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ARE CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCEDURES ADEQUATE IN INFORMATION WARFARE?

**A MONOGRAPH
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
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
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ABSTRACT

ARE CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCEDURES ADEQUATE IN INFORMATION WARFARE? by MAJ Murray J. Duff, USA, 49 pages.

This monograph discusses the ability of Psychological Operations forces to conduct information operations. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U S Army has struggled to adapt to an increasingly volatile series of missions. Many believe the likely conventional or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) threat will involve Information Warfare (IW) as part of the conflict. As a consequence, the army has begun to develop capabilities that allow it to fight more effectively in an information intensive environment. While some aspects of information warfare are conducted domestically, many are executed on foreign soil and involve extensive interaction with other governments, their population, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Each of these entities constitutes a potential target audience for psychological operations while executing information warfare.

The importance of information warfare grows proportionally as the level of technological sophistication increases around the world. The U S Army is compelled to rely upon psychological operations forces to fill vital support roles in the conduct of information warfare.

In this monograph, psychological operations capabilities will be measured using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study and to a lesser extent, recent OOTW operations. Based on the successes and failures found in these examinations, the monograph will draw conclusions as to the abilities of the psychological operations force to conduct information warfare.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U S Army has struggled to adapt to an increasingly volatile series of missions. Many believe the likely conventional or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) threat will involve Information Warfare (IW) as part of its environment of conflict. The specter of a high intensity conflict involving massive commitments of conventional forces is less likely than it has been in the past. As a consequence, the Army has begun to develop capabilities that allow it to fight more effectively in an information intensive environment. While some aspects of information warfare are conducted domestically, many are executed on foreign soil and involve extensive interaction with other governments, their population, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Each of these entities constitutes a potential target audience for psychological operations while executing information warfare.

The importance of information warfare grows proportionally as the level of technological sophistication increases around the world. The U S Army is compelled to rely upon psychological operations forces to fill vital support roles in the conduct of information warfare. As a result, the deployment frequency of psychological operations forces will be a major concern.

In order to effectively deal with these new missions, commanders have levied increased support requirements on the psychological operations community. They are required to conduct effective information operations in

both conventional and OOTW environments. The magnitude and frequency of these requirements have at times placed great strain upon the current force structure. Therefore, it is prudent to examine the current psychological operations philosophy, methodology, procedures, force structure, and force capability to determine if it is adequate and appropriate for the conduct of information warfare across the operational continuum.

In order to properly assess these factors, it is necessary to become familiar with the American philosophy and background of psychological operations. It is important to understand the purpose and mission of nonlethal means of persuasion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the utility, viability or appropriateness of information warfare. It is only germane as an accepted and doctrinal environment in which U S Army forces will operate during future conflict.

Psychological operations capabilities will be measured using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study and to a lesser extent, recent OOTW operations. Based on the successes and failures found in these examinations, the monograph will draw conclusions as to the abilities of the psychological operations force to conduct information warfare.

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PHILOSOPHY

The ultimate objective of American psychological operations is to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and target audiences to take actions favorable to the U S and its allies.¹ Psychological operations (PSYOP) can promote resistance within a civilian populace against a hostile government or be used to enhance the image and legitimacy of a friendly government. When properly employed, PSYOP reduces the morale and efficiency of enemy troops and builds dissidence and disaffection within their ranks.

It is U S policy that psychological operations be conducted across the operational continuum. Psychological operations are conducted to influence foreign governmental and civilian perceptions and attitudes to encourage foreign actions favorable to U S national security objectives and interests. Any level (strategic, operational or tactical) of PSYOP can be executed at any point along the operational continuum. The operational environment does not dictate or limit PSYOP actions or the level of PSYOP applied.²

Military psychological operations are inherently joint operations. CINCs, unified, joint task force and subordinate commanders identify target audiences and develop themes, campaigns and products. These submissions normally flow through channels to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for approval.

The principles and methodologies of developing a campaign are uniform across the operational continuum regardless of the level of war being waged. In an operation short of declared war, national level PSYOP policy is normally

developed from policy statements and official declarations concerning U S foreign policy as well as stated national security objectives. Interagency coordination and cooperation is required for any operation in this type of environment. However, in peace time, the U S ambassador is directly responsible for implementing PSYOP policy overseas.³ In these types of operations, PSYOP campaign objectives are typically more difficult to develop and refine. This fact is related to the rate of change in policy, the amount of interagency agreement, and the level of clarity with which a policy is outlined.

In a declared war, policy emanates from the national command authorities (NCA) after approval of plans submitted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Subsequent to approval, the national policy is executed through a strategy of coherent and mutually supporting international information programs. These programs consist of all U S information dissemination efforts dealing with policy and the conduct of the war.⁴

Unity of effort and unity of theme are critical to the success of any PSYOP campaign. It is important that all themes and products, regardless of the level of employment, reflect and support the national policy. These overt messages are deemed to be official statements from the United States government. Therefore, national information policy and strategy must fully integrate Department of Defense (DOD) PSYOP efforts into all international information programs to alleviate the potential for disseminating contradictory messages or information.

There is a psychological dimension to every element (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) of national power. Foreign perceptions of

American military capabilities are fundamental to strategic deterrent capabilities. Therefore, it is critical that policymakers clearly articulate and disseminate our national policy and military actions. Informational ambiguity can result in policy failure. Communicating clearly with allies, enemies and neutral nations must be viewed as a key element of U S national strategy. The success of strategies such as deterrence, power projection and enlargement hinges on our ability to influence the perceptions of others.

PSYOP operations will be conducted in one or more of four categories along the operational continuum. The categories are strategic, operational, tactical or consolidation PSYOP. Strategic, operational and tactical PSYOP depend on the size of the target audience, the geographical area in which programs are executed, and the amount of time in which observable results are required. Consolidation PSYOP are designed to return an area or country to normalcy after a war or conflict.⁵

Strategic PSYOP are generally designed to advance broad or long-term aims in support of general national strategic planning. Strategic psychological operations are considered an aspect of national diplomacy and are established and guided by intergovernmental working groups. The intergovernmental working groups meet periodically to clarify strategic PSYOP policy and issue direction in light of current political and military developments. However, no permanent mechanism to institutionalize this process exists.⁶ Any U S Army PSYOP unit can be task organized to support strategic PSYOP. Typical strategic PSYOP objectives could be to support and explain U S political

policies, aims and objectives abroad; arouse public opinion or assert political pressures for or against a military operation; stimulate dissension between opponents' military and political elites; encourage disaffection among opponents on the part of ethnic, social, political, economic, and other elements having grievances against each other; or give hope and moral support to resistance elements.

