




# MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN COMBAT: A COMPARISON OF GERMAN AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR II USING CONTENT ANALYSIS

THESIS

Douglas J. Traversa, Captain, USAF
AFIT/GAL/LAR/95S-8



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

AFIT/GAL/LAR/95S-8






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# MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN COMBAT:

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# USING CONTENT ANALYSIS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Logistics and

Acquisition Management

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Science in Acquisitions Logistics Management

Douglas J. Traversa, B.S.

Captain, USAF

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## Preface

Several people provided guidance and support to me while writing this thesis. Without them, I could not have accomplished this work.

First I want to thank Dr. David Vaughan, my advisor. He agreed to be my advisor even though the subject of this thesis is far from the standard fare at AFIT. His vast knowledge of combat literature was extremely valuable in my work, and his inputs were quite helpful.

Secondly, I thank Dr. Shane, my reader. His critiques of my early drafts greatly improved this thesis. He also provided valuable suggestions on the proper way to analyze combat motivation.

I'd also like to thank a dear friend of mine, Jed Black, who help me to search for appropriate books for use in this thesis. He took time out of his busy schedule to search the bookstores of Washington DC in search of books by German combatants when I was having trouble finding them. He also lent me books from his personal library that were ideal for this study.

Finally, and by far most importantly, I'd like to thank my wife Jancy, who stuck by me even when I seemed to spend every waking moment working on this thesis. Her love and support were invaluable, and my debt to her is huge. I doubt I can ever repay it fully.

Douglas J. Traversa

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## Abstract

To determine whether content analysis could be used to successfully identify major combat motivational factors for individuals, this research focused on soldiers who fought in World War II. Combat narratives written by men who fought in World War II were examined. Ten German and ten American works were examined. Of these, five of each were the works of flyers and the other five were the works of ground troops. The following factors were examined: "primary group" influence, ideology, attitudes toward the enemy, group leadership, national leadership, personal gratification, propaganda, religion, vindictiveness, desire to end the war and go home, coercion, and duty/honor/country. References to these motivational factors were tallied, and these results converted into percentages for each group. A qualitative judgment was also made as to the most important factor for each individual. Personal gratification was the primary motivational factor for the American flyers, while duty/honor/country was the most important for the German flyers and American ground troops. The primary factor for the German ground troops was the primary group. The methodology employed successfully identified common combat motivational factors within each group, yet found different factors when contrasting different groups. Further research into this methodology is recommended.

# MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN COMBAT:

# A COMPARISON OF GERMAN AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR II

# USING CONTENT ANALYSIS

## I. Introduction

*A lot of people have morale confused with the desire to fight. I don't know one soldier out of ten thousand who wants to fight. They certainly didn't in that company. The old timers were sick to death of battle and the new replacements were scared to death of it. And yet the company went into battle, and it was a proud company.*

Journalist Ernie Pyle
(Quoted in Kennett, 1987: 133)

*The question remains as to why the German soldier on the Eastern Front did not break, when so many armies have collapsed in the face of much less unfavorable odds.... it is difficult to find another example of an army which fought so long under such terrible conditions and yet showed no significant signs of rebellion or breakup.*

Historian Omer Bartov
(in *The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, pp 37-38, 99)

**Overview**

The two main purposes of this research are to determine if content analysis is an appropriate tool for studying combat motivation and to determine what those motivational factors are for different groups of combatants. Content analysis provides one main

advantage over other methods of studying combat motivation. Through content analysis, studies can be made of combatants from earlier eras. Studies can also be conducted to determine if the same factors were important in different wars and different time periods, although only World War II is studied in this thesis. It might be a useful tool for determining if there are any motivational factors that transcend technology, time period, or national boundaries. Veterans of wars prior to World War II are almost all deceased, so methods such as interviews, questionnaires, or surveys cannot be used to gather data on earlier wars. However, content analysis could still be used, as long as there are sufficient written accounts from any war or battle. Anyone researching combat motivation, particularly those studying multiple wars or the soldiers of more than one nation should be interested in content analysis as a potential tool, because it expands the available sources of data for such studies.

This study attempts to analyze memoirs, autobiographies, and first-person accounts of combat in World War II to identify references to combat motivational factors. To establish the categories of motivational factors used in this study, the works of Henderson, as well as Shils and Janowitz, were fundamental in identifying and specifying motivational factors to be included. The studies of Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, Williams, A.A. Lumsdane, M.H. Lumsdane, Smith, Janis, and Cottrell, detailed in *The American Soldier,* as well as the works of Omer Bartov, also contributed to the development of the methodology.

Another purpose of this study is to see if content analysis identifies different motivational factors for different types of combatants. In this study, four different groups

are studied, American flyers, American ground troops, German flyers, and German ground troops.

**Justification**

The questions of why men fight, and what factors motivate them to fight even when death seems certain, are ancient, complex, and perhaps unanswerable. There is no universally accepted theory of combat motivation. To quote one researcher, "Interpretations of the motivations of men in combat are many, and the library on the subject is voluminous" (Moskos:1985, xxiii). An Army technical report on motivation, satisfaction, and morale includes descriptions of 16 different theories of motivation (Motowidlo and others, 1976:4-28). Despite the lack of a single unifying theory of combat motivation, military leaders must strive to study and understand motivational factors and cultivate them in their people to achieve the greatest chance for victory.

Although well-motivated troops would be expected to perform well in battle, assuming all other factors (like weapons technology) were equal to the enemy's, motivational factors also influenced or predicted casualty rates *away* from the battlefield. Army studies showed units with the worst attitudes about combat also had the highest nonbattle casualty rates, while those with good attitudes about combat had lower rates. These casualty rates were consistent in infantry, heavy weapons, and rifle units. In addition, the best attitudes were held by those who had seen the least combat. Veterans consistently had less favorable attitudes about combat than nonveterans, as well as higher nonbattle casualty rates (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:10, 12, 23).

Understanding combat motivation provides probable benefits to those who understand these factors and can instill them in soldiers. During World War II, the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division of the War Department surveyed American soldiers over a period of four years. The purpose of these surveys was to "provide the Army command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with other facts and inferences, might be helpful in policy formation" (Stouffer, Suchman, and others, 1949:5). In this study, the Army investigated the following elements of motivation: coercive institutional authority, leadership, informal social groups, attitudes about the war and the enemy, the desire to return home or win the war, and finally, religious and philosophic considerations. These studies were later published as *The American Soldier*, to date the most detailed study of combat motivational factors influencing American soldiers (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:107).

**Background**

Wm. Darryl Henderson, a retired Colonel in the US Army and researcher of combat motivation, emphasizes the concept of cohesion, which he defines as "mutual beliefs and needs that cause people to act as a collective whole" (Henderson, 1985: XI). He believes cohesion is the primary motivational factor that must be considered in any study of combat motivation. In his book *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat,* Henderson studies four modern armies (those of North Vietnam, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel), analyzing factors that contribute to cohesion. A similar emphasis on motivation is found in *Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,* by Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, who studied the motivation of German soldiers during World

War II. In particular, they sought to determine which factors contributed to the cohesion of German units. Shills and Janowitz define cohesion as a combination of organizational integrity, fighting effectiveness, and tenacity (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:280-281). They conclude that the primary group was the primary motivational factor for German soldiers. As will be shown later, the views of Henderson are similar to those of Shils and Janowitz. In a contrasting view, historian Omer Bartov has challenged the findings of Shils and Janowitz in at least four separate works (Bartov, 1986, 1989, 1991a, 1991b). He maintains that ideology was the primary motivational factor for German soldiers. All of these views will be examined in detail in the literature review in Chapter II.

For this thesis, soldiers who fought in World War II are studied. World War II was chosen because it was a conflict in which soldiers from two countries with very different political systems and military traditions can be studied. Germans and Americans can be examined in a wide variety of combat situations to determine which motivational factors were primary in their lives. Comparing German and American soldiers is particularly interesting because of the vastly different conditions under which these men fought. For example, German soldiers faced severe and life-threatening shortages of food and equipment towards the end of the war, as the works of Kern (1993), Sajer (1990), and von Luck (1991) demonstrate. US soldiers, on the other hand, were probably the most well-equipped in World War II. "The US Army has probably been the best fed and supplied army in recent history" (Henderson, 1985: 30, 31).

The method of analysis is new in some respects. This study uses content analysis to analyze combat narratives written by men who fought in WWII. There is nothing new

about content analysis, but it is believed that this is the first time that content analysis of combat narratives has been used *solely* for the purposes of examining specific experiential commonalties, in this case combat motivation. This study is primarily qualitative, and the researcher's interpretations of various passages in the narratives studied may be open to dispute. As will be seen in the methodology discussion, a quantitative aspect is introduced into the methodology, but it is acknowledged that the emphasis is on content analysis, with all the potential limitations that implies (researcher bias, lack of expertise, sample selection limitations, and inconsistency of analysis). Some aspects of the content analysis technique used are innovative, and are not based on previous studies or established techniques. These qualifications are not meant to imply that the techniques developed for this research are unprecedented, only that other similar studies were not found in the course of this research. One of the primary purpose of this research is to determine if these techniques show any potential value for further research.

**Research Problem**

One of the primary purposes of this thesis is to determine if content analysis is a useful method for examining combat motivation. The works of Henderson (1985) and Shils and Janowitz (1948), were fundamental in identifying and enumerating motivational factors. Ideas found in the studies of Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, Williams, A.A. Lumsdane, M.H. Lumsdane, Smith, Janis, and Cottrell, recorded in *The American Soldier,* (1949), and the works of Omer Bartov (1986, 1989, 1991a, and 1991b) also helped to influence the design of the methodology.

After the motivational factors were identified and defined, the writings of men who recorded their war experiences in the form of memoirs, autobiographies, or first-person accounts of the war were examined. These works were searched for references to the previously identified motivational factors, using previously established means of identifying such references. An attempt was made to find patterns within and among four groups: American flyers, American ground troops, German flyers, and German ground troops. Two research questions drove this research: what motivational factors drove different groups of men to fight in World War II, and is content analysis a useful tool for studying combat motivation? Using the investigative questions listed in Table 1, data from this research were used to answer the research questions.

TABLE 1

INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS

1. What were the most important motivational factors for American flyers?
2. What were the most important motivational factors for German flyers?
3. What were the most important motivational factors for American ground troops?
4. What were the most important motivational factors for German ground troops?
5. Were there any motivational similarities between American and German flyers?
6. Were there any motivational similarities between American and German ground troops?
7. Were there any motivational similarities between Americans and Germans in general?
8. Were there any motivational similarities between ground troops and flyers?
9. What were the most important motivational factors among the four groups?
10. Is this method of content analysis useful?

**Objectives**

Autobiographies, memoirs, and first-person accounts of battle written by men who fought in World War II were examined. Ten German and ten American works were analyzed. Of these, five of each are the works of flyers and five the works of ground troops. These divisions were not arbitrary. World War II was chosen because, of all wars in recent memory (with the possible exception of Desert Storm), the lines between good and evil, right and wrong, are the most clearly drawn. Few would try to justify the actions of Nazi Germany. German aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland was unprovoked and unjustified, and its attempt to exterminate the Jews remains one of the most horrific examples of human depravity.

The United States did not enter the war as a result of treaty obligations, as did France and Britain, but as the result of Japan's attack against Pearl Harbor and subsequent declaration of war on the United States. If ever a country was justified in going to war, the United States was in WWII. In contrast, few regimes have been so vilified as that of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. The differences between the two countries were profound.

Equally different were the combat environments of the flyer and the ground troop. A kill made in the air entailed the destruction of an aircraft. The deaths of the people inside the aircraft could easily be overlooked, thus providing a mind set of killing machines rather than people. In fact, a "kill" usually meant shooting down an airplane. The fate of the pilot and crew meant nothing as far as the official tally was concerned. For instance, a pilot could become an ace without actually killing anyone, as long as a certain number of

planes were destroyed. The enemy pilots who died usually did so in anonymity, due to the distances, speed, and impersonal nature of aerial combat. After battle, most flyers could return to relatively safe airbases and enjoy decent food and warm beds. Conversely, those who fought on the ground usually spent weeks or months eating K-rations (or their equivalent) and being exposed to a harsh environment as well as enemy fire. Ground combat involved direct observation of corpses (both enemy and friend), constant danger, and an assault on all five senses that could unnerve the strongest of men.

