

**JFLCC:**  
**THE FIRST STEP**

A Monograph  
By  
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Armor



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
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## **ABSTRACT**

**JFLCC: THE FIRST STEP**, by Lieutenant Colonel Myron J. Griswold, USA, 56 pages.

The purpose of this research paper is to provide answers to a series of basic questions as a first step in addressing some of the details necessary to implement the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) concept in a theater of operations or war. These questions are: What is the role of a JFLCC?; What are the responsibilities of a JFLCC?; What functions must a JFLCC headquarters perform to fulfill its responsibilities?; and How should an Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters be organized to carry out the JFLCC functions? Answers to these questions were obtained by analyzing an assortment of doctrinal publications, monographs, and other documents relating to the JFLCC concept, and by examining this concept during the Army's Prairie Warrior exercise in May 1995. From this assessment, insights relating directly to the role, responsibilities, functions, and organization of a JFLCC headquarters have been identified.

The role for a functional land component commander as outlined in Joint Pub 3-0 is viable. He is an operational-level commander who provides unity of command and effort for employing land power to accomplish the operational objectives of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). The JFLCC's overall responsibility is to organize, plan, and direct execution of joint land operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and designation of command relationships. The JFLCC and his staff perform twenty core functions which are critical in conducting successful joint land operations. These functions, adapted from TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield, and also found in MCM-147-93, Universal Joint Task List, relate directly to the six operational level of war operating systems: intelligence, movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, command and control, and support. To help him perform the twenty core functions, the JFLCC organizes his headquarters with a joint staff. The JFLCC relies heavily on the J-2 and J-3 to help him organize, plan, direct, and control joint land operations. The J-2 directs the activities of his staff, and oversees the operation of the joint land intelligence center (JLIC). To integrate and synchronize the complementary capabilities of joint land forces, the J-3 normally organizes a battle staff and activates a joint land operations center (JLOC), a command and control facility not dissimilar from the JFC's joint operations center. It consists of a battle staff command element, a component liaison section, and four functionally organized battle staff teams - one each for operational movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, and support.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. PROBLEM BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

1. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, specifies that "[joint force commanders] JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of organizations . . ." "Functional componency can be appropriate when forces from two or more services operate in the same dimension or medium; a joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is one example."<sup>2</sup> In most cases, the JFLCC will be "the commander with the preponderance of land forces and the requisite command and control capabilities."<sup>3</sup> According to the U.S. Army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5, JFCs can "designate the senior commander of Army combat and support forces as the JFLCC."<sup>4</sup> "[He] could then place other land forces (U.S. Marines or allies) under [operational control] OPCON or [tactical control] TACON of the JFLCC."<sup>5</sup> "Likewise, Army forces could be placed under a JFLCC who is an officer from the U.S. Marine Corps."<sup>6</sup>

2. Beyond these pronouncements, however, there is a dearth of information in joint and Army doctrine on the JFLCC. The Joint Electronic Library (JEL) contains only twenty-nine references to JFLCC - fourteen joint, fourteen Army, zero Marine Corps, and one Air Force. In contrast to the well documented joint force air component commander (JFACC) concept -- three hundred sixty three references to JFACC in the JEL, and a U.S. Air Force primer which addresses how to put this concept into practice -- many of these references duplicate each other, and none of them explain the specific role, responsibilities, functions, and organization of a JFLCC headquarters. Given this lack of specificity on how to organize, plan, and execute land operations under a functional component, JFCs may hesitate to establish a JFLCC, even when conditions in the theater call for one. If, on the other hand, a JFC decides to designate a land force headquarters as a JFLCC regardless of its capability to serve in this role, he may jeopardize the accomplishment of his command's mission.

3. Neither of these two alternatives should be acceptable to the U.S. Army in light of its doctrinal commitment to have an Army Force (ARFOR) commander and staff serve as a JFLCC if the JFC so desires. The success of the JFC's campaign may rest on the capabilities of the JFLCC headquarters to organize, plan, and execute joint or combined land operations. However, an effective JFLCC headquarters will not exist by happenstance; it will require the Army to make some progress in answering several basic questions: What is the role of a JFLCC in a theater of operations or war?; What are the responsibilities of a JFLCC?; What functions must a JFLCC headquarters perform to fulfill its responsibilities?; and How should an ARFOR headquarters be organized to carry out the JFLCC functions? This paper will provide answers to these questions as a first step in addressing some of the details necessary to implement the JFLCC concept in a theater of operations or war.

#### B. METHOD AND SCOPE

To answer the questions outlined above it is appropriate to analyze them both theoretically and within the context of Prairie Warrior '95, an exercise designed to provide the U.S. Army with organizational and operational insights into its 21st Century force.<sup>7</sup> Sections II and III of this paper focus on presenting results from an extensive analysis of relevant doctrinal literature, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monographs, and other miscellaneous documents relating to the JFLCC concept. Section II addresses the selection, role, authority and responsibilities of a JFLCC, and the functions that a JFLCC headquarters must perform to fulfill its responsibilities. Section III suggests an appropriate structure for an ARFOR headquarters to carry out the JFLCC functions identified in the preceding section. Section IV presents six questions which the author intends to use to guide his efforts in examining the JFLCC concept during the Prairie Warrior exercise in May 1995. Results of this examination are presented in the

form of key observations and insights. Section V presents the conclusions derived from the research and analysis.

## II. JFLCC ROLE, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND FUNCTIONS

### A. SELECTION AND ROLE

1. JFCs may decide to organize their commands with a JFLCC. This decision may be appropriate, "when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives, and unity of command and effort are primary considerations."<sup>8</sup> For example, "major operations on land that have an immediate impact on one another [and forced-entry operations] may best be coordinated under a single land component commander."<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, JFCs should consider several other factors before deciding to designate a JFLCC: mission, enemy, forces available, terrain, and time available; the degree of theater maturity; the level of combat experience of subordinate land force commanders; the nature and size of the land force objective; and the service or nationality of the JFC vis-a-vis the major land force participating in the campaign.<sup>10</sup> JFCs will normally assign JFLCC responsibilities to the service component commander having the majority of land forces; "however, [they] will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the command and control capabilities in selecting a commander."<sup>11</sup>

2. In a highly complex operational environment involving the employment of one or more Army corps and one or more Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the JFC is likely to assign JFLCC responsibilities to the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) since he alone has the logistics and the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C4I) infrastructure needed to support sustained operations on land.<sup>12</sup> In this case, the ASCC has two basic options for carrying out these responsibilities: First,



“because of the complexity of the two tasks - operations and support - the ASCC may delegate the authority for performing the support task to a subordinate Army headquarters.”<sup>13</sup> This option permits the ASCC, as the JFLCC, to concentrate on conducting operations. Second, the ASCC can form and deploy an operational-level headquarters (e.g., a numbered army) to control the conduct of operations, while he continues to focus on providing support to Army units in the theater.<sup>14</sup> If the ASCC does not physically deploy to the theater of operations or war, “he may constitute and deploy, in addition to the operational-level headquarters that is conducting operations, a requisite headquarters that performs all command and control for the ASCC’s Title X support responsibilities within the [theater].”<sup>15</sup>

3. The primary purpose for a JFLCC is to provide unity of command and effort for employing land power to accomplish the operational objectives of the JFC. The JFLCC performs this role at the operational level of war: “the link among theater strategy, campaign plans, and tactics and the bridge between theaterwide campaigns and localized battles and engagements.”<sup>16</sup> “[He] focuses on operational responsibilities, leaving logistical support to the respective service component commander.”<sup>17</sup> As an operational-level commander, the JFLCC establishes and maintains linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, nongovernment, private voluntary, or United Nations organizations and conducts major land operations in support of the joint campaign.<sup>18</sup> In conducting these operations, the JFLCC integrates and synchronizes the complementary capabilities of the forces and assets available to him in order to defeat enemy land forces and control land areas. These forces include but are not limited to: units of the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and multinational field commands which fight battles and engagements, “theater intelligence assets, naval gunfire and fleet ballistic missiles, air interdiction, close air support, joint electronic warfare assets, and special operations forces (SOF).”<sup>19</sup>

## B. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The authority of the JFLCC is established by the JFC. Specifically, the JFC designates the forces or military capability that will be made available to the JFLCC and the command relationships for their employment. These relationships normally have the JFLCC exercising "OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capability or forces made available [for tasking]."<sup>20</sup> For example, a senior U.S. Army general serving as a JFLCC could have OPCON of assigned and attached Army forces and TACON of U.S. Marine Corps or allied forces. If, on the other hand, the JFLCC is a Marine Corps general, then he could exercise OPCON over assigned and attached U.S. Marine forces and TACON of U.S. Army or allied forces. However, it is not inconceivable that a JFC might decide to place both Army and Marine Corps units under the OPCON of the JFLCC. Such a decision would maximize the flexibility of the JFLCC in organizing his command for major land operations, thereby allowing him to capitalize on the complementary capabilities of his subordinate forces. The JFC may also establish supported and supporting relationships between his components to accomplish necessary tasks. Each component of the joint force can support or be supported by other components. The support command relationship authorizes the commander being supported, "to exercise general direction of the supporting effort."<sup>21</sup> "General direction includes designation of targets, timing, and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination or efficiency."<sup>22</sup>

2. The responsibilities of the JFLCC are assigned by the JFC. These include but are not limited to: organizing, planning, and directing execution of joint land operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and designation of command relationships. Normally, the JFLCC will have several specific responsibilities:

a. Providing forces and other means to subordinate headquarters so they have the assets necessary to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. One of the most

important *other means* is the allocation of sufficient time to plan and prepare for upcoming operations.<sup>23</sup>

b. Developing a joint land operations plan that best supports the operational objectives of the JFC. This plan must contain realistic missions and tasks and allow subordinate headquarters as much latitude as possible in developing a concept of operations that is *adequate, feasible, acceptable, and doctrinally sound*.<sup>24</sup>

c. Recommending to the JFC the proper employment of subordinate land forces to best accomplish his operational objectives.<sup>25</sup>

d. Directing the execution of joint land operations in a way that best supports the operational objectives of the JFC. To ensure effective joint operations, this exercise of operational direction by the JFLCC can not exceed the limits of his authority as established by the JFC.<sup>26</sup>

e. Coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the operations of other component commanders and appropriate government and non-government agencies.<sup>27</sup>

f. Functioning as the supported commander for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the land area of operations (AO) established by the JFC. In order to facilitate synchronization within this AO, the JFLCC "designates the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations."<sup>28</sup>

g. Evaluating the effectiveness of interdiction operations within the JFLCC AO and forwarding results to the JFC to support his overall combat assessment (CA) effort.<sup>29</sup>

h. Functioning as the supported commander for close air support operations.<sup>30</sup>

i. Functioning, under normal circumstances, as a supporting commander for counterair operations, strategic attack operations, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.<sup>31</sup>


j. Managing and maintaining the enemy ground order of battle data base within the theater.

