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MEETING THE U.S. ARMY'S SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND (ASCC) REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
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
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
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Meeting the U.S. Army's Service Component Command (ASCC)

Requirements for Peace Enforcement Operations

A Monograph Submitted To

The Faculty Of The Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship

School of Advanced Military Studies

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ABSTRACT

Meeting the U.S. Army's Service Component Command (ASCC) Requirements for Peace Enforcement Operations by COL Albert Bryant, Jr., USA, 57 pages.

The close of the cold war dramatically changed the national security environment confronting the United States. The end of the bi-polar confrontation between the communist bloc and the West has created the impression that conventional warfighting tasks and capabilities are less relevant to national security needs. In place of conventional military operations there has been a corresponding increase in the employment of U.S. military forces in less traditional roles. In many ways "Operations Other than War" have become the predominant form of U.S. military employment. The national military strategy identifies peace enforcement, as an important tool for accomplishing the United States' goal of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. Peace enforcement operations have become the means for applying military force in support of diplomatic efforts.

This paper examines the role of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) in providing operational and strategic sustainment support for Army forces conducting peace enforcement operations. Specifically, it seeks to identify the factors and issues the geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) should consider when addressing the role and composition of an ASCC as part of his organization of the theater of operations? The study reviews those conditions that define peace enforcement sustainment requirements and examines Joint and Army logistical doctrine to identify the options available to a CINC for organizing the theater sustainment campaign and the ASCC. Recent U.S. peace enforcement operations in Somalia and in Bosnia serve to illustrate ASCC operations in peace enforcement and help to assess the effectiveness of the organizational and support techniques employed there.

Supported by the review of doctrine and the assessment of important recent operations this study concluded that the manner in which a CINC addresses theater sustainment operations is of vital importance for Army forces committed to peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement operations should be addressed as campaigns requiring a formal organization of the theater sustainment effort. The ASCC organized to support operations should be built around existing organizations and possesses the capability to provide or coordinate strategic and operational logistical functions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MEETING THE U.S. ARMY'S SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND (ASCC) REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS.

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

“Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to *peace enforcement*, peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.”

National Security Strategy of the United States¹

The close of the cold war dramatically changed the national security environment confronting the United States. The end of the bi-polar confrontation between the communist bloc and the West has led to reduced reliance on conventional warfighting tasks and capabilities. Conversely, there has been a corresponding increase in the employment of U.S. military forces in less traditional roles. In many ways “Operations Other than War”² have become the preeminent forms of U.S. military employment. During the past decade, U.S. military forces have deployed in support of a variety of humanitarian relief efforts, military-to-military contacts, counter-drug operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations.

Peace enforcement (PE) operations have emerged as an increasingly important mission in its own right. Since 1992, the United States has deployed military forces to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to conduct such operations. Implementing the national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the national military strategy identifies peace enforcement as an important tool for promoting stability and thwarting

¹ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996), p. 22.

² U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), p. 13-5, 13-8.

aggression. Peace enforcement operations support these objectives by deterring and preventing conflict.³ Given the increased frequency of peace enforcement operations, it is prudent for U.S. military planners to assess how best to organize and support these operations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) in providing theater sustainment support for peace enforcement operations. Specifically, what factors and issues should the geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) consider when he defines the role and composition of the ASCC as part of his theater of operations? This paper is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the ASCC concept. The functions and responsibilities of an ASCC when assigned duties as an operational maneuver or ARFOR headquarters are beyond the scope of this study. Army doctrinal manuals already discuss those issues in detail. Rather, this study will focus solely on the force sustainment role more common to ASCC operations.

The manner in which a CINC addresses theater sustainment operations is important when organizing the theater for peace enforcement operations. For the Army this is especially true. In contrast to the other military services, the operational effectiveness of Army forces is critically linked to the proper functioning of theater sustainment operations. Air Force and Navy units habitually deploy modular, expeditionary forces that draw their operational and strategic logistical support from the CONUS base through a process of unit rotation. In contrast, Army forces must be supported “in the field” and can rarely rely on unit rotation for their strategic and

³ National Security Strategy, p. 4.

operational sustainment. Doctrinally, responsibility for this sustainment mission falls to the ASCC.

This study focuses solely on operational and strategic sustainment issues. Both Joint and Army doctrine identify three levels of logistical sustainment operations: strategic, operational, and tactical.⁴ Tactical logistics deal with the day to day supply and servicing of unit personnel and equipment and is the responsibility of the unit commander and his organic logistic organizations. Operational and strategic logistics, on the other hand, deal with policy, planning, and coordination of sustainment functions and are the responsibility of the theater commander. Joint doctrine characterizes such logistical functions as the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of military strategy and operations.⁵ The challenge confronting the theater CINC is how to integrate the service's strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts, while scheduling the deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of his employment concept.⁶ Therefore, this study emphasizes strategic and operational logistical support issues confronting the geographic CINCs and his Army Service Component Command and avoids any substantial discussion of tactical, logistical support operations.

The study begins by reviewing those conditions that define peace enforcement in the context of an operational level war campaign. The purpose of this review is to describe the operational environment in which ASCC support operations take place.

⁴ Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 27 January 1995), p. I-2.

⁵ Ibid. p. I-1.

⁶ Ibid.

Joint and Army logistical doctrine is then analyzed to identify the options available to a CINC for organizing the theater sustainment campaign and the ASCC. A doctrinal review of required logistical sustainment functions is also conducted. Recent U.S. peace enforcement operations in Somalia and in Bosnia are then reviewed to analyze ASCC operations in execution and to determine the effectiveness of the organizational techniques and support employed. Finally, the study outlines conclusions concerning current ASCC organizational and operational practices and makes recommendations to correct the noted shortcomings.

SECTION II. PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

For more than 40 years U.S. national security strategy was rooted in the concept of containment of the Soviet/Sino communist threat. Containment strategy blended a substantial nuclear weapons arsenal with forward deployed conventional forces to deter war and to stabilize a bi-polar world. The utility of this strategic concept ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new multi-polar world order. The Clinton administration introduced a revised U.S. national security strategy entitled "Engagement and Enlargement" during the mid-90s. This strategy focuses on fostering national security by deterring conflict in a multi-polar world through a blend of political, economic, and military activities.

Regarding military options, President Clinton laid out three criteria as part of his security strategy for deciding when and how to employ U.S. forces.⁷

- Cases involving U.S. vital interests, defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies, and our economic well being.

⁷ National Military Strategy of the United States of America - A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 4.

- Selected cases involving threats to important, not vital, national interests. Peace operations in Haiti and Bosnia are two recent examples.
- Cases of humanitarian interest in which the situation warrants the commitment of the unique resources possessed by the military.

While the first criterion clearly enunciates potential warfighting scenarios, the latter two criteria set the conditions for the increased use of military forces for operations other than war to include peace enforcement operations.

President Clinton defined his general position concerning peace operations in Presidential Decision Directive 25, "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," and in the National Security Strategy statement as follows:

"... When our interest call for it, the United States must also be prepared to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve regional conflicts and bolster new democratic governments.⁸ ...Thus, *our forces must be ready to participate in* peace keeping, *peace enforcement* and other operations in support of these objectives⁹ (emphasis mine).

Clearly, peace enforcement will play an important role in the security policy of the United States for the foreseeable future. Consequently, it is reasonable at this point, to examine the nature of peace enforcement operations and to address what critical issues it may raise for ASCC functions, force composition, and command and control.

Peace enforcement constitutes a unique type of military operation possessing its own defining characteristics and requirements. Although small unit, tactical actions may dominate daily activity, peace enforcement operations are characterized by the consolidation of the strategic, operational, and tactical responsibility into a single operational plane.¹⁰ PE missions often require extended operational timelines as

⁸ Presidential Decision Directive 25, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, May, 1995)

⁹ National Security Strategy, p. 13.

¹⁰ This specific terminology was used by members of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps staff during a Bosnia operation briefing provided to visiting Army Advanced Operational Studies Fellows during a visit to the ARRC headquarters 18 April 1997.

operations focus on maintaining long term security conditions rather than rapid battlefield victory. Although peace operations require substantial joint force participation, especially during deployment and redeployment phases, the forces for such missions have been drawn predominantly from the U.S. Army.

Peace enforcement operations are strategic rather than tactical actions. Peace enforcement operations can be characterized as coercive interventions¹¹ normally in support of diplomatic activity. The national military strategy describes peace enforcement operations as:

“...Operations...which stand in the gray zone between peace and war. These operations are characterized *by the use of force or the threat of the use of force*, and are interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts often involving both governmental and non-governmental organizations. *Such actions may be undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security, or to respond to acts of aggression.*”¹²

Peace enforcement provides the national command authority a vehicle to employ coercive force in support of national interests in such a way as to be sanctioned by the world community and a potentially hesitant U.S. Congress. In addition, successful peace enforcement operations provide a means to preempt a larger and more dangerous commitment of U.S. forces to resolve an expanding crisis. Peace enforcement operations represent a strategic act on the part of the United States. As described by President Clinton in the national security strategy statement, commitment of the U.S. military to operations including peace enforcement, will be carefully limited to those instances involving vital or important national interests. The February, 1996 NSS statement establishes that

¹¹ Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks. U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World. New Challenges and New Responses. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 25.

