


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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The Media Factor: An Essential Ingredient To Operational Success

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract of

### THE MEDIA FACTOR: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

Media is as important a factor in military operations as fire and maneuver. Without the commander utilizing his operational art and leadership to plan for, manage and employ this factor, he may never realize total success of an operation. The report starts with a historical review of media relations from the Revolutionary War to the Haiti operation. The review demonstrates the evolution of the military's attitude toward the media, from the recommendations of the Sidle commission following the Grenada operation to the development of the *DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations* published after the Gulf War. The relationship of the media and the operational commander is discussed, particularly how the media has an affect on the principles of war and the necessity for media planning to be integrated with operational planning. General Boomer, USMC, General Zinni, USMC and General Peay, USA are presented as examples of commanders who successfully understood the media and developed a trust due to open communication with the media. The possible advantageous use of the media as a tool on the battlefield is another option that the commander must consider during the planning.

Finally, a consolidated list of recommendations that have been eluded to throughout the paper are presented. Understanding the role and purpose of the media, keeping the media informed, ensuring access to the commander by the media, and planning and training for media relations are the recommendations. They are intended to facilitate the commander in implementing his operational art with respect to the media factor that is present in all operations.

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## Introduction

The news media are the principle source of information about the military for the general public and military families. Thus, commanders must view the news media as a critical means of communicating with the American public and with military members and families.<sup>1</sup>

The media has become a critical factor in the planning and execution of military operations. The previous quote implies that it is imperative that the commander take the media into consideration throughout all the phases of an operation.

The media forms and distributes the images of the military and war. This has been shown throughout history, particularly by the American film industry. "Films have become our way of seeing ourselves and of asking others to see us."<sup>2</sup> This also holds true for the effects of mass media. The media feels that it is their duty to keep the public informed. No one will contest, in a democracy, the right of the people to know what is going on. What is at question is, what do the people have the right to know, how much, and when do they have the right to know?<sup>3</sup> This is the basis of the strain in the military-media relations.

In our society the media is a very powerful tool. It is a tool that cannot be ignored or neglected by today's military commanders. The commander should utilize his operational art and leadership to properly plan for and utilize this powerful tool. He can use the media to his advantage to achieve and maintain the public's will.

The mass media is not only capable of shaping products but also shaping the perceptions we have. It's not just a question of what we see but what we don't see, what we are told but what we are not told. It's a question of whose stories are told and who's doing the telling....Public policy is frequently based on public perception....So clearly, what stories are told and what stories are left out really can shape our perception and then, as a result of that, public policy.<sup>4</sup>

Media coverage in the battlefield is an inevitability. With that in mind, commanders need to plan now, in peace time, how the media will be utilized, what guidelines will be imposed and what the implications of the media coverage will be.

The media factor should not be an afterthought for the operational commander. It is a factor that affects the operational factors, design and principles of war in all military operations.

Military operations are no longer defined only in terms of fire and maneuver, media relations should also be figured into the definition.<sup>5</sup>

A historical review will demonstrate the importance of the military-media relationship to the operational commander. This review will help surface the need for operational art in planning for and utilizing the media. In addition, it will help develop recommendations for the operational commander to integrate the media into the operation and smooth the road to total operational success.

### **Military-Media Relations: A Historical Perspective**

The military- media relationship is not a recent phenomenon. It dates as far back as the Revolutionary War. Newspapers in those days were not what is thought of as newspapers today. It took a long time for the news to reach the paper to be printed. A majority of the articles were opinion based, similar to one large editorial page. Nonetheless, revolutionary military leaders recognized the usefulness of the media and utilized it by publishing proclamations and orders. They even advertised rewards for deserters.<sup>6</sup> Despite the delay in information there was still concern over what was being printed. Still in its infancy, the relationship was starting to strain. George Washington expressed this concern when he wrote, "It is much to be wished that our printers were more discreet in many of their publications. We see in almost every paper proclamations or accounts transmitted by the enemy of an injurious nature."<sup>7</sup>

