


JPRS-NEA-93-040

1 April 1993



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Near East & South Asia

19980116 185

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-93-040

CONTENTS

1 April 1993

NEAR EAST

ISRAEL

U.S. Pressure Needed for Territorial Compromise [HA'ARETZ 5 Mar]	1
Settler Call To Shoot at Stonethrowers Assessed [HA'ARETZ 5 Mar]	2
Settler, Palestinian Tensions on State Land Use [HA'ARETZ 19 Feb]	4
Unemployment, Housing Problems in Ari'el [HA'ARETZ 26 Feb]	6
Ze'ev Schiff on NPT, Nuclear Free Near East [HA'ARETZ 29 Jan]	8

KUWAIT

Committee Chairman Discusses Citizenship, Security [London AL-MAJALLAH 17 Feb]	9
--	---

LEBANON

Fadlallah Calls For Islamic-Christian Dialogue [AL-ANWAR 14 Jan]	11
Shaykh Fadlallah on Fundamentalism, Peace Process [MONDAY MORNING 1-7 Feb]	13

MOROCCO

Conditions for Political Prisoners 'Worsening' [Paris LE MONDE 28 Feb]	15
Opposition Parties Question Democratic Process [Paris LE MONDE 17 Feb]	16
Efforts To Eradicate, Replace Drug Market [Paris LE MONDE 23 Feb]	17
Lawyers: 'Verdict Reflects Lack of Freedom' [AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI 31 Jan]	19
Measures To Preserve Water Supply [LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 5 Mar]	21

SAUDI ARABIA

Editorial Describes Saddam's 'Black Fate' [UKAZ 14 Jan]	22
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce Election Results [London AL-HAYAH 11 Feb]	23
New Budget Said To Favor Private Sector [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 5 Jan]	24
Wheat, Barley Subsidies Dispensed [UKAZ 17 Jan]	25
Effects of 1993 Budget on Policies Analyzed [AL-MADINAH 9 Jan]	26

SUDAN

Uganda To Oversee Meeting on Talks Resumption [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 10 Feb]	28
Planned Summer Military Offensive Detailed [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 10 Feb]	29
Commentary Discusses Journalist's Arrest [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 9 Feb]	30
Authorities Demolish Planning Minister's Home [London AL-HAYAH 28 Jan]	30

SYRIA

Jews Describe Life in U.S. as Difficult [Paris LE MONDE 4 Mar]	30
--	----

TUNISIA

Concerns Over EC Standards Reported [London AL-HAYAH 26 Jan]	31
--	----

WESTERN SAHARA

Sahrawi Tell of 'Deplorable' Prison Conditions [Rabat L'OPINION 22 Feb]	33
---	----

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Elections, Resignations, Code of Honor Discussed [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 28 Feb]	33
Election Observers Arrive in Capitol [London AL-HAYAH 13 Mar]	34
YSP, GPC To Wage 'Coordinated Competition' [London AL-HAYAH 18 Mar]	35
GPC, YGR Prepare To Name Candidates [London AL-HAYAH 19 Mar]	36
Parties' Merger Postponed, Public To Strike [London AL-HAYAH 16 Mar]	36
Text of 1992 Bank Organization Law Published [AL-THAWRAH 1 Jan]	37

SOUTH ASIA

IRAN

IRI Raises Visa Costs in Response to UK's Move [London KEYHAN 11 Mar]	41
Aid to Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Continues [RESALAT 24 Feb]	41
Cleaning of Sunk Platforms Begins in Karun [London KEYHAN 7 Jan]	41
Grain Production Increases by 2 Million Tons [RESALAT 28 Feb]	41
Development Projects Inaugurated in Shahreza [RESALAT 25 Feb]	41
Lavan Oil Production Capacity Reviewed [RESALAT 28 Feb]	42
Exports Show 54-Percent Increase [RESALAT 28 Feb]	42
Caspian Sea Shipping Expands [RESALAT 27 Feb]	42
Automation of Identity Cards in Khorasan [RESALAT 23 Feb]	42
Weaknesses Noted in News Dissemination [RESALAT 27 Feb]	43
People's Awareness for Paying Taxes Should Be Raised [RESALAT 27 Feb]	43
Heart-Related Deaths Reach 43 Percent [London KEYHAN 7 Jan]	44
Over Half of Mazandaran Population Carry Parasite [London KEYHAN 11 Mar]	44
Narcotics Discovered in Khorasan [RESALAT 1 Mar]	44
Narcotics Located in Various Parts of Qom [RESALAT 24 Feb]	44
Hamadan Detoxification Center Described [RESALAT 23 Feb]	45

ISRAEL

U.S. Pressure Needed for Territorial Compromise

93AA0005B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
5 Mar 93 p B3

[Article by Ze'ev Sternhell: "Strong American Pressure Is Necessary"]

[Text] Everyone in the Israeli political establishment, as well as many of the columnists who have developed ties to Warren Christopher's assistants, really went overboard in trying to convince the visitors that they should handle Yitzhak Rabin with kid gloves. The preachers were of two types: there were those who argued that American pressure was liable to destroy the staying power of the government, which was formed on the basis of a single vote—the very existence of this government is a miracle, so that one must go around it on one's tiptoes. And there were those who advanced the opposite argument and explained that since Ben-Gurion we have not had a government that is at the same time so moderate and so self-assured, a right-wing opposition that is so impotent, and a leader who enjoys such broad public support. Consequently, these interpreters explained in whispers, wisdom requires that the prime minister be given sufficient leeway to lead Israel to the goal in his own way and at his own pace, without interference.

Both these arguments are without foundation. Strong American pressure is required today no less than in the past; for everyone knows that no progress was ever achieved in our relations with the Arabs without external intervention. Today, as well, there will be no movement without a massive American presence. The question is not the good or bad will of this or that government. This is the reality that is the result of the situation that has developed in the region, especially since the Six Day War.

It is, indeed, the case that no Israeli Government, even the most moderate, has the strength necessary to implement on its own the deal of exchanging land for peace. Even the negotiations with Egypt and the disengagement agreements that preceded it required daily intervention by the U.S. administration. From that viewpoint, the difference between a "left" government and a "right" government is much less significant than would appear at first sight. Even a dovish government would be incapable of violating of its free will one of the iron laws that dictate the behavior of every national movement, a law that is part of the basis of the Zionist ethos: The relinquishing of "parts of the homeland" is a crime, and one is obliged to commit a crime only when a knife is at one's throat. Therefore, the debate among us between the right and the left has always been over questions such as quantity and timing, not over matters of principle such as universal values, the rights of others, or questions of morality and justice. It is not by chance that this left government has already succeeded in proving that it is more violent than the governments of the right, is deaf like them, and is no less derisive than they of the principle of equality before the law. The great advantage of this government over its predecessors is not rooted

in the much greater collective wisdom of its members, but in their much greater sensitivity to the limits of Israel's real strength.

It stands to reason that Mr. Rabin is sufficiently realistic not to place exaggerated trust in the flattery of his aides. It appears that he realizes the victory in the June 1992 elections was due in part neither to his engaging personality nor to the supreme wisdom of those around him. The winners in the recent elections in Israel were the leaders of the intifadah in the territories, and the Bush-Baker duo in Washington. The continuing Palestinian uprising supplied the laboratory proof of the need to disconnect from the territories; and the American economic sanctions—the prevention of the guarantees—succeeded in frightening a sufficient number of new immigrants, to the point where they regarded a government in open confrontation with the United States as a band of men who were endangering the public safety, who were prepared in addition to everything else to take away their sustenance. George Bush and James Baker are the ones who brought Shamir to his knees and showed him to be impotent. On the background of the success of the uprising and the economic difficulties, the American steamroller engendered that feeling of emergency that was not created in the days of crazy inflation or in the period of the war in Lebanon. The Israelis understood the hint: In June 1992 they carried out a withdrawal under pressure.

But not only the political elite is in need of a firm approach on the part of Washington: Israeli society in its entirety requires a threat as an alibi towards itself. Thus it was also in the past: Zionism, as every national movement, always regarded the conquest of territory as a supreme goal. The debate between the labor movement and revisionism was over means, not ends. Only under emergency conditions or under heavy international pressure did the labor movement know how to withdraw and to agree to compromises. Such emergency conditions were first created at the end of the thirties (the Arab Revolt and the existential danger to European Jewry), in the War of Independence (the vigorous British demand for withdrawal from Sinai), and again at the end of the Sinai Campaign. At that time, an American-Soviet proposal that could not be refused was made to Ben-Gurion.

The big disaster occurred the day after the Six Day War: The general hysteria that skyrocketed in the Arab world in May 1967, and the call for the destruction of Israel, created a counterresponse throughout the Western world. In the United States, which was already mired in the Vietnam War, there was no one who would save Israel from itself. The status quo was broken only in the Yom Kippur War: American pressure was again exerted successfully on an Israel that was softened due to the traumatic experience at the beginning of October 1973.

Recently, circumstances were created that are somewhat similar to those that prevailed at the end of 1973. Israeli society has been softened due to the five-year-old Palestinian uprising; it suffers from increasing terror; and the political and security leadership know that there is no military solution in the territories. The IDF [Israel Defense

Force] continues to hunt wanted persons and to that end uses Arab masqueraders, antitank missiles, or the Shabak, all as needed. But the bottom line was written a long time ago: Israel is incapable of holding the hills east of the Green Line, and in the existing conditions of the conquest it is incapable of putting an end to the terror.

That goal is impossible—for the simple reason that the invention has not yet been found that would allow a democratic society to liquidate a hostile national movement and maintain its character as a democratic society. The liquidation of the terror is possible either through a political solution or by expelling the population that is rising up. But Israel is also incapable of exiting the conquered territory without U.S. assistance. Only a continuing threat is capable of creating within us sufficiently broad agreement for this rational and simple solution.

Quite paradoxically, it would seem that American pressure is required on a “left” government more than on a government of the right, due to the Kafkaesque metamorphosis that occurred in most of the leaders of Meretz. At least an opposition group that held human rights sacred stood in opposition to Shamir and Sharon. This movement not only knew how to alert public opinion in Israel and abroad, but also how to show a presence in front of homes that were destroyed in Arab villages. Today, politicians who not long ago were counted among the founders of the “Betzelem” organization or were some of the first members of “Peace Now” have been turned into the real “poodles” of political life, so dear to the prime minister. Acts that were revolting crimes in the eyes of rank-and-file Knesset members have become legitimate in the eyes of ministers and chairmen of important Knesset committees.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to think that America is interested in the quality of our public life. The Americans, as well, are interested primarily in themselves and desire speedy results. The White House also is liable to take the easy way out and to satisfy itself with an interim agreement on the Golan Heights. The temptation is great, because a partial solution in the north would ensure a success for both sides, and especially to the two chiefs of state who will again stand for election—actually, at the same time. This proximity of dates does not bode well. A partial agreement, even a very partial one, will be sufficient for Rabin to come to the elections in 1996 with a reasonable chance of victory. The euphoria that would accompany the Syrian-Israeli handshake would not hurt Bill Clinton either. At that time, the Palestinian issue would be liable to go into the deep freeze and to drag on for years. The Golan would serve as an alibi for continuing the conquest. The hawkish left would not rejoice to go forward, while the dovish left has already lost too much of its credibility to replace the Labor Party.

But more than anything else, an American threat is necessary in order to justify, in the eyes of the floating voters in the center, the use of force against those settlers who would demonstrate special toughness. It is an illusion to think that it will be possible to arrive at peace without an

evacuation. It is a more serious illusion to believe that it would be possible to carry out an evacuation without using force.

The task will be even harder than in the Sinai, because today we no longer have at our disposal the gigantic sums that the U.S. taxpayer invested in the peace between Israel and Egypt. It is doubtful whether there will be many in America, which is finally entering the era of belt-tightening, who would, without opposition, volunteer to pay the settlers of Katzrin and 'Ofra for agreeing to move to an apartment in Kfar Saba or Qiryat Shmona.

Settler Call To Shoot at Stonethrowers Assessed

93AA0005C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
5 Mar 93 p B2

[Article by Nadav Shraguy: “Like Hunted Beasts”]

[Text] In May, 1989, Yona Haykin, a resident of the Jewish Quarter in Hebron, was called to the Jerusalem District Court as a defense witness for Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who had been put on trial for manslaughter. On that occasion, Haykin described how he had entered a shop in the center of Hebron and talked with the salesperson, and during this time been stabbed deeply in the back. He told how he had turned, seen the knifer escaping, and begun to run after him while bleeding. The attacker escaped into Hebron's casbah, but a surprise awaited him there—a row of barrels that the IDF [Israel Defense Force] had put in place. “The man seemed to me like a beast in a trap...” Haykin related. “He was hysterical. I was behind him, the barrels in front of him. I fired 14 shots. One struck [him] and blew away his elbow...I shot to kill...”

The state's attorney asked Haykin whether he knew when he began the pursuit that according to the law in Israel it is forbidden to kill a person in flight, even if that person has previously attempted to kill him? Only after Magistrate Brenner promised that Haykin's words would not be taken into account or used as evidence if it were decided to place him on trial did Haykin confirm: “I knew that.” The end result: Haykin was not placed on trial. The O/C [Commanding Officer] Central Command at the time, 'Amram Mitzna, even awarded him a citation.

In March 1989, two months before the stabbing in the center of Hebron, the vehicle of Michel Cohen—also one of the Jewish residents of Hebron—was stoned on the Qiryat Arba-Gush 'Etzyon road. The state handed down an indictment against Cohen that was unconventional, as it was based solely upon Cohen's own complaint to the police, without any other entity having complained about damage or injuries. Cohen was accused only of firing in a built-up area.

The judge for this case, Daniella Wexler, found that at the stage when Cohen's vehicle was stoned and its windows were broken, Cohen's response—leaving the vehicle and firing toward the stonethrowers in order to hit them—constituted a reasonable response. In contrast, she held that Cohen's firing toward the attackers at a later stage, not in order to hit them and with the intention of chasing them away, but only in order to prevent a future threat, could

not be construed as self-defense. The end result: Michel Cohen received a fine of IS [new Israeli shekels] 1,200 and two months' probation.

Haykin, Cohen, and many other Jews of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza did not need the supposedly noisy announcements this week of "Emunim" (the movement that is the continuation of Gush Emunim), the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council, and the chairman of the Gaza Coast Regional Council, which recommend to any Jew who encounters a stonethrowing situation that he use his weapon.

Throughout the intifadah, the heads of regional councils and the heads of settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza have heard recommendations in this spirit on an informal basis from senior IDF officers. This week, the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council spoke officially of "firing for the purpose of deterrence" in every case of stonethrowing, and of shooting with the intention of hitting in case of a threat to life. The announcement by Emunim was even more sweeping, and did not distinguish between the two categories; meanwhile, Tzvi Hendel of Gaza Coast called on residents in the Qatif Region to use their weapons—intending to hit—in every case of danger on the roads.

On Tuesday, a few hours before the announcements were made, Juma'a 'Abd Al-'Aziz, aged 60, was shot to death near Ras al-'Amud, on the road to Ma'ale Adumim. Apparently, the man was shot by the driver of a truck that was stoned, who has not yet been found. That same day, too, a similar incident occurred in the village of 'E-Sawiya on the outskirts of Jerusalem, but with no casualties.

This week's announcements made headlines not because of their novelty, but due to their current relevance. For a lengthy period of time, there has already been circulating among the Jewish settlers in the territories "a sheet for the resident who travels and tours in the territories," with the heading "Know your rights and your duties facing stonethrowers." The sheet is signed by the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council.

The initiative, which received almost no publicity, came, like many initiatives of the Jews living in the territories, from Elyakim Ha'etzni. "Know your rights" is signed by 17 jurists, including 'Azri'el Barak, Dr. Efrayim Zissak, Shalom Glifster, 'Amram Shalit, Hayyim Gross, and Shlomo Nahshon. The main paragraph in the laws that are cited in "Know your rights"—from which can be learned the legal basis for the directive to citizens to shoot not only in the event of a threat to life but also for the purpose of deterrence—is Paragraph 59 of the ordinance on security instructions that were established by the O/Cs [Commanding Officers] of the commands.

This paragraph, in the opinion of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council, requires that "initiative be taken in the face of an offense that is being committed in sight of the citizen," and this is the language: "A person who knew, or who had a reasonable basis to suspect, that another person was committing an offense or intending to commit an offense the punishment for which exceeds three years' imprisonment (the throwing of a stone in the territories

carries 10 to 20 years' imprisonment), and did not give immediate notification of that to the military commander or to the nearby police station, or to any IDF officer, or who did not act in another reasonable manner in order to prevent the act or its continuation or its completion...will be accused of an offense..." (the similar Jordanian law also is cited there).

From this legal basis, the conclusion of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza jurists follows that "any citizen may arrest a criminal." The legal basis for this is found, according to them, in Paragraph 6 of the Ordinance for Criminal Procedure, which states, among other things, that any person may arrest, without an arrest warrant, a person who is committing a crime in his presence.

In "Know your rights," the settlers are told that "it is permissible to use force in carrying out the arrest, but with restraint." The precedent upon which this thesis is built is "Gold vs. the Legal Adviser to the Government" (Criminal Appeal 57/53), where Judge Agranat found a citizen innocent who had taken someone suspected of having committed a crime to a police station, and then shot him to death when he tried to flee. The instruction is based also on another precedent (Civil Appeal 751/66, Ra'ad vs. the State of Israel), where the accused was also found innocent: "A citizen may use force, but: against the criminal and not to endanger others; while the crime is being committed and close to the act; when a more moderate means is not effective."

And more from "the sheet": "Self-defense absolves of criminal responsibility. According to Paragraph 22 of the Penalties Law, whoever attempts to prevent: serious injury, other physical harm, damage to property, aforementioned injury to others whom you protected, damage to the property of another person that was entrusted to him—is absolved of criminal responsibility, on the condition: that only this action that was taken could prevent the injury; that the damage caused by the act of defense in reasonable relationship to the damage that the defense sought to prevent."

"Pay attention," the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council tells the settler. "The proof of the existence of these conditions is the burden of the defender. For example: Shooting is not proportional to a curse. In contrast, there is no doubt that if shooting in time at the attacker can prevent the striking of the stone thrown at the windshield of the passing car—it is permissible to shoot him in order to prevent the blow. Because the harm of the injury of the attacker by a bullet is proportional to 'harm' of the type that murdered Esther Ohana of blessed memory."

Additional advice to the public by the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council: "In case you are interrogated as a suspect in a crime, you are not obligated to give a statement to the police or to answer their questions concerning the incident that led to the investigation. The law gives you the right of silence. This does not mean that you must use this right in every case. Sometimes, your silence before the police is liable to hurt you in court (if you are tried).

Therefore, you are advised to ask the police to allow you to meet with an attorney as soon as possible, in order to consult with him."

The main military prosecutor and the legal adviser to the government, Yosef Harish, do not necessarily agree with this opinion, particularly as concerns the issue of citizens opening fire on fleeing stonethrowers. In the first days of the intifadah, the legal adviser to the government wrote the following on this subject to Elyakim Ha'etzni: "The subject of the use of weapons by citizens for the purpose of arresting a suspect is not treated clearly in Israeli law, and it is subject to the general legal principles that apply to the subject behavior and its consequences." Harish believes that the assertion that a citizen who is being stoned may shoot the stonethrower as part of the procedure for arresting a suspect is "an assertion that is liable to mislead and to entangle, in the sense of placing an obstacle in front of a blind person."

"The question whether the use of a weapon is a reasonable means and required to carry out the arrest, and whether the court will regard the use of a weapon as an act in 'executing the law,' regarding the defense of the justification, is a complex question whose answer must take into account the need for a proper balance between the public interest in the apprehension of criminals and their being brought to court and the interest of the public in protecting the life of a person and his bodily integrity." Harish cites numerous variables "that are liable to have an impact on the proper answer, including the severity of the crime, the circumstances in which it was committed, the circumstances and stages of the arrest, the nature of the arrest, the results of the gunfire, the danger expected from the fleeing person, and the like." Due to these, Harish states, "it is not possible to be precise, except that the reasonableness of the use of force will be judged by the binding rule that the damage that is caused by the use of force will not be disproportionate to the harm to the interest that one is seeking to protect. This rule will be judged in every case on its merits and according to the circumstances."

Despite Harish's clarification, Elyakim Ha'etzni, who initiated the publication of "Know your rights," retracts nothing, and he writes to Harish in his own style: "We accept that the adjustment of the law to life is the guiding principle of the jurist, lest the lack of a connection cause damage to the very rule of law. Your approach, with all respect, is detached from the reality of life. Men, women, and children are traveling day and night in mortal jeopardy, like hunted beasts, against machineguns, stones, bars, ninjas, and the like. In most cases, these citizens are alone on the roads, as it would be absurd to demand of the IDF that every meter be secured between the approximately 150 settlements that are scattered throughout Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. In such a situation, severity in the interpretation of the law, to the greatest possible extent, as implied to my regret by your letter—will not lead to greater law and observance of the law in Israel."

Settler, Palestinian Tensions on State Land Use

93AF0413B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 Feb 93 p B2

[Article by Nadav Shragai; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

The Battle Over State Land

In these days of the construction halt and the development freeze in the territories, the settlers are starting to fight against what they describe as the Arab population's takeover of the state land on the West Bank. They describe the deceptions, the fake plantings, and the rest of the sophisticated methods used by the "locals."

In early 1991, in the last days of the Shamir government's rule, when the feeling that a reversal was on the way was already filling the political corridors, a secret document prepared by the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council reached the hands of several senior officials in the ministries of justice and housing. The paper, entitled "State Land in Judaea and Samaria: a Working Plan," was prepared by Avraham Shvut, of the 'Alon Moreh settlement; it described how the Palestinian population was succeeding, through varied and sophisticated methods and with both external and local financing, in getting control of most of the state lands in the territories and preventing Jewish use of them. Alongside a list of practical recommendations meant to protect existing state land—such as declaring additional territory to be state land and authorizing detailed and descriptive plans for most of the territory in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—the working paper recommends "immediate allocation and transfer of state lands to Jewish entities, such as municipal authorities, settlements, public associations, the Zionist Organization, and the like."

"One way or the other," the article assesses, "autonomy is on the horizon. Whether Israeli rule continues or not, the Arab population will receive some kind of independent administration, an administration that will demand absolute control over state land. We must act quickly, and allocate state lands to nongovernmental Jewish bodies, with binding agreements that will allow these territories to be saved and utilized, and also allow for expansion of the existing Jewish settlements, and the addition of as much territory as possible to them."

With the political reversal, and the extreme care that Pli'a 'Albek, director of the justice ministry's civil division, has taken to ensure legality in the process of transfer and allocation, the leaders of the Jewish settlements in the territories have been able to carry out only a few acts of allocation and transfer of state land to the Jewish settlements, mainly in the Samaria and Benjamin region, as a kind of "land for a rainy day"—the autonomy on the way. The government's decision after the elections (Decision No. 360) has cut short even this slow process. The government has decided to forbid further allocation of "state land" except by decision of the Committee for Exceptional

Cases. For anyone who wants to see the Jewish settlements in the territories continue to grow, this has been a hard blow.

Of the Jewish settlements in the territories, 90 percent have been built on state land. Almost all the territory designated in the descriptive plan for further development of the Jewish settlements is state land. In many cases this means a territory several times larger—often five, six, or even 10 times—than the settlement's present area. Usually these reserved territories, which of course are state lands, are right next to the settlement fences, and extend far, far out, to the borders of Arab towns and cities, or to fields cultivated by Arab villages.

The settlers especially fear that a ban on construction outside the bounds of authorized plans for city building may be combined with a halt to the allocation of state land. In a petition presented to the High Court of Justice, they used the word "gezera" [harsh edict] to describe the oppressed feeling. Attorneys David Rotam and 'Elyakim Ha'atzani write that Jews cannot easily buy land in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza because of a Jordanian law that demands the death penalty for anyone who sells land to Jews. "The vast majority of lands in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza are owned by Arabs," argues the petition. "Declared state lands make up no more than 10 percent of the overall territory, and in addition, they are all on rocky ground. For the Jewish population, they constitute the last and only reserve still available for settlement, and, actually, the only land that can make a contribution to the settlements' continued survival."