¹² The National Military Strategy, p. 12.

“The decision on whether and when to use forces is therefore dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital national interest are at stake, our use of force will be decisive... In other situations posing less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most effect our national interest. Second, in all cases, the cost and risk of U.S. military involvement must be judged commiserate with the stakes involved. ...Haiti and Bosnia are recent examples in this category(cases in which important, but not vital, interests are threatened).”¹³

It is, therefore, unlikely that the U.S. would commit combat forces unless the threat to U.S. interests, direct or indirect, had reached crisis proportions. Hence, it is an inherent assumption of this paper that future commitments of the nation’s military to a peace enforcement mission represent an act taken to achieve a national strategic objective. The idea that the current political climate of the nation would allow for the commitment of U.S. forces into a hostile environment for any reason short of strategic importance is almost inconceivable.

In execution, therefore, PE operations lie within the operation level of war. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, defines the operational level of war as “the employment of military forces to attain theater-strategic objectives in a theater of war and operational objectives in the theater of operations through the design, organization, and execution of subordinate campaigns and major operations.”¹⁴ As an operational task, peace enforcement operations are not simply large tactical operations but take on the character and planning requirements of a campaign. Formulation of the campaign plan requires the CINC to address organization of the theater, establish command and support

¹³ National Security Strategy, p.18.

¹⁴ FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993). p. 6-2.

responsibilities and relationships, and to sequence theater activities across time, space, and function.

A second characteristic of peace enforcement operations related to the campaign nature of the operation is the often extended length of the mission. Table 1 provides a comparison of recent conventional armed interventions with recent peace enforcement operations.¹⁵

Table 1. Operational Windows of Commitment

- Armed Interventions		
Operation Urgent Fury		2 months
Operation Just Cause		2 months
Operation Desert Shield/Storm		8 months
- Peace Enforcement		
Operation Restore Hope		16 months
Operation Joint Endeavor/Guard		17 months (ongoing)
Operation Provide Hope		68 months

The data demonstrates the requirement for planners to address the long term requirements associated with sustaining and reconstituting forces employed for the PE mission. The peace enforcement operations require substantially longer windows of commitment. Recent experience would indicate that PE operations are more effective in resolving intra-national conflicts rather than those between established nation states. Civil wars born of ethnic, religious, racial, or political conflicts are more likely to result in an international commitment to a PE operation. Under these conditions the legitimacy of societal authority mechanisms has collapsed and must be re-imposed by external forces. As the peace enforcement force goes about reestablishing conditions of

¹⁵ Estimated window of initial deployment thru return of bulk of forces.

societal stability and security, a myriad of other tasks must be accomplished before the force can be withdrawn or transition to a smaller, peacekeeping role. These may include:

- Resolution or suppression of centuries old conflicts.
- Establishment of belligerent trust in their own security.
- Restoration of a sufficient level of economic and social normalcy.
- Some form of conflict resolution process, political or otherwise, in place.

While these tasks are not the sole responsibility of the military enforcement force, their resolution is key to achieving the type of comprehensive solution that diplomacy will require. Conversely, these issues normally possess a high degree of resistance to short term fixes and, therefore, may demand prolonged military operations to maintain the required stability and security.

Implied by the requirement for extended operations is the need to develop a long term, inclusive logistical sustainment plan. Both joint and army doctrine divide sustainment support into three functional levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Table 2 summarizes these functions.

Table 2. LOGISTICAL FUNCTIONS

<u>Strategic</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Tactical</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilization • Material Acquisition • Projecting Forces • Strategic Mobility • Strategic Concentration of Logistics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Log Planning • Joint Sustainment Coord • Host Nation Support • Contract Management • LOGCAP • Automation Management • Infrastructure Development • RSOI • Pers Services Support • Health Services Support • ISB/COMMZ Operation • Reconstitution Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manning • Arming • Fueling • Fixing • Moving • Soldier Sustainment

Tactical logistics focus on the immediate supply, repair, and servicing of units, personnel and their equipment. Execution of tactical logistics is the responsibility of component forces and their dedicated logistical support units. A planning focus on tactical logistical support is both common and appropriate for short term intervention operations. Critical to logistical planning for extended operations, however, is the establishment of procedures and organizations necessary for integration of strategic and operational sustainment functions into the overall support plan. At the strategic/operational levels, long term issues of sustained force generation, logistical management, serviceman quality of life, mission transition planning, and force reconstitution are key. While strategic sustainment is provided by the Department of Defense and the services, it is within the unified command and its theater of operations that the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment is accomplished and operational support tasks are executed. It falls to the CINC, therefore, to insure that the service's sustainment architecture is sufficiently robust to provide the necessary command and control and logistical force capabilities to meet the functional requirements of all three levels of sustainment support simultaneously.

A third characteristic of peace enforcement operations is the requirement to employ large, predominant Army forces, to execute the mission. The task of executing peace enforcement operations habitually falls to the U.S. Army. Of the services, the Army is uniquely organized to execute sustained, land based operations. While peace enforcement operations demand joint force participation, the Army has been responsible for providing the bulk of forces committed. As an example, the Army provided more than 80% of the total force committed into the AOR during operations in Somalia, Haiti,

and Bosnia. The Air Force and the Navy play critical roles in support of force deployment, sustainment, and, conduct occasional combat operations. However, their lack of direct interface with local population ultimately reduces them to a supporting role. The reliance on Army forces stems from the combination of three key force design considerations; the requirement for overwhelming combat capability, the essential role of civil-military activities during the mission, and the need for long term, sustainment support for deployed U.S. and other multinational partners.

PE operations support the diplomatic resolution of conflict by deterring further combat among the belligerents.¹⁶ However peaceful the ultimate objective of intervention may be, peace enforcement forces require the capacity to fight and win. As illustrated in

Figure 1, the purpose of peace enforcement is to deter further conflict through coercion if necessary.¹⁷ Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement forces must assume that one or more of the factions may oppose intervention. They must, therefore, possess the

Figure 1. PEACE OPERATIONS MATRIX

Nature of Operations	Military Role	Level of Stability	Force Requirements
Peacekeeping	Assure/Deter (Political/ Economic)	Stability Questionable	Moderate/ Lightly Armed/ Presence
Peace Enforcement	Deter/ (Defensive/ Deny) Coerce	Unstable	Large/ Heavily Armed/ Dominating Presence
Peace Imposition	Deter/ (Offensive) Coerce	Very Unstable	Overwhelming/ Heavily Armed/ Dominating Presence

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Command and Control in Peace Operations, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, May 1995), p. 10.

capability to enforce compliance. Because combat is anticipated and tactical defeats may have strategic consequences, peace enforcement forces must deploy with a full range of capabilities and in overwhelming strength. The force must be capable of forced entry and maintaining security for its lines of communications (LOCs) while executing other assigned tasks. This demands forces that possess the capacity to dominate the situation both physically and psychologically. Therefore, any U.S. force committed to peace enforcement operations can be expected to be large enough and sufficiently equipped with high technology systems to overmatch belligerent forces throughout the area of operations.¹⁸ While the U.S. Marine Corps is capable of providing some of these capabilities in the short run, they lack the broad spectrum of combat and intelligence capabilities necessary to extend and sustain the effort throughout the depth of the AOR. Only the Army possesses these capabilities.

In addition to combat capabilities PE forces must also include substantial civil-military affairs capabilities. Civil-military (CIMIC) forces play a key role in linking military actions to corresponding civilian run actions designed to restore economic and political stability in the region. As such, these forces constitute a critical component in the transition actions necessary to disengage the peace enforcement force. The CIMIC capabilities of the U.S. military rest, almost exclusively, within the Army.

Adding to the need for an army based force is the requirement to provide substantial logistical operating capability. Historically, operating conditions within PE

¹⁸ The lessons learned from the failure to reinforce USFORSOM with requested armor and other high technology systems has been widely acknowledged by the NCA and Army planners. During planning for Operation Joint Endeavor, the JCS and EUCOM focussed on technical overmatch as a design criteria for U.S. forces.