Military-media relations were not only an American problem. The British experienced the turbulence of the relationship during the Crimea war. William Howard Russell's (the 'father' of war correspondents) attacks on the incompetence of the higher command in the Crimea war severely injured the military - media relationship. He additionally reported on the senior officers' lack of concern for the suffering of the troops and the pitiful conditions they were forced to endure.<sup>8</sup> The uneasy relationship and mistrust of the media that resulted from this war were also a product of the fact that this was "the first time the actions and decisions of

the British commanders in the field were being subjected to censure by outsiders as a result of the journalistic insistence that the public 'had the right to know'."9

The Civil War brought the first significant media problem for the American military. This was the genesis of reporters in the battlefield with the troops. The army did not know what to make of it. Just as today, their major concern was operational security, and the fear that the reporters would give away their secrets. This in fact did happen. Three days prior to the Battle of Bull Run the entire Union order of battle and the battle plan of the army moving toward Manassas was published by a New York newspaper.<sup>10</sup> Even though this did not have any affect on the battle it did help cement the preconceived military attitude towards the media. Despite the security breach and claims of media dishonesty, the war, on the whole, was reported fairly accurately. This war caused the military commanders to start considering how to deal with the media. The suggestion of total media exclusion motivated General Sherman to write after the Civil War:

Yet so greedy are the people at large for war news that it is doubtful that any army commander can exclude all reporters without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his own safety.<sup>11</sup>

The handling of the media during World War I and II were quite similar, complete censorship and total control of access. This was acceptable by the majority of the media due to the fact that it was a patriotic press who supported the wars on the whole. Despite the restrictions, the nation's news organizations provided the American public with comprehensive coverage of the war.<sup>12</sup> The operational commanders did not have to be concerned about the media due to the tight restrictions. This was the best time for military-media relations.

The Vietnam war was a war in which no censorship was invoked. It was also the war that soured the relationship of the media and the military. The media felt they were being deceived and manipulated by the military. As a result, the daily news briefings were dubbed "The Five O'clock Follies." Conversely, many in the military felt that the media caused America to lose Vietnam. Unfortunately, this sentiment still lingers. The grass roots feeling

for the military was that it saw itself as the target of a media conspiracy and came out of the war enormously bitter.<sup>13</sup>

Following Vietnam, many military commanders felt that the media was something handled strictly by the public affairs officers. Despite Department of Defense (DOD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directives concerning media planning for military operations the commanders failed to grasp the idea that the media is an integral part of operational planning.<sup>14</sup> This was evident by the lack of media planning for the Grenada operation. As a result, the media was denied access for the first two days. Understandably, this did not strengthen military - media relations. Ironically, the public was not outraged over the issue. In fact, they supported the military actions, as they also supported the handling of the media during Operation Just Cause and Desert Storm.

The result of the Grenada media debacle was the establishment of the Sidle Commission to review and make recommendations to improve military - media relations during military operations. The eight recommendations of the commission are listed in Appendix A. The major idea to come out of the commission was the establishment of the DOD National Media Pool (DNMP).

The belief that the DNMP would solve the previous problems was proven false by Operation Just Cause in Panama. Without the local military commanders involvement or support, the DNMP was deployed. As a result, the pool was able only to cover the latter stages, after the critical phases of the operation were over. This is further evidence of the need for commanders to take personal interest and to include media plans into the operational plans. Resulting from Operation Just Cause, General Colin Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the point to major commanders :

Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations are important... and warrant your personal attention. ... Media coverage and pool support requirements must be planned simultaneously with operational plans and should address all aspects of operational activity. ...<sup>15</sup>



Despite the Gulf War coverage being the most comprehensive wartime news coverage in history,<sup>16</sup> there was still evidence of military commanders not totally embracing the idea of the media as an important factor in operational planning and execution. There was no plan for the maximum number of media that could be accommodated resulting in an overwhelming number on scene. Much to the media's dismay, the military implemented total control over the media. Following the war another attempt at calming the waters between the media and the military was conducted. The result was the *DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations* (see Appendix B). The main focus of these principles is the necessary personal involvement of the military commander in the media planning. The principles provide him a set of standards that have been agreed to and therefore he must take them into planning consideration.

