks of our service, please contact the department of the social-psychological service of the Ukrainian Air Force, which is located in Vinnytsya.

As our service is new in the Armed Forces, there is not a great deal of experience with its work, there is also a lack of theoretical foundations, work methodologies. Therefore we ourselves should accumulate and broaden our experience, and concern ourselves with research activities. For this reason a scientific-methods laboratory, a group for programming-mathematical security, a division for social development and military psychological studies are being created in our administration.

[Lysytsya] And what are, in your opinion, colonel, the most important tasks facing army aviation, what role should it play in the composition of the Armed Forces of our state?

[Budko] If we examine the military forces of many western countries, then we can observe that for them aviation occupies a dominant position. An in the course of conducting a battle to them is relegated perhaps the most important role. About this testify the events in the Persian Gulf, and also the Falklands, and other local wars and conflicts. I therefore feel that, in Ukraine, the Air Force should play a substantial role.

When we turn to our military doctrine, then it is necessary to emphasize that even in defense one cannot get by without aviation. It should protect not only ground forces and national territory against aerial attack, but also decisively influence the destruction of the ground aggressor. Aviation is especially needed in the opening phase of a war. It can, earlier than ground forces, carry the fight to the enemy, which violated the state’s boundaries. And if to the composition of the Air Force are added air assault forces, then they can execute missions to stop sudden enemy attacks and will constitute a quick reaction force. Therefore all statements by some military professionals, and more often by pseudoprofessionals, to the effect that aviation is not a necessary part of the Armed Forces, or is almost unnecessary, I believe are, in no small measure, harmful.

[Lysytsya] In spite of this, whatever discussions might be on-going, a Ukrainian Air Force is being created, and it will have its own symbologies. In your view, what should this symbology be?

[Budko] First of all I would like to emphasize that the fundamental element of our symbology should be the trident. This represents our history. And the symbol of Ukrainian military aviation could be an eagle with spread wings. It needs to be placed on the caps of military aviators. It is necessary to approach the working out of the symbologies very deliberately to incorporate the particulars of every element, to confer with heraldic experts, and with the aviators themselves.
[Lysytsya] In your further work it will be unavoidable, surely to work mutually with the departments of city administration and with the general public. What are your relations with the administration of Vinnytsya and other districts, what help would you like to receive from them?

[Budko] I just had a meeting with a representative of the President of the Vinnytsya district, Mykola Antonovych Didyk. We conducted an unusually meaningful discussion. He was very sensitive of pleas with regard to social protection of service personnel. He promised to help in resolving the problem of living quarters.

We maintain quite close connections with the Vinnytsya pedagogical institute. The instructors help in the teaching of Ukrainian. I expect that such relations will exist with other teaching institutions, establishments, and organizations. This is why the benefit from this will be mutual.

In Vinnytsya, the central building of culture, education and leisure for aviators is presently being built. We plan to carry out active work there. Organizations such as “Prosvida”, the “T.H. Shevchenko Organization of Ukrainian Language”, and other social organizations, can and should participate.

[Lysytsya] Serhiy Oleksandrovych, what role in the life and service activities related to the shaping of aviation will be played by the Ukrainian Officers’ Association and other organizations?

[Budko] The Ukrainian Officers’ Association will play a positive role. It is helping us right now to select cadre. It is approaching this matter seriously, responsibly. But I think, there will come a time when the officers’ association will not be necessary in the Armed Forces, as soon as the problems which the association is resolving disappear.

Servicemen may create other non-political organizations, even professional associations. If they also appear in our midst, the social-psychological service will contact them, that is within its purview. However, when our service begins to function in full force and begins in all ways to carry out its duties, the role of social organizations will, in my view, be reduced considerably, and will after a time vanish completely.

[Lysytsya] Colonel, to finish our conversation, we would like to learn something about the way that you work. What qualities do you most prize in people, what should be the model for a worker in the social-psychological service?

[Budko] For me as the director the social-psychological service, competence is an important criteria. However today there are some questions about this work which I do not fully understand. Therefore I will determinedly work on myself, to increase my knowledge in areas where I am lacking.

Military Collegium Approves Reforms
92UM1446A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Sep 92 p 1

[Article under the rubric “In the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine”; “There Will Be Air Defense Troops”]

[Text] The regular session of the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was held on 28 August of this year.

In accordance with the concept of defense and the armed forces established by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the decision adopted by the Defense Council of Ukraine, the collegium has considered and approved a plan for creating the Southern and Western operational commands out of the Odessa and Carpathian military districts, as well as for restructuring their units and formations.

A plan has been approved for creating the Air Defense Troops as an arm of the armed forces by means of a phased combining and restructuring of the Air Force and Air Defense Troops.

The commanders of the branches of armed forces, the military districts and air armies and the commanders of the PVO [Air Defense] formations took part in the consideration of the issues.

One Third of Military Recruits Unfit for Service
92UM1445C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
2 Sep 92 p 2

[Report by Ukrinform correspondent Nikolay Zaika: “The Results of the Spring Draft”]

[Text] The goal set by the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the spring induction into the armed forces was exceeded by 103.6 percent. Despite this auspicious figure, however, the induction into the military ranks was fairly strained for the first time in the history of the republic’s armed forces. Every third draftee was classified as unfit for the service for reasons of health, and 1,800 individuals failed to report in response to the notices from the military commissariat.

The forecast is no better for the fall induction, it seems. The reasons: a natural reduction of the draft pool, the dangerous ecological situation in the region, reduced monitoring of health-care measures, the absence of a legal basis governing the draft process, and others.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Russian Soldier Sentenced to Death in Azerbaijan Shooting Incident
92UM1465B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
12 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by S. Turchenko under the rubric “The Case of Lieutenant Lukin”; “He Performed His Duty and Has Been Sentenced to Death”]
[Text] It happened in Baku on 7 September 1991. Lt Yevgeniy Lukin went on duty as chief of the guard at the Baku Combined-Arms Command School. At around 2200, at an order from the school duty officer, he and cadet guards Aleksandr Gorbachev, Boris K. and Fakhraddin P. (it will later become clear why I do not give the names of these two fellows) went to the check point, where seven aggressive-minded young men not known to them were trying to gain access to the school grounds.

Lukin tried to bring them to order. In vain. Following regulations, the chief of the guard decided to arrest the troublemakers. However, five of them climbed into the vehicle and attempted to run down the guard personnel. There were only seconds in which to make a decision. At Lt Lukin’s order the guards fired several warning shots into the air. The vehicle continued moving toward the cadets, however. At that point they were forced to open fire on it. We would point out—and this is very important—Lukin himself did not fire.

On 8 September the military prosecutor of the Baku Garrison initiated criminal proceedings in the case. Under current law the file on the case should have been sent to the military tribunal on 5 June. Instead, it turned up in the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 10 June—not without the help of former workers in the military prosecutor’s office at the Baku Garrison—which did not have jurisdiction over what happened under the laws in effect at that time.

Then something strange happened. On 31 August of this year the military collegium sentencedLt Lukin, serviceman with the armed forces of the Russian Federation, to the maximum punishment under the article on premeditated murder and Cadet Gorbachev to a lengthy prison term. The two other cadets did not believe that they would be protected by the Russian authorities, left the territory of the military unit and are now in hiding.

We asked Col Justice A. Korotkov, chief of the investigative directorate of the Main Directorate for Law-Enforcement in the Armed Forces and prosecutor general of Russia, to comment on this tragic situation:

"The criminal case should only have been turned over to the military court of the Transcaucasus Military District in accordance with the 19 March 1992 Ukase of the President of Russia ‘On the Transfer of the Transcaucassus Military District and the Navy’s Caspian Flotilla to the Temporary Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.’ From the legal standpoint, by stretching the point greatly, Lt Lukin’s actions could be regarded as exceeding his authority, but certainly not as premeditated murder. It is very difficult to find any criminal liability at all in Gorbachev’s case.

"The prosecutor general’s office of Russia is trying in vain to have the criminal case transferred to the jurisdiction of republic law-enforcement agencies. The prosecutor general of Russia recently sent a letter to the prosecutor general of the Republic of Azerbaijan requesting that steps be taken to halt the execution and rescind the sentence for Lukin and Gorbachev, and also to consider the matter of transferring jurisdiction over the criminal case to Russia’s military legal agencies. A similar message is expected from the president of Russia to the president of Azerbaijan.”

And so, a terrible, inhumane sentence has been handed down. It must not be carried out.

Lack of Housing, Prospects Forces Russians to Serve in Azerbaijan Army

92UM1465A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 15 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Iskandaryan under the rubric “Hot Spots”: “Where Is the Russian Officer to Turn?”]

[Text]

The Armenians and the Azerbaijani Are Planning to Execute One Slavic Officer Each by Fire

Anatoliy Alekseyev, chairman of the Committee for Servicemen under the Russian government, recently appealed to Azerbaijan’s leadership to pardon Russian Lt Yevgeniy Lukin, who has been sentenced to death by fire by the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan. On 7 September last year Lt Lukin gave the order for cadets at the Baku Military School to open fire on a motor vehicle attempting to enter the school grounds. Three citizens of Azerbaijan were killed as a result.

It is now a fact that serving in the Russian forces at hot spots of the former USSR involves mortal danger. The situation is no better for those who are converting to service under contract for one of the warring parties, however. Robert Kocheryan, chairman of the State Defense Committee of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, has informed a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent that a Stinger has shot down an Azerbaijani Su-25 ground-attack bomber over the Mardakert area in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The pilot, a Ukrainian by nationality, ejected and was rapidly taken prisoner. During the interrogation he stated that he was paid 100,000 rubles for each combat sortie. According to information acquired by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI the officer has now been moved to Armenia. Since mercenaries are not covered by the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, it is perfectly likely that the Armenian court will sentence the captured pilot to death by fire.

Sadly, those officers who are joining a foreign field army are not doing so because they have the good life. For officers of the 4th Army in Azerbaijan the return to the homeland entails difficulties fairly typical for servicemen in general. The main problems are housing and jobs. Even when these are to be found, it is very difficult to move one’s belongings. There are no containers. All of this gives rise to a sense of helplessness, and against that background the Azerbaijani military leadership is issuing offers of service under contract for a period...
starting at 3 months and with a salary an order above the usual. When a contract is signed for a period of more than a year, the officers are promised their own apartments. Arif Yunusov, a correspondent for ROSSIYSKIE VESTI assigned to the press center of the president of Azerbaijan, reports that an international battalion of around 800 men has been formed in the Azerbaijani army. The possibility is not ruled out that non-Azerbaijans are serving also in other subunits. This is legally justified. The Azerbaijani leadership has stated more than once that members of other ethnic groups serving in the Azerbaijani army are citizens of Azerbaijan (this apparently applies to officers of the 4th Army, since they are registered in Azerbaijan), and that the army is not formed on the basis of ethnic origin.

The hopelessness of the situation is forcing Russia's officers to serve in Karabakh. The worse the situation with respect to the withdrawal of the Russian troops becomes and the fewer opportunities there are for finding a haven in the homeland, the more they will join the Azerbaijani army. Several of them have already died on the Karabakh front. Russian mothers are once again receiving coffins from a foreign war.

Receipt of Turkish Military Aid Denied
93US0011A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 41, 7 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Elmira Akhundova: "So Whose East Is It? Turkish Military Experts Are Beyond Azerbaijan’s Means"]

[Text] In connection with the publication in issue No 39 of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of a commentary entitled “The East Is Ours,” which talks about direct military participation by Turkey in the Karabakh conflict on the side of Azerbaijan, I was asked to go to the republic Ministry of Defense.

After obtaining a pass in the commandant’s office to see the chief of the general staff, Major General N. Sadykov, I went to a building standing some distance away. I did not actually see any Turkish military experts but instead at almost every step I met people of obviously Slavic appearance. This is understandable because about 800 Russian-speaking officers from the former Transcaucasus Military District are still officially serving in units of Azerbaijan’s national army at this time, and some of them work at the Ministry of Defense or teach in military schools, while others are handling military training for recruits.

The major general commented on the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA report as follows: “On behalf of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense I can officially state that no Turkish inspectors, advisers, experts, and so forth are in units of the national army. We would like to train officers in military schools and academies abroad. And I spoke about this at a conference of the NATO southern flank countries in Italy attended by military experts from the United States, England, France, and Greece. If any country will undertake to provide assistance in training officers we shall be very glad. Incidentally, officers from the Turkish army were also present at that conference, and they did greet my statement with understanding. However, everything still turns on the lack of hard currency. I was amused to hear that they are saying that foreign instructors are working in units of Azerbaijan’s national army. Yes, for months we have been waiting for official instructions from the Cabinet of Ministers to send even a single Azerbaijani serviceman on a trip abroad. So the noise raised by the mass media is just the latest canard.”

Leyla Yusunova, chief of the information and analysis center at the Ministry of Defense, was even more categorical:

“Have you any idea what 6,000 Turkish soldiers is? That is half a division! If it were even half true the numerous observers coming to the zone of the conflict would long ago have had a large number of facts on the subject. The Turks have helped us only with deliveries of fabric from which we made field uniforms for our troops.”

After the visit to the Ministry of Defense I decided to meet with the leader of the opposition to the present authorities, the National Independence Party, former member of the Military Council Etibar Mamedov. He often visits Turkey and I understand that he enjoys great authority and popularity among Turkish politicians. In response to my question of whether during his trips to Turkey he has negotiated about military participation by Turkish officers in training units of the Azerbaijan national army. E. Mamedov answered in the negative, and he added this:

“Someone in the West wants very much for the myth about military aid to Azerbaijan from neighboring Islamic states to be a reality: Here, they say, Turkey is training Azerbaijani soldiers, providing weapons, and so forth. In fact, if anyone is helping us today in shaping the national armed forces it is the former Soviet officers who have come to serve with us. They at least are not demanding hard currency, they serve for rubles.

MOLDOVA

Defense Minister on Military Doctrine, Dniester Crisis
92UM1845A Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 10 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Brigadier General P. Kryange, defense minister of the Republic of Moldova, by Trofim Stefan for MOLDOVA-PRES; place and date not given: “I Believe That There Was No Other Solution”]

[Text]
[Stefan] Mr. Minister, we shall be pursuing several goals in our present interview. First, many readers are inquiring about the biographical data of the recently
applied defense minister. Second, the public would like to know the truth about the recent events in the city of Bendery, about those who died, and about whether these sacrifices were justified or not since certain organs of the press are putting a varying interpretation on these facts. Third, in the role of minister of defense you might be able to throw light on the situation in the sphere of the accords which have been reached on realization of the "Agreement on the Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region" signed by the presidents of the two states, M. Snegur and B. Yeltsin, in Moscow on 21 July. The question of the measures being adopted in respect to the withdrawal of the 14th Army from the territory of our state and the 300th Airborne Regiment should be clarified also.