AORs have been austere in the extreme. The prevailing conflicts have resulted in significant disruption of the civilian economy and infrastructure. This has made it necessary for PE ground forces to deploy and sustain themselves as self-sufficient entities. Likewise, the potential requirement to provide logistical support for multinational coalition partners, non-governmental agencies and other humanitarian support requirements fall to the ground component command. The Marine Corps' design as a sea borne, forced entry force constrains its ability to provide sustainment support as operations extend inland from the littoral and beyond the initial entry stage of the operation. Hence responsibility for providing both C2 and forces to execute theater sustainment operations have, historically, fallen to the Army. Recent peace enforcement operations have been no exception.

From this brief analysis, one can conclude that any future PE operations will require a substantial commitment of U.S. Army forces. Only the Army can bring the requisite combination of operational, civil military and logistical capabilities to the table. Given the Army's predominant role as part of any peace enforcement JTF, the CINCs need to ensure that the specific operational and sustainment requirements of Army forces are explicitly addressed as part of campaign planning.

In review, peace enforcement operations constitute operational campaigns designed to meet national strategic objectives. They are long term operations that demand campaign planning to provide for theater organization, command and control relationships and the sequencing of major operations and activities. Sustainment planning must address strategic and operational sustainment functions as well as tactical logistical issues. Inherent in planning for peace enforcement operation is the

predominance of Army forces as part of any joint task forces and the requirement to address their specific operational and sustainment requirements.

SECTION III. THEATER ORGANIZATION AND THE ARMY SERVICE

COMPONENT COMMAND

“The commander who fails to provide his army with necessary food and other supplies is making arrangements for his own defeat, even with no enemy present.”

Maxim 19, Maurice’s Strategikon

As indicated by Maurice’s centuries old appraisal, soldiers have long recognized the critical role of logistical support. Historically, the services- Army, Navy, and Air Force, have held sole responsibility for providing sustainment support for deployed forces. The Army met this requirement through assignment of Army logistical forces to the theater. Recent changes in joint doctrine, however, have established the preeminent role of the geographic CINCs in organizing theater sustainment operations.

One of the principle responsibilities of the unified CINCs is to organize the theater for operations to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. The CINC’s authority to organize the theater serves to synchronize the various service sustainment operations and reduces interservice redundancy. Joint doctrine specifically tasked the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to “Establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establishing coordinating instructions for component commanders.”¹⁹ Likewise, doctrine dictates that the JFC conduct campaign planning to “arrange for strategic unity

¹⁹ Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 24 February 1995), p. IV-2.

of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. One of the most important aspects of this planning is the synchronization force employment concepts with the concept for sustainment.”²⁰

Facilitating execution of these responsibilities, joint doctrine also provides the CINC specific authorities.

- Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- Organizing commands and forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.²¹

It is in this later authority to organize the command that the CINC’s role in defining the theater ASCC is embodied. Joint doctrine is somewhat vague as to options available to the CINC to meet the ASCC requirement. It leaves it to the CINC, his staff and his Army component command (ACC)²² to derive the appropriate organizational solutions to integrate service sustainment responsibilities with the command’s concept of sustainment. In fulfilling this responsibility, the CINC is left to depend heavily on service doctrine for appropriate methodologies.

In peacetime, the CINC normally exercises Combatant Command (COCOM) through his assigned ACC whose strategic/operational tasks include the conduct of operations, coordination with the joint headquarters and other service components, and

²⁰ Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 13 April 1995), p. II-18

²¹ Joint Pub 0-2, p. II-14.

²² The term Army Component Command (ACC) is used in lieu of the term Army Service Component Command (ASCC) when referring to the peacetime Army headquarters assigned to each unified command which is responsible for C2 and log support of assigned Army forces during peacetime. The use of this term is to avoid confusion when the term ASCC is used referring to a contingency theater headquarters.

logistical support operations in sustainment of Army forces assigned to theater.²³ During contingency operations, the CINC may continue to act through his assigned ACC or designate a theater ASCC to support the deployed joint force. The ASCC may perform a variety of tasks consistent with his assigned responsibilities. During deployment, the ASCC monitors the situation and manages the required changes to plans and orders that must cascade through the levels of strategic, operational, tactical organization and functions. During operations, the ASCC

- Establishes liaison with joint, multinational, interagency, and non-governmental organizations and advise the CINC on Army capabilities.
- Supports operations by executing Title 10 responsibilities, to include operating the ground transportation system, providing common classes of supply and infrastructure support.
- Conducts operations in support of the joint campaign. If designated as an operational-level commander, the ASCC commander designates, sustains, and shifts subordinate ground forces to support the joint or multi-national plan.²⁴

Army doctrine outlines two general methods for forming a contingency ASCC:

- Designate an operational level headquarters in the area of operations to execute ASCC duties and responsibilities.
- Form and deploy an operational level headquarters, e.g., a numbered army, to control operations and provide C2 for ASCC Title X responsibilities. If the

²³ FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 31 May 1995). p. A2.

²⁴ FM 100-16, Army Operational Support, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 31 May 1995). p. 7-14,15. As noted previously, this study focuses on force sustainment functions stated or inferred by Tasks 1 and 2 and excludes review of operational C2 functions inferred by Task 3.

peacetime ACC commander does not deploy, he may designate a Deputy for Operations or Support as required to deploy forward in his stead.²⁵

In support of normal, peacetime service functions, each unified command is organized with a designated Army component command. Obviously, that headquarters offers the CINC his first option in designating the contingency theater's ASCC as well. If the CINC determines there are factors or responsibilities that would preclude employment of his assigned ACC in that role, he has other options. Typically, there are three existing organizational echelons available to form the operational headquarters if the theater designated ASCC does not deploy: a numbered or theater Army,²⁶ Corps, or Division. These formations also correspond to the normal operational echelons that may deploy as the ARFOR. Each of these echeloned headquarters normally commands dedicated logistical support units. For that reason, there is a tendency to dual hat whatever headquarters is selected as both the ARFOR and the ASCC.

Regardless of the echelon of command or the function performed, the ASCC must maintain a strategic and operational perspective while executing its responsibilities.²⁷ During operations, the ASCC monitors the situation and manages the required changes to plans and orders that must cascade through strategic, operational, and tactical organizations. As such, it follows that the headquarters must possess both the required functional capabilities and the specified authorities necessary to perform them. Because command authority rests with the CINC, it is his responsibility to ensure that army forces

²⁵ FM 100-16, p. 2-12.

²⁶ i.e. U.S. Army, South USARSO serves as forward deployed ASCC for CINCSOUTH, other examples include USARPAC, USARJAP, etc.

²⁷ FM100-7, p. A2.

are properly supported. He does so by ensuring that an adequately staffed headquarters, with the necessary C3I capabilities is formed and that its command authorities are clearly enunciated in published orders and understood by the command and services. The practice of relying on inter- service resolution of support issues is disruptive of the theater sustainment concept and flies in the face of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The unified CINC's directive authority for logistic matters is key to ensuring effective execution of approved operational plans, economy of logistical operations and to minimize overlapping of functions among Service component commands. It also makes the CINC ultimately responsible for all aspects of theater organization and operation. The art of operational logistics is the integration of strategic, operational and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater while scheduling the mobilization and development of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.²⁸ This is the function of the unified commander, his staff, and his service component commands.

To satisfy sustainment support capability requirements, the CINC can draw on a variety of sources ranging from DOD agencies to service provided logistical units and organizations. For peace enforcement contingencies, the Army normally provides the bulk of operational and tactical logistical support units. To support its cold war conventional warfighting forces, the Army developed an extensive, multi-echeloned logistical structure. Operational and tactical logistical functions were the responsibility of dedicated logistical units imbedded into each organizational echelon from field army to

²⁸ Joint Pub 4-0, p. I-1.

battalion level. The ASCC, in response to CINC directed requirements, draws upon units and organizations from across the organization spectrum. Rarely will units drawn from a single operational echelon be sufficient to perform all required functions. Army corps and divisional support commands, for example, are organized to provide tactical logistical support tailored to the needs of their parent headquarters. The support unit for a light infantry based force will possess little fuel handling or tracked vehicle maintenance capability. Similarly, COSCOMs and DISCOMs possess neither the personnel, training, nor equipment to operate in the JOPES or WWMMCCS deployment and strategic movements control systems. Existing organizations must be augmented to meet the full spectrum requirements of peace enforcement operations. Army doctrine would characterize such a tasked organized logistical force as a Theater Army Support Command (TASC).

Formation of a Joint Logistical Support Element (JLSE) provides an alternative to formation of a TASC. A JLSE is often patterned after the formation of the 22d Theater Support Command organized during Operation Desert Storm. A joint support element acts as a coordinating and integrating nexus for service sustainment efforts. In this capacity, it strives to increase sustainment efficiency by reducing service redundancy. It may also be called upon to provide common user force sustainment to part or all of the joint force within its assigned capabilities.