Somalia and Haiti operations demonstrated that it appeared that military commanders were starting to learn the lessons concerning media operational planning. In Somalia, General Zinni, USMC, expertly demonstrated his understanding of the media as it relates to operations by the skill he used in managing the media factor resulting in a positive relationship and effect on the operation. The media and the military commanders expressed few complaints, concerning each other. These two conflicts are just the stepping stones for military commanders to fully embrace the media factor in their operational planning and design.

### **Media and the Operational Commander**

The history of war over the last 200 years has shown that where there is military conflict there will also be the media. A United States Army War College strategic study media analysis noted, "There is no longer a question of whether the news media will cover military operations; journalists will likely precede the force into the area of operation, and they will transmit images of events as they happen, perhaps from both sides of any conflict."<sup>17</sup> The operational commander needs to be aware of this and be properly prepared.

The commander must also realize that the media factor has an affect on the Principles of War. The Principles of War are “guides in formulating a theory of war. They are goals to be obtained in fighting a war.”<sup>18</sup> The specific principles are:

- |             |                    |
|-------------|--------------------|
| * Objective | * Security         |
| * Offensive | * Economy of Force |
| * Mass      | * Unity of Command |
| * Movement  | * Simplicity       |
| * Surprise  |                    |

The media is capable of directly or indirectly affecting several of these principles. Every military operation, in order to be successful, should move towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The media informs the public of the objective and goals. It is important that the public understands how they will be affected by operations. “The policy goals and motives for the operation need to be equally clear and simple, but also compelling so that citizens and allies alike will want to be a part of these operations, while our adversaries will feel powerless to escape the inevitable outcome if they oppose our goals.”<sup>19</sup> The media needs to have a clear understanding of the goals and objectives in order to accurately inform the public. The will of the people, a critical leg of the famous Carl von Clausewitz trinity<sup>20</sup>, must remain strong in order to achieve the objective (Vietnam is an example of what happens when the operational commanders lost the people’s will for the operation). Ensuring that the objective is clear for the media will help maintain the strength of this leg.

The commander also desires to achieve surprise on the enemy and in order to achieve that there must be security. Operational security is always a chief concern for the commander. As a result, he views the media as a weakness in his security armor. Proper planning for and understanding of the media, however, will reduce the commanders worry that the media will detrimentally affect security and surprise.

Media planning is a critical part of the commander’s operational planning. The commander should be personally involved. Pete Williams, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, remarked, “No plan is complete until it has a plan on how the operation is going to be covered.”<sup>21</sup> It is important for the commander to understand that

public support for the operation is critical and he must have his story told. A perfect example of a commander who understood the media factor was General Walter E. Boomer, USMC. During the Gulf War General Boomer had an open door to the media. As a result the Marines got their story told and told well, while the army portrayed the totally opposite attitude and their story did not emerge. General Boomer summed up media planning by stating:

To exclude the [Public Affairs Officer] (PAO) from operational planning because the commander doesn't like the media is like excluding the medical officer because [the commander] doesn't like to deal with casualties. It costs nothing to allow the PAO to keep himself informed. Uncontrolled media and inept reporting might be the price if he is not informed.<sup>22</sup>

In order for the story to be told and the media to be less of a hindrance to the operation, the commander must be, as stressed by General Powell, personally involved. The PAO is his primary assistant, but the PAO cannot assume the responsibility for public affairs for the commander. The bottom line is that the commander may need the media to sell and promote the operation more than the media needs the military to boost its ratings.<sup>23</sup>

This is not to say that there should not be controls on the media. The question, "How should the media be regulated?" needs to be asked during the planning.