So, the first question. Please tell us where you were born and what was the nature of your service up to the rank of general?

[Kryange] I have to say that this is my second interview since I returned home. You have taken me back in thoughts to my far-off childhood. I was born in October 1933 in the village of Salkutsa in Keushenskiy Rayon. I graduated from school there. Prior to being drafted into the army, I completed three years at the Bendery Pedagogical School. I worked for some time as a teacher of logical school. I graduated from school there. Prior to being drafted into the armed forces of the Republic of Moldova, my modest contribution to military matters at this stage. After Mr. Ion Costas was appointed defense minister, I became his deputy.

[Stefan] I am curious as to who has shared the burdens and deprivations of military life with you?

[Kryange] My wife and my two children, of course. My wife is by specialty a math teacher. My children are grown and have their own families. I have two brothers and a sister who live in Moldova.

[Stefan] How long have you been in Moldova?

[Kryange] I have been in Chisinau two years now. As of the time I arrived in the capital of the republic I worked on a volunteer basis in the Military Affairs Department. I helped draw up documents and bills, creating the basis of military doctrine and its concept and structure. This was my modest contribution to military matters at this stage. After Mr. Ion Costas was appointed defense minister, I became his deputy.

[Stefan] Now you hold the position of national defense minister. What is your assessment of military doctrine? Is it justifying itself, based on the actual situation?

[Kryange] Prior to the start of the formation of the armed forces of the Republic of Moldova, military doctrine corresponded fully to the demands of the times. But events are developing so rapidly that we have had to revise certain of its propositions for the purpose of improving them. It is essential to revise the concept on the basis of current realities. In conjunction with the deputy ministers and all the ministry directorate chiefs we have revised the doctrine fundamentally.

[Stefan] What is the basis of the new military doctrine?

[Kryange] The main criterion guiding us was the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency.

[Stefan] Have there been any changes in the structure of the ministry since you came to head it?

[Kryange] At this stage we have brought the ministry structure into line with the requirements of the times, that is, we have created a single administrative system of leadership of the armed forces in place of the former two systems of the ministry and the main staff. There have also been reductions in the ranks of officers and employees for the purpose of excluding a duplication of commands and orders. I would like to mention that this small "perestroyka" of ours was supported both by the deputy ministers and the directorate chiefs.

[Stefan] The next question: The war unleashed by the pro-communist and pro-separatist forces against Moldova forced the leadership of the republic to enlist subunits of the national army also. What role has it performed in the solution of this conflict and in the war as a whole?

[Kryange] In view of the fact that the lives of the police and the carabiniers were in jeopardy because well-trained troops were operating against them, subunits of Moldova's armed forces were put in a state of combat readiness. The first tanks and artillery appeared on the opposite side on 19 May, and for this reason the army was forced to intervene in a solution of this conflict for the purpose of keeping the country intact and integral and for the security of the peaceful population. To speak of the role of the army as such, I would note that it was only thanks to the latter that the aggressive operations of the separatists were halted. In turn, the reservists displayed good training. Under field conditions and in a very short space of time they mastered many army specialties. I am grateful to the men, who defended their homeland with unprecedented enthusiasm and patriotism, sacrificing their lives for the sake of preservation of the integrity of the republic. The artillery subunits gave a particularly good account of themselves. We commended the majority of them for their combat contributions.

[Stefan] Was there a realistic possibility of preventing the capture of combat hardware and firearms from stores of the 14th Russian Army?

[Kryange] To achieve their aims, you see, the separatists used women, at whom, of course, no one could have fired. From my viewpoint, the capture of the weapons could have been prevented inasmuch as this fact may be
classified as a crime. Nontraditional means, up to and including the disabling of equipment for an indefinite period, should have been employed in this situation. By way of the capture of a large quantity of weapons the separatists resolved nothing. On the contrary, these weapons resulted in the loss of many innocent people. This was for Moldova a real tragedy.

[Stefan] According to certain leaders of public organizations and volunteers, since the time that the peace-keeping force was committed to the eastern parts of Moldova our ideals in respect to the defense of the integrity of the republic have been betrayed and the numerous casualties and the war in general and its outcome are wholly on the conscience of our leaders is an opinion which is popularly held. What is your opinion in this connection?

[Kryange] Such an understanding does not correspond to reality. I would like to say that for several days prior to the signing of the above-mentioned agreement we were counting up to 15 persons killed and 50-60 wounded daily. Fighting on was pointless. We did not have the right to put people's lives at risk. I believe that there was simply no other solution because a buildup of a large quantity of military equipment and weapons had been observed on the part of the Dniester region. Combat operations had assumed large-scale dimensions and a positional nature. It was well-known, after all, that, following the Bendery events, the front thereof had doubled.

[Stefan] Why was it Russian forces that acted the part of peace-keeping force? Could we have turned to any other state for military assistance?

[Kryange] A joint peace-keeping force on the part of Moldova, Russia, and the Dniester Region is operating in the security zone. I have to respond to your question particularly precisely: neither Belarus nor Ukraine nor Bulgaria consented to the commitment of their armed forces to the conflict zone, and to avoid further casualties urgent measures had to be adopted.

[Stefan] And what was Romania's response to our statement?

[Kryange] Romania was prepared to render assistance in conjunction with Ukraine and Belarus. I believe that the policy of a peaceful settlement of the conflict adopted by the president of the republic, parliament and the government is the correct one.

[Stefan] Did we not lose this part of the territory simultaneously with the commitment of the peace-keeping force?

[Kryange] I do not believe we did. But we have, after all, achieved what is most important—a full cease-fire and an end to the senseless human casualties—and the conditions for the return of the refugees are gradually being created. Economic relations with the Dniester region are being resumed, and people's contacts will contribute to a political settlement of the conflict.

[Stefan] Is a timeframe for the withdrawal of the peace-keeping force specified in some document?

[Kryange] In accordance with the mutual agreement of the two presidents, the forces may be withdrawn at the demand of one of them. Russia is prepared to call all its battalions home at any moment. It became apparent during my visit to Moscow and also from telephone conversations that the Russian side is prepared to leave the security zone if a peace-keeping force of other states is sent to Moldova.

[Stefan] While in Bendery, I familiarized myself with the local press. The newspapers NOVOYE VREMYA and DNISTROVSKAYA PRAVDA are continuing propaganda of the unlawful authorities: edicts and orders of so-called president I. Smirnov are being published. It is noticeable also that the local press is not subordinate to the laws of the Republic of Moldova. The policy of separatism continues, essentially. How may this fact be evaluated?

[Kryange] Following the signing of the Limanskoye Agreement of 7 July of this year, our side has compiled with the terms of this agreement fully. But the Dniester side has resorted to various subterfuges for the purpose of retaining heavy arms and equipment. The same situation is being observed following also the two presidents' signing of the Moldovan-Russian agreement. A large quantity of firearms was recently discovered at four Bendery enterprises, and similar facts were uncovered in Dubesar. It should be noted that these weapons had not been removed from the security zone, which is contrary to the agreement which was signed. They are deliberately violating the provision concerning a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The leaders of the so-called Dniester Moldavian Republic do not understand that all questions which arise must, in any event, be decided only by diplomatic, peaceful paths and that only the preservation of the unity and integrity of Moldova will lead to a conclusive settlement of the conflict.

[Stefan] Is the Ministry of Defense in possession of facts of a violation of human rights on the left bank of the Dniester, particularly where the peace-keeping force is stationed?

[Kryange] The same guardsmen and participants in combat operations in the Kochiery and Cosnita sectors have been included in the peace-keeping force from the Dniester Region. According to a report of senior officials, instances of dismissal on national grounds, intimidation, insults, and loss of accommodations have been registered in the localities. The inhabitants of the villages of Kochiery and Korzhevo have been deprived of the opportunity to visit the city of Dubesar in view of the fact that the city's local authorities have introduced a permit system. This fact may be seen as a flagrant violation of the agreement.
[Stefan] Have instances of a violation of army discipline by representatives of the peace-keeping force on the part of Moldova been registered?

[Kryange] There have been breaches of discipline, of course. Instances of the abuse of liquor have been particularly frequent. The culprits are subject to immediate discharge with all the ensuing consequences. Cancellation of the service contract is the priority demand.

[Stefan] We will return, with your permission, to the events in the city of Bendery which occurred 19-22 June of this year. Our readers would probably be interested in knowing how many boys from the national army died as a result of the said events. What forced us to leave the city?

[Kryange] As is known, on 19 June the atmosphere in Bendery deteriorated sharply. This was connected primarily with the appearance of the guard headed by Korotniko, with organized provocations. I would note that such an operation on Moldova's part had never been planned. We had on the eve of the events sent up to 40 percent of the reservists on leave. And only when we learned that a full-scale mobilization of reservists was under way in Tiraspol for the purpose of their transfer to the city of Bendery was the decision to commit our battalion made. It was given the assignment of preventing bloodshed, capturing the bridge and preventing the movement of forces and equipment into Bendery.

As far as our losses are concerned, I would like to report with all due responsibility that the number of those who died in Bendery was 22, of whom eight were reservists of the said battalion operating in the region of the bridge. This is very many for three days of combat operations, of course. When tanks from the direction of Tiraspol appeared, firing from the homes and from the fortress began. There was firing from both the flanks and the rear.

[Stefan] Could you name those who repulsed the first tank assaults of the enemy?

[Kryange] It has to be mentioned that those who were at the forward edge fought like true heroes. They included Colonel Karasev, Lieutenant Colonel Chekhodar, Senior Lieutenant Popovich, Captain Prodan, Privates Malinin and Rakovitsa and others. Some 26 persons fought for several days, displaying courage and heroism. I have to say enormous thanks to all for the valor and steadfastness displayed in defense of the integrity of the republic.

[Stefan] Was there an opportunity to blow up the bridge from the Bendery side the night when our battalion entered the city?

[Kryange] Had this operation been planned in advance, the bridge could have been blown up. But there had to have been preparations for this. We never planned operations in the Bendery area and for this reason were forced to retreat from the bridge since many tanks from the Tiraspol side were bearing down on us. Our subunits were in the city until the time the agreement was signed.

[Stefan] Mr. Minister, you recently visited Romania. What were the results of this trip?

[Kryange] I would like to observe concerning this trip that I was part of a government delegation headed by Mr. A. Sangheli, prime minister of the country. Since prior to my appointment as defense minister I had not met the minister of national defense of Romania and his deputies, it was necessary to organize a meeting at which certain problems of mutual interests were talked over. We established bilateral contact, which will help us subsequently decide questions of interest to us.

[Stefan] I have learned from unofficial sources that while in Romania you sought out some of your relatives.

[Kryange] This information is reliable. I did, indeed, meet with my cousin, who is 70 years old, in Bucharest. The meeting was pleasant and interesting. She told me a great deal about our childhood and about my parents.

[Stefan] What are the prospects of the development of relations of the corresponding ministries?

[Kryange] More than 60 persons from Moldova are currently employed in military educational institutions of Romania. Subsequently some students of our military school will complete their training in Romania.

[Stefan] And how will relations with Russia develop?

[Kryange] We maintain normal working relations with the Ministry of Defense of Russia. This enabled us to sign the agreement on the withdrawal of the 300th Airborne Regiment stationed in Chisinau. We are also tackling questions of the transfer home of officers from the Russian Army and problems connected with equipment maintenance and the supply of spares. During my meeting in Moscow with Mr. Grachev, defense minister of Russia, agreement was reached on all officers who have declared a desire to serve in the National Army of Moldova being transferred to the republic as soon as possible.

[Stefan] Please tell us more specifically about the agreement reached on the withdrawal of the 300th Airborne Regiment. What, in your view, is the primary determining factor in this case?

[Kryange] Negotiations on the withdrawal of this regiment had been conducted in the beginning, but without positive results. The Russian side put forward very stiff conditions. It was proposed that a small quantity of equipment and arms, approximately 15-20 percent of the total quantity, be transferred to us. Subsequently Mr. M. Snegur, president of Moldova, took part in the negotiations, and as a result of my trip and meeting with Mr. Grachev an acceptable version, according to which the equipment and arms of the 300th Regiment would be shared approximately equally, was found. More than half the equipment and ammunition is being transferred...
to us in terms of some models. Vehicle pools, a proving ground with equipment and barracks premises will remain at our disposal also.

[Stefan] Experts are already at work in this area, most likely?

[Kryange] A commission has been at work for more than a week. The Ministry of Defense has issued an order on the acceptance of property and military equipment.

[Stefan] Was a timeframe of the regiment's withdrawal specified?

[Kryange] The regiment will be withdrawn within two months following the day this agreement was signed.

[Stefan] Are negotiations under way concerning the withdrawal of the 14th Army from the territory of Moldova?

[Kryange] The negotiations on the withdrawal of this army will resume in September. Alternatives will be presented and the status and mechanism of its stage-by-stage withdrawal will be determined at the meeting.

[Stefan] How is the manning of the National Army with officers and warrant officers of the army of the former USSR going?

[Kryange] The armed forces of our National Army have been manned with officers of Moldovan nationality, in the main, or by those who were born and have lived in Moldova. We are accepting officers of other nationalities also. The main thing is that they be good specialists, take the oath, adopt citizenship, conclude a service contract and serve the people of Moldova. Many of them like our people. They are by conviction democrats and understand, naturally, that this people and these parts need to be defended. We are prepared to accept all who wish to serve in the National Army.

[Stefan] Have there been instances of people being denied service in the armed forces of Moldova?

[Kryange] In practice we have denied no one. Perhaps there are shortcomings in the career officers' drafting of the papers. There is no refusal outright, this is ruled out. We need officers. I repeat, there have been no such instances.

[Stefan] Can it be said that ours will be a professional army?

[Kryange] Calculations show that the maintenance of a professional army would cost the state no more than the present army. As of next year we will organize the manning of the main positions by contract. This will enable us to preserve equipment better and enhance combat readiness. All this will cost the state the least expenditure.

[Stefan] Two issues of the newspaper OASTYA MOLD-OVEY, which is the press organ of the Ministry of Defense, appeared several months ago. What is its future?