Augmenting either organizational alternative are two civilian logistical augmentation programs; Host Nation Support (HNS) and LOGCAP. Each of the programs provides contract based augmentation to unit level capabilities. This augmentation can be additional capabilities provided to reinforce logistical forces or

capabilities used to reduce or replace deployed forces. These programs have the potential of being a significant force multiplier when requirements for operational capability constrain early deployment of logistical forces. Likewise, they offer potential offsets to force structure shortfall created by externally imposed force caps. Conversely, these programs require significant lead time to establish and may not be available during entry phase operations. Furthermore, the productivity of these programs is extremely susceptible to variations in the availability of local contractors, labor, and materials.

Overall, the geographic CINC, as the commander responsible for campaigns and major operations, has both the responsibility and the requirement to organize the theater and its associated logistical sustainment command and control structure. He has a variety of doctrinally supported options for meeting army, theater logistical requirements. In selecting the appropriate method, the CINC must insure that the force possesses the necessary combination of operational command and control and operational logistics capabilities. A critical aspect of peace enforcement operations is the compression of responsibility for strategic, operational and tactical functions into a single operating organization.²⁹ Task organized forces capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict are required.

Regardless of option selected, the CINC must establish clearly defined logistical responsibilities and authorities. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and joint doctrine makes organization of the theater of operations his explicit and

²⁹ Kevin C. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," (Parameters Vol XXVI, No. 3, Autumn 1996), p.70.

sole responsibility. As stated in the national military strategy: "During peace enforcement operations, command and control arrangements are critical."³⁰

SECTION IV. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES: SOMALIA AND BOSNIA

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has deployed a variety of forces to conduct or support peace operations. Operations Restore Hope (ORH) in Somalia and Joint Endeavor (OJE) in Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute the two most significant peace enforcement operations of the decade. As such, they have been selected for review and analysis in an effort to discern common operational patterns, requirements, or problems. Study of these two operations provides the opportunity to review and analyze the manner in which CINCs have addressed the ASCC issue under current operational conditions. It is noteworthy that these two operations offer a study in contrasts in many respects. Most important to this study they offer two different approaches to the organization and function of the ASCC. As such, they offer the possibility of addressing a wide range of issues that might arise during future U.S. peace enforcement operations. From an analysis of the respective CINC's solution to operational and sustainment issues some broad and fundamental conclusions can be reached concerning the ASCC.

Operation RESTORE HOPE: Peace Enforcement Operations in Somalia³¹

³⁰ National Military Strategy, p. 12.

³¹ Information presented in summary form concerning the operations in Somalia were drawn from the following sources: Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995); Center For Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report: Operations Other Than War (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993); S.L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War. Parameters, Vol 23 Number 4: Winter 1993-94. pp 4-26.; David Kassing, Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope (Sanata Monica, California: RAND Arroyo Center, 1994)

“Deploying to Somalia was like going to the moon: everything needed had to be brought in or built there. Every scrap of lumber, drop of fuel, and slice of bread had to be brought in from the outside. From a logistics perspective, Somalia was a nightmare.”

General Joseph P. Hoar³²

In early December 1992, U.S. forces began deployment into the war torn nation of Somalia. A multinational force executed Operation Restore Hope in an effort to end mass starvation among the Somali population brought about by civil unrest. The operation was characterized from the beginning as a peace enforcement operation authorized under the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 794 and chapter VII to the UN charter. The failure of the ongoing UN peacekeeping operation to end a clan based civil war necessitated the requirement for armed intervention. The mission of the U.S. led, multinational force was "to establish, as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."³³ At its peak, over 28,000 U.S. troops deployed in support of Operation RESTORE HOPE, augmented by nearly 10,000 additional troops from 21 coalition nations.³⁴ Combat forces deployed for this mission were predominantly light infantry formations. Attack helicopters, naval air and Marine armored units reinforced the infantry formations. Both ARFOR and MARFOR deployed with their designated support units. Upon completion of initial entry operations, the bulk of Marine forces were withdrawn.

U.S. involvement in Somalia proceeded through three distinct phases. Phase one, a humanitarian assistance mission designated Operation Provide Relief, airlifted food and

³² Joseph P. Hoar, "A CINC's Perspective," Joint Force Quarterly Number 2 (September 1993): p. 60.

³³ Arnold, p. 26.

³⁴ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1995) p. 17.

other humanitarian supplies into Somalia in conjunction with a UN led peacekeeping operations known as UNOSOM I. When the deterioration of security conditions within Somalia forced suspension of UNOSOM I, a new effort, Operation Restore Hope (ORH), was initiated. ORH constituted a US led, UN peace enforcement operation to establish a secure environment for humanitarian effort. ORH ended in May 93 with a transition to the UN led UNOSOM II operation. During this phase, peace enforcement efforts continued and limited nation building activities initiated.³⁵ U.S. participation in UNOSOM II continued until the fall of 1993 when U.S. forces were withdrawn.

Planning for ORH began in mid-November 1992. On 3 December 92, the JCS issued a warning order to USCINCENT initiating direct U.S. intervention in Somalia. CINCENT formed a Joint Task Force (JTF) under the command of CG, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) with the CG, 10th Infantry Division as COMARFOR. D-Day began six days later with a marine amphibious landing near Mogadishu. Subsequently, on 12 December 92 (D+3), U.S. Army forces began deploying into theater.

Upon designation of the CG, 1st MEF as commander JTF Somalia, CENTCOM moved to augment his 1st MEF staff with personnel drawn from component commands. On 4 December, COL Sam E. Hatton, Deputy Commander, 13th Corps Support Command, was designated as JTF Somalia J-4. He and his newly established joint logistical staff began development of a theater logistical estimate. Emerging from this estimate was the requirement for a theater level logistics management plan and theater

³⁵ Allard, pg14.

logistics command to link the strategic logistic base to operational logistics within the theater of operations.³⁶

The logistical environment for ORH was austere. Civil war and crime had destroyed the local economy and had severely damaged the transportation infrastructure. Host nation support of the type seen during Operation Desert Storm was not available. Electricity, running water, and most common amenities were nonexistent. Effectively, all sustainment support had to be deployed into the theater.³⁷ The lack of local resources and emphasis during planning hampered LOGCAP operations.³⁸

Figures 2 and 3 outline the U.S. theater command and control structures for both ORH and UNOSOM II. In both cases, CENTCOM chose to form a JTF responsible for C2 of all activities in the area of operations. Significantly, the CINC failed to designate a theater ASCC in either case. Rather, a joint logistical support element was formed to provide theater logistical command and control and sustainment support. Selected ASCC functions, principally deployment planning, were assigned to the 10th Mountain Division staff, the designated ARFOR headquarters.

³⁶ Lamont Woody, "Coalition Logistics: A Case Study in Operation Restore Hope," (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 3 June 1994), p. 64.

³⁷ Center for Lessons Learned, "Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope 3 Dec 1992 -4 May 1993: Operations Other Than War," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 15 November 1993), p. XII-1.

³⁸ CALL lessons learned, operation Restore Hope, 7 May 93, p. 16. Many similar issues of loss or under utilized resources emerged as multi-hatted staffs attempted to perform duties for which they were not doctrinally organized to perform. Likewise, the requirement placed on the ARFOR to simultaneously plan and execute a major deployment proved exceptionally difficult.

Figure 2. PEACE OPERATIONS MATRIX
UNITAF Somalia Command Relationships





Figure 3.

Figure 3. PEACE OPERATIONS MATRIX
UNISOM II AND USFORSOM



MARFOR's 1st FSSG (FWD) provided the initial theater logistical support from stores located on prepositioned shipping. The JTF J4 section provided logistical command and control. JTF Somalia activated a theater Support Command (JTFSUPCOM) 14 December 92 (D+5). Upon arrival in theater it was to provide common items and theater level logistical support for the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) operations. US Army's 13th COSCOM from Ft Hood, Texas provided the bulk of JTFSUPCOM staff and headquarters personnel to include its commander, Army BG Soloman. The staff was further augmented by personnel from the 10th Mountain Division DISCOM.³⁹ It assumed full responsibility for theater logistical support operations from J-4 JTF Somalia on 29 January 93. JTFSUPCOM assumed responsibility for port operations, traffic and movement functions, and common item support to coalition forces from the MARFOR on or about D+50.

Within the Army, ASCC functional responsibilities were assumed by various headquarters in a haphazard fashion to address specific issues. Headquarters, JTF Somalia relied upon the 10th Mountain Division, its designated ARFOR, as its principle army point of contact and assigned it duties and responsibilities accordingly. As a result, during the initial planning and deployment phases, the 10th Mountain Division staff soon found itself overloaded, attempting to prepare itself for deployment while taking on selected ASCC functions. Especially burdensome were requirements to take part in force structure planning, deployment planning, and force sustainment planning while simultaneously directing ARFOR training, staging, operational planning and deployment.