The first type of control that can be implemented is the organization of a press pool, as described in the Sidle commission. The press pool was born as a result of the exclusion of journalists from the Grenada operation. The objective is to allow journalists from several mediums to represent the press during future military operations. However, pools need to be implemented and utilized very carefully. Operation Just Cause is an example of poor planning and utilization of the press pool. Several media representatives argue that a tightly controlled pool limits access to potential stories and the whole system effectively creates an environment of censorship.<sup>24</sup> To prevent that from occurring, it is imperative that the commander understand that pools are the primary means of early access to operations. They should be as large as security and logistics will allow and they should be disbanded as soon as open media coverage

is feasible. With this understanding , the commander should achieve the success with the media that Lieutenant General Zinni, USMC realized in Somalia.

Another media control is complete censorship. This was the successful practice during World War I and II. However, the environment was different. In WW II, for example it was a "patriotic press fighting fascism and the evils in Japan."<sup>25</sup> The media and the public accepted the censorship. In today's operations the commander is dealing with a much more skeptical media. If total exclusion or manipulation of the media, as censorship could be considered, was the rule, then the military would be viewed as trying to hide some impropriety and would be the loser in the public affairs battle that comes with every operation. This option would not be the best one to choose for media regulation. A commander must be forthright and open with the media, while still maintaining operational security. "If there is bad news it is best to deliver it immediately rather than be accused later of a cover up."<sup>26</sup>

No matter whether controls or not are placed on the media, there should always be guidelines and ground rules set out. These should be worked out during the operational planning phase. (Appendix C is an example of the ground rules and guidelines during Operation Desert Shield.) "The military and the media must agree ... on when a story can be filed from the battlefield or the combat zone. [T]he call must be made by the military commander, who can best judge the threat to soldiers."<sup>27</sup> With these items in place it eliminates the guessing game for the military and the media. Each side knows what the standards are, and with constant communication between each other, these rules and guidelines should not be a major bone of contention.

### **Can The Media Be Trusted ?**

The crux of the matter really boils down to just one major issue of concern that divides [the military and the media], trust ... Trust is the single most important link between the military commander and the news person. Without it, the barrier will always be up to the free flow of information and collegiality so necessary to the resolution of all other problems.<sup>28</sup>

Trust is a major concern for the operational commander. Now that he has set up the guidelines and ground rules, can he trust the media to abide by them? On the whole, history shows that the media has done fairly well at not intentionally disclosing information that had the potential of jeopardizing the operation. The media that was on scene for the Gulf War, for example, was aware of the "left hook" plan but they did not print the information. During Haiti, some of the media was aware of the invasion plans yet they held the information and the military's confidence.

In order to develop the media's trust and the commander's trust for the media there needs to be a positive relationship developed between the two. The commander needs to ensure that the media has a thorough understanding of the rules and purpose behind them so that the media will be willing to operate under the rules. As mentioned earlier the commander should not try to manipulate the media which would just prevent any mutual trust from being established.

Some commanders have been successful in establishing pre-operation confidences with members of the media. General J. H. Binford Peay, USA, had one such relationship during the Gulf War. He had a *New York Times* reporter living with his unit, 101st Airborne. In order to ensure that the reporter got his story and the 101st got their story told, the general cut a deal with the reporter. He told the reporter, "I won't let you file anything until we're committed. You can live with my troops, you can talk to them about anything you want to, talk to me about anything you want to. And I guarantee you that you will get your story out because I will give you my helicopter. But only if you play by the rules."<sup>29</sup> General Peay clearly had developed a relationship and confidence with the media and as a result it was positive for both sides.