[Kryange] The army should have its own press organ. Naturally, this will not be the customary newspaper. It will illustrate the life and activity of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces as a whole. The newspaper should perform the main role in the patriotic education of the younger generation. At the initial stage we published the two issues of the newspaper with the help of our Romanian colleagues. There are, after all, virtually no military journalists in Moldova. As minister of defense, I would like to appeal via the press to young journalists to help us get a military press established. We invite well-trained specialists conversant with military matters to work as military journalists.

[Stefan] How is the law on the functioning of languages on the territory of the republic being embodied in practice in terms of your department?

[Kryange] A Defense Ministry order requiring the commanders of all army units to embark as of 15 September on the organization of classes for tuition of the official language was issued recently. We intend to form groups on the basis of extent of knowledge of Romanian: 100- and 300-hour courses. I believe that by the spring we will all be speaking the official language. I personally will attend the courses to improve my knowledge in the sphere of the official language since I have not spoken my native language for 37 years.

[Stefan] The idea that the Defense Ministry communicates only in Russian has been heard in some mass media. Does this correspond to reality, and what is the ministry's position on this question?

[Kryange] Criticism of the Defense Ministry for its alleged disregard for the official language has been heard recently. This does not correspond to reality inasmuch as we have to proceed from the fact that the vast majority of our officers was for a long time far from the motherland and that for many years the sole medium of communication for them was Russian. This fact testifies that at this stage we are encountering certain difficulties in communication in the official language. There simply are no officers with a consummate knowledge of the official language. We will build the National Army and study the latter in parallel.

[Stefan] May it be said that the army has already been depoliticized?

[Kryange] In accordance with the military concept of the creation of the armed forces of the Republic of Moldova and the law, politicization is not permitted in the army on any pretext. The law of the Republic of Moldova "The Armed Forces" prohibits for servicemen during their period of service in the regular army membership of parties and other social and political organizations.
The Ministry of Defense adheres strictly to all decrees
and laws enacted earlier in this respect.

[Stefan] The final question, Mr. Minister, will sound
somewhat provocative: Did you do anything to return to
Moldova as an officer and general in the armed forces of
the Soviet Army?

[Kryange] As a young officer even I set myself the goal of
returning to the motherland. Four times I sent in a
formal request for a transfer to service in Moldova, but
on each occasion I was turned down for incomprehensible
reasons. I was always firmly convinced that I would
sooner or later return home, and this has happened. My
dream has come true, and I am grateful to fate for the
fact that I have been afforded an opportunity, together
with my colleagues, to participate directly in the organi-
zational development of the armed forces of Moldova.

[Stefan] And I, in turn, thank you for the opportunity to
ascertain certain circumstances of ongoing events and
for the interview as a whole. I wish for you in this field a
demonstration of your knowledge and military experi-
ence for the purpose of the defense of our state. God
grant that the army not be involved hence forward in
such conflicts.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Military Laser Establishment Assailed as Boondoggle
93UM0002A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 26, Jun 92 pp 41-43

[Article by Leonid Mlechin and Viktor Shildyayev under rubric "Economics": "Generals Dream of a Hyperboloid: History of One Classified Establishment Which Devoured Many Billions and Will Devour Even More if Everything Remains the Same"]

[Text] Aleksey Tolstoy could not even imagine that his "Engineer Garin's Hyperboloid" would produce a lasting impression on military leaders with big stars even at the end of the century.

Even scientists' reference to objective laws of physics that prevent embodiment of the writer's fantasy was unable to overcome the magic of a book read in childhood. And people always are found who promise to make the tale a fact because it is a very profitable pursuit.

Combat Lasers

For a quarter century now hundreds of millions of rubles have been allocated from the military budget each year to create a hyperboloid—a combat laser on a tracked drive.

Since 1969 tracked-drive lasers have been assigned to the Luch Central Design Bureau, which later was reorganized as the Astrofizika Scientific Production Association.

An entire city/proving ground in the forest and a scientific research complex in the desert were built for Astrofizika. The 8th Main Directorate was created in what was at that time the Ministry of the Defense Industry to provide Astrofizika with everything necessary.

From 1969 through 1989 the Association's upkeep alone cost a little over R200 million per year, not counting the astronomical expenditures for building proving grounds and test complexes.

Military-industrial complex enterprises and institutes always were in a privileged position, and Astrofizika was not refused anything at all, possibly because Nikolay Ustinov became chief designer and later the Association's general director and general designer. His father, CPSU Central Committee [CC] Politburo Member Dmitriy Ustinov, at that time was CC secretary for the defense industry and later became minister of defense.

Nikolay Ustinov began his scientific career in the Almaz Central Design Bureau, which was established at one time for the son of another Politburo member, Lavrentiy Beriya. Astrofizika associates had a rather pragmatic attitude toward their department: "Our task is to make the general [director] an Academician, Hero of Socialist Labor, and Lenin Prize laureate."

Astrofizika almost coped with these tasks. Nikolay Ustinov became an Academy of Sciences corresponding member and received a Gold Star and State Prize on a classified list—without public discussion of the work and without being published.

The title of full academician and Lenin laureate passed him by because Dmitriy Ustinov died in 1984. Soon Nikolay Ustinov had to leave the general director's chair.

Astrofizika was less successful in accomplishing other tasks.

It Was Ordered To Think

Studies in the area of laser detection and ranging did not produce success. The foreign satellite identification system did not work out.

Combat laser engineering was the principal direction.

In order for a laser beam to burn through, it must be narrowed and concentrated like the hyperboloid. This is possible over a short distance, and lasers are used in industry and medicine. But who needs a weapon capable of hitting the enemy at a distance of several decimeters? A laser rifle with a range of one meter...

The generals demanded a laser that was effective to the horizon, but the generals' dreams shattered against the law of diffraction: the more they tried to concentrate and narrow the beam at the necessary distance, the more it diffused. References to laws of physics was no relief from responsibility. It was ordered to think and explore.

High salaries and honors permitted assembling superb scientists in Astrofizika. They sought and found original scientific and technological solutions. For a real scientist, the more difficult the task, the more interesting it is.

It stands to reason that all the same it is impossible to design a hyperboloid, a deadly beam weapon by which it would be possible to cut up and explode armored equipment at long range, as Aleksey Tolstoy's hero did.

They satisfied themselves with something less—disabling enemy electro-optical devices. When hit by a laser beam, optical aiming and guidance devices (of a tank, artillery piece, antitank missile system) themselves would focus the beam against their will and be put out of action.

Astrofizika scientists succeeded in creating a dozen prototypes. These were gigantic, bulky, cumbersome things on a tracked drive, extraordinarily vulnerable and unreliable.

On the battlefield the enemy would be able to destroy the combat laser, produced at a cost of millions of rubles, with the very first round from a rapid-fire gun.
But as a matter of fact, the protection against them would have been even simpler and cheaper—filters worth a few kopecks on the eyepieces of optical devices used on the battlefield.

A laser weapon is not at all a dead-end direction in development of new military technologies. It was also being worked on in other concerns of the military-industrial complex for creating considerably more practical jamming systems—combat positions were illuminated by a laser, and a blinding sun appeared before the eyes of everyone who had optical devices.

In the Persian Gulf war the Americans demonstrated how else lasers can be used—in precision weapons. Laser guidance to the target ensures almost a one-hundred percent hit.

Why the Military-Industrial Complex Fell in Love With the SDI

It was obvious to Astrofizika workers from the very beginning that gigantic sums of money were being spent futilely.

After Nikolay Ustinov, the Association was headed by Doctor of Technical Sciences Boris Chemodanov, who before that was head of a chair at the Baumanskiy School, which was a rather far cry from laser physics.

Astrofizika hoped for changes which did not come. Already then the Association could have been reoriented to some degree to needs (as it was expressed at that time) of the national economy. For example, produce industrial lasers needed by the manufacturing industry. But Boris Chemodanov gambled on participating in creating a Soviet analogue of the SDI.

The calculation appeared faultless. If the Americans appropriated billions for military space, then Moscow too would do the same. Generals and directors of the military-industrial complex frightened Kremlin leaders with stories of the Americans' terrible space weapon, which had to be answered with a counterweapon.

The program for developing space lasers, generously financed from the military budget, promised a pleasant, comfortable life, although it was clear to scientists that this was the very same kind of wasteful, vain undertaking as Ustinov's tracked-drive lasers.

Politburo Member Lev Zaykov, who at that time was responsible for the defense industry in the CC, promised Astrofizika many tens of millions of rubles for space lasers.

The Association began readjusting for the new tasks and purchased equipment. But full-scale work on creating a Soviet analogue of the SDI nevertheless managed to be avoided, they did not begin ravaging the country once and for all, and in the final account the money promised Astrofizika was not allocated.

Both millions of rubles and valuable time went into development of SDI programs which could have been used for adapting to a new life. Like many other enterprises of the military-industrial complex, Astrofizika proved unready for Yeltsin administration market reforms. As a result Astrofizika fell into a pit of debt—it got into a financial mess [literally “ran aground on the card file”—Translator note], as is customarily said.

To the Bottom in the Same Boat

Although the Ministry of the Defense Industry no longer exists, the military-industrial complex administrative-command system has not been destroyed at all.

It is not just that, as before, defense plants and institutes are forced to suckle an unnecessary, gigantic superstructure apparatus. Worst of all is that the “superstructure” does not allow enterprises to restructure to a market footing and forcibly preserves frail monsters which can only perish under market economy conditions and therefore are forced to hold onto the old system and receive budget subsidies.

Astrofizika's enormous management apparatus, auxiliary services and unique equipment going to waste create...
a gigantic overhead, and production is becoming non-competitive because of an exorbitantly high price.

The system of dispensing state military orders has not changed at all: it is competition not in product quality, but in connections, acquaintances, and the penetrating power of general directors.

The ferment in Astrofizika increased after August 1991. Its components realized that by remaining in the same boat they would go to the bottom, and therefore they demanded independence. A year ago Astrofizika First Deputy General Director Yuriy Kruzhilin himself admitted that “the structure of the Scientific Production Association is just as adapted to making money as a locomotive firebox.” He spoke of “a collective weakened by many years of sinecure.” He should have added “a collective of directors”.

Anatoliy Borodachev, one of the leading Astrofizika engineers, said: “The directors were sometimes appointed to their posts not for intellect and not for abilities, but for loyal qualities.”

But attempts to burst free of the pernicious system, to learn to make money themselves, to produce what is in demand and to become competitive are being suppressed.

The Granat High-Energy Laser Special Design Bureau was first to take this path. It is headed by laser physicist Doctor of Physicomathematical Sciences Nikolay Cheburkin, a protégé of Academician Velikhov.

Its labor collective (approximately 900 persons) voted for separation from Astrofizika and for turning into an independent enterprise. There is a demand and orders for Granat’s lasers, but money which now comes in goes to pay off Astrofizika’s debts.

Councils of labor collectives suggested that Boris Chemodanov turn the unified Astrofizika into a voluntary association of state enterprises called “Russian Laser Center.” The design bureaus and plants which were part of Astrofizika would continue to work together, helping each other, but each would receive as much as it earned.

The Department Looks After Its Monster

But this model did not suit the directors of Astrofizika at all. They did not wish to let go either of Granat or the other subunits, such as the Moscow Nov Electrical Machinery Plant, and they found support “on top.” The Department of the Defense Industry is interested in preserving the monster in the previous form, and in uncontrolled disposition of state property.

They refer here to the need to safeguard the military-industrial complex as the highest achievement of scientific-technical thinking. President Yeltsin’s April ukase “On Urgent Measures To Preserve Russian Federation Scientific-Technical Potential” also came in the nick of time.

The ukase prohibits dividing up scientific research and experimental design organizations in order to avoid “destruction of the technological unity of scientific, experimental production, and training bases.” The ukase is interpreted in different ways. Heads of the military-industrial complex interpret it as a ban on fragmenting their monopolies. But this is not specifically in the ukase.

A struggle is going on over preserving the previous feeding trough and the previous opportunity to command institutes, plants and design bureaus.

Heads of the military-industrial complex are seeking salvation in coalescing with new commercial structures, but not at all in a market sense: the Moscow generals in mufti essentially are dealing in state space, disposing of state property as their own, evicting their workers from office buildings and registering figures of the Tyumen Germs Stock Exchange there.

Together with the stock exchange, Astrofizika created the Astrogermes Joint-Stock Company. It made its share payment in the form of a complex of buildings in Moscow’s historical center at 22 Bolshaya Polyanka, after evicting associates of one of the subunits from there without asking the labor collective’s opinion. Astrofizika received interest-free credit of three and a half million for this. But the fact is, even the simple lease of these buildings, obtained at one time by the son of a Politburo member, would have brought the Association enormously more money.

Runaways Taken Off Allowance

But the military-industrial complex reorganization process is difficult to stop because labor collectives of the Scientific Production Association also are fighting for survival. The Ametist and Raduga special design bureaus already have left Astrofizika.

In the last days of April Granat nevertheless was registered as an independent state enterprise. Sanctions immediately began—they stopped paying salaries. General Director Boris Chemodanov relieved the head of Granat of his position and ordered his legal service to get Granat’s registration revoked as an independent enterprise not a part of the Association. But evidently not hoping to get Granat back, he also issued another order taking the entire collective of the design bureau off “allowance,” although first of course it is necessary to share fixed capital, finances and orders.

The Department of the Defense Industry is in no hurry to confirm Nikolay Cheburkin in the role of director, and without this the design bureau cannot even open its own account in the bank and work normally.

The independent Granat will not disappear if it adapts to the market: the subunits in it also must gain economic independence and even compete with each other. Medical and industrial lasers are highly valued. In addition,
basic laser engineering research will continue, and scientists again will engage in fulfilling the generals' dream of the hyperboloid.

Under market economy conditions enterprises of the military-industrial complex will have to take Granat's path if they wish to survive. This means the military-industrial complex monolith must be fragmented; not destroyed, but specifically fragmented, so that each institute and plant gets its chance and adapts to the new conditions.

Nazarkin on Problems on Defense Industrial Conversion

92UM0001A Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 7, Jul 92 (Signed to press 10 Jul 92) pp 20-23

[Article by Yuri Nazarkin, Russian Foreign Ministry ambassador-at-large: "Some International Aspects of Conversion"]

[Text] Conversion is a widely debated subject in our country today. Because some regard it as a panacea, I wish to point out from the start that I do not consider conversion the chief remedy for our economic crisis and a possible economic collapse. Conversion will not help unless we change types of ownership and offer material incentives in the economic sphere.