Against this background, hundreds of settlers went out on T'u Bishvat morning, from dozens of settlements, and planted tens of thousands of saplings on the state land bordering their settlements. The Israel Defense Force has symbolically uprooted a few of these trees, but could not possibly assign enough soldiers to pull out 50,000 of them. The idea of planting trees to prevent the Arab takeover of state land is not the invention of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council. The Jewish National Fund [JNF] was active for years in the afforestation of various regions of the country in order to prevent the Arab population from taking them over. In 1968-69, the JNF undertook an extensive tree-planting project over an area of hundreds of thousands of dunams all across the West Bank. Most of the forests existing today on the southern slope of Mt. Hebron and in Samaria were planted during that period. The Arabs learned the method very quickly, so that over the last few years they have become experts in everything connected to political tree-planting.

In the territories, tens of thousands of dunams, which have already been declared state land, have been taken over by Arab planting, mainly of olive trees. The methods used to do this are documented in the appendices to the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council's working paper, as well as in many earlier memos written by the council members responsible for questions concerning land. The documents show that this activity has been sophisticated and organized, and that the planters' intentions are clearly not agricultural.

It seems that there have been nurseries that supplied olive saplings at a very low price, and that there have been farmers who planted these saplings without the customary removal of stones, or plowing. Only after a sapling took root was the land around it cleared and plowed. Another method has been to plant a "yihur" of olive. The "yihur" is a branch cut from a kind of wild olive tree known as the "Be'eri." A branch like this has very strong prospects of sinking strong, viable roots. Onto branches like this, a variety of domestic olives can be grafted. A "yihur," after it has been planted, quickly develops a thick trunk. The date that a tree was planted is determined by the thickness of its trunk, and so, plots that have been neglected, or on which only a small portion has been worked, become state land, appearing as though they have been tended for many years.

The Palestinians also utilize the olive tree in mountainous or rocky areas. The olive root breaks through stone and grows well, even on bare rock. Today's chemistry offers farmers preparations that arouse and speed up germination. Preparations of this kind can be bought in the open market, both as spray and as powder, and they are well used. Thus, a person can claim after the first ploughing that he has occupied the piece of land for many years. The civil administration does not have the manpower to enable it to effectively oversee state lands. In the area around Jenin, for example, tens of thousands of dunams are patrolled by one man with only a jeep and a walkie-talkie. The picture is similar in other parts of Judaea and Samaria. The inspection branch of the civil administration has actually reinforced manpower and added equipment just recently, and the Jewish councils, both regional and local, are using helicopters to pinpoint places where land is being stolen. Nevertheless, only rarely do the authorities uncover attempts to steal land.

According to existing practice, if the trees are not uprooted within 90 hours, we do not uproot them, and we must wait until the legal process—which can last months or even years—begins. In a report written several years ago by a police inspector at the Tul Karem station about land near the Ginot Shomron settlement, the inspector says, among other things, that "41 olive trees, which appear to be from three to five years old, were turned over to me, but their roots had been cut, and clearly the trees had been taken out of the ground and were purposely being transported from one place to another for replanting."

Most of the political planting by the Palestinian population is not spontaneous. An organization known as the "Association for Olive Tree Planting in the West Bank" was formerly active in the territories, and was even financed for a while by an agricultural loan company. In a report that was laid on the desks of important administration officials, there is a detailed description of the method Palestinians use to try to take possession of state land: "Knowing the law and practices," he writes there, "the Arab residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza do everything possible to get the lands they have taken possession of put into the Tabu' [Land Registry] in their names, and sometimes even to put in those they have not actually

taken yet." In this realm, too, there is a well-oiled and well-organized machine, which includes local farmers, city dwellers, wealthy men, lawyers, government workers, and local judges. The methods are many and varied—forging documents, giving false witness, pressuring judges to give the right verdict, and—above all—bringing in court decisions that are supposedly on-file in Jordan.

For example, what does a local who has decided to take possession of a certain territory do? He chooses some abandoned plots or sections of state land, which have not been worked for many years. Through the village mukhtar, he clarifies who holds the registry in the tax books. He turns to a local attorney who is financed by hostile elements, and the attorney presents a claim for him against the person registered in the "Maliya," or against his heirs. This claim is presented in the local court, and there they say that the land was bought many years ago and that now, in these days, the seller, or his heirs, is keeping the buyer from working the land. In most of the cases, only one side is present in court during the litigation. The judge authorizes the purchase made many years ago, and decides that it is forbidden for anyone to interfere with the buyer's working the land. The local takes the verdict and presents it to all the offices concerned with the matter: the office of land registry, the finance ministry, the tax office, the police, etc. From that moment on, any way to oppose the local is gone. Everywhere, they show any opponents the verdict and tell them they can go to the local court if they want to nullify it, but no judge will dare to nullify such a verdict, out of fear for his life. With just a little more effort, it is possible to prepare a few villagers who will serve as witnesses and testify in favor of the instigator of the proceedings, and the way toward registering the plot becomes very easy indeed.

An important official who was involved in land registration on the southern slope of Mt. Hebron tells about one case where the owner of a certain property died, as did his wife. The dead couple's daughter arrived at the notary public's, her face covered by a veil and her body covered by skirts that were very long for her height. She identified herself as her dead mother and the notary public granted her power of attorney, confirming, in effect, that her mother was alive. In this case, the ruse was discovered.

With this as a background, the settlers have started out on their own tree-planting campaign, and have no intention of asking for or accepting authorization concerning their activities. According to the statistics of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council, there are about 5.6 million dunams of land in Judaea and Samaria, and the general estimation is that more than a third of these are state lands, which can be divided up as follows: about a million dunams registered in the "Tabu" as state owned; about a million dunams declared state land, but not registered in the state's name; and about 500,000 dunams declared state land within the last 10 years. The Judaea and Samaria leaders estimate that, in addition to all these, there are another million dunams that can be located, declared state land, and taken possession of.

Since the decision was made to halt construction of about 6,000 apartments and freeze further development of the Jewish settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, the settlers have very few defined targets left that they can fight for. The state lands clause is now at the top of their list.

During the talks held in Washington recently between Israel and the Palestinian delegation, Israel suggested dividing the state land on the West Bank into three categories: Lands where Jews are living today would remain in the hands of the Jews; lands where Palestinians are living today would remain in the hands of the Palestinians; and lands defined as state land would be handed over to the joint administration of the autonomy council and Israel. The Palestinians rejected the proposal. The settlers, who are not officially part of the negotiations, rejected it too. To be truthful, they breathed more freely when they learned that the Palestinian side had rejected the proposal. From their point of view, if, God forbid, the Israeli recommendation were accepted, it would only be one matter of time until the settlements slowly died, or in 'Elyakim Ha'atzani's words, "until they have drawn out all the water, and the fish are dead."

Unemployment, Housing Problems in Ari'el

93AA0003A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
26 Feb 93 p B5

[Article by Lili Galili]

[Text] Some months before the recent elections, Ron Nahman, head of the Ari'el local council and a total secularist, went to a Lubavitch rabbi. "Go out and win," the rabbi told Nahman, who was running at the time for a seat in the Knesset. At the same time, he dispatched Nahman on a general mission to inform the Americans that Iran is the real enemy and to speed up the development of Ari'el, which will be home to 40,000 residents.

In the months since that historic meeting, Nahman was elected to the Knesset on the Likud list and Iran is threatening the peace of the world. Regarding Ari'el, there has been a certain slowdown in the wake of the change in government. Instead of preparing for the arrival of the messiah, Nahman, a central figure in Bibi Netanyahu's camp, found himself, acting in his capacity as head of the local council, hosting Moshe Qatzav's primaries convention being held in Ari'el this week. In the cramped hall of the opulent Eshel Hashomron Hotel, some 50 people gathered to hear the gospel according to Qatzav. A similar number also went to a rally for Benny Begin. For a function with Netanyahu planned for next week, the hotel is preparing a large hall capable of holding hundreds of people.

If one didn't know for a fact that the elections have already been held, one might think that March 25 is the date not of the primaries in the opposition party but of the time when Israel will choose between Labor and Likud. "They," the Mapainiks, this week let go a Likud activist from Ari'el, Avi Banita, who worked as a driver at 'Amidar. "They" did not hide from him the fact that the dismissal was

political. Banita thus joined the ever-widening circle of Ari'el's unemployed. On the list of unemployment-stricken cities published 10 days ago, Ari'el, with a rate of 12.1%, stands in the middle, between Ma'alot-Tarshiha and Hatzor in the Galilee.

A tour of Ari'el these days provides a concrete illustration of what was intended as a "change in the national order of priorities" but primarily of the confusion that, in the meantime, has beset that reordering. Eleven thousand people live in Ari'el, among them about 1,100 new immigrants. Eight hundred housing units, all of them sold, are nearing completion. Of the 600 units from the 1992 program, only 80 have been sold. The government no longer applies its massive sales to Ari'el. From both sides of Ari'el's long main street, there are clear signs of work interrupted in midstride on preparing ground and putting in house foundations. On 1 September 1992, the government canceled its part of mortgage grants here; only 60 homes were sold after that. The entire grant was canceled on January 1, 1993; not a single home has been sold since then.

For the approximately 2,500 new residents expected to move into homes already bought, there is a good chance that they will join the ranks of the unemployed. Development of an industrial park in Ari'el began one year ago. Work on the ground was begun and lots were set aside for such concerns as Nehushtan, Yisra'elift, Shemesh Carpets and others. The new budget for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry does not allocate a red cent for settlements in the territories. Work on building factories in Ari'el has come to a halt. The upshot: fewer jobs for more residents. "This means our economic and physical annihilation," Nahman wrote Rabin. "I'm sure that was not your intention." In conversation, he has more scathing things to say while doing a very convincing imitation of Rabin declaring, "I will decide, I will lead."

The letter addressing the freeze on Ari'el's industrial park is one of many with which Nahman has flooded Rabin. There is the letter about the interruption in construction of the highway that cuts through Samaria, another about the lack of entrance points, another about the removal of most of the towns in Judea and Samaria from the roster of development zones, and many, many others.

"We feel persecuted," says one man without a job, who passes the morning hours at a small snack stand in the center of town. "This party knows only how to dry things out. Once they drained only swamps. Now they're drying up people." In Ari'el, the spoiled child of the previous government, people say that they are the main sacrifice of the change in administration. They aren't doctrinaire ideologists, these residents of Ari'el. Many of them grew up in poor neighborhoods around the country, young couples looking for an affordable home and quality of life. Now they feel cheated. How can the government give to Arab villages in the Galilee and not to them?

Ari'el's 11,000 residents have fallen into a trap. Though definitely "not five minutes from Kfar Saba," Ari'el is far from any employment center. A resident hoping to hold a

job in the coastal plain faces a commute of two hours each way on a crowded and decrepit road. In recent months, crossing Samaria has exacted a blood price of five killed. The price in money also creates a trap. Anyone working in Tel Aviv must pay 25 NIS [new Israeli shekels] each day for public transportation there and back. "Someone making 2,000 NIS a month might make the effort to leave at 0600. For anyone making less than that, it isn't worth spending four hours each day and hundreds of shekels," sums up Moti Levy, head of the Ari'el workmen's council, which cast 514 votes for Labor in the elections. At the same time, he is highly critical of the local council's hogging of the limelight and of Nahman, who employs a media consultant paid 8,000 NIS per month. Meanwhile, Nahman, who in any event is his own best public relations man, has announced that the consultant will stop working next month. It is questionable whether this step will have any significant effect on the residents' lives.

For most of them, work outside the town isn't a worthwhile arrangement. Many choose to look for work in one of the factories in the area, the industrial zone, Barqan or Ari'el itself. Factory managers are effectively exploiting the absence of any choice for the residents and the availability of inexpensive Arab laborers. Five hundred Palestinians from neighboring villages work in Barqan and Ari'el. They build and clean Ari'el with a relish that is out of sync with the government's policy.

With staggering cynicism, employers maneuver through the residents' predicament. Four to six NIS per hour is the going rate for Ari'el's inhabitants. Even less is offered to women. The average monthly salary for a man who lives in Ari'el and works in a nearby factory is 1,400 NIS per month. He constantly receives hints that he could be replaced by a lower paid Arab worker, and without social benefits.

Unemployment in Ari'el, as a small town, brings with it a measure of shame. Unlike in development towns in Israel proper, where you will find the jobless opening a backgammon board on the outskirts of the town, or surging forward to pour out their hearts to reporters, here people shut themselves in their rooms and avoid the "hostile media," which they regard as part of the system arrayed against them. Avi, who runs a local minimarket, describes the situation in terms close to his heart. "When the Likud was in power, people would buy five or six containers of yoghurt a day. Now I see women break apart a pair of containers to buy just one. Checks bounce and people pile up debts. In Petah Tiqva (the closest city within the Green Line), they don't accept checks from people who live in Ari'el."

Riding around Ari'el one night, Nahman pins the label "pioneers" on the residents of Ari'el's mobile home park, who are waiting for completion of their homes. During a visit to the mobile homes in the morning, some of the pioneers chose to call themselves "stuck."

In the mobile home nearest to the grocery store, whose proprietor complains about the tenants' debts, signs of

preparations are visible that day. Rosie and Eldar Scheinberg, both 23, were busy packing the contents of their cramped mobile home for a move back to parents in Bat Yam. In a huge wedding photograph that fills almost an entire wall of the mobile home, the couple beam a look of optimism towards the horizon. After 14 months of life in Ari'el, the light in their eyes has gone out. When they bought their house in Ari'el, they were told there would be benefits, dozens of factories and work for everyone. In the meantime, work on their house has been delayed, mortgage payments are swelling and checks made out for a fixed payment of 125 NIS, the rent for the mobile home, come back.

Eldar Scheinberg used to work in an aluminum plant nearby, putting in 10 hours each day for 1,400 NIS a month. "The plant managers here take advantage of the fact that everyone is carrying a mortgage," he says bitterly. "Anyway, the bosses here are interested only in the special grants they get, not in their workers." He works now on his own as a driver, delivering packages, and performing errands. Only gasoline costs burn most of his income.

Rosie received an offer to work in a local candy store for 500 NIS per month. "I feel that they're cheating me," she says defiantly. Now they're breaking their heads looking for a way out of this quagmire. They can't sell their house for five years, and besides, who is buying homes in Ari'el these days? Likewise stuck in place is Sigalit Mizrahi, 26. She moved three months ago from Ramat Gan into a mobile home in Ari'el with her husband and baby. The husband, who worked as a driver in a car rented on a lease plan, now has his income garnished because of accumulating debts. They are both out of work, owe 30,000 NIS on their mortgage and, for the first time in their lives, are being seen by a social worker. "We're cast aside here like dogs," Sigalit fumes. In their group session, they do not know exactly at whom to direct their anger: the local council, the Russians in the mobile homes nearby "who get everything," or the new government that has cut off benefits.

Nahman likes to call this "hatred of the leftists, who will have to pay the piper when we get back into power soon." Meanwhile, one can be consoled only by the tricks of fate, which will lead Minister Yosi Sarid to Ari'el for the first time to inaugurate the Municipal Environmental Association.

Ze'ev Schiff on NPT, Nuclear Free Near East
93WP0079Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
29 Jan 93 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Nuclear Discrimination"]

[Text] The assertion of discrimination in the attitude of the United States towards Israel has been voiced not only with regard to the matter of the expulsion of the Hamas members. A similar assertion is also heard regarding the nuclear weapons that, many believe, are in Israel's possession. This emerges again today because the Clinton administration has adopted a goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, and in the framework of

this effort they intend to put pressure on two Middle Eastern countries—Iraq and Iran. The matter will arise not only in the multilateral committee on arms control between Israel and the Arabs, but also on the occasion of the revised international treaty for nuclear weapons non-proliferation, which the countries of the world will be asked to sign two years from now. How is Israel to be regarded in this matter? This is the question that many are asking themselves in Washington. The American government is now involved in crystallizing a new policy on this question, but meanwhile various proposals of experts on this subject are appearing in writing.

One of the interesting publications appeared recently under the auspices of the Washington Council for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The author of the document is the director of the council, Ambassador James Leonard. He was one of the three members of the committee that prepared for the United Nations a document on turning the Middle East into a nuclear weapons-free region. Leonard was also involved in the peace talks between Israel and Egypt, and served as the U.S.A. representative to the arms control talks in Geneva. The document deals with the general question of the chance of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons before 1995, but the Middle East and, especially, Israel star in it.

According to Leonard, it is difficult to argue that of all the small states in the world that are endangered, only Israel should be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Many believe that it is sufficient for Israel to have a de facto alliance with the United States of America and de facto guarantees of its security, for it to forgo nuclear weapons. True, a state such as Kuwait also is endangered, but the difference that Leonard ignores is that Kuwait was saved seven months after it was conquered. Were Israel in a similar situation, it would not be possible to save it after the fact, even a month later.

According to him, there are three problematical states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—that will refuse to sign the revised Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1995. Two other problematical states, South Africa and North Korea, have already signed. It does not appear that the United States will aim at pressuring Israel to sign the treaty against its will. This Israeli position makes the question a Middle East problem. Leonard tends to accept Israel's position, which is that focusing solely on the nuclear aspect is not a promising approach, because the threat to its security stems today more from conventional weapons. Furthermore, there is no assurance that signing the treaty will ensure that states that have signed it (as in the case of Iraq) will not suddenly choose the nuclear weapons route.

In Leonard's estimation, Israel will adhere to the nuclear treaty only as the final step in a series of moves that will lead to a declaration that the region is free of nuclear weapons, and when there are agreements between it and the Arabs also in the sphere of conventional weapons, as well as chemical and biological weapons. And all this, parallel to progress in the peace talks. This is a process that will last about three decades, and not two or three years. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to defer things and to do

nothing before the new treaty is signed in 1995. Such a policy will cause a conflict between the United States and the Arab states and the Muslim states, which will be asked to sign again the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

What is to be done? First of all, Leonard warns against premature pressures on Israel regarding nuclear weapons. They will achieve nothing, will impair the mutual trust between the two countries, and are even liable to endanger the peace process, which is intended to ease the nuclear tension in the region. Instead, Washington should persuade Israel that in the matter of nuclear arms, what it has is sufficient, and it must take measures to prove that it agrees with this approach.

As an example of the measures that Israel must take, Leonard cites the cessation of the production of plutonium in the Dimona reactor. It would suffice today for Israel to undertake to end the production of plutonium at a certain time in the future and under certain conditions. Israel could also declare that it would not be the first in the Middle East to conduct a nuclear test. As is known, Israel declared long ago that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Leonard is not satisfied with that, and argues that some of the ground-to-ground missiles that Israel is building are intended, according to all the indications, to carry nuclear warheads, and, therefore, as a measure to calm its neighbors, it must declare that it would be willing to accept limitations also on its system of large missiles. Leonard understands that this does not involve unilateral Israeli measures and that the Arabs must do something at the same time. In any event, in his opinion, this period requires much closer coordination between Israel and the United States, and in this he expresses the approach of the new administration in Washington.

KUWAIT

Committee Chairman Discusses Citizenship, Security
93AE0365A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
17 Feb 93 pp 51, 52

[Interview with 'Abbas Munawir, chairman of the Defense and Interior Affairs Committee of Kuwait's National Assembly, by Jasim al-Shimri in Kuwait; date not given]

[Text] A number Kuwaiti National Assembly deputies recently called upon Interior Minister Ahmad Hamud al-Jabir and Defense Minister Shaykh 'Ali Sabah al-Salim to revamp the top management of the two ministries.

AL-MAJALLAH had the following interview with 'Abbas Munawir, chairman of the Defense and Interior Affairs Committee of the National Assembly.

[al-Shimri] Will you be discussing top-level changes at the Ministries of Interior and Defense now that there has been an intense information drive and now that the Finance Committee has linked this issue to the proposed defense budget?

[Munawir] We have discussed the issue with the minister of defense, who expressed his willingness to remove any senior official who has been derelict in his duties or

reluctant to perform them, but he also said that he was not about to do injustice to anyone or to act on rumor.

[al-Shimri] Will you be discussing the restructuring of senior and middle leadership [management]?

[Munawir] That has been on the committee's agenda, and we were supposed to go on trips to the borders and to camps in order to gain firsthand information, but we have had to postpone doing so because the ministers have been constantly traveling. We hope to complete these visits in the near future.

[al-Shimri] You responded to demands for uniform Kuwaiti citizenship by describing naturalized citizens as immigrants. What is the real story?

[Munawir] The fact is that people want irresponsible statements. I am now 62 years old and have been a National Assembly deputy for 31 years. I cannot make irresponsible statements or cause a commotion in order to elicit approval. My public record is without blemish. This is one point. The second point is that there is talk of the need to change second-class citizenship into first-class citizenship ("second-class" means naturalized citizens and "first-class" means original inhabitants). The fact is that I found no relevant constitutional reference to this and consequently said that [the class of] citizenship cannot be changed. Those who came to us from abroad were unable to acquire citizenship in 33 years, so what do we call them? Do we call them Kuwaitis? No! Granting them second-class citizenship is no abridgement of their rights, because those who preceded them are charter citizens. This is why I cannot deceive people and call for a change of citizenship from one class to another, because there is no provision for that under the law.

I will take a position on this issue if and when a bill is submitted to amend the law. I may even support the amendment, but we should not overlook the role of the original citizens. If we poll the latter, will they support such an amendment? Unofficial figures indicate that Kuwait has 86,000 voters, compared with 65,000 holders of second-class citizenship. Do you think that the original Kuwaitis would be receptive to 65,000 new voters all at once? This is my viewpoint, but it does not mean that I am against a particular segment of the population.

Rights of Naturalized Citizens

[al-Shimri] How about the decree (on voting rights) that you withdrew for more study after it was approved by the committee but rejected by the Assembly?

[Munawir] I believe that this decree was the spark that lit the fire. It was a law that was promulgated by the National Assembly in 1986 to increase the period that naturalized citizens must wait before they are eligible to vote from 20 to 30 years. That decree was not ratified by the government until after the 1985 Assembly was dissolved in 1987. The Constitution stipulates that all decrees ratified when the Assembly is dissolved must be submitted to the new

Assembly for review, and this why that decree came before us. We consulted with a constitutional scholar, who advised us that naturalized citizens are entitled to vote in 1996 under that or other laws, regardless of whether the decree is accepted or rejected. That is the reason why we accepted the decree, despite the controversy it created within the Assembly. We cannot change or amend a law promulgated in the absence of the Assembly. The Assembly can only accept or reject the legislation. Now that it has been sent back to the committee, it will be resubmitted as it now stands, according to the opinion of the constitutional scholar.

[al-Shimri] This same citizenship issue raises the question of the biduns [the stateless] most of whom are employed by the Interior and Defense Ministries. What about them?

[Munawir] We have discussed this issue with the interior and defense ministers, who have formed two committees of senior officials in the ministries. Each committee reviewed the names of all of the employees in its ministry. Large numbers of those employees were retained, but others were let go. Those who have relatives in the police or the military and who did not collaborate with Iraqi occupation forces have been retained.

[al-Shimri] Then the loyalty of those who were dismissed is suspect. Why, then, are they allowed to remain in Kuwait?

[Munawir] Because they say they are Kuwaitis. We cannot deport anyone who claims to be Kuwaiti unless we can prove otherwise. The Interior and Defense Ministries have prepared forms that contain certain questions and will distribute them to those individuals. Those who prove to be Kuwaiti will be referred to citizenship committees. Those proven otherwise will be deported to their countries of origin.

[al-Shimri] Are those accepted in the Army and in the police force considered to be Kuwaitis?

[Munawir] Of course not. A Kuwaiti is one who holds Kuwaiti citizenship.

[al-Shimri] Will the committee propose a specific plan to attract Kuwaiti youths to the armed services?

[Munawir] We are entertaining several proposals in that regard, including salary incentives. A large cooperative will be founded to supply the needs of the Army, the Police, and the National Guard and will carry all types of goods, including automobiles and household furniture. Soldiers will be able to take out soft loans to finance their purchases and pay for the construction of their houses. This will shorten the waiting period that young employees of the two ministries must currently endure.

[al-Shimri] Did you have a discussion with the minister of defense on the status of the Dar al-Jazirah forces?

[Munawir] We discussed that issue, and we are quite satisfied that those forces are now properly placed.

[al-Shimri] Are there any plans to request enforcements for those forces?

[Munawir] To be sure, such requests will be made when necessary.

[al-Shamri] You always say "when necessary," without going into the general framework.

[Munawir] The military situation and military preparedness come in degrees. When we see that the military situation has reached the point where reinforcements are called for, we will surely request additional troops.