k. Serving as a member of the JFC's Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). In this capacity, the JFLCC presents the joint land force's prioritized targeting requirements, nominates targets that are outside the boundaries of his AO or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets, and presents the results of previous attacks on key operational targets within his AO.<sup>32</sup>

l. Rehearsing key aspects of the joint land operations plan to allow commanders and staff participating in the operation to become thoroughly familiar with it before execution.<sup>33</sup>

### C. FUNCTIONS

1. To fulfill these responsibilities, the JFLCC and his staff perform a number of functions which are critical in conducting successful joint land operations. Figure 1 lists these *core* JFLCC functions under their respective operational level of war operating system: intelligence, movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, command and control, and support.<sup>34</sup>



## 2. Operational Intelligence

a. Develop Operational Intelligence Requirements. The critical first step in obtaining the operational intelligence necessary for planning and executing joint land operations is the development of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements. The JFLCC develops PIR and information requirements to meet the needs of his planning and decision-making processes. These requirements "drive" the joint and combined intelligence system which the JFLCC uses to collect, process, and distribute ground-focused operational intelligence products.

b. Collect Operational Information. In gathering information to satisfy his PIR and information requirements, the JFLCC prioritizes the employment of available national and theater reconnaissance and surveillance assets. In this regard, a vitally important task for these assets to accomplish is the identification and location of high-payoff targets whose attack, if successful, will help achieve one or more of the JFC's

operational objectives.<sup>35</sup> Assessing the extent of damage to these targets is another critical task which the JFLCC includes in his intelligence collection plan.

c. Process Operational Information. In converting operational information into intelligence, the JFLCC evaluates enemy doctrine, order of battle, dispositions, and capabilities, and assesses the nature and characteristics of his AO and area of interest. Next, he integrates this data to determine the enemy operational-level commander's center of gravity, objectives, intent, and high-payoff targets. Integration requires the JFLCC to provide a common picture of enemy ground forces to his subordinate commanders. He does this by maintaining the ground order of battle data base within the theater, and coordinating with the Army echelons above corps (EAC) military intelligence brigade for communications and computer support to those commanders lacking compatible systems. This brigade can furnish deployable intelligence support elements (DISE), small teams that process national and theater level intelligence, to Army and Marine Corps units or land forces of other nations.<sup>36</sup>

d. Prepare and Disseminate Operational Intelligence Reports. The JFLCC J-2 uses estimates, annexes, reports, and briefings to disseminate timely, accurate, and relevant operational intelligence. Reports and briefings are either *recurring* or *special*. Recurring reports and briefings provide the JFLCC and his subordinate commanders with an update on the overall enemy situation and a general assessment of future enemy actions. Special reports and briefings are necessary when the JFLCC or any of his subordinate commanders desire specific intelligence to support their planning of future operational actions. The JFLCC J-2 monitors the flow of intelligence reports to and from subordinate headquarters to ensure the integrity of the common picture of enemy ground forces.<sup>37</sup>

### 3. Operational Movement and Maneuver

a. Conduct Operational Movement. From the perspective of the JFLCC, operational movement involves the strategic deployment of land forces into the theater,

and the subsequent moving, regrouping, or shifting of these forces to and within his AO. In the first instance, the JFLCC influences the development of the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) by formulating recommendations for the JFC on the number, type, priority, timing, and arrival location of land forces moving into the theater. The basis for these recommendations is establishing a "flow" of combat and support units that best supports the JFC's objectives and operational concept. In the second instance, the JFLCC influences the JFC's allocation of ground, air, and sea assets available to transport land forces from ports of debarkation to operational assembly areas and points beyond, if necessary. Here, the JFLCC's goal is to secure rapidly the operational advantages of position before conducting battles and engagements.

b. Conduct Operational Maneuver. Operational maneuver is the means by which the JFLCC concentrates combat power at the critical time and place to achieve, "a position of advantage over the enemy for accomplishing operational or strategic objectives."<sup>38</sup> It requires the JFLCC to group joint and combined land forces into operational formations which complement one another and best support his concept. This may cause the JFLCC to task organize his forces in a non-standard but, nonetheless effective, manner. For example, after analyzing the factors of METT-T and completing his estimate of the situation the JFLCC could send a corps artillery brigade or elements of a corps engineer brigade to support a MEF conducting the main attack. Conversely, the JFLCC might deem it necessary to place a MEF (Forward) under the OPCON or TACON of an Army Corps commander defending the enemy's main avenue of approach into a lodgment. The JFLCC normally designates at least one of his most mobile and lethal formations to serve as a reserve in order to retain or seize the operational initiative during offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations. Air assault divisions or brigades, armored divisions or brigades, and attack helicopter brigades are some of the units best able to perform this important role.

c. Provide Operational Mobility. There is a strong linkage between operational mobility and movement and maneuver at the operational-level of war. Operational mobility enhances the movement of joint and combined land forces "by preparing and improving facilities and routes critical to major operations."<sup>39</sup> The JFLCC influences the nature and extent of this work in the communication zone (COMMZ) by articulating his movement priorities to the JFC. The JFC, in turn, tasks one or more of his service component commanders to provide the necessary engineer support. In the combat zone the JFLCC normally relies on subordinate land force formations to use their own assets to overcome impediments to movement and counteract the effects of natural or manmade obstacles on operational maneuver.

d. Provide Operational Countermobility. The JFLCC designs large scale obstacle systems to delay, channel, or block the movement and maneuver of enemy operational-level ground units. He designs these systems carefully, in order to present the enemy with a variety of obstacles arrayed in depth, while preserving the ability of friendly operational formations to move and maneuver freely. Next, the JFLCC either tasks subordinate land force commanders or coordinates with the JFACC to emplace obstacle systems.

e. Control Operationally Significant Battle Space. The JFLCC gains an operational advantage over the enemy by identifying and controlling geographic decisive points such as rivers, heights, defiles, air bases, and capitals.<sup>40</sup> The most important geographic decisive points in the JFLCC's AO are those, "which enable eventual attack of the enemy's center of gravity."<sup>41</sup> The JFLCC designates these points, "as objectives and allocates [forces and other means] to control, destroy, or neutralize them."<sup>42</sup>

#### 4. Operational Firepower

a. Process Operational Targets. In applying firepower and nonlethal means to achieve a decisive impact on joint land operations the JFLCC selects high payoff targets and decides how best to strike them. Inside his AO, the JFLCC



coordinates with and then tasks subordinate land force commanders to strike high payoff targets within range of their organic and capable systems. Generally, these systems include fighter or attack aircraft, surface-to-surface long range missiles, attack helicopters, artillery rockets and mines, artillery gunfire, and electronic warfare assets. High payoff targets beyond the capability of these systems, or outside the JFLCC's AO, require a different approach. Specifically, the JFLCC nominates these targets to the JFACC via a coordination and liaison cell in the air operations center (AOC) where they compete with the requirements of the other component commands.<sup>43</sup> With these nominations, and other targeting inputs, the JFACC builds a joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) for each day of the operation. This list is sent to the JTCB for review, and then to the JFC for approval. The rank ordering of JFLCC nominations on the JIPTL depends in large measure on the degree to which they meet the theater-wide targeting objectives and priorities set by the JFC.<sup>44</sup>

b. Integrate Operational Firepower. Inside his AO, the JFLCC synchronizes interdiction and operational maneuver in order to accomplish the JFC's objectives. A high degree of synchronization is likely to yield good results with respect to the JFLCC's destruction of critical enemy functions, facilities, and forces, isolation of the battlefield, and maneuver of subordinate formations to operational depths. Meeting this challenge requires the JFLCC to integrate and synchronize the operational fires of his subordinate operational formations with those provided by other component commands. Some of the interdiction-capable forces available to the other components include fighter or attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; special operations forces (SOF); subsurface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles; aerial-delivered mines, naval gunfire; and electronic warfare systems.<sup>45</sup> Thus, it is essential that representatives from these other components serve on the JFLCC staff to help integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the JFC-designated land AO. If necessary, the JFLCC establishes a fire support coordination line (FSCL) within his AO; he synchronizes

operations on both sides of the FSCL - out to the forward boundary of his AO. To facilitate this synchronization the JFLCC articulates his intent and concept of operations to component commanders contributing forces to the interdiction effort, and determines the timing, priority, and effects of operational fires and interdiction.

#### 5. Operational Protection

a. Provide Operational Aerospace Defense. Protecting operational land force formations, bases, and lines of communication (LOC) from attack and surveillance by enemy aircraft and missiles is one of the JFLCC's most important functions. This protection is absolutely critical in conserving the fighting potential of his force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. Thus, within his AO, the JFLCC relies primarily on the JFC-designated Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) to conduct defensive counterair operations with an assortment of aircraft from the JFACC (dual-hatted as the AADC), and ground-based air defense artillery (ADA) units under the OPCON of his subordinate land force commanders. Simultaneously, the JFLCC implements the four elements of theater missile defense (TMD) - passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I).<sup>46</sup> All JFLCC forces employ passive defense measures to reduce their vulnerability to enemy missiles and minimize the effects of a theater missile attack. Active defense operations require ADA missile defense units in the subordinate operational formations of the JFLCC to destroy both enemy theater missiles in flight, and the airborne platforms which launch these missiles. These missile defense units "operate under the rules of engagement (ROE) and weapon control procedures approved by the JFC and promulgated by the AADC."<sup>47</sup> The JFC normally tasks the JFLCC and other component commanders to conduct "attack operations against theater missiles within their assigned AOs."<sup>48</sup> Systems readily available to the JFLCC to perform this task include ATACMS, attack helicopters, electronic warfare assets, and maneuver forces. As necessary, he coordinates with other component commanders for additional systems to

support attack operations in his AO. These systems may include "fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-air and air-to-surface operations, SOF, and antisubmarine forces."<sup>49</sup> TMD C4I for the JFLCC fulfills several requirements: predicting and detecting a launch; predicting the launch and impact points; providing threat identification, timely warning, and early detection of missiles in flight; accurately identifying the location of launch platforms and support systems; and transmitting targeting data to attack systems expeditiously.<sup>50</sup> The JFLCC coordinates with the US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command for C4I support. This command can furnish the Army TMD Element (ATMDE), "a robust, flexible, multi-echelon ballistic missile/C4I system that provides access to national and theater capabilities."<sup>51</sup>

b. Provide Protection for Operational Forces and Means.

