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STRATEGY Research Project

THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND THE SECOND GENERATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

BY

COLONEL JORGE G. PEREIRA Argentine Army

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Jorge G. Pereira (Col), Argentina.

- TITLE: The Argentine Army and the Second Generation of United Nations Peace Operations.
- FORMAT: Strategic Research Project.

DATE: 29 April 1996 PAGES: 27 CLASIFICATION: Unclassified.

This paper analyzes the evolution of Argentine military participation (focused in the Army) in United Nations second generation peace operations. It argues that participation is based on fundamental changes in Argentine foreing policy, in its civil-military relations, and in the size and organization of the armed forces. It sets forth the political and strategic criteria for such participation. Finally, it reviews the operations in terms of the impact upon the military institution and delineates the benefits to Argentine foreign policy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

International peacekeeping operations are not new, but in this decade, it is one of the most important activities of the United Nations. While only thirteen were conducted by the UN between 1945 and 1987, the same number was carried out between 1988 and February 1992¹. The total number of UN peacekeepers grew from 10,000 in 1988 to nearly 80,000 in 1994. The growth of this UN activity is a direct consequence of the international organization's more influential role in security issues since the end of the Cold War.

The United Nations is the organization with the mandate for organizing and directing those international peace operations forces, and dealing with threats to international peace under regional or multinational auspices. The passing of the Cold War has brought new life to the United Nation's role in legitimizing the use of coercive force.

There is an increasing hemispheric interest in the subject of peacekeeping in support of UN efforts elsewhere in the world, as well as in support of the inter-American system into the region. According to General Barry McCaffrey's statement, there are 11 Latin American countries participating in 13 of 17 ongoing UN peacekeeping operations².

Argentina has participated in several international peace operations in support of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The Argentine Army has been taking part extensively in UN and OAS peacekeeping operations since 1958, and currently, is the most active Latin American country within the UN framework.

Originally, participation by the Army evolved around the military observer missions (peace observing). Since 1992, the Army has extensively expanded participation by sending peacekeeping forces³. But always, the Argentinean government criteria (precondition) was engaged only in traditional peacekeeping principles-chapter six of the UN charter, or humanitarian relief.

International peace force is a delicate subject, because of the extraordinary political sensitivity regarding sovereignty and intervention in the Western Hemisphere,⁴ and the large Argentinean's tradition in non-intervention and self-determination.

In addition, the second generation of peace operations went beyond "peacekeeping". The modern view of contemporary conflicts resulting from civil disorder and inequity is converging with military strategists view of "peacemaking," "peace building," and "peace enforcement," according to the UNESCO⁵.

The purpose of this research is to determine: - How well do the second generation of United Nations peace operations fit for the Argentine government? - Whether the Army's engagements in United Nations international

peace forces represent a positive change in military culture, and in the relationship of the military to civil authority or not?

II. UNDERSTANDING ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICIES

Argentina's history has been marked by alternate civilian and

military rule. Nevertheless, foreign policy has remained without changes and highlighted concepts like neutrality, non-intervention, and self-determination. Neutrality was associated with economic prosperity and self-determination looked like a barricade against US "imperial policy." For the United States people Argentina's foreign policies have frequently appeared obstructive and, in her attitude toward US, Argentina normally sought only to make its own way. In later the 80s and 90s, the national governments found themselves the problem of becoming either irrelevant in the emerging new global order and deepening its marginal hemispheric position or changing centenary foreign policies.

A. The last Radical Party Administration.

The latest period of military rule ended in October 1983 with free presidential election, which gave the presidency to Raul Alfonsin of the Union Civica Radical party.

President Alfonsin took office with a conscious desire to curb the military's power. His strategy for dealing with the military was⁶:

- Returning the Minister of Defense to the chain of command.

- Punishing military officers guilty of human right violations in the past.

- Enhancing the Armed Forces technical capability while redefining their role to that of external defense, a restricted sphere in which they would possess technical autonomy.

- Reducing the military budget. From 1984 to 1988, Argentinean

defense spending fell more than 40 percent in real terms. Those were years of very severe military budget constraints, to the point that funding was concentrated on maintaining manpower.

This administration was never able to consummate its proposals to redefine the Armed Forces role, because of the strong military opposition to human rights trials.