Security Agreements

[al-Shimri] Do you think that Kuwait's security agreements will be effective? How do you reconcile them with the proposed armament [defense] budget?

[Munawir] We understand from the minister of defense that those agreements are effective and preemptive in case of an emergency. It is my belief, however, that we should not depend only on security agreements with stated terms, because they will expire sooner or later. This is why we must be prepared. I ask the members of the Finance Committee to give special consideration to this matter, because the minister of defense makes plans for the future rather than for the present, and those plans must be adequately funded.

[al-Shimri] The minister of the interior fielded questions in the Assembly about the State Security police. Have you discussed that with him?

[Munawir] Every department has its good and bad elements. The minister has promised that everything will be fine and has requested time to purge the ministry of suspects and of unproductive elements.

[al-Shimri] Even though you have been a member of the Bloc of Independent Deputies, it is rumored that you are completely loyal to the government and that this loyalty is likely to color the positions you may take and the proposals you may submit in the future. How do you comment?

[Munawir] As a Kuwaiti, I am completely loyal to the government, but I am not so loyal to the authority. Rather, I support the latter's positives and oppose its negatives. I believe that I am the only one it did not allow to speak when I wanted to express my views.

[al-Shimri] It is feared that the National Assembly may be dissolved in the near future because it has begun to deal with the forbidden issues. Analogies are being made with developments in 1986. How do you comment?

[Munawir] Let them dissolve the Assembly. The government has a right to do so, but the people also have the right to restore the same Assembly within 60 days or elect another. This type of thing is recognized in all of the countries of the world. The important thing is to abide by the Constitution.

[al-Shimri] But some people worry that there are powerful forces that may be invoked in case of security or financial scandals.

[Munawir] We had a long discussion about this when we met behind closed doors. When the subject was brought

up, the head of government, Crown Prince Shaykh Sa'ad al-'Abdallah, and his deputy, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, assured us that they would not be sensitive if any suspected persons were recalled or put on trial, no matter what their position, power, or authority.

LEBANON

Fadlallah Calls For Islamic-Christian Dialogue

93AF0436A Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 14 Jan 93 p 4

[Article: "In Lecture on Islamic-Christian Dialogue, Fadlallah: 'We Have Held Dialogue With Bullets but Solved No Problem'"]

[Text] At the invitation of students of the Beirut University College, His Eminence, Scholar Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah delivered a lecture titled: *Thoughts on Islamic-Christian Dialogue and Student's Role*. The lecture was attended by a number of figures in politics and education and a large number of the college students.

Scholar Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah opened his lecture by saying: "Why dialogue, particularly Islamic-Christian dialogue? The issue requires no more pondering and thinking, because the story today is that we no longer have isolated societies, where each society can isolate itself around its philosophy and its issues, far from other societies, giving a little bit of attention and effort to some emergency contact lines."

He added: "In our age, the issue is not that societies' positions and issues overlap, but that each of us (harbors the other's identity) in his mind and his heart. Each of us moves in his life on the basis that he is united in thought with somebody else when he thinks of the other person and the counter-opinion. Thus, one cannot escape from others because the others are inside one. The others are inside our land and in all the challenges that confront us for peace as a country, a region, a nation, and a world. I am not talking about peace versus military war, but of the peace of the philosophy and of the cause. We disagree because we are diverse, and diversity means disagreement. Even when diversity is integrated and when it produces one individual, it produces an individual with diverse characteristics who harbors within his single identity the diversity of both mother and father. Therefore, it is natural to disagree. The problem is in our warring and our feuding when we disagree. This is the problem that life has experienced throughout history and civilization. If we tried to sum up the history of all wars and their complications, we would find that [the reason is that] one opinion seeks to impose itself on another opinion and one cause seeks to impose itself on another cause."

"The problem is that we move in two directions. In one of the two directions, each of us has a hidden zone unknown to the other. We know that our hidden zones are our psychological caves. When we realize that caves are dark, then we learn how ghosts intervene to exaggerate things, even if there is nothing to exaggerate."

Shaykh Fadlallah added: "There is the problem of the self, which we express as selfishness or individualism. Selfishness makes one's existence rigid. So one fails to move to meet with the other. One's existence is made rigid by the drive to persecute or abolish the other."

"The hidden zones make us fearful, and selfishness makes us attack and persecute. In this regard, dialogue illuminates our hidden zones to one another and works to break, to a degree, the rigidity of selfishness. In dialogue, though one may try to conceal one's self from the other, dialogue will force out of one a word that reveals one's thinking and emotions even if one does not wish to reveal them. Often, words besiege us, thus preventing us from doing a lot of what we conceal, as they prevent us from doing a lot of what we declare. This is because a word does not mean just what the dictionary says it means. Often, a word is said to express inadvertently what is in the subconscious."

The shaykh added: "When words wrestle each other and when dialogue heats up, they could expose what one does not wish to reveal. Dialogue could expose numerous hidden zones. Thus, it can remove numerous obstacles. Muhammad said, 'If you open up to each other, you will not fight.' With openness, fear is eliminated. Thus, there will be no condition to prompt aggression by selfishness."

"As for selfishness, why are we selfish? Because we live the paganism of individualism. Because we are engrossed with the self, we always stand before a mirror to see what we think, feel, and like. What we often neglect is to stand before the other's mirror. Often, we adore ourselves. Dialogue exposes our vanity and challenges the idolatry of the philosophy to which we cling. In dialogue, one presents his philosophy and the other debates it. One philosophy is compelled to defend itself. This is a weak point that makes one weak before the other. When one hears the other's challenges, then one must inevitably become modest. If the other can persuade one, then one must love the other. Thus, some barriers fall and what remains amounts to no more than details."

"As for why have dialogue, it is so we will not remain in this world mere individuals who are not bound by any tie that can create a human society out of them. We hold dialogue so that we can develop an understanding, can persuade each other, and can pursue something that can unite our issues and thoughts or can bring them closer to each other. When we talk of Islamic-Christian dialogue, we proceed on the basis of historical, political, and social conditions that have provoked numerous concerns, complicated matters, and made each side take a position that harbors all of the world's dark caves. Be a Christian, provided that you do not understand your Christianity as bearer of the rancors of history. Be a Muslim, provided that you do not understand your Islam as bearer of the rancors of history. Be a Christian or be a Muslim, provided that it cannot be said that this human being is not you, that your interest is not his interest, and that his cause is not your cause."

"In Lebanon, we live in this climate [in which one harbors the rancors of history]. In places other than Lebanon, we

live to create this climate. In the world, we live in this climate so that the imperialists can exploit religion as the scarecrow or the incinerator in which all get burnt."

"We do not wish to use the Islamic-Christian dialogue issue for public consumption, unlike those who raise this issue for public consumption when they want politics to soften a certain climate at a certain phase, but without producing any results. We want to provoke some suggestions. There is a point that we must discuss, namely the words Muslims and Christians. The problem is that these words vary. When we project Islam and Christianity, we may be projecting them as just facades for certain groups of people—facades that proclaim the name of this or that human group the way tribal names proclaim this or that tribe. Perhaps the issue is that Islam and Christianity are philosophies, values, and systems of human relations. Islam is an entity with great ideas, values, and free human relations and conditions, and Christianity proceeds on the same basis. Christianity, as well as Islam, should be something in one's mind, heart, activity, and positions. There are people who do not belong, but on whom the name is imposed. There are those who belong, but who do not adhere, and there are those who belong and adhere. The issue varies from position to position."

"When Islam is considered a sect and Christianity a sect, then the dialogue is like a dialogue between tribes. It is a different dialogue between two groups—a dialogue concerned with managing their social and political affairs, and so forth. But if we proceed on the basis that there is a Christian intellectual entity within your identity and an Islamic intellectual entity within my identity, then the dialogue will be founded on a firm basis. When the issue is an issue of a human group here and another group there, then dialogue will remain confined within the sphere of the interests of this or that group. This is why we have to determine if we are of the group that belongs to Christianity and the group that belongs to Islam or if we are not among those who belong."

Shaykh Fadlallah added: "In the intellectual Islamic-Christian issue, the question is: Is religion an intellectual state or not? We do not wish to embark on this debate. If we proceed from this starting point, we may discover that there is no disagreement in the general lines of Islam and Christianity and that the disagreement is on some details of the general lines and on some ideas. I am not saying this out of courtesy. I am talking of an intellectual issue raised in the arena. Both Christianity and Islam proceed in their historical affiliation from respect for prophecies."

"One problem is that Christians believe in Jesus as a god, and Muslims do not. Christians do not believe in Muhammad as a prophet, and Muslims do. Redemption, divine secrets, and other matters pertaining to intellectual, not practical assimilation, are other issues that emanate from these differences."

"When we examine the general lines, we find that these lines, except for Christ's identity and the incarnation of Christ, unite Muslims and Christians."

"The issue is an issue of difference in the nature of application of the philosophy. Christian divinity emanates from the concept of association. But the issue of assimilation is different. The spiritual state experienced by the Christian when he devotes himself to God is the same state experienced by the Muslim when he devotes himself to God. Thus, the hereafter represents the concept that stops you from committing sin intentionally. Regarding the practical issue of what worship is and what accountability is, there is no difference between Muslim and Christian. Some may say that Islam evokes fear of God and Christianity evokes love of God. This is not an accurate argument. We love whom we love, and we fear that if we make a mistake in what we do in connection with this love, we will lose this love. In love, fear is coupled with fear."

"When we consider the reality, what difference do we find between Christianity and Islam when we talk of human and spiritual values, honesty, sincerity, sacrifice, and giving? Both Christianity and Islam move along the same line in this regard, even where details of practical human conduct are concerned. When we act in our public life, the bannerline values are discipline and uprightness. Can one believe here that there is Islamic honesty and Christian honesty, Islamic integrity and Christian integrity?"

"Some imagine that Christians live the openness of freedom and Muslims live the lawlessness of freedom. The fact is that it is not so. Chastity is an Islamic value and a Christian value, and this is in conflict with the Western perception. The difference is not in value but in conduct. We agree on 90 percent of the values. Dialogue here can pave the way for a concept that could highlight the difference, and we may discover that there are differences but that these differences should not prevent us from meeting in numerous areas. We should realize this when we are committed Christians and committed Muslims. But when we are not committed, this issue is not important."

"In the real general debate, theological issues are not raised. There are dialogue conferences that discuss concepts, and intellectuals can learn from them."

"But I say here that the problem is not a problem of hardship that emanates from our theological disagreement but a problem of philosophical and intellectual vocabulary. When we consider the real situation, we find that Christians, and Muslims are not preoccupied with the trinity issue. The only theology preoccupying our minds is the political issue whose slogans and illusions have been imposed on us."

"I believe that the political issue—which has been imposed on us and which has raised in the real Lebanese situation slogans concerned with sectarian rights and duties and with fear here and injustice there since Lebanon started opening up to the world around it—has imposed the sectarian regime on us. It was imposed on us, even though we put our signature to it. Lebanon became a need in the region's political situation, and Lebanon was established so that it would be a homeland in which all the region's tendencies would wrestle with one another. I could almost say that the freedom of which we are proud was established

not out of love for the black eyes of the Lebanese but because international intelligence agencies need it to observe all tendencies in the Arab world and outside it."

"Lebanon's sectarian system is connected with the movement of the political struggle among the region's countries. Lebanese wars are the region's schools for sectarian and denominational fragmentation. The Christian-Muslim wars are intended to teach the region's Muslims and Christians how to fight in the future. The Sunni-Shiite wars have been ignited so that the flame of sectarian war will not die. There were no real [objective] circumstances to cause the problem of religious diversity in Lebanon, and there was not any event to cause the war. But the region needed a Lebanese war. To topple the Palestinian issue, a war was needed in Lebanon, because Lebanon is the country where citizen is allowed to fight brother citizen and where sects have the right to contact whomever they wish abroad. We are disunited sects in a united state. If we were to investigate, would we find Lebanese in Lebanon? There are Orthodox, Maronites, Sunna, and Shiites in Lebanon. Lebanon is as big as the sect is. In the south, Lebanon is Shiite. In al-Biqa', Lebanon is divided between this and that sect, and so forth. The Lebanese are not supposed to be Lebanese because if they are Lebanese, they may consider becoming a force. It has been said that Lebanon's strength is in its weakness. Why isn't it said Israel's strength is in its weakness?"

"We are not supposed to feel that there is a homeland for which we are responsible. This is why it is easy for any party to penetrate us in the name of safeguarding this or that sect. The sectarian regime was imposed on us, and then we proceeded to philosophize it. We did not develop the philosophy for our system on the basis of the Lebanese reality. Others created a reality for us that got us involved with several axes, and then we proceeded to philosophize it, saying that this reality represents civilization and prosperity for the Lebanese."

"There are illusions under which we live. The Christians fear the great Islamic ocean, and Muslims fear injustice. These are illusions. The fact is that there is a great Islamic ocean in the East exactly as there is a great Christian ocean in the West. The minorities issue is a worldwide issue. In this century, this issue moves differently from the way it moved in past centuries. If we were to examine the real situation, would we conclude that the presidency has been tantamount to a guaranty for the Christians? What guarantee is it with all this eviction and this common starvation?"

"The same goes for injustice insofar as Muslims are concerned. Injustice is not a Christian issue. We are all done an injustice in Lebanon. The Christian areas that are treated unjustly are the same as the Muslim areas that are treated unjustly. Can one make a distinction between al-Qa' and al-Hirmil, or between Rumaysh and Bint Jubayl? In Lebanon, there is a rich class and a poor class."

"Lebanon's political problem is that we do not examine the past thoroughly. The problem is that through the

history we disseminate, we still try to create hatred whenever the atmosphere is opened for love. The war has tried to keep those who belong to the new generation separated from each other. This is why productive dialogue is your dialogue, young people. Make an effort, especially in your universities, where you learn how to be objective. When you respect your philosophy, future, and country, you will throw all of this legacy off your shoulders. Face the disputed facts with vigilant questions. You congregate here, and you feel that you agree on the philosophy that you study. How do you debate the political issue? With this spirit, learn rationalism from your universities. Do not be collegiate in the library and the classroom, only to become nomads in real life."

"Civilization is not in having one's mind turned into a library, but in transforming one's humanity into influential activity in real life in order to open for the citizen horizons that enrich his life and his future."

"We have often held our dialogue with bullets, and we have learned that bullets have not solved any disputed issue. We have often held dialogue with violence, and violence has toppled our humanity. You try a large variety of soft drinks and cosmetics. What do you say that we try to have an open mind in the best arena—"Invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching" [Koran 16:125]. "Nor can goodness and evil be equal. Repel (evil) with what is better; then will he between whom and thee was hatred become as it were thy friend and intimate" [Koran 41:34]."

"Why dialogue? So that our life can expand and become stronger and more triumphant."

Shaykh Fadlallah on Fundamentalism, Peace Process

*93AF0422A Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English
1-7 Feb 93 pp 10-13*

[Article by Amal Fadlallah and Nadia Schriem: "Fadlallah Elaborates"; boldface words, quotation marks as published]

[Text] Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah is one of Lebanon's most prominent Shiite clerics. A close observer of the Lebanese and Middle Eastern scenes, his opinions are widely regarded as incisive and hard-hitting.

We met with him last week to obtain his views on a number of topical issues, including America's position after Bill Clinton's inauguration, the Arab-Israeli peace talks, and the role of the Islamist movement in the Middle East.

Here is a translation of the interview:

How do you perceive the course of developments over the next 12 months in Lebanon, and in the Arab and Islamic world, in the light of the stagnation in the Middle East peace process, the allied attacks on Iraq and the accession of a new American president?

Lebanese people have long had the sense of living in a kind of "interregnum", a kind of transitional period, in expectation of some decisive turning point which is always in the future. They have the sense, too, of being onlookers in the process by which their own fate will be worked out, a process which is in suspension, "on hold". It's in suspension because America is poised to scotch any Arab or European initiative intended to put Lebanon in touch with the substantive moves now being made in the Middle East. It's as if America was determined to prevent this country from recovering its political and economic health.

As far as rebuilding Lebanon's infrastructure and economy is concerned, I don't imagine much will be done this year, since the ingredients needed for the process are not available. Much hope is being placed in the government (of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri). In my view however, all it can do is to prevent the country from collapsing. It can't do much more because its room for maneuver is limited by the complex interaction and interconnection of many regional and international factors that bear on our situation.

On the Middle Eastern level, 1992 saw no progress made in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, and this was accompanied by a continuing lack of common purpose among Arab governments. Each Arab state continued to be preoccupied with its internal affairs, and inter-Arab relations were often permeated by a feeling of wariness, even mistrust. This feeling was due, more often than not, to the perceived need to "confront Islamic extremism", though extremism was not responsible for this confrontation. The policy applied by this or that state requires the imposition of violence, which creates counter-violence in its turn. This must be seen in the light of American policy, which works to foster mistrust among Arab states, even among its own allies, and will continue to do so until the time comes to draw up a new dispensation for the region.

Thus the Arab world is in a state of fragmentation, which is made worse by the almost complete isolation of Libya and Iraq.

We notice too that some Arab countries seem to be in a great hurry to reach a reconciliation with Israel, even an unconditional reconciliation. We find that Egypt, considered the leader of the Arab world, is putting more pressure on Arab countries than on Israel, doing so presumably in accordance with the role America has given it in the process of settling the conflict.

In the perspective of all this, where this no Arab unity, where there is disintegration from within, where the people have a defeatist mentality, and where, under the guise of "the new world order", fear is imposed by the security authorities. Under these circumstances the Arab nations dare not demonstrate even in favor of the Palestinian deportees. There has been only one demonstration in Cairo, where those protesting were described as "Islamic extremists".

I believe that 1993 will be another year of stagnation. I see no element in the Arab world able of likely to take a vital and vigorous initiative.

What of the new American president, Bill Clinton?

We have to realize that, however large America bulks in the world, its shadow is greater than its substance. It possesses great military power, but that power is not supported by commensurate political or economic strength. The world economic situation is one of complexity, and America, with the weakness of its own domestic economy, will have trouble coping with it. Meanwhile, as Western Europe strives for greater unity, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are facing their own problems. These developments will absorb a very great deal of American attention and energy, not necessarily with the most successful results. I do not believe 1993 will be a distinguished year for U.S. policy.

An Arab-Israeli peace settlement is likely to have repercussions on many levels. How far-reaching do you think these may be for the region? Do you think they might go as far as changing national frontiers?

It is clear that a new Middle East will come into being as the result of a peace settlement. There are plans for significant changes in matters of economics, political affairs and security.

What will happen to all the region's great figures, its "symbols", as we like to call them, who have spent their whole lives in an atmosphere of war and preparations for war? We can well imagine they would feel out of place in a region at peace. I dare say some of them will be making their exits from the scene.

I don't see any signs of a change of frontiers, though. I don't see that this kind of change is required by the needs of American policy or strategy. People speculate about the partition of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state. But I don't think a Kurdish state is on the cards, or even possible. The Kurds are useful merely as a pressure tool against Iran, Turkey and Syria, and as a means of "shuffling the cards".

Israel has often been thought to favor a strategy of creating sectarian mini-states in the countries around it, but I believe that this strategy is no longer useful or necessary. Israel has now become an undisputed fact on the ground, indeed, one of the strongest facts on the international scene, whether we like it or not.

So I don't envisage any considerable changes in terms of frontiers, but I think there will be great changes in terms of "symbols" and political rights.

How will Lebanon be affected by the Mideast peace settlement, if not in terms of frontier changes?

In my opinion Lebanon will be the last country to make peace with Israel. That is why it will remain a kind of sounding board for all the reactions and counterreactions that will accompany the process of peacemaking and reconciliation in the region. But I don't expect this will be accompanied by any serious disturbance. The repercussions will be political, with security overtones, but I don't foresee war.

What about the Palestinians settled in Lebanon? Will they be repatriated, or will they be settled here permanently?

The issue of their settlement must be seen in the light of the overall strategy to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The solution being proposed does not envisage their return to Palestine. There are three other possibilities: a) gathering them together in Jordan, if that ever becomes a "Palestinian state"; b) distributing them in the various parts of the world; and c) leaving them where they now are.

The question of whether they will be settled here or not does not rest with the Palestinians. It will be decided on an international level, just as the creation of Israel was decided. What we, and the Palestinians, must do is make clear that we will reject any attempt to enforce a settlement of Palestinians in this country, knowing of course that there is often a wide gap between a declaration of desire or intention on the one hand, and hard facts on the other.

In any case, I think that this issue is not one we will have to confront in the immediate future.

Where does Iran stand in the regional picture?

Iran, which is a key regional power, has been strengthening its political and economic position and extending the scope of its foreign relations. I believe that the world's decision-making countries, including America, are aware of Iran's importance as a factor of stability in the region. They realize that, in the situation of conflict and rivalry prevailing in the region, if Iran is shaken, the whole region will be perturbed. I for one detect no sign of any attempt to destabilize Iran. This does not mean that the struggle between Iran and America will be resolved, but it does mean that the struggle will be kept within limits each side is careful not to overstep.

How would you define Islamic fundamentalism in its religious and political aspects?

I object to the word "fundamentalism", a term which has overtones of exclusivism. I prefer the term "Islamist movement", which indicates a willingness to interact and live harmoniously with other trends of opinion, rather than to exclude them.

In the Western perspective, "fundamentalism" has implications of violence, and the Islamists have never chosen violence. Rather, violence has been forced upon them. It was imposed on them in the civil strife that devastated Lebanon, in Israeli actions in the Middle East, and in the violence perpetrated by various regimes, even those claiming to be democratic.

I believe the Islamist movement has consolidated its position in the Islamic world and is now a power everyone must reckon with. There is no question now of the regimes snuffing it out, although of course they can still create conditions of instability within it.

I believe the Islamist movement will be able to confront the U.S. ascendancy in more than one way. I can say that it will be the major political factor on the regional scene, and that its presence will have repercussions of many kinds. The United States, after having been relieved of the

Soviet incubus, will find the Islamist movement to be a source of concern in more than one respect.

You have won a reputation as a man of dialogue. Yet not so long ago you were perceived as someone who had "blessed" terrorism. How can you explain this change?

I have never changed. I have never blessed terrorism. What I have done is to confront international imperialism, which aims at imposing its domination on the whole world.

I don't consider the movements of liberation to be terrorist, as the West tries to suggest. I don't consider resistance to Israel or to imperialism a terrorist action, I differentiate between terrorist movements, which take innocent people as their targets for material objectives, and liberation movements, which aim to resist imperialism and to advance freedom.

I believe in upholding the principle which prompts the weak to be independent, and which justifies all means that will help achieve this great objective. Ends do not always justify means in small personal matters. But in great matters the world does not stick to the principle of "ends justifying means", since (achieving) the ultimate objective may require the use of many means.

I have from the beginning been a man of dialogue, having in fact written a book about dialogue in the Koran. But I am also one who cares about the aspirations of the weak to freedom. Certainly we should take the side of the oppressed, as the Koran teaches.

How do you interpret the rapprochement between Israel and the Vatican?

In a recent meeting I had with the papal nuncio, I asked him: "If Jesus Christ were with us now, would he recognize Israel? Would he approve of the Jewish occupation of Palestine and the expulsion of the Palestinian people? I'm addressing you not only to appeal to your Christian conscience; I also address you as the envoy of the pope; who is a representative of Christ on earth and whose word is therefore a word of Christ. Remember that the Temple from which Christ drove the thieves was not only a building existing at a particular moment of time, but is in fact any place where human beings dwell with one another. And I believe that if Christ were to come back now, he would drive the thieves from the 'Temple' of Palestine".

The nuncio responded that Israel was an accomplished fact, to which I replied: "The Devil is also an accomplished fact, but it's no business of ours to give him our blessing".

MOROCCO

Conditions for Political Prisoners 'Worsening'

93AF0426A Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Mouna El Banna: "Morocco: Political Prisoners Criticize the Worsening of Their Prison Conditions"]

[Text] Rabat—For some time, Moroccan political prisoners have increased the number of their hunger strikes

and appeals to national and international public opinion to protest "the worsening of their conditions."

Whether they were arrested for belonging to banned far-left organizations, to the Islamic movement, or simply for trade union activities, in communiques they have sent to the press, all the prisoners have criticized the attitude of Mr. Mohamed Ledidi, the new director general of the prison system.

