

NATO IN THE 1990s: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE

A Monograph
by
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ABSTRACT

“NATO in the 1990s: An Assessment of the Literature,” by Lieutenant Colonel Ann K. Drach, Transportation Corps, 44 pages.

This monograph reviews the significant body of literature on NATO published in English since its revised strategy document, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” appeared in 1991 and determines what contributions this literature makes toward understanding present and future trans-Atlantic security strategies.

The study frames the arguments along four major fault lines: enlargement, the U.S. role in NATO, NATO’s relationship with other European security organizations, and NATO’s conduct of “out-of-area” military operations. The author examines these key areas and provides an assessment across the spectrum of literature published by Alliance leaders, advisors, political analysts, and historians on the nature of the debates, whether or not the debates are changing, and the influence these debates have had in shaping NATO’s post-Cold War direction.

Finally, the author concludes that the nature of the debate is changing and provides a series of implications for NATO which include a discussion of its reinforced role as the world’s premiere post-Cold War security organization and its emerging role as United Nations’ coalition peacekeeper.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION

The Berlin Wall came down in 1989, heralding the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and, subsequently, the demise of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, while liberating the United States from the Soviet threat, has forced this nation to confront a changing world order and to reexamine its national interests and role as world leader. Unlike the bipolar world, which allowed American strategists to unite their traditionally disparate national security views, the “collapse of communism and the unraveling of the USSR eroded that unifying element”...

The result of which has been a burgeoning debate over two distinct yet intertwined sets of issues. The first concerns the nature of the international system following the end of the Cold War. The second concerns the role the United States should occupy in that system.¹

While many nations are struggling with these same issues, nowhere has the debate been more profound than within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and among its critics. NATO’s response to the post-Cold War world defines not only the European political and security landscape, but has far ranging consequences for the United States and its relationship with Europe. U.S.-Europe relations have formed the cornerstone of U.S. policy since World War II and the institutions this country has built in Europe which are fundamental to continued U.S. security and prosperity will be reshaped by NATO’s evolution.²

Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, refers to America as a European power and views a strong, U.S.-led, NATO as the

cornerstone of European security. He identifies the enhanced stability of Europe as a mutual interest of both the United States and Russia and has stated that, "if the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, into a stable European security system." He attributes Russia's current involvement in the European Union (EU) and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program to U.S. engagement in Europe.³

Not everyone shares his view. Much of the literature published in English since NATO's 1990 London Summit and 1991 Rome Summit reflect an isolationist tone. Isolationists feel strongly that America's Cold War strategy of creating and pressing a worldwide strategic advantage can no longer be justified. Isolationist opinion states that America's continued "involvement and entanglement in areas of marginal utility to the United States [are] eroding America's wealth and prosperity."⁴ Another major isolationist position holds that heavy U.S. involvement in NATO dangerously entangles the United States in Europe's complex security affairs. As recently as July 1995, Senator Sam Nunn questioned the value of a revised, expanded NATO warning the Clinton Administration that it "could develop big problems if [it continues] down this path."⁵

The resurgence of isolationism has not, however, silenced those who belong to the school of *realpolitik*-- the belief in unilateral, national self assertion or the

Wilsonian school of international commitment to the ideal of collective security and international justice. As Henry Kissinger describes President Wilson's vision in a speech he delivered to the World Peace Conference in 1919:

The preservation of peace would no longer spring from the traditional calculus of power but from worldwide consensus backed up by a policing mechanism. A universal grouping of largely democratic nations would act as the 'trustee of peace,' and replace the old balance-of-power and alliance systems.⁶

Dr. Kissinger's words are descriptive of NATO's initial response to the end of the Cold War. The rhetoric of both the London and Rome Summits reflected a commitment to transform NATO into an alliance of broader scope with an expanded cooperative, consensus-building orientation which is capable of responding to new security challenges while preserving NATO's principle role in Europe's security architecture.

The outcome of these summit meetings was a post-Cold War blueprint for enhanced European stability. In spite of this blueprint's many tangible successes in dealing with former Warsaw Pact states and other European security issues, there is, nonetheless, a wide-ranging debate over whether or not NATO's current direction serves the interests of either Europe or the United States... "pundits have subjected the alliance to a constant barrage of criticism. While individual critiques fall across a broad spectrum, an overarching complaint is that the alliance has not adapted sufficiently to the changed conditions in Europe."⁷

The purpose of this monograph is to assess this spectrum of literature published in English since 1991 by Alliance leaders, advisors, political analysts

and historians on the major issues facing NATO. This study examines the nature of the debates, determines if the debates are changing as a result of post-Cold War world events, and analyzes the influence these writings have had in shaping NATO's direction. Finally, the monograph draws conclusions on the literature's impact on European and U.S. security interests and provides implications for current and future trans-Atlantic security challenges.

BACKGROUND

NATO's response to the end of the Cold War came with an uncharacteristic unanimous and rapid resolve. At NATO's London Summit in 1990, NATO's political masters, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), announced that a sweeping revision of NATO's strategy was forthcoming. With the publication of the London Declaration during the Summit, the NAC committed NATO to the momentous undertaking of redesigning its strategy and military and political structure--a metamorphosis that continues to this day.⁸

President George Bush delivered the opening remarks at the London Summit, where he characterized the London Declaration as defining a new path for NATO's future. He summarized the importance of the declaration in four key areas. First, the declaration transformed NATO's relationship with old adversaries by inviting the former Warsaw Pact nations to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO. This section of the declaration officially paved the way for formal social, political, and economic ties with former Soviet satellite countries.⁹ While reaffirming its fundamental principle of collective defense, the declaration also promised to substantially reduce NATO's conventional defenses. Through the conclusion of the conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations and new conventional arms reductions, NATO would also prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate conventional military power, thus limiting the offensive options of any one nation on the European Continent. The principle of collective defense through organization of NATO forces into

multinational corps was also agreed to by all NATO members and included in the declaration.¹⁰

The London Declaration tackled the issue of NATO's nuclear strategy, as well as conventional capabilities, by agreeing to modifying NATO's 23-year-old nuclear flexible response option. Nuclear deterrence would remain a fundamental NATO strategy, but only as a greatly reduced weapon of last resort. The London Declaration committed to the reduction of all short-range nuclear systems and, with the cooperation of the then Soviet Union, to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe. In the context of new defense plans and force reductions, the declaration announced that NATO would prepare and publish a new military strategy which moved the alliance away from forward defense and flexible response toward, smaller, rapid response, multinational forces consistent with the revolutionary political changes underway in Europe.¹¹

The declaration's final commitment was to enhance Europe's security identity and defense role by strengthening the European pillar of NATO and ensuring the necessary "transparency and complementarity" with other European security organizations; specifically: the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Community (EC) now the European Union (EU), and the Council of Europe.¹²

The 1991 Rome Summit fulfilled the NAC's London commitment to produce both a new military strategy and security architecture for Europe by publishing two documents designed to be NATO's road map as it moves into the 21st Century. The first document was NATO's new strategy. According to its authors, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" responds to profound political changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe, while reaffirming the basic principles on which NATO was founded, that of common defense. It defines the new strategic environment in light of key political changes across the European landscape. Specifically, it addresses the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the return to sovereignty of its former satellite countries, the unification of Germany, the evolution in importance of Western European security organizations such as the WEU and the OSCE, and the ongoing successes in the chemical defense establishment (CDE), Intermediate range nuclear forces (INF), and strategic arms reduction talks (START) agreements. Finally, it identifies the resulting military challenges for the Alliance and crafts a new strategic doctrine for forces and their use.¹³

The strategy acknowledges that the classical NATO threat of simultaneous, full scale attack has effectively disappeared and reorients NATO's focus from a military threat-based response to a broader framework designed to counter economic, social, and political instabilities which may threaten the Alliance. It establishes the primary resulting military task as disarmament and arms control, while ensuring that NATO's defensive posture is maintained. Though the

strategy does not use the word “peacekeeping,” it does direct the formation of military forces capable of responding to crises in unstable regions “ in adjacent areas,” as a necessary military capability, if European security is threatened. The forces required to perform these tasks are characterized by their ability to rapidly deploy and establish responsive reinforcement and resupply “from both within Europe and from North America.”¹⁴

The Strategic Concept concludes by reaffirming NATO’s defensive nature through the resolve of its members to “safeguard their security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” It dictates the lowest possible level of forces consistent with requirements, while increasing the level of cooperation and “mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace.”¹⁵

The second document published at the Rome Summit responded to the vast political changes confronting the Alliance as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the “Iron Curtain,” which previously defined the territorial separation between East and West. Titled the “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation,” known as the Rome Declaration, its purpose was to exploit newly gained political opportunities to achieve Alliance objectives. This document reinforces the Strategic Concept and confirms that Alliance security must take into account a global view. It lays down a new European security architecture characterized by increased cooperation between NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU, and the Council of Europe. The primary purpose of the Rome Declaration was to provide the guidelines for strengthening the European pillar of the

Alliance by supporting the WEU's military defense role in European stability and by committing the Alliance to strengthening the OSCE process. The latter was to be accomplished through actively supporting OSCE development, particularly in the areas of human rights, disarmament and arms control, and through reinforcement of the OSCE as Europe's crisis manager and peaceful arbitrator of disputes.¹⁶

The Rome Declaration's second purpose was to open the door to the former Warsaw Pact by extending a commitment to assist the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with political and economic reform. It affirmed that the Alliance's security is linked to all other states in Europe. It declared an intent to develop a more institutional relationship of cooperation and consultation and proposed the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which would include foreign ministers from the former Soviet states and meet annually in conjunction with the NAC. The overall intent was to develop a partnership with Central and East European countries through high-level visits, exchanges of views on security issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields leading to the inexorable democratization of all of Europe.¹⁷

The London and Rome Summits still serve as the blue print for NATO's ongoing evolution, in spite of a debate which falls across four major fault lines: enlargement, NATO's relationship to other European security organizations, the conduct of "out of area" military operations--NATO's Southern flank, and the

future role of the United States in NATO. This paper frames the arguments and closely examines the nature of the debates in these areas.¹⁸

NATO EXPANSION

Eastern and Central Europe

The transformation of former Warsaw Pact nations into candidates for admission into NATO's formal, sixteen-member defense alliance is the most complex and controversial issue confronting NATO in the 1990s. The literature which frames the expansion debate is prodigious and ranges from the more-is-always-better view to the position that NATO has been rendered obsolete. Most authors do agree, however, that regardless of its ultimate azimuth, NATO must exercise caution and are encouraged by the fact that NATO has moved with deliberate and measured strides since the end of the Cold War in 1989 in deciding whether or not to expand its membership to former Warsaw Pact states.