As far as Argentina's foreign policies were concerned, the Radical party response to international organizations requesting support was according to the guiding principles as follows: self determination, non intervention, defense of peace, and peaceful solution of conflicts.

A major foreign policy thrust of the Radical party administration has been the Argentina rapprochement with Brazil, calling for economic integration measures and cooperation on nuclear production issues. These matters have provided the main sources of rivalry and mistrust between the two countries in the past years.

In 1984, negotiations with Chile through the Vatican produced the Beagle Channel Treaty. Since it recognizes Chilean sovereignty over the three disputed islands, there was considerable sentiment that the Argentinean government had conceded too much in the negotiation.

The Radical party decided to deepen its participation within the world security issues when its mandate was ending. The objective was to make effective the collective security system envisioned in the United Nations charter, becoming an active member

of the world in security affairs7.

President Alfonsin had always been interested in the Central American conflict. In 1985, Argentina and three other South American countries-Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay- organized themselves as the "Support Group to Contadora." That was an attempt to show the increasing concern and interest generated by the Central American conflict in the whole of the Western Hemisphere. At the time, the risks of an open war among the Central American countries, or of direct foreign intervention in the region, were the roots of this concern⁸.

Nevertheless, the Armed Forces' participation in United Nations/OAS peacekeeping operations had remained at the same levels as previous years. Sending military observers, unarmed forces into peacekeeping situations, were again the paths that the Radical administration had chosen for supporting international peace efforts.

B. The current Peronista Party Administration.

The 1989 presidential election was won by Carlos Menem of the Peronista party. President Menem proved to be quite a surprise politically, with his less than doctrinaire adherence to the traditional Peronist beliefs. Particularly, in his acceptance of the free market, the need to reduce the role of the state, and to abandon the traditional neutralism and become involved in world issues.

President Menem has expended considerable effort to ensure

that his country becomes a reliable and participating member of the international community. Diplomatic relations with the US improved due to Menem's focus on realigning Argentina with the "new world order," rather than "the third world." Examples of Argentina's wish to become more closely involved with US were: Argentina's vote supporting a US-backed measure to have the UN investigate human rights' violations in Cuba; and the decision to send warships to join the multinational force arrayed against Iraq, during operations Desert Shield and the Desert Storm. It was a turning point in both Argentina's foreign policy and military policy.

President Menem also offered to President Clinton his participation as negotiator in the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Because of this initiative, Argentina became involved in the Middle-East peace process, accepting the cost to becoming a player in the international/global environment⁹.

In addition, the Peronista Administration adopted concrete measures in the maintenance of peace in the Southern Cone, such as the signing of agreements with Brazil on aspects related to nuclear energy, and with Chile on chemical and biological weapons. Those received approval by other countries in the region. The agreements on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were signed also at the international level.

Argentina's primary concern in President Menem administration was the economy, and this has meant that the military suffered again serious budget cuts. The historical defense budget level of about 2 percent of the GDP was put at less than 1 percent. The

Chief of Army revealed in 1993 some details on how much the Army spends on "expenses and investment." This type of spending went from 1,600 million pesos in 1980 to 1,000 million pesos in 1982, 560 million pesos in 1987, 105 million pesos in 1991, and 120 million pesos in 1992¹⁰.

The most significant event involving the future of the Armed Forces in this period was the announcement of comprehensive reorganization, which began in 1990. The two-phase effort involved the rationalization of the military command structure in the first stage, followed by the development of new doctrine and structure¹¹.

The definition of roles and missions for the Armed Forces was an important task in the relationship between the government and the military. Related to missions, Oscar Camilion, Argentina's current defense minister said:

"Internally, we are strengthening civil-military relationship to reinforce domestic political institution. Regionally, we want to keep a regional military balance among the nations. We must have a deterrent military capability in the framework of a defensive strategy to secure our national interest. Globally, United Nations peacekeeping operations are very important task for Argentina, and should be one of the principal roles of the Armed Forces in countries like ours. Narcofighting is a different issue in each country. We are well-prepared to battle that problem with the federal police, and we do not need to add that mission to the military."¹²

The nation continues to debate as to the size of the Armed Forces, what functions they should undertake, and how it should be structured. There is uncertainty on what kind of military capability will be needed in the future. Some reasons for this uncertainty are:

The new world order and the expansion of power of the international organizations(UN, OAS, etc) in security issues.
The process of integration initiated in the region-Mercosur, with the uncertainty of the new idea of "security cooperation."
The new threats to the national state in the Southern Conepoverty, unemployment, migration, drug trafficking, domestic and international terrorism, environment, etc.