By examining motivational factors in this context, this study hopes to determine if content analysis is a worthwhile tool for adding to the growing collection of data on combat motivation. This study also proposes avenues for further research in this vein.

This chapter discusses the background, research problem, and objectives of this study. Chapter II is a review of literature dealing with combat motivation. It is here that the list of identifiable motivational factors is formulated and discussed. Chapter III provides the methodology used in this study. It explains the content analysis technique that is used in identifying references to motivational factors. Specifically, criteria for determining if a reference to motivation is made are established. Criteria for determining if content analysis identifies any common motivational factors are also presented.

Chapters IV and V analyze the four primary groups of men, American flyers, American ground troops, German flyers, and German ground troops. It is within and among these four groups that patterns of common motivational factors are sought. For each group, two methods for rating motivational factors are used. First, what is termed the "qualitative" portion is presented. In this section, the researcher identifies one or two

factors that are primary motivators for each individual, based on statements made by the authors, and in some instances, frequency of references to certain factors. This is a subjective analysis on the part of the researcher, based on the criteria established in Chapter III. The second method of rating factors is termed the "quantitative" portion, in which references to motivational factors are tallied and converted into percentages for each individual and for each group. Chapter III explains these rating processes in detail.

Finally, Chapter VI presents comparisons made between ground troops and flyers, as well as between Americans and Germans. Chapter VI also includes the conclusions and recommendations for further research.

## II. Literature Review

### Introduction

There was no universally-accepted theory of combat motivation on which to structure this research (Moskos: 1985, xxiii). Rather, one theory was chosen from many, in this case Henderson's theory of cohesion. Henderson's theory offers a detailed description of many factors that affect cohesion, which he defined as "mutual beliefs and needs that cause people to act as a collective whole" (Henderson, 1985: xi). This list of factors provided an excellent starting point for construction of the list of combat motivational factors that would be used in this study. Because his theory was applied to four different armies from four nations, many applicable nationalistic factors were also examined, which were considered useful for this study. Henderson's factors largely coincided with the factors Shils and Janowitz identified as affecting the cohesion of the primary group in the German Army, which helped to reinforce the validity of these factors.

Henderson equates cohesion with terms such as esprit de corps, group morale, and elan (Henderson, 1985:3). However, he also notes that these terms tend to focus more on small unit or group motivations. Cohesion, however, also signifies that the small group goals and motivations are "in congruence with army [sic] objectives and goals" (Henderson, 1985: 4). So the key to cohesion is that not only do small groups or units work well together, but they also conform to the norms of the overall military hierarchy.

Henderson considers cohesion a vital aspect of combat motivation. He cites the Israeli and North Vietnamese armies as examples of armies whose successes were largely attributable to strong unit cohesion (Henderson, 1985: xviii). In another example, he

argues that in the Falklands War, even though the Argentines outnumbered the British and had adequate weapons and supplies, "it became clear that the Argentines lacked the will to prevail that is characteristic in cohesive, well-led units" (Henderson, 1985: 3).

Shils and Janowitz emphasize the primary group as the prime motivational factor for the German Army, but in reality their conclusions are similar to Henderson's. In fact, an excellent definition of the primary group is found in Henderson's book:

> [Primary groups are] characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association . . . is a certain fusion of individualities into a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we." (Charles H. Cooley, quoted in Henderson, 1985:162)

Shils and Janowitz believe that German combat effectiveness was due largely to the capacity of primary groups to avoid disintegration and maintain cohesion. As long as a soldier's primary group continued to function and meet a soldier's basic needs (food, shelter, friendship, esteem), that soldier would usually continue to fight (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:281). The main difference between Henderson's theory of cohesion and Shils and Janowitz's theory of the primary group is that cohesion includes all aspects of primary group motivation, but expands on that idea to include the fact that the primary group must not only meet individual needs, but must support the overall goals and norms of the larger organizational structure (Henderson, 1985: 4).

In both theories, a series of factors that contribute to either successful cohesion or strong primary groups is identified. Because the primary group can be considered as a subset of Henderson's cohesion theory, factors identified by Shils and Janowitz are

combined with factors identified by Henderson. One factor, vindictiveness, was added based on studies in *The American Soldier,* which found it to be a significant factor (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:167). For purposes of this paper, these factors are referred to as combat motivational factors or motivational factors, because they contribute at least indirectly to a soldier's willingness to fight. These factors are listed in Appendix A, with citations from Henderson, Shils, and Janowitz, and will be elaborated upon in the following portions of the literature review.

One further clarification is necessary before proceeding. The German ground forces were actually composed of two different armies, the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS (*Schuetzstaffeln or defense squads*) (Humble, 1975: 100). The Waffen-SS was a branch of the larger SS. "Waffen" meant "armed," and referred to combat troops, while "SS" referred to political units, such as those that ran the concentration camps (Knappe, 1993: 7). The Wehrmacht was the national army, while the SS started out as the private army of the Nazi party and personal bodyguard of Hitler. "One fact that is obvious is that the origins of the force [the Waffen-SS] lay in the desire of Hitler to have at his disposal an iron guard which owed allegiance to nothing and nobody but himself (Humble, 1975: 106). As the war went on, the SS continued to grow, and was better equipped than its Wehrmacht counterparts, and the SS developed a reputation as the elite force of Germany. "The men of these superb divisions had an *esprit de corps* second to none" (Humble, 1975: 106). Besides being fanatical fighters, SS soldiers were responsible for most of the atrocities committed during the war (Humble, 1975:108).

The focus of this study is on Wehrmacht, rather than SS, soldiers. The vast majority of SS soldiers were volunteers (Humble, 1975: 100-105), which implies a greater desire, or at least an implicit willingness, to fight. Wehrmacht soldiers, on the other hand, were often conscripts rather than volunteers. Because the American army was made up of both conscripts and volunteers, it was decided that focusing on Wehrmacht soldiers allowed this study to examine motivational factors of men from armies created in similar fashion.

By not examining SS soldiers, this study also reduces any possible bias in results obtained from studying troops from an all-volunteer, elite army. Factors such as ideology, primary group, and personal gratification might be more dominant in troops from the SS. For instance, Shils and Janowitz maintain that SS divisions had a much larger "hard core" than Wehrmacht divisions. They define "hard core" as Nazis who "were imbued with the ideology of *Gemeinschaft* (community solidarity), were enthusiasts for the military life, had definite homo-erotic tendencies, and accordingly placed a very high value on "toughness," manly comradeliness, and group solidarity (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:286). Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the SS, implied that ideology was a major motivating factor for SS troops by saying, "It is the unity of sword and creed, of military power and political belief, which makes the Waffen-SS so invincible" (Humble, 1975:100).

**Primary Group**

The primary group represents a group of people who associate and cooperate closely, so much so that the members tend to think of themselves as a whole (Charles H. Cooley, quoted in Henderson, 1985:162). In the case of the military, the primary group refers especially to those men the soldier sees daily and associates with. If the men of a small

unit properly fuse together and function as a team, the smaller unit's cohesion becomes the primary factor influencing a soldier's fighting spirit (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:283-284).

Although Henderson considers cohesion to be the primary motivational factor for soldiers, he includes an appendix in his book which discusses the primary group theory of motivation (Henderson, 1985:161-166). He acknowledges the importance of the primary group, but has this criticism:

> A significant question remains. Will the primary group produce behavior by the soldier that is congruent with the goals of the organization? Many investigators have noted that the primary group cohesiveness that emerges in the small combat unit can militate either for or against the goals of the formal military organization. (Henderson, 1985:164)

However, Henderson also says "the only force on the battlefield strong enough to make a soldier advance under fire is his loyalty to a small group and the group's expectation that he will advance" (Henderson, 1985:22-23). Henderson argues that primary group motivation is important, but will not always increase larger group cohesion. It is clear from the context that Henderson is referring to the same concept as Shils and Janowitz when he discusses cohesion and cohesiveness, since Henderson references Shils and Janowitz's works several times during his discussion (Henderson, 1985:163-164). Henderson believes cohesion is the key factor to combat motivation, with the primary group modifying it either positively or negatively (Henderson, 1985:163-164).

Shils and Janowitz provide evidence to support Henderson's views. For instance, they cite examples of primary group motivation which contradicted larger organizational goals, as when primary groups surrendered as a whole. Even though the primary group acted in

concert, agreeing as a group to surrender, this was clearly not in accordance with the desire of higher headquarters. The oath which all German soldiers took required them never to desert or surrender (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 293, 294). Therefore, the primary group could be a powerful motivational force, as long as the group goals were in accordance with the larger unit goals. However, this was not always the case.

Unfortunately, *The American Soldier* contains no studies of groups in action, and contains no empirical data on primary groups (Shils, 1950:18-19). However, the studies in *The American* Soldier do suggest that the informal group served to set and reinforce standards and to support and sustain each group member (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:130).

Despite the lack of empirical data, several facts were determined. First, soldiers did not feel guilty about not being in combat if their group was not in combat, but individually felt very strongly that if the unit was in combat, they had to fight with the unit not to let the group down. Additionally, the American soldier knew that if he was in good standing with his group, the members of the group would look out for him if he needed help. On a larger scale, the power of the U.S. Army gave him a sense of being part of "a mighty war machine," which helped ward off feelings of weakness. The soldiers also had confidence in their equipment and supply system. A vast majority believed their equipment was better than the enemy's, and they knew they would have the food and ammunition they needed. All of these factors strengthened ties to the primary group and bolstered morale (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:136,137, 143-147).

Others agree that a strong motivating factor for American troops was the bonding and closeness formed through training and combat. Often wounded soldiers wanted to return to duty immediately. They were afraid that if they were away from their unit too long, they would be replaced, and then they would have to go to a different unit (Kennett, 1987:139). In contrast, American replacement soldiers were usually sent to units where they knew no one. Consequently, they had to cope with the stresses of combat and new surroundings alone. A large number of them suffered combat exhaustion (the point at which a man has been in combat too long, becomes ineffective in combat, and needs a rest) in their first engagement, a higher percentage than those who were an established part of the unit (Kennett, 1987:145, 146).

Perhaps the most debated factor in this study is the degree to which the primary group contributed to the effectiveness of the German Army. Shortly after the war, Shils and Janowitz, who worked for the Army Psychological Warfare Division during the war, wrote "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." Most of their information was gathered from interviews with German POWs in the last half of the war (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 282).

When Shils and Janowitz reported their findings, a widely accepted theory was that the Wehrmacht's tenacity was due to the strong political beliefs of its soldiers (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 281). Shils and Janowitz argue that political factors were minor, and the real reason for the Germans' fighting skill and perseverance was "the steady satisfaction of certain *primary* personality demands afforded by the social organization of the army [sic]" (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:281). These primary demands included food, clothing,

camaraderie, and a sense of power. When these needs were met, a soldier would be less concerned with self-preservation and more concerned with group-preservation. Once the primary group (his squad or unit) either failed to meet his needs or ceased to exist, self-preservation became primary, resulting in a lack of a desire to fight to the very end (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:281).

Unit solidarity was considered essential by German officers. To promote solidarity, units that had achieved victory together were dissolved only if absolutely necessary. Regiments were sometimes allowed to reach a depletion level of 75% rather than being disbanded (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 287). Additionally, new members were added when the unit was not on the front line, allowing them time to assimilate into the group before going to battle. Because of this solidarity, "The German Army, on all fronts, maintained a high degree of organizational integrity and fighting effectiveness through a series of almost unbroken retreats over a period of several years" (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:280). Even after the inevitable defeat of Germany was apparent, most German soldiers continued to fight on unless their "basic physiological demands" were not met. For example, medical services were kept at high standards, and the food supplies were usually adequate. When food supplies or the quality of medical care decreased, so did the men's morale (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:287- 291).