1) The JFLCC safeguards his formations, bases, and LOCs from the effects of enemy operational maneuver and firepower by, "preparing operationally significant fortifications, removing operationally significant hazards, and protecting the use of the electromagnetic spectrum."<sup>52</sup> All three tasks require the JFLCC and his subordinate commanders to be cognizant of the enemy's potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In this regard, they harden key command, control, and communications and logistics sites, and employ nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) units to identify and clean up areas of contamination, "which adversely affect execution of the [JFLCC's] plan."<sup>53</sup>

2) The JFLCC concentrates on three other aspects of operational protection: the health, welfare, and morale of soldiers and units, safety, and preventing fratricide. "[He] ensures systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, preventive medicine, . . . maintenance evacuation, and rapid replacement or repair of hardware."<sup>54</sup> To preserve combat power, the JFLCC integrates safety into all facets of his command's planning, operations, and training. The JFLCC reduces the likelihood of fratricide - the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly

personnel by friendly fire - by exhibiting command interest in the subject, understanding when battlefield conditions raise the chances of an incident occurring, maintaining situational awareness and positive control of operational fires, and rehearsing the most "difficult" parts of an operation.<sup>55</sup>

c. Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means. The JFLCC safeguards his formations, bases, and LOCs from the effects of enemy surveillance, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage by employing operations security and force protection measures. Specifically, to maintain secrecy about his command's capabilities, activities, and intentions, the JFLCC protects emitters and data sent through command, control, communications and computer systems, uses basic concealment techniques, and varies operational methods.<sup>56</sup> Also, he directs the establishment of a strong counterintelligence program within his command, and ensures that plans to secure LOCs, key facilities, and the flanks of operational formations are viable.

d. Conduct Deception in Support of Joint Land Operations. As an integral element of joint operations, deception at the operational-level complements or reinforces the JFC's deception plan. The JFLCC uses operational deception as a force multiplier to mislead the opposing enemy commander, "prompting him to plan and conduct his activities in a manner that unwittingly serves the [JFC's and JFLCC's] objectives."<sup>57</sup> During the formulation of the JFLCC's concept, representatives from each staff functional area come together to plan the deception operation. Their plan identifies the deception objective - "the enemy commander and the decisions he is expected to make during the operation"; and the deception story - the arrangement of joint and combined forces and means in a manner which distorts, conceals, or falsifies the JFLCC's capabilities, activities, and intentions.<sup>58</sup> The deception plan also provides the JFLCC with a mechanism for assessing the extent to which the deception story has influenced the decisions of the opposing operational commander.

## 6. Operational Command and Control

### a. Acquire, Assess, and Communicate Operational Level Information, and Maintain Status.

1) The service component providing the JFLCC is responsible for establishing his command and control links. Vital to conducting successful joint land operations, these links provide the JFLCC connectivity with the JFC, JTCB, components, subordinate units, and multinational, interagency, nongovernment, private voluntary, or United Nations organizations. In this regard, the JFLCC must be capable of exchanging accurate information quickly as part of an interoperable and compatible theater communications network. Thus, he identifies data exchange requirements as early as possible to ascertain whether existing communications and computer systems are adequate to fulfill his responsibilities and support normal communications demands. Modifying or augmenting these systems may be necessary if subordinate units are unable to access critical data. Of particular concern to the JFLCC are the provisions made for an effective interface among the various tactical command and control systems of the Army, Marine Corps, and multinational units in his command.

2) Liaison is an important method for the JFLCC to acquire and communicate operational-level information. To facilitate mutual understanding and unity of effort, the JFLCC employs liaison teams both vertically and horizontally. As a minimum, he sends them to the headquarters of his immediate subordinate land force formations, any autonomous multinational formations, other component commands, and the JFC. Resourced by service components, these teams must have the communications and computer systems, vehicles, language capability, and cultural orientation to promote a thorough understanding of the JFLCC's intent at the receiving headquarters. The liaison team with the JFC is particularly important: it keeps the JFLCC abreast of the strategic

situation in theater including any changes in policies, goals, other elements of power, objectives, and commander's concept and intent.<sup>59</sup>

3) To exercise effective command and control, the JFLCC needs a system "to screen, circulate, store, and display [accurate] operational data."<sup>60</sup> Rapid access to this data is a prerequisite for the JFLCC to understand the current situation and then make and implement sound command decisions. The increasing availability of Information-Age technology to the JFLCC will enhance his situational awareness and should help him issue rapid, clear, and correct orders.

b. Determine Operational Actions. To determine a course of action for a joint land operation, the JFLCC and his staff participate in an operational decision-making process. This process begins in one of two ways: the JFLCC either receives a warning order, campaign plan or OPLAN from the JFC, or recognizes a requirement to develop an operational plan himself. Next, the JFLCC and his staff "conduct mission analysis by deriving specified and implied tasks, identifying friendly and enemy operational centers of gravity, determining the commander's overall intent for the operation, and developing staff estimates."<sup>61</sup> At the conclusion of mission analysis, the JFLCC issues guidance in the form of a planning directive to his staff, subordinate commands, and supporting components and agencies. This directive contains information necessary to continue planning: the JFC's intent, the JFLCC's mission statement and intent, planning assumptions, constraints, restrictions, centers of gravity, phasing, decisive points, and operational objectives.<sup>62</sup> Key planners use this information to develop, analyze, and compare courses of action. Analysis requires these planners to wargame each JFLCC course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages. In comparing the various courses of actions, planners, "use decision criteria derived from the [JFLCC's] guidance and pertinent operational concepts."<sup>63</sup> This methodology clarifies which course of action offers the best prospect of success; planners send it to the JFLCC as a recommendation for his approval. Potentially, the other courses of action become

branches or sequels to phases of the joint land operation. In the last step of the operational decision-making process the JFLCC finalizes his concept and intent. His staff helps him complete this task by ensuring that the concept of operations addresses task organization; movement and maneuver of operational formations; operational fires; operational protection including counterair, TMD, and deception; command and control; phasing and priorities by phase; SOF and special weapons employment; and tasks to subordinate units, including the designation of a main effort.<sup>64</sup>

c. Direct and Lead Operational Forces.

1) After finalization of the concept and commander's intent, the JFLCC staff completes their coordination with appropriate higher, lower, and lateral headquarters, and prepares the joint land OPLAN. At this point, planners focus most of their efforts on integrating key details from the intelligence and logistics estimates into the OPLAN itself. There is an obligation for planners to submit the OPLAN to the JFLCC for his approval; he, in turn, sends the plan to the JFC who reviews it for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and doctrinal soundness.<sup>65</sup>

2) The JFLCC supervises the execution of joint land operations by positioning himself wherever he can best direct and motivate his subordinate commanders. These locations vary according to the situation, but generally include the JFLCC's main and mobile command posts, and the headquarters of his subordinate land force formations. The overriding concern of the JFLCC at each of these locations is to have ready access to all information necessary for conducting successful operations, and the means to communicate his decisions rapidly.

3) The JFLCC is the primary synchronizer of joint capabilities in his AO. As such, one of the JFLCC's most important functions is to coordinate, integrate, and regulate forces and weapons operating in the airspace above his AO. He performs this function in several ways: by coordinating the use of his forces and weapons with other components on a regular and recurring basis; developing an airspace control plan

which accommodates the needs of his subordinate commanders and complies with the policies and procedures of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA); forwarding this plan to the ACA for integration into the theater airspace control plan; maintaining connectivity with the ACA and other elements of the theater air control system (TACS) - ADA command and control centers, fire support coordination cells, air traffic services facilities, and airspace control liaison personnel with key facilities of the ACA; forwarding requests to the ACA for their approval of modifications, deletions, or additions to existing airspace control measures; and exercising airspace control in designated special use airspace subject to the policies and procedures of the ACA.<sup>66</sup> A key airspace control measure for the JFLCC and other components to reach agreement on is a coordination altitude to separate fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Normally, aircraft operating below this altitude need not be put on the daily integrated tasking order (ITO), thereby enhancing the flexibility and responsiveness of JFLCC operations.<sup>67</sup>

d. Employ Command and Control Warfare. The JFLCC integrates OPSEC, deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare, and physical destruction to accomplish two tasks simultaneously: protect his own command and control capabilities and deny or degrade the enemy operational commander's ability to gather information and transmit sound decisions.<sup>68</sup> To integrate these five elements of combat power effectively requires the JFLCC to develop specific command and control warfare objectives. Prioritization of these objectives is essential because they compete with other important battlefield tasks for certain scarce assets (e.g., PSYOP units, space-based information systems, and ATACMS). Nonetheless, it will usually be "advantageous for [the JFLCC] to allocate an adequate number of electronic warfare, artillery, and air assets for the express purpose of attacking enemy command posts."<sup>69</sup> "In this way, he can disrupt, disorient, and paralyze a number of critical nodes within [the enemy's] C3 system."<sup>70</sup>



7. Operational Support. The JFLCC identifies requirements and establishes priorities for operational support, but is normally not responsible for providing supplies and services to his subordinate units. The JFLCC J-4 first addresses these requirements and priorities during the operational decision-making process when he develops a concept of support in coordination with the Army and Marine Corps service components. The JFLCC depends on these components to sustain Army and Marine Corps forces in his command. He, on the other hand, must let them know, "what is needed, how much, where to place it, and what the risks are if what is needed is not provided."<sup>71</sup> Providing this type of data to the service components is absolutely essential for several categories of support: fuel, ammunition, class IX repair parts, repair and evacuation of equipment, hospitalization and medical evacuation of personnel, replacements, movement services, public affairs, sustainment engineering, and law enforcement and prisoner control. In almost all instances, the JFLCC prioritizes the allocation of these materials and services among his subordinate units, "giving the preponderance of support to forces making the main effort and sometimes shifting priorities as the [operation] unfolds."<sup>72</sup>

### III. JFLCC ORGANIZATION

#### A. GENERAL

To help him perform these core functions, the JFLCC organizes his headquarters with a joint staff. The JFLCC mans his staff with personnel from two basic sources: an existing Army or Marine Corps headquarters which constitutes the base staff for the JFLCC, and the resources of other service and functional components within the theater. These components provide warfighting experts who augment the base staff. These soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors, provide the JFLCC with the in-depth expertise necessary for conducting successful joint land operations. They serve in key staff positions throughout the JFLCC headquarters. Figure 2 depicts a notional JFLCC

headquarters consisting of four basic joint staff elements: command group, commander's personal staff group, special staff group, and the coordinating staff group.