They never omit mention of the fact that in April 1992, Mr. Ledidi was the chairman of the tribunal in Rabat that passed sentence on the secretary general of the Democratic Labor Confederation, Mr. Noubir Amaoui. Mr. Amaoui was then sentenced to two years in prison for diffaming the government. The prisoners accuse Mr. Ledidi and his subordinates of endangering the "gains" they had made after "long years of suffering." So visits are again strictly regulated and direct contacts banned. Visits by children are no longer allowed, medical care is very inadequate, and the food is as poor as the prisons are dirty. Last, the prisoners have demanded the right to pursue their studies.

On Friday, 26 February in Rabat, during a meeting with the press, prisoner families complained of this "worsening of the situation" and expressed their "fear that the prisoners not become the victims of serious health accidents." In early February the Justice Ministry, to which the prison system reports, had rejected these charges, stating that Mr. Ledidi was in the process of "undertaking a reorganization so as to improve living conditions in prison, with regard to both food and space."

Several days ago, the Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH, independent) asked the authorities, "for humanitarian reasons," to quickly free Mr. Abderrahim Sawab, a prisoner in Casablanca's Okacha prison who was sentenced to 15 years in prison following the events of June 1981. At that time he was 17 years old. According to the OMDH, he is "in a critical state of health, suffering from tuberculosis, suffering from paralysis in his lower extremities, and exhibiting serious mental problems."

In June 1990, the OMDH calculated there were 300 political prisoners in Morocco. On Friday the families present and members of the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH, left-wing opposition) used the figure of 750 political prisoners, including Islamicists. For their part, the Moroccan authorities reject the distinction between "ordinary" prisoners and "political" detainees.

Opposition Parties Question Democratic Process

93AF0419 Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Feb 93 p 6

[Article by special correspondent in Rabat Jacques de Barrin: "Morocco: Preparation of Legislative Elections; The Opposition Denounces Pretenses at 'Democratic Process'"—first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] The Moroccans are supposed to elect a new Chamber of Representatives on 30 April; the mandate of the previous chamber expired on 9 October 1992. Questioning the sincerity of the "democratic process" started by King Hassan II, four opposition parties just addressed him

a kind of warning, the motives of which were explained to us by Mr. Abderrahman Youssoufi, first secretary of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP).

"It's our tragedy: people no longer trust the democratic process. They are sick of being cheated every time they go to the polls," Mr. Youssoufi, first secretary of the USFP—one of the leading opposition parties—complained. The most recent proof of this, he said, is the constitutional referendum of 4 September, which turned into a plebiscite (99.96 percent), and the municipal elections of 16 December, which were notoriously distorted by the injection of money.

The four opposition parties that form the Democratic Bloc have just suspended their participation in the national commission in charge of overseeing the election process, and asked for "the creation of a climate of political detente that would restore the people's confidence." According to Mr. Youssoufi, "the government must be made to face its responsibilities, forced to start talking in earnest" (with the opposition).

"Can you imagine that we have not yet managed to get the complete results of the last municipal elections from the Ministry of Interior," Mr. Youssoufi pointed out. "They just agreed to tell us how many votes our elected candidates did get." And he denounced the government's "stalling answers" concerning the apportionment of constituencies, the updating of electoral rolls, voter registration cards, and the staffing of the polling stations....

But will the opposition parties resign themselves to participating in the next elections? The USFP first secretary noted "some reluctance" among militants. A sign of a bad mood: "Several provincial federations," he observed, "have not yet sent us their candidate lists." All things considered, however, Mr. Youssoufi believes boycotting the polls would not help. "We are not ashamed of adopting this strategy," he said. "It is a way of having our fellow citizens take part in the democratic process and presenting our ideas to them, even though the government is trying to marginalize us." Has democratic practice changed significantly enough during the past 30 years or so to justify Mr. Youssoufi and his friends' choice a posteriori? "There has not been much progress," he just answered. "We have little room to maneuver. We struggle."

In the present context, however, the only solution is "to be militant and to struggle." And he wished for "a firm and resolute civic presence" to foil the government's ploys.

The Amaoui Case

"If the country is to be managed better, it needs an executive branch issued from a properly elected parliamentary majority," the USFP first secretary insisted. Does the idea of a genuine constitutional monarchy to replace a monarchy by divine right fall among the "analyses that ought no longer to be made," as Hassan II recently told LE POINT? "It is at least one element in the political debate," Mr. Youssoufi assured. "It is quite conceivable that the Moroccans will discuss the attributions of the various government bodies."

According to Mr. Youssoufi, the Rabat court of appeal's recent decision to uphold the sentence to two years in prison with no possibility of probation pronounced against Mr. Noubir Amaoui, the Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT) general secretary and USFP political bureau member, charged with "slandering" the government, is evidence that the government gets nervous whenever it is challenged. "We did all we could to ensure that everything would go on dispassionately, with no provocation whatsoever," he explained. "The government could have chosen any of a very wide range of solutions without losing face." Because of the government's blunders, "Mr. Amaoui has become a symbolic figure of the opposition, and the next election campaign may well revolve around his name," Mr. Youssoufi noted. "We won on all counts: the futility of the proceedings against our comrade was proved."

The USFP first secretary shares the opinion of the U.S. Department of State which, in a recent report, mentioned continued and serious human rights violations. He thus would like "Morocco to ratify conventions on torture and on discrimination against women." In this respect, he would like women to participate in the country's political life, whereas they are excluded from it, as in Gulf countries. Can we imagine that, one day, a woman will head the government? "It is forbidden," the king decided. "Why not," Mr. Youssoufi retorts.

Efforts To Eradicate, Replace Drug Market

93WD0412Z Paris LE MONDE in French
23 Feb 93 pp 1, 5

[Article by Jacques de Barrin: "The Rif War: The King of Morocco Intends To Utilize Major Means To Eliminate Cannabis Growing and Trafficking"]

[Text] Chefchaouen—They were travelers without luggage and they had struck out on the road to Chefchaouen and Ketama in the heart of the Rif just as others before them had taken the more perilous and more distant road to Pokhara and Kathmandu at the foot of the Himalayas. It was in around 1975. With a look that was at once mocking and bemused, the primitive mountain dwellers of the area had watched these odd tourists enjoy, among the area's other products, the famous kif—a mixture of tobacco and cannabis—with which they had forever been stuffing their wooden pipes.

The picturesque aspect of this story very quickly got blurred. Living as they did off of poor, sloping patches of land, these Rif peasants understood the profits they could make out of this situation.

They understood this all the more since at the time the drought was destroying traditional crops. So traffickers joined the dance to use every means to organize the collection of cannabis (in other words, Indian hemp)—from the beast of burden to the airplane-taxi—to "develop" this grass in the form of a paste, chira, and secondarily in the form of oil, then market the finished product on foreign markets, especially European ones. "Starting in 1980, people stopped listening to us," said Mr. Ahmed Chbicheb, the director of the Western Rif Rural

Economic Development [Agency] (DERRO), who, as far back as 1962, had been assigned to look into the fate of these northern provinces, which had been forgotten for far too long.

It was a policy of jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire: while Mr. Chbicheb and his associates were busy reforesting the region, planting fruit trees and opening up trails and reintroducing small-scale farming, other less well-intentioned spirits were busy setting up "dirty development" structures around cannabis to such a degree that land given over to Indian hemp growing leapt from 5,000 to 50,000 hectares, which were often mistaken for forest. Although he was poorly paid by his customers, the Rif peasant gained his advantage from this "business"—as they put it around Ketama—since without much effort this agricultural speculation earned him at a minimum 10 times more dirhams than wheat and barley or almond or olive trees.

Dealing just with raw cannabis, before any processing, had ended up accounting for an annual turnover of 18 billion dirhams, or about 11 billion francs. That was the equivalent of transfers from Moroccan workers abroad or one-third the country's export receipts! The extent of the challenge thrown down by drug lords and their associates was no longer on the scale of the meager resources at the DERRO's disposal and of the few "good conscience projects" such as the one at Issaguen, near Ketama, which had been conceived to erase cannabis fields from the Rif landscape. This underground trade linked to cannabis gave a very negative image of a country that was negotiating its ties to Europe.

And in order to wipe it out, Hassan II understood how urgent it was to establish order there, all the more quickly as Morocco was in the process of becoming a jumping off point for hard drugs—cocaine—which moved via Casablanca and Tangiers between South America and Europe.

Furthermore this "pre-Columbian" situation was beginning to have devastating effects on social structures and, what was more, on power structures. A gilded youth came to enjoy drugs. Fatal brawls started to pit rival bands of traffickers. "Values had changed in the wrong way," a Tangiers resident said. "The drug barons had managed to become admired and envied by some. They knew how to play the good part, to act as benefactors, by sponsoring soccer teams, for instance, or building mosques, or offering their clients pilgrimages to Mecca."

In the 16 October 1992 municipal elections, drug money had flowed like water, especially in the "contaminated" northern provinces. There were 440 candidates whose behavior was dubious, members for the most part of parties of the government majority, who had had to be restarted by the administration. But this did not prevent about ten of them from running and...getting elected.

Hassan II then ordered a "ruthless fight" to be waged against drug trafficking, "taking only the general interest into consideration." Three thousand men assisted by 14 vedette boats, two single-engine airplanes, two helicopters, and one piece of radar, "sealed off" the coast from Larache

to Al Hoceima. A permit to go to sea was established and the weekly Rio de Janeiro-Casablanca flight suspended. Aided by the dismissal of several high-level officials, this first offensive produced record seizures of chira: 8.8 tonnes in a single month (47.6 tonnes in 1991), and the arrests of several dozen dealers.

"Repressive action must be accompanied by economic action," Mr. Ahmed Midaoui, the governor of Tangiers, emphasized. The ruler of the Rif has thus just revealed the major outlines of a five-year development plan for the Rif, which will make up for the shortage to be derived from cannabis and its derivatives. As an area for emigration and smuggling located a few nautical miles from the Spanish coast, the northern provinces should thus find themselves offered the means to live honestly, the objective being to disenclose them, reforest them, build dams there, provide new impetus to traditional crops and animal husbandry, and put together a network of small- and medium-sized businesses. The cost of the operation, according to Hassan II: "At a minimum, 2 billion dollars."

"It's really nice to point to us, but we can't win this battle alone. The ball is now in your court," Moroccan officials tell the international community, in particular the countries of Europe, whose financial help they are soliciting. To do so they do not hesitate—this is a fair war—to present themselves as the innocent victims in a play they have not written since, if you believe them, consumers and traffickers are almost all foreign nationals.

Without denying the seriousness of these arguments—more than one-quarter of Moroccan cannabis is consumed in Europe—and of the repressive measures that have already been taken, the creditors, among them the European Economic Community, hope to discuss the open-ended bill with which they have been presented and see to it that there is follow-up. Hassan II needs this international sponsorship to convince his own people that this spectacular operation arises not out of a mere whim on his part but from a determination to follow his ambitions straight through to the end.

Natives of the Rif, who have a conspiratorial temperament and never, both during the Spanish occupation and post-independence, had very pleasant relations with the central government—they have not forgotten the fierce repression carried out in their area by Hassan II in 1959, when he was the heir apparent, in the company of the late criminal General Mohamed Oufkir—are not ready to drop their distrust. "The people around here have had enough speeches," a local official conceded. "They want something concrete. This economic development program will only have a chance of succeeding if the orders don't fall from on high, if they know how to win the confidence of those involved and to link them very closely to developing their lands. The battle will not be won with flamethrowers."

For the moment in the Abd el-Krim area, you can still only see the bad side of things. Peasants live off cannabis money, but their savings are drying up. Already in the village souks around Chefchaouen, deals are less frequent and the bargaining more intense. Auctions have been held

in the markets and consciousness-raising meetings held for local elected officials to announce to everyone that times have changed. But will the planters of Indian hemp be convinced to abandon so quickly the growing of this miracle grass when the sowing season is approaching?

In the northern provinces, economic activity is suffering from the fatal blow dealt drug trafficking. Isn't it estimated that at least one-quarter of the phenomenal receipts from this illicit trade remain in Morocco? In Tetouan as in Tangiers, banks are suffering from a shortage of liquid assets, dealers having wisely emptied their accounts. The real estate sector, in which this dirty money got laundered, is experiencing hard times and, as a result, artisans' order books shrink. The second-hand luxury car market is dying. Even travel agencies are complaining about poor economic conditions. "Those who supply us with kif for Europe have brought a lot of people out of poverty and I must applaud them," one reader of *LES NOUVELLES DU NORD*, the Tangiers weekly paper, dared write recently. "The state has never been able to do what these people have done...."

"They'll get tired," the traffickers chuckle under their coats as they huddle today. "We've brought them to heel," the local authorities boast. If you believe them, in the northern provinces, there have not been major drug seizures since the beginning of the year and there are reportedly no more stocks to sell. Might some cannabis dealers have once again become mere smugglers? A customs agent said: "It's better to deal in cheeses and small electronic items than in drugs."

Will this stand-off be as easy to win as they say it will be in high places? In their despair, will certain traffickers, perhaps with the complicity of local poorly paid authorities, try to move thin slabs of chira across the mountains and on mule back toward the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla? Others, as was shown by the major seizures in early February in the port of Casablanca, are testing ways out that are less in the public limelight than those in the north.

Will the "kingpins" of Moroccan drugs manage? This is an open secret: this mafia has protectors who are highly placed in the power structure. "No pity for reprehensible acts," states Mr. Midaoui, "but there can be no question of acting on the basis of rumors." However from Tangiers to Tetouan, everyone knows the identity of the big traffickers—from Dib, "the wolf," to Abdelouhed Meziane, "the chocolate king"—and pretends to be astonished that they get caught in the net of justice.

To be sure, some traffickers—and their accomplices—have been arrested, found guilty, and given harsh sentences. But many Moroccans are asking of a government which, according to them, "can be unaware of nothing in the drug world, to stop choosing its victims." So that the trails that lead to Chefchaouen and to Kebama will be covered up for ever.

Lawyers: 'Verdict Reflects Lack of Freedom'
*93AF0377A Rabat AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI
in Arabic 31 Jan 93 p 2*

[Statements by USFP Political Bureau and defense lawyers for Noubir Amaoui, a USFP political bureau member and secretary general of the Democratic Labor Confederation, in reaction to the verdict handed down in Amaoui's appeal case]

[Text] National and international public opinion was surprised by the verdict handed down by the Court of Appeals on 28 January 1993 against our brother, Noubir Amaoui, which sentences him to two years in prison. The verdict upholds the initial verdict that was handed down by the Court of First Instance in Rabat nine months ago, despite the meritorious arguments of brother Amaoui's defense.

The defense stressed that this trial violated the law because it was assigned to a court that lacked territorial jurisdiction and was conducted according to faulty matters of procedure, which invalidate it. Moreover, regarding its fundamental merits, it violated international treaties and pacts that stipulate respect for freedom of opinion and expression.

Therefore, by itself, this trial suffices to indicate the absence of true democracy [in Morocco], the rulers' determination to pursue a course incompatible with human rights, and fact that official rhetoric regarding respect for freedoms enjoys no credibility.

Those who concocted this trial against struggler Noubir Amaoui, a member of the political bureau of our party, the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces], and the secretary general of CDT [Democratic Labor Confederation], intended to silence a voice that publicly declared the truth. Their aim was to preclude any real dialogue about the structural bases for establishing true democracy in our country based on popular representation, separation of powers, and the provision of real guarantees for the development of organizations based on fairness, supervision, accountability, and the unity of legal legitimacy [i.e., the uniform granting of legal status to engage in political activity]. They sought to put an end to the social struggle that is escalating under the auspices of a resistant, struggling central [committee], which reflects the working masses' aspirations to change and to secure their daily bread, honor, and freedom. They also aimed to split patriotic, democratic ranks and prevent the crystallization of a patriotic will determined to move forward on the road to reform and salvation.

However, they were taken by surprise by the enormity of popular solidarity with struggler Amaoui. His case has entered history through a wide gate, inasmuch as all citizens throughout our country know the truth about the circumstances surrounding this case. In one fell blow, these circumstances clearly exposed official conduct, which is stamped with errors, aimlessness, and abuse of the law.

The appeal phase is over. But the problems of corruption, bribery, the exploitation of influence, and far-reaching political and constitutional reform are now being put forth

with unprecedented stridency. Amaoui's trial marks a decisive phase in our country's history and a new political stirring in the conscience of the public at large. Brother Amaoui has become a symbol of our nation's noblest aspiration.

We salute our brother Amaoui for his steadfastness and boldness, and we promise to continue the struggle for the release of all political prisoners.

Let all honorable voices at home and abroad unite to continue their support of and solidarity with Amaoui. Let us continue, with determination and confidence in the future, on the road of the struggle for those principles Amaoui is paying the price of defending.

[Signed] The Political Bureau of the USFP in Rabat, 28 January 1993.

Following the verdict handed down by the Rabat Court of Appeals on Thursday evening, which upheld the initial sentence of two years of effective imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 dirhams against brother Mohamed Noubir Amaoui, we contacted a number of defense lawyers in the trial. They gave us their impressions of the appeal trial and verdict.

Abdelkebir Toubih: 'Appeal Verdict Was Political Surprise'

The verdict handed down by the Court of Appeals in brother Amaoui's case was a political surprise whose consequences were not calculated.

Since it was first brought, the case has been marked by clear violations. No one involved in judicial activity will dispute the occurrence of these violations. Nor will not hesitate to underscore them.

The complaint was originally brought by a party that was not legally qualified to do so. Also, the court that adjudicated it did not have jurisdiction.

Amaoui's detention is ultimate proof of a blatant violation of the law, because it represents a precedent, not only regarding trials in Morocco since independence, but also judicial action in most countries.

When fault is found with a political official from Amaoui's level, one must not focus attention on this official. Rather, commissions of inquiry should be established. The matter concerns public funds belonging to the state. When the veracity of what is published about this official is not proved, one can then speak of libel. The onus of establishing libel does not realistically fall on the accused, but on whoever considers himself a concerned party.

To conclude, I maintain that Amaoui, as everyone knows, and I say everyone, has no special accounts, personal benefits, or opportunistic aspirations. Rather, he is a struggler who defends convictions at which he arrived with every good intention. He is concerned with advancing all elements of his country.

Amaoui can take pride in, and be warmed by, the fact that the USFP first secretary and all political bureau members were present at all phases of the trial.

Amaoui's case has clearly raised for all Moroccans the problem of the judiciary's mission with respect to safeguarding freedom.

Mohamed El Helui: 'Trial Reflects Ordeal of Freedom in Morocco'

Brother Amaoui's trial highlighted the limits on the exercise of democracy, especially public freedoms, because it reflects the ordeal of freedom and the ordeal of dialogue between the opposition and the government at the level of the trial itself.

For the first time in the history of political trials, I heard a prosecuted political official and lawyers raising, in striking agreement, the issue of the judiciary's independence, stressing that it is a basic foundation of the democratic edifice.

For the first time in Morocco, a prosecuted politician has been incarcerated during an adjudication hearing by order of the court for a misdemeanor under the press article. This is an unprecedented, blatant, repugnant violation of an essential guarantee stipulated by the Freedoms Law. In addition, I noted no dialogue, in the correct sense, between Amaoui and his lawyers, on one hand, and the representative of the public prosecutor's office and the government's representative, on the other hand. The speeches contradicted each other, and the dialogue was a dialogue of the deaf.

Brother Amaoui spoke from a position of responsibility in his capacity as a party leader and political leader. At the same time, he expressed the sentiments of all opposition groups who rushed to support him.

More importantly, in my view, his statements regarding the ordeals to which he was subjected and the misunderstanding that he perceived with his official "interlocutors" are manifestations of the difficulties that impede the establishment of the foundations of national conciliation.

I believe that the limited amount of freedom provided by democratic reform have generated a longing to seek that conciliation, which is needed to face the challenges and to safeguard what brother Amaoui called Morocco's national security. However, to achieve this, greater freedoms are needed to provide the conditions for a true dialogue, not a misleading dialogue based on confusion and ambiguity. Also needed, in my view, is greater clarification of positions on the part of all political forces and [word illegible] forces that are in power and that restrict freedoms.

Khaled El Soufiani: 'Appeal Verdict Major Political Mistake'

I did not expect a different verdict in the appeal, though not because brother Amaoui committed a crime deserving of punishment or because the prosecution had any grounds whatsoever. Rather, the verdict, which is a political verdict that bears no relation to the law, was to be expected

because everything points to a complete lack of will to move toward a new Morocco and because the rulers still have no desire in the existence of a divergent view.

Much has been said regarding the legal aspect. It emerged that the complaint was invalid, that jurisdiction in the case belonged to the Casablanca Court, and that the previous/current government did not know, according to its lawyers' statement, the target of the expressions that it considered libelous. Much has also been said about the arbitrary arrest, which violates the law and internationally recognized human rights. Several examples of worsening corruption were given regarding some ministers or some who illegally enriched themselves. Everyone has noted the absence of conditions for a fair trial, and the way in which the judiciary's independence has been treated. The matter reached the point of the court being neglectful regarding its formulation of a decision on the request to terminate the arbitrary arrest [of Amaoui], even though the defense argued the illegality of not responding to or not deciding the request. All of this was evident in the trial. The verdict handed down underscored the trial's political nature and its lack of relation to the law.

In my capacity as a struggler in Amaoui's party, in addition to being his lawyer, I believe that the appeal verdict was a major political error and a new expression of the lack of credibility in everything said about moving toward building a new Morocco.

Moreover, it reflects the rejection of all of the constituent factors of this new Morocco, which can only be truly democratic, starting with clearing the way to freedom of expression, the first step of which should be to repeal all types of political detention. Our party and other patriotic and progressive parties can certainly not avoid taking into account what this verdict demonstrates.

Khaled El Nasri: 'Morocco Has Lost Much Because of This Verdict'

The verdict handed down regarding Amaoui pains me because it legitimizes two errors.

The first is that from a legal standpoint the government's capacity as the complainant has been shown to be groundless. As for the prosecution and conviction, the defense has made clear that exoneration was in order given the absence of any libel or insult.

The second error is that, politically, the verdict is incompatible with the country's needs. Our country has certainly lost much because of this verdict. It should be made clear that the defense focused on the right to criticize as an essential right among the foundations of a state based on law and democracy. Libel cannot be considered in the context of political struggle.

Amaoui's ideas do indeed run counter to the opinions of other parties. However, democracy imposes the rule of respect for all ideas and permission to express them.

Morocco does not need this type of verdict, which perpetuates the split in relations between civilian society and political interlocutors. On the contrary, Morocco needs not

only social dialogue, but also a broader, more comprehensive cultural dialogue in which all Moroccans from all political views and schools participate in order to establish a great national conciliation that guarantees meeting the challenge of the enormous economic, social, and political problems.

That, in my belief, is the primary entryway to the social and political stability that is desired.

Abdallah El Ouladi: 'Appeal Verdict Is a Dangerous Development'

The decision handed down by the Rabat Court of Appeal on 28 January 1993 regarding the case of Noubir Muhammad Amaoui, which upheld the initial verdict convicting him of libel and insult against the previous government and sentenced him to effective imprisonment for two years, did not take into account the procedural and meritorious protests [al-dufu'at] submitted by the defense, even though these protests complied with the letter and spirit of the law in effect, in view of the argumentation and explanations put forth by the defense throughout the trial.

Therefore, I believe that the defense, after communicating with Amaoui, will undoubtedly undertake an objection for cassation regarding this decision.

We hope that the High Council will strike down this decision when it is presented to it.

This case does not just damage Amaoui as a citizen and leading struggler in a party and a syndicate central committee that are among the most important constitutional institutions in the country. It also does serious damage to freedom of thought and expression. The entrenchment of the view taken in the appeal verdict, especially regarding two such serious issues as geographical jurisdiction and arrest pursuant to Chapter 400 of the Criminal Code regarding press cases, is conducive to suspending an intolerable sword over the necks of the press, journalists, and intellectuals.

This is a dangerous development in an area that is vital and basic to our nation's advancement and florescence. The numerous restrictions that have harmed freedom of thought and expression since independence notwithstanding, it is unprecedented in Morocco.

Measures To Preserve Water Supply

*93WN0320Z Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 5 Mar 93 p 13*

[Article by Laila Jalal: "ONEP: Offensive Against Waste"]

[Text] *The ONEP [National Drinking Water Office] is currently involved in several actions intended to combat the wasting of water.*

On 30 December 1992, the ONEP began operating a new water supply system in the center of Sebaa Aioun (Meknes Province) that will increase the production of drinking water with an additional flow of 2,600 cubic meters per day. This brings the total flow to over 3,000 cubic meters per day.