Operational PSYOP are regional or national in scope and orientation. They are directed against regional target audiences and planned to alter audience behavior more rapidly than strategic PSYOP. Operational PSYOP possess characteristics of both strategic and tactical PSYOP. Typical operational PSYOP objectives may be to minimize civilian interference with U S operations; prepare a target audience for the introduction of U S forces; counter enemy propaganda; or encourage disaffection of opponent's forces and population.

Tactical PSYOP are planned and executed in assigned objective areas in direct support of Army or joint tactical operations. The execution of tactical PSYOP are the responsibility of tactical commanders and assets are task organized to facilitate success. All tactical PSYOP themes and products must support operational and strategic objectives. Typical tactical PSYOP objectives include lowering the opponents morale and combat efficiency; support deception operations; facilitate the occupation of opponent's areas by delivering ultimatums and giving rallying point locations or directions for the cessation of hostilities; support strategic PSYOP by furnishing detailed, timely information on

local vulnerabilities that may be used in strategic plans and operations; or build a favorable image of U S soldiers and leaders.

Consolidation PSYOP are conducted in areas which are newly accessible or are formerly enemy held territory. The emphasis of consolidation PSYOP is on a return to normalcy. Consolidation PSYOP often facilitates American disengagement from a conflict area or area of operation. Typical consolidation objectives may be to enlist the cooperation of the population in restoring order; reduce support for saboteurs; or promote rebuilding and reorganization of a functional system of government or national infrastructure.⁷

Title 10 United States Code established PSYOP as a special operations force.⁸ When psychological operations commanders plan and employ PSYOP forces they do so based on the implementation of twelve special operations imperatives. They are:

- Understand the operational environment: The environment in which the target audience lives is critical to the success of PSYOP. It determines the type of execution and media to be used. The design of appeal and call to action programs must make sense and be attainable. Additionally, portions of the target audience may be outside the assigned area of operations, therefore actions must be coordinated to address accessibility issues.
- Recognize Political Implications: PSYOP planners must consider the immediate, long-term, and unintended political consequences their programs may generate. The employment of special operations forces

may generate resentment or appreciation in a particular target audience. An awareness for the domestic and international political ramifications of an action can be critical to success or failure of a particular operation.

- Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility: All actions and appeals must clearly reflect official U S policy. They should also outline the economic, political and social advantages gained by cooperating with U S forces. PSYOP must present an accurate and credible picture of previous and anticipated actions.
- Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects: When one considers the attention given by the world to American military actions, a temporary tactical advantage may not justify a strategic, international, or political setback. Commanders and PSYOP planners must consider the impact of military operations on local, regional, international, and domestic audiences.
- Apply Capabilities Indirectly: Whenever possible, PSYOP commanders should use host nation intelligence, production, and dissemination to tailor actions and appeals to the target audience. This minimizes the prospects for cultural mishaps in the dissemination phase. Themes must clearly emphasize the requirement for target audience participation in the problem solving process.
- Develop Multiple Options: Use every possible dissemination means to maximize area and target audience coverage.

- Ensure Long-Term Sustainment: Planners should develop and execute campaigns and programs that reflect and facilitate the attainment of U S strategic goals. Operational and tactical operations must be synchronized and nested with national strategic themes and campaigns.
- Provide Intelligence: PSYOP units possess the ability to provide supported, higher and lower headquarters with target audience intelligence required to estimate the results of psychological and conventional operations.
- Balance Security and Synchronization: PSYOP must conduct action and appeal programs that coincide with and support the effects of other military operations. This coordination allows all units to maximize their effects on the enemy and associated target audiences.⁹

PSYOP forces offer the commander, regardless of the level or intensity of conflict in which he is engaged, a significant combat multiplier. PSYOP derive their maximum effectiveness from being a part of a total operation. They are not a substitute for combat forces. However, they may be employed when the use of combat forces is inappropriate. When properly integrated with military and political actions and objectives, PSYOP forces may make the difference between success and failure.¹⁰

INFORMATION WARFARE

Recently, a concept known as “information warfare” has become popular within the defense establishment. The concept is founded upon the idea that information and information technologies are increasingly important to national security in general and to the conduct of warfare specifically. The Army officially recognized, adopted, and institutionalized the concept in August 1996 when it published FM 100-6, Information Operations. Information Operations envision an environment in which advanced conflict will be characterized by the struggle over information systems. Information warfare involves all forms of struggle over control and dominance of information. It considers these to be essentially one effort and the techniques of information warfare are seen as aspects of the same discipline.¹¹

Those nations who master the techniques and procedures of information warfare should find themselves in a position of advantage over those nations who have not invested adequately in their information warfare capabilities. If proponents are correct, information warfare will relegate other, more traditional and conventional forms of warfare to less important roles in national defense. As the world’s preeminent information society, the United States should be able to expand its lead and capabilities to a point of relative security. If it fails to do so, it may be at a considerable disadvantage, regardless of American strengths in other military dimensions.¹²

Although there is little disagreement that information systems are becoming important in the conduct of strategic thinking, in many ways there is still confusion as to what information warfare really is and what its components are. Thomas Rona, an early advocate of information warfare developed this definition: "The strategic, operational, and tactical level competitions across the spectrum of peace, crisis, crisis escalation, conflict, war, war termination, and reconstitution/restoration, waged between competitors, adversaries or enemies using information means to achieve their objectives."¹³ Many believe this definition to be too broad for any practical use. It seems to encompass, in one form or another, all forms of human activity.

Several forms of information warfare are said to exist. They range in maturity from the historic (that information technology influences but does not determine events) to the radical (which involves questionable assumptions about the behavior of societies and organizations). Information is not in and of itself a medium of warfare, except in certain specific aspects such as electronic jamming. Information superiority may be achievable, but information supremacy (where one protagonist can keep the other from entering the information battlefield) is probably as unlikely as logistics supremacy.