Group loyalty was so strong that many men who disagreed with Nazism would nonetheless stay with their unit rather than desert and let their comrades down. As a result, near the end of the war, group surrenders occurred more often. Because the men would not leave the primary group, if the group as a whole felt the position was hopeless,

the men would surrender together. The few who did desert, at least on the Western Front, deserted because they could not assimilate into the primary group (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:285). Political or ideological reasons were seldom a factor. The units that experienced the least cohesion were those made up of men from different ethnic backgrounds. Units made up of Austrians, Czechs, Poles, and Russians could not form close group ties due to differences in language, culture, and religion. Most of these men had been forced to join the army and had little motivation to fight (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:285-286). Although they admit their study was weak in some areas, Shils and Janowitz claim

> the solidarity of the German Army was discovered . . . to be based only very indirectly on political convictions or broader ethical beliefs. Where conditions were such as to allow primary group life to function smoothly, and where the primary group developed a high degree of cohesion, morale was high and resistance effective or at least very determined, regardless in the main of the political attitudes of the soldiers. (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:314-315)

Some historians, mainly German, disagree with the "primary group" theory. The most prolific of the English-speaking dissenters is Israeli historian Omer Bartov. He finds the following weaknesses with the Shils and Janowitz study: the interviews were with POWs, it focused on men who fought on the Western Front, and it ignores the fact that many primary groups suffered between 200 and 300 per cent casualties (Bartov, 1986:36). Furthermore, the interviews were conducted at the very end of the war, some after Hitler had committed suicide. Because the war was clearly lost, and those being interviewed were prisoners, the veracity of their answers is suspect (Bartov, 1991a:32).

Bartov also points out that the Wehrmacht began to show its amazing staying power later in the war, when the primary groups were in an advanced state of disintegration.

"Yet while the primary groups did more or less disappear, the army fought with far greater determination and against far greater odds than at any time in the past" (Bartov, 1991a:33). Because there were no longer stable primary groups, Bartov argues that Shils and Janowitz's theories were largely irrelevant, at least on the Eastern Front.

Even though primary groups were disintegrating at crucial times, belonging to an *ideal* primary group, made up of a certain type of people, could be a strong motivational force. However, ideology, not socialization, would strengthen ties to this *ideal* group (Bartov, 1991a:5-6). For example, the Germans offered less resistance in the West than the East, even though the primary groups were more intact in the West. This grim determination of the troops in the East to fight on at all costs was mainly ideological (Bartov, 1991a:34-35).

Although Bartov maintains that ideology and indoctrination were really the prime motivating factors, he does not discount entirely the "primary group" element of motivation. "Battalions, regiments, and divisions were raised on a regional basis, making for linguistic, religious, normative, and many other kinds of affinities for the men" (Bartov, 1991a:30). New conscripts would come from the same region that the original unit members came from, and wounded men returned to their unit when they recovered. Strong efforts were made to keep primary groups together; and even though this was more difficult administratively, it did boost morale. Even Bartov agrees that as long as the group cohesion was maintained, morale was enhanced (Bartov, 1991a:30). The key point, according to Bartov, is that unit cohesion was not maintained throughout the war, especially on the Eastern Front, and therefore could not have been the main reason the

Germans fought desperately until the end of the war. It is clear that Bartov is using the same definition of cohesion as Shils and Janowitz, since he intersperses his discussions of cohesion with direct quotes of Shils and Janowitz (Bartov, 1991a:31, 32).

**Ideology**

Ideology includes nationalism, racism, and/or political convictions. It does not include religious faith, which will be examined separately. According to Henderson, ideology is effective for getting men to join the military or enter battle, but, "during the battle, ideology appears to have significantly less influence in controlling a soldier's behavior" (Henderson, 1985: 110). Henderson also maintains that ideology's effect on soldiers is largely dependent on unit leaders. Only conscientious and fair leaders will be able to use ideology to influence their men (Henderson, 1985:110). Shils and Janowitz found that volunteer armies are more strongly motivated by political or ideological factors than conscript armies (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:284). In perhaps no other area is such a large difference found between the Americans and the Germans.

No studies examined in this research indicated that ideology was a major or significant motivating factor among American troops in World War II. "The American soldier was typically without deep personal commitment to a war which he nevertheless accepted as unavoidable. . . he gave little concern to the conflicting values underlying the struggle" (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:149). While it was true that the American soldier believed that war was essential once the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, he was otherwise lacking in any serious convictions about the war. Other than an almost unanimous agreement that the Japanese had to be defeated, American soldiers thought

little about the reason for the war, or the moral and philosophic aspects of fighting (Stouffer, Suchman, and others, 1949:431). In fact, talking about such things was discouraged. Many different observers agree that there was a group code forbidding "talk of the flag-waving variety." Soldiers believed "talk that did not subordinate idealistic values and patriotism to the harsher realities of the combat situation was hypocritical" (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:150).

Some researchers believe that ideology was a major motivating factor in the Waffen-SS (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:286). What is less certain is how much Nazi ideology influenced Wehrmacht soldiers. Regardless of its actual effect, there is no question that the war had ideological overtones. "The war against the Soviet Union was described by the leaders of the Third Reich as a '*Weltanschauungskrieg,*' [literally a 'war of world views'] that is a war of ideologies" (Bartov, 1986:68).

In 1955, when Germany created a new army, several memoirs by Wehrmacht generals attempted to put the best light on the old German army. They claimed the blame for the evils of Nazi Germany was Hitler's. Further, they maintained that the Wehrmacht generals despised Hitler and were simply doing their soldierly duty by obeying him. Historians of this period, such as Harold J. Gordon (*The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926*) and Robert O'Neill (*The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-39*) agreed with this view and propounded it in their studies (Carr, 1987:4-5).

Beginning in the 1960s, Nazi archives, which had been seized by the United States, were returned to Germany. Several German historians wrote books linking the actions of the Nazis with those of the Wehrmacht. Some of the charges made were that the

Wehrmacht participated in the execution of Russians and Jews, exploited Russian POWs as slave labor, and carried out a "war of racial annihilation" against the Russian sub-humans (*untermenschen*) (Carr, 1987:5-8).

Historian Klaus-Jürgen Müller believes that the German officer caste cooperated with the Nazis to achieve two mutually desirable goals: the restoration of Germany as a world power, and reorganization of German industry and society to prepare for total war. Hitler's stated goal was to build the new Germany on two pillars, the army and the Nazi party. In this scheme, the Wehrmacht supposedly received equal stature with the Nazi party, so the generals willingly participated in Hitler's plans (Müller, 1987:104-105). Hitler remained loyal to the army when others in the Nazi party wished to reduce the stature of the Wehrmacht, and the Wehrmacht generals reciprocated this loyalty throughout the war (Müller, 1987:108).

Even Shils and Janowitz, proponents of the "primary group" theory of motivation, acknowledge that

> Even before the outbreak of the war, the Nazi Party took an active hand in the internal high policy of the Wehrmacht . . . this process of Nazification continued steadily until the Wehrmacht was finally rendered powerless to make its own decisions. Nazi Party control over the Wehrmacht was designed to insure (1) that Nazi strategic intentions be carried out (2) that capitulation would be made impossible and (3) *that internal solidarity down to the lowest private would be maintained* [italics mine]. (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:306-307)

A man motivated by ideology, such as a "hard core" Nazi, would be less likely to be demoralized; his determination would in turn would strengthen the resolve of the other soldiers in the unit (Kellett 1982:327). Shils and Janowitz also acknowledge the importance of the "hard core" Nazi soldier for strengthening morale within the

Wehrmacht. "The presence of a few such men in a group, zealous, energetic, unsparing of themselves, provided models for weaker men, and facilitated the process of identification" (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:304). Still, they maintain that official indoctrination sessions were largely ineffective. For example, a German sergeant, when asked about political motivations, said, "When you ask such a question, I realize you have no idea what makes a soldier fight. The soldiers lie in their holes and are happy if they live through the next day. If we think at all, it's about the end of the war and then home" (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:284). Additionally, many German POWs claimed that they usually slept through indoctrination sessions. Of course, such statements must be considered in the light of the fact that they were prisoners, and might not want to admit to Nazi affiliation (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:286, 309).

Bartov maintains that the influence of Nazism was strong, even within the Wehrmacht. In his study of officers on the Eastern Front, he found that about 15% of the Wehrmacht officers were aristocratic. Most of these were higher-ranking officers who looked on the Nazis with contempt. Few of these nobles were members of the Nazi party. However, about a third of all officers were party members. Most of these were junior officers and were exposed to Nazi propaganda and teachings most of their adult lives. So while most of the higher ranking officers were not Nazis, most of the lower ranking ones were, and these devoted Nazi officers were the ones who had the most contact with the enlisted men doing the actual fighting (Bartov, 1986:64).

Bartov also argues that the indoctrination sessions were far more effective than Shils and Janowitz claim. Wehrmacht soldiers welcomed Nazi propaganda, looking at it more

as entertainment or news. Officers would gather with the enlisted men to discuss issues pertaining to the war, promoting both morale and political indoctrination. The officers told the soldiers what they were doing was important, and that the "cause" made their suffering worth the effort. A German guide for officers said, "The motivating factor of the Bolshevist enemy is a political idea which must be overcome by an even more powerful political dynamic" (Bartov, 1986: 89-92).

As the war on the eastern front dragged on, Germany lost its technological advantage. To bolster morale and determination to fight, the Wehrmacht "accepted Hitler's view that this was an all-or-nothing struggle for survival, a 'war of ideologies' which demanded total spiritual commitment" (Bartov, 1991a:4).

> Nazism strove to achieve a complete dehumanism of the peoples of the East; and the army followed suit at an increasing pace. The crises of the first winter, and then the catastrophe of Stalingrad, only served to enhance the conviction of the officers that their appeals to the troops should consist of even greater National Socialistic content. The bitterness of the long and costly war, the ideological convictions of the opposing sides, as well as the traditional hatred towards the Slavs, dating long before Hitler appeared on the scene, made it easier for the military to adopt the Nazi view of the war. (Bartov, 1986:83)

**Attitudes Towards the Enemy**

Although in some ways linked to vindictiveness, this category refers to a soldier's feelings about the enemy as human beings; i.e., are they evil, subhuman, or normal people who just happen to be in the other army? For example, Henderson found examples of hatred for the enemy acting as a motivating factor, such as some Israelis' hatred for Arabs (Henderson, 1985:63). Actual vindictiveness based on previous enemy actions is a separate category which will be covered later.

Americans viewed Germans and Japanese differently. Americans thought the Germans were good soldiers, better than the British or French; and there usually wasn't a deep hatred for the Germans on the part of the American soldier (Kennett, 1987:156). For instance, a survey of soldiers in North Africa and Sicily showed that 54% agreed with the statement "They are men just like us; it's too bad we have to be fighting them" (Kennett, 1987:158). There were many instances of German and American troops setting up temporary truces while both sides took care of the wounded. Americans also indicated that they liked the German civilians better than the civilians of other countries they had passed through, like France and Belgium (Kennett, 1987:158, 217).

The German SS was not looked at so kindly, however. After reports of an SS atrocity, it was not uncommon for American troops to refuse to take prisoners for several days. They would kill any German soldier they could, even those attempting to surrender (Kennett, 1987:159-162).

Americans had a much different view of the Japanese. Polls taken during the war showed that American troops generally felt that the Japanese deserved no mercy whatsoever. Troops often preferred to kill Japanese soldiers rather than give them a chance to surrender (Kennett, 1987:163). Not surprisingly, when asked, "How did seeing prisoners make you feel about the enemy?" forty-two percent of the soldiers in the Pacific chose "All the more like killing them," while only 18 percent of the soldiers in Europe responded identically (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:161).

The German view of the enemy also depended on which enemy was being considered. The Russians were viewed as devils, and their victory would be a defeat for civilization.

The Western Allies, though the enemy, were still civilized people and would treat Germany better than the Russians would. Amazingly, towards the end of the war, the Germans even tried to get the Western Allies to join them in fighting the Russian hordes descending on Europe (Bartov, 1991a:34-35).