³⁹ Arnold, p24

This was especially difficult given the abbreviated planning-to-execution window for the operation and the associated requirement for early deployment of the ARFOR staff itself into theater. The 10th Mountain Division was assigned these responsibility by the JTF despite its lack of expertise or capability. The ARFOR deployment cell consisted of the division's G3-Air officer and a handful of personnel hastily designated for deployment system training. This was required as no divisional staff section was staffed or trained in the use of JOPES to input, monitor, or validate the TPFDL. Historically, this had been a corps level function. Likewise, the division had only a single WWMCCS operator to support the continuous requirement to input deployment data. Compounding the problem, the ARFOR staff did not have direct access or control over the Army portion of the TPFDL. Instead, it had to depend on three different headquarters to operate in a coordinated manner to insure force flow was in accordance with operational planning requirements.⁴⁰ For example, ARCENT attempted to manage the flow of non-10th Mountain and other Ft Drum units with little or no consultation with the ARFOR staff.⁴¹ The failure to establish a single controlling headquarters for Army deployment, an ASCC function, had devastating effect on the speed and efficiency of the deployment itself. Eighteen percent of Army equipment shipped by sealift to Somalia during the critical first 60 days of the operation were unnecessary forcing their immediate return to CONUS.⁴² The shipment and subsequent return of needless equipment seriously

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 7. The headquarters were 18th Corps at FT Bragg, North Carolina; ARCENT and U.S. Army FORSCOM at FT Gillem, Georgia.

⁴¹ Ibid p. 7.

⁴² CALL Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned, p.5.

disrupted the entire transportation system and delayed arrival of other key equipment and supplies.

Another critical issue asserting a heavy influence upon support command logisticians was the responsibility to meet the tactical support needs of many UNITAF coalition nations. In addition to shouldering responsibility for providing the theater wide U.S. operational-tactical logistical interface, JTFSUPCOM assumed an active role as a tactical logistics headquarter to provide the tactical support functions for many nations. The requirement to provide “common use” supplies for coalition forces meant more than simply making supplies available. It also included the performance of all other tactical functions associated with supply. These included storage, stockage management, transportation, and distribution control. In the understaffed, ad-hoc JTFSUPCOM headquarters, meeting these immediate tactical logistical requirements became the main focus of the headquarters. Fulfilling long range planning and strategic/operational sustainment functions was left to the ARFOR itself and to the JTF J4.

CENTCOM's rationale for deciding not to establish an ASCC headquarters is unclear. The confusion created by its failure to establish clear lines of responsibility and authority was substantial. For example, MG Arnold, the ARFOR commander notes that he was forced to simultaneously coordinated with four different headquarters, 18th ABN Corps (US Army), US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), ARCENT (McDill AFB), and I MEF (JTF Somalia) for planning and deployment.⁴³ Apart from building TPFDD deployment data, sustainment planning was constrained to issues of days of supply and

⁴³ Arnold, p.26.

tactical logistical functions. It is an inescapable conclusion that ARCENT played only a limited role in operational planning and deployment control. Likewise, there appears to have been no thought of employing 3d Army in its doctrinal role as ASCC headquarters in support of the operation. Rather, CENTCOM relied on its Desert Storm experience and created an ad hoc, joint theater support command. It is critical to note that the hastily organized command was not configured to provide all of the operational sustainment functions required for Army forces. With a few exceptions, tactical logistical units were cobbled together to provide tactical logistical support to U.S. and coalition forces. Compounding the problem, the late formation of the support command precluded any significant role in operational planning, deployment, and RSOI functions.

There are a number of plausible explanations for CENTCOM's failure to address the theater ASCC issue. First, it is likely that the command saw no reason to do so. Having both ARCENT and FORSCOM available to fulfill that role, it assumed that any "Army" service support requirements would be provided in a business as usual manner. Second, the CENTCOM planning staff appears to have been captive of its own Desert Storm experience and saw establishment of a joint theater support command as the most efficient way to meet anticipated service requirements. It is also likely that the light infantry base upon which the ARFOR was built may have convinced CENTCOM planners that the corresponding logistical support requirements would be equally "light" and required no special considerations. Regardless of the rationale, CENTCOM planners tended to address ORH as a limited duration, tactical operation that did not require a theater organizational solution. Balancing force cap considerations with anticipated mission requirements led to deployment of a well-armed force capable of

executing the immediately required tactical security mission. Similarly, sustainment planning focused on short term, tactical logistics. Inefficiencies during deployment were accepted as part of the cost of compressed time schedules. Long term strategic and operational sustainment issues were simply not addressed.

Operation Joint Endeavor: Peace Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-6)⁴⁴

After nearly three years of limited involvement in events in the former state of Yugoslavia, U.S. forces under NATO command began Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE). OJE represented the largest military operation in Europe since the Second World War, in December of 1995. EUCOM, the U.S. unified command tasked with support to the operation deployed a joint task force built around the 1st Armored Division (U.S.) (1AD) to meet U.S. commitments to the operation. Preliminary planning for the operation that would become Joint Endeavor began in early September 1995 in response to JCS queries concerning force requirements. CINCEUR was designated as a force provider and supporting CINC for what the expected NATO commanded operation. In contrast to Somalia planning, EUCOM quickly confirmed U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) would retain its role as the theater ASCC in support of the operation. As a result, parallel planning was conducted among all key headquarters. This facilitated synchronization of U.S. sustainment plans with those being developed by NATO's operational headquarters,

⁴⁴ Sources for the summarized account of action of OJE was taken from Center for Lessons Learned, "Lessons Learned Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, May, 1996); Center for Lessons Learned, "CAAT 10 Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina: RSOI, Title 10 Sustainment and Force Protection," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, August, 1996); Personal notes prepared while the author was serving as Chief, Plans for V Corps and USAREUR FWD during the period June 95-June 96.

principally Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Operation Joint Endeavor sprang from a negotiated settlement concluded in late November, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio ending hostilities among warring factions in the former Yugoslavian state of Bosnia. The formal peace agreement was signed in Paris 14 December 1995. The mission to implement what became known as the "Dayton Accords" fell to the military arm of NATO which began immediate execution of plans prepared following Dayton to meet the implementation requirements. Operational command and control was exercised through NATO channels from the North Atlantic Council through the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to Commander, Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH). The Allied Ready Reaction Corps (ARRC) was designated as ground component command exercising NATO OPCON of three multinational divisions operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H). U.S. led, multinational air and naval operations, supporting the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission to the former Yugoslavia assumed similar roles under NATO command. NATO's initial milestone requirement was to establish command and control in the region and assume responsibility of the AOR from UNPROFOR no later than 20 December 1995.

The primary U.S. force contribution to the Implementation Force (IFOR), dubbed Task Force Eagle, consisted of "Old Ironsides" the 1st AD augmented with six V Corps (U.S.) separate brigades and three multinational brigades.⁴⁵ The U.S. also contributed unit and individual augmentations for the ARRC headquarters, a national support

⁴⁵ Turkish Regimental Combat Team, Russian Airborne Bde, and a composite Nordic Bde drawn from the nations of the Baltic region to include former Warsaw Pact participants Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia.

element (NSE), and air, naval, and special operations forces working throughout the AOR. While joint, the U.S. force committed into Bosnia-Herzegovina was overwhelmingly drawn from the U.S. Army. At its peak, nearly 25,000 U.S. Army soldiers, nearly 5/6 of the total U.S. force commitment, were supporting OJE.

U.S. policy (in Bosnia) focused on five goals: sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserved the country's territorial integrity and provided a viable future for all its peoples; stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict; halting the slaughter of innocents; preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan war and helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.⁴⁶ While the first three goals reflect regional humanitarian concerns the latter two goals are directly linked to U.S. strategic objectives as outlined in the national security strategy statement.⁴⁷ The strategic importance of the operation is illustrated in this excerpt taken from a message from the former Chairman of the JCS, GEN Vessey, to the commander of the U.S. task force, MG Nash.

"...The reputation of the United States, the future of NATO, the future of united action to prevent war ride on the tracks of Old Ironsides."⁴⁸

Operation Joint Endeavor was, from the beginning, a peace enforcement operation. Coalition forces were fully authorized to use force if necessary to compel compliance by the FWF with the military components of the Dayton accords. The initial military tasks assigned to the IFOR IAW the Dayton accords included:

⁴⁶ National Security Strategy, p. 35 .

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 11-12.

⁴⁸ Center for Lessons Learned, "Lessons Learned Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, May, 1996), foreward..

- Accept Transfer of Authority (TOA) throughout the area of operations from the existing UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) NLT +96 hours.

- Separate the FWF by establishment of a Zone of Separation (ZOS) NLT D+30.

- Enforce FWF withdrawal from the area of the ZOS and designated areas for transfer.


- Ensure freedom of movement throughout B-H.