However, one thing is clear. The theory that information is a tool with the power of combat weaponry is now a reality. We have entered an era where information dominance is essential to the successful conduct of military operations. Because of this, the Army, realizes it has entered an era in which winning the information war is a priority. Consequently, the information war has

become one of the Army's five long-range modernization objectives.¹⁴ For the purposes of this paper, the Department of Defense (DOD) definition is recognized. Information warfare is "actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information - based processes, information systems, and computer - based networks while defending one's own information, information - based processes, information systems and computer - based networks."¹⁵

Today's geostrategic environment is complex and will become even more so in the future. Information technology will make significant advances over the next 20 years. Developments in information technology are certain to revolutionize how nations, nongovernmental organizations and people interact. Global communications networks will grow, increase in speed and expand collective awareness by electronically linking organizations and individuals around the world. Additionally, military and civilian information networks will become increasingly intertwined and interdependent.¹⁶

FM 100-6 calls this the Global Information Environment (GIE). It defines GIE as "all individuals, organizations or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or National Command Authorities, that collect process and disseminate information to national and international audiences."¹⁷ According to doctrine all military operations take place within the GIE, which is interactive and pervasive in its presence and influence. Current multimedia technologies allow the near real time transition of any aspect of military operations to a world wide audience. Given this fact, and acknowledging that suppression or control of

information may at times be neither possible nor desirable, doctrine attempts to outline the influences and actors that shape the battlespace of the military information environment (MIE).

MIE is defined as an environment within the GIE, consisting of information systems and organizations, friendly and adversarial, military and nonmilitary that support, enable or distinctly influence a specific military operation.¹⁸ As advances in technology enable more and more independent individuals, groups and nations to be linked in the GIE, it should be expected that they will attempt to protect their interests by exerting their influence in the MIE.

When the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published FM 100-6, it established a doctrinal framework designed to enable friendly forces to control available and relevant information; protect their ability to sense, integrate, process, decide and act on that information; and attack their adversary's ability to sense, integrate, process decide and act on that same information.¹⁹ Information operations integrate all aspects of information to support and enhance combat power. The objective is to dominate the battlespace at the right time and place with the right combination of weapons or resources. FM 100-6 defines information operations as, "continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations; Information operations include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities."²⁰

Army organizations conducting information operations acquire, use, protect, manage, exploit and deny information to the enemy. These operations are executed as part of a dynamic process to support each component in a fully integrated or joint operation. Command and Control Warfare (C2W), Civil Affairs (CA), and Public Affairs (PA) are the three components used to gain information dominance. C2W is particularly important to this examination.

C2W is the joint application of information warfare in military operations. Its aim is to influence, deny information to, degrade or destroy the enemy's command and control capacity while protecting friendly command and control against such actions. It is conducted by integrating the effects of psychological operations, electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC) and physical destruction. The integration of these elements improves the targeting process by combining their synergistic effect with the combat power of traditional attack directed against the enemy's decision cycle, gaining control of his cycle and generating information dominance.²¹

In the conduct of C2W and therefore information operations, psychological operations are based on the projection of truth and a credible message. PSYOP are an essential element of C2-protect and C2-attack operations. The Army has demonstrated considerable strength and enjoyed success in the conduct of PSYOP. One example of this success came during the course of the Gulf War. The combined operations of the allied coalition physically and psychologically isolated a large element of Iraqi forces on Faylaka Island. Rather than conduct a direct assault, a tactical PSYOP team from the 9th PSYOP Battalion flew aerial

loudspeaker missions around the island. The message told the enemy below to surrender the next day at the radio tower. The next day 1,405 Iraqis, including a general officer, were in formation at the radio tower, waiting to surrender to Marine forces without a single shot having been fired.²²

The main objective of PSYOP in C2W is to minimize the effects of the enemy's hostile propaganda and disinformation campaign against U S forces and interests. Demonstrating the inaccuracy of enemy propaganda or disinformation directed against operations conducted by U S or coalition forces is essential to maintaining positive public opinion domestically and internationally. Additionally, PSYOP can discretely disseminate messages to enemy C4I collectors, enhance combat power with surrender appeals, and increase the image of U S technological superiority in order to increase enemy apprehensions and misperceptions.

Information warfare can also be executed by using PSYOP against the every day task of deceiving the enemy's bureaucracies, diplomats and spies concerning friendly intentions and capabilities. These type of operations involve all levels of government including agencies inside and outside the defense department. By using advanced information technology, one can accentuate or enhance operational deception. Institutions such as network news organizations and technologies such as near real time satellite communications ease the dissemination of deception. A nation's preparation for war can either be highlighted in order to convey a posture of strength and readiness or minimized to create a calming effect. Historically, such activity has been commonplace.

However, it hasn't been labeled warfare, rather it has been viewed as the normal conduct of statecraft.²³ In information operations these type of actions must be viewed as part of the overall PSYOP effort and consequently should be organized and orchestrated accordingly.

Information warfare is not new. In its simplest form it consists of activities that gain information and knowledge and improve friendly execution of operations while denying an adversary similar opportunities or capabilities by whatever means available. The Information Age and its new technology will offer the nation, and specifically the Army, opportunities as well as significant challenges. Information warfare can enhance the Army's ability to achieve situation dominance. If we seize the opportunity to exploit the new technologies associated with information operations, the effects will produce significant military advantage for the forces conducting those operations.²⁴

CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FORCE STRUCTURE and PROCEDURES

An organization should be constituted so that it is capable of effectively carrying out its assigned functions. In order to properly assess the appropriateness and capability of the psychological operations force and its methodological procedures in the conduct of information warfare, we must first examine the current force structure. In relation to psychological operations, an institutionalized structure is essential for the effective implementation of psychological programs. There must be a definite organizational structure with distinct lines of authority and responsibility for the development and implementation of policy, plans, and operations. Whether strategic, operational or tactical in scope, the PSYOP mission requires staff and personnel capable of developing and implementing policy, developing and executing plans, collecting intelligence, evaluating programs, and conducting operations.²⁵

Planning

Psychological operations are planned and programmed to use communication media and other actions to influence emotion, attitudes, and behaviors of selected target audiences. Planning is critical to successful PSYOP. Random and isolated actions will not produce consistent and lasting results. Planning must be integrated at all levels, from the strategic and national

plan to the PSYOP annex for tactical operations at the battalion level. Without an effective and comprehensive plan, coordinated at all levels, PSYOP cannot succeed.