In addition, the problem is devising a model for the Armed Forces to fit the needs and wants of both institutions concerned, the government and the Armed Forces.

The Peronist Administration felt itself part of "The Program For Peace" enunciated by the Secretary General of the United Nations, with the concept of preventive diplomacy which derives from it, with confidence and security building measures, and with operational actions taken by the guarantor of world peace. The assistance to this program is realized through a permanent offer to participate with the military or civilian personnel in peacekeeping operation or humanitarian relief.¹³

Argentina has clearly stated that it will cooperate with the United Nations in any mission of a peacekeeping nature, but the Menem Administration has been reserved about peace enforcement or peace making initiatives.

The Army has always maintained that its primary mission is to provide a credible deterrence against any threat to the basic interest of the nation. Military leadership has remained focused on training the Army for its primary mission. But, that goal was

enhanced with other secondary missions that are compatible with the military capability. Those are to support foreign policy objectives in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief; and to help civilian authorities and people in domestic needs¹⁴.

In this context, the Government and the Armed Forces worked diligently to share the national interest and develop national political goals. The interagency works were linked to the studies developed by the Joint Staff, opening a new civil-military dialogue in supporting the country's domestic and foreign policies¹⁵.

After Argentine Navy participation in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army announced that the country would send troops to the former Yugoslavia, to join the United Nations peacekeeping forces, the most significant military support to Argentina's foreign policy. The decision to send to Croatia a battalion- 1,350 soldiers in December 1991, was also the end of the old policy to send only unarmed forces in support of United Nations peace operations.

During 1994, the Argentine government announced that: - It proposed to the UN the creation of a "white helmet" as initiative of the President Carlos Menem. It would be a force of civilian especialists to conduct humanitarian relief.¹⁶ - Argentina's desire to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.¹⁷

- The military service (conscription) would be abolished in 1995, and replaced by an all-volunteer force. This change would enhance the future Army's deployment capability for United Nations peace operations.

III. THE EVOLUTION IN NATURE AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS.

A. The United Nations traditional peacekeeping operations.

From the end of War World II through 1988 there were 13 peace operations conducted by United Nations. At that time, Security Council vetoes were more common and, as a result, peacekeeping activities were more limited. Between 1988 and 1994, 21 new operations were undertaken because of the International Organization becoming more accepted, even when it may limit national sovereignty.

After the high speed growth of the early 90s, peacekeeping has entered a shake out period that is likely to be prolonged. Maybe, the reason was that the International Organization proved less than effective in orchestrating responses to civil wars and humanitarian disasters.

Total UN peacekeeping personnel peaked in 1994 at just over 90,000; today just over 65,000 remain in the field. By the end of 1994, dramatic growth in peace operations was reversed and several ongoing operations were ended. Most of those which remain are deployed in the former Yugoslavia, and more than half the rest of UN forces are in missions with fewer than 200 personnel.¹⁸

United Nations budget for traditional peacekeeping operations were \$440 million in 1982; it had risen to \$800 million in 1987, and it is over \$3 billion in 1995/96. It represents three times the normal UN budget¹⁹. The United States, which contributes with more than 30% of the total, is working to reduce its peacekeeping assessment percentage to 25% in 1996²⁰. Moreover, the most important donors such as United States, Russia, and Spain have been deeply in arrears in the last two years. One of the consequences is, for example, that the United Nations owes Argentina more than \$12 million in direct reimbursement for the past and present participating in peace operations.²¹

The Secretary General must solicit economic contributions for each new mission, or each time a mission is deployed or expanded. This creates a serious weakness and dependence for the Secretary General because he needs the willingness of the member states, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to make available the necessary financial and logistical support. On the other hand, this situation permits permanent members of the Security Council to pursue their national interests, in the name of international security.

Peacekeeping defies a consensus definition, not only because it does not appear in the Chapter, but also because it has taken different forms to meet several different crises.