- Monitor and enforce, as required, FWF demilitarization activities to include demining, weapons stockpiling, demobilization, etc.

As with operations in Somalia, Operation Joint Endeavor was executed under conditions increasingly common to peace enforcement operations. Of greatest significance to this study, OJE was a combined operation executed with a non U.S. operational chain of command (see Figure 4). Forces were committed under NATO command.⁴⁹ Transfer of authority (TOA) of U.S. forces to NATO control did not take place until they had been certified mission ready by U.S. command authorities and deployed into the AFSOUTH AOR. TF Eagle executed its duties under NATO OPCON. Conversely, logistical support, to include deployment into the AOR, was a national responsibility in accordance with NATO procedures. U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) provided command and control for sustainment operations supporting all U.S. Army forces and personnel to include those supporting deployed NATO headquarters

⁴⁹ It should be noted that U.S. officers filled most of the key NATO command billets. the NATO SACEUR, GEN Joulwan, also served as U.S. CINCEUR and the commander AFSOUTH was U.S. Admiral Smith. While this eased language problems, it is an open question as to its impact on communications as U.S. only headquarters were often at larger heads with their NATO equivalents.

Figure 4. PEACE OPERATIONS MATRIX
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
COMMAND AND CONTROL



such as AFSOUTH and the ARRC. USAREUR maintained administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces serving in theater while coordinating support activities with the AFSOUTH Deputy Commander for Support (MG Farmen, U.S. Army).

Similarly, OJE required a major force deployment on an externally imposed, short time line for establishing operational capability. Unlike ORH, however, the deployment problem was one of intra-theater movement of forward deployed Army forces⁵⁰ rather than joint forces deployed from a CONUS base. Despite the massive size of the deployment, there was little dependence on strategic transportation system or

⁵⁰ Well over 4000 CONUS based personnel and units were deployed to Europe in support of OJE. The vast majority of these back filled requirements in Germany created by units serving in Bosnia.

resources.⁵¹ OJE represented the first overland deployment for the U.S. Army since 1945 and was executed across the winter, Christmas holiday season.⁵² The coordination of rail, road, and intratheater air movement of both U.S. and coalition forces became a critical task.⁵³ In contrast to ORH, OJE employed a predominantly heavy, high technology force rather than light force characteristic of previous peace operation deployments. This was in response to threat conditions,⁵⁴ the rugged, compartmentalized terrain, requirements for 24 hour, all weather monitoring capabilities, and force protection considerations. The force composition, coupled with the compressed, politically derived timelines heightened the criticality of reception, staging, integration and onward movement activities and created substantial force sustainment and training issues.

Like Somalia, the operating environment within B-H was austere. Characteristic of many peace enforcement operations, the regional infrastructure was heavily damaged and the local economy largely destroyed. The political climate greatly reduced the possibility of host nation support. Any contracting effort with an ethnic group or state within the former Yugoslavia was open to political criticism that would lessen the credibility of the IFOR. The political environment was largely fractured along ethnic lines. The Bosnian federal government was in its embryonic stage and had no real control over the country. What varied significantly from operating conditions found during ORH

⁵¹ 12 C17 strategic airlifters were made available to support deployment. Of these only six were cleared for flights into B-H. In addition, poor winter weather conditions greatly restricted air operations during much of the initial deployment period.

⁵² The availability of host nation support was greatly reduced due to holiday considerations. One key fact-Bundestrail train availability was reduced from the anticipated 15-20 trains per day to 6 during the first month of deployment.

⁵³ MG Nash was quoted as saying that "the rail plan could only be fully appreciated by von Schieffen. All told deployment required 2,277 buses and trucks, 362 trains, and 1,358 air sorties to move more than 27,000 PAX, 9,000 vehicles and nearly 200,000 MTONs of equipment and supplies.

⁵⁴ heavy weopns; tank bn adjacent to TFE LOCs

was the wide range of climatic and environmental extremes confronting the force. Force deployment began during severe winter cold and precipitation, then cycled through spring thaws and flooding, summer heat, and fall rains back into a winter freeze. Seasonal diseases threatened the health of the force while seasonal weather and its accompanying conditions (mud slides, flooding, etc.) interfered with efforts to improve roads, build bridges, and erect temporary structures.⁵⁵ Overcoming these conditions required comprehensive planning of force protection measures. This planning focused on training and equipping troops to combat effectively the ever changing environment conditions.

In addition, the one year duration of the mission coupled with the Army's decision not to rotate units, made maintaining soldier readiness more difficult. These readiness issues ranged from MOS and crew served weapons training, soldier professional development opportunities, maintenance of soldier and family morale, to preventing soldier complacency. USAREUR (Fwd) planned and directed a variety of theater training and morale programs designed to maintain the fighting edge of deployed soldiers and the morale of their families. Likewise, the command planned and executed major equipment upgrade and modification programs to support force protection and assure technological dominance. Significantly, USAREUR (FWD) also planned and supported periodic reorganization of TF Eagle to facilitate maximum operational effectiveness and to minimize unit recovery time upon redeployment. Empowered by its ADCON relationship with the deployed force, USAREUR (Fwd) served as an effective

⁵⁵ During the 3 months prior to force deployment, Bosnian military forces had suffered nearly 300 deaths to a local, virus based fever. The spring warming was expected to bring an outbreak of vector carried diseases such as Hemoragic fever and malaria. Source: Health assessment briefing to DCINC, USAREUR Nov, 95.

ASCC headquarters. TF Eagle was freed, in turn, to focus on its operational taskings from the NATO chain of command.

CINCEUR chose to support the NATO led operation through his service component commands instead of forming a JTF. This was consistent with both NATO command procedures and with his early approach to support for UNPROFOR operations. Air and naval forces already positioned to support UNPROFOR reverted from their UN support role to their appropriate component command under NATO's AFSOUTH headquarters. TF Eagle was placed NATO OPCON to the Land Component Command (LCC)/COMARRC (see Figure 4). Critically CINCEUR retained ADCON of TF Eagle through his Army Service Component Command headquarters, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR). He accepted the recommendation to establish a forward headquarters in the vicinity of the AOR to provide forward command and control of sustainment operations and direct liaison with TF Eagle. Support for air and naval forces remained a service component responsibility.

A second critical organizational decision made by the CINC was to form and forward position an ASCC headquarters and support command. It is important to note that both a headquarters, USAREUR (Fwd)⁵⁶, and a separate support command, 21st TAACOM (Fwd) were established and then positioned forward to support the ARFOR, TF Eagle. This was consistent with Army doctrine. Doctrine allows for the ASCC, in conjunction with the ARFOR, to develop an intermediate staging base (ISB) as required offshore or in a third country close to the contingency area. The Army commander tasked

⁵⁶ The ASCC was designated USAREUR (FWD) instead of 7th U.S. Army (Fwd) as a result of NATO political sensitivities.

with this responsibility stages forces and supporting resources and then pushes them forward in support of the operation.⁵⁷

Deployment was a national responsibility. Hence, EUCOM, through its service components, controlled intra-theater deployment instead of NATO. The forward positioning of USAREUR (Fwd) allowed it to meter force flow so to insure that forces and sustainment requirements were always in balance and to conduct RSOI activities upon force arrival. Likewise, TF Eagle was relieved of responsibility for staging, deploying and conducting RSOI support. They were, therefore, able to focus on their own preparation for deployment and , upon arrival in the AOR, on the operational tasks at hand under NATO operational control.

After deployment, USAREUR (Fwd) shifted the priority of effort to force sustainment activities. These activities included continued force protection measures, force modernization enhancements, “in-country” crew and unit training, LOGCAP and contracting supervision, and improvements in soldier quality of life. The ASCC continued to perform RSOI functions for late deploying units and personnel as well as service and stage units for redeployment from the AOR.

OJE was successfully completed in late December 1996 and the IFOR replaced with a smaller, Stabilization Force (SFOR). This division (-) size force is expected to be operational for a period 18 months. USAREUR (FWD) maintains a correspondingly reduced sized ASCC headquarters at the theater ISB site near Kaposvar, Hungary.

COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS

⁵⁷ FM 100-7, p. A-4.

Any assessment of the effectiveness of the operational sustainment structures established by the theater CINCs must begin with a review of their success in meeting sustainment requirements. Table 3 summarizes those sustainment functions satisfied during each operation. Although adequate tactical logistical support was provided forces during both operations, there appears to be a significant difference in the level and effectiveness of operational and strategic sustainment support.

