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
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
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# **FOREWORD**

istorically, psychological operations (PSYOP) have played a key role in military campaigns. Today, PSYOP are considered an integral part of US joint military operations. As such, PSYOP are a responsibility of all US military commanders. Modern PSYOP are enhanced by our ability to communicate massive amounts of information to target audiences with the intent of influencing their attitudes, emotions, objective reasoning powers, decision-making processes, and behavior. Examples of PSYOP include: promises, threats of force or retaliation, conditions of surrender, safe passage for deserters, or support to resistance groups. Successful and effective PSYOP depend on several factors such as: the intended message we are trying to convey; the message form and format; the degree of integration with other efforts; cultural differences; probability of reception; timely action; and the target audience's perception of our credibility and capability to carry out promises or threatened action.



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# INTRODUCTION

Who Says What In Which Channel To Whom With What Effect

Harold D. Lasswell

### **PURPOSE**

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5.5 provides Air Force doctrine for psychological operations (PSYOP) and supports basic air and space doctrine. It replaces Air Force PSYOP doctrine outlined in Air Force Manual (AFM) 2-5, chapter 6, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-702.

# **APPLICATION**

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. This doctrine is authoritative but not directive; commanders are encouraged to exercise judgment in applying this doctrine to accomplish their missions.

# **SCOPE**

This document discusses PSYOP organizations, command and control relationships, air campaign planning, and support considerations. It also covers how USAF air and space assets can support and conduct joint PSYOP across the range of military operations.

# **JOINT DOCTRINE**

This document is consistent with and complements Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; Joint Pub 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01, Joint Information Warfare Policy; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U); Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Annex D); and the War Mobilization Plan (Annex DD); but its purpose is to promulgate the Air Force perspective on psychological operations. As such, it focuses on how Air Force assets can be organized, trained, equipped, and operated to conduct and support joint PSYOP.

# CHAPTER ONE GENERAL

### BASIS

A 1983 National Security Decision Directive required the revitalization of US military PSYOP capability and directed the development of a PSYOP Master Plan. The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan required the Armed Forces to develop both joint and Service PSYOP doctrine. The updated 1990 PSYOP Master Plan directs each Service to evaluate and, if necessary, amend its PSYOP doctrine to ensure it supports and is compatible with joint PSYOP doctrine. In 1993, the Joint Staff published Joint Pub 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, which requires each Service to develop PSYOP doctrine for assigned primary functions.

# **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)


USAF PSYOP forces support the attainment of United States (US) national and military objectives through planned operations designed to convey selected information to targeted audiences. PSYOP are systematically employed to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to US objectives. While certain USAF assets are assigned primary PSYOP responsibilities, almost all air and space assets have the inherent capability to support PSYOP. Because PSYOP are an integral part of US military operations, USAF forces must be prepared to support joint PSYOP objectives across the range of military operations.

# **PSYOP APPROVAL PROCESS**

There are strict guidelines that must be met before PSYOP can be initiated. Policy approval authority for peacetime PSYOP rests with the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and is delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. During war, this approval may be delegated to the warfighters; i.e., theater commanders in chief (CINC) and joint task force (JTF) commanders.

#### BENEFITS OF USAF PSYOP

One aim of the joint force commander (JFC) is to conduct asymmetrical operations; that is, to employ friendly strength against the enemy's weaknesses. By effectively employing PSYOP, the JFC creates, exposes, and exploits weak "seams" in the enemy's operations. Effective PSYOP integrated into the joint campaign can create uncertainty and ambiguity, thereby lowering the adversary's morale and fighting efficiency. Properly targeted PSYOP can turn the opinions and activities of foreign groups away from the cause of their leaders and military and encourage disaffection among dissident elements within the adversary military and civilian populace. Properly integrated, PSYOP can magnify the effects of friendly operations and degrade the enemy's ability to conduct operations.



# PSYOP RELATIONSHIP TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

Information plays a vital role in warfare. Commanders realize it is essential to protect the flow of friendly information, while at the same time influencing the thoughts, emotions, and objective reasoning of the enemy. IO strategy includes lethal and nonlethal means to allow friendly air and space forces to operate more quickly and effectively than the adversary. An objective of IO is to inhibit opposing forces' ability to correctly assess and respond to situations, while enhancing friendly forces' capability to do the same. IO techniques interfere with the enemy's decision cycle—the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop. Commanders shape operations by controlling adversary views of the environment through effective IO. Well-integrated IO can result in information dominance, maximize combat power, and deter hostilities. PSYOP is one of several military actions which can support IO goals. Used independently, PSYOP may have a measurable effect on the adversary. However, military effectiveness is maximized when PSYOP is properly integrated and orchestrated with other IO concepts and principles in joint or multinational operations.