Figure 2. Notional JFLCC Organization

Source: Adapted from Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, June, 1994); FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February, 1995).

## B. COMMAND GROUP

The command group consists of five key individuals: the JFLCC, Deputy JFLCC, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Secretary of the Staff. To broaden the base of high-level expertise and influence within the organization, the JFLCC and his deputy are normally from different services. In defining the duties of his deputy, the JFLCC is cognizant of the overriding operational requirement to synchronize the complementary capabilities of subordinate units from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and multinational field commands. Thus, one of the deputy's principal duties is to advise the

JFLCC on the best ways to integrate these forces to achieve a consistently high degree of synchronization during joint land operations. The Chief of Staff directs and coordinates the work of the special and functional staff groups, and is most often from the same service as the JFLCC, particularly if the officer in that position has been directing the *core* of the JFLCC's staff in peacetime.<sup>73</sup> A Deputy Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Staff assist the Chief of Staff in performing his duties. The Secretary of the Staff prepares a calendar of events for the JFLCC, Deputy JFLCC, and Chief of Staff, manages the flow of correspondence into and out of the command group, and maintains records of command group decisions, policies, and procedures.

#### C. PERSONAL STAFF GROUP

Instead of working through the Chief of Staff or Secretary of the Staff, personal staff group members assist the JFLCC directly by performing duties over which he desires to maintain personal control. Typically, these members include the JFLCC's aide-de-camp, command sergeant major, political advisor, chaplain, public affairs officer, inspector general, and staff judge advocate. In performing their duties, the public affairs officer, inspector general, and staff judge advocate, are particularly sensitive to the varying requirements, technical aspects, and procedures of the component parts of the joint land force.

#### D. SPECIAL STAFF GROUP

Members of the special staff group provide the JFLCC with advice and recommendations on technical, administrative, and certain operational matters. This group is normally small in order to avoid an unnecessary duplication of effort with corresponding staff sections within service component headquarters that concentrate on solving such issues.<sup>74</sup> In some instances, representatives from interagency, nongovernment, private voluntary, and United Nations organizations, may serve as special staff group members. They, along with other members of the special staff, such as the administrative officer, surgeon, and provost marshal, prepare input in their areas of

expertise for JFLCC estimates, plans, orders, and reports. These individuals also “plan and supervise training in their own staff sections and provide . . . input to [the JFLCC] on the level of training throughout the command in their respective areas.”<sup>75</sup>

#### E. COORDINATING STAFF GROUP

The coordinating staff group consists of six staff divisions that generally adhere to the major functions of command: manpower and personnel; intelligence; operations; logistics; plans and policy; and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems. The officers who lead these divisions are the JFLCC’s principal staff assistants for all operational matters in their respective functional areas. In this regard, they are responsible directly to the Chief of Staff, “for acquiring information, analyzing this information to determine the implications and impact upon the command, and most importantly, providing the [JFLCC] with timely and accurate recommendations . . .”<sup>76</sup>


Coordinating staff officers frequently request and obtain information and recommendations from members of the special staff group; they also establish procedures for the full and proper coordination of these recommendations.

1. Manpower and Personnel Division (J-1). The J-1 is the principal staff officer for the JFLCC on all manpower and personnel matters. He devotes most of his time and energy to maintaining accurate unit strength data; developing replacement plans; overseeing the surgeon’s coordination of patient treatment and evacuation operations; and supervising activities for the administration of discipline, law, and order including the handling of enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees.<sup>77</sup> In performing these tasks, the J-1 concentrates on identifying requirements and establishing priorities. He then passes this information to service component commanders who have the wherewithal to provide the JFLCC’s subordinate units with the requisite manpower and personnel support. Any formulation of joint land force personnel policies by the J-1 will require him to consider carefully the existing policies of the JFC and his service component commanders.<sup>78</sup>

2. Intelligence Division (J-2). The J-2 is the principal staff officer for the JFLCC on all operational intelligence matters. As such, he is responsible for performing the four core JFLCC intelligence functions: develop operational intelligence requirements, collect operational information, process operational information, and prepare and disseminate operational intelligence reports. To accomplish these functions the JFLCC J-2 directs the activities of his staff, and, "oversees the operation of the joint [land] intelligence center (JLIC)."<sup>79</sup> The analysis and control element (ACE) from the EAC military intelligence brigade is the principal organization within the JLIC. The EAC ACE coordinates with and provides connectivity to national and theater intelligence sources, the intelligence centers of the JFLCC's major subordinate formations, and the JFC's joint intelligence center (JIC). Its functions are similar to those of the JIC: collection management, all source processing, and preparation and dissemination of timely and relevant ground-focused intelligence products. Some of the more important products are intelligence preparation of the battlefield templates, high payoff target lists, and battle damage assessment summaries. A counterintelligence section in the EAC ACE provides analytical support for operations security measures and deception operations. A small team from the U.S. Air Force normally augments the EAC ACE to provide weather support for JFLCC operations.<sup>80</sup> In large scale deployments, the EAC ACE can dispatch a DISE with the JFLCC assault element or mobile command post. The DISE provides the JFLCC with operational intelligence in support of his concept of operations and intent.<sup>81</sup>

3. Operations Division (J-3). The J-3 is the principal staff officer for the JFLCC on matters pertaining to the organization, planning, direction, and control of joint land operations. In this regard, he devotes most of his efforts to integrating and synchronizing the complementary capabilities of joint land forces. To accomplish this critical and complex task the J-3 normally organizes a battle staff and activates a joint [land] operations center (JLOC).<sup>82</sup> Representatives from each of the staff divisions serve as

members of the battle staff. The battle staff works in the JLOC, a command and control facility not dissimilar from the JFC's joint operations center (JOC). In essence, the JLOC is the focal point within the JFLCC's main command post "for [formulating], monitoring, and [directing] the execution of his decisions."<sup>83</sup> Figure 3 depicts a notional JLOC consisting of a battle staff command element, a component liaison section, and four battle staff teams.



a. **Battle Staff Command Element.** This element consists of the JFLCC or, in his absence, the Deputy JFLCC, Chief of Staff, J-2, and J-3. These individuals monitor the overall situation in the JFLCC's AO and receive advice and recommendations on operational matters from component senior liaison officers and leaders of the battle staff teams. To focus the efforts of these key staff officers in providing relevant advice and sound recommendations, the JFLCC formulates commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).<sup>84</sup> CCIR help to streamline the

JFLCC's decisionmaking process, thereby allowing him to decide and act appropriately when changes in the operational situation occur. Members of the battle staff command element transmit new JFLCC decisions to their counterparts at lower and higher echelons, and to component senior liaison officers and battle staff team leaders.

b. Component Liaison Section. Augmenting the JLOC are liaison elements from each of the components (e.g., AFLE, NALE, SOLE, and SLO). These elements are led by senior liaison officers who "serve as conduits for direct coordination between the [JFLCC] and their respective component commanders."<sup>85</sup> Each element consists of warfighting experts who help integrate and synchronize their component's participation in joint land operations. On the advice of component senior liaison officers, the JFLCC Chief of Staff integrates these experts into the JLIC and battle staff teams of the JLOC. He relies on them to present the views and perspectives of their component commanders in key areas such as targeting, airspace control, counterair and theater missile defense operations, and deception.

c. Battle Staff Team Movement and Maneuver. This team consists of J-3 current operations and engineer officers, intelligence analysts, and liaison officers from the JFLCC's major subordinate units. These individuals receive, store, and display information on the strengths, locations, and activities of enemy ground and JFLCC forces. As experts in operational movement and maneuver, they also advise the JFLCC on a variety of factors including the flow of joint land forces into the theater, transport of these forces from the COMMZ to the combat zone, conduct of combat operations by his major subordinate land formations, and commitment and redesignation of his reserve.<sup>86</sup> When necessary, members of the Battle Staff Team Movement and Maneuver do not hesitate to recommend modifications to existing operational plans. Thus, they stay in close contact with J-3 plans officers who are responsible for preparing short-range future plans (e.g., branches which change the disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of one or more of the JFLCC's major subordinate formations).<sup>87</sup>

d. Battle Staff Team Firepower. This team consists of J-2 and J-3 deep operations officers, and targeting specialists from the liaison elements of the other components. Members of this team provide the JFLCC with advice and recommendations on the integration and synchronization of operational firepower assets - both the organic long-range systems of his subordinate units, and the interdiction-capable forces from other components. Essentially, the Battle Staff Team Firepower is the joint equivalent of the Army's EAC deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). As such, it performs a number of critical targeting tasks: develops plans for the employment of operational firepower assets and control of forces and weapons operating in the airspace above the JFLCC's AO; establishes fire support coordination and airspace control measures to support the JFLCC's concept of operations; tasks subordinate land force formations to engage high payoff targets within the JFLCC's AO; nominates other high payoff targets to the JFACC's AOC for inclusion on the daily JIPTL; establishes priorities and criteria for battle damage assessment of operational targets in the JFLCC's AO; provides battle damage assessment feedback to subordinate headquarters; and prepares the JFLCC to perform his duties as a member of the JTCB.<sup>88</sup> In performing these rather complex tasks to standard, all members of the Battle Staff Team Firepower must coordinate regularly with certain individuals and organizations: their counterparts at lower and higher echelons; and warfighting experts in the JLIC, other battle staff teams, and the JFLCC's liaison cell in the AOC.