Although the Germans weren't attacked first by the Russians, their view of the Russians was much like the American attitude towards the Japanese. As the war went against the Germans, and their homeland was threatened with Russian occupation, "Nazi propaganda did its utmost to convince the troops that they were defending humanity against a demonic invasion" (Bartov, 1989:58).

The Germans had a great fear of being captured by the Russians. Nazis who had committed atrocities were especially nervous about what they had done, believing the Russians would seek revenge. There were rumors that captured Germans were being castrated (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:292). It was even reported that the SS deliberately committed atrocities on both civilians and soldiers to further increase the fears of the German soldiers as to what might happen to them if they were caught (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:292). This same fear was not held towards the Western Allies.

**Group Leadership**

The leadership referred to here is supervisory, operational leadership, not higher-level staff leadership. It deals with leaders who interact with the author on a regular basis. For instance, a private may refer to leadership by an NCO and an officer if he interacts with both. Strong leadership is important, but only if it is experienced personally. Managerial leadership, while important at higher levels, will do little to motivate soldiers at the unit

level (Henderson, 1985:108). According to S.L.A. Marshall, frightened men will easily panic and be routed "unless they are under very strong control." They will also become careless in times of relative calm. Strong leadership is essential to counter this tendency (Marshall, 1947:143-144). So in examining leadership, all references are to operational officer and NCO leadership. National leadership is discussed later.

When asked what they thought was the most important factor in combat motivation, American officers cited leadership and discipline most often, while it was hardly mentioned by enlisted men. This is not to say that the enlisted had no respect for the officers. In fact, men in front-line units had a more favorable view of their officers than those in support units. However, at least on a conscious level, they did not consider officer leadership a major motivational factor (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:110,119).

However, there is evidence that leadership was more important than the enlisted personnel thought. Army psychologists noticed that there could be large differences between the number of neuropsychiatric casualties in two infantry companies of the same battalions fighting under identical conditions. The determining factor was the quality of leadership; those units with better leaders had fewer neuropsychiatric casualties (Kennett, 1987:142).

German officers were trained differently from their American counterparts. Even lower level commanders could have soldiers executed; but although they had life and death powers over the troops, they were trained not to abuse this power (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:297). In fact, they were taught to express fatherly concern and considerate behavior in relations to the men, and to be both kind and stern. This image of

a "kind but stern, ideologically neutral officer who was only doing his job" is not universally accepted.

> Over the years interpretations have oscillated between wholesale condemnation of the officer corps, whose members were generally depicted in wartime propaganda as tight-lipped martinets complete with dueling scars and monocle and, on the other hand, a conviction that the overwhelming majority of German officers were decent fellows who did no more than their bounden duty to their country and in so doing upheld the highest traditions of the officer corps. (Carr, 1987:1)

The enlisted troops were to obey officers without question. Although there seem to have been excellent relations between the officers and enlisted, there was little informality. The relationship was more like a father to a son, not like two close friends (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:297). A captured German army officer said that political indoctrination and "pep talks" were "all rot"; whether the men would follow an officer depended upon the personality of the officer (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:297-298).

Leadership was viewed as necessary for the average German soldier to function as a civilized human being. The honor of being a soldier was important in Germany. Not only was it honorable to be a soldier, but all soldiers had to obey those in authority over them to maintain that honor. "Domination by higher authority was eagerly accepted by most ordinary soldiers, who feared that if they were allowed to exercise their initiative . . . their own narcissistic and rebellious impulses would come to the fore" (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:293).

**National Leadership**

National leadership is similar to ideology in that it seems to have been a minor factor, perhaps even the most minor factor, influencing American troops. Henderson believes

that other than a general awareness of the presidency, American soldiers lacked knowledge about the nation's political system and leaders which could have been used to instill patriotic values (Henderson, 1985: 99). On the other hand, Shils and Janowitz believe that German troops were strongly influenced by their leader, Adolf Hitler. Most German soldiers showed "an intense and personal devotion to Adolph Hitler" throughout the war (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:303). When things went badly, Hitler was not blamed. Rather, dishonest advisors who kept the truth from the Führer were the culprits. The soldiers felt that Hitler would not keep fighting unless there was good reason, even though they might not know those reasons. Towards the end of the war most high-level leaders, including Goebbels and Goering, were looked on with increasing disdain, yet loyalty to Hitler was maintained until the end (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:305).

Historian Ian Kershaw maintains that even when the German populace had grown disenchanted with Nazism, they still had faith in Hitler. He calls this the "Hitler Myth," an almost religious adoration of their Führer (Bartov, 1986:102). Ironically, as discontent grew with the Nazis, their faith in Hitler grew also. The people seemed to believe that Hitler would have put an end to Nazi crimes if he had only known about them. The existence of such undeserved faith shows that Nazi philosophy was sufficiently vague to allow the populace to believe it could still follow Hitler while condemning Nazi atrocities (Bartov, 1986:102). The troops had an equally strong faith in Hitler, and this was an important factor in maintaining morale. A poll among German POWs in January 1945 showed that 60% of the prisoners still had faith in Hitler (Bartov, 1986:104).

Many middle-ranking officers were particularly indebted to Hitler, for if it had not been for his rise to power and militarization of Germany, they would not have possessed their positions of power and prestige. As the war progressed, these officers rose to the ranks of general and field marshal. Hitler had a great deal of personal interaction with these men, and they had absorbed and embraced his goals and philosophies. "Even those officers who plotted against Hitler seem to have been mostly motivated by institutional, political, and strategic rather than moral and legal concerns" (Bartov, 89:56-57).

**Personal Gratification**

This category refers to the attainment of power, prestige, money, public approval, thrills, or pleasure derived from either the military or combat. Personal gratification was not mentioned often in the reviewed literature, and when it was it was usually from a staff-level perspective. The War Department took many actions along these lines in an attempt to improve morale. For example, the chance to go to Officer Candidate School was viewed as important for morale for the enlisted men, so minimum quotas were maintained, even though these quotas led to an overproduction of officers. In 1944, the Bronze Star Medal was created to increase recognition of men who had been in combat. The Expert Infantry and Combat Infantry titles and badges were created, which raised pay $10 and $15 per month respectively. Finally, the War Department attempted to match each inductee's skills and aptitudes to a suitable military assignment (Palmer, 1971:2, 62, 119-121).

> The publicizing of technical requirements produced an expectation among many inductees that they could best contribute to the war by continuing with their usual occupations, somewhat modified, in the Army. The satisfaction or

> disappointment of these expectations became an important factor in morale. (Palmer, 1971:7)

Henderson believes that monetary incentives may induce people to join the military, but they are of little value in actual combat: "No job is worth getting killed for" (Henderson, 1985:58). The idea that young men join the military to become "real men" or prove their manliness was unsubstantiated in the reviewed literature. In Germany, the military was considered an honorable profession (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 294-297). In the United States, there was far less community pressure to join the military than in World War I. There was, however, pressure to do a good job once in (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:131).

Finally, some men actually enjoyed combat. These men often performed bravely, some would say suicidally, in combat. According to psychiatrist Eli Ginzberg,

> Many of the outstanding combat soldiers were hostile, emotionally insecure, extremely unstable personalities who might well be termed clinically 'psychopaths,' whatever that may imply, who fully enjoyed the opportunity of taking out hostilities directly in a socially acceptable setting of warfare and who in the absence of such an outlet not infrequently end up in penitentiaries. (Quoted in Kennett, 1987:138)

Shills and Janowitz point out that German officers sometimes gained support for their authority by providing to their men "blameless gratification of primitive impulses and from the sanctioning of all types of aggressive social behavior outside the army group" (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:298).

**Propaganda**

A subset of ideology, propaganda refers to the actual dissemination of officially approved information (accurate or not) to the troops. It can accomplished through radio,

newspapers, pamphlets, lectures, speeches, and newsreels. Because ideology was rarely mentioned as a major factor motivating the Americans, it is not surprising that propaganda was also seldom mentioned. Henderson does not identify propaganda as a factor affecting cohesion. Shils and Janowitz, on the other hand, point out that the Germans were exposed to a great deal of propaganda, some of which was effective, at least to a small degree (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:307-311). The total effect of this exposure is as hotly debated as the topic of ideology.

As the war continued to go badly for the Germans, the generals hoped that increasing the levels of propaganda would help strengthen the resolve of the troops to continue fighting in what was becoming an increasingly hopeless war. Bartov claims that his study of memoirs, oral testimonies, private letters, and analyses of soldier's opinions by German agencies all show that this propaganda, which "relied on a radical demonization of the enemy and on a similarly extreme deification of the Führer" was extremely effective (Bartov, 1986:97, 1991a:8). One of the main topics of indoctrination sessions later in the war was the imminent arrival of secret weapons which would supposedly turn the tide of the war (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:310).

**Religion**

Neither side fought the war for religious reasons, unless one considers National Socialism a religion. For the purposes of this study, National Socialism as a motivating factor is dealt with under ideology. Although religion was not a significant cause for the war, it did play a part in helping individual soldiers survive terrifying combat situations. Henderson points out that religion can promote cohesion. "The broad umbrella of

Christianity that covers most religions in the United States offers some basis for common religious values, which in turn promote the basic values necessary for cohesion" (Henderson, 1985: 84).

Many American soldiers said that prayer helped them in combat. In fact, the only thing rated more helpful than prayer (and only by officers) was not wanting to let the other men down (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:172-175). However, no specific religion or belief was identified as being helpful. "Prayer is not of itself a sufficient indicator of religious faith; it may have been adopted as an instrument of psychological self-defense in much the same way as belief in talismans (e.g., a rabbit's foot) or in fatalism" (Kellett, 1982:195).

Religious faith was also important to the German troops. German divisions had only one Catholic and one Lutheran chaplain, yet there was a large demand for religious literature. Faith was important to the troops, whether it was faith in God or National Socialism. Although religious beliefs can be a major motivational factor in warfare, National Socialism was stressed far more heavily than any religious viewpoint (Bartov, 1986:93).

Shils and Janowitz do not mention religion as a motivating factor. They claim that the ethical aspects of the war did not present a problem to most German soldiers. They viewed such acts as invading Russia or extirpating the Jews as strategic mistakes, rather than being morally wrong. Based on their interviews of German prisoners, Shils and Janowitz maintain there were "practically no" recorded cases of desertion due to outrage at Nazi atrocities (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:302-303).

**Vindictiveness**

Vindictiveness is defined as a desire for revenge and has many causes. Whenever the enemy is perceived as fighting unfairly or committing atrocities, a sense of revenge is kindled. Losing a loved one to the enemy can cause vindictiveness. Perceived injustices against a soldier's home country can also be a source of vindictiveness. The reviewed literature indicates that vindictiveness was a larger factor for Americans than for the Germans. As already stated, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was an almost universal influence on American troops, which produced a desire for revenge in many Americans.

Motivational factors were about the same for American forces in Europe and the Pacific, with one major exception: vindictiveness was the primary incentive for 18% of those in the Pacific, while only for 8.5% of those in Europe. There was also a strong correlation between witnessing enemy atrocities and vindictiveness (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:110, 162).

*The American Soldier* found that men with a higher degree of vindictiveness were more committed to the Army and more likely to believe the war was worth fighting (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:167). Ironically, vindictiveness did not increase towards the enemy that the soldier had actually fought against. For instance, soldiers fighting in the Pacific were less vindictive towards the Japanese than Americans fighting in Europe or training in the United States. Vindictiveness towards a specific group actually decreased or stayed the same when fighting against that specific group (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:157).

**Desire to End the War and Go Home**

For many soldiers, the war was an unpleasant necessity, and their main motivation was winning the war as quickly as possible so they could go home to their loved ones. When 634 German POWs were interviewed in 1944, 95% claimed they were only concerned about personal or family issues (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:303). On the American side, when veteran infantrymen were asked what one thing kept them going and doing their best in combat, the most cited response (39%) was "getting the task done," that is, getting the war over so they could go home. Second most often (10%) was "thoughts of home and loved ones." Therefore, almost half were motivated by issues related to home (Kennett, 1987:140, Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:109). American soldiers knew there were few replacements, so the only way home, other than being seriously wounded, was winning the war. For example, on August 6, 1944, the entire replacement pool for infantry in France consisted of one man (Marshall, 1947:16).

