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
**RESERVE COMPONENT FUTURE FORCE READINESS,
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
OPERATIONAL COMMANDER**


By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.


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ABSTRACT

Major weaknesses within the readiness reporting system slow the process of the Services to provide *trained* and ready forces to the CINC in a *timely* manner. These weaknesses hinder the CINC's ability to get inside the enemy decision cycle.

The 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) provided the foundation and means by which the Secretary of Defense made "readiness" the number one priority within the Department of Defense (DOD). Additionally, the BUR provided guidance for modifying the U.S. defense force to meet future security threats. Part of that modification was a new role for the Reserve Component (RC) force, in the form of increased reliance, which gave them a new relevance to the warfighting Commander In Chief (CINC). The BUR also created new problems for the CINC in meeting the increased number of defense requirements, with a rapidly decreasing defense force.

This paper discusses Reserve Component training readiness, with particular emphasis on Army National Guard training and the Status Of Resources and Training System (SORTS), used to report, track and monitor training readiness; Improvements and innovations in each can help ease the problems for the warfighting CINC, created by the BUR. Improvements in these two areas will reduce the time RC units need for post mobilization training and increase the potential of providing RC capabilities to the CINC in less time. This will allow the CINC a greater potential for operating within the enemy decision cycle and a greater chance for military success at any level along the spectrum of armed conflict.

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INTRODUCTION

The 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) provided the foundation and means by which the Secretary of Defense made “readiness” the number one priority within the Department of Defense (DOD). Additionally, the BUR provided guidance for modifying the U.S. defense force to meet future security threats. Part of that modification was a new role for the Reserve Component (RC) force, in the form of increased reliance, which gave them a new relevance to the warfighting Commander In Chief (CINC).

The CINCs are responsible for identifying capabilities needed from the Services to protect U.S. interest. Considering the readiness priority and the new role of the RC it is critical for the Services to identify readiness shortfalls. These short falls must be identified early enough to correct them before they begin to negatively effect force capabilities. Thus, the ability to quickly assess readiness has major implications for the CINC. Defense force readiness is reported and analyzed based on four areas: personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment maintenance and training. This paper focuses on Reserve Component training readiness, with particular emphasis on Army National Guard training. Additionally, the system used to report, track and monitor readiness will be discussed in unclassified terms.

Major weaknesses within the readiness reporting system slow the process of the Services to provide trained and ready forces to the CINC. These weaknesses hinder the CINCs ability to get inside the enemy decision cycle. Thus, the implication is that weaknesses in readiness reporting may jeopardize the future ability of the military to protect U.S. vital interests.

RELEVANCE OF THE RC TO THE CINC

Changing threats and world situations, including the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the former Soviet Union caused the defense department to initiate the Bottom-Up Review in 1993. The BUR served to provide direction for the reassessment of all the U.S. defense concepts, plans and programs. In addition, the Secretary of Defense established readiness as the number one priority within the DOD. As a result of the BUR, the size, mix and compositions of the defense force began to take on modifications which would better allow for the future defense of U.S. vital interests. BUR force modifications called for the reduction in size of both the Active and Reserve component forces. The CINC now faced a complex problem of managing increased defense requirements, due to the current world situations, with a rapidly decreasing military force.

In an attempt to satisfy the CINC's problem, the BUR also provided guidance for meeting the challenge of maintaining readiness while executing an increased number of requirements with an increasingly smaller defense force. This challenge was met by executing a concept called "compensating leverage." Compensating leverage increases the use of reserve component forces in order to reduce the risks and control the cost of a smaller Active component force. "This does not mean maintaining a larger reserve and National Guard force, but rather making smarter use of the RC forces."¹ The collapse of the former Soviet Union eliminated the need for U.S. forces capable of defeating a large regenerative enemy. Thus, the requirement for a large Reserve component force decreased. However, a smaller Active component force must increase its reliance on the capabilities of the RC to meet

identified security requirements. Today, the RC must be incorporated into all operational planning. Therefore, the RC has a renewed relevance to the warfighting CINC.