# CHAPTER TWO

# USAF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

# **GENERAL**

PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities. USAF PSYOP are rarely conducted independently of joint PSYOP; as such, these operations are guided by certain enduring joint principles and objectives. This chapter provides the framework which guides USAF participation in joint PSYOP.

### CATEGORIES OF PSYOP

As an integral part of US military response options, PSYOP are effective at all levels of warfare. USAF air and space assets can support PSYOP activities across the range of military operations. Just as it is important to understand the differences between the PSYOP categories (strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation), it is also important to understand that they may overlap. As an example, once tactical leaflets get picked up and are broadcast by a media source, they may take on a strategic significance.

#### Strategic

Strategic PSYOP are conducted on a global or regional basis in support of national military strategy. PSYOP may take many forms, to include diplomatic positions, announcements, or communiqués. Also, threatened or actual US military presence provides a powerful psychological message. Accordingly, the US may deploy or relocate USAF assets and forces, such as a fighter or bomber wing, to serve as a message of US resolve and a powerful deterrent to foreign aggression.

# Operational

Operational PSYOP are conducted in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of a theater commander's objectives. These operations are designed to strengthen US and allied capabilities to conduct military operations in the theater and accomplish particular missions during crises and open hostilities. They are conducted prior to and during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities, in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of theater campaigns and strategies. At the operational level, USAF efforts may include leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, and airborne radio or television transmissions designed to encourage enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender, or undertake any other activity supportive of US objectives. Additionally, potential adversaries can be favorably influenced by PSYOP thus precluding possible confrontations. These efforts may also influence the local populace to report terrorist, sabotage, or other plans to attack US or friendly forces, thereby enabling the US to counter those plans. Persistent attacks can have a synergistic effect with PSYOP accelerating the degradation of morale and encouraging desertion. During Operation DESERT STORM, special operations C-130s dropped leaflets warning Iraqi soldiers that they would be bombed by the world's largest conventional bomb. The next day, the JFC employed a series of BLU-82 airdrops. Shortly thereafter, the C-130s dropped leaflets announcing additional BLU-82 airdrops. The combination of the leaflets and bombs were subsequently credited with directly causing a significant number of Iraqi desertions.

# **Tactical**

Tactical PSYOP are normally conducted in conjunction with other tactical operations against opposing forces or audiences. At this level, PSYOP are normally targeted for individual engagements. During Operation JUST CAUSE, ground units employed loudspeakers to drive a fugitive from justice out of his hiding location and to cause the surrender of thousands of Panamanian Defense Force personnel. In similar situations, USAF assets can be employed to broadcast radio and loudspeaker messages which may influence a wider audience.

#### Consolidation

Consolidation PSYOP are conducted in areas of operations inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace. PSYOP may also be conducted in areas where US forces are present to help influence the foreign populace to support US local objectives and allow operational freedom of the supported commanders. Consolidation PSYOP may be particularly effective during foreign internal defense operations.



# **PSYOP PRINCIPLES**

Certain principles should be adhered to for effective employment of USAF assets in support of either long- or short-term PSYOP. While the methods may vary with the target audience, the basic considerations are the same.

- Define clear PSYOP objectives which correspond to the supported commander's vision of how the campaign should proceed. The objectives should be constant with concurrent diplomatic, economic, political, or multinational efforts.
- Base PSYOP themes, activities, and symbols on a thorough analysis
  of targets, including friendly and adversary PSYOP capabilities,
  strengths, and weaknesses.