PSYOP plans are designed to integrate all available assets (Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense), and concentrate them on significant objectives and target audiences based military, political or economic operations. Generally PSYOP plans consist of (1) concept of operations, (2) definition of target groups, (3) clear definition of objectives, (4) general thematic guidance for each objective, (5) injunctions or prohibitions in respect to themes, (6) time lines or schedules to ensure phased and fully synchronized multimedia operations, and (7) definitive instructions for PSYOP units and assets.²⁶

Currently in the U S government, there is no central planning agency with proponency for psychological operations. The United States Information Agency (USIA) issues general program guidance to its services. In turn, the United States Information Service develops country plans tailored for each specific country and approved by the Ambassador. The Department of Defense (DOD) develops PSYOP plans to support military contingency operations and when directed by the President, supports USIA plans overseas.²⁷ DOD informally coordinates with the Department of State (DOS), USIA, and other appropriate governmental agencies.

Army PSYOP mission planning focuses on how to provide the most effective support to the supported unit regardless of the level of conflict. PSYOP commanders and coordinators conduct time-sensitive deliberate planning and

targeting. Their missions are products of the joint strategic planning process and therefore, must reflect current national security policy and strategy.²⁸

PSYOP planning has three essential stages; assess the situation to weigh the use of PSYOP, develop PSYOP plans, and execute and monitoring approved PSYOP plans.²⁹

During the assessment phase, PSYOP planners must identify foreign groups that can affect the achievement of U S goals and objectives or a commander's mission. Planners evaluate the attitudes and behavior of each target audience and determine the desired behavior of that group. Additionally, they assess the target audience's susceptibility to U S PSYOP actions. Finally, planners assess U S capabilities to execute specific PSYOP actions and present courses of action to decision makers.

In the plans development stage, planners further analyze and develop the assessments made during the previous stage. Themes and messages are developed and tested and means of dissemination are selected.

The execution and monitoring stage ensures that PSYOP actions are on time and products are distributed on schedule. Actions are evaluated and assessed for overall results and refinements are made based on the consequent data.³⁰

Unless commanders and planners at all levels are cognizant of the breadth and scope of PSYOP planning, the probability of success in information warfare is significantly lessened. PSYOP planning must begin early, it must be

fully synchronized with national goals and policy objectives, and it must continue throughout the duration of the operation.

Force Structure

The current organization of a PSYOP group was developed based on lessons learned from operations Just Cause, Promote Liberty, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort.³¹ The Army's only active PSYOP capability is found in the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It plans and executes authorized PSYOP activities on a worldwide basis in support of all non-mobilization contingencies and open hostilities short of declared war. It also develops, coordinates, and conducts peacetime PSYOP activities. During declared war, the 4th Group assists in the planning and execution of strategic and operational PSYOP for the unified commands.³²

The 4th Group's mission statement is, "to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice, and plan, develop, and conduct Psychological Operations in support of the Unified Commanders, coalition forces, or other government agencies, as directed by the National Command Authorities. They can be conducted at strategic, operational, and tactical levels."³³ Components of the 4th POG mission are:

- Rapidly deploy assigned forces to support Army conventional or special operations forces and USMC maneuver units.

- Develop campaign plans and integrate them with operational plans or theater peacetime PSYOP programs.

- Conceive and produce PSYOP media products, including: aerial delivered leaflets, posters, handbills, audio-visual products, video tapes, AM/FM radio broadcasts, and tactical loudspeaker appeals.

- Conduct operational PSYOP campaigns: establish a joint PSYOP headquarters, direct and employ all multi-service PSYOP assets, and conduct liaison with sister service components, U S government agencies or host nation officials to effect product dissemination.

- In concert with ground operations, conduct tactical PSYOP.

- Provide linguists and cultural expertise to assist commanders in executing PSYOP missions.

- As directed by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), prepare PSYOP intelligence assessments and studies for DOD and other U S government agencies.

The 4th POG is organized as an asset of the United States Special Operations Command. CINCSOC exercises Combatant Command authority through United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). When regional CINCs require PSYOP forces, they must request them from CINCSOC through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). USASOC is an Army Major Command (MACOM) with direct links to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) for service responsibilities involving PSYOP forces. However, 4th POG

is primarily funded by the special operations budget (MFP-11 funds), rather than the budget (MFP-2 funds) used by conventional Army units.

The 4th POG consists of six subordinate units. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), performs the functions of any typical Army HHC. The PSYOP Distribution Battalion (PDB) has four subordinate companies and does the actual production of products in support of the other battalions in the Group. Three regional battalions, which are oriented towards areas of the world divided along CINC boundaries. The final unit is the tactical battalion which executes all tactical dissemination and loudspeaker operations.

The PDB is a functionally oriented battalion that is responsible for all organic print, radio & television broadcast, audio-visual production and communication capabilities. Typically, regional battalions attempt to secure host nation support agreements for product production however, PDB personnel can print on foreign presses and broadcast from local stations if contractual agreements are not possible. Products can be produced at Fort Bragg and shipped to deployed units or the battalion is capable of deploying its organic facilities in country. When fully deployed the PDB has the capacity to generate over 1 million 3" x 6" black and white leaflets every 24 hours.³⁴

Regional PSYOP is conducted at the strategic or operational level of conflict and operates under the staff proponency of the Theater/JTF J3 or typically the Military Group in an embassy. Regional PSYOP for the Unified Commands is divided among the three regional battalions in the 4th POG. The 1st PSYOP Battalion supports Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The 6th

PSYOP Battalion supports European Command (EUCOM) in Africa and in Europe. Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) are supported by the 8th PSYOP Battalion. These battalions are also called upon to support theater Unified and Specified Commands or JTFs, including conventional and special operations forces. Each regional battalion divides its geographic area of responsibility by company. Within the companies, responsibilities are further divided between Propaganda Development Centers (PDCs) at the Operational Detachment level.