By adapting the RC forces to meet new requirements and assigning them missions that properly utilize their strengths, they can be available to assist the CINC at any level along the spectrum of armed conflict.² Improved readiness and flexibility make the reserve components more ready to address the two major regional conflict (MRC) scenario. By receiving additional resourcing Army National Guard (ARNG) combat units are able to support higher readiness levels, therefore providing added combat power to the CINC when needed. The BUR directed that “Army National Guard combat units will be better trained, more capable, and more ready. If mobilized early during a conflict, brigade-sized units could provide extra security and flexibility if a second conflict arose while the first was still going on.”³ This was the basis for the formation of the 15 National Guard Enhanced Combat Brigades. These brigades eliminated the Army National Guard “round-out” and “round-up” organizations. Enhanced brigades are referred to as enhanced separate brigades (e-SB) and organized as separate combat brigades with the ability to provide combat capability to any CINC as required. Priority resourcing for these brigades allows them to maintain the highest levels of readiness in personnel and equipment. Training in the e-SB is resourced to achieve a lower level of readiness prior to deployment. However, once mobilized the e-SB must be at the highest readiness level, including training, within 90 days. Being able to rely on the e-SB provides the CINC with several advantages, including timely additional combat power, flexibility and sustainability, all of which increase his ability to operate within the enemy decision cycle.

In addition to the e-SB, other National Guard forces along with the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) force are resourced to help promote internal stability and security during peace operations and humanitarian assistance operations. Reserve components as a whole will be resourced to provide support to the Active component in the areas of strategic airlift, service support operations and civil affairs. Reserve components can also be available to provide rotational forces and a replacement base to the CINC, allowing for operations over a long time frame, if needed.⁴

The BUR addressed each Service in detail, identifying missions and future force structure modifications as well as infrastructure changes. Of particular importance to the reserve component force was the subject of increased RC use through compensating leverage. The importance of increased use to the RC centered around training the force to meet required readiness levels, so that the CINC is assured of having ready forces when and where he needs them.

RC TRAINING

Having established the relevance of the Reserve component forces to the CINC, and the fact that additional resourcing is directed to selected reserve component forces, the focus shifts to discussing how RC forces are meeting readiness training requirements.

To meet the training requirements for priority units as well as for the balance of the Reserve component force (including the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps), the Services have developed many innovative training concepts. These concepts come under a defense department approach called “mission readiness.”

Mission readiness means the allocation of resources and the adjustment of the readiness of military units based on the military threats to the United States; the amount of warning time of the potential hostilities; the

likelihood that particular military units will be used in a military action; and the ability of the military departments to transport those units to the scene of a military action.⁵

In short, mission readiness means time required vs. time available. It is the relationship between the time required to prepare a unit for the mission capability specified by the CINC from its readiness baseline of today, and the time available until the unit is needed in the theater. (Figure I)⁶ For example, if a unit requires 45 days of post mobilization training to meet specified readiness levels, but the CINC needs to have that unit available in theater within 30 days, it can be considered non-mission ready, because time required is greater than time available. Therefore, additional training resources must be directed to that unit so that required training time is reduced to below 30 days. Due to resource constraints, many units are authorized to maintain lower training readiness levels prior to mobilization. Thus, the additional training resourcing must be provided post mobilization, causing an increased demand on being able to provide resources in a timely manner. Nevertheless, training readiness is not the only area that effects mission readiness. As stated in the definition, mission readiness considers all factors which influence a unit's ability to provide capability to the CINC when needed. This includes equipment, personnel, transportation, lift etc. (Figures II & III) Therefore, even though this paper is focused on training readiness, monitoring all areas of readiness is essential to successfully supporting the warfighting CINC.