Three years elapsed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 before the NAC issued its first invitation at NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit to Central and Eastern European nations to participate in a Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Designed to strengthen security relationships, promote democratic growth, and develop military cooperation and interoperability, PfP was created to work in concert with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which opened NATO's political door to Eastern and Central Europe in 1991. PfP has a declared goal of expanding the scope on NACC activities and providing for a permanent presence of PfP nations at NATO Headquarters,

enabling non-NATO NACC members access to formal dialogue during crisis resolution.¹⁹

At the same time NATO issued its PfP invitation at the Brussels Summit, it also directed an Alliance internal study to analyze how NATO should enlarge, to determine the principles to guide the process, and to assess the implications of the eventual inclusion of new members. The study, published in December 1995, addresses principles of enlargement; how to ensure that it contributes to European security and stability, how the NACC and PfP contribute to enlargement, how enlargement contributes to the Alliance, implications of membership for new members--both their rights and obligations, and modalities which the process should follow. The study intentionally does not address who should be admitted into an expanded NATO nor does it give timelines for enlargement, though it does accept its inevitability.²⁰

NATO's initial response to the enlargement issue triggered a flurry of articles and scholarly papers by advocates and nay sayers alike. The major arguments fall into two, distinct groupings. Those in favor of expansion cite the following key points:

- Expansion would be responsive to reform leaders in Central and Eastern Europe.
- It enhances European security and avoids a security vacuum.
- It provides security assurances to Central and Eastern European states against what they see as the greatest threat--instability and possible challenges from Russia and others in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).
- Expansion enables domestic reform and integration with the West.
- Quick expansion takes advantage of the current Russian situation, precluding Russia veto attempts.²¹

Those against NATO expansion represent a smaller body of literature, but are equally strident in their views. The key points against expansion are:

- There is no threat to Central and Eastern Europe necessitating expansion.
- Discriminating between candidate members may cause a new iron curtain to fall.
- NATO should not extend security commitments while it is drawing down military resources.
- Expansion could ruin NATO, causing it to lose its ability to focus in terms of cohesion and consensus building, while jeopardizing relationships between allies, and subjecting it to a possible Russian veto power.²²

On the side of expansion, NATO's own voices ring the loudest. Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, represents the prevailing NATO view reflected in both NATO's 1995 expansion study and its reception by NATO members. Mr. von Moltke argues that it is essential for NATO to function beyond its traditional defensive alliance charter and come to view itself as a community with a shared commitment to open democratic societies, human rights and market economies. He further states that in a Europe which is rapidly growing together on one continent, in order to eliminate the divisive fissures of past differences, it is a condition of success that international institutions such as NATO and the EU open membership to Central and Eastern European countries which share the same values and economic space.²³

Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics at the University of Hull in England vehemently disagrees. Dr. Gray, and others, believe that rather than commissioning research studies, what NATO needs to do is exercise clear thinking. Convinced that NATO should advance its security architecture for

wartime operations rather than peacetime ones, he believes that NATO should be making bold decisions which move its policy in a nonlinear way, creating a better track record than its current slant toward incrementalism. He summarizes his objection to expansion as follows.

Stated most starkly, NATO's problem today is that it has not identified the problem. NATO is a solution which will have difficulty surviving, let alone prospering, in the absence of intra-Alliance consensus of the problem (dare one say threat) that justifies its continued existence.²⁴

At the heart of the expansion issue, Dr. Gray represents a widely held view that NATO should not foster future cohesion at the cost of creating security problems. He suggests that NATO should not redefine its collective defensive characteristic into one of collective security. Transformation to a collective security organization dictates inclusion of candidate countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) such as Russia, who may not function cooperatively, causing NATO to be damaged beyond revival as an instrument for collective defense. Dr. Gray closes this argument with a word of caution.

Whether or not NATO expanded as well, or as wisely, as it should have in the Cold War, the coin of the realm--the strategic effect upon Soviet containment--was unarguable. The current undisciplined debate over the expansion of the Alliance suffers precisely from a loss of this coin of the realm...[this] expansion debate most probably will be settled case by case, virtually no matter what the formal criteria may be for full Alliance membership...NATO will redefine itself without a clear sense of what is necessary.²⁵

The inability to recapture its common defense identity is not the only significant cost identified by those who caution against NATO expansion. Many believe that the cost to "outfit" candidate NATO members with suitable militaries and free marketing investment capital will be borne by NATO members. In fiscal year (FY) 1996, alone, the United States budgeted \$100 million dollars for PfP training programs, with \$25 million of it earmarked for Poland, arguably the most sophisticated of the 27 PfP participants.²⁶

William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, both military analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), located at the U.S. Army War College, have written widely on the issue of NATO expansion and refer to the resulting financial conundrum as the "pay as you play" roadblock. Dr. Johnsen notes that expansion advocates often identify PfP participation as an ideal medium for partner states to join the NATO fold because PfP facilitates the states' development of Western levels of military sophistication, model democratic governments, and growing market economies--all requirements for NATO membership.

However conceptually sound this principle may be, the fact remains that even the more economically developed of these countries (i.e. the Visegrad states [Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia]) are finding it difficult to squeeze already scarce resources to finance these efforts.²⁷

Former Warsaw Pact states struggling to finance their own modernization will find it difficult to appeal to their Western European neighbors for economic backing in their drive to become NATO members. It seems that East meets West

when it comes to comparing scarce resources. The latest statistics on leading EU nations' current economic postures indicate that there is no ready financial solution forthcoming from within Western Europe's borders. Germany, often described as Europe's economic engine, reported nearly 4.2 million unemployed workers in February 1996, the highest number since 1933. German economic growth has also been slow, projected to be less than 1.5 percent for 1996, roughly half that projected for the United States. A similar economic profile exists in Italy, Great Britain, and France. In total, throughout the EU's member nations, there were 18.1 million people unemployed as of January 1996, representing 11.7 percent of the entire population.²⁸

Western Europe's economic downturn has not influenced the prevailing political winds in the United States regarding enlargement, even though economic costs to the United States may increase as a result. Neither costs nor concerns about Russian response have dissuaded the Clinton Administration from its wholehearted formal endorsement of NATO expansion. The United States designed the PfP program and, throughout 1995, was very influential in persuading Western European allies to use potential NATO membership as a means of democratizing former communist countries. W. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security advisor, when confronted with concerns about a possible negative Russian reaction to NATO expansion, stated, "This is an important psychological and strategic moment. We can seize it or not. In the

end, I think the Russians will understand that it is in their best interests to accept the inevitability of NATO enlargement.”²⁹

Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, made a compelling argument in support of expansion in an August 1995 article, “Why NATO Should Grow,” written for The New York Review. Talbott describes NATO’s current Eastern boundary as unnatural and anachronistic, based on its post World War II origins. Given acceptance that NATO will continue to serve as the heart of the European security system, he believes it is imperative that NATO’s boundaries evolve in concert with Europe’s ongoing social, political, and economic evolution. Talbott argues that NATO enlargement has been an inherent NATO feature since its inception in 1949, pointing to later admissions of West Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Spain. While acknowledging the fundamental military purpose of NATO, Talbott insists that a review of NATO’s past five decades produces evidence that NATO also provides undeniable political stability to Europe. Establishing political membership criteria, i.e.: democratization, civilian control of militaries, and free marketization, in addition to the military requirements of modernization and interoperability, represents a unique opportunity.