e. Battle Staff Team Protection. This team contains three primary cells: an aerospace defense cell consisting of J-3 air and missile defense officers, ATMDE personnel, and intelligence analysts who monitor defensive counterair operations closely, and help the JFLCC integrate the four elements of TMD; a cell consisting of J-2 and J-3 assistant staff officers who are responsible for integrating OPSEC, deception and PSYOP as part of the JFLCC's overall command and control warfare effort; and a cell consisting of NBC experts who provide advice and recommendations to the JFLCC on the enemy's



use, or potential use, of WMD. Members of the aerospace defense cell provide the JFLCC and his subordinate commanders with up-to-date assessments of the ballistic missile threat, almost instantaneous notification of missile launches, and rapid dissemination of missile targeting data and engagement results.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, aerospace defense cell members coordinate regularly with members of the Battle Staff Team Firepower who have primary responsibility for integrating and synchronizing TMD attack operations in the JFLCC's AO. OPSEC, deception, and PSYOP officers monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of activities occurring within their respective areas of expertise. When necessary, these officers do not hesitate to recommend adjustments to existing OPSEC, deception, and PSYOP plans. As such, they must keep in close contact with both their counterparts at lower and higher echelons, and specialists in command and control warfare from other battle staff teams and the component liaison section. NBC experts conduct recurring risk assessments to ascertain the likelihood and probable effects of a WMD attack by enemy forces. They also assist the JFLCC in determining the extent to which his major subordinate formations are implementing the defensive NBC principles of avoidance, protection, and decontamination. In this regard, JFLCC NBC experts examine a variety of factors: dispersion of units and use of terrain for shielding against the effects of WMD, quality of NBC training, effectiveness of OPSEC measures, survivability of command posts and logistics bases, and quantity and disposition of decontamination units.<sup>90</sup>

f. Battle Staff Team Support. This team consists of operational support officers including the J-1, J-4, and J-6, or their deputies. Members of this team receive, store, and display information on the current status of manpower and personnel matters, logistics, and C4 systems within the JFLCC's major subordinate units. They use this information as a basis for close and continuous coordination with service component commanders who provide the capabilities to meet the JFLCC's operational support requirements. In turn, members of the Battle Staff Team Support provide the JFLCC

with advice and recommendations on the priorities of available support for his major subordinate units. As astute judges of operational support risks, these individuals do not hesitate to warn the JFLCC when his concept of operations becomes untenable because of significant shortfalls in personnel, supplies, services, or communications and electronics support. Nonetheless, to preclude a situation like this occurring, they stay abreast of key operational activities such as the movement and maneuver of one or more operational-level formations, large-scale countermobility operations, striking of targets deep in the JFLCC's AO, TMD operations, and WMD attacks by the enemy. Thus, Battle Staff Team Support members must coordinate continuously with officers in the other battle staff teams and J-3 plans section.

4. Logistics Division (J-4). The J-4 is the principal staff officer for the JFLCC on all supply, maintenance, transportation, and services matters. He devotes most of his time and energy to maintaining reports which contain accurate data for the JFLCC's major subordinate units in each of these logistics areas; formulating logistics plans to include providing the J-3 with recommendations on main supply routes, and input on rear area operations and area damage control considerations; monitoring the allocation of critical petroleum products to subordinate units; overseeing the dissemination of the controlled supply rate (CSR) of ammunition and its accountability; monitoring and analyzing the readiness status of key items of equipment; monitoring the availability of air mobility assets, operational readiness float equipment and host nation support; and monitoring graves registration activities in the JFLCC's AO.<sup>91</sup> For each of these tasks, the J-4, just like the J-1, focuses on identifying requirements and establishing priorities. Next, he transmits this data to service component commanders who possess the logistics necessary to support the JFLCC's subordinate units. "Because many of the [issues] confronting [the J-4] are necessarily of a single-service nature,"<sup>92</sup> he scrutinizes the existing policies of the JFC and service component commanders before developing and promulgating any logistics policies of his own.

5. Plans and Policy Division (J-5). The J-5 is the principal staff officer for the JFLCC on matters pertaining to long-range future planning including the preparation of subordinate campaign plans and major OPLANs. As the JFLCC's primary point of contact on strategic deployment issues, one of the J-5's most important tasks in preparing subordinate campaign plans is to coordinate and review the TPFDL. Thus, he works closely with the JFC's J-5 planners in developing a TPFDL to flow joint land forces into theater in a way that best supports the JFC's objectives and operational concept. Major OPLANs are prepared by the JFLCC's J-5 planners as sequels to the current operation. For example, these officers plan for a counteroffensive as a logical sequel to a defense, and "for postconflict operations to support the transition from war to peace, including the integration of civil-military operations and a subsequent transfer of control to civilian authorities."<sup>93</sup> The J-5 may contain a small group of officers who conduct simulations and analyses to help the JFLCC wargame courses of action during the operational decision-making process. Normally, the J-5 participates in command and control warfare planning activities, and may even be put in charge of the JFLCC's planning group for this relatively new joint concept.

6. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Division (J-6). The J-6 is the principal staff officer for the JFLCC on all matters concerning communications, electronics, and automated information systems support. As such, he devotes most of his efforts to maintaining reports which contain accurate data for the JFLCC's major subordinate units in each of these C4 systems areas; formulating plans that provide for connectivity throughout the JFLCC's AO and within his own headquarters; formulating plans for the use of signal activities to support deception and PSYOP operations; monitoring the allocation and assignment of frequencies to subordinate units; monitoring the implementation of signal and communications security procedures throughout the command; and assisting the J-3 in the preparation of OPSEC and electronic warfare annexes for subordinate campaign plans, major OPLANs, and

short-range future plans.<sup>94</sup> In performing these tasks, the J-6 keeps in close and continuous contact with the service component providing the JFLCC with his command and control links. He also maintains a strong working relationship with the JFC's J-6 who establishes policy and issues guidance for implementing and integrating interoperable C4 systems within the theater.<sup>95</sup> In both instances, the J-6's overriding concern is that Army, Marine Corps, and any multinational units in the JFLCC's command be able to communicate with one another freely and openly.<sup>96</sup>

#### IV. OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS FROM PRAIRIE WARRIOR 95

##### A. PRAIRIE WARRIOR 95 EAC COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

The command and control structure for EAC headquarters in Prairie Warrior 95 reflected the combined nature of the *Blueland* Theater of Operations.<sup>97</sup> As the theater headquarters for the exercise, Combined Forces Command (CFC) had five combined component commands to accomplish the operational objectives of the Commander-in-Chief's (CINCCFC's) counteroffensive OPLAN: Combined Land Component Commander (CLCC), Combined Air Component Commander (CACC), Combined Special Operations Task Force (CSOTF), Combined Naval Component Commander (CNCC), and Combined Marine Component Commander (CMCC). SAMS and Command and General Staff College students from the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps served as commanders and staff officers in the CFC and component headquarters. US Army Blueland (USA-BL) provided support to US Army units in theater, and common-user support for other US forces as directed by CINCCFC who was dual-hatted as the CINC, United States Forces Blueland (USF-BL).<sup>98</sup> Command and General Staff College faculty, TRADOC service school augmentees, and reserve component soldiers (e.g., 412th Engineer Command) served as staff officers in this Army three-star Title X headquarters.

## B. SYNOPSIS OF OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS

1. As an advanced warfighting experiment, Prairie Warrior 95 provided an opportunity for the author to examine the JFLCC concept in some detail.<sup>99</sup> As mentioned above, the land component commander (LCC) in the Blueland Theater of Operations was the CLCC - a functional component commander for combined, vice joint, land operations during the exercise. Nevertheless, this functional component role is consistent with the doctrine outlined in Joint Pub 3-0.<sup>100</sup> As such, the recording of observations and derivation of insights on the JFLCC concept relates directly to an analysis of the role, responsibilities, functions, and organization of the LCC headquarters for this exercise - namely, the CLCC. To guide the efforts of the author in examining this concept, six questions were asked. These questions, and the key observations and insights associated with them are:

2. Question # 1. What role did the LCC play in the Blueland Theater of Operations?

a. The CLCC exercised OPCON of two Blueland armies, First Blueland Army and Third Blueland Army, 9th (US) Army, 52nd Mobile Strike Force (MSF), and the 47th Air Assault Division (-). As such, the primary purpose for the CLCC in Prairie Warrior 95 was to provide unity of command and effort for employing land power to accomplish the operational objectives of the CINCCFC. The CLCC performed this role at the operational level of war in a major theater of operations.

b. During the exercise, the CLCC focused on operational responsibilities; he left logistical support to Blueland national authorities and the USA-BL. In essence, the CLCC served as the combined equivalent of a US Army Group Commander, concentrating on the employment of his five operational formations, rather than on the details of individual tactical engagements. The only exception to this observation was the significant amount of time and energy that the CLCC devoted to planning, coordinating, and supervising the execution of deep operations in support of the MSF's attack against

the Orangeland 12th Operational Exploitation Force (OEF). At times, the CLCC and his staff felt this preoccupation with the MSF caused them to lose focus on subsequent operations, 72-96 hours out. Because of the experimental nature of the MSF, and lack of an intermediate headquarters between it and the CLCC, this development was not wholly unexpected.

3. Question # 2. Was this role sufficient in accomplishing the operational objectives of the theater commander?

a. Yes. The CLCC was successful in integrating and synchronizing the complementary capabilities of the forces and assets available to him in order to accomplish a number of key operational objectives: retention of Taejon and Seoul, destruction of forward elements of the 2nd and 1st Orangeland Army Groups, and defeat of the 12th OEF. In addition to the major subordinate land formations mentioned previously, the capabilities available to the CLCC included theater intelligence assets, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), naval gunfire and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs), air interdiction, close air support, airlift, joint electronic warfare assets, land and sea-based missiles used in a theater missile defense role, and special operations forces.

b. Also, by designating a LCC for the Blue Land Theater of Operations, the CINCCFC relieved himself of the direct task of synchronizing the internal actions and activities of the combined land force. This allowed the CINC to focus his time and energies on synchronizing the efforts of all his components in order to achieve the strategic and operational objectives of the CFC counteroffensive. In other words, by not having to concentrate exclusively on combined land operations, the CINCCFC was better able to balance competing component needs while maintaining a theater perspective. As evidence of maintaining a strategic perspective, the C-5 planners in the CFC headquarters prepared two concept summary plans during the exercise: a sequel to the ongoing counteroffensive and a plan for postconflict operations to support the transition from war

to peace, including the integration of civil-military operations and a subsequent transfer of control to civilian authorities.