The project cost a total of 10 million dirhams and was financed completely by the ONEP. It remedies the problem of an insufficient water supply during peak periods and will cover future requirements through the year 2020. But combatting the wasting of water, especially in urban areas, is one of the ONEP's priorities. The fact that drinking water accounts for only 10 percent of the nationwide demand has not prevented the office from starting to reflect on the problem of water waste in urban areas. The purpose of that reflection is to come up with a national water conservation policy.

The measures adopted by the ONEP to combat the wasting of water were motivated basically by the concern to make the cost of mobilizing new resources tolerable, such mobilizations being made necessary by a sharp increase in demand. Demand for drinking water was growing by an average of about 8 percent per year. Implementation of those measures was also motivated in part and accelerated in particular by the drought from which Morocco has been suffering for the past decade.

The measures implemented by the ONEP concern several components of demand and are part of a strategy for rational water use. For example, the ONEP has adopted a series of institutional, technical, and educational measures as well as taking steps affecting the rate structure.

At the institutional level, the decision was made to eliminate free water supplies in government buildings and to set up vigilance committees, headed by the local authority and representing everyone involved, that formulate and follow up on a specific strategy for combating waste. It should be pointed out that the threshold of waste is established on the basis of available resources.

Flexible Increases!

As far as rates are concerned, it was decided to implement a policy differentiating the various social classes. For example, the average sales price of water has undergone an increase adapted to the consumption level in order to provide the least privileged classes with access to water and encourage a reduction in waste on the part of big consumers. Because of its progressive nature, that rate structure actually penalizes the excessive consumption of water.

Moreover, and in the technical area, the ONEP has managed to set up a vast rehabilitation program at the national level with help in particular from the UNDP [UN Development Program], the WHO, and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]. That program is intended to rehabilitate facilities so as to reduce leaks and losses in the production and distribution phases. The ONEP is also controlling consumption at public drinking fountains by installing pressure reducers and turning the fountains off at night.

Public awareness is another important component of the fight against waste. At that level, the ONEP is undertaking noteworthy efforts in the form of a media campaign aimed at making consumers realize that water carries a cost and that there is an urgent need to avoid wasting it.

Such measures are intended to have the direct effect of reducing the consumer's water bill by reducing the level of demand. In this connection, the rate system being applied to big consumers will have the effect of slowing the increase in water demand, especially when one considers that 5 percent of the big consumers use as much as 70 percent of the small consumers. Studies conducted following the implementation of those measures show that demand is increasing more slowly: the average annual increase in demand has dropped from 8 percent to 4 percent in recent years. That reduction has been achieved at the same time that, thanks to a system of medium-term loans to water customers, the number of connections has risen from 62 to 74 percent.

SAUDI ARABIA

Editorial Describes Saddam's 'Black Fate'

93AE0335B Jeddah *UKAZ in Arabic* 14 Jan 93 p 1

[Unattributed article]

[Text] It seems that Saddam Husayn is living out his worst nightmare because he has begun to feel his real end and to reap the harvest of his "arrogance" and his insistence on destroying our brotherly Iraqi people. The Iraqi people's capabilities, potential, and great Arab energies have already been ruined as a result of Saddam's "atrocities" and miscalculated "adventures." The Iraqi people's qualities were also ruined as a result of Saddam's hanging on to power and his insistence on continuing to rule, even though this would be on account of his people's benefit and not in favor of Iraq and its security, safety, and territorial unity.

Whoever follows Saddam's actions and statements realizes that the man is collapsing and that his system, which is based on fright, horror, murder, and destruction, can no longer resist the solid international coalition to rescue Iraq and the Iraqi people from a dictator who lacks human feelings and values, who exaggerated his country's destruction, and who terrorizes and tortures his people so that he can remain at the top.

Saddam's private press secretary, a member of his entourage who is prejudiced against the Iraqi people, said: "Kuwait is part of Iraq, and this is a historical fact that international treaties, conspiracies, and organizations did not and will not ever change."

The press secretary also said (in an article published yesterday's in the Iraqi Republic's newspaper): "Kuwait will return to Iraq in spite of everybody, and Saddam Husayn will last, Iraq will last, and Kuwait will remain under one wing and Kurdistan under the other".

Before that, we witnessed and followed the man as he challenged, resisted, and ignored the legitimate international resolutions. Later, we witnessed the intentional intrusion into the Kuwaiti territories in a provocative manner that aroused sarcasm and rage.

So, what does Saddam Husayn want, and what is he aiming at?

The international family's experience with the man indicates that he is living in a state of suffocation and that he is passing through a phase where he has no hope of remaining in power or of being able to resist the international procedures that aim at protecting the Iraqi people, providing safety and security to the Iraqi territories, and finally putting an end to his rule, which is characterized by atrocity and tyranny.

A person who is in such a state, whose eagerness to hold on to authority exceeds that of maintaining his country's safety and safeguarding his unarmed people's souls, is capable of disregarding all humanitarian principles and values. Such a person can engage in a new mad adventure—that would be his only choice because he has lost any possibility either to live more, resist more, or achieve any of his collapsing ambitions.

Saddam's clashes with the international community in a clear, provocative attempt, which is possibly tinged with intended stubbornness, necessitates that the international family bear full responsibility to cut off the serpent's head.

Saddam has done too much to destroy his people and country while ignoring the international organization's resolutions and disregarding all of the values, traditions, and observed pacts in an extremely arrogant and disgusting manner.

It seems that this time, the state of greed that Saddam and his ruling entourage live in has no limits. This is because his despair and the fear of his black fate have reached their climax, and he can no longer survive. Subsequently, just reprimanding him and allowing him to die a slow death does not seem enough to deal with his case. It would be better if he died once and for all in order for Iraq and the Iraqi people to survive. Both Iraq and the Iraqi people are more valuable. Since Saddam has rotted the land, it is not beneficial to let him live any longer.

As for Kuwait...as for the pure land of Kuwait...it is not to be grabbed by Saddam Husayn's hands or others like him. Kuwait is destined to survive and reemerge, thus illustrating the meaning of righteousness and justice and writing a new chapter in history with regard to dealing with dictators, tyrants, and those who are arrogant on earth. In this way, this nation will consolidate its confidence and optimism, as long as wisdom and balanced judgment are observed.

Does Saddam Husayn realize the black fate that both his entourage and his "sick" mind are leading him to?

The Arab people who know Saddam well and who realize the fate that a madman like him could lead them to stand today with all of their will, awareness, and determination to confront this rash tyrant. These people ascertain the necessity of getting rid of Saddam so that Iraq can survive, its great people can be protected, and all can look to the future with love, hope, and optimism under a leadership that believes in honest work and building for the benefit of the people and for future generations.

Riyadh Chamber of Commerce Election Results

93AE0345A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
11 Feb 93 p 11

[Report from Riyadh by Sulayman Nimr: "Riyadh Chamber of Commerce Election Results: "Victory for Development Group Candidates"]

[Text] The Development Group, with a slate of candidates for Riyadh Chamber of Commerce elections, surprised observers and won all 12 [elected] seats on the chamber's board of directors. The Solidarity Group lost the elections, and not one of its candidates was lucky enough to win a seat.

'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'id, chairman of the committee that supervised the elections, announced at 0400 yesterday morning the results of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce elections for the upcoming four-year term. Well-known businessman 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Juraysi, head of the Development Group, won the highest plurality, having received 2,975 votes out of a total of 4,574 votes cast. His competitor Ibrahim al-Tawq, head of the Solidarity Group and former chamber chairman, received only 1,502 votes.

Development candidate 'Ali Fahd al-'Awaydah, 30 years old and the youngest of the candidates, won 2,515 votes to rank first among industrialist candidates.

It is to be noted that chamber bylaws call for the election of six industrialists and six merchants.

Of about 26,000 chamber members entitled to vote, a total of 4,579 cast their votes during the two-day chamber elections that ended two nights ago.

Even though modest, the number of votes cast is the highest since the Chamber was founded 26 years ago and compares favorably with a mere 1,800 votes cast in the previous election. This indicates the importance of this election and reflects efforts by the two competing groups to garner supporters and motivate them to vote.

Since the Development Group won all board of directors seats, its leader 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Juraysi is guaranteed the chamber's chair and, consequently, the presidency of the Council of Saudi Chambers, because it is the Riyadh chamber's turn to assume that post next session. This fact endowed the elections with even more importance.

Within two weeks from the date the election results are announced, the Saudi Ministry of Commerce is to appoint, in consultation with the Ministry of Industry, six additional individuals to the chamber's board, bringing the total number of chamber directors to 18.

The Development Group's victory brings 10 new members to the chamber's board.

It should be noted that the Development Group consists mostly of the "new generation" of Saudi businessmen who have sought to break the old guard's hold on the board.

Al-Juraysi's experience played a major role in guaranteeing the Development Group's sweeping election victory, whereas Solidarity Group candidates tended to rely on

their standing in the business community. Personal factors and direct personal contact played a major role in influencing voters.

That was also the first time that the media paid obvious attention to the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce elections. Each of the two competing groups also paid special attention to the media and took care to publicize its viewpoint in the local press. The latter handled the issue with great care and sensitivity.

Al-Juraysi, leader of the Development Group, was careful to express thanks and appreciation to all those voted and to those who supported him and his group.

He made a press statement in which he emphasized commitment to the group's election platform, which "aims at enhancing chamber performance in a manner that will serve all chamber members, as well as the various groups and components of the business sector."

Al-Juraysi said that the Development Group's victory will open new working horizons and will provide new style and performance mechanisms to enhance interaction between businessmen and the chamber, on one hand, and society, on the other hand.

It was observed that independent candidates had no discernible presence in the chamber elections and were not able to compete. Bandar al-Sayf, the leading independent candidate, received only 331 votes. The polls closed at 2100 Tuesday after two full days of voting. The voting was characterized by strong and keen competition between the Development Group and the Solidarity Group. Even though computers were used, it took more than six hours to count the 4,579 votes cast. Five votes were invalidated by the committee that supervised the process.

Election Results

Candidate	Number of Votes
Merchants	
Development Group	
'Abd-al-Rahman 'Ali al-Juraysi	2,975
'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-'Ajlan	2,516
'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Urayfi	2,483
'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-'Azl	2,468
'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jumay'	2,451
'Abdallah Sulayman al-Muqayrin	2,215
Solidarity Group	
Mutlaq 'Abdallah al-Mutlaq	1,321
Sa'd 'Abdallah al-Tuwajri	1,282
Khalid Hamad al-Malik	1,277
Sultan Muhammad al-Shuhayl	1,235
Yusif Hamdan al-Hamdan	1,325
Sultan bin-Muhammad Bin-Salih	1,171
Independents	
Bandar Ibrahim al-Sayf	331

Election Results (Continued)	
Candidate	Number of Votes
'Adnan Hamad al-Khumays	253
Ibrahim Muhammad Bin-Su'aydan	249
Hamad 'Ali al-Saqri	219
Zhafir Mutlaq al-'Ajami	116
Industrialists	
Development Group	
'Ali Fahd al-'Uwaydah	2,515
Khalaf 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Khalaf	2,480
Fahd Thunyan al-'Ubaykan	2,448
Mushari Faysal am-Mu'ammar	2,440
Fahd Sulayman al-Rajithi	2,406
'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad al-Daris	3,397
Solidarity Group	
Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Tawq	1,502
Sa'd Ibrahim al-Mu'ajjil	1,406
'Abd al-'Aziz Hamad al-'Isi	1,333
'Abdallah 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Qadir	1,298
'Abdallah al-Zamil al-Salim	1,245
Sulayman 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Salih	1,213
Independents	
'Abd-al-Muhsin 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Hukayr	248
Salih Muhammad al-Suwayd	230

New Budget Said To Favor Private Sector

93AE0321A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
5 Jan 93 p 9

[Article by Salah Sanadi]

[Text] Saudi Arabia issued its annual budget yesterday. It included marked increases in spending to support the national economy, which recorded high growth rates in 1991. The 1993 budget included a 9 percent increase over the figure that was estimated for public spending in 1992. Public spending in 1992 amounted to about 181 billion riyals, whereas public spending in the new budget is estimated at 196.9 billion riyals, which is an increase of 16 billion riyals.

Knowledgeable economic sources asserted that the volume of public spending and the sums allocated to projects in the new budget were positive signs that could be of benefit to the private sector and to investment activities in the kingdom.

According to the royal decree issued yesterday concerning the new budget, total allocations for government expenditures during 1993 are estimated at 196.95 billion riyals. These expenditures include government employees' salaries, administrative and clerical expenses, expenses allocated for contracts for the operation and maintenance of public infrastructure and government establishments, contracts for construction projects, and other government

purchases. The budget also includes allocations for subsidies that are directed toward the support of various kinds of economic and social activities.

In the budget statement, it was noticed that King Fahd was appreciative of the role of the private sector. He said: "We appreciate our citizens' enthusiasm to invest in productive projects, and we call upon them to continue investing in such projects within the framework of the support and encouragement provided by the state."

Yesterday, another royal decree was issued that approved the 22 public organizations budgets, which are annexed to the state budget and which totaled about 30.692 billion riyals.

The general state budget comprised about 8 billion riyals of concessionary loans, with no interest to citizens for agricultural, industrial, and real estate loans, as well as for the Citizens' Loan Bank. A royal decree was also issued to approve the municipalities' and water utilities' budgets for the new financial year. These budgets amounted to 6.385 billion riyals.

Allocations

Education: 34.093 billion riyals are allocated to this sector in the budget. It is significant to note that 800 new schools and six junior colleges will be opened during the coming school year. In addition, a program for the construction of new schools will be initiated. The first phase of this program includes the construction of 400 schools in different regions of the kingdom, for a total estimated cost of 5 billion riyals.

Health services and social development: Allocations to this sector in the new budget amount to 14.087 billion riyals. Five hundred health centers will be established to cover all regions of the kingdom at a cost of 1.6 billion riyals. These centers will be connected to the principal hospitals in the major regions and towns so that a network of services and health information facilities will be available.

Transportation and telecommunications: 9.078 billion riyals have been allocated to this sector.

Infrastructure: 2.095 billion riyals have been allocated to this sector.

Local subsidies for the support of various economic and social activities: 9.167 billion riyals have been allocated to these activities in the new budget. It is worth mentioning that social security assistance in 1993 is 1.2 billion riyals more than it was in 1992. This increase is the result of a royal directive that was issued a short time ago.

Loans from Funds

Specialized development funds and banks, such as the Agricultural Bank, the Industrial Development Fund, the Real Estate Development Fund, and the Loan Bank will continue their loan activities in the new year along the same lines as previous years. Loans provided through these funds and banks in the new year are estimated at 8 billion riyals.

It is known that loans provided through these funds and banks contribute directly to increased industrial, agricultural, and real estate investments, in addition to increasing productivity. This is because these loans provide sufficient financing for the various productive activities with almost no interest and for long terms. Eventually these loans will be paid for from investment earnings.

With regard to national capital, it is worth noting the role of the investment activities undertaken by government and nongovernment organizations, as well as by companies, such as those involved in petroleum production, basic manufacturing, and other private companies. In addition to government expenditures, the investments by these establishments contribute to increasing both the volume of national investments and the demand for local goods and commodities. These investments also create many job opportunities.

Non-Oil Sectors

The Saudi Ministry of Finance yesterday issued information that indicated continuing economic prosperity and steady growth for a fourth consecutive year. Results of estimates showed that the gross domestic product [GDP] of both the government and nongovernment sectors registered a 5 percent increase at current prices. The nongovernment sector realized a 6 percent growth rate. The growth rate for the agricultural sector was 75 percent, and the growth rate of the industrial sector was 64 percent. These rates were achieved at a time when many states in the world have been experiencing severe economic recessions. With regard to the cost of living, data indicates that the index figure for the cost of living declined last year by one-half of a 1 percent compared with the year before. There were numerous reasons for the decline in prices, among them were the decline in freight costs, the stability in the supply of goods and services, and overcoming of effects of the war to liberate Kuwait. Resolutions made at the beginning of the year to reduce fees impacted on the cost of living and consequently on prices, causing both to decline.

In the banking and finance sector, the performance of Saudi banks continued to improve. The volume of loans provided by these banks for the first seven months of 1992 increased, compared with the same period of 1991. The loans amounted to 108.4 billion riyals for the first seven months of 1992. Total deposits at banks also increased, amounting to 177.200 billion riyals during the first seven months of 1992. As for foreign trade, the value of exports last year totalled about 160.6 billion riyals and that of imports was estimated at 122.600 billion riyals.

The ministry said that the new budget would be an instrument to support and consolidate the basis for economic prosperity and that it would contribute to maintaining the level of achievements that the different sectors had realized during other fiscal years.

Annexed Budget

In the budget, 3.069 billion riyals are allocated to 22 public organizations, which are annexed to the state general budget. These organizations are: the General Organization

for Ports, Saudi Airlines, the General Organization for Electricity, the General Organization for Grain Silos and Flour Mills, the General Organization for Desalinization of Water, the General Organization for Railways, the General Organization for Petroleum and Minerals, the Royal Institute for Jubayl and Yanbu', the Saudi Arab Institute for Standards and Specifications, King Saud University, King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University, King Fahd University for Petroleum and Minerals, Imam Muhammad Bin-Saud Islamic University, the Islamic University at Madinah, King Faysal University, Um al-Qura University, the General Institute for Technical Education and Professional Training, King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Center for Science and Technology, the Institute for Public Administration, the Saudi Red Crescent Association, the General Organization for Military Industries, and the Retirement Pension Fund.

Wheat, Barley Subsidies Dispensed

93AE0335A Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 17 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by 'Abdallah al-'Arifaj]

[Text] Executing the order of the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, the General Organization for Grain Silos and Flour Mills have, since 1 January, started to dispense more than 6 billion riyals as entitlements to wheat and barley growers in the different regions of the kingdom, as a subsidy for their 1991-92 (1412 H) crops.

This gesture from the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines proves his royal highness's eagerness—may God protect him—to support and encourage agricultural production in the kingdom, especially in the cultivation of wheat and barley. The increase in the production of wheat and barley made the kingdom one of the most important countries in the world for wheat exports.

Khalid Bin-'Ali al-Rayyis, director of grain silos and flour mills in Riyadh region, said that Riyadh silos were presently engaged in preparing lists of disbursements in order to start payments at the beginning of next month. They would be able to dispense 400 checks to 400 farmers each day. He indicated that for farmers whose disbursements were less than 1 million riyals, disbursements would be carried out through the 10 branches of the organization in the different regions of the Kingdom, whereas, the organization itself would pay those whose entitlements exceeded 1 million riyals.

Al-Rayyis said that growers were being paid two riyals for a kilogram of wheat and one riyal for a kilogram of barley.

Al-Rayyis asserted that disbursement of entitlements to growers was a noble gesture from the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, and it proved the state's encouragement to and support for both the agricultural sector and the farmers.

Al-Rayyis, at the end of his statement, appealed to all farmers in Riyadh region to check with the silo branches in order to receive their entitlements for the wheat and barley

crops. However, farmers should beforehand obtain statements from the Agricultural Bank in order to pay for bank loans against the value of their crops.

Numerous wheat and barley growers expressed to 'UKAZ their sincere gratitude to the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines for his noble directive to dispense entitlements for the wheat and barley crops for 1991-92 (1412 H).

Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah al-Zuman, a farmer from Sudayr region, said: "The farmers in the region are pleased by the noble gesture by the guardian and father of all, the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines—may God protect him. With this gesture, all of us will be able to continue cultivating wheat and barley".

Ibrahim al-Shuwayri, one of the farmers in al-Khurj region said: "This gesture represents a new gratitude from our king, for whom we are ready to give our lives. This gesture also shows his eagerness—may God protect him—to get acquainted with the conditions and circumstances of farmers, who are among his loyal subjects."

Effects of 1993 Budget on Policies Analyzed

93AE0259A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 9 Jan 93 p 11

[Article by 'Umar Salim Ba Qa'ar]

[Text] Much has been written about Saudi Arabia's national budget for the upcoming fiscal year of 1413/1414. Despite this, much remains upon which light can be shed through discussion and analysis. The local dimension, in the form of trends in domestic spending, is one of these facets and is the most important. However, ever since the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz came to power, the Saudi national budget has reflected the success of an integrated arrangement of international, regional, and domestic economic policies. States that enjoy stability in their financial revenues and where the standard of living of their citizens is rising all share a primary characteristic, namely that their political leaders are experienced in maintaining a fine balance between working effectively within the world economic framework, with full realization of the importance of international economic stability, and what is needed to motivate the components of local development.

From this standpoint, the dimensions of monetary, fiscal, and oil policies and those of development plans, within the framework of the priorities of the individual and the family, are what this analysis will focus upon.

National Budget and Oil Policy

The efforts expended by Saudi leaders to achieve stability in the world oil market have not gone with the wind. The fact understood by Saudi financial planners is that the stability of oil prices worldwide has a positive effect on economic trends from which the national economy benefits because financial revenues are tied to oil export. They are the lifeblood of the development plans in which the state committed itself to the family and the individual.

The accompanying table brings out a number of indicators in this framework, namely:

- Stability of the indicators of financial revenues from the oil sector. This is proof that one of the elements of the balance in Saudi oil policy is quantity and the diversity needed in the bases of oil investment, as is reflected in projects in the petrochemicals industries.
- Even at times when revenues adjusted to fluctuations in the world market, indicators of government spending continued to rise. This in turn reflected a commitment to a level of economic ease for the Saudi individual and family consistent with the development plans set by the state.
- In the few periods during which there was a disparity between estimates of spending and income, stability of domestic spending won out. This goal would not have been achieved if not for the existence of previous financial reserves that Saudi financial planners were able to draw upon at the appropriate time.
- The delicate balance needed between investing surplus oil revenues in capital development projects, on one hand, or in short term assets, on the other. The former are difficult to convert to available funds when needed, but they give fixed returns, while the latter provide an income cushion during times of fluctuation in the world oil market.

Estimates of the Articles of the Saudi National Budget

Fiscal Year	Income	Spending
1402/1403	313,400	313,400
1403/1404	260,000	260,000
1404/1405	260,000	260,000
1405/1406	200,000	200,000
1406/1407	200,000	200,000
1407/1408	117,280	170,000
1408/1409	110,300	141,200
1409/1410	116,000	141,200
1410/1411	118,000	143,000
1411/1412	118,000	143,000
1412/1413	151,000	181,000
1413/1414	169,050	196,900

Estimates of Percentage Increases in Various Sectors in the 1413/1414 H Budget

Sector	Percentage
Development Fund (Agriculture, Industry, Housing)	72.86
Public Health	15.30
Municipal Services	10.65
Education	9.70
Water Resources	9.95
Transport and Communications	11.94
Security	13.60
Social and Economic Activities	29.32

National Budget and Fiscal Policy

The second dimension lies in the success of policies that concern the link between the annual national budget and fiscal policy. Here one must focus on one of the mainstays of the Saudi economic system, namely its respect for and preservation of private ownership by the Saudi family and individual, like government spending in its two halves: current and developmental, which is one of the facets of measuring success. The current half of government spending is embodied in what the state is committed to in the way of annually recurring expenditures, such as salaries of state employees, allotments for maintaining projects, subsidies in support of service facilities, and social security allotments that are needed to guarantee the dignity of the individual and family to which the state is committed. The development half is spending for long-term investments to diversify the nonpetroleum revenue base.

However, being content to analyze these aspects underestimates the significance of an important aspect, namely the role of the public economic establishments in life. Here we have many examples that will make clear the fiscal policy dimension in guaranteeing the standard and type of living. Perhaps the most prominent are:

- Fiscal policy for these establishments does not necessarily aim to make a profit, rather it ties performance to quality and quantity of public service which directly benefits the citizen. Some outstanding examples are the performances of Saudi Arabian Airlines; public establishments in the areas of electricity, grain silos, flour mills, water desalinization, railroads; and the royal authority for Jubayl, Yanbu', and Madinat al-Malak 'Abd-al-'Aziz for science, technology, technical education, and vocational training.
- Fiscal policy adapts the cost of the services of these establishments to the real income of the individual and the family. Pricing policies have been reviewed more than once, as in the cases of water, telephone, and electric services; residential gas consumption; and fees on private means of transportation.
- Continuing policies of government support to achieve a balance between progress in the quality of life, and giving incentive to the private sector to produce more. Thus customs tariffs were reviewed in order to protect the national industry from unfair competition, but at the same time keep the cost of national imports in the area of services and commodities that depend on supply from foreign markets within the reach of the real income of citizens.