At the December 1994 NAC Ministerial, Secretary Christopher and his Canadian and European counterparts made respect for democracy and international norms of behavior explicit preconditions for membership, so that enlargement of NATO would be a force for the rule of law both within Europe’s new democracies and among them.³⁰

This political grist has fueled large-scale, though cautious, support within the community of American political scientists for an enlarged NATO. The prolific body of work produced by Dr. William T. Johnsen, a research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and holder of the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the Army War College, is most representative of current thinking on the issue. Dr. Johnsen has taken the position that the Alliance has a strong interest in ensuring that reforms in Central and Eastern Europe succeed. He believes that in order for the Alliance to find its role in the process it

...must firmly decide its fundamental purpose...that collective defense remains the core function of the Alliance, [but] core does not mean sole and the Alliance has increasingly been looked to assume the collective security function in Europe.³¹

Jeffery Simon, a senior fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, echoes his support, but feels that, though NATO's response to the problem of enlargement has been extraordinary, it has also been insufficient. Until NATO tackles the conundrum of who should be given NATO membership and in what order, he believes that enlargement may actually trigger regional instabilities and compromise NATO's potential deterrent effects.³² Dr. Johnsen also addresses this concern but concludes that if NATO does not seriously pursue enlargement, it will "sow the seeds of its own irrelevance." Equally important, Dr. Johnsen is convinced that an unwillingness to enlarge could actually jeopardize cohesion in NATO by allowing ethnicity and regionalism to develop its own interests.³³

Russia--The Wild Card

One aspect of NATO enlargement where Dr. Johnsen and Dr. Simon share a common view is on the issue of Russia. Both point out that just as PfP was crafted with Russian sensitivities in mind so must NATO consider Russia's enigmatic responses to Western enlargement initiatives. Dr. Simon cautions that problems with Eastern expansion could "turn into flashpoints if Russian ultranationalists come to power."³⁴

In no other way has the enlargement debate been so confusing. Even within NATO's ranks the ability to gain consensus on a course of action which accommodates Russia has been difficult. As Dr. Johnsen reported after the NAC's PfP announcement in January 1994:

The recent public disagreement in Berlin between German Federal Minister of Defense, Volker Ruhe, and U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, over future Russian integration into NATO points to continued controversy within the Alliance. In short, Ruhe argued that Russia would never be willing to be 'governed' by Brussels, while Perry stated, 'I am not prepared to shut the door on that issue.'³⁵

In spite of Western anxiety, Russia's Foreign Minister, Andrei V. Kozyrev, signed the PfP Framework Document in a ceremony in Brussels in June 1994, formally enrolling Russia into PfP. In a speech to the NAC commemorating the event Mr. Kozyrev said both NATO and Russia were committed to a radical transformation in their relations and that Russia's national interests should be pursued through cooperation, not confrontation. Declaring Russia and NATO

“like-minded nations” belonging to the same democratic community, Mr. Kozyrev, nonetheless, closed with a note of caution.

It should, however, be clear that genuine partnership is an equal partnership. Our relations should be deprived of even the slightest hint of paternalism. There can be no vetoes on the others’ actions nor surprises undermining mutual trust. Partnership does not mean playing at give-away. It means, on the contrary, close cooperation based on respect for the interest of the other side.³⁶

His words were echoed six months later by another notable Russian, Vyacheslav A. Nikonov, a Deputy in the Russian Parliament, in an article commissioned by the Reserve Officers Association of the United States. Mr. Nikonov writes that NATO is widely viewed within Russia as the worst of any active international organizations. Though he acknowledges that this negative attitude has its roots in a Cold War mentality, residual suspicions make NATO a well-suited lightning rod for current Russian problems. Mr. Nikonov espouses the position that NATO’s utility in assuring European and world stability is unquestionable, one he says he shares with other Russian democratic leaders. He does address the need for serious cooperation between Russia and NATO, but declares the PfP ineffective and harmless to Russian interests. His conclusion, however, is ominous.

If there is a foreign policy matter on which there is overall national consensus in Russia, it is the expansion of NATO. Yes, Russia fully respects the right of every country to choose its international partners, but [it] cannot support geostrategic changes which are contrary to its vital interests.³⁷

Russia's declared national interests and post-Cold War residual power initially spawned a "Russia first" approach to European security favored by many American statesmen and authors. General (Ret) William E. Odom in his article, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics are Wrong," identifies this approach with President Clinton and key administration leaders, such as Strobe Talbott, Fred Ikle, and Stephen Sestanovich. The rationale behind "Russia first" was that a European security arrangement could be accomplished within the context of bilateral United States and democratic Russia initiatives. This rationale also assumed that Western Europeans would be highly supportive of this process. General Odom criticizes this approach from the standpoint that the outcome of Russian democratization initiatives is not preordained and the process too slow to respond to transition programs currently needed and ongoing in other former Warsaw Pact states.³⁸

The adverse affects of the "Russia first" approach on NATO's efforts to enlarge were seen early in the process. Russian anti-democratic actions, such as its handling of the Chechnya crisis, Russian policy toward Central Asia and the Transcaucus, a move away from market reforms, the erosion of its military capability, and the resurgence of communist movements, have forced the United States and Europe to look for other ways to pursue an expanded European security environment while acknowledging the fact of Russia's critical role. Defense Minister Kozyrev, in a 1995 Foreign Policy article, insists that a deepening relationship between NATO and Russia must take place first. He

wrote that any admission of Central and European states prior to a Russia-integrated transformed alliance is a threat to Russian security.

Our Eastern European counterparts have argued that for them, membership in NATO would be a psychological symbol of rejoining the Western civilization that Central and East Europe have allegedly been a part of since time immemorial. But, what we are dealing with is joining a military and political alliance. This fact inevitably makes the advocates...seek arguments of a military and strategic nature, which ...always boils down to the thesis of a threat from Russia--if not from today's democratic Russia, then possibly from the imperial Russia of tomorrow.³⁹

U.S. Senator Bill Bradley agrees. In a speech delivered in August 1995, he stated that NATO expansion revives the "imperial paradigm" which holds that Soviet-era expansionism is derived less from communism than from something inherent in Russia's gene pool. Rather than extending military guarantees that may threaten fragile stabilities, Senator Bradley proposed cheaper solutions, such as expanding student exchange programs, connecting U.S. aid with observable improvements in Russian life, and stimulating economic development through trade policies. Undersecretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe, in a March 1995 speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies reinforced the need for the programs highlighted by Senator Bradley, by stating, "it is no exaggeration to say that Russia's development, both internal and external, is the critical factor in determining the future of European security." He disagrees with Senator Bradley, however, when he further states that while continued aid for Russian reform should continue, it would be premature to abandon a new security architecture that includes NATO expansion.⁴⁰

Both NATO's and the United States position to expand NATO are picking up momentum. At the Annual Conference on European Security Issues held in Munich during February 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said that NATO will accelerate plans to admit new member states in spite of opposition from Russia. He emphasized that it was inevitable that NATO would grow and that Russia should come to view NATO expansion as security enhancing for Russia, as well as the rest of Europe. The next day, the Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Andrei Kokoshin, countered by saying that many Russians view NATO Eastward expansion as a threat and that it was understood at the negotiations for the unification of Germany that NATO would not absorb former Warsaw Pact nations. Dr. Perry responded with,

If NATO enlargement is the carrot for encouraging reform, then we cannot keep the carrot continually out of reach. Russia will come to understand that NATO enlargement means enlarging the zone of security and stability that is very much in Russia's interest.⁴¹

In an editorial published in the Kansas City Star on February 25, 1996, readers are reminded that the current Russian political landscape is volatile and that caution may be in order. The article states that Russia's elections to be held in June 1996 will be the most pivotal in Russian history. Though President Boris Yeltsin, the democratic incumbent, intends to run for re-election, the editorial identifies him as unpopular among the people, with less than 20 percent of the vote within his reach, while the leader in current polls is Gennady Zyuganov, a

communist. According to the paper, democratic reform may hang in the balance

The article closes with this assessment.

...[it] hasn't helped matters by bringing up the issue of westward expansion of NATO, a topic that feeds the paranoiac tendencies of Russian nationalism. At this point, the best thing the West could do on behalf of the cause of reform is maintain a discreet silence.⁴²

THE UNITED STATES ROLE NATO

When the iron curtain fell off its rod with a loud clang, both the advocates and opponents of continued U. S. involvement in NATO quickly formed their battle lines around the debris. On one side of the debate are the Atlanticists, so called by Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter of the CATO Institute, who insist that NATO's continued existence is essential to prevent renewed instability in Europe and that the Alliance's U.S. leadership is fundamental to NATO's viability. Any U.S. retreat to isolationism, their argument goes, would jeopardize vital American political and economic interests in Europe. According to the Atlanticists, if history is a guide, Europe has served as the fulcrum for the global balance of power throughout the twentieth century. One Atlanticist, Dr. Richard Russell, argues that the past is prologue and that the United States must continue to play its leadership role in balancing that power in Europe during the Post-Cold War era.

...one lesson to draw from the United States experience in Europe is the shortsightedness of a rapid political and military withdrawal from the Continent...Are we so confident that another bid for regional hegemony will not emerge in the next ten to fifteen years in Europe that we can afford to dismantle NATO today?⁴³

Those on the other side of the debate support U.S. retrenchment. Following a line of logic which recognizes NATO's contribution to the prevention of World War III and its role in the West's Cold War victory, the retrenchment camp views NATO as a now-obsolete manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in

Europe during the Cold War. As a result of this obsolescence, the argument goes, Europe is now fully capable of forming a cultural alliance independent of the United States and that the Western European states have the military capacity to defend their own territory against any imaginable military threat. Less clear is the retrenchment camp's position on who should provide the necessary leadership in a European-only alliance. As Dr. Henry Kissinger stated,

America and Europe have a joint interest in avoiding unbridled national German and Russian policies competing over the center of the Continent. Without America, Great Britain and France cannot sustain the political balance in Western Europe; Germany would be tempted by nationalism; Russia would lack a global interlocutor. And without Europe, America could turn, psychologically as well as geographically and geopolitically into an island off the shores of Eurasia.⁴⁴

There are few on either side of the debate who would disagree with Dr. Kissinger's assessment. The retrenchment camp's position, while acknowledging a leadership dilemma, is that the solution to the problem should not involve the United States. The application of U.S. leadership to preclude ancient European animosities from shaping future cooperation efforts within the Continent rallies the American anti-Atlanticists who believe that other, more effective, options for European stability exist. As Richard Haass observed, there is no successor to U.S. containment doctrine to guide American policy makers when negotiating European commitments that appropriately blend ways and means that strikes a balance of protecting U.S. vital interests while conserving U.S. wealth.⁴⁵

Dr. Carpenter, who has written widely on the subject of American alliances in the post-Cold War world, is even more succinct. He calls for U.S. withdrawal from NATO citing an instant savings of \$90 billion a year. He asserts that the fundamental premise that originally underlay the alliance no longer exists and that in addition to the financial costs, continued American involvement may pose increased risk to U.S. vital interests by embroiling America in European disputes and conflicts which otherwise would not provide a menace to the United States.⁴⁶