4. Question # 3. What were the responsibilities of the LCC? The CINCCFC established the authority and assigned the responsibilities of the CLCC. Specifically, the CINCCFC designated the forces that were made available to the CLCC and the command relationships for their employment. He also established supported and supporting relationships between his components to accomplish necessary tasks. The CLCC's overall responsibility was to organize, plan, and direct execution of combined land operations based on the CINCCFC's concept of operations and designation of command relationships. During Prairie Warrior 95, the CLCC had several specific responsibilities:

a. Provided forces and means to subordinate headquarters so they had the assets necessary to accomplish assigned missions and tasks.

b. Developed a combined land OPLAN that supported the operational objectives of the CINCCFC's counteroffensive. This plan contained realistic missions and tasks and allowed subordinate headquarters great latitude in developing a concept of operations that was adequate, feasible, acceptable, and doctrinally sound.

c. Directed the execution of combined land operations in a way that best supported the operational objectives of the CINCCFC. This exercise of operational direction by the CLCC did not exceed the limits of his authority as established by the CINCCFC.

d. Coordinated the planning and execution of combined land operations with the operations of other component commanders.

e. Functioned as the supported commander for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the land AO established by the CINCCFC.

f. Evaluated the general effectiveness of interdiction operations within the CLCC AO, and forwarded results to the CINCCFC to support his overall combat assessment effort.

g. Functioned as the supported commander for close air support operations.

h. Functioned as a supporting commander for counterair operations, strategic attack operations, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and the CINCCFC's overall air interdiction effort.

i. Managed and maintained the enemy ground order of battle data base within the theater.

j. Served as a member of the CINCCFC's JTCB.

5. Question # 4. What functions did the LCC headquarters perform to fulfill its responsibilities?

a. The CLCC and his staff performed a number of core functions which are critical in conducting successful combined land operations. These functions are identified below, and in some instances discussed, under their respective operational level of war operating system: intelligence, movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, command and control, and support.

1) Operational Intelligence. The C-2 staff performed four fundamental intelligence functions: develop operational intelligence requirements, collect operational information, process operational information, and prepare and disseminate operational intelligence reports.

2) Operational Movement and Maneuver. The C-3 staff performed five basic movement and maneuver functions: conduct operational movement, conduct operational maneuver, provide operational mobility, provide operational countermobility, and control operationally significant battle space.

3) Operational Firepower. The CLCC and his staff performed two essential firepower functions: process operational targets and integrate operational firepower.



a) **Process Operational Targets.** In applying firepower to achieve a decisive impact on combined land operations, the CLCC selected high payoff targets and decided how best to strike them. Inside his AO, the CLCC coordinated with, and then tasked subordinate land force commanders to strike high payoff targets within range of their organic and capable systems. During Prairie Warrior 95 these systems included Marine fighter and attack aircraft, ATACMS, attack helicopters, and artillery rockets and mines. High payoff targets beyond the capability of these systems, or outside the CLCC's AO, required a different approach. Specifically, the CLCC nominated these targets to the CACC via the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) in the AOC where they competed with the requirements of the other component commands.

b) Inside his AO, the CLCC synchronized interdiction and operational maneuver in order to accomplish the CINCCFC's objectives. Meeting this challenge required the CLCC to integrate and synchronize the operational fires of his subordinate operational formations with those provided by the other component commands. Some of the interdiction-capable forces used by the other components during the exercise included fighter and attack aircraft and bombers, aerial-delivered mines, special operations forces, TLAMs, and naval gunfire. Representatives from these other components served on the CLCC staff to help integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the CINC-designated land AO for the counteroffensive.

4) **Operational Protection.** The CLCC and his staff focused their efforts on one of the CLCC's most important functions: provide operational aerospace defense. Within his AO, the CLCC relied primarily on the CINC-designated AADC to conduct defensive counterair operations, and ground-based ADA units under the OPCON of his subordinate land force commanders. Simultaneously, the CLCC concentrated on implementing the four elements of TMD. In particular, TMD staff officers in the CLCC headquarters spent a lot of time coordinating with the USA-BL's EAC ADA brigade providing active defense coverage in the communications zone and the Seoul pocket.

5) Operational Command and Control. The CLCC and his staff performed three command and control functions: acquire, assess, and communicate operational-level information and maintain status, determine operational actions (implement operational decision-making process), and direct and lead operational forces.

6) Operational Support. The CLCC and his support staff officers performed one vitally important support function - identify requirements and establish priorities for operational support. These staff officers spent a lot of time coordinating with their counterparts in the headquarters of USA-BL in order to let them know what was needed, how much, where to place it, and what the risks were if what was needed was not provided. Unfortunately, because of staffing limitations, their efforts were hampered by not having a full-time liaison team in the USA-BL headquarters. Nonetheless, the CLCC did a good job of prioritizing the allocation of available personnel, materials and services among his subordinate units. Specifically, he gave the preponderance of support to units making the main effort - initially, to the First Blue Land Army, then to the MSF. However, the CLCC did not hesitate to shift certain priorities when the situation in Taejon with the surrounded 22nd Infantry Division became critical.

b. Some core LCC functions were not performed by the CLCC and his staff. For example, although addressed in the CLCC's OPLAN for the counteroffensive, protection and security of operational forces and means, and conducting deception received little attention during the exercise. Another function not performed in its entirety was command and control warfare. While some subfunctions of command and control warfare were performed (i.e., psychological operations and physical destruction), others were not (i.e., OPSEC, deception, and electronic warfare). This relatively new joint concept was not addressed substantively either in the CLCC or CINCCFC OPLANs.

6. Question # 5. How was the LCC headquarters organized to carry out its functions?

a. The CLCC headquarters was organized on a functional basis for Prairie Warrior 95. Specifically, two organizations from the CLCC's main command post were set-up and operational: the combined land intelligence center and the combined land operations center. The combined land intelligence center provided connectivity to national and theater intelligence sources, and the intelligence centers of the CLCC's major subordinate formations. A CLCC C-2, four assistant C-2 staff officers, and several All-Source Analysis System operators from Fort Huachuca manned the combined land intelligence center. Its functions were not dissimilar from those of joint intelligence center: collection management, all-source processing, and preparation and dissemination of ground-focused intelligence products such as attack guidance matrices and high payoff target lists. Because of staffing and equipment limitations in the combined land intelligence center, battle damage assessment summaries were not produced, nor was any counterintelligence analytical support provided for OPSEC measures and deception operations. The combined land operations center was the focal point for formulating, monitoring, and directing the execution of the CLCC's decisions. It consisted of a battle staff command element, a component liaison section, and four functionally organized battle staff teams:

1) Battle Staff Command Element. This element consisted of the CLCC and his Chief of Staff and C-3, Operations Officer. These individuals monitored the overall situation in the CLCC's AO and received and evaluated advice and recommendations on operational matters from component liaison officers and leaders of the battle staff teams. Members of the battle staff command element transmitted CLCC decisions to their counterparts at lower and higher echelons, and to component liaison officers, and battle staff team leaders.

2) Component Liaison Section. Augmenting the combined land operations center were liaison elements from the other components - CNCC, CACC, and CSOTF. Each element consisted of at least one warfighting expert who helped integrate

and synchronize their component's participation in combined land operations. These experts were adept in presenting the views and perspectives of their component commanders in key areas such as targeting, airspace control, and counterair and TMD operations.

3) Battle Staff Team Movement and Maneuver. This team consisted of C-3 current operations officers who received, stored, and displayed information on the strengths, locations, and activities of enemy ground and CLCC forces. These individuals advised the CLCC on a variety of factors including the conduct of combat operations by his major subordinate land formations and commitment and redesignation of his reserve. Team members spent a great deal of time coordinating with representatives of the combined land intelligence center and members of the Battle Staff Team Firepower. They also stayed in close contact with the C-3 plans officer who wrote an OPLAN for employing the MSF in a sequel to its defeat of the 12th OEF.

4) Battle Staff Team Firepower. This team consisted of C-3 deep operations officers, and targeting specialists from the liaison elements of the other components. Members of this team provided the CLCC with advice and recommendations on the integration and synchronization of operational firepower assets - both the organic long-range systems of his subordinate units, and the interdiction-capable forces from other components. Essentially, the Battle Staff Team Firepower was operating as the combined equivalent of the Army's EAC DOCC. As such, it performed a number of critical targeting tasks: development of a plan for the employment of operational firepower assets and control of forces and weapons operating in the airspace above the CLCC's AO; establishment of fire support coordination and airspace control measures to support the CLCC's concept of operations; tasking of subordinate land force formations to engage high payoff targets within the CLCC's AO; nomination of other high payoff targets to the CACC's AOC for inclusion on the daily JIPTL; adjudication and resolution of air support allocation issues; preparation of the CLCC to perform his

duties as a member of the JTCB; and establishment of priorities and criteria for battle damage assessment of operational targets in the CLCC's AO.

5) Battle Staff Team Protection. This team focused on integrating and synchronizing TMD operations in the CLCC's AO. Members of this team provided the CLCC and his immediate subordinate commanders with up-to-date assessments of the ballistic missile threat, notification of missile launches, and dissemination of missile targeting data and engagement results. Battle Staff Team Protection members were in close and almost continuous contact with members of the Battle Staff Team Firepower who had responsibility for integrating and synchronizing TMD attack operations in the CLCC's AO. Members of this team did not focus on integrating OPSEC measures and deception operations since there was little or no attention given to these functions by the CLCC and his staff. Because of staffing limitations, WMD protection issues had to be solved using a single NBC officer for both the CLCC and 9th Army staffs.

6) Battle Staff Team Support. This team consisted of operational support officers including the C-1, C-4, C-6, and civil-military operations officer. Members of this team received, stored, and displayed information on the current status of manpower and personnel matters, logistics, C4 systems, and host nation support activities within the CLCC's major subordinate units. They used this information as a basis for close and continuous coordination with the Commander, USA-BL and his staff who provided most of the capabilities to meet the CLCC's operational support requirements. In turn, members of the Battle Staff Team Support provided the CLCC with advice and recommendations on the priorities of available support for his major subordinate units.

b. The use of information-age technology in the combined land operations center was highlighted by the *Phoenix* command and control system that allowed the CLCC to video-conference directly with the Commander, MSF on operational matters either one of them deemed important. On numerous occasions during the exercise, the *Phoenix* command and control system significantly enhanced the ability of the two

headquarters to obtain a clear understanding of the situation, quickly formulate a plan of action, and execute a synchronized attack which seriously degraded a powerful enemy unit.