National Budget and Fiscal Policy

As for the third dimension, it has close ties to the world economy that differ in form and number from those found in the oil sector. They are distinguished by such aspects as:

- Continued moderation in the exchange rate between the Saudi riyal and other competing international currencies.

- Preserving the fundamentals of the national balance of trade by achieving a surplus in dealing with trade partners.
- Maintaining a balance in the transfer of capital in a way that would facilitate domestic investment for joint projects by attracting the necessary foreign capital.
- Supporting monetary transactions between individuals and establishments by creating the organizations related to meeting obligations and setting up funds through the banking sector.
- Supporting the role of the banking sector as an institution by providing areas for the investment of individual and family savings and by increasing its role as a financial intermediary to the private sector in order to intensify the investment of surplus income locally.

To prove the success of linking the national budget to oil policy, it suffices to point to the stability of the exchange rate of the Saudi riyal domestically compared with other international currencies, especially in the face of the challenge presented by freedom of exchange.

Likewise, it translates practically in another area, namely in controlling the rise in the general level of prices locally so that they remain in step with the continuous increases in the level of individual and family income.

National Budget and Government Spending

The final dimension also arises from international considerations, in evaluating the world economic climate in which the budget was issued. Even though more advanced industrial economies are showing signs of stagnation and of inflation in the cost of living, the budget comes this year at a time that has forced many other states to reduce their budgets, affirming the kingdom's direction towards committing itself to a better life for the Saudi individual and family.

Monetary allotments to the various economic sectors are full of indications of certain increase. Allotments to the sector of lending institutions that make specialized loans rose by 72.86 percent over what it had been in last year's budget. Likewise, the item pertaining to economic and social activities rose by 29.32 percent compared with the previous year. Likewise, the public health sector had an increase of 15.3 percent; economic revenues, 12.1 percent; municipal services, 10.65 percent; education, 9.7 percent; municipal services and water agencies, 9.95 percent; transportation and wired and wireless communications, 11.94 percent; and the security sectors, 13.6 percent.

In addition to the banking and financial sector, growth has continued in the activity of local banks. Total loans offered rose over the previous year by more than 37 percent, and the banking sector's financing capacity rose by more than 42 percent.

In the area of trade with trading partners, the basic value of national exports during the past fiscal year of 1411/1412 H has been estimated at about 160.58 billion riyals, as opposed to 133.57 billion riyals, or a surplus in the balance of international trade of more than 27 billion Saudi riyals.

One of the positive aspects of coordinating fiscal and monetary policy is the ability to harmonize the need to expand in offering money locally with the need to keep the rates of increase in local prices within the established limits. Comparative estimates of the cost of living, which translates directly into the level of economic comfort of the individual and the family, dropped by half a percentage point from its level in 1411/1412 H. Many of the factors are intertwined, most notably, an end to the inflationary pressures that accompanied the local production sector in preparing for, supporting, and implementing the victorious war to liberate Kuwait and returning rates of shipping costs and insurance rates on transporting goods to rates that are appropriate to the end of the circumstances that led to their rise. Thus in an analysis, one cannot ignore the role of decisions to lower customs duties on many imported commodities that have the strongest link between the lifestyles and spending habits of the Saudi individual and family.

In response, we see growth in the national income. In the past year, estimates of growth in the gross domestic product in public and private activity continued the trends of previous years, such that the average annual growth rate reached 5 percent. The private sector was able to achieve growth that was estimated at more than 6.3 percent annually. But this total hides a number of areas of outstanding individual accomplishment. The growth rate of agricultural sector, for example, was estimated at more than 7.7 percent; likewise that of the industrial sector, which was estimated at 6.7 percent.

It must be pointed out that when revenues fall short of spending expectations at certain times, the situation, when compared to that at the level of the individual and family, does not differ essentially from the need of the head of the household at certain times for additional sources of money to meet an emergency need or to finance something. But what weakens the comparison is that the Saudi economy is in a unique situation because it does not suffer from a shortage of available national capital, whether for short-term financing, as in temporary situations when revenues fall short of expected spending, or long-term financing, as in cases of investment planning that are costly at first, but that yield high returns after their rates stabilize.

Surpluses in national capital are a reflection of the rise in average individual and family income, a rise in the profitability of the activities and actions of the private sector, and an increase in the competitive power of Saudi production in foreign markets.

National Budget and Security Policy

The previous policies, inasmuch as they affect and are affected by the national budget, cannot but be crowned by a security policy with clear characteristics and precisely formulated goals. Internal security and stability and countering foreign threats are the pillars of monetary revenues in all areas. No price can be placed on it because its importance goes beyond figures, to the heart of incentives to increase production and innovation. The currents in economic benefits will remain illusory unless they are

supported by feelings that they can be achieved, and in response, economic expenditures are growing beyond the ability of the private capital to bear them. Thus, national spending for internal security purposes and foreign defense are considered a basic necessity, indeed a mainstay of the success of the previous policies.

National Budget and the Linkage Between Policies

In order to best understand the national budget, which occurs once a year, the policies that drive its survival and continuation must be examined. This viewpoint, in turn, makes us go beyond analyzing figures, which intrinsically examine the policies and their content, which turn those annual figures into tangible fact, a real translation of hopes and aspirations, and a leading vision that represents the star of the vision in the heavens in which the policies orbit.

SUDAN

Uganda To Oversee Meeting on Talks Resumption

93AF0388B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Imam Muhammad Imam: "Sudanese Government Delegation Announces Agreement With Southern Leaders"]

[Text] In response to an invitation from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, it is expected that Dr. 'Ali al-Haj Muhammad, the Sudanese minister of planning and investment and the government's negotiator, will meet today or tomorrow with Colonel John Garang, the leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Sudan (Torit Faction). This meeting will be attended by the Ugandan president and is being held for the purpose of discussing the possibility of resuming peace talks between the two sides, in order to reach a just and comprehensive solution to the problem of southern Sudan.

In a telephone call to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT from Kampala, Dr. 'Ali al-Haj said: "The government's delegation has come to Kampala at the invitation of Ugandan President Museveni to meet with Col. John Garang, after having been informed of Garang's agreement to attend the Kampala meeting. This was done to carry out Ugandan President Museveni's pledge to Sudanese President General 'Umar al-Bashir to arrange a meeting between the Sudanese Government and Col. Garang, in the hope of ending the deadlock in the peace talks." The government negotiator stated that negotiations had been held with three separatist leaders, who have broken away from the Garang Movement. They are Carbino Quanying, Arok Thon Arok, and Faustino Atem. The negotiations lasted three days, ending on 9 February. They concluded their meeting with a joint communique, in which they reached basic principles. They stated that they consider the initiatives and meetings in Addis Adaba, Nairobi, and Abuja, a suitable foundation for future discussions and dialogue, so that an appropriate climate may be prepared for a peace agreement to establish pillars of stability in southern Sudan. The Sudanese minister added that at the three leaders' request, the meeting was postponed until their

efforts are completed vis-a-vis unifying the movement's various factions, in preparation for the success of the second Abuja negotiations.

Planned Summer Military Offensive Detailed

93AF0388A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Feb 93 p 4

[Article: "Military Campaign on 8 Axes in Southern Sudan"]

[Text] Western diplomatic sources have revealed that beginning in mid-January the Sudanese Government has begun to implement its military plan for a 1993 summer military offensive.

It is expected that this year's campaign will cover eight crucial axes and will use approximately 30,000 men armed with modern weapons, including tanks, artillery, and fighter aircraft. The offensive will take place in three regions of southern Sudan, as well as South Kordofan. The campaign will be aimed at regaining all of the towns of southern Sudan that are now under the control of John Garang's forces (Torit Faction) or Riak Mashar (al-Nasir Faction).

These sources state that the eight military axes are:

- Juba-Yei-Kaia-Kajo Kaji
- Juba-Torit-Nimule
- Malakal-Fam al-Subat-Abota (on the Upper Nile)
- An axis starting inside Ethiopia to Joku-Asosa-Gambila-al-Nasir
- Another axis from within Ethiopian territory begins from Rath on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border to Jabal Boma-Bibor-the Junqali Canal, where it will join with the Malakal-Fam al-Sobat forces (axis 3)
- The river axis, starting at Kusti-Malakal-Shambe-Bor-Mongalla-Juba
- South Kordofan axis, beginning at al-Obeid to Kaduqli-Bentiu to South Kordofan
- Kapoeta-Narus-Loki Shoki (on the Sudanese-Kenyan border)

These sources revealed that military action to implement the 1993 military offensive plan actually began nearly a month ago on four of these axes, the first, fourth, seventh, and eighth.

Military action on the Juba-Yei-Kaia-Kajo Kaji axis began on 10 January. It is employing, in addition to an armored brigade from the Sudanese Army and the People's Defense Forces, approximately 5,000 men from the Ugandan Armed Resistance, who belong to the (Orris) Faction, and (Latoka) tribal elements led by two separatist leaders, (Lim Non) and (Joseph Adoho).

Information provided to these sources indicates that the forces carrying out operations on this axis have reached the town of Yei, located about 100 miles from Juba. It took these forces about 30 days to cover that distance, and during this time, fierce battles were fought with Garang's forces. Garang's Movement stated that government losses in this sector are estimated at 400, while Garang's forces have lost about 30 men.

The expected outcome on this axis is the seizure of Kajo Kaji, where Colonel Garang's current military headquarters is located.

The second axis, where action has begun, starts from Ethiopian territory to Joku-Asosa-Gambila-al-Nasir. On this axis, the Sudanese Government has massed two battalions, i.e., between 2,000 and 2,500 men. Operations in this sector will rely on supply lines from inside Ethiopia and drop centers, which were agreed upon with the Ethiopian Government during the Sudanese vice president's visit to Addis Adaba in November 1992.

The sources added that many fighter aircraft are expected to be used in this sector. However, these sources anticipate no military action on this axis if negotiations, held in Uganda between the separatist faction from Garang's Movement and the government of General al-Bashir, are successful and achieve an agreement that will take the al-Nasir Faction's forces out of the operations.

The third axis where action has begun is Kapoeta-Narus-Loki Shoki. This covers the Eastern Equatorial area, where it is expected that an armored brigade will participate, supported by fighter aircraft.

Action in this sector began on 23 December 1992, when two government battalions advanced from Kapoeta toward Narus. In the village of Bono, 30 miles from Kapoeta, the two battalions were ambushed by Garang's forces, causing many casualties. The remaining force returned to Kapoeta and went into permanent camps. On the way back, they joined with Tabosa tribal militias.

The fourth axis, where action has been underway since the middle of January 1993, is the South Kordofan sector. Government forces have surrounded towns and villages of (Ligori) and Saburi, near the town of Kaduqli. They have carried out 18 operations against the inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains, who support Garang's Movement. Other similar operations have been conducted against the residents of the towns of (Ligawah), Dilling, Hayban, and Mandi.

Yusuf Kuwah of Garang's Movement, the official in charge of the South Kordofan region that is under the control of Garang's forces, sent a letter this week, calling on the international community and human rights organizations to "exercise their responsibilities to pressure Khar-toum to stop its repeated violations of human rights and its barbaric crimes against the inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains in the South Kordofan area."

Kuwah also demanded that urgent steps be taken to enable humanitarian relief and assistance to reach the citizens of the Nuba Mountains, who are affected by the government's military offensive. He said that humanitarian aid should be sent by air and from the town of Loki Shoki on the Kenyan-Sudanese border.

Commentary Discusses Journalist's Arrest*93AF0388C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
9 Feb 93 p 9*

[Editorial by Amir Tahiri: "Regimes That Silence the Press"]

[Text] With the arrest of our colleague Muhammad 'Abd-al-Sayyid, this newspaper's correspondent in Khartoum, the Sudanese authorities repeat the method long used by dictatorial regimes.

Are there books of advice and guidance to teach every dictator how to silence the press? To our knowledge, there are no such books. Nevertheless, nearly every dictator behaves in the same way when it pertains to taking repressive actions against the press. Evidently, actions of this type by rulers are governed by natural instincts, and their reactions have the cohesiveness and continuity of a mechanical man who cannot differentiate between one thing and another.

The arrest, or abduction, of our colleague Muhammad 'Abd-al-Sayyid (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT's correspondent in Khartoum) by the Sudanese authorities, is a carbon copy or model of dictatorial hatred for journalists. The scenario followed in these cases stipulates the need for silence. A journalist disappears, and no one acknowledges responsibility for the incident. Clearly, the abductors hope that the world will close its eyes and plug its ears to the victim's fate. However, no sooner does the world's conscience cry out over the arrest or abduction than the dictator tries to charge the victim with all kinds of crimes. For the most part, the dictatorship claims that the journalist was detained for reasons that have nothing to do with his profession, but rather, for "other reasons." At this point, these regimes use various kinds of excuses and interpretations that rely on the dictator's propaganda advisers' creative ability to concoct fabrications.

In Eastern Europe, regimes accused the victims of "sabotage and terrorism." In Soviet Russia, they were called "mentally deranged," and the Kremlin accused Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, both of whom won Nobel prizes in literature, of "mental deficiency." The old, senile men who rule China have devised other charges against writers whom they do not like. "Capitalist speculators" is one example. In Iran, the mullahs in power use the term "apostate" to describe anyone who opposes them, and Saddam Husayn thinks anyone who does not kneel before him is a "traitor or spy."

Therefore, the Sudanese Government did nothing new when it accused 'Abd-al-Sayyid of "spreading sectarian policies." However, it could do something really new by releasing him promptly. We advise them to follow a mature course. We say that no one in this age of ours believes those fairy tales that they have alleged.

Authorities Demolish Planning Minister's Home*93AF0388D London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 28 Jan 93 p 6*

[Article by 'Umar Muhammad al-Hasan: "Khartoum Authorities Demolish Economic Planning Minister's Home; Violated Housing Laws"]

[Text] Ministry of Housing authorities in the state of Khartoum have demolished the home of a prominent minister in the Sudanese Government who is considered to be one of the senior leaders of the National Islamic Front, which supports al-Bashir's government. This was done within the framework of a plan to eliminate unplanned houses in the Sudanese capital.

On 26 January 1993, Sudanese Television reported an operation to destroy the home of Dr. 'Ali al-Haj Muhammad, the Sudanese minister of economic planning and investment, which had been built in an area outside of the housing plans for the city of Khartoum. This house was very controversial in 1988, which is when this Sudanese official assumed the post of minister of trade in the coalition government of former Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, in which the Ummah Party, Democratic Union Party, and the Islamic Front participated.

The demolition operations also included the home of a senior officer in the Sudanese Army's Supreme Command. The minister of housing in the state of Khartoum, Dr. Sharaf al-Din Banqa, said that his ministry's policy rests on the equality of people before the law. "By beginning with the elimination of the minister's house, we intended to assure everyone that we are serious about our work and that we will make no distinction among citizens."

Dr. Banqa went on to say that his ministry has distributed housing units to 40,000 citizens during the past two years. It wants to apply the government's policy aimed at "restoring the citizens' confidence in the governmental apparatus." He indicated that "the housing law will be applied to a group of government officials." He went on to add that the Sudanese minister was not present when his home was destroyed, since he was out of the country on an official mission.

The Sudanese press, in the democratic era, described the minister's house as an "unplanned palace," with enormous floor space, which was in violation of the land-use laws. Officials in the Housing Ministry explained that the operations to eliminate unplanned houses in the area would be completed by the end of next week and that the land would be distributed to citizens in the amount of 600 meters per family.

SYRIA**Jews Describe Life in U.S. as Difficult***93AF0437A Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Mar 93 p 5*

[Article by special correspondent Francoise Chipaux: "Great Majority of Jews Have Already Emigrated to United States"]

[Text] Damascus—Eleven months after being granted the freedom to travel as families, and by implication freedom to emigrate if they wish, nearly three-fourths of Syria's Jews have left the country. According to one community leader, 90 percent of the 1,100 remaining have applied for exit visas. However, according to one who returned after several weeks in Brooklyn, where the vast majority of the Syrian Jewish emigrant community live, "life is terrible

there. If all of us had the assurance we could come and go as we choose, we would all come back, because life here is so much easier," he said.

After initially issuing a massive number of exit visas—2,700 in the first four months—the authorities have noticeably slowed the pace, and the slowdown in visa issuances has raised doubts about the future of a measure that was ordered by President Hafiz al-Asad himself. Said one member of the community council: "Nowadays, only about 10 visas a month are being issued, and they're not going to entire families, which complicates things."

Community leaders who were received by President al-Asad last April would like to believe that "all this bureaucratic harassment is the work of low-level functionaries;" they continue to hope "the promises made by the president will be respected at all echelons." The current situation is especially deplorable, they say, because with all the problems Syrian Jews have adapting to life in the United States, many reportedly would like to return—some already have—if only they could be sure of permanent freedom of movement.

"People are going to the United States because they think that if they don't do it now, they'll lose the chance," avers one member of the community. "But there's nothing there for them to do. None of the emigrants has found work in his own field, and there are more than 50 doctors and pharmacists who haven't even been able to find employment as orderlies. It's a very hard thing, to have to go back to school (to satisfy American laws), when they were the most renowned physicians in Damascus. As for the merchants, the luckiest of them has a job working 10 hours a day for \$200 a month," he adds bitterly.

Freedom of Movement

Members of the community already established in the United States, who have broadly encouraged the migration, provide a great deal of assistance to all new arrivals, including financial aid, but "we cannot live forever as charity cases," he continues.

"If we could be sure of getting our exit visas (valid for one year) when we want them," vows an engineer whose family has already departed, "there wouldn't be a problem with Syrian Jewry. Most would return to their livelihoods here, where they were much happier, and just visit their relatives in the United States when they wish. Many other Syrians do it, why not us? That's all we're asking."

Meanwhile, the wave of departures has already somewhat emptied the old "Jewish quarter" of Damascus, complicating the lives of those who remain behind. "There are no more rabbis for circumcisions," laments one mother. "Twelve children born in the last six months are still waiting." "Only one kosher butcher shop is still open," complains another, "which means we have to go far out of our way to get meat."

Some of them, about 400—a number equal to 10 percent of the size of the Jewish community that resided here a year ago—have no intention of leaving Syria. "The reports we've received from recent emigrants are not encouraging,

and besides—why leave?" a merchant shrugs. "Here, we're in our own country: We know everyone, everyone knows us. What would we do somewhere else?"

TUNISIA

Concerns Over EC Standards Reported

93AF0397A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 26 Jan 93 p 12

[Article by Samirah al-Sadafi: "Tunisian Concerns Over Repercussions of European Unity on Local Exports to EC States; Refusal To Comply With Terms Leads 3,000 Firms to Bankruptcy"]

[Text] Tunisian concerns are mounting over the repercussions of European unity on the local economy, particularly on the fate of industrial and agricultural exports to the European Community [EC]. Tunisian exporters view the standards and specifications that a unified Europe would apply as tantamount to fetters on the export activity of the North African region and as veiled protectionist barriers.

Tunisian exporters' worries are due to the fact that 75 percent of their exports go to the EC countries and are worth an estimated nearly 3 billion dinars (\$3.3 billion). What may add to their unease about European unity is that the local economy is more and more dependant on an open-door policy and commitment to fundamental reforms that will lead to more active exports.

"We are forced to adapt to the terms imposed by the European market," one industrialist told AL-HAYAH, "because refusal to comply with them is leading 3,000 industrial firms into bankruptcy and adding 250 workers to the ranks of the unemployed."

At the forefront of the Tunisian exporters' complaints are the measures upon which the European countries agreed regarding the variety of products. The agreements require the monitoring of exporting firms in their home countries and at all stages of production to ensure compliance with unified Europe's standards and specifications.

European countries demand that their trading partners comply with these unified specifications. The EC countries report on the progress of exporting firms, which led to criticism on the part of Tunisian businessmen, who emphasized that "it is unreasonable for the European Community to ask developing countries to adapt to terms of economic modernization that the European countries themselves achieved only a short time ago."

Seeking to solve the problems caused by the weakness of the level of technical training for local industrial workers, compared to the level of their European counterparts, Tunisia's European partners, particularly Italy, France, Germany, and Belgium, are granting loans and preparing vocational training programs.

Joint Loans and Programs

Germany has granted 15 million marks (nearly \$10 million) to fund a training program, established 12 vocational training programs this year, and sent 21 advisers and

experts in the technical training sector to Tunisia. Tunisia's number one economic partner, France, granted a 300-million-franc loan, which became known as the "Beregovoy Loan," after the current prime minister, who allowed it to be used to increase investments by 30 percent. Part of the loan is earmarked for the development of a technical training program.

Belgium decided, in the most recent meeting of the Joint Tunisian-Belgian Cooperation Commission, to grant 900 million Belgian francs (\$26 million) to strengthen cooperation with Tunisia in the investment and vocational training fields for the period 1992-94.

The Joint Tunisian-Italian Commission, in its recent meetings in Tunisia, reached a similar accord with a three-year period, in order to boost cooperation in establishing joint ventures in the tourism, transport, energy, communications, and vocational training sectors.

After a meeting last June that included local and Italian financiers and investors, Rome decided to put \$55 million at the disposal of owners of joint investment projects.

In addition to this first problem relating to the level of technical training that requires training courses for workers and increasing the number of relevant engineers and technicians that oversee them, Tunisian industrialists point out that other problems relating to the nature of European standards and specifications, upon which the member states of the European Community have not agreed for some reason, have cast a shadow of vagueness over the terms for getting Tunisian products into EC countries.

Local industrialists told AL-HAYAH that they cannot export to countries such as Denmark, Britain, and Switzerland because of the tough import standards and intense scrutiny of imports, although they export to France, Italy, Germany, and Holland because of their flexible terms and monitoring.

They add that "with the unifying of standards and cancellation of internal borders, the unified monitoring imposed on imports—including Tunisian imports—will represent high barriers that will be difficult to overcome."

They pointed out that the roster of European standards and specifications will not only cover the variety of products. It will cover packaging and preservation, thus tightening the noose around exports, especially food products, which require greater attention, among them seafood products, from which Tunisia earns approximately 100 million dinars (\$110 million) per year.

One might say that the appropriate formula that the industrialists point to for surmounting the difficulties they will face after the achievement of European unity would be the development of a partnership with European financiers, because they are able to guarantee the adaptation of local products to European specifications in all phases of production.

Requirements of European Unity

To inaugurate this new option, it should be noted that the number of joint firms has increased in recent years to meet the requirements of a unified Europe and surmount the obstacles that must be faced.

There are an estimated 1,458 export firms in Tunisia, including 367 firms that are owned by foreign financiers, 366 joint ventures, and 725 firms owned by local investors, with the number of total investments in export firms estimated at 849 million dinars (nearly \$1 billion).

In this context, last week vice president of the European Investment Fund (Alan Brant) and Tunisian Minister of Economy Sadok Rabah signed a loan agreement worth 20 million dinars (\$23 million), earmarked for the funding of export-oriented industrial joint ventures.

Foreign investors have benefited from the advantages granted by the July, 1990 law for new projects in the service export sector, which made possible the establishment of 694 new projects in the services sector last year, compared with 481 in 1990.

Tunisia recently linked the National Institution for Promoting Investment with the European Information Center in the Belgian city of Monceau to facilitate the exchange of information and to increase investment cooperation with the countries of Europe.

Domestic Market

As local industries gradually adapt to European standards, government officials believe that the local economy will benefit by the consequent improvement in the variety of goods intended for the domestic market. It is said that Tunisia has begun, in recent years, to implement a plan to free imports, leading industrialists to improve product variety and to meet the mounting competition from imported products.

Tunisian Minister of the Economy Sadok Rabah estimated the number of products freed this year at 900 commodities, representing 17 percent of total commodities. He asserted that the government had a plan to free the import of 75 percent of products within three years, starting this year.

Striving to meet the requirements of European unity, and to reduce the expected negative repercussions on export activity, Tunisians are trying to establish investment relations with Asian countries, especially South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Hong Kong, and to benefit from their experience in exporting and training industrial workers.

"We cannot change geography, however, and the markets of Europe are more appropriate than any others for our products," as one businessman told AL-HAYAH.

For this reason Tunisians are inclined to seek agreements with the European Community so that the new standards and specifications can be applied flexibly once the economic unity of the EC states has taken place.