Dr. Carpenter accuses the Atlanticists of viewing Europe as a geopolitical puzzle in which all the pieces are interconnected and vital to the whole. The Atlanticist premise that every development in Europe is connected and that all are vital to its stability, especially those ethnic and state conflicts in Europe's periphery, are an illusion, according to Dr. Carpenter. He likens the current European power balance to that of the 19th century when there were multiple centers of influence which experienced occasional episodes of disorder, change, and violence, none of which threatened the United States. Stating his position against U.S. involvement in NATO Dr. Carpenter concludes,

American leaders should not only resist suggestions to enlarge NATO's security jurisdiction, they should seriously consider a policy that moves in precisely the opposite direction--toward giving the venerable alliance a well-earned retirement...Although European and American security interests overlap, they are, nevertheless, distinct and sometimes may even be in conflict...Washington would be wise to encourage the European states to form new security structures ...or strengthen existing bodies...as replacements for NATO.⁴⁷

Not all agree with Dr. Carpenter's harsh assessment. Lieutenant General (Retired) Odom refers to Dr. Carpenter as the CATO Institute's "incessant spokesman on foreign affairs," and calls his approach to U.S. involvement in Europe dangerous. General Odom cites three reasons why the United States must continue to be an integral component of Europe's security architecture. First he believes that only Germany has the national power to lead a Western European alliance, a leadership that France and Great Britain would reject. His second point is that Russia continues its imperial aspirations which are currently being manifested diplomatically by encouraging dissension among Europeans and disengagement by the United States. General Odom describes the Russian threat as "...not a new military, but...internal disorder, coupled with a foreign policy aimed at dividing Europe as the United States looks on passively." The last point pertains to NATO's current military structure which General Odom does not believe is within the capability of Western Europe to replicate without United States capabilities. The U.S. military currently compensates for European inadequacies and provides the insurance that precludes Russia from gaining advantage.⁴⁸

Dr. Michael Roskin, a visiting professor at the United States Army War College, amplifies General Odom's argument for continued U.S. involvement in Europe by stating his belief that a U.S. withdrawal from the Alliance may cause the pendulum to swing too far in the other direction toward isolationism. Dr. Roskin believes that U.S. public opinion tends toward isolationism; insofar as it

sees no important national interests anywhere. He maintains that the United States is not desperate to hold NATO; but, if a lack of interest in European security is allowed to develop as a result of U.S. withdrawal from the Alliance that, in itself, will create a "warping effect" on U.S. national interests vis-à-vis Europe.⁴⁹

Dr. David Jablonsky, a fellow professor at the Army War College, agrees with Dr. Roskin, stating that the paradox of preparing for war to maintain the peace is the post-Cold War dilemma. Echoing Dr. Haass, he defines the solution of how much engagement is enough by returning the discussion to the balance of ends, ways, and means. Dr. Jablonsky believes that the number of variables required to compute the proper balance in a world of interdependent states has increased exponentially, making it a difficult process to accomplish in a democratic society. An advocate of extended U.S. conventional deterrence, he cautions, nonetheless, that if U.S. power in Europe cannot be retained through democratic consensus, the United States will ultimately create a military power vacuum on the Continent, just as it did in the aftermath of W.W.II, thereby setting the conditions for the Cold War.⁵⁰

Another issue concerning the U.S. role in NATO is not frequently addressed in the literature, but stands in the center of the debate. It is the issue of nuclear weapons and capabilities. The safe management of nuclear weapons and the ability of the United States to figure prominently in the oversight of their

maintenance and proliferation is of vital importance to both Europe and the United States. As discussed in a Brookings Institute paper on collective security,

Uncoiling the readiness posture of strategic arsenals so that they present less risk of inadvertent use is an unfinished task that will require some policy to accomplish...meanwhile a problem of deep historical significance is unfolding as the destiny of the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR is debated among the successor states, and as these states face a very real prospect of further disintegration and chaos into which the nuclear arsenal could be swept.⁵¹

Finally, the issue of American “principle,” or ideal, that makes the United States continuously respond to nations in need of assistance as they search for their place in post-Cold War order provides the premiere rationale for continued engagement. George Kennan’s position is representative of the majority, “these demands have...taken a leading place in our diplomacy...at stake is our relations with other great powers, and these place even more important demands on our attention, policies, and resources.”⁵² Compounding American idealism is the American psyche, which, many believe renders any discussion of U.S. withdrawal from Europe moot. As Stephen Rosenfeld wrote in 1994, in spite of the “come home message” being heard on “both the left and the right” America is compelled to remain involved in NATO.

...the American relationship with Europe is central. For, still most Americans, Europe is kin and family, Europe is democratic and free market, Europe is close in culture and society. Europe is a friend and a partner, still, in the great geopolitical enterprises of our time. In this sense every act of foreign policy involving Europe is for Americans an act of self-definition. On this foundation the Atlantic Alliance rests.⁵³

EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The debate over the future of the United States in NATO raises the fundamental issue of Europe's overall changing security and defense identity (ESDI). NATO is the primary pillar in Europe's security architecture, yet all NATO legislatures are responding to the receding threat by reducing their military and financial commitments to the Alliance. The creation of a broadened, distinctly European, security and defense identity acknowledges a diminishing NATO role, which may ultimately include a reduction in transatlantic security commitments, and reflects a European desire for an autonomous security structure, controlled by European interests and influence.⁵⁴

Though most European governments agree in principle that some form of enhanced European component to ESDI is desirable, there is contentious debate over what the roles and structures of ESDI should be. NATO is often described as the "pillar of first resort" in Europe's security architecture and there are few European security analysts who would suggest that NATO relinquish its central military role in providing for Europe's collective defense requirements. Post-Cold War initiatives have been focused, instead, on enhancing the European security pillar through economic and political unity among European states. The United States has welcomed these initiatives, including the development of the EU, the economic pillar, and its military arm, the WEU, because it potentially serves to help reduce the American burden of European defense and gives the

United States a possible partner in military operations outside of NATO, such as was the case during Operation Desert Storm.⁵⁵

Support within NATO has also been unanimous. As a result of the 1994 NATO Summit, the Alliance announced its formal recognition of the EU's, as well as the WEU's, enhanced role in providing for European security and committed to support their operations with NATO assets, as approved by the NAC. This commitment fulfilled a NATO pledge to work toward strengthening the European pillars of ESDI as set forth in NATO's Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, published in 1991. Strengthening the European pillars of ESDI also dictates the creation of an exclusively European defensive capability independent of NATO, according to Willem van Eekelen, the WEU's Secretary General.

At Maastricht, European leaders recognized that a community of more than 350 million citizens needed an autonomous defense, while admitting that a fully-fledged European Union would still need the Atlantic Alliance to deter remaining nuclear capabilities to the East and to serve as the only place for consultation on security issues of common interest to Europeans and North Americans alike.⁵⁶

The ESDI debate centers on the lack of consensus as to what constitutes the "European community." In his 1995 article, "The Case Against 'Europe'," Noel Malcolm calls the move toward a unified Europe a "synthetic project" first floated in the 1920s and 1930s as a potential solution to the Franco-German rivalry which was dominating the Continent. Highly critical of the EU, he cites its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as its only economic achievement, but

declares CAP a failed and massively corrupt system which consumes over 60% of the EU's annual budget while providing no economic gain for Europe's farmers. Mr. Malcolm also fears the implementation of the EU's common currency, the Euro-mark, believing that it cannot respond to widely divergent national economies with varying characteristics.⁵⁷

These same deeply ingrained and disparate national characteristics among European states are ignored politically, as well. According to Malcolm, the concept of a united and idealized Europe is predicated on the belief that "the nation-state is obsolete." He calls the ideal of a united Europe "an article of faith against which rational arguments cannot prevail."

It is no use pointing out that the most successful countries in the modern world--Japan, the United States, and indeed Germany itself--are nation states. It matters little if one is to say that some of the most dynamic economies today belong to small states--South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore--that feel no need to submerge themselves into large multinational entities.⁵⁸

Dr. Douglas Stuart, an American political scientist, supports Malcolm's point of view. In Dr. Stuart's analysis of the Maastricht Treaty's attempt to deepen EU integration into ESDI while simultaneously expanding its membership, he concludes that the EU's construction and direction are buried in Cold War cement. He strongly urges that prior to any further EU consolidation aimed at economic prosperity the European Continent develop a different order based on the values of democracy, growth of free markets, civilian control of the military,

protection of individual rights, peaceful resolution of disputes and effective security cooperation.⁵⁹

Only after a European order based on these tenets is achieved, can Europe move beyond the intra-European debate which has previously been guided by an artificially narrow view of Europe as its Western region. According to Dr. Stuart, the collapse of the Berlin Wall changed the nature and face of Europe.