It is the responsibility of the regional PSYOP battalions to develop and execute the PSYOP campaign plan. Additionally, when directed by the POG commander, they provide regionally specific support to the Joint PSYOP Task Force Commander.

The 9th PSYOP battalion is the only active tactical PSYOP battalion in the U S Army. It is capable of providing "face-to-face" tactical support for maneuver units. Within a theater, tactical support is rendered by a Corps PSYOP Support Element (CPSE), Division PSYOP Support Element (DPSE), Brigade PSYOP Support Element (BPSE) or a Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT). These elements give the tactical commander the capability to communicate directly with the enemy or foreign civilians using a variety of means. Tactical PSYOP units do not develop products or campaigns however, they are responsible to disseminate products developed by the regional battalions.

The PSYOP support elements, from brigade through corps, are responsible to exercise staff supervision over subordinate elements and TPTs.

They augment the supported unit's operations section and function as the primary PSYOP advisor to the commander and the operations officer. The primary task of the PSYOP support element is to ensure that PSYOP are integrated into the plan and fully synchronized with the entire operation. In order to achieve this level of integration, it is important that support elements are actively involved in the mission analysis, course of action development, war-gaming, and operations order development. The support elements are responsible for writing the PSYOP annex to all orders and executing all appropriate staff coordination commensurate with the level of command they are supporting.

The 4th POG is capable of providing a full range of PSYOP support including propaganda/product development, media production, strategic, operational, and tactical information dissemination. The Group has the technical expertise to assist USAF activities in plotting the dispersion patterns for aerial-delivered leaflets. Organic media assets range from light to heavy print production, radio broadcast stations, audio production, audio-visual production and distribution, and tactical loudspeaker dissemination.

Doctrinally, when PSYOP units are employed during contingency operations, the senior PSYOP headquarters is OPCON to the CINC/JTF Commander with staff proponentcy in the J3. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan charges 4th POG with providing the CINC/JTF Commander a PSYOP campaign plan.³⁵ The 9th PSYOP Battalion normally provides attached PSYOP

elements to maneuver units in order to execute face-to-face dissemination of tactical elements of the campaign plan.

The requirements for successful and effective psychological operations are considerable. Persuasive communication in the information age can not be haphazard or sporadic. It must be a well-coordinated and sustained effort at all levels of engagement. Effective communication of a refined and succinct message requires a thorough knowledge and expertise in a variety of psychological, sociological and cultural factors.³⁶ U S Army PSYOP forces, found in the 4th POG, are structured and trained with the intent of executing the mission of delivering that information age message.

CASE STUDY:
OPERATION DESERT STORM

In order to examine the effectiveness of PSYOP methodology, procedure, force structure and capability it is necessary to examine a case study that offered PSYOP forces the opportunity to fully exercise those functions. Operation Desert Shield/Storm offers the best opportunity to study the full range of PSYOP activities and forces operating in a high intensity environment in support of a major regional contingency.

Understanding the role of psychological operations in Operation Desert Shield/Storm requires an examination of the role and activities of PSYOP forces across the operational continuum. With regard to information warfare, a new force, the international media, became an important factor in the conduct of the war. Various news organization from around the world, and in particular the Cable News Network (CNN), demonstrated the power of information warfare by broadcasting in near real time events occurring throughout the theater of operation. The reporting of timely and factual information had significant implications on planning, formulation and execution of coalition and Iraqi PSYOP. Both sides attempted to exploit their capabilities on the information battlefield by conducting extensive PSYOP campaigns.

The Iraqi propaganda system, modeled after the Soviet system, was similar to that of many other totalitarian states. It attempted to capitalize on the use of religious words, phrases and symbols.³⁷

The Iraqis used the following four objectives for their PSYOP campaign:

- Rationalize their invasion of Kuwait.
- Gain support of Arab masses.
- Discourage nations from participating in the United Nations embargo.
- Discourage or hinder military attacks on Iraq.

The four themes generated for these objectives are:

- The revolutionary forces in Kuwait had asked for Iraqi help.
- Iraq is the champion of oppressed Arabs.
- The West is depriving the Iraqi people of food and medicine.
- Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait after a short time (later changed to

explain the annexation of Kuwait as a permanent province of Iraq).³⁸

The Iraqi PSYOP effort achieved varying results. In addition to the objectives and themes stated above, the threat of chemical weapons and the use of Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia also proved to be very effective psychological weapons. They were an attempt to divide the nations participating in the coalition, weaken the United Nations resolve and rally the Arab masses behind Iraq. The attacks served to divert coalition assets toward Scud hunting and strained coalition unity.

However, a lack of truthfulness proved fatal to Iraqi credibility. Mistakes such as the unsophisticated use of signs and workers jackets printed in English at the alleged site of a bombed milk factory, quickly convinced target audiences that Saddam's information campaign could not be trusted. As a result, neither

international public opinion nor the world media were moved to support Iraqi actions.

Conversely, coalition PSYOP efforts were very successful. Like expert planning, superior technology, overwhelming firepower and logistics PSYOP efforts played a significant part in the victory. PSYOP contributed to the successful coalition operation by encouraging solidarity, reducing enemy combat power and deceiving the enemy about allied intentions. Before Operation Desert Shield, during combat operations, and in the aftermath, approximately 650 soldiers from the 4th Psychological Operations Group and from various reserve PSYOP units contributed to the coalition PSYOP effort.³⁹

The PSYOP task force included a strategic PSYOP battalion, the PDB, the 6th and the 9th PSYOP Battalions augmented by loudspeaker teams from the 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th, and 362nd reserve Tactical PSYOP Companies. Other elements included liaison officers supporting component commands as well as VII and XVIII Corps (including French and British forces), the 13th PSYOP Battalion (EPW), and elements supporting U S special operations forces and USMC units.⁴⁰

Months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, soldiers from the 4th POG were in the region, working for U S defense attaches in Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Yemen, Djibouti, and Pakistan.⁴¹ The cultural and linguistic experience these soldiers gained before the war proved invaluable during the execution of the PSYOP campaign.