In the final
analysis, sustainment
support to both Operations

Restore Hope and
Joint Endeavor was
sufficient to successfully
meet the basic mission
requirements.
However, as illustrated by
Table 3 data, sustainment
support to ORH was, at
best, marginal in meeting
the doctrinal requirements
for operational and
strategic sustainment
support. This had

**Table 3. ASCC EFFECTIVENESS
LOGISTICAL FUNCTION SATISFACTION**

		<u>ORH</u>	<u>OJE</u>
Strategic			
• Mobilization		X	X
• Material Acquisition			X
• Projecting Forces		M	X
• Strategic Mobility		X	X
• Strategic Concentration of Logistics			X
Operational			
• Log Planning			X
• Joint Sustainment Coord		X	M
• Host Nation Support		M	X
• Contract Management		X	X
• LOGCAP		M	X
• Automation Management			X
• Infrastructure Development		M	X
• RSOI			X
• Pers Services Support		X	X
• Health Services Support		X	X
• ISB/COMMZ Operation			X
• Reconstitution Management			X
Tactical			
• Manning		X	X
• Arming		X	X
• Fueling		X	X
• Fixing		X	X
• Moving		X	X
• Soldier Sustainment		X	X

X- Doctrinally complete support

M- Marginal Support

tremendously negative effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of the sustainment effort and, by extension, the execution of operational tasks.

Given their relative performance, what can be learned from these two operations about the organization of the theater and function of the ASCC? Three main ideas emerge from an analysis of the contrasting organizational approaches. First, externally imposed caps on in theater deployment strengths will often preclude the deployment of a doctrinal, multi-echelon, logistical organizations. The alternative strategies employed to meet end strength limits should insure that all required logistical sustainment functions are addressed. Second, CINCs should, whenever possible, use existing ASCC structures instead of forming ad hoc functional commands. Third, Army planning responsibility for the full range of sustainment support functions should be assigned to a single headquarters. The resulting planning efforts should synchronize sustainment activities from initial force formation through force post-operational recovery and reconstitution.

Limits on the strength of the force deployed heavily influenced planning for both operations. In both cases, the NCA limited the strength of AOR forces without regard for the assigned tasks.⁵⁸ Externally imposed limits on in-theater strength placed a premium on establishing the proper balance between deployment of tactical combat formations and the required theater sustainment forces. For CENTCOM and ORH, this resulted in efforts to save spaces by dual hatting units, organizations and headquarters. The resulting JTFSUPCOM organization was tasked to provide both command and control and theater

⁵⁸ For ORH see Arnold, pg 11. ARFOR force cap set a 13.4K well short of the 20K initial estimate; For OJE the author participated in analysis which called for a greater than 30K US Army force to be committed as part of TF Eagle in B-H. Subsequently, the total Joint U.S. force strength was capped at 25K. This number also included those U.S. forces augmenting or supporting NATO headquarters and other coalition forces.

sustainment support. Resourced to conduct tactical logistics, JTFSUPCOM provided minimal operational and strategic sustainment. Operational and strategic sustainment was provided from the CONUS base to meet only *immediate needs* on a case by case basis. In contrast, EUCOM chose a different approach for OJE. Deeming a requirement for a dedicated ASCC sustainment headquarters, EUCOM chose to move its strategic/operational sustainment interface “off shore” by establishing an intermediate staging base in neighboring Hungary to avoid violating force cap restrictions. Likewise, it established a separate, subordinate logistics support command, the 21st TAACOM (Fwd) to execute operational logistical functions. In doing so, EUCOM ensured that multi-tiered, logistical support was proactively provided in support of the operational commanders needs and that Army force sustainment support was comprehensive, inclusive, and synchronized throughout the operation.

A second critical consideration for theater organization is whether to use existing organizations to perform required functions or create an ad hoc formation. For OJE, EUCOM chose to use its assigned ASCC to perform that function. USAREUR, as the OJE theater ASCC, was operational and involved from the beginning of the mission planning process in August 1995. It led the parallel planning effort for the Army with NATO. It provided TF Eagle as well as CONUS based augmenting forces a single U.S. point of contact prior to and during the operation. In addition, USAREUR developed a comprehensive, theater sustainment campaign plan that addressed tactical, operational, and strategic sustainment functions. In addition, because it retained responsibility for most of TF Eagle units post deployment, USAREUR planning extended through the transition, redeployment, homestation support, and reconstitution phases of the operation.

The resulting plan brought a high degree of synchronization and consistency. As an existing staff, USAREUR was able to quickly integrate the necessary augmentees and deploy USAREUR (Fwd) with its designated support command ahead of TF Eagle to coordinate deployment and direct RSOI activities. This was critical in an environment in which operational and sustainment capabilities had to be built simultaneously.

As noted earlier, CENTCOM chose to form a JTFSUPCOM to provide sustainment support for the coalition. The JTFSUPCOM was activated five days into the deployment, built as an ad hoc composite of corps and division level troops, and was not available until D+50 to assume responsibility for theater sustainment support. Hence the command did not participate in initial planning and, once in place, was consumed by day to day tactical sustainment support requirements. As a tactical logistical headquarters, JTFSUPCOM did a credible job in executing operational logistical functions within its capability but was largely unable to take the longer, strategic view of its sustainment mission.

The failure to designate and resource a supporting ASCC headquarters resulted in that function being distributed among a number of CONUS based organizations. This violates the principle of unity of command and diluted the effectiveness of support rendered. Problems with deployment planning and execution are emblematic of this problem. Unity of command has long been one of the basic doctrinal principles used to coordinate the planning and execution of military operation. One of the primary reasons why the CINC must organize the theater of operations is to define command relationships in an effort to promote unity of command. The practice of establishing ad hoc commands under the time constrained planning and execution horizons common to many

peace enforcement operations appears to be functionally perilous. In an environment where clarity of command responsibility and authority are key, the use of existing headquarters and organizations would seem to be all the more recommended. MAJ John Tibbets reached a similar conclusion in his study of the doctrinal implications of theater logistical operations stating that "Existing organizations are a better solution to responsiveness than ad-hoc modularity."⁵⁹ JTF Somalia and its follow-on during UNOSOM II, USFORSOM, might have been better served if 3d Army had been assigned the responsibilities and commensurate authorities of the theater ASCC.

The third major conclusion of this study is that establishing an ASCC as the single focal point for all aspects of Army sustainment planning has a positive effect. When properly identified and empowered, this headquarters can play a vital role in linking strategic and operational sustainment support of Army forces to the tactical logistical operations being conducted in the field. This doctrinal role can be executed in support of and in coordination with a joint support command or ARFOR component force. This point was clearly evident in contrasting the completeness and integration of Army planning effort for ORH and OJE. Identification and delegation of specific operational responsibilities to USAREUR as an ASCC headquarters for OJE established a single planning point of contact for all aspects of forming, training, and deploying TF Eagle. Likewise, the establishment of an ADCON relationship with all Army forces deployed during the operation had the effect of sustaining the ASCC as a single point of contact for all sustainment activities regardless of echelon. Conversely, the absence of a

⁵⁹ John R. Tibbets, "Power Projection Logistics: What Theater Support Unit?," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 19 May 1995), p. 38.

singular ASCC for ORH led to the fragmentation of the planning process and effectively divorced the largely tactical, in-country sustainment functions from the operational and strategic sustainment base in CONUS. Significantly, neither CENTCOM nor ARCENT's initial planning horizon extended beyond the entry and lodgment security phases of the operation. As a result, planning during the initial phase was not synchronized with the end game strategies for Army forces; that is, theater transition activities, unit rotation policies, redeployment procedures, and reconstitution of JSCAP required force capabilities. Task organized units returning to parent headquarters require common guidance and standards. These activities were largely developed as separate planning actions by the JTF in theater or by ARFOR parent unit headquarters upon arrival at home station. The lack of a long view of the problem was a specific concern of MG Arnold, the ARFOR commander. He expressed concern that the "long term consequences for readiness, training, and quality of life" needed to be addressed.⁶⁰ From its wartime experiences, Army doctrine calls for these activities to be controlled and directed by a headquarters "two up" from the operational echelon. Candidate headquarters might have included U.S. Army FORSCOM, ARCENT, or a designated theater ASCC.

In contrast, USAREUR began immediately to develop the force transition plans, policies, and procedures necessary to synchronize transition, redeployment and ground operational requirements and to speed efficient unit reconstitution. Examples of this process included:

- Plans for redesigning the force as initial operation tasks were completed
- Establishment of in-AOR training centers designed to maintain small unit METL task proficiency

⁶⁰ Arnold, p. 24.

- Organization of unit and individual Rest and Relaxation programs (R&R)
- Synchronization of barracks renovation projects within central Europe with anticipated unit return dates.⁶¹

The effectiveness of this planning is best illustrated by the rapid recovery of the 1st Armored Division and other Task Force Eagle units upon their return from Bosnia. MG David L. Grange, Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization for the Army staff estimates TF Eagle forces regained pre-deployment unit readiness and proficiency in collective conventional wartime tasks within four months of return from OJE.⁶² The speed of unit recovery is remarkable when compared to the eighteen months estimated time required for unit recovery from the conventional operations they executed during Operation Desert Storm.⁶³

In comparing the two operations it should be noted that EUCOM enjoyed a number of significant advantages in comparison to CENTCOM in the development of their respective plans. Despite its complexity, the OJE command structure was not an ad hoc organization. National prerogatives and command responsibilities within NATO were well understood. NATO procedures helped minimize C3I problems as they occurred during planning and subsequent execution. EUCOM also benefited from its existing theater structure. The primary forces used for OJE are assigned to EUCOM.