WESTERN SAHARA

Sahrawi Tell of 'Deplorable' Prison Conditions

93AF0427A Rabat L'OPINION in French 22 Feb 93 p 8

[Unattributed article: "A New Group of Prisoners From the Tindouf Camps Returns To the Motherland"]

[Text] *A new group of Sahrawi Moroccan citizens who had been imprisoned in the Lahmada camps has managed to escape their jailers and return to the motherland in response to the appeal from His Majesty the King Hassan II: "The Fatherland is lenient and merciful."*

The group includes Messrs. Seddiq Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, a soldier born in Laayoune in 1953; Ahmed Ould El Wali Ould Ahmed Fall, a former soldier posted to the so-called fourth region, born in 1972 in Dakhla; [and] Abdallah Ould Mohamed Ould Massoud, a soldier posted to the so-called second region, born in 1960 in Dakhla.

In statements to Moroccan Television (RTM) broadcast Friday evening, group members referred to the deplorable living conditions endured by Moroccan citizens held against their will in the Lahmada camps and revealed the repression and torture techniques used against anyone whose loyalty they suspect in the detention centers by "POLISARIO" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] mercenaries.

Mr. Seddiq Ould Mohamed Laghdaf emphasized that the blockade imposed on the prisoners by the bands of mercenaries is a highly stifling and repressive one, in addition to the systematic controls imposed by the "POLISARIO" on the imprisoned population to prevent the spread of any piece of news or information, which does not serve its designs.

For his part, Mr. Ahmed Ould El Wali Ould Ahmed Fall pointed out that the prisoners in the camps live in miserable conditions and that the group of mercenaries does not care at all about the fate of people, worried as it is with protecting its interests and privileges.

Mr. Ahmed Fall stated that he had spent a nine-year period in Cuba during which he was not allowed to contact his family due to the policy of putting citizens into brigades and to their methods aimed at separating the members of a single family so as to indoctrinate them better.

Mr. Ahmed Abdallah Ould Mohamed brought up the sanitary conditions in the Lahmada camps, stating that that situation is much deteriorated owing to inadequate food and sometimes its near nonexistence, which helps explain the number of sick.

They all said they were happy to be back with their families in their much loved fatherland to take part in the work of developing the kingdom at the sides of their fellow citizens.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Elections, Resignations, Code of Honor Discussed

93AE0393B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 28 Feb 93 p 4

[Article: "Broad Consultations To Agree to 'Code of Honor'"]

[Text] Sanaa—Political sources in Sanaa expect the next few days to witness broad consultations among various political and party forces on a number of issues connected with the parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for 27 April 1993, especially on a political code of honor among all parties, on candidates, and on guarantees for free and honest elections.

An authoritative source of the YSP [Yemeni Socialist Party] Political Bureau has assured AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that a number of YSP leaders held yesterday evening consultations among themselves on current issues, on developments connected with the YSP relationship with the GPC [General People's Congress], on issues connected with the elections and on launching a broad dialogue with the other political parties in the arena.

The source noted that the Political Bureau will meet tomorrow to adopt appropriate official positions on the various issues raised, including issue of the party candidates in the elections and the issue of election alliances.

The source noted that the few coming days will witness various meetings between the higher YSP and GPC bodies. He said that the joint six-member committee discussed at its meetings in recent weeks all options presented to it to raise the YSP-GPC relations to higher levels.

The source asserted that the committee has not reached final agreement on any of the projected formulae.

As for talks with the other parties, the source said that the two ruling parties wish to enter into such dialogue with the other political forces as a single party but that no final agreement has been developed on this wish. The source did not exclude the possibility that this dialogue will take the direction of embracing a broad alliance as an alternative to merger.

The paper 26 SEPTEMBER, published by the armed forces, noted that there is a serious call to boost dialogue among the Yemeni political forces in the coming days so that they will approve a political code of honor that establishes national constants and common denominators for the parties and to do so as part of the effort to create the best climate for real democratic elections in the country. The paper has also pointed out that the Parties Affairs Committee will be reactivated in the next few days and that the role of the committee, chaired by Rashid Muhammad Thabit, minister of state for Chamber of Deputies affairs, will be boosted so that it will review the status of the political organizations and parties in accordance with the law and will give their presence legitimacy before the elections.

In a related development, an authoritative source of the YSP Political Bureau told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that it is likely that the government will contest the announcement that the Higher Elections Committee made in the middle of last week in which it urged all those who wish to run for election to the Chamber of Deputies and who hold in the current government the positions of active minister, deputy ministers, undersecretaries, governors, deputy governors, magistrates, department directors, directors of ministry offices, agencies, and organizations, security directors, military commanders, and executive officials of local councils to submit their resignations prior to 27 February 1993 to the constitutional and legal authorities concerned with their appointment. The committee called for this resignation in accordance with the provisions of Article 103 of the Constitution and paragraph B of the election law, which does not permit occupants of these positions to run for election to the Chamber of Deputies in the areas in which they work unless at least three months have lapsed since they left their official positions in the election district concerned.

The source noted that the contest will focus on the fact that the Higher Elections Committee has interpreted the law, whereas such interpretation is not within its jurisdiction. It will also focus on the fact that the committee considers the prime minister an active minister, as stated in its announcement, whereas paragraph B of Article 55 of the election law makes absolutely no mention of the prime minister.

The source said that the provisions contained in the election committee's announcement create a legal problem with their interpretations of the law, not to mention that the deadline for resignation, which is 27 February 1993 in accordance with the announcement, has passed without it being disclosed who among the people concerned have submitted their resignations and whether these people have obtained the constitutional and legal decisions confirming that their resignations have been accepted.

Commenting on this issue, 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Basir, a member of the Elections Committee and the Legal Committee chairman, has asserted that the Higher Elections Committee has received to date just two copies of resignations submitted by Engineer Ahmad al-Anisi, the minister of communications, and Muhammad al-Khadim al-Wajih, the minister of civil service and administrative reform, both of whom are from the GPC.

Al-Basir said copies of resignations are not legally acceptable to the Elections Committee as documents for the approval of nomination unless they are coupled with decisions by the authorities to approve the resignations and unless they are issued before 27 February 1993.

As for the possibility that the government will contest the Higher Committee's announcement, al-Basir said that the government is entitled to do so and that the law and the Constitution are clear. He cited Article 103 of the Constitution, which states that the government consists of the prime minister, his deputies, and the ministers and that together, they form the Council of Ministers. Al-Basir

wondered whether a minister or the prime minister has greater influence and broader powers.

Al-Basir said he finds it unlikely that there is any legal problem with the announcement and he has said that the problem is more political than legal.

Elections Committee sources assured AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the announcement urging whoever wishes to run for election and who is covered by paragraph B of Article 55 of the election law to resign was considered by the committee for a long time and debated in several committee meetings. The call was opposed by some members who represent the YSP and GPC. Meanwhile, YSP sources said that YSP representatives were not present at the meeting in which the committee decided to issue the announcement. But 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Basir said that the announcement was approved in the presence of legal quorum of other committee members.

Whereas GPC sources have pointed out that a number of ministers belonging to the GPC submitted their resignation at last Thursday's Council of Ministers meeting in response to the Election Committee's call because they plan to run as candidates in the forthcoming elections, YSP circles continue to focus on legal issues connected with the announcement and they continue to be reserved about the names of the party candidates who hold executive positions covered by the announcement, especially about Prime Minister Engineer Haydar al-'Attas. Yemeni political circles have noted that it is likely that al-'Attas will run for election in one of the districts of Hadhramaut Governorate.

A number of ministers have asserted that if the prime minister runs for election to the next Chamber of Deputies, then the entire cabinet must resign and a new cabinet must be formed in accordance with Article 103 of the Constitution, which considers the government a complete, objective unit.

Jarallah 'Umar, a member of the Elections Committee and the YSP Political Bureau, said that he finds it unlikely that a deputy prime minister will be assigned to run the government affairs in such a case. He said that a new cabinet must be formed.

Election Observers Arrive in Capitol

93AE0390A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 13 Mar 93 p 4

[Article by Iqbal 'Ali 'Abdallah from Aden: "Al-'Attas Refused To Submit His Resignation in Accordance with Elections Law"]

[Text] Official sources in the Higher Elections Committee indicated that "approximately 300 European observers are expected to arrive in Yemen in the next few days." The observers are coming to Yemen to monitor parliamentary elections, which will be held next April 27.

The same sources assured AL-HAYAH that "central authorities asked the European Parliament to send an international team of observers to Yemen to monitor the elections to guarantee that they will be conducted in an impartial and democratic manner. After all, these elections

are the first elections to be held in the country since reunification, which took place on 22 May 1990. Independent social and religious figures, as well as political parties (those in the opposition, as well as those who are loyal to those in power), will be participating in these elections."

A delegation from the National Democratic Institute, which is affiliated with the Democratic Party, the party in power in the United States, arrived in Sanaa two days ago for the same purpose. The delegation is overseeing the final preparations that are being made by the government and by the Higher Elections Committee to receive the European observation team.

With regard to the status of the elections, confidential sources indicated that "government sources affirmed that the period of time that the Higher Committee for Parliamentary Elections had set for the resignation of Mr. Haydar al-'Attas, the head of government, had expired. Members of al-'Attas's administration and those holding official executive positions were also supposed to submit their resignations. And yet, the prime minister refused to submit his resignation in accordance with the Elections Law, which was ratified last year by the present Council of Representatives (parliament). The prime minister refused to submit his resignation on the grounds that he is a candidate for the next council, and he accused the Higher Elections Committee and its chairman, Justice 'Abd-al-Karim al-'Arashi, who is a member of the Presidential Council, of trying to drag the government into a precarious situation that has nothing to do with the Constitution."

These sources added that the Ministry of Legal Affairs was charged by the head of government "to file a two-count complaint with the Supreme Court in the country. The first count challenged the constitutionality of applying Paragraph B of Article 55 to ministers. This paragraph stipulates that any person holding a government position, including the head of government, shall submit his resignation from his position when he declares his candidacy to run for office in the parliamentary elections. The second count of the complaint challenged the constitutionality and legality of the Supreme Elections Committee's declaration establishing new legal provisions that contravene the constitutional and statutory provisions that are in effect in the country."

The same sources indicated that the government's complaint was based on Articles 60 and 76 of the Constitution, which approved the principle of serving simultaneously as a member of parliament and as a member of the Council of Ministers. The government's complaint was also based on Article 83 of the Elections Law, which exempted the head of government and members of government from the rule that bars civil servants from simultaneously holding public jobs and serving as members of parliament."

The sources affirmed that "the country's Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this matter, which has created a conflict between the government and the Supreme Elections Committee. And that conflict has caused a delay in the third and penultimate stage of the elections process, namely, the one during which people declare their candidacy."

YSP, GPC To Wage 'Coordinated Competition'

93AE0422B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
18 Mar 93 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Yemen: Competition Between Two Ruling Parties Reaffirmed"]

[Text] Sanaa—Yemeni political sources reaffirmed yesterday that the two ruling parties have not reached agreement on how to wage the general elections on 27 April 1993. The sources said that the option open to the two parties, namely the General People's Congress [GPC] and the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP], is competition.

'Abdallah Ghanim, member of the GPC General Committee, has told AL-HAYAH that the "two parties will wage the elections on the basis of honorable fraternal competition within a framework of coordination." Ghanim emphasized that "this coordination must not violate the principle of competition. Rather, its objective must be confined to preventing a confrontation."

Ghanim, a former minister in what used to be South Yemen prior to unity and a prominent leader of the YSP during the administration of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, has denied a statement attributed to him and published by AL-HAYAH last Sunday, which said that "there will be a surprise for some parties two days before the elections" and that "there is a flaw in the parties' relations with their masses and supporters." In the course of his denial, Ghanim said: "I have made no such statement. The people behind this statement seek to distort the reputation of the GPC and its leaders."

In Aden, some bankers said yesterday that a crisis caused by the short supply of paper currency in the southern governorates has been alleviated in wake of the Central Bank's remittance of money to its Aden branch to pay the wages of government employees. These bankers noted that the bank branch got in the past two days nearly 325 million Yemeni riyals (\$27 million) from the Central Bank's head office in Sanaa.

The Central Bank had failed to supply government departments, state-owned agencies, and banks in a number of southern governorates with paper money as of last January. Bankers have asserted that the Central Bank branch in Aden will make the paper money available immediately. Banking sources and diplomats have attributed the crisis in part to the government decision to withdraw old paper money before it got new banknotes valued at 100 billion riyals (\$8.33 billion).

Bankers have also said that a part of the new paper currency was returned to be reprinted when it was discovered that it contained typing errors. These bankers expect the new paper currency to be delivered next week.

The Central Bank of Yemen began circulating new 50-riyal bills last February.

Muhammad Ahmad al-Junayd, governor of the Central Bank of Yemen, has said that the currency crisis will end when new paper currency is delivered to Yemen in April.

GPC, YGR Prepare To Name Candidates

93AE0422A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
19 Mar 93 pp 1,4

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Haydari in Sanaa and Iqbal 'Ali 'Abdallah in Aden: "Yemen: Congress and Reform to Compete With Two Candidates in Each Electoral Districts"]

[Text] Sources of the General People's Congress [GPC] said yesterday that the GPC will wage the election campaign in all districts, numbering 301 districts, and that the Yemeni Grouping for Reform [YGR] is also moving in this direction in order to obtain a majority in the assembly that is expected to emanate from the April 1993 election.

The sources reiterated that the talk of a merger with the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] "has been postponed until after the election now that a conviction has developed that time is short and does not provide a chance to accomplish the objective of the merger." These sources added that the "talk about a unified list for both parties is premature."

The YGR, led by Shaykh 'Abdallah Husayn al-Ahmar, is the third biggest party in Yemen, and it is evident that it plans to have its members run for election in all districts out of its desire to play a larger role in the new assembly on the basis of its own program that is independent of the two ruling parties.

In a related development, Muhammad Salih al-Salahi, general secretary of the National Union of Patriotic Masses, told AL-HAYAH that a "large number of political parties and organizations and popular organizations that form the congress of popular parties and organizations are holding concerted meetings and consultations to create a democratic national alliance of opposition parties so these parties will enter the campaign as a single coalition facing the alliance of the two ruling parties and of some other parties that participate with these two parties in the Higher Elections Committee—a committee that has violated its obligations and its representation of the parties that elected it as their representative."

Al-Salahi added: "The alliance of opposition parties will issue a statement on this matter and will announce a unified election program and a single candidate list in all electoral districts in all parts of the republic. This is because all believe that there is no way to foil the attempt to marginalize the opposition's role except through this alliance, which will also form a very significant factor in preventing manipulation, cheating, and circumvention in the elections. Consequently, the alliance will help establish the mainstays and credibility of the desired democracy and will send the largest number of opposition members to the new parliament so that they will form an active parliamentary opposition bloc, will embody the masses' aspirations in the near future, and will constitute a true and influential opposition."

Al-Salahi stressed that the alliance will continue to be open to any other parties and organizations that wish to join it, especially "national congress" parties.

Regarding the situation in Aden, worker groups from the various government organizations and departments in the governorate will head tomorrow to branch offices of the Chamber of Deputies, the cabinet, and the two ruling parties to deliver "messages protesting the serious deterioration of conditions of the governorate, of its inhabitants, and of its workers."

The above was stated by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahid, chairman of the governorate's Labor Council, who added that the messages include a "demand that an end be put to the actions that are carried out by the political and executive authority intentionally and that constitute a flagrant violation of the constitution and the laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies."

The chairman of the Aden Labor Council also stressed that "on occasion of the 37th anniversary of the creation of the Yemeni labor union movement, all of the governorate's utilities and organizations will witness tomorrow labor meetings in which the manifestation of joy will turn into a tempestuous protest against the government."

Parties' Merger Postponed, Public To Strike

93AE0393A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
16 Mar 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Haydari in Sanaa and Iqbal 'Ali 'Abdallah in Aden: "Yemen: Merger of Two Parties Will Not Take Place Before Elections"]

[Text] It seems that merger of Yemen's two ruling parties has been postponed until after the general parliamentary elections that are scheduled for 27 April 1993 because of disagreement on the timing of the execution of the merger process between the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP] and the General People's Congress [GPC].

An official GPC source assured AL-HAYAH yesterday that the YSP-GPC merger has been postponed until after the elections and that it has become certain that the two parties will wage the election campaign independently.

The source said that the radical YSP wing has proposed that only the two leaderships be merged and that the GPC has decided that any talk about merger, unification or coordination between the two parties can be postponed if the current period is not long enough to hold talks on these issues. The source added that each party has to shoulder its responsibility independently and that dialogue between the country's two main parties should be held in light of outcome of the elections. Concluding, the source said that the YSP and GPC "have refuted the allegations that there is a premeditated plan to monopolize power in the coming phase."

In Aden, union and labor leaders in Aden Governorate have urged all workers and employees in the country's economic and business capital to stage a general and comprehensive strike today, Tuesday, in protest of the "deteriorated and lawless" general conditions that have

caused the country to live in a state of "tension, anxiety, and fear of an unknown future."

A statement issued two days ago by the governorate Labor Council said that the "political and executive authority (government) follows an administrative and fiscal policy inherited from the Ottoman rule and from the imamate. This policy proliferates the malady of illicit aggrandizement by way of land appropriation, by withdrawing currency liquidity, by failing to disburse workers' wages, by abolishing role of the local people's council, by failing to appoint a new governor to succeed Mahmud 'Arrasi who resigned last August, and by depriving local agencies of their powers." The authorities concerned have sent 60 million riyals to pay a part of the delayed wages.

The statement, of which AL-HAYAH has obtained a copy, said that the "authority's failure to fulfill its responsibilities toward the citizens has led to complicating governorate affairs and to the failure to deal with all of the conditions from which we suffer, the latest of which is the natural catastrophe that has inflicted enormous losses in lives and property." This seems to be a reference to the floods that afflicted Aden last February.

In the statement, labor unions and councils urged the "political and executive authority to curtail the insane inflation and to keep it at the pre-September 1992 levels, to deal with the conditions of the public sector and not sell this sector or touch its labor, to solve the unemployment problem, and to enhance health and other services." The statement also urges "all parties, popular organizations, unions, and social and religious figures to show total solidarity with the Aden workers and employees strike and to confront the efforts to turn the city into a village, instead of its being the country's economic and business capital."

Preparations for the strike were begun yesterday. City workers and employees began wearing red arm bands for the first time to protest the fact that they have not received their monthly wages since last January. Traffic problems were experienced in most of the city's main roads when the workers and employees of seven public sector corporations blocked the streets and outlets, thus causing long traffic jams.

Authoritative labor union sources said that red banners will be flown until the 20th of this month, which coincides with the 37th anniversary of creation of the Yemeni labor union movement. This effort will be crowned with meetings and demonstrations that will be organized to protest the recent "deterioration" of the conditions in Aden.

It is to be noted that in Sanaa the government issued prompt instructions for the delivery of large sums of money to government banks in Aden to pay workers' and employees' salaries. Nearly 60 million riyals were delivered at noon yesterday as a first consignment. This will be followed by other large sums to pay for worker and employee wage increases amounting to 70 percent. These increases were approved by the government last January.

At noon last Monday and under the slogans of "no building and no development of the modern Yemeni state

without scientific research, no state without laws and no law without application, and procrastination in applying the law is evidence of the lack of government credibility," Sanaa witnessed a march organized by researchers in three Yemeni scientific research centers, namely the Studies and Research Center, the Educational Research and Development Center, and the Agricultural Research Authority.

The march started at al-Tahrir Square in the city center and was led by four individuals wearing black with the word "government" inscribed on their backs. They carried a coffin wrapped in a white shroud that bore the phrase "national development and political, economic, financial, and administrative reform program." This was a symbolic reference to the program that was approved by the Chamber of Deputies 17 months ago and that the government of Haydar al-'Attas has not implemented.

Text of 1992 Bank Organization Law Published

93AE0357B Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 1 Jan 93 p 3

[Text] Prime Ministerial Decision No. 280 of 1993 concerning regulations organizing exchange transactions in the Yemeni Republic:

The prime minister, after recognizing the Yemeni Republic's Constitution of 14 November 1992, the republic's decision No. 31 of 1991 concerning the Yemeni Central Bank, and republic's Decision No. 36 of 1991 concerning banks, and on the basis of submissions by the minister of finance and following the approval of the cabinet, has decided:

Chapter 1: Definitions

Article 1: These regulations shall be called "Regulations Organizing Money Changing Transactions."

Article 2: The following words and terms in the regulations shall have the meanings stated below, unless the context of the text has a different meaning or evidence indicates otherwise:

- Government: Government of the Republic of Yemen;
- Bank: The Yemeni Central Bank;
- Board: The Board of Directors of the Yemeni Central Bank;
- Governor: Governor of the Yemeni Central Bank;
- Exchange transactions: Transactions that deal with foreign currencies or precious metals;
- Changer: Every natural or corporate person licensed to deal with exchange transactions in accordance with these regulations;
- Foreign currency: Any non-Yemeni currency;
- Precious metals: Bullion, coins, gold or silver currency in any state or condition, with the exception of gold and silver whose value is increased by manufacturing;
- Licensed bank: A commercial bank that is licensed to carry out exchange transactions in the Republic of Yemen in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 36 of 1991 concerning banks;
- Person: A natural or corporate person.

Chapter 2: General Rules Governing Exchange Transactions

Article 3: No exchange company shall be registered in Yemen unless it has a license issued by the Central Bank in accordance with Article 5, clause 1 of the law on banks.

Article 4: (a) No company may be registered to carry out exchange business with the official quarters concerned with registering companies and individual facilities until after it has obtained written preliminary and prior approval from the Bank of its registration, its constituting contract, and its statutes with regard to finance companies.

(b) After the company registration procedures are completed and the company is allowed to carry out its work in accordance with the provisions of the laws in force, the Bank will issue the final license for carrying out exchange transactions, and the company shall be registered in a special register with the Bank.

Article 5: The Bank shall publish in the official gazette the names of the quarters that have been licensed to carry out exchange transactions in Yemen and the addresses of the places where they carry out their activities, after the procedures of their registration with both the Bank and with the official authorities referred to in Article 4 of these regulations have been completed.

Article 6: (a) The license issued in accordance with these regulations shall be valid for three years, and the Bank shall renew it after its expiry if no violations of the provisions of these regulations have been committed.

(b) The Bank has the right to issue a decision to withdraw any license if the licensee companies or the installations fail to abide by the provisions of these regulations.

Article 7: Licenses to carry out exchange transactions in Yemen may be issued to the two following categories:

- Category 1: This category includes Yemeni joint stock companies or companies of limited liabilities in accordance with the provisions of the Yemeni laws in force, provided that the stocks or the partners' share are nominal and entirely owned by Yemenis, whether natural or corporate persons.
- Category 2: This category includes individual facilities or companies established in accordance with the provisions of laws in force and are owned by Yemenis.

Article 8: (a) Company capital for category 1 licenses should be no less than 10 million Yemeni riyals.

(b) The capital of facilities or companies of the second category should be no less than 2 million riyals.

Article 9: (a) Licensing of category 1 companies shall define the locations and addresses at which exchange business is to be carried out.

(b) Licensing of category 2 of company facilities shall define the locations at which business is licensed to be carried out.

(c) A changer is not allowed to open a branch or branches other than those at which he is licensed to carry out

business. Otherwise, he will be subject to the penalties provided in Article 5 of the Law No. 26 of 1991 on banks. Also, no licensed branch may be transferred except with the Bank's written approval.

Article 10: A changer is prohibited from combining, under the name, the legal form, or the location at which he is permitted to operate in accordance with Article 14 of this regulation, any other commercial activity, and no company or facility of the first or second category may include in its statute or constituting contract any objectives that contradict the changing transactions that are permitted to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this regulation.

Article 11: Before starting his business, a changer shall deposit in a licensed bank to the order of the bank governor a cash sum equivalent to 25 percent of the paid capital for companies of the first category and companies and facilities of the second category as a guarantee for the changer's adherence to these regulations and the instructions issued accordingly. This deposit shall be treated the same as deposits in commercial banks.

Article 12: A changer may not terminate or suspend his business without the written approval of the Central Bank, which establishes the method and conditions of terminating or suspending operation.

Article 13: If a licensed person fails to carry out exchange transactions within six months of the date he was notified of the issuing of a license, the Bank has the right to cancel the license or grant him an extension not exceeding six months from the expiration date of the first period and then cancel if he does not carry out exchange business after the expiration of the extension period.