**Coercion**

Opinions are divided on this issue. While few would argue that coercion is completely unnecessary in the military, researchers disagree on how much influence it has. For instance, Shils argues that the coercive powers of the Army are not very compelling in battle; in fact, soldiers should be given more discretion because of the unpredictable nature of combat. Because formal authority and possible sanctions are less significant to a soldier in combat than the fear of death, the will to continue fighting must come from within (Shils, 1950:20). Henderson maintains the cohesion of a unit will be weakened if a soldier feels escape is easy and punishments for desertion are minor. Conversely, if a soldier

perceives no means of escape, "he will conclude that he is committed for the duration and will see his best chances for survival as dependent upon the members of his immediate unit" (Henderson, 1985:16).

Coercion was not a major motivational factor for American soldiers. One hundred and two soldiers were executed during the war, and only one of those was for desertion; the rest were for murder or rape. Furthermore, soldiers who had seen a great deal of combat were less afraid of Army punishments and were more willing to go AWOL or at least tolerate those who did go AWOL temporarily (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:112-115). This seems to be due to two factors. First, "among men who had seen extensive combat . . . the punishments which the Army could threaten appear to have lost much of their impressiveness in the face of the growing bitterness of the men at the daily punishment of life and death in the line" (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:114). Secondly, there was also a tendency for soldiers to be more tolerant of combat veterans who went AWOL. The more time a man had spent in combat, the more likely it would be that his fellow soldiers would not mind if he went AWOL temporarily (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:114).

At the end of World War I, there was a breakdown of discipline in the German Army. To avoid this, the Wehrmacht adopted two new philosophies: many of the social barriers between officer and enlisted were eliminated, but blind obedience and loyalty would be demanded from the men. Hitler in turn expected this same loyalty and obedience from his generals. It was thought that only through this loyalty and obedience could men survive modern warfare (Bartov, 1991a:60). To maintain this loyalty and obedience, "executions

. . .were carried out with great publicity as a warning to others. Desertion, cowardice, and self-mutilation, as well as more serious crimes, could warrant the death penalty" (Bartov, 1986:30). Fifteen thousand German men were executed in WWII, as opposed to 48 in WWI, (Bartov, 1991:51). The presence of the "hard core" Nazis in a unit prevented the other men from discussing the political factors of the war. In World War I German soldiers often shared anti-war feelings, but in World War II there was no open dissent. Furthermore, towards the end of the war, soldiers were told that if they deserted, their families would be punished (Shils and Janowitz, 1948:287, 290).

**Duty/Honor/Country**

Duty/honor/country encompasses feelings of duty (both to country and fellow soldiers), a sense of honor, patriotism, and a love for the individual's home country and all it represents. It may also include a belief that orders must be obeyed without question, unless the orders are clearly illegal. Many of the men studied, both American and German, believed that they had a duty to follow orders without questioning them. Duty/honor/ country does not represent loyalty to a political ideal, which is covered under ideology.

Historian Richard Holmes defines honor this way:

> In part this honour is concerned with the obligations of the professional soldier, and in part it is a reflection of the 'manly honour' which encourages so many young men to enlist and buoys them up before their first battle. But, in a more specific sense, it is individual soldierly honour that impels a man to rejoin his unit when he has every reason not to, and prevails upon him to remain at his post even though flight would save him. . . .At the very core of the matter of honour lies a man's sense of obligation to his comrades and his desire to obtain and retain their respect. (Holmes: 1985, 301-302)

Shills and Janowitz believed that soldierly honor strengthened primary group solidarity in German soldiers (Shils and Janowitz: 1948, 296). Surveys of American veterans of the European theater showed that between nine and sixteen percent of the men thought that a sense of duty was the primary incentive to keep fighting (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:109-110). Henderson states that soldiers will often do what is expected of them (duty), even if personally they would prefer to be doing something else (Henderson, 1985: 23).

Historian George L. Mosse points out that many non-Germans volunteered to fight in the German Army because of a love for their country. They were either fighting against previous oppression (such as men from Baltic nations) or were fighting to secure a place for their country in the new world order under Nazi domination (Mosse: 1990, 206). However, this was not the case for the Germans themselves, because most able-bodied men were drafted when the war started (Mosse: 1990, 205). *The American Soldier* indicates that patriotism was not a major factor for American soldiers. In fact, "flag-waving" talk was discouraged and considered phony and unrealistic (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:150). However, Henderson believes that if a soldier believes his country values his actions, unit cohesion will be enhanced (Henderson, 1985: 79).

**Flyers and Ground Troops**

American aviators had a higher degree of satisfaction with their assignments than did ground troops. Partially, this satisfaction was because almost all flyers were volunteers. They were also more willing to go into combat than ground troops. The methods used to recruit flyers partially explains their higher morale. Publicity for the Air Corps presented flyers as elite, better than the average soldier. Many men entered the Air Corps with romanticized notions about flying, but their willingness to fight decreased with the number of missions flown (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:327-342, 367).

Flying itself was seen as thrilling and adventurous. "It involved exciting visual and kinesthetic experiences as well as the exercise of skills. Flying was often regarded as a kind of sport" (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:351). Flyers also received more time off and lighter workloads than ground troops. They received better medical care because of the various physical disorders they faced flying at high altitude. They also had a much shorter tour of duty. Although never made official policy, aviators who completed a tour of duty (approximately 30-60 missions, depending on the type of aircraft) could usually arrange a transfer to a ground duty assignment for the rest of the war (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:353-359). Even though the attrition rate was high among bomber crews, they had a goal to shoot for. Once they had achieved this goal, they were likely to survive the war. Front line ground troops, on the other hand, often experienced equally high attrition rates (depending on their position during a battle) without such a hope.

## Summary

This chapter reviewed the literature pertaining to combat motivation. The following eleven major topics areas were discussed: "primary group" influence, ideology, attitudes toward the enemy, group leadership, national leadership, personal gratification, propaganda, religion, vindictiveness, thoughts of ending the war and going home, coercion, and duty/honor/country. These same categories are used in the research for this thesis.

Research to this point has not identified any single primary factor that motivated all, or even a majority of soldiers who fought in WWII. For some factors, such as "primary group" influence and ideology, no consensus exists as to the amount of influence exerted. Other factors have a larger consensus, such as religion, but they are usually considered of only minor importance. The significance of leadership is also debated, and it is not even certain that those being led appreciate its importance.

Finally, as far as can be determined, no studies have been conducted using only content analysis to identify combat motivational factors . If this thesis shows that specific factors play a significant role in the motivation of certain groups, and that these factors can be identified using content analysis, then more studies will be suggested for determining if content analysis can be used in examining the complex issue of combat motivation.

# III. Methodology

## Overview

This research proceeded in several phases, which are summarized in Table 2. In the first phase, a literature review was conducted to produce a list of combat motivational factors for analysis. An attempt was also made to locate previous research that focused on using content analysis to study combat motivation. The results of the literature review are contained in Chapter II. The second phase of this research involved devising the parameters and techniques which would be used in the content analysis, detailed later in this chapter.

The third phase involved selection of the combat narratives to be analyzed. Due to time constraints, availability, and the exploratory nature of this research, twenty autobiographical accounts were agreed upon as a representative sample for this study. Five accounts from each of the four groups (American flyers, American ground troops, German flyers, and German ground troops) were studied. Availability was a major consideration in choosing the accounts, especially in the case of the Germans. There was some concern that there might be a bias shown in works that were translated into English. There was a possibility that any author showing a strong pro-Nazi view might not have his work translated and published in an English-speaking country. However, the works of Rudel (1979) and Knoke (1979) indicate that men who have no regrets about being associated with Nazi Germany have had their works translated into English.

TABLE 2

METHODOLOGY

| | |
|---|---|
| Step 1: Review Literature | Literature pertaining to combat motivation was researched. A list of combat motivational factors to be studied was constructed. |
| Step 2: Devise Method of Content analysis | The graphical and tabular presentation of research results was devised. The checklist for identifying references to motivational research in the literature was also created. |
| Step 3: Select Books | Books written by combatants in WWII were identified which met the criteria for this research. The writer must have fought for either the Germans or the Americans, and must have been either a flyer or a ground troop. After sufficient books had been identified, five books from each of the four categories (American flyers and ground troops, German flyers and ground troops) were randomly selected. |
| Step 4: Analyze Books | All 20 books were analyzed for references to any of the previously identified combat motivational factors. |
| Step 5: Record Findings | All references were tallied and shown in graphical form. Scores were converted into percentages for each individual, and these percentages were averaged into a composite score for each of the four groups. Patterns of similar motivation were looked for in each group. |
| Step 6: Compare Findings | Group scores were compared. Primary motivational factors for each group were also compared. |
| Step 7: State Conclusions | Conclusions of the study were presented. |

Five narratives from each category were used in this study. These narratives were randomly selected from a pool of narratives meeting the established criteria. Initially works by Generals and Field Marshals were included in this pool. However, after some consideration, it was decided that men of such high rank were unlikely to have spent much time fighting on the front lines, and their books were removed from the selection pool. One exception was made in the case of General Patton. This researcher decided that Patton would be included in this study for several reasons. Patton had a colorful and outspoken image, a reputation for getting things done even at personal risk, and an appendix in his book detailing his philosophy of combat. This appendix showed sufficient promise of applicability to this research that Patton's book was retained in the selection pool, and it was selected and analyzed as part of this study.

The works selected showed a wide diversity of experiences. In the American flyer group, three pilots and two bomber crew members were chosen. Two fought with the Flying Tigers in China, one with the Marines in the Pacific, and three fought in Europe (Scott fought both in China and Europe). Among the American ground troops, one was a Marine who fought in the Pacific, and four were Army officers who fought in Europe. All of the German pilots flew fighters, though on many different fronts, while all of the ground troops spent at least part of their careers on the Russian Front, though one also fought in North Africa, and two describe combat in France. Nine of the ten Americans were officers, while four of the German flyers and two of the ground troops were officers (one of the enlisted men was made an officer shortly before his death).

Another selection criterion was that each author must have participated in combat, not merely have been in the military. Henderson states that some factors may motivate a soldier to go to a battlefield, but have little effect once there (Henderson, 1985:110). While motivational factors that affect a soldier prior to battle were important, and were included in this study, it was desired that each author also relate actual combat experiences to account for any factors that were more evident in battle than would be evident prior to battle.

Works of fiction were not included in this study. Although it is certainly possible that fictional works could provide accurate insights into combat motivation, the fictional framework would introduce analytical considerations beyond the scope of this study. The goal for this thesis was to analyze the motivations of actual combatants, not of any fictional characters, not matter how realistically portrayed. Finally, the books must have been available in English. The final phases of this research included analyzing the selected books, determining the motivational factors, recording the findings, and making suggestions for further research.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

The data used in this study were derived from published memoirs, autobiographies, and first-hand accounts of men who fought in World War II. In reviewing the literature of combat motivation, no references to any studies similar to this study were found. All the studies examined used either interviews, surveys, or questionnaires to gather data. No studies based on the analysis of literature were reviewed or even referenced in the reviewed literature. Two books seemed promising at first, *Their Finest Hours: Narratives*

*of the R.A.F. and the Luftwaffe in World War II,* by Jerome Klinkowitz, and *The Second World War in Literature,* by Ian Higgins. Unfortunately, neither book actually sought to derive combat motivational factors from literature. Rather, they looked at themes found in military literature. Further, *The Second World War in Literature* deals with both fiction and non-fiction. *Their Finest Hours: Narratives of the R.A.F. and the Luftwaffe in World War II* did provide the titles of some books by German flyers that were used in this study, as well as others that could be used in future studies (see appendix A). As no literature reviewed covered the type of content analysis proposed for this study, the methodology was developed based on discussions with the advisor for this study.

It is believed that content analysis may be a valuable method for studying combat motivation. More time is spent writing a book than answering questions in an interview or on a survey. It is likely that the authors, in the lengthy process of writing, were moved to carefully consider what motivated them to fight, perhaps more carefully than people responding to surveys or questionnaires. Content analysis may provide a worthwhile method for analysis of combat motivations.