7. Question # 6. How did the Commander, 9th (US) Army integrate and synchronize the complementary capabilities of the II (US) Corps and I MEF during Prairie Warrior 95? Task organization decisions made by the Commander, 9th (US) Army capitalized on the complementary capabilities of the II Corps and I MEF. During the preparation of his counteroffensive OPLAN, the CINCCFC/USF-BL designated the 9th (US) Army headquarters as the JFLCC. Furthermore, the CINCCFC/USF-BL placed the II Corps and I MEF under the OPCON of the JFLCC for the counteroffensive. Thus, the Commander, 9th (US) Army, as the JFLCC, had the authority "to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission." With this authority, and after analyzing the factors of METT-T and completing his estimate of the situation, the Commander, 9th (US) Army placed the 62nd Field Artillery Brigade, including an attached target acquisition detachment of two Q-37 counterbattery radar sections, and the 61st Engineer Group under the OPCON of the Commander, I MEF. Subsequently, the Commander, I MEF established a support relationship for the 62nd Field Artillery Brigade: reinforcing to the 11th Marines, the artillery regiment assigned to the 1st Marine Division, the ground combat element of the I MEF. Another significant task organization decision made by the Commander, 9th (US) Army involved the attachment of the I MEF's Marine Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company to the II Corps. His intent in making these task organization decisions was twofold: enhance the ability of I MEF to conduct counterfire and rivercrossing operations, and provide II Corps with an organization to plan, request, coordinate, and control naval gunfire and naval and I MEF air support.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

### A. GENERAL

The purpose of this paper was to provide answers to a series of basic questions as a first step in addressing some of the details necessary to implement the JFLCC concept in a theater of operations or war. These questions were: What is the role of a JFLCC in a theater of operations or war?; What are the responsibilities of a JFLCC?; What functions must a JFLCC headquarters perform to fulfill its responsibilities?; and How should an ARFOR headquarters be organized to carry out the JFLCC functions? Answers to these questions were obtained in two ways: by analyzing an assortment of doctrinal publications, monographs, and other miscellaneous documents relating to the JFLCC concept; and by examining this concept during the Army's Prairie Warrior exercise in May 1995. From this overall assessment a number of insights relating directly to the role, responsibilities, functions, and organization of a JFLCC headquarters in a theater of operations or war have been identified.

### B. ROLE

1. The role for a functional land component commander as outlined in Joint Pub 3-0 is viable. He is an operational-level commander who provides unity of command and effort for employing land power to accomplish the operational objectives of the JFC. Normally, the JFLCC focuses on operational responsibilities, leaving logistical support to multinational authorities and U.S. service component commands in theater. As such, he establishes and maintains linkages to joint, multinational, interagency, nongovernment, private voluntary, or United Nations organizations and conducts major land operations in support of the joint campaign. In conducting these operations, the JFLCC integrates and synchronizes the complementary capabilities of the forces and assets available to him in order to defeat enemy land forces and control land areas. These forces include but are not limited to: units of the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and multinational field commands

which fight battles and engagements; theater intelligence assets; operational firepower assets such as JFACC provided air interdiction and close air support aircraft, naval gunfire and sea-based cruise missiles, and joint electronic warfare systems; and SOF.

2. In a highly complex operational environment involving the employment of one or more Army corps and one or more MEF, the JFC is likely to assign JFLCC responsibilities to the ASCC. In this case, the ASCC adopts one of two options: he delegates the authority for performing the support task to a subordinate Army headquarters, and uses his staff as a base JFLCC headquarters, or he forms and deploys a numbered army to control the conduct of operations. The commander of this numbered army serves as the JFLCC and concentrates on the operational employment of his major subordinate land formations. However, in a less complex operational environment, this should not preclude some lower echelon of command (e.g., corps or MEF) from serving as the JFLCC if the JFC decides to organize his command with a functional component commander for joint land operations. In a mature theater containing multiple armies of various nationalities it is not unlikely that a CINC would designate a CLCC to control combined land operations.

### C. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The JFC establishes the authority and assigns the responsibilities of the JFLCC. In the first instance, the JFC designates the forces or military capability that will be made available to the JFLCC and the command relationships for their employment. These relationships normally have the JFLCC exercising OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capability or forces made available for tasking. However, it is not inconceivable, and may be preferable, that a JFC might decide to place both Army and Marine Corps units under the OPCON of the JFLCC. Such a decision would maximize the flexibility of the JFLCC in organizing his command for major land operations, thereby allowing him to capitalize on the complementary capabilities of his subordinate forces. The JFC may also establish supported and



supporting relationships between his components to accomplish necessary tasks. Each component of the joint force can support or be supported by other components. The support command relationship authorizes the commander being supported to exercise general direction of the supporting effort which includes determining targets, timing, and duration of the supporting activity, and issuing other instructions for enhancing coordination and efficiency. In the second instance, the JFLCC's overall responsibility is to organize, plan, and direct execution of joint land operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and designation of command relationships. Normally, the JFLCC will have several specific responsibilities ranging from coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the operations of other component commanders, to functioning as the supported commander for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the land AO established by the JFC.

2. In establishing the authority and assigning the responsibilities of the JFLCC, as well as the other component commanders, the JFC performs one of his most important tasks. JFC decisions in these two areas will have far-reaching effects on his ability to synchronize the component's complementary capabilities -- they can either facilitate his synchronization efforts or make them more difficult. In this regard, one of the principal ways for the CINC to enhance synchronization is by designating the most appropriate command and support relationships for his components. Furthermore, an Army or Marine Corps general officer selected by a JFC in the future to serve as a JFLCC should probably expect to be assigned most, if not all, of the specific responsibilities identified in section II of this paper.

#### D. FUNCTIONS

1. The JFLCC and his staff perform a number of core functions which are critical in conducting successful joint land operations. These functions, adapted from TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield, and also found in MCM -147-93, Universal Joint Task List, are:

a. Operational Intelligence. The four core intelligence functions are develop operational intelligence requirements, collect operational information, process operational information, and prepare and disseminate operational intelligence reports.

b. Operational Movement and Maneuver. The five core movement and maneuver functions are conduct operational movement, conduct operational maneuver, provide operational mobility, provide operational countermobility, and control operationally significant battle space.

c. Operational Firepower. The two core firepower functions are process operational targets and integrate operational firepower.

d. Operational Protection. The four core protection functions are provide operational aerospace defense, provide protection for operational forces and means, provide security for operational forces and means, and conduct deception in support of joint land operations.

e. Operational Command and Control. The four core command and control functions are acquire, assess, and communicate operational level information, and maintain status; determine operational actions (operational decision-making process); direct and lead operational forces; and employ command and control warfare.

f. Operational Support. The one core support function is identify requirements and establish priorities for operational support.

2. The processing of targets, integration of firepower, provision of aerospace defense, and identification of requirements and establishment of priorities for operational support are functions which require a tremendous amount of coordination between the JFLCC headquarters and the headquarters of his immediate subordinate land force formations, other component commands, and the JFC. This requirement is not surprising with the two firepower functions since a JFLCC normally has no forces or assets of his own to conduct operational fires. His challenge is to integrate and synchronize the operational fires of his operational formations with those provided by other component

commands. Therefore, the JFLCC must rely heavily on three sources of expertise: liaison teams from his immediate subordinate land formations working in his headquarters; warfighting experts from the other components who serve as liaison officers in the JFLCC headquarters; and the BCE or MARLO, or some combination of these organizations, in the AOC of the JFACC. Furthermore, because of the extensive coordination requirements which exist for the JFLCC and his staff when carrying out their duties relating to TMD active defense operations and the one operational support function identified above, it is imperative for the JFLCC to establish liaison team(s) with one or more service component commanders in the theater. This rather robust liaison requirement is a necessity for the integration of operations and support during joint or combined land operations.

#### E. ORGANIZATION

1. To help him perform the core functions identified above, the JFLCC organizes his headquarters with a joint staff consisting of four basic elements: command group, commander's personal staff group, special staff group, and the coordinating staff group. The command group consists of five key individuals: the JFLCC, Deputy JFLCC, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Secretary of the Staff. To broaden the base of high-level expertise and influence within the organization, the JFLCC and his deputy are normally from different services. Instead of working through the Chief of Staff or Secretary of the Staff, personal staff group members assist the JFLCC directly by performing duties over which he desires to maintain personal control. Typically, these members include the JFLCC's aide-de-camp, command sergeant major, political advisor, chaplain, public affairs officer, inspector general, and staff judge advocate. Members of the special staff group provide the JFLCC with advice and recommendations on technical, administrative, and certain operational matters. This group is normally small in order to avoid an unnecessary duplication of effort with corresponding staff sections within service component headquarters that concentrate on solving these types of matters.

The coordinating staff group consists of six staff divisions that generally adhere to the major functions of command: manpower and personnel; intelligence; operations; logistics; plans and policy; and C4 systems. The officers who lead these divisions are the JFLCC's principal staff assistants for all operational matters in their respective functional areas. In particular, the JFLCC relies heavily on the expertise and experience of the J-2 and J-3 to help him organize, plan, direct, and control joint land operations.

2. To accomplish the four core operational intelligence functions the JFLCC J-2 directs the activities of his staff, and oversees the operation of the JLIC. The ACE from the EAC military intelligence brigade is the principal organization within the JLIC. The EAC ACE coordinates with and provides connectivity to national and theater intelligence sources, the intelligence centers of the JFLCC's major subordinate formations, and the JFC's JIC. Its functions are similar to those of the JIC: collection management, all source processing, and preparation and dissemination of timely and relevant ground-focused intelligence products such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield templates, attack guidance matrices, high payoff target lists, and battle damage assessment summaries. A counterintelligence section in the EAC ACE provides analytical support for OPSEC measures and deception operations. Also, the U.S. Air Force normally augments the EAC ACE with a weather support team.

3. The J-3 devotes most of his efforts to integrating and synchronizing the complementary capabilities of joint land forces. To accomplish this critical and complex task the J-3 normally organizes a battle staff and activates a JLOC. Representatives from each of the staff divisions serve as members of the battle staff. The battle staff works in the JLOC, a command and control facility not dissimilar from the JFC's JOC. In essence, the JLOC is the focal point within the JFLCC's main command post for formulating, monitoring, and directing the execution of the JFLCC's decisions. It consists of a battle staff command element, a component liaison section, and four functionally organized battle staff teams - one each for operational movement and maneuver, operational

firepower, operational protection, and operational support. Of particular importance is the work done by the J-3 deep operations officers, and targeting specialists from the liaison elements of the other components in the Battle Staff Team Firepower. These individuals provide the JFLCC with advice and recommendations on the integration and synchronization of operational firepower assets - both the organic long-range systems of his subordinate units, and the interdiction-capable forces from other components. Essentially, the Battle Staff Team Firepower operates as the joint equivalent of the U.S. Army's EAC DOCC.