The United States uses peace operations as an umbrella term that encompasses two activities: peacekeeping, which is undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents and where the military activity is confined to monitoring and reporting, and peace enforcement, where military forces may be used to compel compliance.²²

Argentina prefers to talk about peacekeeping and to fit these operations into a traditional approach. Those that are organized by the United Nations on an ad-hoc basis to act as an interposition force following a cease-fire, but before any agreement resolving major issues in a dispute.²³

The main characteristics (principles) are:

 They are executed under the control of UN Security Council, through the office of the Secretary General. The UN requires that forces employed come from member states voluntarily; they involve normally military and/or police personnel as well as civilians.
 It is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflicts and the making of peace.

3. They require the consent of all the involved parties.²⁴

4. Non-use of force except in extreme cases of self-defense.

5. They are executed with full respect for national sovereignty, and the noninterference-impartiality and neutrality in internal affair of UN members states.²⁵

6. They are provisory operations, actions carried out to attempt to stop or prevent a conflict. Final settlements must be reached through favorable climate having been created by such operations.

These traditionalist preconditions exhibit, on the one hand, how peacekeeping is a mechanism that translates Charter ideals into reality. On the other hand, they show how these familiar concepts fail to fit a new reality.

The Argentine participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations is analyzed primarily in the framework of the Ministry

of Foreign Relations, in order to determine the interest or convenience of the country to participate²⁶. Thereafter, the subject is handled in the Ministry of Defense in order to determine the material possibility of participation, and finally, it is handled in the National Congress for final acceptance.

Sometimes, the decisions require simple analysis, like the case of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, since this involved flagrant armed aggression of one state against another, punished by all international law that guides relations among states. On the other hand, the majority of conflicts in which the United Nations is engaged deals with situations which caused serious conflicts within states, with effects beyond the borders.

Another aspect which deserves special analysis is the case of a coalition of states that are authorized to act by the Security Council-Chapter VII, like Gulf War; or if it is a peacekeeping operation under the mandate of the Security Council and the operational command of the Secretary General-Chapter VI; and finally, if it is a mixed solution such as Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which have normally not given the best results.

The experience of the members of the Defense Commission of the National Congress shows that an involvement without the concurrence of the parties, and without the stable cease fire, frequently has limited possibilities of success for the long term.²⁷

The Argentine Government and the Army have participated successfully in support of United Nations peace efforts since 1958, by participating in 10 peacekeeping operations. In the past 37

years over 10,000 Army soldiers have participated, with over 90% taking part since 1991. The Army peacekeeping operations started with the assignment of four military observers to Lebanon in 1958, and have followed with representatives in the Congo in 1960; an infantry brigade in alert status for possible employment during the "Cuba missiles' crisis" in 1962; and a detachment of officers as military observers to the Middle East in 1967. Military observers were also dispatched to monitor the El Salvador-Honduras conflict in 1960.

Since 1991, there has been an increasing level of involvement and the Army is participating in nine peacekeeping operations with military observers, staff, and battalions. Almost 1,500 soldiers have been deployed in peace operations in 1995, and they are rotated every six months²⁸. Some of the most significant are: UNPROFOR and UNCRO in Croatia with one battalion(900 soldiers) was the largest Argentine deployment; UNFICYT in Cyprus with one joint task force(400 soldiers); and UNIKOM in Kuwait with one engineer's company(more than 60 soldiers). Smaller forces are operating in UNGONIL in Lebanon; UNTSO in Palestine; MINURSO in Western Sahara; UNAMIR in Rwanda; and UNAVEM in Angola.²⁹

B. The Organization of American States and peace operations in the region.

The other category of institutional alternative comprises operations that shift the responsibility for peacekeeping away from the United Nations to other regional organizations, in our case the

Organization of American States (OAS). With the proliferation of conflict situations, the UN leadership has sought to share responsibilities with regional organizations.