- Evaluate results for their relevance to the overall campaign objectives. The commander's decision to terminate or revise PSYOP programs should be linked to the analysis of all-source intelligence. All friendly actions should be thoroughly evaluated for psychological implications, and where necessary, should be supported by deliberate PSYOP actions to offset potentially negative effects or to reinforce positive effects. To the extent possible, PSYOP should be pretested to determine possible outcomes.
- Use transmission medium or media which are reliable and readily accessible by target audiences. US forces must ensure message media are tailored for the local populace. Media can range from leaflets, to posters, to "hi tech" radio and television broadcasts. Planners should ensure transmission media can cover large segments of the target audience.
- Decrease the enemy's will to resist. The psychological dimension
  of warfare affects those fighting the battle, their political and
  military leaders and staffs, and the civilian population. During
  military operations, US personnel want to face an enemy who is
  unsure and confused about its cause and capabilities, and certain
  of an impending defeat. Even if the enemy is unwilling to surrender,
  they may be influenced not to engage in combat.




Figure 2.1. PSYOP Principles

# **PSYOP OBJECTIVES**

Effective PSYOP provide the NCA unique leverage by influencing targeted foreign groups, key political and military leaders, and governments to act in a manner compatible with US goals and objectives. PSYOP are low-cost, high-impact tools which allow the JFC to directly communicate with and influence an adversary or selected foreign audience. By implanting the correct message in an enemy's mind, PSYOP may preclude the need to employ additional combat forces. When combat is unavoidable, effective PSYOP can reduce the period of conflict. PSYOP, while part of the informational instrument of national power, magnify the political, military, and economic instruments of national power.

#### General

- Reduce the efficiency of opposing forces.
- Advance US or multinational efforts by modifying or influencing attitudes and behaviors of selected audiences.
- Obtain the cooperation of multinational partners and neutrals.

# Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

- Support the elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy.
- Modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities.
- Support the theater CINC's regional security strategy objectives.
- Support the objectives of the country team.
- Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external threats.
- Gain and sustain foreign popular belief in, and support for, US and multinational goals and objectives.
- Deter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the US, its multinational partners, or the conduct of friendly operations.
- Increase foreign popular support for US and multinational military operations.

- Diminish the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political system.
- Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to friendly powers.
- Diminish support and increase reporting of terrorist, sabotage, or other attack plans against US activities and resources outside the continental United States.
- Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary power.
- Support and enhance humanitarian assistance and foreign internal defense activities.
- Facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations.

#### War

- Project the image of a strong, technologically superior, wellprepared US military force that will win on the battlefield and protect the US, its friends, and multinational partners whenever necessary.
- Foster an understanding of US political policies, aims, and objectives.
- Foster support for multinational operations.
- Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for (or against) a military operation.
- Undermine confidence in adversary leadership.
- Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary forces.
- Increase the psychological impact of US and multinational combat power.
- Support other elements of IO.
- Counter hostile foreign propaganda efforts.
- Influence the development of adversary strategy and tactics.
- Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary.

# COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

As an integral part of the joint team, air commanders should be aware of the unique contributions air and space power bring to PSYOP. Commanders need to recognize that although most USAF units are not dedicated to PSYOP, assets such as aircraft, space, communications, and computer equipment may prove extremely valuable in achieving PSYOP objectives. Commanders need to evaluate the potential psychological effects and implications of all contemplated courses of action, addressing both intended and unintended consequences of military operations. Commanders should also ensure their staffs understand how PSYOP support can be obtained from national and theater resources, and how they are applied to Air Force mission objectives. Finally, commanders should realize that PSYOP are most effective when planning is done early and in conjunction with the actual air campaign planning process.

# CHAPTER THREE

# COMMAND AND CONTROL AND ORGANIZATION

# **GENERAL**

USAF PSYOP command and control arrangements should be flexible to adapt to different requirements. Because of the strategic and operational importance to the JFC's strategic concept, PSYOP planning is normally centralized at the combatant command level. Similarly, when the combatant commander activates a subordinate joint force (subordinate unified command or JTF), PSYOP planning is normally centralized at that level. The theater joint force air component commander (JFACC) should ensure that USAF planners assist theater PSYOP planning staffs to enhance planning and coordination capability.

#### COMMAND

JFCs delegate the appropriate level of authority in accordance with guidelines in Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Joint Pub 0-2 details the assignment and purposes of the different types of command authority, including combatant command (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), support, and coordinating authority.

# OPERATIONAL CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

Joint force commanders normally exercise OPCON of assigned and attached forces through the subunified or component commander best suited for successful mission support and execution. USAF conventional air assets are normally under the OPCON of the Air Force Component Commander, who may also be designated the JFACC. Special operations forces (SOF) aviation assets, including PSYOP-dedicated assets, normally remain under the OPCON of the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or

the commander of the joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The commander of the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) normally exercises TACON of USAF assets when performing the PSYOP mission.