At the same time, we can hardly expect to succeed if our economy remains militarised. Currently our military spending ranges between 25 per cent and 30 per cent of GNP.* *(The estimate comes from Western experts. By comparison, the GNP share of military spending is 6 per cent in the United States, 3 per cent in Germany and 1 per cent in Japan) This implies that the defence sector, which is using the most valuable manpower and material resources, fully dominates the economy.

It is known that our original response to the call for conversion was the same as if it had been a question of launching a fresh campaign. Of course, we made a start by bungling, with the result that plants producing tanks switched to prams while plants making missiles set about specialising in the manufacture of pans and irons. They say that some time ago you could have bought in household stores shovels made from a titanium alloy.

“Conversion” on these lines began not only to disrupt military production but to undermine the foundations of highly skilled labour and a relatively high standard of technology laid over the decades. It was rumoured that our military-industrial complex (MIC) was out to discredit the very idea of converting military production facilities to civilian output. I wonder. As likely as not, this is just another case of bungling. But for this, opponents of conversion would hardly have been able to plot against it.

At the moment we are witnessing another extreme. We are told that conversion should consist in military enterprises working as usual and in selling part of the arms made for hard currency to buy food, clothing and footwear for the people.

It is this “remarkable idea” that can really prevent conversion, for it suggests that no retooling is needed. All you have to do is churn out military equipment and sell it for hard currency.

Let us set the moral aspect of the matter aside and take a look at the economic one. Who would be the main buyers of our arms? Certain Third World countries who are already buying them.

The Soviet Union used to be a major exporter of arms. Its main recipients were those countries which have bound up their armed forces with Soviet-made weapons.

We might be able to increase those exports somewhat by delivering updated models. But we cannot expect the increase to be substantial enough to help us solve our economic problems. Countries which equip their armed forces with Western weapons would refuse to buy our tanks and aircraft even at dumping prices because readjustment would be too costly: it would necessitate changing the training system and the sources drawn on for ammunition and spares. Besides, it would be naïve of us to expect Western arms exporters to cede their markets to us without resistance. They would exert political and economic pressure on the government of a country tempted to buy arms from us. Inevitable difficulties would be created for our relations with Western countries exporting arms—they might take advantage of, among other things, our stake in securing economic and other aid from them.

It follows that this so-called conversion, i.e., conversion without retooling the production system, is no solution worth the name.

Obviously, the most rational way is to switch from military output to civilian products as technologically close to that output as possible and therefore requiring a similar technological base. The aircraft industry, for one, could make more airliners at the expense of warplanes. Conversion would be easy enough to effect in the MIC’s radioelectronic industry, which makes many dual-purpose components.

On the other hand, converting many other industries is much more difficult and, above all, more expensive. The retooling of enterprises requires huge investments. Besides, in each particular case it is necessary to ascertain the economic expediency of retooling this or that enterprise and find optimum solutions to technological, economic and social problems.

Effective and wide-ranging conversion requires international cooperation in this field, foreign investment, and intensive multilateral interchanges of experience. This
makes the attitude of industrialised countries to our conversion highly important.

By and large, we cannot complain of a lack of attention on the part of leading Western countries to our problems in general and to the problem of conversion in CIS member states in particular. Our war machine and the militarised economy feeding it have always caused the deepest concern in many countries, being perceived as endangering their security. Therefore one would expect their attitude to the conversion of a large part of our military production to civilian output to be most favourable. It actually is, in principle. But the problem turns out not to be simple at all with regard to concrete aspects of participation by industrialised states and their private companies in promoting conversion of our military sector.

Originally, when we announced our intention to return to the path of human civilisation, including the economy, foreign business literally rushed to our country, seeing it as a vast field for mutually beneficial activities. But that euphoria was soon over. The main reasons for a cooling towards the idea among even the boldest businessmen must have been growing political instability and economic chaos and a practically non-existent legal basis for the functioning of a market economy.

Foreign business showed great interest not in the last place in our defence industries because these have attained a much higher technological level than civilian industries employing competent specialists and a veritable labour aristocracy that for decades was drawn to industries employing competent specialists and a veritable labour aristocracy that for decades was drawn to

Besides seeing the unfavourable factors mentioned above, foreign business realised that cooperation with our defence sector involves certain hazards.

First of all, foreign private companies come up here against state monopoly. Coupled with the lack of adequate legislation regulating market relations, this monopoly places foreign business at a great disadvantage. Second, the fact that dividing the pie among apparatus alignments plainly takes a sharper form in the military sector than in civilian fields makes the situation still more unpredictable. A telltale indication of this was the ANT case, which seems to have had a markedly restraining effect on foreign businessmen inclined to cooperate with us in conversion.

Regrettably, obstacles to cooperation in this area are also raised by the West. Exports of "sensitive" technologies and products that may have "military and strategic" importance from the United States and other Western countries to former Soviet republics are still restricted.

Still functioning is the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) set up in 1949. It includes all NATO countries (with the exception of Iceland) and Japan. COCOM was established to draw up, examine and renew lists of commodities whose export to socialist countries is banned. There are three such lists banning the export of (1) goods associated with nuclear energy, (2) goods and technologies associated with direct military use, and (3) dual-purpose goods and technologies that can have civilian or military applications. The third list is particularly controversial.

COCOM members are banned from exporting to our territory, say, objects (civilian satellites to be exact) that can be launched into space by our rockets although some of its members are interested in this. Our opportunities of using rockets for space launches for peaceful purposes are thus reduced considerably.

These and other restrictions were imposed in the Cold War period of hard confrontation between the West and the socialist camp. The camp is gone, and the socio-economic character of its former member countries is changing fast. Nevertheless, the restrictions are still there. And while voices are raised now and then in favour of easing them, there is no tangible change yet. This hampers cooperation with Western firms in the interest of conversion, for the process requires not only investments but exchanges of knowhow in fields contiguous to military production.

What is the matter? Don't the United States and other Western countries realise that the world has gone through a radical transformation and that to help us carry out conversion means enabling us to demilitarise the economy of the ex-Soviet Union all the more rapidly, thereby serving Western interests as well?

I suppose the explanation is not incomprehension but the West's fear that it may soon have to compete on the world market with our firms born of conversion. We are already competitors in commercial space exploration. If our space technology survives the drastic cut in government funding and joins in the world economy, it will remain a strong competitor, primarily for American and French companies. Other industries being converted also have a fair chance to enter the world market thanks to a high technological level and a cheap, highly skilled workforce. Why, 1,500 rubles is worth a mere $10 to $15 at today's preposterous rate. Is there a country where one could subsist on such pay?

On the other hand, we cannot really look forward to our products and services (except those involving space technology, as was mentioned above) gaining access to the world market in the foreseeable future. This is due to the boundless state of economic chaos we are living through and to a bottomless home market.

Conversion in industries producing nuclear and chemical weapons and making missiles has an important aspect which must be taken into account by all of us, including the West. Much is said and written currently about the threat of "nuclear mercenaries" moving from the ex-Soviet Union to Third World countries, especially countries ruled by dictatorial, militarist regimes. There is no factual evidence of this threat to date but it is real,
not hypothetical. Some of our nuclear, missile and chemical specialists who find themselves out of work in their field and are in straitened circumstances may be tempted to sign contracts with countries seeking to equip themselves with mass destruction weapons. Western experts estimate the number of CIS nationals having nuclear expertise at 100,000.

We certainly have legislative restrictions on foreign travel by specialists familiar with state secrets and take steps to guarantee their social security. It may be useful to set up international centres coordinating relevant research. But the only reliable way to prevent the drain of specialists in sensitive fields is to provide them with normal conditions for life and work in their own country. In this, the professional aspect of the problem is as important as the material one.

It is therefore essential to effect conversion in a way ensuring that specialists retain their qualifications and continue to do what they have been trained in, this time for peaceful purposes. This necessity should be borne in mind by Western statesmen who can use their powers to remove obstacles and create incentives to cooperation between Western companies and our state and commercial structures in converting our military sector.

International cooperation in conversion of military production largely depends on ourselves. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has made an encouraging statement about the intention to foster this cooperation by introducing most favoured nation treatment and reducing taxes on corresponding joint projects.

Efforts at intergovernmental level and promotion of business ties at the level of private firms and enterprises should be mutually complementary. Forms may vary.

An interesting idea has been advanced in the Russian press* ("See ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 4, January 1992) in favour of establishing a "military stock exchange" which businessmen, MIC people and foreign companies could join. Apart from selling military property and armaments, the stock exchange could effect conversion by using military technologies in joint ventures to put out high-tech products for peaceful uses.

The United Nations and its specialised agencies (ECOSOC, ILO, UNIDO) could play a big role in organising diversified cooperation in conversion. They have at their disposal many valuable initiatives concerning disarmament and development as well as the planning and implementation of conversion measures. These organisations could discuss retooling of military production facilities to civilian output in close connection with disarmament talks. Such an approach would help specify conditions for and the actual lines of conversion of the defence sector. It would help prevent and neutralise adverse socio-economic effects of disarmament.

The countries concerned could consult international organisations on problems arising from conversion, such as those of securing funds for conversion projects, creating effective demand for output resulting from their realisation, and providing economic incentives for conversion of military enterprises to civilian output.

Conversion is inseparable from disarmament and generally results from it. As it makes progress, it can create favourable political and social conditions for carrying through new measures in the field of disarmament.

 Needless to say, a wise, competent redirection of military resources will offer us a further source vitally important for the advancement of our economy.

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Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments Discusses Arms Industry
92UM1445B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
2 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen Ivan Oleynik, deputy minister for armaments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and chief of armaments of the armed forces of Ukraine, by Capt Igor Melnichuk, senior officer in the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, under the rubric “First Interview in the New Position” : “We Shall Protect Our Independence”]

[Text]

Calling Card

In a decree of 4 June 1992 President of Ukraine L.M. Kravchuk appointed Lt Gen Ivan Ivanovich Oleynik deputy minister of defense for armaments and chief of armaments of the armed forces of Ukraine.

Ivan Ivanovich was born into a working-class family in the village of Skraglevka in Berdichevsky Rayon, Zhitomir Oblast. He began his military career in 1955, when he graduated from secondary school and entered the Leningrad Higher Naval School of Armament Engineers. He served in the Strategic Rocket Forces as engineer, senior engineer, section chief in a formation, chief of staff and commander of a missile regiment.

He completed the command school at the Military Academy imeni F. Dzerzhinskiy with a gold medal.

After that his military career did not proceed so simply. He served as chief of staff of a missile division and commanded the division for seven years. Later he was appointed chief of the Perm Higher Military Command-Engineer School of the Strategic Rocket Forces. This was followed by other appointments: chief of the Plesetsk space launch facility and first deputy chief of the Main Directorate for Missile Weapons Operation.

Lt Gen I. Oleynik is a candidate of military sciences and doctor of technical sciences. He has the academic titles of senior scientific associate and honored worker of science

GENERAL ISSUES
and technology of the RSFSR. He has been awarded the orders of the Red Star and For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, 2nd and 3rd degrees, and orders of the Republic of Cuba and the Mongolian People's Republic.

[Melnichuk] Ivan Ivanovich, you have not been in the new position long, and therefore one of the most fitting questions to ask you first would be how you began your job in Ukraine.

[Oleynik] I began my work in the new position primarily by working out the organization and staff structure and studying the Ukraine's scientific-industrial centers. In a month and a half I managed to visit 119 industrial enterprises, design offices and scientific production associations. As deputy defense commander for armaments it was important for me first of all to determine our priorities and the status and capabilities of the industrial complex over the long term.

The tasks facing the Armament Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine consist in determining the state of the weapons and equipment in the forces, arranging for their competent operation and determining prospects for the development of new models to replace those becoming obsolete. We know that we cannot accomplish them without stable and close interaction with industry.

[Melnichuk] The tasks are truly difficult. Obviously there are problems, are there not?

[Oleynik] Of course. They occur in all difficult and serious work. Not because we lack the scientific and technological capability and enterprise capacities, however, but because in the past our enterprises and production teams were casually isolated by various ministries and departments, and they frequently did not know one another's capabilities. Advanced technology and a high level of development were not passed on among the ministries, and some of them were therefore inventing the wheel, figuratively speaking—their own wheel, though—while others strove for a subsistence operation, producing all the assembly parts within their own scientific production association. One encounters this at every step today, and it clearly keeps us from working at full capacity.

One of our main jobs is therefore that of revealing the capabilities of each team to the others and coordinating them comprehensively for the work of developing the weapons and military equipment which will be needed for the armed forces of Ukraine is reliable, highly effective and relatively inexpensive.

We have encountered situations in which individual managers have not considered the fact that they were spending the people's money and have developed models of weapons and equipment whose production cost enormous sums of money but whose performance does not measure up to the increased requirements. In addition, these systems were based on components with a high level of breakdowns. This made them energy- and labor-intensive, as a result of which their dimensions and weight were greatly increased. The poor reliability of these weapons made it necessary to produce large quantities and kinds of spare parts, instruments and accessories. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will neither order nor purchase that kind of equipment. This would be ruinous for our state.

[Melnichuk] This was no doubt precisely the subject of your discussion during your meeting with the general directors of industrial enterprises operating for defense just prior to our interview.

[Oleynik] You are right. We discussed the problem of how to preserve the industry and how to make it capable of providing our unique and talented working class with work and earnings—honest earnings, though. That is, so that the earnings are commensurate with the labor invested and the labor goes into the output of products measuring up to the latest in scientific and technological progress.

[Melnichuk] What else troubles you, one of the deputy defense ministers?

[Oleynik] I am troubled by the fact that the separation of Ukraine from the former Union as an independent state has severed a number of economic ties. Not only have we lost certain suppliers as a result, but much of the equipment needed by our armed forces today remains outside Ukraine. At the same time equipment needed by the military departments of other CIS states is now undergoing repairs at enterprises of Ukraine. It therefore seems to me that we have to apply the principle of mutual respect, mutual trust and mutual economic benefit and conclude agreements with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and with the military departments of other former republics on an exchange of this equipment on the basis of equivalent value.

[Melnichuk] At the present time there are no such agreements, however. Does this mean that the equipment will remain where it is?

[Oleynik] There have been certain developments in this area. The work is proceeding very slowly, however. For now talks are being conducted with Russia only for individual branches of the armed forces. We are making preparations for specific talks with other states.
[Melnichuk] Ivan Ivanovich, a number of the media agencies, including Radio Liberty, BBC and the Sunday Times, have spread around the world reports that Ukraine is selling weapons to the CIS nations and to certain developing countries. One example cited was the shipment of two trainloads of tanks (80 tanks) to Azerbaijan during the first part of July. There was also talk of the sale of tanks to Iran. How reliable are these reports?