The United Nations' frequency of handling threats to peace and security is comparable to that of the average regional organizations. Furthermore, the rate of effectiveness has been similar for regional and global organizations.³⁰

The Organization of American States was very successful in dealing with threats to peace in our Hemisphere before 1965, because it has an established history of diplomatic accords and mediation. Opposition, resistance and suspicion grew in the 1965 Dominican Republic peacekeeping case. There, the effort was as much enforcement as peacekeeping, and there was a consensus that the OAS peace forces served mainly to cover unilateral US interests³¹. Historically, US has not hesitated to intervene unilaterally in its own strategic, economic or political interest, especially in the sensitive Central American area. The perceptions of the OAS independence has suffered from the heavy political and military influence of the United States.

Given these realities, it is understandable that Argentina and other Latin American countries, in the OAS system, have sought juridical and legal means to limit intervention by the United States. Thus, the inter-American system has an overriding commitment to non-intervention and state sovereignty which frequently has blocked or restricted peacekeeping efforts.

Generally, regional peacekeeping efforts may be desirable when

done jointly with the United Nations commitment. The emphasis has been on peacemaking and not peacekeeping, and mainly confined to conflicts involving small states in the region. Military observers have been employed effectively, but usually on a mixed militarycivilian basis and with clear subordination to the politicaldiplomatic organs.

'..

Currently, The Organization of American States, with the strong support of the members, is playing the leading role in attempting to deal with the situation in our Hemispherie, resolving some local problems that affect members most directly. While not a security organization, its commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and its increasing prominent role in the support of democracy-Santiago Accord, makes it a significant factor in considerations of regional security.³²

Argentina's support to OAS peace efforts in Central America has not been valuable before 80s. Since 1985, it has played an important role into the "Support Group to Contadora," "The Cartagena Accord," "The Group of Eight," and "The Acapulco Treaty."³³

The Army, The Navy, and The Air Force, as well as civilian personnel, have been involved in solution to conflicts between Honduras and Nicaragua-ONUCA, 1990; El Salvador-ONUSAL, 1992; Guatemala-MINUGUA, 1995; and Haiti-UNMIH-1995.³⁴

Recently, the Argentine participation trying to resolve the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador was an original solution for a centenary dispute. Argentina, along with Brazil, Chile, and

United States, is a guarantor state under the Rio Protocol, the 1942 agreement designed to help both countries deal with their longstanding border dispute. The guarantor military observer group supports the February 1995 Itamaraty Declaration of Peace between Peru and Ecuador by observing and reporting on the application of the agreement.³⁵

C. The United Nations and the second generation of peace operations.

The deployment to Namibia was the first of the new generation of peace operations, which adopted broader mandates and involved greater participation from member nations, taken responsibilities for which personnel has not been properly prepared and organized. Traditional combat training was often inappropriate for this mission and needed the development of new skills.

The complexity of contemporary peace operations also arises from the number of civilian and military personnel and agencies involved in such operations. All of them, set into hostile environments, have led to greater risks and to a dramatic rise in casualties. The UN reports that deaths in November 1994 were at the rate of one every two days, all of them attributable to hostilities or local conflict situations.³⁶

The United Nations Secretary General 1992 report "An Agenda For Peace" suggested that the UN may be compelled to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states in special circumstances. Some of them are: civil war, failure of governments to protect

populations from violence, gross violations of human rights, the collapse of governing institutions generating humanitarian concerns, etc.³⁷

In this opportunity Mr. Boutros-Ghali said:

"The transition from one international era to another is symbolized today, by a new group of member states taking their seats in the General Assembly. (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kazakhstan, all joined in 1992). Their entrance reaffirms the idea of the state as the basic entity of international relations. While respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state remains central, it is undeniable that the centuries old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stand, and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory. A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty, not to weaken its essence, but to recognize that it may take more than one form and perform more than one function."38

In reality, a second generation of UN operations is emerging outside the parameters of traditional peacekeeping, to cope with the new commitments of "a more effective world's security." The spectrum of possibilities has been stretched to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian relief(also protecting the delivery). In addition, for managing these issues Mr. Boutros-Ghali called for the creation of a standing brigade-sized UN rapid deployment force, a request that was supported by the Argentine Republic, but produced disappointing results.³⁹

In 1992, the UN activities in Cambodia became complex with the mandate including such diverse tasks as repatriation, demobilization, and supervising national elections. In fact, the UN became "the facto government of Cambodia" for 18 months, attempting to convert a traditional society to a multiparty system, and a flourishing Western economy.⁴⁰