...[It] did away with the distinction between the northern and southern littorals of the Mediterranean...[and recreated] the Eurasian context of European politics. And it shattered the cultural and political moat between a Christian Europe and the nation of Islam.⁶⁰

Dr. Stuart closes his argument against strengthening the EU by stating that it has caused more problems than solutions and concludes that the case for a strong NATO is greater than ever while Europe struggles with the development of foreign and security policies which accommodate a vastly enlarged geographic region.⁶¹

Until Europe redefines the boundaries of its contiguous character, the solution to creating more potent European security organizations may lie in the continued development of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is the only European-led, regional forum in Europe which brings together all the countries of Europe, as well as the United States and Canada, under a common framework which addresses fundamental freedoms, democracy, and human rights. Its activities have been concentrated in the areas of early warning and conflict prevention. Formerly known as the Community for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO's commitment to increase cooperation with, and strengthen, the OSCE was also set forth in the Rome Declaration. It was reemphasized at the OSCE's Budapest Summit in December 1994 when the NATO Secretary General committed to place Alliance resources and expertise at the OSCE's disposal in support of its emerging peacekeeping and crisis management missions.⁶²

Successfully putting teeth into the OSCE by giving it enforcement and punitive powers, according to the OSCE Secretary General, Wilhelm Hoynck, is critical to its development as a principle pillar in Europe's security architecture. Mr. Wilhelm suggests that the internal development of these capabilities must be accomplished through linkage to the United Nations (UN). Cooperation with the UN establishes the OSCE as the peacekeeping broker for European interests, as well as placing the legitimacy of a world court between it and NATO assets-- assets which can be made available to the UN for peace operations in behalf of OSCE objectives. The evolution of the OSCE into this role appears to be a successful strategy. It was this exact political road map which launched NATO forces into the Former Yugoslavia (FY) in December 1995.⁶³

OUT OF AREA OR OUT OF BUSINESS

The inability of Europe's ESDI pillar to meet the challenges created by the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has accelerated a U.S.-led NATO emergence as the preeminent post-Cold War security organization in Europe. The decision to give precedence to military rather than political and economic means for stabilizing Europe's Southern flank was a conscious one throughout Europe's governing bodies. Deferring to NATO, though reluctantly done, was necessary due to competing European diplomacies in the Balkans. Germany's early recognition of Croatia caused France and Great Britain to lean toward Serbia making a WEU-led military coalition impossible. In the five years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in the face of initial U.S. passivity, the EU, OSCE, and UN were unable to achieve the necessary unity of effort required to either broker peace in Bosnia or to deploy the necessary military forces to enforce one, thus failing to resolve Europe's foremost post-Cold War security problem.⁶⁴

NATO's ministers recognized the inevitability of this post-Cold War legacy in 1991 when they published the Alliance's new strategy which declared that NATO must be capable of sending lighter, multinational force into "adjacent areas." This vision of a changed NATO came early after the Cold War, but the internal transformation it created is still evolving. In a speech presented at the Library of Congress in February 1996, Mr. Javier Solana, NATO's new Secretary General, confirmed the inevitability of NATO's expanded role as Europe's out-of-area peacekeepers.

NATO itself has had to change from the static, military shield of the Cold War to a more flexible and dynamic organization oriented to the now fluid security environment in Europe...we have already altered our strategic concept, force structures and political and security missions in fundamental ways...to maintain strategic balance in Europe [NATO must] undertake crisis management and peacekeeping missions beyond NATO's geographic treaty area.⁶⁵

NATO's changing security mantle from that of Cold-War static defender to projection-force peacekeeper has added another expanding dimension to its overall transformation. In its first out-of-area mission in the former Yugoslavia, NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) consists of a worldwide military coalition. According to Secretary Solana, only half of IFOR's forces belong to NATO's sixteen allies. Russia, other PfP nations, Europe's neutrals, such as Finland and Sweden, and non-European nations such as Morocco, Jordan, and Malaysia, make up the other half. The long term implication of this international, NATO-led, peacekeeping coalition in Secretary Solana's view, is "a united and democratic Europe with NATO as its cornerstone."⁶⁶

Richard Kugler, writing about post-Cold War NATO strategies, further extends the argument for NATO to develop a well-articulated policy for handling out-of-area problems. He defines NATO's major security problems as Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. Mr. Kugler takes the position that if NATO does not develop a strategy for these regions:

...NATO will be retired to the sidelines. Moreover, if NATO does not address these problems, they are unlikely to be solved at all: neither the CSCE [OSCE], nor the EC [EU], nor the United Nations is currently taking over the task in NATO's absence.⁶⁷

Dr. William T. Johnsen, at the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, also believes in the inevitability of NATO developing strategies to deal with out-of-area crises and violence which could spill over onto NATO territory. He cautions, however, that in examining changed security conditions in regions such as the Mediterranean basin, NATO cohesion may be threatened by internal competing interests, such as may now exist between what Turkey views as important in the region as opposed to how Northern Europeans view their interests there. As for the United States, he insists that a shift in NATO's center of gravity to Europe's Southern Region presents an opportunity for the U.S. to exert new leadership in an area where there are many U.S. vital interests--North Africa, the Middle east, and Russia. He concludes that the United States should channel considerable energy through NATO to develop Southern Region strategies which will shape the nature of the security arrangements in this vitally important area of the world.⁶⁸

Though the Alliance's 1991 strategy limits its discussion of out-of-area operations to adjacent land masses, not all of NATO's out-of-area interests apply to a geopolitical backdrop. Since 1990, NATO and Japan have convened three joint security conferences. The purpose of these gatherings has been to maintain a working relationship between Europe, North America, and Japan in order that unstable situations can be identified and action taken to cauterize them. Not intended to create a security defense superstructure between these three regional powers, the conference discussions have centered mainly around the long-term

security implications of the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Additionally, these sessions have served as a forum to review the new nuclear threat which is growing from that same lack of Soviet control and to discuss methods of disarmament and nonproliferation.⁶⁹

The latest conference held in Brussels in December 1994 dramatically departed from previous agendas, however, in that the conference representatives acknowledged NATO's expanding security role in the area of deregulated global free trade and commerce. The keynote speaker, Hiroski Fukuda, Japanese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, described mutual economic interests as the most powerful attraction between Europe and Asia and told those assembled that shared Japanese/NATO security concerns must be based on political and economic dimensions.

Dr. Charles S. Maier of Harvard University takes sharp exception with this view. He maintains that a collective crisis does surround Europe, Asia, and North America, but that it is based not on economic or political causes, but on the moral decline of their peoples. Citing that post-Cold War exhaustion has made people wary of great projects, reforms, and politicians, he believes conditions are ripe for the reemergence of populists, who will fuel old resentments and heightened xenophobia, ultimately leading to a resurgence of nationalism and tribalism. The true threat to these democratic regions, he asserts, will be the possible resulting disintegration from within. He defines the European solution to this trend, not in terms of NATO, but through a strengthened OSCE and EU and their formation of

institutional networks which will pursue goals beyond the protection of territorial integrity, such as commitment to civic inclusiveness, common international projects, and the development of loyalties beyond ethnic and cultural kinship.⁷⁰

Regardless of which direction NATO's out-of-area interests take it, it is certain that NATO's transformation through redefined post-Cold War roles and responsibilities will be largely based on its current involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Whether the nature of NATO's new extended range is geographic, political, economic, or moral, Secretary General Solana told the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February, 1996 is the year in which "the rhetorical flourish will end and NATO restructures itself" to accommodate greater European defense responsibilities--all as a result of its Bosnia deployment.⁷¹

Richard Holbrooke strongly concurs. In his departure speech as he stepped down as Assistant Secretary of Defense in February 1996, he compared the present period in Europe to the years following World War II, from 1947 to 1949, when President Truman laid down the European security institutions that served the West in countering a rising Soviet threat and which eventually won the Cold War. Mr. Holbrooke views NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia as no less pivotal in determining NATO's survival and the character of future trans-Atlantic ties.

For me, the theme of this year is very simple: We cannot afford to fail...Everything is at stake here: the future of NATO, America's role in Europe, relations with Russia, the reintegration of France into the NATO command structure. The future of American military operations overseas will be determined by Bosnia.⁷²

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The nature of the debate concerning NATO's future is changing. A major legacy of the Cold War is a new international system which includes a cauldron of unresolved national and ethnic disputes, many of which are competing for support and resolution from Western democracies. At the dawn of the 21st Century, NATO, the world's strongest alliance, is confronted with an ultimatum to respond to this new world order with renewed leadership and stabilizing presence. The alternative of remaining wedded to a Cold War role as Western Europe's static military defender, a path to irrelevancy, is no longer an option as a result of operations in the Balkans. Since NATO's member nations represent the majority of the world's economic and political powers whose engagement in world security issues is otherwise inevitable, neither logic nor the literature supports disbanding this highly successful organization. The debate over NATO's future utility has been supplanted by discussions of how pervasive NATO should become.⁷³

Dr. William Perry, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, frames the future in terms of the World War II Marshall Plan. Calling a commitment to a strong NATO "one of the great lessons of the 20th century," he views NATO's role in trans-Atlantic security as a fulfillment of General Marshall's vision of a Europe united in peace and prosperity. Recognizing that peace, democracy, and economic strength are inseparable, Dr. Perry reiterated the Clinton Administration's position that NATO, alone, can provide the path for cooperation and reconciliation needed

throughout Europe during the Cold War era. In a speech presented to the Wehrkunde Conference in February 1996, he expressed early optimism for NATO operations in the Balkans, by predicting that this first, out-of-area mission will secure Russian support for an expanded NATO, bring France permanently back into NATO's military fold, and serve as the badly needed model for making NATO's command structure more streamlined and flexible.⁷⁴

The fundamental unresolved issue reflected in the literature remains that of how military force should be used in the receding shadow of Cold War threats. The emerging role of military forces in current world events will function as the harbinger of a U.S.-led NATO's future shape and scope. As the historian, Dr. Paul Johnson, stated,

The likelihood of Clinton's America, or any other America, shrinking into an isolationist posture is nil...Like it or not, America will continue to be the world's reluctant sheriff, sometimes arriving late, but always getting there...For in the end, America remains an idealistic and moralizing society, which cannot stand idly by when gross wickedness is taking place...and most Americans, in their warm and strong hearts, would not wish it otherwise.⁷⁵