# ORGANIZATION OF PSYOP FORCES

The organization of PSYOP forces is generally dictated by the scale of joint operations. The organization may vary depending on the nature of the mission, the availability and qualification of assets and personnel, and the supported commander's assessment of the PSYOP requirement. To assess the situation, the supported commander may request a PSYOP assessment team. This team confers with the commander, develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate component mix of assets (personnel and equipment) to accomplish the mission. If the team determines that significant PSYOP forces are required to accomplish the JFC objectives, a JPOTF may be required. Although the JPOTF could be assigned anywhere in the JFC structure, it normally remains under the control of the JFC to provide a centralized PSYOP focus (see Figure 3.1). If a JPOTF is established, USAF planners should be prepared to advise JPOTF personnel on USAF PSYOP capabilities to ensure smooth planning, coordination, and mission execution.




Figure 3.1. Typical Command Relationship for a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

# AIR RESERVE COMPONENT (ARC) FORCES

During full mobilization, the entire USAF PSYOP capability becomes available for employment by the supported combatant commander. Presently, a significant portion of USAF PSYOP capability is maintained in the ARC. Early identification of ARC PSYOP requirements by the PSYOP assessment team is essential to ensure timely ARC activation, processing, and training, if required. Both active and Reserve forces which provide PSYOP capability should be identified in the theater time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to ensure theater PSYOP objectives and operations are not delayed.

# CHAPTER FOUR

# USAF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION

# **GENERAL**

The USAF has unique characteristics which provide the potential for the application of air and space power in a broad range of mission areas. Although PSYOP messages have traditionally been associated with written and verbal communications, air and space power can support theater PSYOP efforts in three primary ways. First, specially equipped USAF aircraft can transmit messages over communications media such as radio and television or air-drop leaflets. Second, US aircraft, with their dynamic presence and actions, transmit an unmistakable psychological message to most adversaries. The mere presence of USAF aircraft can ground an enemy's air force and demoralize their army and civilian population or promote stability. USAF satellites and aerial reconnaissance photos can also be used to discredit adversary intentions. Finally, airpower can be used to "bomb for effect" to help shape the battlefield. Examples include: massive and persistent bombing of military targets, single airdrops of the world's largest conventional bomb, precision-guided munitions to destroy specific targets, as well as use of high-speed, low-level flights for noise and shock value. The synergistic application of these uses of airpower can tremendously aid theater PSYOP objectives.

# JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFACC) AND THE AIR CAMPAIGN

The JFC will normally designate a JFACC to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations through a cohesive joint air operations plan and integrated control system. The JFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the Service component commander with the preponderance of air assets and the ability to plan, task,

and control joint air operations. The JFACC coordinates with other component commanders to accomplish theater objectives.

# CENTRALIZED PLANNING

The planning for joint air support for PSYOP should be centrally located at the JFACC's headquarters and integrated into the joint air operations center (JAOC). This is accomplished through extensive coordination by USAF PSYOP planners working with the JPOTF, if established. PSYOP messages must be coordinated with counterintelligence, deception, and operations security (OPSEC) planners to ensure consistency and the desired effect is achieved. When developing strategies and long-range plans, air campaign planners should always consider the employment of air and space power to achieve theater PSYOP objectives. However, USAF planners should not confuse psychological impact with PSYOP. Lethal use of airpower may have a resulting significant psychological impact, but this by product of air operations should not automatically be considered PSYOP. PSYOP are approved operations with the express purpose to influence the attitudes, emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of a targeted audience.

# PSYOP AND THE AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS

As with other USAF capabilities, air campaign planners must integrate PSYOP throughout the air campaign planning and execution phases. One objective of the JFC should be to conduct PSYOP using theater airpower. Theater PSYOP will be planned by the JPOTF, if formed, and integrated in the air campaign by air planners.