As important as it is to the success of the operation for the commander to keep his subordinate commanders informed, it is equally important to keep the media informed. Secretary of Defense William Perry stated:

When the media understands what they're involved in, and they're briefed on what the security considerations are and what the limitations are going to be - as long as you factor in what their needs are, and what they're there for - then the [relationship] is usually going to work out.<sup>30</sup>

The development of a mutual trust by keeping the flow of information open is what both parties need to facilitate the media's understanding. The commander's ability to communicate his situational awareness to the media is a real test of his operational leadership.<sup>31</sup>

Nevertheless, there are many civilian and military leaders that believe the media cannot be trusted with pre-operation confidence. Such leaders contend that there will always be one percent of the media that is untrustworthy. Granted, it is difficult to establish pre-operation confidence like the type that General Peay established with a large group. Nonetheless, the commander should still attempt to provide for the media as much information as security will allow. Mutual respect will be established and maintained, resulting in preserving this important relationship and preserving a very important asset. It is true that the media can be considered as adversaries, however it is the commander's operational leadership that prevents the media from turning into antagonists and therefore never being able to establish any mutual trust.

### **Another Tool Available for the Commander's Use**

U.S. forces must be capable of responding to media demands for instantaneous information, and of using the rapid transmission of data to its advantage. This magnifies the importance of tending to image considerations. ...But it also suggests the need for greater information dominance and for some thought about how modern, real-time news reporting can be used to U.S. advantage in future military operations.<sup>32</sup>

The operational commander must keep in mind that media can be used on the battlefield as another weapon. It is a very powerful tool that, if used correctly, can help influence the outcome of an operation. Just the mention of "using" the media for operational advantage will frighten many people. It is not suggesting, however, that the operational commander lie to the

media or mislead them. The idea is that "commanders must appreciate the impact that the media can make on military operations and must factor it into their plans and goals."<sup>33</sup>

The purpose of using the media as a battlefield weapon is to influence the outcome of the operation by limiting or eliminating the need to fire a shot. A major way to effect this influence is to change the public will and to place doubt on the purpose of the operation thereby causing policies to change or actions to be delayed. By using this weapon the commander manipulates the operational factors of time, space, and force.

Unfortunately, the American society is very vulnerable to the use of the media as a weapon against them. A recent example of this vulnerability is Saddam Hussein's skillful use of the media weapon.

Hussein successfully utilized the media to invoke terror by contributing to live coverage of Scud missiles streaking across the sky. Additionally, he reminded the American public that "war involves the loss of life and property, regardless of our carefully planned and executed 'surgical' air strikes,"<sup>34</sup> by encouraging media coverage of crying innocent civilians and displaying rubble of destroyed "civilian" targets. Hussein was also successful in causing Americans to question the purpose and strategy of the U.S. operation by timing the release of the hostages just prior to Christmas, therefore removing an objective for the allied mobilization. He was also able to manipulate the operational factors by timing his expression to negotiate to the media at the same time as the optimal weather for an allied attack developed. This affected the pace of the battle by delaying the ground attack another 24-48 hours.<sup>35</sup>

Even though Hussein was not ultimately successful in his operation, he displayed his understanding of the use of the media as a weapon and how to exploit that power to his own advantage.<sup>36</sup>

Commanders should realize that this powerful tool is available and that it is available to almost anyone, no matter how advanced a military force they possess. He should, therefore, plan accordingly to utilize and/or to counter this weapon.

## Recommendations for the Commander

This paper has demonstrated how the media has affected operational commanders and military operations in the past. It has revealed that the media is an important part of operations and can be used to a commander's advantage. Additionally, it has demonstrated that ultimately it is the commander who sets the tone for the success of media relations through the use of operational art. Operational art enables the commander to translate his joint force strategy into operational design and ultimately tactical actions by integrating key activities of all levels of war.<sup>37</sup>

The following is a consolidated list of a few recommendations, eluded to throughout the paper, that are intended to facilitate the operational commander to integrate the activities of the media and to smooth the path to success.

1) Understand the role of and purpose for the media in military operations. This is developed through training and education provided to all military members particularly operational commanders. A factor to media appreciation is the understanding of the logistics required for the media. This includes understanding and planning for the medium in which reporters will file their stories, whether it is a DOD transported satellite transmitter and receiver or transportation to the central media filing area. As large an effort as possible, that does not impede the mission or compromise operational security, should be undertaken to support the media.<sup>38</sup>

The effective use of the PAO is another facet that will enhance the commander's appreciation for the media. The PAO is the resident expert on the subject, therefore he should be included in the operational planning. As discussed earlier, he should be the commander's assistant for media affairs not the director of media affairs, that responsibility rests with the operational commander.