In this vein, both the United States and NATO share the same leadership responsibility for bringing the opportunity for peace, democracy, and prosperity to all the nations of Europe. It has become increasingly difficult for the United States to act with unilateral authority as the world's only super power. The diffusion of political and economic power has dictated that America seek alliance consensus and support as it engages internationally in pursuit of its national

interests. This is true in spite of the fact that U.S. economic and military power give it a unique capability among nations to forestall crises and perform as a global balancing act. A strong NATO enables the United States to successfully achieve this responsibility.⁷⁶

The preponderance of the literature supports an expanded, strengthened NATO. Underlying themes calling for the development of coherent policies and strategic priorities do not significantly detract from the overriding consensus that both the United States and NATO can forge a military alliance capable of producing “niche forces” to support the goals of democratic reforms and human rights, as well as performing their traditional role of deterring others in the use of force to achieve their ends.⁷⁷

George Kennan, in a March 1996 interview, voiced a fading protest in his strong opposition to NATO expansion because of his belief that harmful Russian alienation and unwarranted European divisiveness will result. Convinced that the United States has only two current global interests, the environment and management of weapons of mass destruction, he does not view NATO as central to either one. He argued that the United States should stabilize its foreign ties at current levels and invest its energies on domestic issues.⁷⁸

The school of thought that says, “let Europe take care of itself” seems to have taken recess, in spite of opinions such as Mr. Kennan’s. An early lesson from NATO’s operations in the Former Yugoslavia indicates that not only is there no single European leader who can insure consensus on European political

integration, but that the power to accomplish this lies almost exclusively with the United States. President Clinton has, accordingly, internalized this lesson and embraced his leadership responsibility. In a March 1996 speech at George Washington University, Anthony Lake, the President's security advisor, said,

...[the] neo-know nothings argue that with the Cold War won it is safe to return to Fortress America. [They] would have America retreat from its responsibilities. They fail to recognize that the global trend toward democracy and free markets...is neither inevitable nor irreversible...No outcome [is] more important than America's role in the world. We can succeed only if we continue to lead--not merely be engaged, but lead.⁷⁹

NATO's initial success in the Balkans underscores the importance of U.S. leadership in European affairs and has made NATO the current best bet as the world's premiere security organization. However, there will undoubtedly be a resounding chorus of "I told you so," sung in virtually every language, if NATO fails to bring a desperately needed peace to its own flanks. NATO Secretary General Solana summarized the importance of Bosnia operations in the development of Europe's new security architecture as events unfold through out the course of this year. "The time of talk and transition is now coming to an end. [This] is the year in which practice replaces theory..."--the flourish of rhetoric will end in 1996.⁸⁰

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Ronald D. Asmus, The New Strategic Debate, Arroyo Center, Rand, 1994, p. x.
- ² James B. Steinberg, An Ever Closer Union: European Integration and Its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, p. 3.
- ³ Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 50.
- ⁴ Asmus. p. xi.
- ⁵ Jonathan S. Landay, The Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 1995, pp. 1 and 5.
- ⁶ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p 52. Dr. Kissinger's description of President Wilson's world view may strike the reader as highly reminiscent of NATO's current military operations in the Balkans. Dr. Kissinger states throughout Chapter 2 that Wilsonian ideals have uniformly prevailed over other American political winds in the Twentieth Century and even states on page 54, that "America waged the Cold War not as a conflict between two super powers but as a moral struggle for democracy."
- ⁷ William T. Johnsen, NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. 1.
- ⁸ S. Nelson Drew, NATO From Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition, McNair Paper 35, National Defense University, (January 1995), p. 4. S. Nelson Drew was considered one of the United States foremost experts on NATO. Subsequent to the publication of this paper he was assigned as a National Security Council aide. On 19 August 1995, he and Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Frasure, died while serving on a diplomatic team finalizing the Bosnian peace agreements, when his armored personnel carrier slipped off a steep slope while enroute to Sarajevo from Mount Igman.
- ⁹ United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C., verbatim text of President Bush's prepared remarks with attached London Declaration, July 6, 1990 press conference, London England, p. 1. See also, the text of the London Declaration, NATO Handbook, 1995. It is also available on the Internet, NATO Home Page, as well as through the NATO Information Office, Brussels.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. Specifically, the London Declaration regards the future of nuclear weapons in Europe as follows (paragraph 17), “These (nuclear weapons) will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discontinued. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making the nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.”

¹² Ibid. The last three paragraphs of the London Summit are devoted to creating an enhanced involvement of all European security organizations in stabilizing Europe’s future.

¹³ “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” The NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, Belgium, November 1991, p. 3. This strategy document also, intentionally, provides the first unclassified military strategy published by NATO, giving unlimited access to NATO’s military intentions by all nations.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 9-12. The strategy discusses in great detail the shift in focus for conventional forces, while providing only three paragraphs of guidance on the characteristics of nuclear forces. There are two reasons for this. First, the nuclear disarmament talks and treaties were well underway at the time and would dictate future characteristics of nuclear forces in mutual agreement with the Soviet Union. Second, NATO’s nuclear characteristics and policies remain classified.

¹⁵ Ibid., p 14. Though not included in the document’s conclusion, the Strategic Concept is very careful to weave the theme of strong North American ties throughout its pages, emphasizing that North American presence is vital to European security and that, conversely, European security continues to be vitally important to North American interests

¹⁶ “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation,” Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 paragraphs 4, 6, 7, and 13. This document may be obtained through the NATO information office in Brussels. It is also incorporated in full text into the 1995 NATO Handbook, NATO fact sheets and NATO Review, as it contains only 21 paragraphs.

¹⁷ Ibid. Paragraphs 9-11.

¹⁸ William T. Johnsen, NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?, May 25, 1995, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. 1.

¹⁹ "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document," full text of the PFP document published by the NAC at the Brussels Summit, January 1994, as reported in NATO Review, February 1994, p. 29. Major objectives of the PFP program, as published in NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 9, June 1994, are to facilitate transparency of national defense and budget planning, democratize the use of armed forces, be able to respond to UN and OSCE authority, and to develop cooperative and interoperable armed forces with NATO. See also, Daniel Burroughs, "Joining the Club: NATO Debates Terms for Welcoming Former Foes," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1993, p. 25. In a news conference after a NATO meeting in October 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated that PFP would give NATO a larger pool of interoperable military forces to use while denying that the PFP Program was an initiative designed to sidestep the issue of NATO enlargement.

²⁰ Gebhardt von Moltke, "NATO Moves Toward Enlargement," NATO Review, January 1996, p. 3. The NATO Enlargement Study is unclassified and currently available on the Internet.

²¹ James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Security Alignments, McNair Paper 40, National Defense University, Washington D.C., April 1995, pp. vi-vii. Mr. Morrison also summarized the points pertaining to the common ground of caution within the enlargement debate (p. viii): 1). resolve other problems first, such as the Balkans; 2). Work on the Russia relationship first; 3). reforms are too new and insecure in Eastern and Central Europe--wait for clarity of purpose in these states; 4). more debate and study is needed. NATO's national parliaments have not debated the issue at national levels yet; 5). Early admission of some states may discourage others who are not admitted and who are working fragile reforms; 6). Let Russia play the first card. If it threatens NATO candidates, they could be admitted at that time.

²² Ibid. p. vi.

²³ Von Moltke. p. 4. Also, see the by line articles produced by regular contributors to, and staff writers of NATO Review and NATO's Sixteen Nations, the two primary periodicals focused on NATO. Frederick Bonnart, the Editor of NATO's Sixteen Nations, speaks for the majority of journalists who cover NATO when he wrote an editorial called "Unchanging Purpose," in Vol 2/1994, in which he stated the following, "Gradually it [NATO] will expand to take in qualified new members but it must ensure that their adhesion will not weaken but strengthen the organization and keep its ultimate purpose undiluted. This is the same purpose as originally defined by the Washington Treaty which critics would do well to remember and aspiring members should understand." General George Jouwan, SACEUR, has been equally emphatic in his support for expansion. In an article written for International Defense Review--Defense '95, called "A New

NATO: New Strategy, New Structure, and New Programs," (p. 6), he states, "...many countries outside the alliance are looking for the security, stability, and prosperity associated with NATO. The Alliance leaders, therefore, sought a means by which NATO could open its doors and invite all of Europe to join in new strengthened, stabilizing relationships." Some British NATO officials are willing to demur, however. Field Marshall Sir Richard Vincent, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, in an article based on a speech to the RUSI Institute, entitled "NATO--Where Next?" and published in the RUSI Journal in December 1993, offered a personal observation that the security guarantees associated with NATO expansion would not provide the desired deterrence effectiveness they could not be underpinned by political will and military capabilities. He went on to say that he could not envision NATO's sixteen member parliaments voting for "watertight security guarantees through some form of extension of Article V of the Washington Treaty." (Article V states that an attack on one member is an attack on all members and will be accorded full, national military response by all sixteen nations.)

²⁴ Colin S. Gray, "NATO: In Trouble at the Crossroads Again," Strategic Review, Summer 1995, p. 9. Dr. Gray states that he takes this strong position to counter the "latest burgeoning debate on NATO's expansion which is the 'just don't stand there do something' school of statecraft." He cites, specifically, Senator Richard Lugar, quoted in Odom ("NATO's Expansion," p. 47) as saying "NATO must go out of area or out of business." He also cites Zalmay M. Khalilzad's widely published Rand Issue Paper, May 1993, in which he states that NATO "must be transformed into an entity with pan-European operational scope--providing full membership, including Article V guarantees, to East Central Europe and Russia, once each state has a stable democratic polity and market economy."

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9. See also three articles on NATO expansion in Survival, Spring 1995, (Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," pp. 7-33; Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," pp. 34-52; and Dana H. Allin, "Can Containment Work Again?" pp. 53-65).