Within the defense department's "mission readiness" approach to innovative training is the Army's Bold Shift initiative. After the Gulf War the Army initiated a program called Bold Shift, which included the Army National Guard's Project Standard Bearer, and the Army Reserve's Project Prime. Both Prime and Standard Bearer were designed to improve

individual deployability, sharpen emphasis on unit leadership training and increase the compatibility of active units with Guard and Reserve units.⁷ Out of these programs came the identification of high priority units within the Army Reserve component force (Army National Guard and Army Reserve). These high priority units include the e-SB, and the Force Support Packages (FSP). The FSP consist of identified combat support and combat service support units from both the ARNG and the USAR, which receive added resourcing in order to maintain the highest possible readiness levels and shortest deployment times. These units will be the first of the Army Reserve component force to provide support to the CINC. Thus, the training requirements for these priority units are among the highest in the Army and the various Army training initiatives are used maintain their training readiness levels.

Being ready to fight remains the first priority of the Reserve components, and training is the cornerstone of readiness.⁸ In spite of this cornerstone, training resources for non-priority units have decreased greatly since the BUR. Additionally, continued force reductions have magnified the challenge of maintaining RC training readiness. These events created the implementation of several training innovations to maintain both individual and collective RC unit training. Each of these training innovations are described below.

The Ground Force Readiness Enhancement Program (GFRE). The GFRE is a program developed by the Army and managed by Forces Command (FORSCOM) to maximize Reserve component unit readiness. The primary focus is on pre-mobilization training readiness within the enhanced brigades.⁹ This allows the FORSCOM commander to have direct involvement with the training of the National Guard combat units which have the highest readiness and training requirements. These combat units must be able to provide

combat capability to the CINC within 90 days of mobilization. Thus, by focusing on pre-mobilization training during peace time, these units are insured of being able to meet the needs of the CINC. This increases the CINC's ability to operate inside of the enemies decision cycle by creating flexibility, avoiding culminating points of victory, increasing sustainability, maximizing combat power, etc.

The Total Army School System (TASS). The TASS program is designed to provide the Army with a school system that shares the training load, uses certified instructors, meets equal accreditation standards and teaches standard courses to Active, Reserve and National Guard soldiers.¹⁰

Simulation In Training for Advanced Readiness (SIMITAR). The Congressionally mandated Army National Guard Advanced Research Projects Agency has developed two goals for SIMITAR. The first goal is to increase ARNG training readiness through the application of distributed information technologies and innovative training strategies. The second goal is to develop and integrate affordable technologies that enable realistic training at local armories or at a soldier's home through use of personal computers.¹¹

Flexible Training Schedule Initiatives. The Flexible Training Schedule Initiative basically allows the commander to vary inactive duty training and annual training periods by conducting more frequent training periods. Traditionally, Reserve component personnel trained two days per month and two weeks per year on annual training. In many cases this rigid structure allowed for the loss of additional training opportunities. With flexible training schedules, reserve duty can be supplemented by additional training periods. For example, aviators can schedule additional flight training with flexible training schedules. The Air

National Guard allows members returning from three-level technical training to perform their missed unit training assemblies consecutively to get valuable hands-on training which improves unit cohesiveness. The Marine Corps Reserve has flexible schedules to provide units with better field training opportunities. Likewise, the Air Force Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, and Naval Reserve use variations of the available training time to provide maximum support to the gaining command.¹²

Total Force Distance Learning Initiatives. Total force distance learning is new to the military, but the civilian higher education community has been using this concept through modern technology for years. Basically, the training material is distributed to remote locations via satellite or other communications means, and the student interacts just as if he or she were in a traditional classroom setting. Eighty four members of the 28th rotation of the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) Sinai, (4-505 Parachute Infantry regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division) completed required military education using this system during their assignment in the Sinai.¹³

Operational Missions. The 28th rotation of the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) Sinai, was the first rotation in the history of the MFO Sinai to be conducted by a unit composed of 80% Army Reserve component (USAR and ARNG) and 20% Active component personnel.¹⁴ It was a complete success and adds to the growing list of “operational missions” which the Reserve Component has undertaken since the completion of the BUR. Taking part in operational missions many times requires the use of Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). The PSRC involuntarily activates Reserve component personnel and units for support to operational commanders. RC forces have participated in many operational

missions including Southern Watch in Southern Iraq, Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Sharp Guard in the Adriatic Sea, Provide Promise and Deny Flight, both in Bosnia. To insure that RC personnel and units remain trained and ready to accomplish these types of missions in the future, increased emphasis is put on “Joint” and “overseas” training.