The PSYOP task force supporting the Commander in Chief of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) had a three phase mission: Phase I demonstrated U S resolve, consolidated support, dissuaded regional Iraqi support, deterred hostilities, and promoted combined and multinational interoperability. Phase II reinforced the U S and coalition defensive efforts and persuaded Iraq to cease hostilities. Phase III supported offensive operations and promoted and maintained local, regional and international support for the coalition efforts.⁴²

Commander in Chief USCENTCOM approved the following task force objectives:

- Gain acceptance and support for U S operations.
- Intimidate Iraqi forces.
- Encourage Iraqi dissension, alienation, malingering, loss of confidence, resistance, desertion and defection.
- Create doubt and division among the Iraqi leadership.
- Strengthen the confidence and determination of friendly states to resist aggression.
- Project the U S as a credible deterrent and a capable force.⁴³

Initial planning was directed toward easily coordinated and obtainable PSYOP dissemination methods and techniques. The PSYOP Task Force received guidance from three levels: The strategic level (the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the National Security Council, and the interagency Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee), the operational level (senior commanders

including General Schwarzkopf), and the tactical level (ground combat commanders).⁴⁴

Although the theater PSYOP plan was approved by CINC USCENTCOM, the interagency approval process, mandated by DOD directive, was slow, and execution authority did not come until December.⁴⁵ Months of potential PSYOP preparation of the battlefield were lost because of delays in the approval process.⁴⁶ Ironically, if the Saudis did not request U S support to encourage Iraqi desertion and defection, PSYOP might not have been allowed to play an active part in the operation at all.

Operational success in the Gulf war resulted from effective innovation in the field and from properly executed, time-sensitive planning at the operational and tactical levels. Coalition PSYOP efforts concentrated at the tactical level. They had a significant affect on Iraqi soldiers. Tactical PSYOP was effective in terms of four principal sets of operations:

- radio transmissions
- loudspeaker broadcasts
- leaflet dissemination
- enemy prisoners of war team actions

These four sets of operations began on an overt basis on 12 January 1991, five days before the start of the air war phase of Operation Desert Storm. Leaflet and radio activities were initiated in January and terminated in March and May respectively. The loudspeaker and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) actions began in February with the ground campaign and ended in March and April.⁴⁷

During this time period, the four operations focused on the intended Iraqi target audience in concert with effective air and ground campaigns. The result of this combined PSYOP, air, and ground attack was an unexpectedly large number of Iraqi prisoners. During the war 29 million leaflets were dropped in theater, radio transmissions were conducted for 17 hours each day, and aerial broadcasts were conducted for 19.5 hours per day. More than 73,000 Iraqis were reached through PSYOP and 70% of all EPWs reported PSYOP messages had some impact on their surrender.⁴⁸

Radio Transmissions

Throughout the war, six broadcast platforms were used. Three were Volant Solo using EC-130 aircraft and three were ground radio stations. The three radio stations were "Voice of the Gulf," "Voice of America," and "free Kuwaiti People." These stations were run almost exclusively by USCENTCOM as a part of the theater operational plan.

Programs were made of pre-recorded messages broadcast almost continuously each day. The broadcasts conveyed such themes as the inevitability of defeat, the illegitimacy of Saddam's leadership, and surrender appeals. In terms of audience exposure, the relative effectiveness of the radio transmissions, was approximately 58 percent (no transmission equals zero percent). The degree of persuasiveness was estimated at 46 percent. Impact on soldiers surrendering reached about 34 percent.⁴⁹ These results are

moderate. This may be because of oral traditions and the auditory nature of the society of the target audience.

Leaflet Drops

Unlike radio broadcasts, leaflet and other forms of print PSYOP proved especially effective. Out of a target audience of 300,000 Iraqi troops, approximately 98 percent read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in the theater. An estimated 88 percent of Iraqi forces were influenced as intended, by the leaflet drops. Over 77 percent of all prisoners were convinced to surrender through the combination of leaflet operations and tactical combat actions.⁵⁰

Leaflets were initially disseminated prior to combat operations by C-130 aircraft; they were dropped from high altitude along the southern Kuwaiti border and followed prevailing wind patterns in order to cover front line enemy units. Once the air campaign began, they were distributed against deeper targets by F-16 and B-52 aircraft using the M-129A1 leaflet bomb.⁵¹ Leaflets were used to support both combat and deception operations.

The language used in the leaflets was simple and direct. They were visually oriented in order to appeal to an audience that seemed to respond positively to a visual message. However, it is unclear whether success came as a result of psychological reasons or as a result of the volume of leaflets dropped.

Despite Arab assistance in the design and approval process, some leaflets lost their affect because of cultural obstacles. When an Iraqi saw words in the familiar thought bubble of Western comic strips, he became confused. Iraqi culture does not think in bubbles and did not link them to words and pictures. This technique had been so internalized by the designers of the leaflets that they didn't envision other cultures not understanding the use of bubbles to indicate words or thoughts.

Loudspeaker Broadcasts

Loudspeakers were used extensively during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Typically, they supported specific corps and division level tactical operations. Loudspeaker operations focused on communicating directly with the enemy and reinforcing leaflet and broadcast messages of futility and surrender.⁵² During deception operations they were used to simulate the movement of heavy combat equipment and combat units in an effort to get enemy artillery positions to fire and expose themselves to counter-battery fire and TAC air.

Typically, loudspeaker operations were executed by two or three man teams in direct support of forward combat brigades. Teams consisted of a Kuwaiti or Saudi linguist and two noncommissioned officers and a communications specialist.

In terms of audience exposure, persuasiveness and impact on surrender, loudspeaker broadcasts generally produced moderate effectiveness. The

success rate of loudspeakers was found to be very similar to those of radio transmissions.⁵³ Of the EPWs post-tested, 34 percent were exposed to loudspeaker operations, 18 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 16 percent stated that loudspeaker appeals were a factor in their surrender or defection.⁵⁴ This fact seems to demonstrate that loudspeaker operations are not obsolete and still have a role in heavy combat operations.