The UN Security Council Resolution 699, which condemned Iraq's government repression against its rebellious civilian population Kurd and Shiite, changed the view that international law did not allow intervention in a state to save citizens from their own rulers.⁴¹

The UN Security Council resolution 940, which authorized the adoption of "all necessary measures" and the use of force to restore democracy and order in Haiti, provides a legal framework for intervention founded in chapter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 940, also authorized a second stage of multilateral action in Haiti, calling for a secure and stable environment, professionalizing the Armed Forces, creating a separate police force, and the organization of fair and free legislative elections⁴². Such nebulous mandates raise several questions like how long will be the mandate? What criteria will be used to decide when a stable environment has been established? And more for which there are no answers.

The ambiguity in mandates that limit nation-state sovereignty, the high financial costs of operating in a multilateral fashion, and public sensitivity to casualties have led several countries, which traditionally have supplied personnel for peacekeeping missions, to review their policies and to develop a more guarded approach toward sending their forces into second generation conflict situations.⁴³

In addition, multilateral action has proven difficult because of differing political objectives among states and organizations, problems in making decisions in a timely manner, and limited military capabilities of some countries or coalitions for operating in multilateral fashion.

The 90s have given peacekeeping another new task: the protection of the delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians caught up in a continuing conflict. This task tests the established practices of peacekeeping, especially the circumstances in which UN soldiers may open fire.

Argentina's challenge is to decide where and when she should become involved in the new generation of peace operations, because sometimes, such operations will require putting forces in harm's way. The Argentine military establishment has been selective and influential in the selection of the missions in which it will participate.

The Ministry of Defense fashioned an interdisciplinary team for dealing with this subject in 1995. The premise for this study was that the most important mechanism of international security for armed intervention to enforce the peace, is the UN Charter, articles 42, 44, 45, 46, and 50. The team concluded that in order to use coercion, it is necessary to keep in mind the following criteria before adopting a decision of this nature:⁴⁴

1. <u>Criteria for Justification</u>: it must involve an aggression or a commitment achieved previously (a defensive alliance) that is necessary to confront in order to reestablish the peace or avoid an

escalation of the conflict, which might increase the dangers or risk of the action taken by the aggressor (the concept of rationality).

2. <u>Criteria of national interest</u>: the commitment must respond to important political reasons, either necessity or circumstantial convenience (the concept of end).

3. <u>Criteria of adequate means</u>: it will require advanced technology to conduct the action with efficacy and the probability of success (the concept of means adequate to the ends).

4. <u>Criteria of limited objectives</u>: it will require well defined "rules of engagement," which take into account the strategic limitations which condition, and therefore, limit the employment of violence and the choice of the most appropriate means, which should take into account a calculation of the casualties expected (the concept of efficient implementation).

<u>Criteria of favorable public opinion</u>: it requires favorable conditions to support the justification and the national interest.
 <u>Criteria of participation by the National Congress</u>: this is a constitutional requirement which must authorize the deployment of troops abroad. Without it the participation is prevented (the concept of legality).

These factors are an aid in decision-making process; they are not by themselves some prescriptive devices, except the last one. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

The National Congress approval for deployment of troops abroad is a key point in the internal political process. When the government is the majority party in the Congress, the process become easy like is currently the situation. But, it becomes more complex when the government faces an opposition majority in the Senate and House of Representatives, and must resort to negotiation.

The opposition normally talks about issues like nonintervention, self-determination, and what will be our national interest in this kind of intervention. In addition, the argument that is not necessary to spill Argentine blood in internal issues so far from our region, is also a usual argument by the Congress opposition. The common perception is that those positions are simply "red herrings."

Related with the second generation of peace operations and according to his thought in international security issues, the current Administration resolved:

- To accept the UN offers for participating in United Nations Transitional Administration For Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). This is a UN peace enforcement operation (chapter VII), and will be undertaken in Croatia in April 1996. The Argentine Army is ready to send to Croatia a small armored battalion.

- To offer Argentinean personnel (civilian especialists and military) to UN Secretary General as "white helmets," for supporting humanitarian relief anywhere in the world.

- To make unilateral agreements with several countries and send

"white Helmets" for helping both population and government. The most recent was the Argentinean white helmet deployment in the Gaza Zone.