The fundamental factor that will lead to a media appreciation for the commander is his realization that the media representatives are generally responsible people who will comply with



reasonable limitations and can be trusted, but only if the commander and the media step off on the right foot together.<sup>39</sup>

2) Keep the media informed. In order to facilitate stepping off on the right foot and helping the media publish the accurate story the commander is looking for, the media must have knowledge of the operation. With this understanding they will realize the purpose of events and the reasons behind some of the restraints placed upon them. This, however, does not guarantee that they will like the restraint. Nonetheless, it provides them the background and operational understanding for the limitations. The commander should also try to reward the media for complying, as General Peay did in the Gulf War. For example, the media could be ensured that they will be provided the transportation to file their stories or the commander could assure the media that they will be told where the next story will break and provide them good positions to get the best shots. If the context and plan of the operation is provided to the media and that channel of information is kept open, the reports will be accurate and the media will feel as if the military is being up front with them. Lieutenant General Zinni, during Operation United Shield, masterfully planned for the press and kept them informed throughout. He stated, "I think it's a give-and-take proposition. It's a shared sense of cooperation. It's a willingness to work out the details to attain the best results all around."<sup>40</sup>

3) Ensure access to the commander and subordinates is provided to the media. "To ensure complete coverage of joint operations, commanders should plan to assist journalists to gain access to all unclassified forces."<sup>41</sup> In addition, the commander should make himself available, without interfering with the operation, to the media. The commander is the only one that can accurately deliver his command's story. Without the commander facing the media with solutions to problems or details of successes, the media may focus only on negative aspects of the operation. The commander must also keep his subordinates informed about the media. He needs to inform them of the presence of the media, the reason for their presence, and the need to be straightforward with the media. This advanced notice and the commander's guidance conveying his positive stance for the media is critical to the success of the relationship.

4) Plan and train for media relations. As mentioned throughout this paper, the commander, his staff, and subordinate commands should fully plan for the media factor of the operation and most importantly ensure complete understanding of the plan. The media planning should be conducted concurrently with the operational planning. It should be as detailed and dedicated planning as is conducted for other factors of the operation (i.e. deployment, employment, maneuver, etc.). Training should go hand in hand with the plan. A properly trained force will encourage success on the battlefield. This holds true for media relations as well as operational maneuver. Media training will provide the commander and subordinates familiarity with the plan and a necessary comfort factor in dealing with the media during the operation.

### **Conclusion**

Any commander today has to think about all this. Your psychological operations, your public affair relationships, the stories you're getting out, your relationship with the press - these are as important a part of your planning and execution as anything else in an operation. I think we need to think things through and plan before the event, rather than cope with situations as they occur.<sup>42</sup>

The era of the dedicated war correspondent is gone. The media has changed since those times and so has the military and the operations that the military are getting involved in. The military is going to be involved mostly in regional conflicts similar in size and composition to the Somali operation. This has introduced all types of media challenges for the commander. The military commander in the field will have to utilize his operational art and leadership in planning for and employment of the media.

The media plays a critical role in military operations. That role has evolved over time due in part to technology and the evolution of the military commander in his appreciation for the media factor of operations. Public perception of military operations is crucial to its success. The medium through which this perception generates itself is the media. The military

commander who understands the importance of public perception will keep the lines of communication with the media open, thoroughly plan for the media, and develop trust for the media representatives covering his operation. The media will turn into a "force multiplier" by keeping the troops motivated and keeping U.S. and world opinion firmly behind the operation.<sup>43</sup>

The relationship between the military and the media will not always be a favorable one. However, with mutual understanding, proper training, and a little give and take the most accurate (positive or critical) and informative stories will emerge. The media will be confident that they effectively and accurately informed the public. The military will be confident that they effectively got their story told and properly utilized the relationship that is an essential ingredient to military success. As demonstrated by earlier operations, successful operations are not totally successful unless the media factor is properly handled.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Joint Pub 1-07 Initial Draft, quoted in Richard M. Bridges, "The Military, The Media and The Next Conflict: Have We Learned Our Lesson?," Army, August 1995, 30.