Based on these results, PSYOP during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm were among the most successful PSYOP campaigns ever executed by the United States. PSYOP were incorporated into air and ground operations from the beginning and when combined with the effects of coalition firepower, they proved highly effective. During Desert Storm, coalition PSYOP proved its value at the operational level and reaffirmed the importance of credibility. Coalition determination to portray only truthful overt PSYOP, coupled with the overwhelming threat of imminent military destruction, successfully induced thousands of early surrenders. Accordingly, casualties were reduced on both sides.

PSYOPS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

In order to achieve success in information operations the Army must adapt its efforts directly to the threat. We must learn to fight smart in the information environment. There is no smarter way to fight than through the aggressive application of psychological operations across the operational continuum. In Operation Other Than War, PSYOP can provide the commander with the edge he needs to successfully execute his mission.

With respect to the operational continuum, PSYOP forces are actively engaged in peacetime and conflict. Peacetime is a nonhostile state during which political, economic, psychological, and military measures are used to reach national goals. Operations in this environment do not always involve combat troops. Typical peacetime operations include, but are not limited to, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping. Peacetime PSYOP objectives may include such things as keeping foreign groups and countries from starting hostilities against the United States, or projecting a favorable image of the United States internationally.

Conflict entails all aspects of national security: diplomatic, military, economic, and informational. Conflict is characterized by terrorism and counterterrorism and insurgency and counterinsurgency (all phases). Although combat power is a significant factor in conflict, noncombat activities can be as decisive in conflict as combat operations are in war. Failure to achieve noncombat objectives can mean defeat in conflict. In conflict all military,

psychological, economic and social activities are effective only so far as they support the overall political goal. PSYOP serve as a weapons system in conflict by:⁵⁵

- Building and sustaining support for U S or allied political systems.
- Attacking the legitimacy and credibility of a competitor's political system.
- Mobilizing popular support for economic, political or social programs consistent with U S goals.

- Shifting the loyalty of hostile forces and their supporters to a friendly power.

In conflicts short of war, the commitment of general purpose forces may be inappropriate or not feasible. In circumstances such as these, PSYOP forces offer the National Command Authority (NCA) options for engagement that would otherwise be unavailable. During Operation Just Cause, prior to the commitment of general purpose forces, PSYOP planners designed and executed consolidation programs to encourage popular Panamanian support for U S national goals. Additionally, PSYOP teams successfully supported foreign internal defense (FID) missions designed to strengthen the capabilities of U S allies around the region. During the consolidation phase of the operation, PSYOP teams played a critical role in the legitimization of the new government and the return to normalcy.

As a subset of information operations, PSYOP offers a nonlethal resolution mechanism in OOTW. It is here that the U S can attack an adversary through the employment of a military information support team (MIST). MISTs

give ambassadors and JTF commanders an effective methodology to engage selected audiences. In an OOTW environment PSYOP is a significant force multiplier that gives leaders powerful resources to achieve desired results.

An effective MIST works with many organizations on a complex array of activities, including campaign development, product management, establishing a network of contacts, and familiarization with local protocols. In Haiti, well prior to the initiation of Operation Uphold Democracy, JTF Haiti included a PSYOP MIST which proved highly successful. Haiti offered an ideal environment for PSYOP employment. Literacy is low, and Haitian society relies on word-of-mouth communication. Official news broadcasts and publications are viewed with suspicion. Rumors are the preferred source of information, and their credibility is judged by how well the listener knows the person repeating them. The MIST developed and executed an information campaign directed toward three audiences. To the Haitian military, it communicated the benefits of professionalization. To the police, it communicated the desirability of separation from the army. And to the population at large, it communicated confidence in the democratic process.⁵⁶

Some difficulties arose in the execution of the information campaign when the country team and later the Office of the Secretary of Defense expressed concern that PSYOP could be perceived badly by the international community. They feared that PSYOP would be misconstrued as American "propaganda." These concerns were alleviated by changing the name of the MIST to public-awareness liaison (PAL). Regardless of the name, it is clear that agencies

within the DOD, DOS and external to the government do not fully understand the nature and mission of PSYOP forces.

The execution of PSYOP in an OOTW environment may require the MIST to educate agencies and officials concerning the nature of PSYOP. The most viable way to avoid these difficulties is to coordinate and incorporate PSYOP goals and objectives with three sources: the country team, the supported theater unified commands and the regionally oriented PSYOP battalion. In this manner the MIST can find common ground between multiple information goals and long term OOTW host nation and U S political objectives.

A military information program's essence is commitment to the concept that information is an "instrument of power." During Operation Uphold Democracy, PSYOP units used MISTs, tactical PSYOP and staff augmentation to ensure that the military information program was properly executed. Early integration of PSYOP at all levels of command enhanced PSYOP's operational use and success. Each PSYOP Campaign Objective (PCO), was derived from the supported unit's mission and objectives. Commander's understood the role that PSYOP would play in the operation and used PSYOP accordingly. Because the JTF commander understood and supported the information program, PSYOP planners and operators were given wide latitude and flexibility in execution.

In Bosnia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), experienced a first when it deployed a multinational PSYOP force based on the lessons and principles learned by the U S Army in Just Cause and Uphold Democracy. Evidence of the success of the information campaign in Bosnia was the degree

of compliance achieved with the various requirements of the General Framework Agreement. As in Haiti, messages were structured to support the unit mission and were disseminated through the use of tactical PSYOP and MISTs. Routine intelligence reports from a variety of sources also confirmed the success of the information campaign.⁵⁷ These successes demonstrate the validity of the techniques and procedures developed to execute PSYOP in an OOTW environment.

When PSYOP assets are used effectively, they possess the ability to generate information synergy. MISTs are uniquely structured to incorporate and enhance interagency activities critical to success. When a host nation and country team believe in and support military information activities, PSYOP forces can cover the battlefield with truthful information that will advance both U S and host nation political objectives that ultimately bring victory in OOTW.

CONCLUSION

The clear strategic, operational and tactical success of psychological operations in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and in recent OOTW like Operation Uphold Democracy, demonstrate the viability of PSYOP forces in the conduct of information warfare. It is evident that PSYOP forces offer immeasurable potential and varying options to the NCA and operational commanders. They have repeatedly proven their expertise and unique skills. However, it is equally clear that there is room for improvement in the methodology used to execute PSYOP in information warfare.