**How References Were Tallied.** Each work was read completely, and each reference to a motivational factor ("primary group" influence, ideology, attitudes toward the enemy, group leadership, national leadership, personal gratification, propaganda, religion, vindictiveness, desire to end the war and go home, coercion, and duty/honor/country) was tallied. The total number of references *for each individual* was then converted into a percentage.

For the quantitative portion of this study, criteria derived from information discovered during the literature review process were used to determine if a reference was made to one of the motivational factors under study. These criteria are listed in Table 3.

**Converting Scores into Percentages.** The total number of occurrences for each motivational factor was not compared to the totals for any of the other authors. All books were of different lengths, and each author had a different writing style and emphasized different aspects of the war. Comparing totals could be misleading. However, converting these factors into percentages allowed a more meaningful comparison between individuals. For example, if author A refers to vindictiveness 10 times, and author B refers to it 15 times, little can be determined. It would be erroneous to claim that vindictiveness was more of a factor for author B than it was for author A, based on these totals. Author A may have mentioned motivational factors a total of 40 times. In this case, vindictiveness accounts for 25% of the total. In contrast, author B may have mentioned motivational factors much more often, for a total of 150. In this case, vindictiveness accounts for only 10%, which is a lower percentage than for author A.

Individual percentages provided a more reasonable method of contrast between authors. Therefore, the percentages for each motivational factor were used for comparison purposes between the five members of a group (as shown in Figure 2, where the motivational factors of the five American flyers are compared). Further, percentages of each factor within a group (i.e., American flyers) were calculated and compared against

TABLE 3

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA FOR MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

| | |
|---|---|
| Primary Group | - A stated desire to return to a unit in combat in order to be with friends and unit members, even though the author may be out of combat, i.e., on leave or in the hospital<br>-Any references to protecting the group or its members, or struggling to survive for the sake of group members<br>- Examples of a group member helping the author to continue fighting |
| Ideology | - Specific references to fighting for or against a political ideology, such as democracy, communism, or national socialism<br>- References to how important it is that an ideology survive or triumph, or that other ideologies be prevented from spreading |
| Attitudes Toward the Enemy | - References to the enemy as sub-human or evil and deserving elimination<br>- Desire to continue fighting to avoid capture because of atrocities committed by the enemy<br>- Desire to keep enemy from invading author's own country because of fears of atrocities being committed against civilians |
| Group Leadership. | - References to immediate superiors providing inspiration or motivation to fight<br>- A superior setting the example and invoking respect in his men, causing them to continue fighting<br>- Motivation due directly to the words or deeds of a superior |
| National Leadership | - Mention of a national leader as an inspiration<br>- Finding strength to continue fighting due to the words or actions of a national leader |
| Personal Gratification | - Expressing pleasure, excitement, joy, at being in a combat situation<br>- Relishing awards, recognition, and promotions received due to combat<br>- Expressing enjoyment, satisfaction, or pleasure in killing enemies |

TABLE 3 (continued)

| | |
|---|---|
| Propaganda | - Receiving renewed hope due to proclamations of secret weapons which will turn the tide of the war<br>- Continuing to fight based on slogans or urgings received through official communications channels (speeches, newsreels, posters, newspapers)<br>- Continuing to fight based on official indoctrination sessions conducted by either superiors or Nazi Party officials |
| Religion | - Prayers to God concerning combat<br>- References to comfort or direction received from God<br>- References to help received from chaplains, pastors, priests, or other religious leaders |
| Vindictiveness | - A desire to kill the enemy in retaliation for dead comrades or family<br>- A desire to kill the enemy in retaliation for actions against author's own country<br>- A desire to kill the enemy in retaliation for personal loss |
| Desire to End the War and Go Home | - References to wanting the war to end so author can return home to family and loved ones<br>- Reference to lack of interest in anything other than ending the fighting so life can return to normal<br>- References to a willingness to fight, but having as a main goal surviving the war |
| Coercion. | - Witnessing execution of fellow soldiers for not doing their duty<br>- Fear of punishment if author does not fight<br>- Fear of punishment if author does not enlist<br>- Fear of author's family being punished if author does not fight<br>- Fear of what superior will do if author does not fight |
| Duty/Honor/ Country | - Any statement similar to "I must follow orders."<br>- Fighting to preserve the author's country<br>- References to cowardice or not fighting as being dishonorable<br>- References to a soldier's duty or honor. |

those of the other three groups. This calculation was done by totaling all the references to a particular factor within a group, and dividing this number by the total number of references to all factors within that same group.

**Qualitative Scoring.** It was also possible that one particular motivational factor might not be mentioned often, yet be the primary factor in the author's combat experience.

Therefore, a qualitative judgment was also made of each motivational element. Each factor received one of the following ratings: "major factor," "minor factor," "no factor," or "negative factor." Using a methodology similar to Henderson's, tables were used to highlight the relative importance of each motivational factor for each individual within a group (Henderson, 1985:7). As Henderson correctly states, "These [ratings], of course, are not definitive but depend upon the judgment of the analyst" (Henderson, 1985:7).

**Identification of Primary Factors.** Because of the small sample size, subjective and exploratory nature of the research, and lack of precedence for this technique, only basic statistical analysis was performed. General patterns were sought in an effort to determine if continued research of this type could be justified.

To determine if this type of content analysis has value, trends of similar combat motivation were sought. For instance, in the qualitative assessment of each of the four groups, if any factor was determined to be a major factor for three or more authors, that factor was consider significant, and a pattern of similar major combat motivational factors within a group was considered to have been successfully identified. Three was chosen because it represents a simple majority of a group of five. On the other hand, if no factors were considered major by more than two authors, a pattern of similar major combat motivational factors within a group was not considered to have been successfully identified. For the quantitative studies, any factor scoring more than 20% for a group was considered significant, and a pattern of similar major combat motivational factors within a group was considered to have been successfully identified.

Again, it must be stressed that this is the first stage of exploratory research using content analysis to examine combat motivation. One major goal of this study is to determine if further research is warranted. No sweeping claims can be made about motivational factors for any of these groups, but motivational trends can be identified and the potential worth of further study can also established.

**Definitions**

Major factor. The factor was considered to be one of the top two motivational factors for an individual, primarily determined by intensity of statements and secondarily by frequency of references to that factor compared to all other references. For example, Leroy Newby made it clear that his primary motivation in combat was survival. "There is little doubt that our number one concern was to survive - fifty times" (Newby: 1983,176). Regardless of the number of mentions of any other factors, ending the war and going home would be rated as a major motivational factor for Newby.

Minor factor. These are factors other than major factors that contributed positively to combat motivation. These factors were mentioned in the book as contributing, even in a minor way, to overall combat motivation.

No factor. The factor was never mentioned, or was specifically described as not contributing to combat motivation.

Negative Factor. This factor actually detracted from the ability to fight effectively. Some examples would include poor leadership or religious convictions opposed to combat. For instance, Robert Leckie was so angry over the behavior of one officer that he threatened to kill that officer. He also arranged to spend time in a hospital because of a rupture. The

rupture was a minor inconvenience, and Leckie would probably have ignored it except for this officer. Leckie was more concerned with avoiding punishment from this officer than with his medical problems, and was glad to avoid combat because of his hatred for the officer.

**Sample**

Table 4 lists all the combat narratives that were selected for analysis.

TABLE 4

BOOKS COMPRISING SAMPLE

| **German Flyers:** |
|---|
| *In Defiance* by Walter Boener |
| *I Flew for the Führer* by Heinz Knoke |
| *I Fought You From the Skies* by Willi Heilman |
| *Messerschmitts Over Sicily* by Johannes Steinhoff |
| *Stuka Pilot* by Hans Ulrich Rudel |
| **German Ground Troops:** |
| *The Forgotten Soldier* by Guy Sajer |
| *The Outermost Frontier* by Helmut Pabst |
| *Panzer Commander* by Hans von Luck |
| *Soldat* by Siegfried Knappe |
| *War Diary: 1941-45* by Ernst Kern |
| **American Flyers:** |
| *50 Mission Crush* by Donald R. Currier |
| *Flights of Passage* by Samuel Hynes |
| *God is my Co-Pilot* by Robert Scott |
| *Target Ploesti* by Leroy Newby |
| *Roar of the Tiger* by James H. Howard |
| **American Ground Troops:** |
| *Road to Huertgen* by Paul Boesch |
| *Company Commander* by Charles B. MacDonald |
| *Helmet for My Pillow* by Robert Leckie |
| *If You Survive* by George Wilson |
| *War as I Knew It* by George S. Patton, Jr. |

## Assumptions and Limitations

A major assumption of this study is that each author accurately recorded any and all significant combat motivational factors. Further, the honesty of each author was accepted. It is acknowledged that some researchers have accused some German veterans of lying about their devotion to or involvement in the Nazi party. However, it is impossible to certify the honesty of all participants in any form of research, and each book examined was treated as though it was completely accurate, at least in terms of the validity of personal experience and motivational factors.

One factor not considered in this study is the length of time between the writing of the book and the time the author was actually in combat. For the purposes of this study it is assumed that this length of time did not affect the accuracy of the writings of the men studied. It is acknowledged that this assumption may be incorrect, and further research could be directed towards this question. A possible source of bias in this study is the fact that all the men studied took the time to write personal narratives. The personality traits these men possessed that allowed them to complete their narratives may in some way set them apart from other men in the groups they represent. Of course, it is equally possible that these personality traits in no way affect these men's perceptions of combat motivation.

## IV. Results and Discussion - Flyers

### American Flyers

**Overview.** The five American flyers researched are as follows:

1. Donald R. Currier, B-24 navigator in Italy.
2. James H. Howard, P-40 pilot in China with the Flying Tigers and P-51 pilot in Europe.
3. Samuel Hynes, TBM (dive bomber) pilot in the Pacific.
4. Leroy W. Newby, B-24 bombardier in Italy.
5. Robert L. Scott, P-40 pilot in Burma and in China (with the Flying Tigers).

From a purely quantitative point of view, the American flyer sample provided some of the least informative books for this thesis. Howard provided only four references, and Currier only two. Personal gratification was by far the most frequently mentioned motivating factor, and it also possessed the highest percentage of mentions at 37%. Duty and honor was second at 16%, and primary group was a close third at 14%.

One unexpected factor was referred to, which is not specifically a motivational factor for combat, but essential for morale. Humor was mentioned by Newby (128 and 178) and Hynes (222) as important in keeping the men's spirits up. In fact, Newby describes some of the antics that the crew would perform (such as passing gas into each other's oxygen supply), even while under attack. "It did serve to break the tension, and it was just this sort of thing that kept our crew loose and, at least so far, free from combat fatigue" (178).

The impersonal nature of aerial combat was mentioned by Howard (125, 308), Currier (100), and Newby (70, 166). There were also some interesting observations on the

differences between air and ground combat. Hynes describes his remoteness from the ground war:

> But our own soldiers were not much more real to us than the enemy. If they were in the Army they were called Doggies, which was short for Dog -faces, and Marines despised them, along with their commanders [Hynes was a marine pilot]. . . . Even our own Marine infantrymen were a different species . . . remote allies at best. (Hynes, 1988:208)

Currier once had an Army Major fly on his plane as an observer. The Major thought the flyers had the worst form of combat, completely vulnerable and exposed. Currier countered

> "Personally, I don't know how you guys on the ground can stand being under fire for days with all sorts of guns shooting at you. You live in holes like animals, cold, wet and probably hungry. I can't imagine hearing shells come screeching in and exploding all around me. We usually don't hear anything."
>
> "I still have a hole to duck into," responded the Major. (Currier, 1992:146)

None of the flyers felt envy for the ground troops, or expressed a desire to be fighting on the ground rather than in the air.

The 50-mission "contract" was mentioned by the two bomber crew members, and Newby said, "There is little doubt that our number one concern was to survive--fifty times" (Newby, 1983:176). The other flyers had no idea when they would return home, as this "contract" applied only to bomber crews.