[Melnichuk] If you will allow me, I shall continue on that subject. Those same reports alleged that two months earlier Ukraine had already sold Azerbaijan one lot of tanks. Although the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the government have denied it, the author states that the transaction took place....

[Melnichuk] Ukraine signed and committed itself to fulfill the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This imposes a great responsibility upon us. We will have to destroy a certain part of the weapons and equipment.

[Melnichuk] We did indeed sign the Treaty on OVSE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]. I would like to express my own personal opinion on the matter, however.

I believe that we were in too big a hurry to affirm our intention to observe all the points in this treaty. It was compiled in such a way that as we lower the level of conventional weapons we are accepting large commitments to ruin our state economically. Destruction is not productive or creative work, after all. In addition, destruction of the weapons will involve large outlays of workdays, manpower and materials. Because of this, nothing will be produced. I therefore believe that we should convert to civilian systems and machines not just 5.7 percent but the entire stock of equipment with such potential, and not turn it into a pile of scrap metal. This is ruinous for our state.

[Melnichuk] Ivan Ivanovich, tell us a little bit about your work at the Plesetsk space launch facility and then tell us whether Ukraine will have its own space forces.

[Melnichuk] All my 37 years in the military were indeed spent outside Ukraine. And today I can only regret the fact that I did not serve the homeland a single day previously, was not surrounded by its warmth and am getting to know the homeland only now, when I have entered my mature years.

[I] returned to Ukraine with a great feeling of pride. In connection with this I have a few wishes for the officers, warrant officers and enlisted men of the armed forces of Ukraine. The present times demand great personal responsibility of each of us in the performance of his military duty. We are serving the people of Ukraine, after all. For now not everyone is imbued with that feeling. Unfortunately, we have in our military people with poor professional qualities, low morality and lack of competence, people who do not take pride in belonging to the armed forces of Ukraine and who have...
lost their sense of respect for elders, that which has existed in Ukraine since antiquity. And we need to bear in mind that serving the homeland imposes upon us a burden of great responsibility to our people, to our families. Only integrity, conscientiousness and the competent employment of the equipment entrusted to us by each will help us to accomplish the difficult tasks facing us in a worthy manner.

Plight of Tula Defense Industries
92UM1486A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Vorobyev: “Conversion: The Problem of Today and the Tula Defense Plants Again Await Meetings with Yegor Gaydar”]

[Text] At the start a slight digression. The following story happened at one of the defense enterprises: the plant management, having seen that the workers had begun to save on food, provided 15 rubles a day for a full meal, partially from the wages of the workers themselves. This was with the agreement of the labor collective. But then an incident occurred: certain women began to bring thermoses with them in order... to take the food home for their children...

I heard this story at the Department of the Defense Industry and literally a couple of days later I happened to talk with a worker at one of the defense enterprises in the city of Tula. “That was not thought up,” he confirmed, “you can see such things in our city.”

“Such things” is life from wage to wage, and the lack of the most essential items such as bread, products for the family, and economy in everything. At the defense industry enterprises, at present wages are significantly lower than even at ordinary civilian firms, not to mention the commercial ones. And how could they be higher if the military orders have dried up while it costs 3-4-fold more for a ruble for conversion.

Last week, as is known, Tula was visited by the acting head of the Russian Federation Government, Yegor Gaydar. The visit was a full one and remarkable for the Tula defense industry, if one considers that a majority of the city’s enterprises operate in the interest of the military department. However literally a week after the trip, Yegor Gaydar promised to receive the directors of the Tula defense enterprises. It is assumed that this meeting will provide the answers to the official letter from the Tula Union of Directors.

Possibly Yegor Gaydar must be answered in a somewhat more specific manner by the General Director of the Tula State Machine Building Plant, Vadim Usov. And although Gaydar, while still in Tula, approved the letter from the director who represented more than 20,000 workers: “To Comrade Vavilov (first deputy minister of finances). I request that we together examine and find a satisfactory solution,” Director Usov clearly had questions. For example, with whom would this “together” be? If with him [Gaydar], then he might hope at least for something, but if with those to whom he had turned repeatedly, that is, to the MVES [Ministry of External Economic Ties, the Ministry of Economy and the Central Bank, then it would all go on following the old bureaucratic circle.

The enterprise managed by Vadim Usov delivered under contract military products to one of the European countries for an amount of several million U.S. dollars. They whisked for their money, for it was foreign exchange. Although all 200 articles were shipped out in April, as was envisaged by the contract, up to the present not a dollar has been received on the plant’s account. In the working draft of 9 June 1992, “between (the European country) and Russia, the payments for the delivery of the special equipment are to be used to offset reciprocal demands between Russia...” and the country where the products of the Usov plant were sold.

“It turns out that we have settled up Russia’s debts. Of course, on the one hand, it is flattering to be responsible for the entire state, but on the other, thousands of plant workers after filling the order (they worked several months!) ended up without any money,” said Usov.

Incidentally, the remaining Tula defense enterprises have ended up in the severest financial situation. Many of them are on the brink of bankruptcy. In the shops you feel an atmosphere of dissatisfaction. Thus the letter from the Tula directors to Yegor Gaydar and signed by N. Maslennikov (Tula Defense Plant), V. Usov (Tula Machine Building Plant), V. Mitin (the Die Plant), V. Shiryayev (the Cartridge Plant), V. Andrianov (Tula Precision Machine Building), L. Zavodchikov (Tula Coal), E. Trushin (Octave Plant), N. Makarovets (Alloy Plant) and V. Morozov (Tula Scientific Institute for Technical Information) was more than timely.

“The Conversion Law is not being carried out,” write the directors. “But up to the present there has been no government decision on the plan for the production and delivery of military products and military-end research and development for next year. The defense-end production and research and development have not been paid for. Regardless of the ukase from the Russian Federation President which allows the enterprises to sell weapons independently overseas, the foreign trade organizations of the Russian Federation MVES in every possible way impede this process while the enterprises producing the weapons and military equipment do not have income from the concluded contracts.”

The defense workers assume that the right of choosing a middleman has been given to them, but it is also possible for the foreign trade organizations of the Russian Federation MVES. Thus, the enterprise itself will set the amount of the commission fee depending upon the quality of the work done by the middleman. The foreign exchange earnings should go immediately to the account...
of the enterprises and they correspondingly will made deductions to the state, to the middlemen and the supplies. But this is the ruble part of the payment.

Among the demands of the members of the Tula Union of Directors is the revising of the amount of the export fees, taxes, bank fees and those of the “commission” foreign trade organizations, so that the enterprises would have left to them 60 percent of the net foreign exchange earnings from the contract value of the products.

“But we have not received this amount,” said the Director General of the Tula Cartridge Plant Association, Vasily Shirsayev. “The ninth month is drawing to a close and the money has still not been received on the enterprise’s account. It is hanging about in certain banks. Someone clearly is cashing in on the turnover. It can’t be otherwise. With the plant forces I have already completed several contracts and delivered the ammunition in the first quarter, but up to now there has been no payment.”

Yes, the defense workers are now being told: “You are independent.” But when the time arrives for the settling of accounts, no one is in any rush to share the earnings with them. The directors have even bombarded the superior bodies, including the government, with “confidential letters.”

However, the money still has not been received on the account of the manufacturing enterprise. Of course, the producers of the military products simply are not sitting there thinking up how they can operate better. The same Usov has organized in Tula the trade of products from his enterprise. The plant has even started a store and this is called Muravye. They sell motor scooters in it. With a credit of 350 million rubles for conversion, it manufactures many of the civilian products. But how can things be straightened out if there is 100 million rubles of the state’s property and possibly even more has been pledged for credits to the state, to the middlemen and the “commission” foreign trade organizations, so that the enterprises would have left to them 60 percent of the net foreign exchange earnings from the contract value of the products.

And to all else new difficulties are arising at the enterprises of the Tula defense industry. The latest news: they will be auctioned off. The workers have again raised questions: who will purchase the shares if the wages for a plant machinist are lower than those of a civilian worker? It is all well and good if the owners of the shares of the same Tula enterprises are our compatriots, but what if... Incidentally, it is better not to think about this.

Legislation on Dual-Use Chemical Export Controls

Presidental Directive
925D07504 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 3

[“Directive of the president of the Russian Federation: On Introduction of Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Chemicals and Technologies Which Are of Worldwide Significance But Can Be Used In the Creation of Chemical Weapons”]

[Text]

1. To approve the list submitted by the government of the Russian Federation of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but can be used in the creation of chemical weapons which are exported under licenses (appended).

2. The government of the Russian Federation is to approve the statute on the procedure for control of exports from the Russian Federation of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but can be used in the creation of chemical weapons.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
No. 508-rp.

List of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but can be used in the creation of chemical weapons and which are exported under licenses

Section I. Chemicals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of position</th>
<th>Name of chemical</th>
<th>Code on commodity list for foreign economic activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Compounds with one P-methyl, P-ethyl, or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>N, N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>N, N-diisopropylienothenane-2-thiol</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>N, N-diisopropylienothenane-2-ol</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>Diethyl- N, N-dimethylaminophosphates</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>pinacol alcohol</td>
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<td>3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>quinuclidine-3-ol</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>thiodiglycol</td>
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<td>arsenic trichloride</td>
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<td>1.12</td>
<td>dichloromethane carbonic acid</td>
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<td>triethylphosphite</td>
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</table>
List of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but can be used in the creation of chemical weapons and which are exported under licenses (Continued)

Section I. Chemicals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of position</th>
<th>Name of chemical</th>
<th>Code on commodity list for foreign economic activity</th>
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<td>.3-quinuclidine</td>
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<td>1.26.</td>
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<td>1.37.</td>
<td>phosphorus pentasulfide</td>
<td>281390100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.38.</td>
<td>diisopropylamine</td>
<td>292119900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.39.</td>
<td>diethyllaminoethanol</td>
<td>292219000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.40.</td>
<td>sodium sulfide</td>
<td>283010000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section II. Technologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of position</th>
<th>Name of technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.1.</td>
<td>Technology for producing compounds containing F-methyl, F-ethyl, or F-Propyl (normal or iso) compound:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.1.</td>
<td>dimethylmethylphosphonate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.2.</td>
<td>methylphosphonyldifluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.3.</td>
<td>methylphosphonyldichloride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.4.</td>
<td>diethylmethylphosphonate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.5.</td>
<td>ethylphosphonyldifluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.6.</td>
<td>ethylphosphonyldichloride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.7.</td>
<td>ethylphosphinyldifluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.8.</td>
<td>methylphosphinyldichloride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.9.</td>
<td>0-ethyl-2-diisopropylaminomethylmethylphosphonite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.10.</td>
<td>diethylmethylphosphonite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.11.</td>
<td>dimethylethylphosphonate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.12.</td>
<td>ethylphosphonyldifluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.13.</td>
<td>methylphosphonyldifluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.14.</td>
<td>phosphacrylate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.15.</td>
<td>phosdiol-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1.16.</td>
<td>estephane-383</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.1.17.</td>
<td>hexarane</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.1.18.</td>
<td>phostetrol I</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.1.19.</td>
<td>phostetrol II</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Government Decree


[Text] In keeping with the directive of the president of the Russian Federation of 16 September 1992 No. 508-rp "On Introduction of Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Chemicals and Technologies Which Are of Worldwide Significance But Can Be Used In the Creation of Chemical Weapons," the government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To approve the appended statute on the procedure for control of exports from the Russian Federation of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but may be used in the creation of chemical weapons.
2. Commissions for export control of the Russian Federation under the government of the Russian Federation in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation are to provide for organization of control of exports from the Russian Federation of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but may be used in the creation of chemical weapons.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar

Export Control Statute

925D0750C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 4

["Statute on the Procedure for Control of Exports from the Russian Federation of Chemicals and Technologies Which Are of Worldwide Significance But May Be Used in the Creation of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text]

1. The present statute specifies a complex of measures for control of exports of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but may be used in the creation of chemical weapons (henceforth called dual-use chemicals and technologies).

2. The procedure for control of exports from the Russian Federation of dual-use chemicals and technologies envisages:

—preparation and issuance of resolutions regarding the possibility of exporting dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the list approved by the president of the Russian Federation of chemicals and technologies which are of worldwide significance but may be used in the creation of chemical weapons and which are exported under licenses (henceforth called the List);

—licensing and declaration of exports of dual-use chemicals and technologies.

3. Subjects of economic activity on the territory of the Russian Federation or in places (points) under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Federation, regardless of the form of ownership, upon conclusion of contracts (agreements, treaties) for the export of dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the List, necessarily must indicate the requirement that the importer of these chemicals and technologies will not be used for purposes of production of chemical weapons, re-exported, or transferred to anyone else without the written permission of the exporter, which must be coordinated with the Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation under the government of the Russian Federation. Permission for re-exporting may be obtained upon fulfillment of the conditions indicated in the present point.

The obligations under the guarantees must be especially documented by the importer in the state organ of the importer country which regulates foreign economic activity for each concrete transaction for the delivery of each exported object included on the List.

4. Dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the List may not be exported from the Russian Federation or re-exported to a state that is violating the ban on the use of chemical weapons established by the 17 June 1925 Geneva protocol on banning wartime use of asphyxiating, toxic, or other similar gases and bacteriological means.

5. Licensing of the exportation of dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the List is mandatory for all subjects of economic activity on the territory of the Russian Federation, regardless of the form of ownership, and is done for all kinds of foreign economic activity, including direct production and scientific-technical ties, coastal and border trade, and commodity exchange operations in keeping with the present statute.

Dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the List are exported only under one-time licenses issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation.

The basis for the issuance of the license is a resolution of the commission for export control of the Russian Federation under the government of the Russian Federation concerning the possibility of exporting dual-use chemicals and technologies.

In order to obtain a resolution one sends to the export control division of the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation (103009. Moscow. Okhotnyy ryad. 1), which is a working organ of the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation, an application for the issuance of a license filled out in keeping with the requirements established by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation. Appended to the application are copies of the contract and a document specifying the importer's guarantees that the exported object will not be used for chemical weapons.

The decision to issue the resolution is made no later than 20 days after the aforementioned division receives the indicated documents. The resolution is sent by this division to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and a copy is sent to the applicant.