Joint Reserve Unit Training. There are no Joint Reserve Units at this time.

Nevertheless, Reserve personnel and units are providing ongoing support to joint headquarters commands. This not only provides joint training opportunity for individual Reserve personnel, but provides needed support to the joint commander. The establishment of joint reserve units is not a dead issue. These units “would facilitate augmentation in time of conflict and peacetime support to the CINCs. Such units would also provide common joint training among the Service elements.”¹⁵

Overseas Training (ODT). Overseas training, some time referred to as Overseas Deployment Training (ODT), is one of the most effective training opportunities for the Reserve components. “The planning necessary for a Reserve component unit to prepare and execute an overseas training mission closely parallels the planning required in the event of mobilization and deployment.”¹⁶ Thus, as world situations change and the overseas training program matures, the objectives and purposes of overseas training are refined to fit the needs of the warfighting CINC. Overseas training has caused the development of a closer relationship between the CINC and the Reserve component forces.

Training, Readiness and Operations Unit Planning, Execution and Resourcing System (TROUPERS). This is the Army National Guard’s most recent initiative. It is a system of insuring that forces are trained and capable of providing timely support to the warfighting

CINC. TROUPERS is being developed by National Guard Bureau (NGB), utilizing Calibre Systems (a civilian contractor), to expedite delivery of a working systems integration tool this fiscal year, 1997.

In today's resourcing environment, the "old way" of doing business is not suited to meet the current and upcoming challenge. We need new tools to support individual, unit, state and Service *training* goals. We must synchronize training plans with the dollars required to ensure successful execution. The major problem identified in doing this is timeliness of information transfer on the expenditure and availability of the limited resources. It is crucial for any program manager to have a tracking device to establish not only the amount of resources he/she has, but how much he/she has expended. The key to such a tracking system is *timeliness*. The Plans, Operations, and Training Officers (POTO) from each of the states are concerned that "current" financial information, for decision making, averaged 45 days old by the time they received it. The goal is to empower trainers to rapidly identify available funds, capture the dollars, and reinvest those dollars in the training of ARNG soldiers, so that trained and capable units can be provided to the warfighting CINC when needed.

*TROUPERS is a reports engine that will draw information from existing databases, and present current information to the senior leaders within each state concerning budget, reservation, obligation, execution, and forecasted year-end execution for Annual Training, IDT, Schools, Special Training, and National Guard supply accounts. The goal is to allow the state senior leaders to know current resource allocations, identify changing/new resource requirements, and have the ability to wargame for 'what if' scenarios to support future training events.*¹⁷

Together with the state representatives, NGB redefines how training can be planned, and how resources can be allocated in the coming years. By connecting old "stovepipe" systems with new processes, trainers are able to transform data into useful information to plan

training. The system saves dollars, reduces state-level workloads and improves the accuracy of information. It links directly to data stored by standard Army and National Guard systems, to generate a current, accurate prediction of who will participate in training, what it will cost, and the impact of unanticipated changes. For example, if the unit commander excuses three people from IDT, those payroll dollars are immediately identified, and could be made available to support sending one person to a two week school. Similarly, if the state cancels a conference, those dollars can be immediately quantified and diverted to support sending more people to Annual Training, or to some other training event. It forecasts the cost of an event months before the date of execution, automatically advises NGB of changes to scheduled training events and then updates the USPFO Budget Officer on the execution obligation plans.