The following are some examples of themes and targets against which air campaign planners could employ USAF PSYOP capabilities: culture, religious considerations, history, political systems, economy, leadership personality and training, enemy orders of battle, past war experience, doctrine, and strategies. Part of the air campaign planning process involves determining the centers of

gravity (CG). Enemy CGs can be attacked directly or indirectly. Direct attacks are those that physically attack a CG and engage it in decisive combat. Indirect attack is defined as causing the downfall of the CG by attacking its supporting elements until the CG collapses of its own weight or is completely ineffective. Because PSYOP target adversary's attitudes, emotions, reasoning, and behavior, and are not necessarily intended to destroy the enemy, these operations are normally considered indirect operations.

The ultimate goal of the air campaign planning process is an effective air campaign. The air campaign plan harmonizes and integrates joint air operations in support of joint force objectives. The planners identify CG targets, prioritize them, indicate the level of effort, and phase required missions in relation to the JFC's plan (and in relation to each other). The plan typically contains traditional USAF missions such as strategic attack, counterair operations, interdiction, close air support, and maritime support operations. However, this is also the opportunity to integrate USAF assets fully in support of other uses of airpower, such as PSYOP.

# INTEGRATING USAF PSYOP INTO THE JOINT PSYOP CAMPAIGN

USAF PSYOP must not be planned or conducted independent of the joint PSYOP planning staff. The JPOTF, if activated, is responsible for managing and integrating theater PSYOP and for ensuring component operations are consistent with theater PSYOP objectives. Independent operations could undermine theater PSYOP objectives, thus degrading overall JFC objectives. Once USAF PSYOP opportunities and options are identified, plans should be recommended to and approved by the JPOTF or the joint PSYOP staff. Long-range plans are normally conducted through routine air operations planning and targeting processes, while short-notice planning may be expedited through the special operations liaison element (SOLE) located at the JFACC's JAOC. The SOLE consists of joint SOF aviation expertise which includes "Commando Solo" expertise. The SOLE maintains daily communications with both the JFSOCC and JPOTF headquarters.

# **PSYOP FORCES IN MOOTW**

Aircrew members and support personnel trained to conduct or support PSYOP for combat operations normally do not require additional training to conduct PSYOP for MOOTW. However, there may be requirements for unique support capabilities, such as intelligence personnel, political military affairs personnel, and other area specialists. Through humanitarian operations, PSYOP can align foreign governments with the US, thus averting possible future confrontations. Specialized training allows these personnel to understand a potential adversary's thought process and to predict possible enemy and friendly actions to manipulate favorable outcomes. As during war, personnel participating in MOOTW must have a thorough understanding of the rules of engagement. AFDD 2-3, Military Operations Other Than War, provides detailed guidance on how air and space assets can be employed during MOOTW.

# **CHAPTER FIVE**

# USAF PSYOP SUPPORT AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

### **INTELLIGENCE**

Effective PSYOP actions depend upon timely and accurate intelligence information. Intelligence personnel should be assigned to and deploy with dedicated PSYOP units, while other USAF units which may be tasked to support PSYOP objectives should be cognizant of the intelligence required and available to achieve those objectives. Because the threat situation and PSYOP requirements are constantly changing, intelligence personnel need access to nearreal-time, all-source intelligence from Service (Air Intelligence Agency), theater (joint intelligence centers), and national intelligence (Defense Intelligence Agency) components. More importantly, intelligence participation in PSYOP requires an extensive peacetime or precrisis/conflict commitment to intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Simply put, PSYOP requires a broad array of military, political, social, and economic intelligence on potential adversaries. Normally, because of the rapid nature of warfare, this intelligence cannot adequately be collected, analyzed, and properly displayed during the crisis or conflict phase of an operation. In addition, "damage assessment" presents an equal or greater challenge to intelligence personnel in the PSYOP arena than to those engaged in strategic attack, interdiction, or close air support operations. Intelligence personnel should identify in advance the sources of information they can call upon to help assess the effectiveness of PSYOP. Collection, analysis, and reporting procedures should be developed, coordinated, and practiced until they are institutionalized and personnel are proficient. For additional intelligence information, see AFDD 2-5.4, Intelligence.

# COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS (C4)

 $C^4$  systems facilitate the execution of command and control ( $C^2$ ) and its supporting functions.  $C^4$  systems are essential for

planning, mounting, and sustaining successful joint PSYOP. Rapid, reliable, redundant, and secure communications between staffs and components are required for planning and conducting successful joint PSYOP. PSYOP communications should be structured to support centralized control and decentralized execution. USAF PSYOP communications should be interoperable with joint PSYOP communications capabilities and should also be integrated with the joint PSYOP secure voice, data, and satellite networks. Communications and computer resources (information technology including visual information technology) must be designed to support electronic generation and dissemination of PSYOP information against selected targets as an extension of information warfare.