Chapter 3: Permissible Exchange Business

Article 14: The Bank allows the changer to carry out the following transactions:

- Buying and selling foreign currency notes and at his expense and responsibility.
- Buying, collecting, or selling travel and bank checks issued by banks operating in Yemen or abroad at his expense and his responsibility. In case of purchase, collection should be through coverage, and in case of sale, through accounts opened with banks licensed to operate in Yemen.
- Purchasing and selling precious metals.
- Effecting or accepting remittances to and from abroad in accordance with the laws on dealing with foreign currency.
- Authorized changers and bankers operating in Yemen are permitted to transfer currency with a prior approval of the Central Bank after defining the amount and stating the purpose of transfer. The amount of currency citizens are allowed to transfer shall be increased from \$3,000 to \$10,000 per passport.
- Any other transactions approved by the Bank and according to the conditions it stipulates.

Article 15: (a) The prices of sale and purchase of foreign currencies in which changers deal shall be defined by a committee comprised of the following individuals:

The chairman of the board of the Banks Association, chairman;

Two members of the Banks Association, members;

A member of the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, member;

A delegate from the General Administration of Bank Control, controller;

(b) The Bank, in consultation with the committee, shall lay down the rules governing the work of the committee referred to in clause (a) of this article. In fixing the exchange rate, the committee shall be guided by the market indices in order to arrive at a realistic rate, making sure that a real rate that reflects the market's mechanism is fixed.

Chapter 4: Prohibited Transactions

Article 16: A changer may not engage in any banking activity provided for in the 1991 law on banks, with the exception of what is allowed in Article 14 of this regulation. A changer is not permitted to take positions in foreign exchange futures market or undertake any similar obligations.

Article 17: A changer may not obtain direct or indirect credit facilities from local or foreign banks without a prior written permit from the Bank.

Article 18: None of the partners in an exchange company is permitted to carry out any of the following transactions:

- Withdrawing any amounts that exceed their share of the company's annual net profits;
- Having current accounts, deposits, or other types of accounts in the company.

Article 19: None of the partners in an exchange company may borrow from the company or make a loan to it without first obtaining a prior written approval from the Bank.

Article 20: A changer may not engage in illegal speculations in foreign currency or precious metals in any way or by any means, including circulating reports of conflicting and falsified events or falsehoods, publicize such events, or offer to sell or buy those currencies or precious metals in such a manner or under conditions that might cause confusion in dealing with them or in raising or lowering their prices.

Chapter 5: Rules of Supervision and Control

Article 21: A changer is subject to control by the Bank and must abide by the statistics system and the procedures the Bank decides upon in this regard. He should submit periodical statements on his financial position and the total of sales and purchase of foreign currency, travelers checks, and precious metals concluded during the period covered by the statement.

Article 22: Companies of the first category and facilities and companies of the second category licensed to engage in exchange should meet the following conditions:

- The capital of the company or the facilities should at all times be no less than the minimum fixed for the category in which it is licensed to operate.
- The company or facilities should keep regular account ledgers in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Article 23: The Bank has the right to charge one or more of its employees to inspect companies of the first category and facilities and companies of the second category when it deems it is necessary to ascertain adherence to the provisions of this regulation. The changer and all of his employees must submit to the bank employees all of the necessary books, statements of account, necessary documents, and any other facilities needed to complete the inspection in the best possible manner. All information that comes to the knowledge of any Bank employees shall be considered secret and for the use of the Bank and may not be divulged to others.

Article 24: A changer of the first category shall appoint a chartered accountant to audit the accounts. He is obliged to provide the Bank with a copy of the budget at the end of the fiscal year, the account statement for the ending fiscal year, and a statement of profits and losses and the chartered accountant's report on them at a date not later than four months from the end of the fiscal year. The chartered accountant should state in his report whether the licensed company or facility has violated any provisions of these regulations or directives issued by the Bank, and a changer should publish his annual final accounts in at least one impartial daily newspaper after its publication is approved by the Bank.

Article 25: If a category 1 changer delays the appointment of a licensed chartered accountant in accordance with Article 24 of these regulations, the Bank shall appoint a licensed chartered accountant and determine his fees, which are payable by the changer.

Article 26: Changers in category 2 are obliged to keep legal accounting records that are subject to periodic inspection by the Bank. The Bank accountants shall produce a general budget for the exchange transactions of this category for the fiscal year and ratify the budget.

Article 27: Licensed exchange companies and facilities should ensure that no working capital in foreign currencies exceeding the equivalent of the paid capital and the constituting reserves is maintained.

These companies and facilities should review the position of the foreign currencies they possess with regard to the allowable amount in accordance with this article, based on the position of their accounts by the end of the business day every Thursday.

Any surplus in the balance of the allowable working capital should be relinquished by selling it not later than the end of business hours on the Saturday subsequent to the preparation of their accounts position referred to in the aforementioned clause of this article. The surplus may be

sold to licensed exchange companies and facilities, to the commercial banks, or to the [Central] Bank. The Bank shall fix the hours for dealing with the public during the morning and the evening periods for the licensed exchange companies and facilities for all days of the week and the official holidays.

Chapter 6: Final rules

Article 28: The Governor may, in circumstances dictated by public interest, decide, after consultation with the Bank's board of directors, to suspend the work of exchange facilities and companies or to suspend some of them if he deems it necessary.

Article 29: Anyone violating the provisions of these regulations or the conditions of the decisions to grant licenses to carry out exchange business by corporate or natural persons shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 36 of 1991 and other laws.

Article 30: Corporations or natural persons licensed to carry out exchange business in Yemen in accordance with the rules of these regulations may establish an association whose membership shall be restricted to those persons, providing the Bank approves its statutes.

The association shall be the means by which the collective views of changers licensed to carry out exchange business, the Bank, and the various government authorities and departments may be gauged. The objective of the association should include the following:

- Study of the problems facing changers in the field of their business and make recommendations in this regard to be submitted to the authorities concerned.
- Efforts to resolve problems that may arise among changers members of the association.
- Facilitation of contacts between the Bank and the changers in the field of publicizing the instructions regulating exchange business and other matters relating to exchange business in Yemen.

Article 31: The Governor, on the basis of the cabinet approval, may issue instructions implementing provisions of this law.

Article 32: This decision shall be in effect from the date it is issued and shall be published in the official gazette.

Issued at the prime minister's office on 7 Rajab 1413 HG, corresponding to 31 December 1992.

Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas, prime minister

IRAN

IRI Raises Visa Costs in Response to UK's Move

93LA0012E London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Mar 93 p 1

[Text] The cost of an entry visa to Iran for Britons suddenly increased 36 times from 14 pounds to 504 pounds. The Embassy of the Islamic Republic in England announced that it considers this increase "in line" with the increase that the British Embassy has made to issue visas to Iranians in Tehran. The Islamic Republic considers this increase one of the effects of establishing a single foreign exchange rate. The cost of issuing visas at the English embassy in Tehran to Iranians increased from 1,200 rials to 50,000 rials.

Aid to Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Continues

93LA0007A Tehran RESALAT in Persian 24 Feb 93 p 3

[Text] As the people of our Islamic country continue to give aid to the innocent and defenseless Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 194,072,728 rials were donated by various organizations for this humanitarian cause.

According to IRNA, of the above-mentioned amount, up to the amount of 100,800,000 rials was allocated by the Office of Religious Endowments and Charities; 4,494,693 rials were gifts of the employees of the Education Department of District 9 of Tehran; 104 million rials in cash and noncash gifts were donated by the personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; and 84,778,025 rials in cash was donated by the employees of the organizations affiliated with the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics to the innocent Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Following this aid, \$1,123 and 13 pieces of gold by the Turkish Muslim Women's Union and \$1,064.10 from the cultural representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran abroad have been allocated for this important cause.

Also, the gifts of the personnel of the organizations affiliated with the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics in this connection included 140,120 dinars, two Bahar-e Azadi coins, three gold rings and bracelets, a gold bracelet, and a silver coin, along with a gold plaque.

Cleaning of Sunk Platforms Begins in Karun

93LA0008D London KEYHAN in Persian 7 Jan 93 p 3

[Text] The cleaning of platforms that were sunk in the mud of the Karun River bed in Khorramshahr during the war has begun. These platforms number more than 200, and the cost of pulling them out will be paid from the funds of the Reconstruction Headquarters of Khuzestan Province.

The decision as to whether the platforms will be reconstructed or repaired will be made after they have been recovered. The governor of Khorramshahr, under whose supervision the operations are taking place, has asked the owners of these platforms to go to the Port Office of Khorramshahr and supervise the repair or rebuilding. For these sunken platforms, "supervisory fees" may or may

not be collected from the owners, because a certain foundation to return the hotels or other facilities that were destroyed in the war to their owners requested supervisory fees at 5 percent annually (the going rate) and in some cases asked for taxes.

Grain Production Increases by 2 Million Tons

93LA0007I Tehran RESALAT in Persian 28 Feb 93 p 15

[Text] Rome. IRNA. The production of various kinds of Iranian grain in 1992 increased by more than 2 million tons compared to 1991.

According to the annual report of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, FAO, our country produced 16.5 million tons of various grains in 1992, which compared to 14.5 million tons in 1991 shows an increase of about 2 million tons.

The production of various grains in Iran in 1990 amounted to about 13.6 million tons. According to an FAO report, a major part of the increase in grains in our country was registered in the wheat harvest.

According to the FAO estimate, the harvest of wheat in Iran increased from 8.9 million tons in 1991 to 10.2 million tons in 1992.

According to this report, the production of Iranian rice also increased, from 2.2 million tons in 1991 to 2.5 million tons in 1992.

According to the FAO annual report, Iran is the ninth-largest producer of grains in Asia, after China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.

Development Projects Inaugurated in Shahreza

93LA0007C Tehran RESALAT in Persian 25 Feb 93 p 12

[Text] Shahreza. RESALAT Correspondent. Six developmental projects were inaugurated and put into operation in ceremonies in the presence of Engineer Jahangiri, the governor general of Esfahan, the clerics, and the officials of the city of Shahreza.

The first phase of the overpass on the road entering Shahreza was inaugurated and put into operation. This bridge, which is 350 meters long, 8 meters wide, and 5.4 meters high, was built with 140 million rials from the funds of the Shahreza City Hall. Twenty-three thousand cubic meters of dirt was removed, and 4,000 cubic meters of concrete as well as 100 tons of metal posts were used. For the purpose of waste water for this project, 10 wells were dug under the overpass at distances of 30 meters.

The new hospital and maternity ward of Samiyyeh in Shahreza was inaugurated and put into operation. This two-story project was built on 900 square meters of land and includes five patient rooms, a conference room, a laboratory, seven service rooms, and three operation

rooms. So far, 160 million rials have been spent, of which 30 million rials were donated by the people.

In ceremonies, the Imam Khomeyni High School of the city of Shahreza was inaugurated. This high school was built on 3,000 square meters of land with 2,450 square meters under construction. It has 19 classrooms and an auditorium and used 160 million rials in expenditures of the administration of the reconstruction group.

The rural road of the village of Laricheh, a suburb of Shahreza, was inaugurated and put into operation. The length of this road is 2,500 meters, its width is eight meters, and the volume of sand used for reconstruction is 6,250 meters. The funds that were spent from the funds in Note 66 amounted to 30 million rials, and 5 million rials came from local self-help sources. It was built by the Construction Jihad of this city.

The ground satellite station of the village of Hamgin, a suburb of Shahreza, was inaugurated and put into operation. This station has 5 watts of power and its radiation power is 100 watts. The project cost 3,226,000 rials, which was paid by the local self-help organization and the District Office of Semiram.

In ceremonies, the building of the Post Office of Dehaqan was inaugurated and set into operation. In these ceremonies, Engineer Jahangiri, the governor general of Esfahan, spoke about the efforts of the officials of Shahreza in connection with the inauguration of the projects in this city and the presence of the people on the scenes of the revolution.

It is noteworthy that this building was built on 450 square meters of land, with 160 square meters under construction, at a cost of 250 million rials.

Lavan Oil Production Capacity Reviewed

93LA0007H Tehran RESALAT in Persian 28 Feb 93 p 15

[Text] Shiraz. RESALAT Correspondent. With the building and operation of the new Lavan Island oil facilities, the capacity of which is designed to be 220,000 barrels per day, the registration, refining, storing, loading, and export of crude oil on Lavan Island became possible.

According to this report, following the Iraqi air strikes and the U.S. Navy attack on the sea and land facilities of Lavan Island and the infliction of general damage to these facilities, in 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991], the Construction and Petrochemical Industries Installation Company engaged in the reconstruction and building of the Lavan Island facilities.

This project includes the reconstruction and building of oil stabilization facilities that receive oil from Salman Oil District through underwater pipelines.

Exports Show 54-Percent Increase

93LA0007G Tehran RESALAT in Persian 28 Feb 93 p 15

[Text] Tehran. IRNA. Exports by the National Iranian Industries Organization in the first 10 months of this year

reached \$34,076,000, whereas this figure during a similar period last year was \$22,150,000.

According to a report by the Public Relations Office of the National Iranian Industries Organization, the level of exports this year shows an increase of 54 percent compared to last year.

During this period, the textile industries and household supplies group had the highest and the Export Company of the National Iranian Industries Organization had the lowest figures for exports.

Caspian Sea Shipping Expands

93LA0007E Tehran RESALAT in Persian 27 Feb 93 p 2

[Text] Astara. IRNA. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the creation of four new countries around the Caspian Sea, the shipping activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have found a very timely opportunity for expansion.

Following the visit of Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani to Moscow and his meeting with Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union at the time, Iran was granted permission for four ships to travel to Bandar Anzali and the ports of the other countries.

Since then, the shipping of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the purchase of three cargo ships, called Iran Qadir, Iran Bashir, and Iran Basir, along with a passenger ship called Mirza Kuchek Khan, began a great deal of activity in the largest lake in the world.

These activities revitalized the shipping rights of Iran in the Caspian Sea, which were lost in the disgraceful Torkomanchay and Golsetan Treaties.

The shipping of the Islamic Republic of Iran, considering the increase in its activities in the Caspian Sea, established an affiliated organization, called the Caspian Sea Shipping Company, centered in Bandar Anzali, from the beginning of 1371 [21 Mar 1992].

This company, by the middle of the year, in 24 sea voyages, has transported about 64,000 tons of goods to the ports of Nowshahr and Anzali and has received about \$772,000 in fares.

Hoseyn Porsan-Fumani, the spokesman for the shipping of the Islamic Republic of Iran, said: Iran is trying to create a large shipping company at the level of [EKO] member companies, for which the preparations have been made.

Automation of Identity Cards in Khorasan

93LA0007B Tehran RESALAT in Persian 23 Feb 93 p 12

[Text] Mashhad. RESALAT Correspondent: The two-day seminar of the officials of the Office of Registration and Records of Khorasan was held in the Office of Registration and Records of Khorasan in the presence of the general director, deputies, and experts of that office.

According to our correspondent, in this seminar Engineer Khedmatgozar, the director general of registration and records of Khorasan Province, announced that the

National Registration Office has engaged in making active a training center and four training units in the provinces, work on the creation of an automated population data base is up to 90 percent complete, and the installation of computers in 76 cities is 50 percent complete. Eighty-five percent of the identity cards of the fellow citizens have also been changed.

He added: The continuation of the reconstruction of the destroyed documents of the country and the examination of the document; the handling of the registration problems of the foreign returnees, migrants, and refugees; the issuance of identity cards; the allocation of national codes; and dozens of other projects are projected in the programs of the Second-Year Plan.

He also referred to the computer system in Khorasan and announced: In Esfand [20 Feb-20 Mar] this year, the installation of this system will begin in Mashhad, Sabzevar, Bojnord, Neyshabur, Quchan, Torbat-e Heydariyeh, Torbat-e Jam, Kashmar, Gonabad, and Birjand, which will be operational once the necessary work is complete.

According to the same report, the budget of the Registration Office of Khorasan Province in 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] was announced as 1.34 billion rials.

In conclusion, the director general of registration also once again mentioned the deadline for the exchange of identity cards of various age groups, except for those born prior to 1310 [21 Mar 1931] through the end of 1371 [20 Mar 1993].

Weaknesses Noted in News Dissemination

93LA0007F Tehran RESALAT in Persian 27 Feb 93 p 2

[Text] **Undoubtedly, one of the most important duties of the press is the proper and precise dissemination of news and information to the people. The officials of the press must take sufficient care in the way news is presented to the society, in particular in choosing their news headlines.**

HAMSHAHRI newspaper, on 25/11/71 [14 Feb 1993], reported an item of news, quoting the director of the Office of Large Economy of Plan and Budget Organization concerning the increase in the pay to government employees of 23.8 percent in 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994], which was also published in other newspapers.

As stated in the text of the report: This increase was due to the payment of previous debts to the government employees and their annual raises, which are not considered an increase in pay.

These postponed payments were to have been paid to the employees earlier. Because they did not receive it then, the government is paying its debt, and this cannot be considered an increase. Also, annual raises are extended every year, and there is no need for reporting the most obvious issue. Despite this, how has the Office of Large Economy of the Plan and Budget Organization called this an increase in pay?

Certainly this statement and choosing the headline of "Payment to Government Employees Will Increase by

23.8 Percent" at the beginning of the new year, which is not ineffective in increasing prices of goods, will harm more than anyone else the deprived stratum of salaried people.

Such a news item is published and then its denial by the National Organization for Administrative and Employment Affairs is published and then the verification of the increase in the payment to government employees by the Plan and Budget Organization is published. Both the verification and the denial of this report verified one thing, that is, postponed payments and annual raises, and illustrates lack of coordination between the organization in charge, on the one hand, and the weakness of news dissemination by the press, on the other hand, which will create uncertainty in the society and have inflationary consequences.

People's Awareness for Paying Taxes Should Be Raised

93LA0007D Tehran RESALAT in Persian 27 Feb 93 p 12

[Text] **Gorgan. RESALAT Correspondent. For the development of the country, government tax revenues must increase, and by proper advertisement, the awareness for paying taxes should be raised in the country.**

Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Hasan 'Alavi, the deputy of the people of Gorgan and Aqqala in the Majles, in a meeting of the Administrative Council of Gorgan, which was held in the presence of the officials of the city in the conference room of the Governor's Office, made the above statement and said: The only stratum that pays taxes fully is the employee and salaried stratum. Considering that taxes are a main source of government revenues, we must encourage the people to pay taxes toward the government budget.

He said: Some organizations collect money from the people under the name of self-help, which is against the law, and the law that existed earlier in this regard has been rescinded. Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Alavi said: This improper method of collecting money from the people has caused our people to think that the money that they pay in taxes to the Ministry of Finance and City Halls is self-help. Hence, we must raise the awareness of the payment of legal fees in the people, and one of the important characteristics of next year's national budget is the revitalization of the issue of taxes.

The deputy from Gorgan in the Majles referred to the issue of the characteristics of the 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] budget bill and said: In next year's budget bill, special attention has been paid to the education and agricultural sectors and deprived areas. With the ratification of Note 16, which has been one of the successful notes

of the budget bills in previous years, the way has been opened for the use of people's taxes in the implementation of regional projects.

Also, thanking the people for their extensive presence in the march on God's Day, 22 Bahman [11 Feb], he mentioned the blessed month of Ramazan as the Month of Self-Help and the Month of God's Bounty.

Heart-Related Deaths Reach 43 Percent

93LA0008C London KEYHAN in Persian 7 Jan 93 p 3

[Text] Published statistics in Tehran show that the number of people who die of heart disease in Tehran has increased from 28 percent in 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987] to 43.5 percent in 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993], an increase of 15.5 percent.

The Behesht-e Zahra Organization in a published report wrote that in the five years between 1365 and 1370 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1992], nearly 220,000 people have died in Tehran. In these statistics, those who died in Farvardin and Ordibehesht 1365 [21 Mar-20 Apr and 21 Apr-21 May 1986] and Mehr 1366 [23 Sep-22 Oct] were not included without any reason being mentioned.

Also, what is worthy of note is that the Behesht-e Zahra Organization has avoided mentioning the number of "martyrs," and this shows that the above-mentioned statistics in this regard are probably worrisome. Physicians consider the increase in the number of heart patients among the dead as due to the "psychological pressures resulting from economic and social problems."

Of the dead in the five years under study, 58 percent were men and 42 percent women. What seems astonishing in these statistics is the unusually high rate of children's deaths (30 percent). Of course, the statistics have not specified the age group of the "children." Statistics state that children's deaths decreased from 13,000 in 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987] to 10,000 in 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992].

Over Half of Mazandaran Population Carry Parasite

93LA0012F London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Mar 93 p 2

[Text] Research at Sari Medical College showed that 67.6 percent of the population of the province of Mazandaran is infected with parasitic diseases. Dr. Gholami, professor at the Sari Medical College, who took part in this research, said: The one-celled [giardia] parasite spreads night and day among children in the schools and centers. This parasite spreads to healthy persons via food and infected individuals.

Dr. Gholami said the symptoms of this disease are sudden loss of weight and swelling of the stomach. He said: This parasite has a disk-shaped sheet that sticks to the walls of the small intestine, and obstructs the absorption of fat and vitamins in the cornea of the victim's eyes.

Other effects of this discomfort are weakened eyesight and retarded growth during adolescence.

Dr. Gholami also said: A small worm is another of the parasites spreading among the people of Mazandaran, and this sickness spreads via oral contact. This professor considers the failure to observe health-care procedures in restaurants and food sales outlets and the contamination of fruits and vegetables to be among the causes for the spread of these diseases.

Narcotics Discovered in Khorasan

93WB0030A Tehran RESALAT in Persian 1 Mar 93 p 14

[Text] Mashhad. IRNA. With the arrest of 240 dealers in death, more than 208 kg of narcotics were discovered in the past few days in 11 cities of Khorasan Province.

The report by IRNA quoting the Public Relations Office of Khorasan Security Zone indicates that the personnel of the Security Zone of Gazik, Birjand, Qayen, Khaf, Tayeb, Gonabad, Torbat Heydariyyeh, Sarakhs, Sabzevar, and Bojnord in the past few days by implementing stop and inspect operations, discovered 163 kg of opium and 1 kg of heroin on 15 smugglers.

In this connection, four battlefield weapons and more than 930 battlefield bullets along with six motorcycles were confiscated.

Also, the antinarcotics officials of Security District 3 of Mashhad succeeded in arresting nine smugglers and discovering 33.3 kg of opium, 800 grams of heroin, and 500 grams of opium extract.

Those arrested were transporting narcotics in a bus from Zahedan and distributing them in Mashhad.

Narcotics Located in Various Parts of Qom

93WB0030B Tehran RESALAT in Persian 24 Feb 93 p 14

[Text] Karaj. RESALAT Correspondent. Because of the efforts of the law enforcement agents of Qom, while inspecting a vehicle, 153 kg of narcotics were discovered hidden in a pineapple can and confiscated.

According to a report by our correspondent quoting the Public Relations Office of Tehran Province Security Zone in Karaj, during the inspection of a vehicle and questioning the driver, 145.5 kg of opium was discovered, which had been skillfully hidden in the spare tire and around the tire well of the above-mentioned vehicle. Also, law enforcement agents, inspecting the passengers of a bus along the Kashan road bottleneck, became suspicious of an individual called Sa'di and during the inspection discovered 6 kg of opium hidden inside a can of pineapple compote.

The source added: Also, on another passenger bus, which was headed for Tehran from Shiraz, 2 kg of hashish was discovered.

This report added: The hard-working law enforcement officials of this region this past week discovered 280 obscene video tapes and 550 smuggled boxes of cigarettes

and arrested 19 thieves, four smugglers, 10 addicts, and 70 street bums and troublemakers and sent them to the proper authorities.

Hamadan Detoxification Center Described

93WB0030C Tehran RESALAT in Persian 23 Feb 93 p 14

[Text] *In the course of this year, 1,670 narcotics addicts were able to give up their addiction in the Rehabilitation and Convalesce Complex for Social Illnesses of Hamadan and returned to the bosom of their families.*

One of the officials of the Welfare Organization of Hamadan Province said in an interview with IRAN correspondent: During their two-months-to-a-year stay in the Rehabilitation and Recuperation Complex, while giving up their addictions, this number of persons received training in the technical and trade workshops of this complex.

He added: The Rehabilitation and Convalesce Complex for Social Illnesses of Hamadan, with a capacity of 5,000 people, is one of the largest complexes of its kind in the country, with numerous technical and trade workshops as well as training facilities for narcotics addicts.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTS may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTS or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTS and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.