The fundamental concept is that it can provide the ability to simultaneously view the cost of training planned by the POTO against the resources available, it will clearly identify unfinanced training events and most importantly, it will support wargaming and alternative training opportunities based on available resources. The system is updated daily, and can provide timely access to current training readiness and future training resources.¹⁸

Future capabilities include linkages to the Status Of Resources and Training System (SORTS). This is a classified system of reporting unit readiness in the areas of personnel, equipment and training. This linkage would come very close to giving the CINC timely visibility of Army National Guard unit training readiness so decisions may be made supporting deliberate planning as well as crisis action planning. (Figures IV&V)

READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM & THE CINC

The discussion of the BUR has identified readiness as the number one priority within the defense department and has shown the renewed relevance of the Reserve Components to the warfighting CINC. The reliance on the Reserve component forces by the CINC, caused the creation of training innovations now being implemented by the RC to meet and maintain training readiness. The system which allows the Services and the CINCs to monitor force readiness is called the Status Of Resources and Training System (SORTS).

SORTS “is the single, automated reporting system within the Department of Defense that provides the National Command Authority (NCA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the authoritative identification, location, assignment, personnel, and equipment data for registered units and organizations of the U.S. Armed Forces.”¹⁹ Since 1984 various reports have identified systemic problems within the reporting system. Many of those problems remain today. If this system is the means by which the NCA, CJCS, along with the CINCs and Services Chiefs monitor readiness, and problems still exist, it is logical that those problems be identified and corrected. Thus, the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense was tasked with reporting on the efficiency and effectiveness of the SORTS in providing timely and accurate information to meet the needs of the National Command Authorities and senior Department of Defense (DOD) decision makers.²⁰ The results of the 1996 DOD Inspector General’s report evaluated SORTS as being “ineffective in accomplishing its highest priorities--supporting crisis response and deliberate planning...CINCs cannot rely on SORTS to plan deployments; determine authoritative unit status or location; assess execution of Operations Plans; or make effective, time-sensitive

decisions.” In short, the CINC cannot use SORTS to access unit training readiness or assist him in getting inside the enemies decision cycle.²¹

All the Services use the SORTS to a high degree. The Air Force and the Marine Corps use SORTS data to identify, confirm and resolve resourcing and training shortfalls. The Navy uses SORTS to track historical problems, perform trend analysis and conduct routine briefings. The Army SORTS affects virtually all functional management areas and systems, to include unit logistics, supply, budgeting and personnel pay and assignments. However, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) has developed a lack of confidence in the system mainly, because of untimely data. In some cases the data is out dated by years.²² This being the case, not only is the CINC unable to use this tool to get into the enemy decision cycle, the tool may actually be causing the CINC to move further away from that cycle. This could lead to poor, untimely decisions by the operational commander and worst yet, it could potentially allow the enemy to get inside our decision cycle.

In 1995, while the DOD Inspector General was evaluating the SORTS, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) published its Report. The CORM report stated, among other things, that “the geographic CINCs need joint readiness assessments to plan for employment of forces not assigned to them in peacetime.” This includes many Reserve component forces, the majority of which are assigned to CINC Atlantic Command during peacetime. The report goes on to say that “more importantly, the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense need these assessments to help them plan future forces.”²³

In June of 1994 the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness issued its report. The Task Force concluded that although there are some downward indicators, the general readiness posture of today's conventional and unconventional forces is acceptable in most areas. Additionally noted was the need to be able to identify readiness inhibitors early enough so that corrective action could be taken, before a drop in readiness occurred.²⁴

These reports are in effect telling the defense department that there is a need for more timely and accurate data on the readiness and training of the force. Many efforts are ongoing to address this need. The Global Command and Control (GCCS) system is trying to do just that. Within GCCS is the Global Command and Control, Status Of Resources And Training System, called GSORTS, which is the system of transmitting SORTS reports over the GCCS. However, in the DOD IG report on SORTS, "representatives from Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Command, indicated that when GCCS was installed, the staff received no written documentation, no effective user handbook or guidance, and only scant training on the software."²⁵ Nevertheless, attempts are being made to bridge the problem of timely and accurate delivery of readiness and training data.

Once this problem is corrected, commanders at all levels along with warfighting CINC's will have timely and accurate visibility to force readiness, including RC training readiness. This in turn will allow the Reserve components to focus resources where needed so that selected units can meet training readiness requirements and be "mission ready." Mission ready forces enhance the CINC's ability to operate within the enemy decision cycle. That helps to ensure that our forces are capable of meeting future national security requirements and protect U.S. vital interests.