²⁶ John Borawski and Macha Khmeleveskaja, NATO's Partnership for Peace: a Critical View," International Defense Review--Defense '95, p. 15.

²⁷ William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, "NATO Expansion and Partnership for Peace: Assessing the Facts," RUSI Journal, December 1994, p. 50.

²⁸ "Help Wanted in Germany...and Europe," U.S. News and World Report, February 19, 1996, p. 19.

²⁹ Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Service, "Turmoil Marks Debate Over NATO's Makeup and Membership," The Hague, July 6, 1995, p. 1. This article is the first of a three part series based on interviews with dozens of American and European officials that describe how nations came to the decision to expand NATO. The first article discusses the policy debates, the second explores the views on NATO's European members and the third speculates on the public debates bound to be triggered by NATO's expansion policy. Not all American politicians have wholeheartedly signed up for NATO expansion. Though their views have been placed in abeyance in support of President Clinton's military deployments to Bosnia, as late as last Fall several members of Congress were expressing reservations to enlargement. According to Strobe Talbot in a The New York Review article, "Why NATO Should Grow," August 1995, Senator Sam Nunn expressed his concerns in a speech "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World," delivered to a military symposium in June 1995, in Norfolk Virginia. Others who have spoken against enlargement are Michael Mandelbaum, Stephen Sestanovich, Charles Kupchan, and Arnold Horelick. However, those in favor have a weighted advantage. Notable support includes the Republican Party's Contract with America, which calls for the Visegrad Four to become full NATO members by the year 2000. Other supporters include, Senators Richard Lugar of Indiana and Mitch McConnell, of Kentucky, as well as Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, (Jan-Feb 1995, pp. 26-42), Samuel Huntington, James Baker, and Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," Washington Post, (December 19, 1994, op-ed page).

³⁰ Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," The New York Review, August 10, 1995, pp. 27-29.

³¹ Johnsen, NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind? p. 35.

³² Jeffery Simon, "Partnership for Peace," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, pp. 43-44. See also Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, McNair Paper 39, National Defense University, April 1995. Dr. Simon states in this study that, if NATO is not careful, its PfP Program could undermine: 1). Central East Europe's regional cooperation by turning local actors into competitors, 2). domestic support for the region's reformers, 3). the regions fragile civil-military relations, and 4). subregional security by draining meager resources from real regional defense requirements. In the INSS's Strategic Forum, No. 31, May 1995, Dr. Simon reported on an INSS symposium on NATO enlargement held in Washington D.C. in April 1995. His conclusion of panelist consensus was that; 1). enlargement should be slow, 2). restrict new memberships, 3). the Visegrad states are not ready to join, 3). PfP has been successful and has wide spread support of its members, 4). Baltic and Balkan

states and the Ukraine displayed great concern about being left behind, 5). Strengthening the tie between WEU and PfP would reassure those who are not admitted to NATO in the first go around, 6). NATO must be prepared to send forces to new member countries to avoid making a "hollow commitment." 7). It will take 20 years to bring the Visegrad countries' militaries up to a level of NATO interoperability. and 8). Expansion could have a large, negative impact on Russia that even a compensation package and new NATO-Russia treaty could not mitigate.

³³ William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction, SSI, August 1994, p. 17. In addition to his argument for enlargement, Dr. Johnsen defends PfP because: it does provide some differentiating criteria for candidate states to use, it allows nations to proceed at their own pace, and PfP prevents nationalization of defense structures in East and Central Europe, a major Western concern. See also his work, Pandora's Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and its Implications, SSI, December 23, 1994--specifically his discussion on "Crafting Policy: Easier Said Than Done," in which he discusses the risk associated with inaction vs. the benefit of intervention in the form of the willingness to take deterrent strategic steps, such as diplomatic recognition and economic assistance. Finally see his volume, NATO's New Front Line: The Growing Importance of the Southern Frontier, in which Dr. Johnsen presents the case that NATO's strategic political and military interests exceed the depth of NATO's boundaries. Extending NATO's boundaries extends its operational capabilities into regions of interest and importance, where NATO may find itself engaged.

³⁴ Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement," Strategic Forum, INSS, No. 57, 1995, p. 1. The authors assess the NATO enlargement process vis-à-vis the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and argue that expansion into this region could pose serious problems for these states if mishandled. Both feel that Russia could be provoked to the point of expanding militarily. Likewise, expansion into Russia's direct area of influence poses a credibility problem for NATO given Article 5 guarantees. Intervention in behalf of these three lightly armed countries would require NATO nuclear deterrence.

³⁵ William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, "NATO Expansion and Partnership for Peace: Assessing the Facts," RUSI Journal, December 1994, pp. 47-48.

³⁶ Andrei V. Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO: a Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe," NATO Review, August 1994, p. 3.

³⁷ Vyachelslav A. Nikonov, "Transformation of Russia--Challenges from Without," The Officer, January 1995, pp. 32-34. Supporting this view is an article, "NATO and Russia" written by Alexei Arbatov for Security Dialog, Vol 26(2), pp. 135-146. Dr. Arbatov is a member of the Russian Parliament. He states that there is growing disfavor for the West among Russians. He believes that Russia cannot join NATO because NATO could never extend security guarantees to Russia. For those two reasons, any Eastward expansion of NATO is viewed as threatening and will play into the hands of the enemies of Russia's reformers.

³⁸ General (Ret) William E. Odom, "NATO Expansion: Why the Critics are Wrong," The National Interest, No. 39, Spring 1995, p. 39. See also, Fred Ikle, "Comrades in Arms," The National Interest, Winter 1991 and "How to Ruin NATO," The New York Times, January 11, 1995, p. A21. Stephan Sestanovich, a proponent for Russian democracy, as opposed to Ikle, whose advocacy supports the Russian military, has published two key note articles favoring the "Russian First" approach, "Giving Russia it Due," The National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 3-13 and "Russia Turns the Corner," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994, pp. 83-98. Both gentleman are no longer serving in the Clinton Administration in their former capacities.

³⁹ Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace," Foreign Policy, Summer 1995, p. 12-13. A symposium on NATO enlargement was held by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INNS) in Washington D.C. in April 1995. One product of that conference was a paper, published as INNS Strategy forum #34, July 1995, titled, "NATO Enlargement: A Russian Perspective," by Alexei Pushkov, the Director for Political and Public Affairs of the Public Russian TV and columnist for Moscow News. Mr. Pushkov cites seven consequences for NATO enlargement: 1). A deepening gap between Russian and Western civilizations, 2). An inward reorientation of Russia toward less respect toward the West, 3). Rebirth of Russian historical spheres of influence in self defense, 4). A weakening of overall European security, 5). A new threat to post Cold War security structures, specifically arms control agreements and organizations, 6). Unwelcome influence on internal Russian politics--favoring establishment of a dictatorial regime, and 7). Encouragement of new militarism in Russia.

⁴⁰ George F. Will, "Bradley is of Caliber Unusual in U.S. Politics," International Herald Tribune, August 22, 1995. See also, Undersecretary Slocombe's remarks, published in Defense Issues, "Partnership for Peace and NATO--Russian Relations," Vol.10, No. 28, American Forces Information Service. Undersecretary Slocombe does mention some Dr. Perry initiatives which recognize Russia's special role in European security--for example, the development of a special oversight commission and special, NATO-Russia bilateral agreements.

⁴¹ Internet news release by Berserkistan, the worldwide news service of Pacific Interactive Media Corp., Index of Russian World Wide Web sites.

⁴² "Russian Free-for-All," editorial, no byline, Kansas City Star, February 25, 1995, p. 5 (Opinion Section). The extent to which this issue has permeated public and political thinking in America is reflected in the fact that this editorial, forcefully presented, appeared as the major headline in this issue of a newspaper which does not have staff coverage within NATO and does not normally provide editorial coverage on the subject.

⁴³ Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, CATO Institute, Washington D.C., 1994, p. 3. Dr. Carpenter's position will be discussed in detail in further paragraphs of this section. Overall, his position is that NATO has become a post-Cold War anachronism and that the United States attitude of both dependence and dominance in Western Europe is unhealthy to U.S. national interests. The quotation belongs to Dr. Richard L Russell, as written in an article, "The American National Interest in Europe," Strategic Review, Summer 1995, p. 46, "written while he was a doctoral candidate at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. Dr. Russell's comments were echoed by NATO's new Secretary General, Javier Solana at a speech given at Georgetown University on February 20, 1996,

Isolationism may be a natural instinct, particularly for a country like the United States which enjoys the protection of two vast oceans and friendly neighbors. But the historical record is that it never works, and never lasts. Indeed ironically whenever the United States turns its back on the world, the more forcefully it then had to re-engage and at a much greater cost in American blood and treasure, than if it had upheld its international commitments from the outset.

⁴⁴ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 822. The argument which defines NATO efficacy as an obsolete manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power during the Cold War was made by John J. Mearsheimer in an article, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5. He goes on to say that it was the balance of power created by the bipolar, Cold War world and not NATO which provided stability to Western Europe. NATO's role was to balance external Soviet power, a requirement which no longer exists and to balance powers within NATO, not the entire European continent, an important distinction. In his book, After Bipolarity, University of Michigan, 1995, Dr. Fred Chernoff, a professor at Colgate University, reinforces Dr. Kissinger's view by saying that it is uncertain who could play a leadership role from within Europe, citing German

reluctance to take its military "out of area" and that other Western European countries cannot take the necessary economic lead (p. 259).

⁴⁵ Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995, pp. 44-45.