-To open in 1995 a peacekeeping training facility in Campo de Mayo (Buenos Aires). This base provides training for civilian and military personnel destined for UN missions. The peacekeeping center is supported by the UN and trains troops from throughout the Southern Cone.

IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE ARGENTINE DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS.

Several authors have attempted to assess national motivations to participate in international peace efforts. Most of them agree on three points; first, there is clearly an idealistic commitment to the UN as the best instrument for peace and considers this to be a priority element in their foreign policies; second, service in a UN peacekeeping mission with a major unit tends to elevate national pride and exposure at the world level; finally, the training and experience obtained have value and may not be available under routine national assignments.

From the Argentine Army point of view, the principal reasons for the extensive participation of the Argentine Armed Forces in UN/OAS peace operations, among others, are:

1. To promote world peace.

2. To fulfill the nation's international commitments.

3. To assist in reducing its geographical isolation.

4. To project the Argentine image to the world.

. ..

5. To develop the capacity to employ military forces in a joint and multinational effort in an environment of collective security.6. To develop and enhance the ability to prepare elements (units) for overseas employment in support of designated theater of operation.

7. To professionalize the forces in technical areas of peace operations (commanders, staff, observers, units, etc.).

Nevertheless, whatever reason you choose, this increased exposure is not only for a military nature with the troops but a governmental exposure as well. When Mr. Camilion opened the multinational peacekeeping exercise in the Argentine Army War College, he said:

"If peacekeeping operations have taught Argentines anything, it is that these are among the most interdisciplinary operations ever undertaken by our government. The military-civilian dialogue has never been more important for all of us."45

Peace operations abroad provide a chance at harmonious civilmilitary relations that can bring potential benefits to both the government and the Army. They have allowed the Army to become a valuable player in Argentine foreign policies, bringing praise and recognition to it. Participation has also offered the military an opportunity to improve its image and prestige, both at home and abroad.

The Chief of the Army (General Balza) said during his orientation to the Army for the military year 1994:

"International peace operations will never become the primary mission of the army, and the institutional

survival won't be a primary motivation for participation." 46

The participation of Argentine contingents in United Nations peacekeeping forces has enabled almost 25% of the Army to get training in combined operations with other armies of the world, by comparing their operational modalities, learning new techniques, getting to know other continents, and--in light of other people's problems-- learn to put one's own in perspective. Never before have so many officers and NCOs traveled abroad in organic units, gaining vast cultural benefits in the process.⁴⁷

This type of operations offers also an operational environment for the Army. Operations are conducted in hostile field conditions that sometimes approximate real combat. It provides a field exercise for leadership, military tactics, logistics, and other military functions.

During times of economic crisis, the opportunity to deploy large numbers of troops, which are partially paid by the United Nations, offers both the government and the military an economic incentive for cooperation. Nevertheless, the United Nations owes Argentina \$12 million for past and current participation of its Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations. These burdens of cost to the Government of Argentina, without timely reimbursement, could either discourage future participation of Argentine civil/military or diminish the level of its military readiness.⁴⁸

V. CONCLUSIONS

The new idea of "world security" is supported by three central elements: first, the logic of cooperation, secondly, the management of the dynamic world changes, and finally, the globalization of the economy.

The world is becoming rapidly more interdependent and countries, with regards to their influence, are looking to take the chief role in the political and economic areas. The countries that pretend to have global responsibilities must be prepared to actively engage militarily or with appropriate means, and assume responsibility based on clearly defined end states.

Argentina has historically maintained a policy of international isolation that, for the moment, has economically benefited its past. But in the process it marginalized its ability to influence international affairs.

The Argentine Government options were either to accept The United Nations International Peace System with its triumphs and failures or become irrelevant in the emerging new global order and deepen its marginal hemispheric position. The Administration of President Menem substantially modified the national strategy of the past decades.

Given the past unilateral policies of Argentina, it now needs to embrace a more multilateral process. The United Nations peace operations are providing the Government as well as the Armed Forces the opportunity to project into the international arena, and receive the benefits of these engagements.

Argentina does not have a history of interventionism. This condition is an important point for making its troops welcome and enhances the probability of succes of the UN peace operations.

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In short, peace operations, including the second generation, are both a valuable experience and an important secondary mission for the Argentine Army.

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