#### LOGISTICS

USAF PSYOP planners should provide sustainment requirements to Air Force logisticians during both deliberate and crisis action planning. Before any PSYOP plan is executed, planners need to coordinate all aspects of logistics supportability. Logistics planners work closely with joint operations planners to bring operating supplies, repair parts, and major end-items for PSYOP-peculiar equipment into the theater. This should ensure continuous sustainment and support of the PSYOP plan; it also will ensure requirements are included in the operations plan or operations order TPFDD.

Since most PSYOP involve operating from deployed locations, dedicated USAF PSYOP units develop mobility packages by establishing unit type codes (UTCs) consisting of operations, intelligence, maintenance, and other support personnel required to manage deployed USAF PSYOP. These UTCs should be built to respond to requirements across the range of military operations.

To ensure timely notification of USAF PSYOP units and assets, USAF MAJCOMs with dedicated PSYOP assets should ensure resources are identified in the appropriate TPFDD. While UTCs are normally placed in regional TPFDDs, forces should be ready to respond to all requirements. USAF PSYOP forces should be able to execute time-sensitive deployments. Dedicated PSYOP units can

deploy with minimal organic logistics support, contributing to their mobility, flexibility, and responsiveness. Additional maintenance and support personnel, as well as associated equipment, normally require airlift support or surface transportation for deployment. Humanitarian operations or MOOTW may require the evacuation, transfer, or supply of host-nation civilians. USAF PSYOP assets should also be adequately supported by readiness spares packages for extended deployments.



# **OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)**

USAF PSYOP forces should be prepared to respond to sensitive taskings and to maintain the strictest OPSEC requirements. Security of information is vitally important to PSYOP forces from initial deployment through the recovery phase. OPSEC denies the enemy valuable information about friendly capabilities and intentions, including advance notice of mission unique training, joint preparations, deployment, and employment. Air Force personnel do this by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators and actions associated with planning and conducting military operations and activities. Failure to implement an effective OPSEC program could result in mission compromise and loss of personnel and resources.

#### MILITARY DECEPTION

In a sophisticated battle environment, it is essential that the JFC use the necessary tools to accomplish the mission. One effective means of gaining an advantage over the enemy is to build military deception into battle plans and individual missions. PSYOP and deception both can create significant holes in the enemy's morale and fighting capability. PSYOP and military deception can be employed separately; however, military deception plans can take advantage of PSYOP themes to enhance planning opportunities. Therefore, coordination is imperative between military deception and PSYOP planners. Imaginative application of deception principles, coupled with aggressive training and execution, can result in improved combat effectiveness at all levels, particularly when employed synergistically with PSYOP. USAF PSYOP forces must ensure military deception does not adversely affect the credibility of PSYOP.

# **LEGAL**

PSYOP personnel should understand the political and legal implications of their operations. Commanders at all levels must consult their legal advisors on the legal aspects of specific operations. Commanders must keep their legal advisors informed on all aspects of plans, policies, directives, and doctrine.

# **TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

As potential enemies become increasingly sophisticated, their levels of technology, communications, and mass media will mature. The USAF-dedicated PSYOP capability needs to keep pace with future threat environments by ensuring its forces are equipped with state-of-the-art acquisitions and modernizations. These new technologies should enhance the joint PSYOP capability, ultimately degrading the enemy's fighting capability. Effective integration of new USAF PSYOP technologies will reduce the number and severity of future lethal engagements.

# METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC (METOC) CONSIDERATIONS

Timely and accurate METOC information is important for success of PSYOP missions and must be considered and implemented during all phases of planning and execution. METOC conditions can degrade or enhance PSYOP depending upon the extent of effects and how well they are considered in the planning process. USAF units participating in PSYOP should have ready access to METOC information required to plan and conduct PSYOP and to achieve theater PSYOP objectives. PSYOP should be supported by a singlecoordinated mission forecast produced by a centralized METOC unit and tailored to specific mission needs by METOC personnel at the mission execution level. Timely and accurate launch, recovery, and target area forecasts will enhance the decision-making process by allowing PSYOP personnel to use the weather to minimize exposure to threats. Key forecast elements include (but are not limited to) weather hazards to air operations, target wind profiles, atmospheric and space environment effects on electromagnetic propagation, atmospheric effects on acoustic propagation, and target area precipitation. Rapid, reliable communications for conveying information between METOC units and PSYOP forces are essential.