⁴⁶ Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, pp. 4-8. Dr. Carpenter continues his point by saying that if NATO has accomplished the mission for which it was designed then it is reasonable to ask if it should go out of business versus taking its missions "out of area" in order to reclaim a faulty legitimacy for its continued existence.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also Chapter 2, in which he discusses the rationale for continued U.S. involvement, concluding that the current U.S. policy is bankrupt. He paints the Atlanticists, as embodied by Senator Lugar, as a group of "Chicken Littles" who see European stability as a light switch which is either turned on or off--where any disruption will cause the entire security architecture to unravel. Dr. Carpenter calls this the "nightmare scenario" and says it would be easy to dismiss with a chuckle if it were not being expressed by such influential people.

⁴⁸ General Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics are Wrong," pp. 40-41. General Odom also discusses the inability of a federation of European states to accomplish what the United States has militarily because of its lack of common resources, language, and land to accomplish the research, development, doctrine and training. See also his book, America's Military Revolution, American University Press, 1993, Chapters 4 and 6.

⁴⁹ Michael G. Roskin, National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, May 20, 1994, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁰ David Jablonsky, Why is Strategy Difficult?, Strategic Studies Institute, June 1, 1992, pp. 68-69. Dr. Jablonsky does agree that the strategic culture has changed and that a new vision is required. He argues that as the national military strategy bankrupts in light of the absence of conventional military threats, it becomes disconnected from the national security strategy. If the gap between the two becomes too large the United States will lose its ability to secure its vital interests.

⁵¹ Ashton Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, The Brookings Institute, 1992, p. 2.

⁵² George F. Kennan, "American Principles," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 125.

⁵³ Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "View From Washington," NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 39, No. 1/1994, p. 13. Stephen Rosenfeld is the deputy editor of the editorial page of The Washington Post.

⁵⁴ See the NATO Handbook, Published by the NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995, Appendix XVI, pp. 353-366, for a detailed accounting of member nation contributions from 1970 through 1994. An excellent discussion of growing European awareness and attempt to strengthen the European pillar of ESDI can be found in Douglas T. Stuart's Can Europe Survive Maastricht?, where he lays out the conditions for the European move toward the Treaty on European Union, which transformed the European Community (EC) into the European Union (EU) in November 1993. Negotiated in December 1991 in Maastricht, Netherlands, it is predominantly an economic document designed to fully integrate Western Europe's economy and monetary systems. The treaty also established the Western European Union (WEU) as the EU's defense arm. RAND also published an account of the ESDI evolution in its report, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation, by Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, in 1993. This work provides a comprehensive review of NATO's role in fomenting and supporting ESDI initiatives, and makes a strong case for transatlantic support of a strengthened European pillar within Europe's security architecture.

⁵⁵ Harris and Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation, p. vii. See also, Simon Serfaty, "All in the Family: The United States and Europe," Current History, November 1994, p. 355. Dr. Serfaty makes the argument that strengthening European unity is a U.S. national interest regardless of the future the transatlantic defense framework.

⁵⁶ "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," states that "...[NATO] is working toward a new security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU, and the Council of Europe complement each other." See also, The NATO Handbook, pp. 186 and 201, which states,

"An important step towards closer cooperation between NATO and WEU was taken during the January 1994 NATO Summit, when 16 member countries of the Alliance gave full support to the development of European Security and Defense Identity and to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance through the WEU and the defense component of the European Union...NATO has agreed to make its collective assets available on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by European allies in implementing a Common Foreign and Security Policy."

Willem van Eeklen's comments are found in his International Defense Review--Defense '95, article, "WEU's Role in the New European Security Environment," p. 22.

⁵⁷ Noel Malcolm, "The Case Against 'Europe'," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, pp. 57-58. Mr. Malcolm goes on to state that the EU recognizes the problem of trying to level the economic playing field within Europe and proposes a solution which transfers massive amounts of money into the weaker state economies and that it has even built the architecture to administer these transfers. The only thing missing, he declares, is the money.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁵⁹ Douglas T. Stuart, Can Europe Survive Maastricht?, Strategic Studies Institute, February 4, 1994, p. 7. See also Willem van Eeklen, p. 22. For a more optimistic view read James B. Morrison's McNair Paper No. 40, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, April 1995. Dr. Morrison believes that the EU has worked hard and been successful in deepening its integration into ESDI while broadening its membership. He also holds the view that the WEU has been "reinvigorated," through expansion of both members and "observers," and through expanding its common defense policies.

⁶⁰ Stuart, p. 7.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

⁶² "Alliance Interaction with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)," NATO Fact Sheet No. 6, November 1995, pp. 1-2. See also, NATO Handbook, "The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)," pp. 187-191. Wilhelm Hoyneck, the OSCE Secretary General, writing for International Defense Review--Defense 95, in an article entitled, "CSCE Contribution to Early Warning, Conflict Prevention, and Crisis Management," pp. 30-35, declared that these are the proper roles for the (now) OSCE and that it must develop enforcement and punitive powers and that because it has publicly denounced the internal development of these capabilities that it must acquire them through linkage to the United Nations (UN).

⁶³ Hoyneck, p. 35. Another good article covering the debate over whether the OSCE should be a cooperation council or "the seed of a new collective security system" for Europe was written by John Barowski and Bruce George, in the same International Defense Review-Defense 1995, pp. 36-40. Called "The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: a Case of Identity," this article builds a case for an OCSE which has the ability not just to seek cooperation, but to deter threats and enforce its security objectives.

⁶⁴ Rick Atkinson and John Pomfret, "EU and NATO Compete for Control," Washington Post Service, published in The Hague, July 7, 1995, pp. 1 and 6. See also Gen (Ret) Odom's article, "NATO Expansion: The Critics are Wrong," in which he states, "The Bosnian affair has demonstrated the core problems of achieving a so-called 'European pillar' based on political union that could prosecute effective military operations under a single command. In the face of U.S. passivity, France, Britain, and Germany quickly revealed that they are far from a common foreign policy, even in Europe." (p. 40). Gen (Ret) Odom goes on to say that the prospects for a common European defense and foreign policy looks dimmer today than it did three years ago. Edward Luttwak, in his article, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, called the diplomatic and military initiatives of the UN and the EU to deal with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia an "utter failure."

⁶⁵ Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, in a speech given at the Library of Congress, February 22, 1996, pp. 2-3, available on the Internet, NATO Home Page. To review the Alliance's declaration to take its strategy into "adjacent areas," see The Alliance's Strategic Concept, p. 11.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6. Secretary Solana goes on to say that how NATO concludes this history-making mission will be critical because of its impact on impending NATO enlargement. He cautions that none of this can be accomplished without continued U.S. leadership.

⁶⁷ Richard L. Kugler, NATO Military Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era--Issues and Options, RAND, 1992, p. 9. Also see pp. x, and 46-56. Mr. Kluger admits this his view represents an increasingly ambitious strategy for NATO and that even if the Alliance cooperates in developing a strategy like the one he suggests, its ability to execute it will be influenced by the extent to which resources-- budgetary, manpower, and technological-- are made available. In other words, "NATO's strategy will continue to wear a dollar sign." (p. 46).

⁶⁸ William T. Johnsen, NATO's New Front Line: The Growing Importance of the Southern Frontier, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1, 1992, pp. xiii and 67-69. See also his work, PANDORA'S BOX REOPENED: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and its Implications, Strategic Studies Institute, December 23, 1994, in which he discusses the high probability of ethnic conflict in Europe--conflicts that he believes will ultimately involve the United States regardless of its initial aloofness. He warns that American inactivity could have considerable consequences and that a strategy of early intervention through NATO could prevent full scale conflicts that may impact U.S. vital interests or divide the alliance into competing factions (pp. 26-27).

⁶⁹ Michael Devlin, "NATO/Japan Security Conference," published by the NATO Office of Information and Press, December 1994, obtained through Internet, NATO Home Page.

⁷⁰ Charles S. Maier, "Democracy and Its Discontents," Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 49, 58, and 63-64.

⁷¹ Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, in a speech at the Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, 3-4 February 1996, obtained through the Internet, NATO home page. See also, Lenard J. Cohen, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State," Current History, March 1996, p. 112. Dr. Cohen believes that not only will NATO's involvement in Bosnia solidify NATO's future, it may have an equal effect on the success of President Clinton's 1996 reelection campaign, the success of which would virtually guarantee an expanded, strengthened NATO.

⁷² Michael Dobbs, "Holbrooke's Parting Shot--For Now," The Washington Post, March 3, 1996, pp. C-1 and C-4.

⁷³ Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993, pp. 35-37.

⁷⁴ William J. Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Completing Marshall's Plan in Europe," a speech presented to the Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, Germany, February 4, 1996. Dr. Perry goes on to say that he does not believe that we need a new Marshall Plan, but that all nations respond to self interests and that, just as the Marshall Plan responded to Europe's need for economic revival, NATO can respond to Central and Eastern European desire for a security architecture while these states develop politically and economically.

⁷⁵ Paul Johnson, "The myth of American Isolationism--Reinterpreting the Past," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, pp. 163-164.

⁷⁶ Dr. Assad Homayoun and Professor Ralph Ostrich, "The U.S. and the Post-Soviet World: Facing the New Political, Economic, and Strategic Realities," Defense and Foreign Affairs--Strategic Policy, February/March 1994, no page, "Strategic Overview" commentary.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ George Kennan, an interview with Jeff Trimble, Assistant Managing Editor, U.S. News and World Report, March 11, 1996, p. 41. The purpose of Mr. Kennan's interview was to discuss his new book, published in February 1996, At a Century's Ending.

⁷⁹ Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National security Affairs, in a speech, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," given at George Washington University, March 6, 1996. See also Gen (Ret) Odom's article, "NATO Expansion: The Critics are Wrong." Gen (Ret) Odom summarizes the prevailing view by stating that only U.S. leadership can gain the consensus necessary to transition states to democratic, free market economies and to keep progress from reversing (p. 49).

⁸⁰ Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, in his remarks at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich in February 1996.

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