One major problem, in terms of this thesis, was that the authors tended to focus more on the details of their missions than on their feelings and motivations. The one exception is Scott, who wrote his book before the war ended. He is the only author who portrayed the enemy as villainous, and no doubt his book was partially written to motivate others to

keep fighting. Hynes also provided a large number of references, but his were primarily to the joys of flying. He was rarely in serious danger due to enemy actions, so his feelings primarily centered on the personal gratification he received from the act of flying, rather than combat.

**Donald R. Currier, *50 Mission Crush.*** Currier was a navigator on the B-24 Liberator bomber. He was based in Italy with the 449th bomber group, a part of the 15th Air Force, and spent his entire tour there. He arrived in Italy in January, 1944. Among his missions were the famous raids on the oil fields of Ploesti, Romania, where more planes were shot down by flak than over any other target in the world (Newby: 1983, 326). After completing 50 missions, he was discharged and returned to the United States in August, 1944. He served a total of six months in combat, and spent the rest of the war as a civilian.

Currier makes only two references to motivational factors. Early in his book, his plane needs repairs as his squadron leaves for Italy. His crew is eager to finish the repairs and catch up. "Why were we in such a hurry to get to war? To tell the truth, we were lonesome for our buddies in the squadron. We missed seeing a friendly face in the mess line or at the bar in the club" (23). He explains that the crew stuck together on the ground only when they were not with other members of 449th Bomb Group. Pilots tended to spend their time with other pilots, navigators with other navigators, and so on. The men of Currier's plane missed their comrades, and even if it meant going into combat, they wanted to be with those comrades (23-24).

His only other reference is to religion, which is also his primary motivational factor. As he is approaching his 50th mission, he is growing increasingly uneasy, worried that he will die before his finishes his tour.

> That night, as I lay in my bunk unable to sleep, I did something I had never done before. I prayed to God. My prayer was very simple because I was not a religious person then. I said, "God, give me my life, and I will never ask for anything else again. . . . After I had prayed, I somehow knew that I was going to be OK. Though I flew a number of other missions-and some of them were rough-I never again felt the fear that I had experienced before that night. (140)

Currier's book was the shortest book of the 20 used, and mainly dealt with mission descriptions. His description of his new-found faith clearly indicates that his faith in God gave him the strength to complete his tour. Other than the two references mentioned here, Currier does not deal with other forms of combat motivation.

**James H. Howard, *Roar of the Tiger.*** Howard was a pilot in the Navy when World War II started. He was allowed to resign from the Navy in order to join the Flying Tigers, which he joined in 1941, before the attack on Pearl Harbor. He became an ace in China, flying the P-40. When his tour was over, he went back to the United States. He was required to register for the draft, and was offered commissions in both the Navy and the Army Air Force. He chose the Army Air Force, and was assigned to the 354th Fighter Group, which soon moved from the United States to Boxted, England. He became an ace in Europe also, this time flying the P-51.

Like Currier, Howard focuses mainly on the missions rather than his motivations. He joins the Navy to become a pilot because "I was sure I'd find romance and adventure of the highest order"(8). He was raised in China (his father was a doctor working in China), so there is an element of nostalgia involved in his decision to join the Flying Tigers (59).

However, "The overpowering reason was my yearning for adventure and action" (59). Personal gratification seems to have been Howard's strongest motivator throughout the war. Other factors include a sense of duty and vindictiveness. "I asked myself if I had gone through the intensive training to become a naval aviator so I could enjoy flying, or if I had joined to defend my country from aggression. . . . My role was that of a warrior who was subject to the orders of his superiors. I decided that if there was to be a war, I wanted to be in it" (33). After shooting down a Japanese bomber that was about to land, Howard wrestles with guilt. However, he concludes, "This was war--look what they had done to us at Pearl Harbor" (125).

Howard also provides some insights on leadership. He reads a report by military analyst Hanson Baldwin which states that the morale of American soldiers was suffering because of buck-passing by American officers who were only concerned with promotions and power (284-285). Howard strongly disagrees with this report, believing that such leaders were rare. However, he goes on to relate his personal knowledge of some such officers, and it causes him to "shudder for the lives that were risked needlessly" (285). Yet he maintains that most officers placed country before self-advancement.

**Samuel Hynes, *Flights of Passage.*** Although Hynes grew up loving airplanes, ironically he never imagined being a pilot. "I was not, even in imagination, a pilot; but I was a true believer in the religion of flight" (4). He joined the Navy in 1943, and during aviation training elected to become a Marine pilot. He flew TBMs (dive bombers) late in the war. The only Japanese aircraft he saw while flying was a Baka suicide plane, which he unsuccessfully tried to shoot down. In fact, this book gives the impression that the

war was boring and usually uneventful. In describing his life on Ulithi, his first base, Hynes said, "It was like Eden. And the life we lived was as easy and as pleasant as it should have been in such a place. After a day's flying - never very demanding - you could swim, shower, and go to the club for a cold beer. . . . The next day would be the same" (164).

Hynes and his fellow flyers don't seem to fully understand what war is. The underlying theme of this book is that the war is a great adventure, sometimes dangerous, but on the whole safe if you are careful. He also shares some rather macabre thoughts. For instance, he and his squadron mates watch a carrier blow up after it has been hit by a kamikaze:

> We were excited by it--perhaps entertained is a more precise word - it was a spectacle, like a *cison et lumiere*, with noise, light, explosions. We didn't know what was happening to human lives while we watched, but even if we had, I wonder if it would have mattered. . . We took it as a sign that the war was still with us, that we still had an enemy, and went to bed heartened by the incident. (Hynes, 1988:180)

When the war ends, amidst the celebration, Hynes notes, "But we were saddened, too, though we didn't talk about that . Our common enterprise had come to an end; the invasion of Kyushu, and our flaming deaths in combat, would not take place" (254).

Hynes' motivation is definitely not a hatred for the enemy. He is amazed by the Japanese desire to die in combat (216, 224) but generally feels sorry for them, since they will clearly lose the war but keep on fighting anyway (234, 242). He also has no desire to actually kill anyone. "Being a bombing pilot, I had never set out to kill anyone, or to think of human beings as my target" (Hynes, 1988:242). National leadership is also not a factor at all, as Hynes says the death of Roosevelt means nothing to him (186).

Personal gratification, specifically the joy of flying and being a flyer, is the major motivating factor for Hynes (4, 29, 153, 164, 179, 186, 240, 241, 246, 249, 252, 254, 255, 266, 274). In fact, no other author in this study mentions any motivational factor as much as Hynes mentions personal gratification.

**Leroy Newby, *Target Ploesti.*** Newby was a bombardier on a B-24. He was assigned to the 460th Bomb Group, part of the 15th Air Force, and was stationed in Spinazzola, Italy. He arrived in February, 1944 and served his entire tour in Italy. In August, 1944, he completed his fiftieth mission and was discharged from the Army Air Force. He returned to the United States, and like Currier, spent the rest of the war as a civilian.

As mentioned in the overview, Newby's primary motivation is to survive 50 missions and go home. Another major factor is a sense of duty and pride. "We knew our side was going to win the war. There was no doubt in any of our minds about that. But being among the best on a winning team was a great feeling" (168). During the long trips to the targets, Newby has plenty of time to think about the war and his role in it. "I would often think about the war itself. *What was I doing here? I chose THIS? I could have been stateside.* Not really - I actually *wanted* to fight in the war. We were on the right side. We were the good guys. . . . Let's win the war and get it over with" (175-176).

Newby also wrestles with the morality of killing people. A chaplain tells him to keep it impersonal and only think about bombing military targets, not people. He also points out that more lives will be saved if the Allies win the war, and that any killing done now will save more lives in the long run. The chaplain urges the crews not to think about what happens to the people on the ground when the bombers attack. Newby claims that the

chaplain's advice was comforting, and he does manage to avoid thinking about the personal aspects of the war (166-167).

As already mentioned in the overview, humor was important to Newby and his crew, as it helped to relieve the tensions of bomb missions. They repeatedly played pranks on each other. On one mission the men discover that if they urinate through the bomb bay doors, the urine freezes and seeps into the tail gunner's turret, covering him with a frozen yellow mist. When the gunner complains, more men line up to urinate. As Newby says, "It was just the sort of comic relief needed to bring us all down from our emotional high. I hope Sid appreciated how much he helped us. I'm sure it even helped him" (128).

**Robert L. Scott, *God is my Co-Pilot.*** Early in his life, Scott decided that he wanted to spend his life flying. He fought diligently and unwaveringly for acceptance into West Point. He almost didn't make it, but in 1932 he graduated, though near the bottom of his class. By the time WW II had started, Scott was considered too old for combat, and was used in instructor duties. He finally entered the war by volunteering to pilot a B-17 (he lied about having extensive B-17 experience) in an early raid on Japan. The raid never took place, and Scott found himself in Burma flying cargo planes into China. He finally acquired a P-40, carried out a one-man war against the Japanese occupying Burma, and eventually joined the Flying Tigers when they officially became part of the Army Air Force.

Scott's book is unique in several respects. It is the only book of the five to depict the enemy as evil and villainous. It is the only one to have been written and published during

the war. Finally, this book is at least partly a motivational book designed to inspire others to fight.

Scott possess extremely strong feelings of hatred for the Japanese:

> But this was a different type of war, against a race of fanatics, who had been repressed for so long in their warped minds that they were barbaric madmen. . . Personally, every time I cut Japanese columns to pieces in Burma, strafed Japs swimming from boats we were sinking, or blew a Jap pilot right out of the sky, I just laughed in my heart and knew that I had stepped a day closer to victory. (Scott, 1943:189)

Scott also calls the Japanese "little, warp-brained savages with an in-bred persecution complex" (190) and "monkey men" (111). He claims no pilot he knew felt any remorse about killing Japanese (189). Scott also mentions vindictiveness several times as a motivating factor (98, 152, 153).

The leadership of General Chennault is also important. Of the men who make up the Flying Tigers, Scott says, "I knew these great pilots--I knew they were great American adventurers who would have fought just as hard for peanuts or Confederate money--as long as they were fighting for General Chennault and were flying those beloved P-40's" (Scott, 1943:106).

Personal gratification is mentioned most often, usually dealing with the joys of flying or the joys of killing Japanese. However, the single most important reason for fighting is a love of family and country. "We were going to fight, and many of us die, for just what I had here-my wife and family. To me they were all that was real, they were all that I could understand. To me, they were America" (Scott, 1943:36).

**Conclusions.** Table 5 shows the results of the qualitative analysis, while Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the results of the quantitative analysis. In the quantitative analysis, personal

gratification was deemed a major factor for three of the authors, duty/honor/country for two, and religion and a desire to end the war and go home were each major factors for one author. Personal gratification was considered a significant factor for the American flyer group because it was a major factor for least three men.

Figures 1-3 deal with the quantitative analysis. In Figure 1 the total number of references for each factor is shown. In Figure 2 these totals are converted into percentages for each individual, and in Figure 3 the group percentages are shown. Hyne's 15 references to personal gratification are the most references by any author to any single motivational factor. Scott's 10 references are the third most. In fact, these 25 references account for almost half of all the references in all five books by American flyers (there were a total of 52 references). When group percentages were calculated, personal gratification accounted for 52% of the combined percentage scores, while the second highest category, duty/honor/country, accounted for only 12%. Vindictiveness and attitude towards the enemy tied for third at 10%. This portion of the study found one factor (personal gratification) to be significant for the German flyer group, since it scored over 20%.

TABLE 5

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: AMERICAN FLYERS

| | Currier | Howard | Hynes | Newby | Scott |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Group | * | 0 | * | * | 0 |
| Ideology | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Attitudes Towards the Enemy | 0 | 0 | N | 0 | * |
| Group Leadership | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | * |
| National Leadership | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personal Gratification | 0 | ** | ** | 0 | ** |
| Propaganda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Religion | ** | 0 | 0 | * | 0 |
| Vindictiveness | 0 | * | 0 | * | * |
| End War and Go Home | 0 | 0 | 0 | ** | 0 |
| Coercion | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Duty-Honor-Country | 0 | * | * | ** | ** |

** Major Factor

* Minor Factor

0 No Factor

N Negative Factor




**Figure 1 American Flyers (Individual Totals)**




**Figure 2 American Flyers (Individual Percentages)**




**Figure 3 American Flyers (Group Percentages)**

## German Flyers

**Overview.** The five German flyers researched are as follows:

1. Walter Boener, ME 109 pilot, mainly on the Western Front.
2. Willi Heilman, FW 190 pilot on the Western Front.
3. Heinz Knoke, ME 109 pilot in France, Norway, and the Eastern Front.
4. Ulrich Rudel, JU 87 and FW 190 pilot on the Eastern Front.
5. Johannes Steinhoff, ME 109 pilot on almost every front.