# CHAPTER SIX PREPARATION FOR PSYOP

# COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Commanders of units that routinely conduct PSYOP should ensure their personnel are familiar with the principles, objectives, and responsibilities outlined in this document. Airmen and support personnel need to understand how their operations contribute to the JFC's overall PSYOP campaign. Additionally, commanders should continually evaluate their training programs to ensure realistic aircrew training meets known operational taskings and supports joint PSYOP interoperability concepts. AFDD 2-8, *Training and Education Doctrine*, provides guidance on training and education of air and space forces.

# **TRAINING**

USAF units should participate in joint training which emphasizes command and control arrangements and joint interoperability, as well as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures required to conduct the PSYOP mission. As an example, USAF units tasked to conduct leaflet operations should be familiar with joint coordination procedures, ballistic information (provided by requester), computer procedures, and dispersion characteristics for leaflets they may air-drop. In addition, these units should conduct training airdrops to evaluate their capability.


### **EXERCISES**

USAF-dedicated PSYOP assets should be scheduled to participate regularly in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other PSYOP-related exercises. The top priority should be to participate in exercises which provide realistic training for aircrew and support personnel. Participation in exercises with insufficient PSYOP participation or without realistic training wastes valuable time and

resources, and may, unnecessarily, limit the availability of scarce PSYOP resources for real-world requirements. Exercise planners need to consider participation in command post exercises to train PSYOP staff and liaison personnel. Liaison personnel should be employed not only for individual training but to advise other staffs of USAF PSYOP capabilities and limitations.

# WARGAMING, MODELING, AND SIMULATION

Wargaming, modeling, and simulation can be used to examine and demonstrate the utility of dedicated PSYOP forces and conventional forces supporting PSYOP objectives to affect the outcome of joint operations. These useful tools save thousands of dollars in deployment costs and are also valuable for training staff and liaison personnel.



# **EDUCATION**

USAF personnel who plan, coordinate, or conduct PSYOP ought to attend specially developed PSYOP courses. Responsibility for joint PSYOP training belongs to the Joint Staff and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the executive agent. Certain MAJCOMs conduct courses specifically aimed at meeting

these training requirements. Personnel requiring PSYOP training should contact their unit or MAJCOM training monitors to establish quotas in basic PSYOP courses.

# **GLOSSARY**

# Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFI Air Force Instruction
AFM Air Force Manual

ARC Air Reserve Component

C<sup>2</sup> command and control

C<sup>4</sup> command, control, communications,

and computers

CG center(s) of gravity
CINC commander in chief

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces
COMARFOR Commander, Army Forces
COMNAVFOR Commander, Marine Forces
Commander, Naval Forces

DODD Department of Defense Directive

IO information operations
JAOC joint air operations center

JOINT Chiefs of Staff

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component

commander

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF joint task force

MAJCOM major command

METOC meteorological and oceanographic MOOTW military operations other than war

NCA National Command Authorities

OODA observe, orient, decide, and act

OPCON operational control OPSEC operations security

PSYOP psychological operations

pub publication

SO special operations SOF special operations forces

SOLE special operations liaison element

TACON tactical control

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UTC unit type code

#### **Definitions**

combatant command (command authority)—Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should

be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. See also **operational control**; **tactical control**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*information operations*—Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO**. (New term proposed by Joint Pub 3-13 and promulgated in DODD S-3600.1 dated 9 Dec 96.)

*joint air operations center*—A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives. Also called **JAOC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander—The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*joint special operations task force*—A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations

units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called **JSOTF**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military deception—Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: a. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. **b. operational military deception**—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception— Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)— Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. See also combatant command (command authority); tactical control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations forces—Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called **SOF**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*special operations liaison element (SOLE)*—A special operations liaison team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SO air and surface operations with conventional air. (AFDD 2-7)

tactical control—Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called **TACON**. See also **combatant command (command authority)**; **operational control**. (Joint Pub 1-02)