⁶¹ As an example of force redesign, selected engineer units were introduced early to perform LOC opening and base camp construction projects were scheduled for early redeployment. Similarly, withdrawal of light infantry units providing initial force presence were synchronized with the closure of other elements of TF Eagle to meet force cap guidance.

⁶² David L. Grange and Benton Borum, The Readiness Factor, A Prescription For Preparing the Army For All Contemporary Challenges, Armed Forces Journal International, April 1997, p 25.

⁶³ This estimate was provided by LTG John Abrams, Deputy Commanding General, USAREUR (FWD), when being briefed on the concept for force recovery on or about 10 March 1996. LTG Abram's estimate of time required for unit recovery reflects his experience as Assistant Division Commander for Support of the 1st Cavalry Division at Ft Hood, Texas upon its return from ODS.

USAREUR, as the Army service component of EUCOM, already exercised command authority over most participating forces and was their sustainment headquarters. Established functional responsibilities and relationships were quickly exploited during execution. Conversely, U.S. Army FORSCOM's role as the Army's force generator for ORH complicated CENTCOM planning and rendered ARCENT a by-stander during much of the critical early planning. The intrusive presence of FORSCOM certainly reduced CENTCOM reliance on 3rd Army at the critical planning juncture. It may have caused CENTCOM to by-pass their ASCC headquarters during planning and, subsequently, during the operation. To avoid this confusion, CINCs must specifically identify the ASCC and assign its responsibilities and authorities.

Section V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

The purpose of this study has been to assess the options available to geographic CINCs for organizing theater sustainment support for Army forces employed in peace enforcement operations. The study began by reviewing peace enforcement operations to identify required theater sustainment activities. Next, a review of joint and Army doctrine determined both doctrinal sustainment requirements and alternative strategies for meeting those requirements. Armed with this information, the study reviewed and analyzed two recent U.S. peace enforcement operations: Operations Restore Hope and Joint Endeavor. From that analysis, some general conclusions have emerged.

First, peace enforcement operations should not be considered as simply large, tactical operations. Rather, they constitute theater operations with strategic implications and require a fully operational approach for organizing the theater. In accordance with joint doctrine, the CINC, supported by his ACC, is responsible for this function. He must

do so sufficiently early to allow for all operational headquarters to participate in the planning process.

Despite the current emphasis on “jointness,” CINCs and their staffs must understand and appreciate the different processes by which the services generate and sustain forces to meet operational requirements. Peace enforcement operations will normally require joint force participation. Therefore, formation of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to conduct peace enforcement operations has been the norm. As illustrated by Operation Restore Hope, these JTFs have often included a joint logistical command organized to meet theater sustainment requirements. Establishment of a joint logistical staff or joint support command neither insures that theater ASCC responsibilities will be addressed nor that support provided will be adequate. Joint doctrine permits the CINC to “modify standard arrangements to meet the specific requirements of each situation and to promote unity of effort.”⁶⁴ Caution, however, must be applied when existing organizational relationships or functions are modified in the name of jointness. If a joint logistical command option is employed in lieu of using service component support, the ASCC must be involved in the planning process. It must also conduct parallel activities; that is, training, force mobilization, force modernization, etc., while the CINC completes his operational concept. The unique operational and strategic sustainment requirements of the U.S. Army may demand a different solution than that for the other service participants. That is why joint doctrine retains its emphasis on service component involvement in the sustainment process.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation, p. V-4,5.

⁶⁵ Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), p. IV-3.

When considering options for forming a contingency ASCC, the use of existing organizations and headquarters appears to be the most efficient way to meet the requirement. Each of the four unified commands responsible for a specific land area have assigned an Army service component headquarters that could be utilized to meet the operational requirement. They are available for immediate integration into the planning process and are already players in the Army's strategic/operational/ tactical sustainment process. While each of these headquarters may require some augmentation to become fully deployable, the required augmentation pales in comparison to the requirement to form a fully staffed headquarters from scratch.

In addition to establishing a responsible headquarters to execute ASCC responsibilities, CINCs must insure that the sustainment structure includes forces capable of executing operational sustainment functions. Operational sustainment is much more than staff and command functions planned and controlled at echelons above corps.⁶⁶ The formation of a separate theater support command is, of itself, insufficient to meet army theater sustainment requirements for PE operations. CENTCOM's formation of a JTFSUPCOM, modeled on its Desert Storm experiences, to support ORH was inappropriate and failed to meet all logistical needs. Although operating factors often collapse responsibilities for strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment functions into a single deployed echelon, sustainment requirements go beyond the capacity of any single echelon's logistical headquarters. Without substantial augmentation, Army COSCOM and DISCOM headquarters and associated units do not have the equipment,

⁶⁶ Peter Lichtenberger, "Theater Army Support Command: Support for the Non-Forward Deployed Force," (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Military Studies Program, 1992), p. 48.

expertise or orientation to perform effectively as a theater logistical headquarters. They are doctrinally organized and equipped to provide tactical logistical support. Their organizations are normally tailored to support selected units organic to their parent organization and they routinely lack the planning and communications structures necessary to serve as a theater coordinating headquarters. Giving such an organization, joint support responsibilities only exacerbate the problem.

The importance of an intermediate logistical headquarters is increased by the potential requirement to provide common user items support for other, multinational forces. Canadian MG Lewis MacKenzie, commander of the UNPROFOR mission to the former Yugoslavia and a veteran of a number of U.N. sponsored peacekeeping missions worldwide, has suggested that the U.S. assume a central role in the sustainment of UN peace operations. In recognition of U.S. logistical expertise and system of worldwide basis, MG MacKenzie states "Among nations, only the U.S. is capable of providing the badly needed logistics support to UN forces in the field. The U.S. manages large logistics problems, both in planning and execution, better than anyone else. If they were to provide the necessary support, two major goals would be achieved: the UN would receive outstanding logistics support; and the U.S. would have an audit trail at the UN."⁶⁷ Regardless of the resolution of MG MacKenzie's suggestion, the U.S. can expect coalition partners to request substantial logistical support to during future PE operations. The presence of a properly staffed headquarters capable of support coordination may be critical.

⁶⁷ Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper -The Road to Sarejevo. (Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993) p. 332.

Peace enforcement sustainment support is a complex enterprise. It requires headquarters and logistical organizations to address issues of organization and functional responsibility that would not their concern during normal conventional operations. But, as the Army's Center for Lessons Learned has found, "Logistical support during peace operations is not normal military logistics and cannot be perceived as business as usual. It is often unique and more complex than logistical support for any other mission."⁶⁸ While U.S. Army logisticians and soldiers have demonstrated exceptional adaptability in meeting logistical challenges of peace operations, there is no reason why their versatility and ability to improvise should serve as the basis of theater sustainment effort. For the ARFOR conducting peace enforcement operations, a robust, operationally focused logistical command and control element, e.g., a designated ASCC is a necessity.

⁶⁸ pg xiii-1 call newsletter 93-8 dec 93

COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

ADCON- Administrative Control
AOR- Area of responsibility
APOD- arrival port of debarkation
ARFOR- Army Forces
ACC- Army Component Command
ASCC- Army Service Component Command
CENTCOM- U.S. Central Command
CINC- Commander in Chief
COCOM- Combatant Command
COMMZ- Communication Zone
CONUS- Continental United States
COSCOM- Corps support command
DISCOM- Division support command
DOD- Department of Defense
EAC- Echelons above corps
EUCOM- U.S. European Command
HNS- Host Nation Support
JOPES- Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JSCAP- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF- Joint Task Force
LOC- Lines of Communications
LOGCAP- Logistical Civilian Augmentation Program
MARFOR- Marine Forces
NCA- National Command Authority
NMS- National Military Strategy
NSS- National Security Strategy
NGO- Non-governmental agencies
OJE- Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina Dec 95-Mar 97
ORH- Operation Restore Hope, Somalia Dec 92- May 93
PE- Peace Enforcement
PVO- Private voluntary organizations
TAACOM- Theater Army area command
TASC- Theater Army support command
TPFDD- Time phased force deployment data
UN- United Nations
UNOSOM- UN Operation, Somalia
UNPROFOR- UN Protection Force (Former Republic of Yugoslavia)
UPC- Unified Command Plan
WWMMCCS- World Wide Military Movement Command and Control System

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