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties sends (in the agreed-upon form) to the export control division of the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation information on the licenses issued on the basis of the resolution.

6. Dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the List, when moved outside the Russian Federation, are subject to mandatory declaration in keeping with the established procedure.
The exporter submits to the customs control organs of the Russian Federation the declaration and a copy of the license that has been received, which serve as a basis for allowing the exported object to cross the borders of the Russian Federation.

The State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation submits (in the agreed-upon form) to the export control division of the Ministry of the Economy of the Russian Federation information on declarations that have been submitted for the exportation of goods and services for which the licenses and resolutions specified by Point 5 of the present statute have been issued.

7. Dual-use chemicals and technologies included on the List and shipped from the territory of the Russian Federation without submission of a customs declaration and a copy of the license or in violation of the established procedure for declaration are not allowed to pass.

**Tula Offers 6-Barreled 30-MM 9-A-621 Cannon for Sale**

*92UM0015B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 4*

[Advertisement under the heading “PO [Production Association] ‘Tula Machinery Construction Factory’ Offers”]

[Brief]

**SIX-BARREL AIRCRAFT CANNON**

30-mm six-barrel aircraft cannon is intended for arming fighter-bomber MiG-27, MiG-27K with the mission of destruction the aircrafts, helicopters and armoured vehicles [sic]. Operation of the automatic mechanisms is based on the principle of using the energy of the powder gases evacuated from the barrels. The cannon design employs a circuit of multibarrel weapons with a revolving cluster. The cannon is installed into the stationary built-in aircraft mount and the fire is remotely controlled.

**BASIC DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cartridges</th>
<th>high-explosive-incendiary shell; armour-piercing-incendiary-tracer shell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charge ignition method</td>
<td>elektric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass of cartridge</td>
<td>0.83 kg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feeding of cannon with cartridges</td>
<td>L.H., belt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply voltage</td>
<td>27 V DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure of compressed air supplied to pneumatic starter of cannon</td>
<td>70 plus 4/minus 5 kgf/sq.cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air consumption per one charging</td>
<td>70 l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating conditions</td>
<td>plus/minus 60°C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Address: 2, Mosin st., 300002, Tula, Russia
Telephone (0872) 31-74-65
Telex: 253114 ALFA SU
Telefax: (0872) 27-26-20

**MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**Navies in U.S., NATO Strategy**

*92UM1493A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 8-9, Aug-Sep 92 (signed to press 28 Aug 92) pp 95-101*

[Article by Captain 1st Rank N. Nikolayev under rubric “In Foreign Fleets”: “Navies in New U.S. and NATO Strategies”]

[Text] The qualitatively new military-political and military-strategic situation which took shape in the world by mid-1992 as a result of changes in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern European countries, the signing of treaties on reducing nuclear and conventional arms, and decisions made by the CIS (above all Russia), the United States and a number of other states to carry out unilateral reductions in their armed forces in upcoming years in addition to concluded agreements led to a considerably reduced danger of a large-scale conflict breaking out. Leading world states are re-examining their undertakings and goals in the international area as well as their military doctrines and strategies.

At the same time the principal meaning and content of the adjustment of policy of the United States and North Atlantic Alliance is to take maximum advantage of these changes to strengthen and expand their influence in the world arena. In the policy followed with respect to the CIS (Russia), their leadership is striving to ensure our country’s transition to capitalism in the economy and to western forms of democracy in the sociopolitical structure by means of political and ideological influence and by means of economic assistance that is meted out and oriented toward development of market relationships. Special attention here is given to encouraging a process of strengthening the political and economic independence of CIS member republics as a guarantee that a
more monolithic state capable of exerting significant influence on world processes will not arise on former USSR territory.

A statement by General Powell, chairman of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], is characteristic in this connection: "The disintegration of the former USSR and complete bankruptcy of its economic system threw the time periods of its possible attack on the United States and countries of Western Europe into the unforeseeable future. The armed forces of the former USSR are noncombat-ready, disorganized, and incapable of concentrating forces for attack in short time periods. It will take years and decades for Russia and the former Soviet republics to bring their armed forces to a modern level. This is enough time to modernize the U.S. Armed Forces and take them to a qualitatively new level of combat readiness."

Thus preconditions have been created in which only one superpower, the United States of America, possessing the means for exerting global influence—military potential, political influence and economic might—remains in world politics.

The American leadership continues to give special attention in carrying out its foreign policy aims to the development of options for use of military power as a means of deterring potential enemies or "punishing" them by direct armed intervention.

A new military strategy called "regional defense strategy" was adopted in the United States in August 1991. Its principal elements are military presence in forward areas, reaction to crises in regions vitally important for the country, deterrence of a probable enemy by strategic nuclear weapons, strategic defense, and retaining the capability of restoring forces if necessary.

On the whole, special emphasis in developing the new doctrinal provisions was placed on the need to refocus overall U.S. military strategy from a global conflict with the CIS (Russia) to ensuring regional security. Thus, American strategists re-evaluated the degree of threat on the part of the CIS (Russia) toward that of "third world" countries in connection with the overall change in the world military-political and military-strategic situation.

In this connection, by 1995-1997 it is planned to carry out a reduction and a certain reorganization of the U.S. Armed Forces. The following reduction is envisaged:

- Army divisions from 28 to 18;
- size of Marines from 196,000 to 160,000 persons;
- overall number of attack carrier groups from 15 to 12;
- Tactical Air Command wings from 36 to 25;
- Strategic Air Command wings from 21 to 17;
- Navy ships and vessels from 564 to 435.

But a statement made by U.S. President G. Bush during his "State of the Union" address to Congress on 28 January 1992 is not without interest with respect to the American leadership's approach to the problem of reduction: "We must not go back to the days of the hollow army. We cannot repeat the mistakes made twice in this century, when armistice was followed by recklessness and defense was purged as if the world were permanently safe."

This is why a reduction in the U.S. Navy's quantitative makeup (by an average of 25 percent) will be accomplished basically by placing ships of obsolete classes in the emergency reserve. But these ships can be introduced to the Navy order of battle under emergency conditions in 10-14 days. In the opinion of U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral F. Kelso, the planned reduction in the American Navy's numerical strength will not reflect on its combat power in any way inasmuch as there will be a considerable increase in the number of ships carrying precision weapons, above all Tomahawk cruise missiles. In 1995 it is planned to have around 150 of these weapon platforms in the U.S. Navy, including 66 surface combatants and 83 nuclear powered submarines. In Admiral Kelso's assessment, the latter circumstance will entail changes in forms and methods of employing U.S. Navy general purpose forces.

With respect to reorganization, the U.S. Armed Forces evidently will include two main components: strategic offensive forces and general purpose forces. The former will be included in the U.S. Armed Forces unified Strategic Command, in whose makeup it is proposed to have 18 SSBN's, 550 ICBM's and 181 strategic bombers (including 20 new B-2 bombers) by the late 1990's. The general purpose forces will operate in the form of three main commands: U.S. Armed Forces Atlantic and Pacific and U.S. Contingency Forces (Table 1).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formations</th>
<th>Makeup of Forces in Forward Areas (Outside the United States)</th>
<th>Makeup of Forces for Reaction to a Crisis Situation (Located in the United States)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force tactical fighter wings</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier task groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine expeditionary brigades</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the new military strategy which was adopted, a U.S. Armed Forces JCS joint staff working group developed seven possible war scenarios for the period up to the year 2000 (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Area</th>
<th>Probable Enemy and Nature of Threat to United States</th>
<th>Number of U.S. Forces Used in Conflict</th>
<th>Goal of U.S. Operations</th>
<th>Attainment of Success by U.S. Forces (By End of Day...)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eurasian continent (one country or coalition of countries)</td>
<td>A global threat to the United States that has appeared, such as on the part of Russia</td>
<td>Restored U.S. forces</td>
<td>Achieve removal of Russian and Belarusian forces from the Baltic, having weakened Russia's military potential</td>
<td>D89-D90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>Russia and Belarus invade Lithuania</td>
<td>7-10 Army divisions; up to 4 Army brigades; 1-2 Marine expeditionary divisions; 45-63 fighter squadrons; 4 heavy bomber squadrons; 6-8 carrier task groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>Iraq invades Kuwait and Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5 Army divisions; 1 Marine expeditionary division; 15 fighter squadrons; 4 heavy bomber squadrons; 3 carrier task groups</td>
<td>In first phase contain Iraqi Armed Forces after inflicting damage on them; in second phase defeat Iraqi Armed Forces by counteroffensive over seven days</td>
<td>D54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>North Korea invades Republic of Korea territory</td>
<td>5 army divisions; 2 Marine expeditionary divisions; 16 fighter squadrons; 4 heavy bomber squadrons; 5 carrier task groups</td>
<td>In first phase contain North Korean Armed Forces together with ROK Armed Forces; in second phase defeat them by counteroffensive over 28 days without making it necessary for North Korea to employ nuclear weapons</td>
<td>D90-D91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf and Korean Peninsula (simultaneously)</td>
<td>Iraq and North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>First defeat Iraqi Armed Forces; then, after strategic redeployment of forces, defeat North Korean Armed Forces in 157 days</td>
<td>D70; D227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Islands</td>
<td>American citizens taken hostage by putschists</td>
<td>1-2 army divisions; 1 Marine expeditionary brigade</td>
<td>Free hostages by airborne and amphibious assault forces</td>
<td>D7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Threat by rightist forces to close Canal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Take airports and seaports by airborne and amphibious assault forces</td>
<td>D7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wars and armed conflicts on the territory of third world countries—"regional conflicts"—are considered most likely. A war against Russia, successor to the USSR which retains the capability of destroying the United States of America by nuclear weapons, also is not precluded.

A variant of a war of the NATO bloc against Russia and Belarus for the Baltic is new. The Americans assume that in case an expansionist, authoritarian government comes to power in Russia, it will demand that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia grant autonomy to Russians. After 6-8 months of rising tension, a ground force grouping consisting of 24 divisions (18 Russian and 6 Belarusian) will begin an offensive westward along the Lithuanian-Polish border, after which Lithuania will turn to NATO for help.

After initially deploying a portion of reaction forces in Poland, the NATO bloc will bring the force grouping up to 18 divisions and 66 tactical air squadrons in 30 days of the threat period. Initially 7 heavy (armored and mechanized) divisions, 1 Marine expeditionary division, 45 tactical air squadrons, 4 strategic air squadrons, and 6 carrier task groups from the U.S. Armed Forces will become part of the NATO Allied Forces grouping. If necessary, this grouping will be reinforced by 3 U.S. Army light divisions and 4 separate brigades, 1 Marine expeditionary division, 18 tactical air squadrons and 2 carrier task groups. The Americans believe they will achieve success in 89-90 days of war.

The appearance of a global war, which can result from the arrival of a strong antidemocratic government to power in Russia and a rise in the global threat to the United States (after 1994), is a less likely scenario. American strategists assume that by the year 2000 "some one country or coalition of countries will begin following a hostile policy in the security sphere and will obtain a military potential which will create a threat to U.S. interests through global military rivalry." In attempting to achieve its goals by political means, the United States will begin building up national military might. The outcome of a global war (including a nuclear war) is not forecast because of its uncertainty.

In November 1991 the North Atlantic Alliance leadership adopted a "new NATO strategic concept," which essentially is a bloc coalition military doctrine for the transition period up to the end of the 1990's. Despite official recognition of a reduced threat on the part of the former Soviet Union, in this concept only the CIS (Russia) is considered a potential enemy of NATO under conditions of the new military-strategic situation in Europe. But the aim of preparing NATO Allied Forces for two kinds of wars—general and limited—is kept unchanged.

"Nuclear deterrence," based on the principle of being first to employ nuclear weapons, has remained a fundamental principle of coalition military strategy. And although this deterrence will be carried out with a lowered level of nuclear arms, emphasis is placed on developing means of delivering air-launched and sea-launched nuclear weapons.

The new strategic concept envisages a reorganization of NATO Allied Forces formations and units into highly mobile multinational formations, an upgrading of the system for building up armed forces groupings in Europe in case the situation becomes aggravated, development of an optimum ratio of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe with consideration of the reduced role of nuclear weapons, and a transition from the concept of "forward defense" to that of "reduced forward presence."

This concept presumes rejection of a linear disposition of bloc forces along the borders of Germany under peacetime conditions and their transition to an echeloned dispersal within the entire European Theater with the main grouping stationed in rear areas. It also envisages a substantial increase in troop mobility and in their readiness to concentrate on any threatened axis in a short time in order to inflict maximum damage on the enemy and support the deployment of reinforcing troops.

Reorganization of NATO Allied Forces presumes the following:

- a reduction in the number of main commands from three (Atlantic, European and Channel) to two (Atlantic and European);
- a change in the zone of responsibility of NATO Allied Forces commands in Europe; transfer of Denmark and Land Schleswig-Holstein to Allied Forces Central Europe and also formation of a new Allied Forces Northwestern Theater command based on the former Allied Command Channel and the Norwegian Armed Forces, which previously were part of Allied Forces Northern Europe;
- establishment of three categories of multinational armed forces: reaction forces (including "Immediate Reaction Forces" and "Rapid Reaction Forces"), main defensive forces, and reinforcing forces.

With respect to NATO Allied Naval Forces, it is envisaged employing them both in the "Immediate Reaction Forces" as well as in the "Rapid Reaction Forces." American Admiral L. Edney, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, developed a so-called "block (modular) structure" of NATO Allied Naval Force elements in accordance with which increasingly larger "blocks (modules)" will be included in the aforementioned categories of NATO forces in the form of task groups, task forces and expanded task forces depending on tension of the situation. The makeup, purpose and periodicity of activation of NATO Allied Naval Force elements are shown in Table 3.
It is proposed to include in “Immediate Reaction Forces” (IRF) the coalition forces which are in daily readiness and are in permanent operational subordination to NATO commands, including the NATO Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic.

A standing force already exists in the Atlantic. It is believed that in a period of threat each of six countries (United States, Great Britain, FRG, Norway, Canada, Netherlands) will allocate not one each, as under day-to-day conditions, but 3-6 combatant ships each to its makeup. The period for making the expanded force cohesive will take 1-4 weeks.

Formation of a NATO Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean was officially announced in Naples on 30 April 1992; combatant ships of the US, UK, FRG, Greek, Italian, Turkish, Spanish and Dutch navies of the “guided missile destroyer-frigate” type were included in it (a total of up to eight units).