CONCLUSION

As the United States continues to meet the force structure and training requirements established in the BUR, and the warfighting CINCs continue to identify military capabilities required to meet national security needs and protect vital interest, the Reserve components continue to train forces in order to maintain readiness and remain relevant to the warfighting CINC. However, for the problems associated with monitoring and tracking force readiness to be improved, systems such as the ARNG TROUPERS must be correctly integrated with the SORTS and GCCS so that timely forecasting of trends can be identifies. This will allow the CINCs, Service Chiefs and commanders at all levels to have timely visibility of resources and readiness, and thus be able to direct those resources where needed so that RC forces can meet mission readiness and provide capabilities to the warfighting CINC when and where needed.

Major weaknesses within the readiness reporting system slow the process of the Services to provide *trained* and ready forces to the CINC. These weaknesses hinder the CINCs ability to get inside the enemy decision cycle. Thus, the implication is that weaknesses in readiness reporting may jeopardize the future ability of the military to protect U.S. vital interests. Waiting for an unexpected threat to emerge in order to justify the application of resources is too late. Continuing to monitor training and readiness in traditional ways is ineffective in meeting the demands of timely training assessment and mission readiness.

I recommend that the senior leaders within the defense department apply the required resources to improve and integrate the various readiness and training systems, now, so that the CINCs can be assured of having every possible advantage of operating inside the enemy decision cycle today and in the future.

DEPLOYABILITY RATING

Time Required to Prepare the Unit
for the Mission Capability Specified
-- by the CinC -- from its Readiness
Baseline of TODAY.

DEPLOYABILITY
RATING =

Time Available Until the
Unit is Needed in the Theater.

(As established by CinC OPLAN)

READY TO DO WHAT AND WHEN?

- Forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to deal with dangers to US national security.
- Forces must meet standards in terms of:
 - Time it takes to mobilize, deploy and engage;
 - Missions they should be able to accomplish once engaged;
 - Time they should remain engaged.¹

SORTS reports on how well units meet Service standards for people, equipment and training.

¹ Annual Report to the President and the Congress, SECDEF, JAN 94

MISSION READINESS

DEPLOYABILITY: Time Required & Time Available

ALERT OF UNIT

PERSONNEL PLAN = Full MOSQ

TRAINING PLAN =
Mission Training

EQUIPPING PLAN = Fill to 100%

Time Unit
Is Available

DEPLOYMENT

Time
Required

Unit Deployment
Plan

0 days

Time from Unit Mobilization

Ready to
Load Data




Figure IV




Figure V

NOTES

¹ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington: 1993), 91.

² Ibid., 91.

³ Ibid., 22.

⁴ Ibid., 91.

⁵ U.S. Dept. of Defense, FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: 1995), 64.

⁶ U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Strategic Plans and Analysis, "Mission Readiness," Briefing, Washington: 9 February 1995.

⁷ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington: 1993), 94-95.

⁸ U.S. Dept. of Defense, FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: 1995), 64.

⁹ Ibid., 71.

¹⁰ Ibid., 73.

¹¹ Ibid., 73.

¹² Ibid., 73-74.

¹³ U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Reserve Component Soldiers As Peacekeepers, (Alexandria, VA: 1996), 191.

¹⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵ U.S. Dept. of Defense, FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: 1995), 78.

¹⁶ Ibid., 78.

¹⁷ U.S. Army National Guard Director of Operations and Training, "TROUPERS." Briefing, National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC: 1 May 1997.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Inspector General, Evaluation Report on the Status Of Resources and Training System (Washington: 1996), i.

²⁰ Ibid., i-ii.

²¹ Ibid., 5.

²² Ibid., 9.

²³ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington: 1995), 2-11.

²⁴ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness (Washington: 1994), 10.

²⁵ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Inspector General, Evaluation Report on the Status Of Resources and Training System (Washington: 1996), 17.

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