4. Information-Age technology in the JLOC and the operations centers of the JFLCC's major subordinate commanders is a powerful tool for enhancing the ability of these organizations to obtain a clear understanding of the situation, quickly formulate a plan of action, and execute a synchronized attack. The primary advantage of expanding this capability to each of the battle staff teams and their counterpart staff elements at lower echelons is obvious: enhanced situational awareness in terms of staff officers having an up-to-date relevant common picture of the battlefield, including accurate statuses of friendly units for all key operational functions. In the future, with this type of information and knowledge of the CCIR, staff officers in a JLOC will be capable of providing the JFLCC with relevant advice and sound recommendations, thereby allowing him to decide and act appropriately when changes in the operational situation occur.

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ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, September 1993), p. II-17.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, March 1994), p. 202.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), p. 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Prairie Warrior 95 is really four exercises in one. It is a capstone learning experience for the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) in the form of a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) "Warfighter" exercise at corps and division level. It is also a capstone learning experience for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) whose Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) students and Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) students perform the echelons above corps (EAC) staff functions at theater CINC, land component command, and numbered army level. The third embedded exercise is the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) of Prairie Warrior itself, and the Mobile Strike Force (MSF), an experimental force for determining design principles and operational concepts for the Army's Force XXI division. Finally, as phase III of the Department of the Army's (DA) General Headquarters (GHQ) exercise, Prairie Warrior provides the DA staff with the opportunity to investigate issues relating to the Army's Title X responsibilities.

<sup>8</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. II-17.

<sup>9</sup> FM 100-5, p. 4-4.

<sup>10</sup> Major Andrew S. Sandoy, "The Land Component Commander: Is One Required?", (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1990), p. 37. Sandoy presents an interesting historical analysis of when it might be appropriate for a theater commander to designate a land component commander. He concludes that there are five considerations which may favor the use of a subordinate land component commander: theater immaturity, combat inexperienced leaders, concentrated objectives, a "weak" theater commander, and a theater commander with a different service or nationality from the predominant land force.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, June 1994), p. IV-26.

<sup>12</sup> Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "America's 2 Armies," Joint Force Quarterly, Issue No. 6, Autumn/Winter 1994-95: p. 41.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Army, FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 1995), p. 2-41.

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- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-39 and 2-40.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 2-40.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. iv.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 2-17.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 2-35.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 1-13.
- <sup>20</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. II-18.
- <sup>21</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. III-14.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. IV-15.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. IV-16; Joint Chiefs of Staff, User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, September 1994), p. 10. Definitions of the four criteria are extrapolated from information in this User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning: *adequacy* -- does the plan meet JFC objectives and guidance? *feasibility* -- can the plan be implemented using the available resources? *acceptability* -- is the plan militarily and politically prudent and acceptable? *doctrinal soundness* -- does the plan comply with joint warfighting principles contained in joint doctrine?
- <sup>25</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-26.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. IV-16.
- <sup>27</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, January 1994), p. V-11.
- <sup>28</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. IV-22.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. IV-24.
- <sup>30</sup> U.S. Air Force, JFACC Primer, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, February 1994), p. 16.
- <sup>31</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, pp. IV-7, IV-8, and IV-17; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, November 1994), p. II-3.
- <sup>32</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-35.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. III-40.
- <sup>34</sup> U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 11-9 (Final Draft), Blueprint of the Battlefield, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1993), p. 6-10.
- <sup>35</sup> FM 100-7, p. 5-30.

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<sup>36</sup> Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) and Marine Corps Force Central Command (MARCENT), Concept Paper, "Implementing the Duties as the Deputy Joint Force Land Component Commander (DJFLCC)", (Fort McPherson, Georgia: Headquarters, Third U.S. Army/ARCENT, March 1995), no page number.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., no page number.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. C-2.

<sup>39</sup> FM 100-7, p. 5-5.

<sup>40</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-28.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. III-29.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Joint Pub 3-56.1, p. II-7. Each component normally provides liaison elements to the JFACC - Army battlefield coordination element (BCE), naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Air Force liaison element (AFLE), special operations liaison element (SOLE), air mobility element (AME), strategic liaison team (STRATLAT), space liaison officer (SLO), and Marine liaison officer (MARLO). The existence of a JFLCC would seem to argue for some modification of this structure (e.g., combining the BCE and MARLO into one organization since the Army and Marines would be fighting together on land as part of the same component). In this case, the expectation of the JFC and JFACC would be for one liaison element to "serve as a conduit for direct coordination between the JFACC and the JFLCC, ... and represent the JFLCC on time sensitive and critical issues."

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp. III-10 and III-11.

<sup>45</sup> FM100-7, p. 7-9.

<sup>46</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, March 1994), pp. I-3 and I-4.

<sup>47</sup> US Army, FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 June 1995), p. 3-8.

<sup>48</sup> Joint Pub 3-01.5, p. III-13.

<sup>49</sup> FM 44-100, p. 3-14.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 3-15.

<sup>51</sup> US Army, Public Affairs Brochure, US Army Theater Missile Defense, (Arlington, Virginia: Public and Government Affairs Directorate, US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, undated).

<sup>52</sup> FM 100-7, p. 5-21.

<sup>53</sup> TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. C-8.

<sup>54</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. IV-9.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. IV-10; FM 100-5, p. 2-11.



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- <sup>56</sup> TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. C-9.
- <sup>57</sup> FM 100-5, p. 6-9.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.; TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. C-9.
- <sup>59</sup> TRADOC Pam 11-9, pp. C-11 and C-12.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. C-11.
- <sup>61</sup> User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning, p. 8.
- <sup>62</sup> Major Patrick A. Stallings, "What To Do, What To Do? Determining a Course of Action at the Operational Level of War."; (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1991), pp. 30 and 32. In this monograph Stallings presents a decision-making process for the operational commander. He outlines "a logical framework for staff and command action, defines a common joint approach to course of action development and selection, and ensures that operational concepts and theory are incorporated in the thought process." In addition to the text, Stallings' provides several tools (e.g., charts, tables, and matrices) that operational commanders and planners can use to facilitate their completion of key tasks and actions from the operational decision-making process. Of particular interest are two different matrices he proposes for wargaming courses of action (see pages 35 and 37).
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 39.
- <sup>64</sup> TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. C-13.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. C-14.
- <sup>66</sup> U.S. Army, FM 100-103, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1987), pp. 1-14 and 1-15.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-9 and 2-10.
- <sup>68</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-40.
- <sup>69</sup> Major Myron J. Griswold, "Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity", (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1986), p. 30.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup> Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired, "Thoughts for Joint Commanders", (pamphlet, privately printed by the author, Annapolis, Maryland, August 1993), p. 51.
- <sup>72</sup> FM 100-7, p. 5-36.
- <sup>73</sup> Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), p. III-4.
- <sup>74</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-19.
- <sup>75</sup> US Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 25 May 1984), p. 2-4.

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- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>77</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-20; Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), p. III-5.
- <sup>78</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-20.
- <sup>79</sup> Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), p. III-5.
- <sup>80</sup> FM 100-7, pp. 6-19 and A-36.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid., pp. A-37 and A-38.
- <sup>82</sup> Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), p. III-7.
- <sup>83</sup> Joint Pub 1-02, p. 205.
- <sup>84</sup> US Army, Student Text (ST) 100-9, The Tactical Decisionmaking Process, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1 July 1993), pp. 2-9 and 2-10.
- <sup>85</sup> Joint Pub 3-56.1, p. II-7.
- <sup>86</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-23; Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), p. III-7.
- <sup>87</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-20; FM 100-5, p. 6-9.
- <sup>88</sup> FM 100-7, pp. 7-11 thru 7-15.
- <sup>89</sup> US Army, Public Affairs Brochure, US Army Theater Missile Defense Element's Force Projection TOC, (Arlington, Virginia: Public and Government Affairs Directorate, US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, undated).
- <sup>90</sup> FM 100-7, pp. 5-22 thru 5-24.
- <sup>91</sup> FM 101-5, pp. 3-10 and 3-11.
- <sup>92</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-21.
- <sup>93</sup> Joint Pub 3-56 (Proposed Final Publication), p. III-12.
- <sup>94</sup> FM 101-5, pp. 3-22 and 3-23.
- <sup>95</sup> Joint Pub 0-2 (Draft), p. IV-21.
- <sup>96</sup> Lieutenant General (Retired) Cushman's Pamphlet entitled "Thoughts for Joint Commander's", pp. 42-44. In this part of his pamphlet Cushman says that free and open information flow was the key to the German's use of *auftragstaktik* in World War II; he goes on to say that free and open information flow in today's operational environment means "that the movement of information among all elements of the force and its support, regardless of function or Service, is open, free, and unrestrained by any concern other than effectiveness in the common mission and keeping our information from the enemy." Cushman suggests that "a program called C4I for the Warrior launched in 1992 by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff can create for a joint force a Joint SuperNet for free and open information flow, thereby providing the essential ingredient for *auftragstaktik* and permitting the commander's all-Service forces to fight as a true team."

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<sup>97</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Myron J. Griswold, "Echelons Above Corps Command and Control for Prairie Warrior 95", (one page information paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 1995). Generally, the *Blueland* Theater of Operations in Prairie Warrior 95 consisted of the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding waters, the East Sea, Yellow Sea, and South Sea. To minimize political sensitivities and avoid direct comparisons with the military situation on the Peninsula today, the Deputy Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College directed that exercise planners use the words *Blueland* and *Orangeland* when referring to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and North Korea, respectively.

<sup>98</sup> On paper, USF-BL, a sub-unified command of US Pacific Command (USPACOM), was the higher headquarters of USA-BL, its Army component. US forces assigned to USF-BL are dedicated to a support and coordination role for CFC. Because of staffing limitations, a separate USF-BL headquarters was not established for the exercise; however, not unlike the situation that exists within the higher echelon military staffs in South Korea today, some of the USF-BL's more important functions during Prairie Warrior 95 were performed by logisticians on the CFC staff.

<sup>99</sup> The author was a member of the U. S. Army's Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) for Prairie Warrior 95. The mission of the CAAT was to observe, collect data, and document insights on important concepts and issues in five primary areas: MSF, EAC, Confederation of Models, Synthetic Theater of War, and Revolution in Military Affairs. It was supported by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and included subject matter experts from the TRADOC battle laboratories, proponents, and other pertinent agencies. As a member of the CAAT, the author recorded twelve specific observations on the JFLCC concept which are not included in this research paper, but are a part of the official CALL data base. These observations are accessible in this data base; all files can be shipped electronically via modem or in "hard copy". CALL POC is MAJ Jay Stefaney, DSN 552-3839/3284.

<sup>100</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. II-17.

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