The NATO Standing Naval Forces Baltic as well as standing logistic support groups in these theaters still have to be established. In contrast to the Mediterranean force, it will include four task groups: attack (five ships of the guided missile destroyer-guided missile frigate type), minesweeping (up to four minesweepers and minelayers), ASW (submarines and shore-based patrol aircraft) and light forces (guided missile patrol boats).

Under the concept, all standing forces and groups must be in readiness to begin performing combat missions within 24 hours from the moment the order is received.

In the “Rapid Reaction Forces” (RRF) it is proposed to include multinational force organizations established as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Organization</th>
<th>Makeup</th>
<th>Purpose of Force Organization</th>
<th>Periodicity of Assembly of Force Organizations in Day-to-Day Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standing task force</td>
<td>Similar to makeup of NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Mediterranean (usually 3-5 surface combatants of destroyer and frigate types)</td>
<td>Naval presence in zone of responsibility in peacetime. Observation and naval presence in period of crisis by reinforced makeup of NATO Standing Force</td>
<td>Conducts constant activity and is dissolved only for Christmas and New Year holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO task group (for on-call operations)</td>
<td>8-10 new cruisers and destroyers for performing functions of a multipurpose force (at least one surface combatant must be fitted out as a command ship; all surface combatants must have LINK 2 and SATCOM communication systems)</td>
<td>Observation and naval presence in crisis period. Readiness for operations in limited conflict</td>
<td>Rehearsal of operations of each task group is envisaged at least once a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO task force (for on-call operations)</td>
<td>Elements of NATO task group with one multipurpose/ASW carrier. A group of landing ships with Marines (for example, Anglo-Dutch) can be included here</td>
<td>Providing additional capabilities for achieving sea supremacy, winning air superiority, and delivering strikes against shore. Amphibious landing forces are intended for limited operations</td>
<td>Rehearsal of operations of each task force is envisaged at least once every two years during major exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO operational formation (for on-call operations)</td>
<td>Several multipurpose carrier groups and an amphibious landing force at full strength</td>
<td>Readiness for operations under conditions of an increasingly complicated crisis situation</td>
<td>Rehearsal of operations of each operational formation is envisaged once every 1.5-5 years during major exercises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is the naval forces as no other branch of the Armed Forces that can be effectively employed both in wartime as well as peacetime. Possessing over half of the practically invulnerable submarine-launched strategic nuclear munitions, powerful attack aviation, and mobile
Marines, the U.S. and NATO naval forces contain a constant strategic threat to essentially any region of the globe.

The Persian Gulf conflict showed that it was the naval forces that were first to form a full-weight grouping in the Near East—two U.S. Navy multipurpose carrier groups were operating in this region just ten days after it began. Because of its dependence on the basing system, even highly mobile Air Force aviation was forced to spend more time on deployment (over 14 days) than ship forces and the U.S. Marines.

U.S. Secretary of the Navy L. Garrett expressed himself about the growing importance of the role of naval forces under present conditions in his report to the U.S. Congress of 1 December 1991: "In the emerging world military-political situation, U.S. naval forces remain the only branch of the Armed Forces capable in peacetime of most effectively implementing an American military presence in any part of the world, providing a show of force and controlling strategically important ocean areas."

The outfitting of naval forces of the United States and its allies with qualitatively new means of warfare and the growth of their combat capabilities connected with this are reflected in modern concepts of combat employment of naval forces. The "U.S. forward maritime strategy" and NATO naval strategy (both adopted in 1986) are designed above all for active operations by forces off our shores. They are oriented toward preparing naval forces for a wide-scale war using conventional and nuclear weapons and for conducting active offensive operations against our fleets in all ocean and sea sectors.

The immediate mission is considered to be that of sealing off and defeating the main forces of our fleets before they move to lines in the West (Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain) and in the East (Aleutians-Kuriles-Japanese Islands). In the assessment of the U.S. and NATO naval commands, its accomplishment pursues the following primary goals: taking the strategic and operational initiative at sea in one's hands, forcing our Navy to conduct defensive operations in our own coastal areas of sea and ocean theaters of military operations, and ensuring the security of strategic transoceanic lines of communication of paramount importance for ground force groupings of armed forces of the United States, NATO and their allies in Europe and the Far East. It is planned to achieve those goals during the first operations of the initial period of war by winning and firmly holding superiority in areas immediately contiguous with our territorial waters (in the Norwegian and Mediterranean seas and Sea of Japan, and on the Kamchatka operational axis). The subsequent mission is to seal off and destroy our fleets in their basing areas by active combat operations of naval and air forces and by wide use of mine ordnance.

Modern U.S. and NATO naval strategies find their implementation in fundamental concepts of combat employment of naval forces—"forward naval lines" (United States) and "forward defense at sea" (NATO)—and in the principle of "flexible employment of forces in operations" (United States and NATO).

The concept of "forward naval lines" ("forward defense at sea") envisages establishing a nuclear-missile threat from all sea sectors above all by deploying carrier and missile attack forces in forward sea and ocean areas, sealing off the Navy's forces off our shores, and preventing deployment of our fleets into ocean zones for the purpose of considerably reducing intensity of military operations on ocean lines of communication.

The goal of the principle of "flexible employment of forces in operations" is to increase readiness and efficiency of deploying naval attack groupings, which is achieved by a rapid buildup of these forces, above all carrier forces, in the necessary area and at a given time and by their flexible employment according to place, time and makeup in accordance with the existing situation. In accordance with this principle, under day-to-day conditions one multipurpose carrier group each is part of forward groupings of the Sixth and Seventh fleets, as well as in the Indian Ocean; if necessary they concentrate quickly in given areas and are reinforced by additional carrier and operational missile groups which are in a high degree of combat readiness or are rehearsing combat training missions off U.S. shores. Using that same Persian Gulf conflict as an example, three weeks after it began (on 2 August 1990, the day Iraqi Armed Forces invaded Kuwaiti territory) three U.S. Navy multipurpose carrier groups and one operational missile group already were operating in this region.

Following the adoption of new U.S. and NATO military strategies, the American and North Atlantic Alliance commands began active work to develop a new naval strategy for the period up to the year 2000. In the opinion of American and NATO strategists, this was occasioned by the new conditions in which the threat to their fleets on the part of our Navy is reduced.

In the Americans' opinion, under these conditions it is necessary to carry out a balanced reduction of the Navy's ship order of battle without reducing its combat power by changing priorities in U.S. Navy organizational development programs. In particular, a new concept was advanced in the U.S. Navy for creating advanced large surface combatants based on a common hull (around 35,000 tons displacement): amphibious assault ship, attack-assault carrier, light attack carrier, guided missile patrol boat mother ship and logistic support vessel. They also believe this will permit considerably reducing funds allocated for building ships because of the high degree of standardization and unification of equipment and technologies, and also reducing the likelihood of correctly identifying ships and ship forces from external distinguishing signs. In addition it is considered possible to significantly increase U.S. Marine combat power and thereby bring naval forces to the foreground in medium and low intensity conflicts, which in the American
assessments will become the basic form of crisis situations in the future up to the end of the 1990's.

According to a statement by the U.S. Navy leadership, the role of Marines will grow considerably in the 1990's. The experience of combat employment of task forces of Marine ground and air forces in the war against Iraq indicates that the forward presence of Marine formations and subunits in potential world crisis areas is the main prerequisite for successful, rapid attainment of American military and political goals there. The principal task here is to ensure opportunities for Marine task forces to accomplish missions assigned the Marines both independently and as part of joint U.S. army, air and naval forces in any area of the world, as was the case in the war against Iraq.

An analysis of official information on development of new U.S. and NATO naval strategies provides grounds to assume that basic missions of naval forces for the 1990's with respect to the CIS (Russian) Joint Armed Forces and Navy have not undergone substantial changes. But final formulation of basic provisions of the new U.S. and NATO naval strategies and bringing their navies into line with their aims should be expected in the mid-1990's (in the absence of sharp changes in the world military-strategic situation).


Military Forces Arrayed in Georgia-Abkhaz Conflict
92UM1448A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Sep 92 pp 1,2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "The War with Separatists' on Mountains and Beaches: Survey of August Combat Actions"]

[Text] The political struggle has been supplanted by outright armed conflict in virtually all southern areas adjacent to the former Union. Instead of gatherings attended by thousands, there are now tank battles, sieges, probing actions, and air and artillery strikes. Power, glory, and booty are now enjoyed by those who have acquired—by hook or crook—the most artillery pieces and armor. The troops of various "national" guards and armies are subordinated largely to "field" commanders, not to "civilian" authority, a situation that leads to constant political instability, for the battles against the "external" enemy (the "separatists") are subject to increasingly frequent internal, internecine conflicts and coups.

In Georgia there are five separate "armies": the National Guard; Mkhedrioni; detachments of "zviadists"; and Ossetian and Abkhazian home guards. The National Guard of Kitovani and the Mkhedrioni of Ioseliani are currently operating jointly in Western Georgia (against the zviadists) and in Abkhazia, but their subordination to Georgia State Soviet Chairman Shevardnadze is quite tenuous.

The remaining "armies" in Georgia are independent of the State Soviet, including in the formal sense. That which is currently taking place there may be said to constitute entirely natural competition ("struggle for existence"), one which will end when the strongest "army" will destroy the others and assume power in a country that is "liberated from tyranny; unified and independent." The same as what happened in Spain after Generalissimo Franco's victory in the Civil War. Incidentally, Georgia is not Spain, and the Caucasus is not the Pyrenees. Every victory in the Caucasus is temporary. There is little faith in a Spanish flowering of a Caucasian "Iberia."

Also unstable is the internal situation in Azerbaijan, where the political power is in the hands of the People's Front, but the army is subordinated to Defense Minister Rakhim Gaziyev ("creator of the NAA" [Azerbaijan National Army]). Gaziyev emerged from the People's Front in the fall of 1991, at which time he was appointed to the post of defense minister by Yakub Mamedov, not by incumbent President Abulfaz Elchibey. Informed observers are of the opinion that Rakhim Gaziyev operates independently of the President and the government, certainly not in the interests of the People's Front.

In Moldova, the active patriotic agitation activity of the People's Front there, which is especially successful in the case of armed volunteers—"veterans" of the Dniester area war—may soon end in a coup, the same as in the case of Baku and Tbilisi. (This is especially true of the completion of the presidential elections held in Romania.) Thus, the real power would go to the adherents of the "war to the victorious conclusion."

Only in Armenia does a legally elected President wield full control of the Armed Forces and the situation in the country. However, new battlefield failures in Karabakh may result in the assumption of power by more militant forces in Armenia.

Thus, in all the above independent states, an endless war for "national interests" ("against separatists"), one interrupted from time to time by more or less extended periods of peace—is almost inevitable. A war waged in the southern areas of the former Union feeds itself: Power tends to go to those who see an advantage in a military situation and in new campaigns.

To conquer the "bandits," and obtain "national sovereignty," there is need for a guard force; to counter a mutinous guard force, for an army; to deal with a recalcitrant army, for intervention ("peacekeeping forces," the U.N., CSCE, NATO, etc.). An endless number of cycles of this sort, as has occurred, may come about. (Just look at the history of Lebanon from 1973 to the present.)

Sea Mines to Float at Gagra

On 4 August in Tbilisi, Shevardnadze made the triumphant announcement of the "national reconciliation."
There was a release of political prisoners, including Valter Shurgaya, the leader of the 24 June failed coup.

The National Guard discontinued its efforts to take Tskhinval after the attempted coup. In Dagomys in the evening of the same day—24 June—Eduard Shevardnadze signed an agreement calling for an end to fighting and troop deployment in Ossetia. This agreement did actually take effect, in contradistinction to the preceding ones.

After peace set in around Tskhinval (ignoring minor firefightes and mortar shelling), there was a quickening in the pace of transfer of weapons to the Georgian National Army (the Guard plus the Mkhedrioni). Especially noteworthy was the Georgian acquisition of Mi-24 fire support helicopters.

All the weapons of the guards motorized rifle division in Akhalsikhe were turned over to the State Soviet. This division was at reduced strength, i.e., it had virtually no enlisted and noncommissioned conscript personnel, but it did possess sufficient combat vehicles and armament for expansion to full strength.

On 11 August, the “national reconciliation” talks being held in Zugdidi ended with the kidnapping of Georgian Internal Affairs Minister Gventsadze and, along with him, the other members of the State Soviet delegation. It was alleged that Valter Shurgaya participated in the kidnapping. This ended the “national reconciliation” for a time. State Soviet troops were rapidly redeployed to Western Georgia (more than 3,000 men, more than 100 pieces of armor). Incidentally, if one looks at the speed at which which the shock group was assembled in the Zugdidi area (especially in light of the condition of the Georgian roads, most notably railroads), all the preparatory work must have been carried out previously. Incidentally, Zugdidi was taken without armed conflict.

Georgian troops as early as the eve of 14 August crossed the Inguri River to enter Abkhaz territory. An armored assault column took Gali and Ochamchire on the move, crossed the bridge over the Kodori River, and entered Sukhumi by 12 o’clock. The State Soviet troops were joined by local Georgian armed units. Combat helicopters provided air support. The Abkhaz armed posts were crushed.

According to an official statement issued by the Georgia State Soviet Press Center, the Georgian troops entered Sukhumi to guard the bridges, railroad, and other strategic facilities, and to carry out the plan for freeing the hostages. The operation was personally headed by Tengiz Kitovani.

On 14 August, armed followers of Gamsakhurdia freed Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Roman Gventsadze. He spoke on Georgian television, saying that he had been treated “well” and that “the hostages could have escaped without particular difficulty, but that they did not wish to do that, to prevent bloodshed.” Freed on 19 August was Georgian Vice Premier Aleksandr Kavsadze, who had been kidnapped on 9 July. Starting with 17 and 18 of August, the subject of the “hostages,” as a justification for the Abkhaz campaign, received decreasing attention by official Georgian propaganda.

At the same time, the Georgian Army’s actions in Abkhazia were extraordinarily successful. Only in the center of Sukhumi, not far from the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet building, did the Georgian units encounter any organized resistance. The city was subjected to attack by combat helicopters. The following persons were killed on the premises of the Moskovskiy Okrug sanatorium of the PVO [Air Defense]: Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Katkov; Reserve Major Mikhail Khomenko; and Masha Stanovskikh, 18-year-old wife of a captain. Several persons suffered wounds. All the harm, according to witnesses, was inflicted by the fire of the Georgian helicopters.