This examination demonstrates that in order to improve PSYOP methodology, procedures, and force capability in information operations two broad areas must be addressed:

- education of senior civilian and military leaders on the value of psychological operations in the informational dimension
- planning for the use of psychological operations in a dynamic information environment

As a result of the Gulf War, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor the Army's civilian and military leadership have begun to realize the benefits of a strong PSYOP capability. Renewed efforts must be made to indoctrinate non-DOD agencies on psychological operations. In OOTW, country teams play a critical role in the conduct of information operations. If they are not familiar with the roles of PSYOP forces, a loss of effectiveness will result.

Among the Army as a whole the level of education and understanding concerning PSYOP must increase. High level emphasis, continuously applied, will be necessary to remedy the long-standing absence of PSYOP instruction in military education. PSYOP should be integrated into computer assisted combat simulations. Institutionalization of military PSYOP will occur when commanders are convinced that it is indispensable to combat effectiveness on the information battlefield.

The experience gained in the Gulf War and in Haiti clearly demonstrates the need to integrate PSYOP into the planning process as early as possible. As joint and unified commanders identify their priorities for contingency planning, the PSYOP community must be alert to offer their services early on. Existing regional analytical studies may require revision in order to provide the foundation for detailed PSYOP planning. Supporting PSYOP plans must anticipate the changing requirements of information warfare in contingency plans involving unified commands and their assigned forces.

In order to facilitate planning and coordination, the role of DOD in the overall U S government's international information program must be clarified. Official policy should outline a role in which the DOS and USIA view DOD and military PSYOP as an active partner in the international information arena. Additionally, the DOD should establish a policy that affixes roles and responsibilities for international information activities among PSYOP, public affairs, and public diplomacy. We must institutionalize a level of interaction that

will allow us to overcome the planning deficiencies and delays that hampered the start of psychological operations in Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

The United States is at the forefront of the information age and information warfare. Psychological operations are, and must remain, a critical element of information operations. The lessons learned from these operations correctly point out that PSYOP is an effective weapon system in information warfare. Additionally, it must precede, accompany, and follow all military operations while being coordinated with all agencies of government and be systematically integrated with U S national security policy and objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict. The operations outlined demonstrate that, with the exception of two adjustments (better civilian and military education and improved planning), current psychological operations philosophy, methodology, procedure, force structure and force capability are appropriate for the conduct of information warfare in future operations.

¹ Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1996), 5.

² *Ibid.*, 7.

³ Phillip P. Katz, Ronald D. Mclaurin and Preston S. Abbot, "A Critical Analysis of U S PSYOP," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1996), 126.

⁴ Goldstein, *Psychological Operations*, 7.

⁵ Department of the Army, *FM 33-1-1 Psychological Operations: Techniques and Procedures* (Washington DC, 1994), 2-3.

⁶ Goldstein, *Psychological Operations*, 10.

⁷ Department of the Army, *FM 33-1-1*, 2-3.

⁸ Department of the Army, *FM 33-1 Psychological Operations* (Washington DC, 1993), 3-10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

¹¹ Martin C. Libicki, *What Is Information Warfare?* (The Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology, 1995), National Defense University, ix.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Libicki, *Information Warfare*, 4.

¹⁴ Michael D. Starry and Charles W. Arneson Jr., "FM 100-6: Information Operations," *Military Review* 6 (November-December 1996): 11.

¹⁵ Department of the Army, *FM 100-6 Information Operations* (Washington DC, 1996), 2-2.

¹⁶ Starry and Arneson, *Information Operations*.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, *FM 100-6 Information Operations*, 1-2.

¹⁸ Starry and Arneson, *Information Operations*, 12.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Department of the Army, *FM 100-6 Information Operations*, 2-3.

²¹ Starry and Arneson, *Information Operations*, 13.

²² Department of the Army, *FM 100-6 Information Operations*, 1-13.

²³ Libiki, *Information Warfare*, 44.

²⁴ Starry and Arneson, *Information Operations*, 17.

²⁵ Philip P. Katz, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Preston S. Abbott, *A Critical Analysis of U S PSYOP*, in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1996), 125.

²⁶ Ibid., 127.

²⁷ Ibid., 131.

²⁸ Department of the Army, *FM 33-1 Psychological Operations*, 7-1.

²⁹ Ibid., 7-14

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 4-1.

³² Ibid., 4-1.

³³ Print Company, PSYOP Distribution Battalion (Airborne), 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), *4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) Capabilities Handbook* (Fort Bragg: PSYOP Distribution Battalion, 1993), 2. The majority of the information outlined or presented in this section was taken directly from this PDB work.

³⁴ Ibid., 24.

³⁵ Ibid., 5.

³⁶ Katz, McLaurin, and Abbott, *A Critical Analysis*, 144.

³⁷ Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, ed., *PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1996), 341.

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- ³⁸ Ibid., 342.
- ³⁹ Jeffery B. Jones, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom." *Special Warfare* 7 (July 1994): 22.
- ⁴⁰ Jack N. Summe, "PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm," *Special Warfare* 5 (October 1992): 6.
- ⁴¹ Jones, "PSYOP in Desert Shield," 22.
- ⁴² Ibid., 23
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 24.
- ⁴⁵ Bryan N. Karabaich, *Psychological Operations During Desert Shield/Storm: A Post-Operational Analysis* (Fort Bragg: United States Special Operations Command, 1993), 2-5
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 2-9.
- ⁴⁷ Golstein, "PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm." 350.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid.
- ⁴⁹ Karabaich, "Psychological Operations."
- ⁵⁰ Golstein, "PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm." 353.
- ⁵¹ Summe, "PSYOP Support." 7.
- ⁵² Ibid., 8.
- ⁵³ Goldstein, "PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm." 351.
- ⁵⁴ Summe, "PSYOP Support." 8.
- ⁵⁵ Department of the Army, *FM 33-1 Psychological Operations*,
- ⁵⁶ Toyna H. Wakefield, JTF Haiti: Lasting Impressions, "Special Warfare 3 (July 1994): 7.
- ⁵⁷ D. J. Stone, Out of the Shadows: The Re-emergence of the United Kingdom's Military Psychological Operations Capability Since 1945, "The British Army Review" 114 (June 1996): 10.

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