<sup>2</sup> "The Media and Images of War: Perception Versus Reality," The Defense Monitor, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1994, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Bernard E. Trainor, "The Military-Media Boxing Match," Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 28.

<sup>4</sup> David Considine, quoted in "The Media and Images of War: Perception Versus Reality," The Defense Monitor, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1994, 7.

<sup>5</sup> Anthony C. Zinni and Frederick M. Lorenz, "Media Relations: A Commander's Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1995, 67.

<sup>6</sup> Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America's Team: The Odd Couple - A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military, (Nashville: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 35.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Alan Hooper, The Military and the Media, (England: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1982), 6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Trainor, 31.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>12</sup> Aukofer and Lawrence, 39.

<sup>13</sup> Trainor, 39.

<sup>14</sup> Aukofer and Lawrence, 44.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars," Parameters, Autumn 1994, 48.

<sup>18</sup> C. R. Brown, "The Principles of War," Proceedings, June 1949, 623.

<sup>19</sup> Stech, 51.

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- 20 The other two legs of the trinity are the government and the army.
- 21 Aukofer and Lawrence, 170.
- 22 Ibid., 80.
- 23 Larry Grossman, "Newshounds and the Dogs of War," Government Executive, September 1991, 31.
- 24 Zinni and Lorenz, 67.
- 25 Trainor, 34.
- 26 Zinni and Lorenz, 69.
- 27 Aukofer and Lawrence, 63.
- 28 Bridges, 39.
- 29 Aukofer and Lawrence, 64.
- 30 Ibid., 66.
- 31 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 86.
- 32 Stech, 46.
- 33 Ellen K. Haddock, "Media on the Battlefield: An Underestimated Weapon," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1992, 32.
- 34 Ibid., 31.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C., 1 February 1995), GL-10.
- 38 Zinni and Lorenz, 71.
- 39 Ibid., 69.
- 40 Anthony Zinni, "It's Not Nice and Neat," Proceedings, August 1995, 29.
- 41 Bridges, 33.

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<sup>42</sup> Zinni, 29.

<sup>43</sup> Stech, 47.

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## Appendix A

### Military Media Relations Panel (Sidle Panel) Recommendations

1. Public affairs planning for military operations should be conducted concurrently with operational planning.
2. When it becomes apparent during planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means for press access, planning should provide for the largest press pool possible and then minimize the length of time it is used until full coverage is feasible.
3. In connection with the use of pools, pre-established and updated press accreditation along with notification lists should be used to speed the notification and deployment process.
4. Media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established by the military.
5. Public affairs planning should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation. Military escorts should help correspondents get to the action.
6. Planners must consider media communications requirements and assure sufficient availability to all the media to send reports out quickly.
7. Planning should include transportation support.
8. Military and media leaders should meet to discuss mutual problems existing between military and media relationships.

## Appendix B

### DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations

The following principles have been adopted by representatives of major American news media and the Pentagon to be followed in any future combat situation involving American troops.

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard of covering U.S. military operations. But pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity - within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of the credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best effort to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special Operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool System.

## Appendix C

### Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

1. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."
2. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.
3. Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwait border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
4. Rules of engagement details.
5. Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.
6. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
7. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.
8. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
9. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
10. Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
11. Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angle of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.
12. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel lost of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provided tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

## Appendix C (cont.) Guidelines for News Media

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables converters, etc.

Night Operations - Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, provided they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

1. Upon registering with the [Joint Information Bureau], news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.
2. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with the reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed material to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be

immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporters news organization.

3. Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.