The Georgian National Army is equipped with four Mi-24 fire support helicopters (two Mi-24Ps and two Mi-24Vs). The helicopters were not “privatized,” stolen or purchased by the “fighters”; they were officially handed over by the Russian Army from the Telavi helicopter regiment in the last half of July, on the very threshold of the Abkhaz campaign. It is alleged that the crews of the helicopters consisted of “volunteers” selected from regular personnel of the regiment. Several helicopter wings (reduced-strength squadrons) were rapidly deployed from Tskhinval to Telavi in the spring of 1992 as “replacements” for Mi-26 transport giants withdrawn from there.

The Mi-24P is armed with an onboard 30-millimeter aircraft gun. In addition, it is capable of carrying externally-suspended pods of multiple unguided rockets and guided missiles, with the latter including antitank guided missiles. The Mi-24P can drop fragmentation-incendiary bombs and napalm. The crew consists of two men. There is a troop compartment (for eight to 10 men), which is normally empty. (The lift is insufficient for simultaneously carrying troops, full tanks, and externally-suspended weapons.) The helicopter is protected from small-arms fire. Speed is 300 kilometers per hour.

The Mi-24V is armed with a 12.7-millimeter, four-barrel, rapid-fire aircraft gun. The remaining armament and data are the same as that of the Mi-24P.

After the attack on the city and PVO sanatorium, SU-27 fighters from the PVO base at Gudauta appeared in the sky over Sukhumi, the purpose being to exert pressure on the combatants. The aircraft did not use their weapons. Nonetheless, the Georgian units discontinued their advance, even leaving the center of the city. An evacuation of resting people by sea and military transport aircraft was initiated. Troops of the 104th Airborne Division stationed at Gyanzdza (Azerbaijan) were rapidly deployed there to lend support to the operation.

On 15 August, Georgian troops were landed at Gantiadi, not far from Leselidze, where the Russo-Georgian border runs along the Psou River. The State Soviet troops
covered the Maritime Highway and the Leselidze railroad, and they took Gagra, where they joined up with the local Georgian detachment (allegedly the Mkhedrioni). The Georgian troops then headed south in the direction of Pitsunda, up to the Bzyb River.

After the evacuation of the greater part of the resting people from Sukhumi was completed, the Georgian Army (Kitovani Guard) resumed its advance in the morning of 18 August. The Kitovani headquarters set itself up in the southern outskirts of Sukhumi. The Abkhaz forces pulled away and dug in on the northern banks of the Gumista River. At 12:30, two officers from General Gela Lanchava's subunit lowered the Abkhaz flag flying over the Abkhaz Armed Forces building and raised the Georgian flag.

"The Abkhaz campaign has come to an end," stated Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani on that day as he was interviewed by a NEGA correspondent. He also explained Abkhazia's new state arrangement: "Georgia's State Soviet, acting in concert with National Guard headquarters, had decided to create the Temporary Council on Management of the State of Emergency in Abkhazia."

In an interview held several days later with the newspaper RESPUBLIKA GRUZIA, Tengiz Kitovani absolutely insisted that Vladislav Ardzinba, head of the Abkhaz Parliament, retire. "It is my opinion that the Abkhaz Parliament be dissolved. As far as protection of the Abkhaz people is concerned, we can do that ourselves, without outside help," said Kitovani.

Vladislav Ardzinba appealed for help to the U.N. and President Yeltsin, but this, incidentally, was unsuccessful. Boris Yeltsin allegedly advised Ardzinba during their telephone conversation to "work on all the problems in concert with Georgian Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani."

Quite different was the reaction of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (KGNK). On 18 August in Grozny, the KGNK Parliament condemned the Georgian State Soviet policy and that of the Russian leadership. On 22 August, KGNK President Musa (Yuriy) Shaniyev and KGNK Parliament Chairman Yusup Soslambekov signed a decree relative to "the rapid deployment of volunteers to Abkhaz soil to offer armed resistance to the aggressors," "terrorist acts" committed in the Tbilisi area, the declaration that "all persons of Georgian origin located on the soil of theconfederation are to be treated as hostages," and the blockade of Georgia. Incidentally, resolutions passed by the KGNK, essentially a public organization, are not binding with respect to the member republics. In addition, the North Caucasian republics that possess their own armed units of any size ("national guards")—Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingush Republic—are less than enthusiastic about sending them to Abkhazia. They need to keep their troops close to home, just in case, perhaps to be used against each other. Thus, what was sent to Abkhazia were unarmed, hastily assembled detachments of volunteers, mostly from Kabarda, Cherkesia, and Adyge.

In his 27 August Appeal to the Leadership of Georgia and Abkhazia, President Yeltsin stated: "As far as we are concerned, we intend to take all measures necessary to put an end to attempts by armed volunteer detachments to penetrate Georgian territory." Units of Russian border troops, the MVD, and troops of the Transcaucasus Group of Forces are taking active measures to localize the Abkhaz conflict. Nonetheless, several hundred volunteers were able to squeeze their way into Abkhazia via Klukhorskiy Pass, in which lies the only road there through the Major Caucasian Ridge (Teberda-Tsebelo-Sukhumi). In addition, local guides were successful in leading several detachments over the Caucasian Ridge in the Rits Lake area (the favorite rest spot of people's leader Stalin).

The Abkhaz campaign did not end with the taking of Sukhumi. While the evacuation was in progress, the Abkhazians were able to recover from the defeats they suffered in the first week of the war. Also, the Georgian troops were busily engaged in pillaging and sending their booty home, so that for some time they were in no mood for a new advance.

The principal military and political missions of the campaign—complete control over the coastal single-track rail line to Russia and the parallel motor highway, and elimination of Vladislav Ardzinba's regime, were not accomplished. The Georgian troops occupied the Gali and Ochamchire areas, and the coast as far as Sukhumi. Also occupied was a beachhead in the north—Leselidze-Gantiadi-Gagra-Kolkhida. Abkhaz forces are still in control of the republic's mountainous and near-cities and a piece of the coast between the Gumista River in the south to the Bzyb River in the north (the Sukhumi suburb of Esfera-Novyy Afon-Gudauta-Pitsunda). Vladislav Ardzinba and a large number of Abkhaz members of the Supreme Soviet set up operations in Guda. The Abkhazians have been able to create a more or less stable defense front along the Gumista. In the north, between Pitsunda and Gagra, there is no continuous front. Fighting groups are operating on both sides.

Position warfare has been initiated, with the Georgians enjoying complete superiority in heavy armament and in the air, while the Abkhazians possess only knowledge of the area, skill in launching counterattacks at night, and courage borne of despair. On the night leading into 26 August, Home Guard detachments and KGNK volunteers moved from the direction of the mountains to attack Georgian guard subunits in the Gagra area and the railroad station located in Sukhumi. The Georgians, as acknowledged by Eduard Shevardnadze, suffered heavy losses. Colonel Karkarashvili, the new commander in Abkhazia, issued his now famous ultimatum, whereby he would exterminate all 97,000 Abkhazians if they continued to resist, even if this would cost 100,000 Georgian
lives. Incidentally, the ultimatum's deadline (1300 hours, 26 August) passed virtually without incident.

On 29 August, Tengiz Kitovani, Vladislav Ardzinba, and Sergei Shoygu, chairman of the Russian Parliament's Commission on Emergencies, met in Sochi. They reached another cease fire agreement, which no one intended to honor, of course. Incidentally, according to Kitovani, they discussed an even more important topic: future Russo-Georgian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia. It appears a Russo-Georgian agreement will be concluded in Moscow on 3 September, one dealing with peaceful settlement in Abkhazia, as based on the following obvious principles: withdrawal of the Georgian National Guard; disarming of "illegal units" and creating peacekeeping forces, which will watch over strategically important routes located on the soil of Abkhazia. Georgia's position will be completely constructive, since this, after all, is the purpose behind the insertion of Georgian troops into Abkhazia. Indidentally, the military "booty" undoubtedly played a fairly substantial role, especially as far as the campaign's rank and file were concerned.

Nonetheless, before there occurs a "separation," the Georgian troops most likely will attempt to take the last unoccupied piece of the Black Sea coast. On the evening before 1 September, Georgian armor forded the Gumista but could not break into Novyy Afn, in spite of air support. Lightly-armed Abkhaz Home Guard members were able to disable several tanks and, by day's end, stop the breakthrough.

However, they could not hold on for long. Professor Dzhaba Ioseliani (head of the Mkhedrioni) allegedly arrived at Gagra with a detachment of fighting men to personally take over the northern front. It appears that the advance toward Gudauta will proceed concentrically and at the same time as the "peacekeeping" efforts of Russian diplomacy.

That is when the strike large units of the Georgian Guard will actually leave Abkhazia. For the sole unoccupied place is Tskhinval, around which the present Georgian Army formed (during the long and unsuccessful siege). After all, the taking of Tskhinval and liberating of Shido-Kartli is for the Army a matter of honor (and of glory and political influence for the leaders and of booty for soldiers). Incidentally, after Ossetia there will still be plenty of reasons to launch new campaigns into Western Georgia, Adzharia, and once more into Abkhazia.

And in the intervals, after the next "peacemaking," the Georgian Army will take up its demand for, and most likely be given, new weapons by the Transcaucasus Group of Forces. (As "gratitude for its constructive position at the negotiations." All the more since the major part of the troops of this unfortunate group is stationed just there—on Georgian soil. So a source there will be.

The following are stationed in Georgia: a motorized rifle division of almost full strength, located in Akhalkalaki (Novaya Krepost); a reduced-strength division in Batumi; a tank training regiment in Gori; an airborne assault brigade in Kutaisi; numerous separate artillery units; and units and large units of the PVO.

Appearing on North Ossetian television on 20 August, Colonel General Gennadiy Filatov, commander of the mixed peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, noted that "the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia have virtually accomplished their mission. The settlement process has become irreversible."

The chances are high that the Russian "peacekeepers" will soon be withdrawn, for they will be needed in other areas, since the demand for them is growing, while the number of Russian Army combat-ready large units is quite limited. When this happens, the Guard and the Mkhedrioni after the subsequent "bandit attack" or "stealing" will once take up the campaign, the ultimate mission of which will not be Sukhumi or Tskhinval, but Tbilisi, where the problem of who is to rule Georgia will be decided.

Situation in Nalchik Deteriorating

93UM00154 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Oct 92 p 3


[Text] The situation in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria continues to be tense. Col Khuseyn Kashirgov, an instructor in the military department of one of the local institutes, addressed an unsanctioned meeting at the republic's Soviet Center. He called upon the men present on the square immediately to sign up for combat detachments.

Other speakers usually advance two demands: that Valeriy Kokov, republic president, resign and that internal-troop units of the Russian Federation leave the city immediately. At first glance these appear to be different demands. They have a great deal in common, however. This was underscored in an interview I conducted with Maj Gen Anatoliy Kulikov, directorate chief of the Main Directorate of the Commander of Internal Troops of the Russian Federation's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

"The troops are here," Anatoliy Sergeyevich stated, "to provide security for the population and to protect the legal government elected by the people. We are coping with this mission for now."

"The situation in the city is worsening, however. Combat formations are being formed with local residents. The approaches to Nalchik are being blocked. The airport is not operating. We are therefore unable to send
soldiers wounded while defending the building housing the republic's Supreme Soviet to the MVD's Central Hospital."

I met with those servicemen. One of them is Sgt Aleksandr Shestakov, a squad commander. He was wounded in the head and arm.

"We were guarding the Soviet Center that day," Aleksandr told me. "A battalion from Russia was deployed to our left. They took the main thrust of the attack. We rushed to their aid. I was surrounded at once by six men. Young men, but their eyes were filled with so much hatred."

Aleksandr feels that he was lucky. Pvt Igor Drokov, who arrived with the subunits, almost lost his life. He was sent to the hospital's resuscitation section with two knife wounds in the back (!).

In one of the tents there I met soldiers from a local internal-troop battalion. They were all from Kabardinia.

"I do not know what has happened to our people," one of them told me. "Where did this ardent nationalism come from?"

That same day I visited the republic's Soviet Center, which continues to be guarded by special internal-troop subunits of the Russian Federation's MVD together with the police. Maj Valeriy Bushuyev, commander of the subunit, made the point that it is the subunit's mission to prevent bloodshed.

Will it be able to cope with that mission? The commander has confidence in his men.

"The problem is," the officer explained, "that there is absolutely no logic in the actions of those attending the meetings. Many of them simply do not know what they are doing or what the outcome could be. There would be big trouble if they were to acquire firearms."

This cannot be ruled out. The Caucasus area is saturated with weapons, which have recently literally flooded into the southern regions of Russia.

"According to our information," Maj Gen Anatoliy Kulikov said by way of confirming this, "the arsenals of various illegal armed formations contain several dozen rifled weapons."

SECURITY SERVICES

Additional Internal Troops Transferred Nearer Caucasus
92UM1496A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 2
[Article from ITAR-TASS: "The South of Russia Protected by MVD Troops"]
[Text] About 10 specialized motorized police battalions from the Russian Internal Troops from the Volga Region and central oblasts of the country have been moved into the Caucasus regions of the Russian Federation. This was learned from well-informed sources.

One of the reasons for the moving of the Internal Troop subunits was to guarantee the safety of the population in the southern regions of the Russian Federation because of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and the possible appearance of armed guerrillas in these regions.

Kazan Director Arrested for Attempt to Smuggle Artillery Munitions
92UM1496B Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Sep 92 p 1
[Article by Yevgeniy Ukhov from Kazan: "Traces of the Mafia at the Powder Box"]
[Text] TRUD has already announced the confiscation in Voronezh of a large batch of artillery shells being sent into the region of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the thwarted attempt to remove from the plant rail spur 40 boxes of powder for clients from Georgia. This was followed by the sensational news that brought to the investigatory solitary cell was... the Corresponding Member of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences and Director of the Kazan Scientific Research Institute for Chemical Products (the daughter enterprise of the powder plant) G. Marchenko. A doctor of sciences, professor and author of 400 scientific works is suspected of direct involvement in the "Voronezh affair." Somewhat before there was an attack on the General Director of the Scientific-Production Association imeni V. Lenin, S. Bogatyrev, as during a stroll he had been cruelly set upon by unknown persons and was brought to the hospital with a brain concussion and fractures.

And although the republic KGB and MVD do not link the attack on the director with the instances of the loss of plant production, all the same the conclusion arises that a clearly explosive situation has arisen near the “powder box.” Corruption, illegal deals, mysterious contracts and outright racketeering here have become a common phenomenon and when confronted with these the law-enforcement bodies often give in.
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