The German flyer sample provided some fascinating contrasts. Ideology was a major factor for Knoke , a minor factor for Rudel, but a negative factor for the others, who actually considered Nazi ideology useless, outmoded, or even dangerous. It is also interesting to note that while Knoke and Rudel could be considered true Nazis as well as soldiers, both claim they knew nothing about the atrocities that had been committed and felt the perpetrators should be punished. The divisions are similar when looking at national leadership, where again it is a positive factor for Rudel and Knoke but a negative factor for the others. Propaganda was a negative factor for Boener and Steinhoff, yet the other three were heartened by stories of the new jet fighters and enraged by stories of enemy atrocities. A major surprise was that only Steinhoff mentioned the primary group as a motivational factor.

There were also similarities. All five flyers were motivated by personal gratification, in this case the joys of flying. Even in the direst situations, these men can find beauty in flight. Four of the five were strongly motivated by a sense of duty. Only Boener believed he was coerced into fighting.

As a group, more information for this study was gleaned than from the American flyers. The general impression from the works of the German flyers is that they considered themselves soldiers who must obey their orders without thinking. Even when the situation seemed hopeless, surrender or defection was never considered. Those who fought on the Eastern Front were terrified of what would happen if the Russians reached Germany, and this hatred for the Russians was a powerful factor. None of the authors expresses any particular animosity towards the Western Allies.

**Walter Boener, *In Defiance.*** Boener's father was a diplomat stationed in Uruguay when World War II began. In 1942, Uruguay declared war on Germany, and all German diplomats were expelled. Boener was 13 years old at the time and was surprised that his parents were upset about having to return to Germany. Over the next few weeks they began to explain what Nazi Germany was really like.

Boener learns about concentration camps, although not about the atrocities being committed there (16). He also learns about the network of informers that the Nazis have set up, and that anyone disagreeing with Nazi policies could be sent to a concentration camp. As his father says, "Walter, we have missed the boat. It's too late. We have been forced into the role of cowards" (20). His father warns him to always pretend to respect Nazis and to never say anything negative about the Nazi Party or Hitler (21). However, his father also says that if the war lasts long enough, Boener may have to go into combat, but he could fight for Germany without "total blame" because the Nazis were pushed into war by commercial interest groups in Europe and overseas (49).

As the war goes on, Boener is forced to join the Hitler Youth. As part of his training, he goes to glider school, where he excels due to flight training his father had given him in Uruguay. As he progresses through training, he is noticed by Luftwaffe officials. After successfully avoiding two P-51s while on a glider flight, Boener is offered a chance to join the Luftwaffe, even though he is 15 years old (the minimum age is 18). The official explanation is that Boener's parents probably altered his birth certificate in order to keep Boener from being drafted. After some paper work, Boener becomes 18 years old and joins the Luftwaffe (166-167).

Throughout the book Boener reiterates his hatred for the Nazis and even thinks of Allied pilots as allies with him seeking to get rid of Hitler (163). Nevertheless, he is willing to kill them whenever possible. Of course, Boener is 15 years old and probably lacks the maturity to realize the madness of the situation. He is merely trying to survive the war and finds himself caught up in the excitement of combat, exalting in each victory, even though it hinders his ultimate goal, the destruction of the Nazis.

Coercion is unquestionably the largest factor in Boener's life. He lives in constant fear of the Nazis (21,51,155,166,233) and cooperates with the military establishment to save his own life. Even so, he is ultimately arrested by the Gestapo, tried, and found guilty of high treason, and sentenced to death. He escapes during an Allied air raid which destroys the prison he was being held in, and ultimately reaches the Allied lines in Germany.

The only other motivational factor of significance is Boener's love for flying (114). Conversely, several factors, such as ideology, attitudes towards the enemy, and national leadership, were motivations *not* to fight. Boener has a consistently positive view of the

Allies (34, 163, 193, 292, 225, 243, 278, 279, 288) and a consistently negative view of Hitler (170, 76, 281, 288) and the Nazis (16, 19, 76). For instance, Boener says, "This was my first encounter with the feared bombers that came to get rid of Hitler. I wished I could fly with them and shake their hands, but that was the irony of war. I wondered if they knew how most of us felt about the Führer and why we still had to shoot the bombers down" (243)! It really made no sense for him to keep fighting, considering his feelings. One can only assume that Boener doesn't defect (prior to his arrest) due to fear, either for his own life or that of his family's well being.

**Willi Heilman, *I Fought You From the Skies.*** Heilman was unique in this study in that he was the only man to have fought both as a flyer and on the ground. He started the war in the infantry, and was wounded in the Polish campaign. Later he became a pilot, and fought the Western Allies over France and Germany, flying the FW 190. He eventually became the commander of Wing 54, the "Green Hearts."

Heilman provides the least amount of references of all the German flyers. Nonetheless, he provides some fascinating insights. When he was in the infantry, he believed that the flyers led a privileged existence. However, once he became a pilot, he believed that the flyers actually had a worse situation than the ground troops. He reasoned that since ground troops are constantly living and fighting under extreme conditions, "the nerves become dulled and a state of imbecility makes it easier for human beings to endure their fate in cold blood" (33). On the other hand, for the pilots, "each murderish contrast between a comfortable life and the stark antechamber of death plays on his emotions"

(33). Having experienced both types of combat, Heilman believes it is psychologically harder to fight the war as a pilot than it is on the ground.

Duty and honor are the prime motivating factors for Heilman. He states that Germans went into the war "to protect women and children" (123). Even when he is sure that Hitler intends to drag Germany down into misery, he makes it clear to a Nazi Party Commissar Officer that he and his men will "remain true to their oath" (171). In the epilogue, Heilman states that he and his men fought for Germany and never lost their love for their country (187).

Ideology and national leadership are definitely not motivational factors. Heilman mentions how his men hate the Nazi political officers and consider their Nazi slogans "antiquated" (150). Towards the end of the war, he even imprisons a political officer and leaves him locked in a cellar for the Allies to capture. As already mentioned, Heilman believes Hitler will destroy Germany. He also believes that Hitler and Göring are incapable of effectively running the air war (98) and that staff leaders are ignorant and know nothing about aerial combat, sending men to certain death on impossible missions (133).

**Heinz Knoke, *I Flew for the Führer.*** Knoke flew ME 109s first on the Russian Front, then in Norway, and finally as part of the Second Fighter Division in France and Germany. Knoke was an ace, shooting down 52 planes. In October, 1944 he was seriously wounded when a jeep he was driving hit a mine. He did not fly again in the war. In fact, he did not serve in any military capacity, so serious were his wounds.

Like Rudel, Knoke has a great respect for Hitler, saying that he has "absolute faith in Hitler" (8) and that he doubts "the world has ever known a more brilliant orator than this man" (27). However, he does not hold Göring in such high regard, disagreeing with him when he blames the German pilots for the failure of the air defenses in the west (139. He does consider Hitler's decision to use the ME 262 jet as a bomber instead of a fighter to be "idiotic" (198).

Ideology is important to Knoke. He considers National Socialism appealing but believes that Nazi organizations repeatedly failed to correctly apply its fundamental principles, leading to corruption (6). He also considers Communism a great evil which must be eliminated. "I do not see how there can ever be lasting peace in the world as long as bolshevism [sic] continues to exist. It will have to go on one day to conquer the world, according to the Communist theories of world revolution. The price to be paid for a peace of that sort is the enslavement of every nation and all mankind" (202). Just before the war ends, Knoke writes in his diary that he would be willing to fly again to fight against the Russians to drive them out of Germany (209).

Knoke believes without question most if not all of the Nazi propaganda he hears. He believes stories that Poland is massacring thousands of Germans daily (10). After the Germans invade Poland, he believes stories of more "crimes of humanity" discovered by the invading German armies (11). In the later part of the war he is encouraged by reports of secret weapons, like the ME 262, which will allow Germany to regain control of the skies (171).

Duty and honor are also important to Knoke. He claims that he and his men are dedicated to fight for their country (142) . He is outraged to hear about the attempt to assassinate Hitler, considering it "infamous" (181). At one point his hand is wounded so severely that he can not hold a control stick. Yet, after observing the aftermath of a bombing raid on Hamburg, he considers it his duty to fly somehow, and rigs up a sling that allows him to control his plane and return to combat (118).

Knoke's attitude towards his enemy varies. He views the Russians as dangerous fanatics (48) and hates communism. He has a more charitable view of the Western Allies. He considers the British to be tough, clean fighters (30) as well as courageous (57). Once, after shooting down a Spitfire, he finds himself hoping that the pilot will bail out and live. The Germans find the pilot, and they all share a meal together. Late in the war, Knoke and an American pilot shoot each other down, and meet on the ground. They have a friendly chat and Knoke notes, "There is no suggestion of hatred between us, nor any reason for it. We have too much in common. We are both pilots, and we have both just narrowly escaped death" (178). For Knoke, attitude towards the enemy was a motivational factor when he was fighting Russians, but not when he was fighting the Western Allies.

**Hans Ulrich Rudel, *Stuka Pilot.*** Rudel was Germany's most decorated pilot during World War II. He had over 6000 flying hours and 2500 sorties. A new decoration was created by Hitler to honor him, the Gold Oak Leaves with Swords and Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. He spent most of the war flying Stuka (JU 87) dive bombers, but also flew FW 190s.

Rudel has a deep hatred for Communism and sees the war as a war against the spread of Bolshevism (43, 71, 91, 241). He is surprised that the Western Allies do not see the menace and join with Germany to fight against the Soviet Union (267). When the invasion of the Soviet Union begins, he writes, "It is a good thing we struck. . . It looks as if the Soviets meant to build all these preparations up as a base for invasion against us" (17). He is also aware of Russian troops mutilating German bodies, which further strengthens his determination to fight (80).

Rudel's hatred for the Russians does not extend to the Western Allies, though he did consider some of their actions barbaric. After the war ends and he is in American custody, he is questioned about the atrocities committed at concentration camps. He claims to know nothing about them and does not even believe such places existed. He further responds that the allies have committed many atrocities in their bombings of German cities, where "countless women and children were massacred" (284). He also points out that the Russians had committed many atrocities.

Rudel has a great respect for Hitler. He is personally decorated by Hitler four times, and each time Rudel is impressed by Hitler's knowledge of weapons and war production (91, 118, 162, 228). Of the five German flyers studied, he has the most favorable view of Hitler, and also has the least negative view of Göring and other higher-level leaders.

Propaganda also plays a part in Rudel's motivation. Twice he mentions new secret weapons that he hopes will turn the tide of the war (118, 162). And of course, any propaganda against the Soviets is believed unquestioningly. It never occurs to him that the Russians may be justified in fighting because Germany invaded. To Rudel, the war is just

part of the Communist plan to conquer the world. "The devil is now gambling for Germany, for all Europe. Invaluable forces are bleeding to death, the last bastion of the world is crumbling under the assault of Red Russia. . . Stubborn refusal to accept this fate and the determination that 'This must not happen' keep us going" (241).

Finally, a sense of duty and obedience to orders are strong motivating factors. He notes that even when orders seem unreasonable, "argument would be merely a waste of breath. Those are our orders, and we obey them" (36). No sacrifice is too great if it will save Germany (252), and Rudel claims that he and his men did not fight for a political party, but only for Germany (284).

**Johannes Steinhoff, *Messerschmitts Over Sicily.***

Steinhoff flew ME 109s on the Eastern Front, in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. Later in the war he crashed in a ME 262 jet fighter, severely burning his face. This book covers a two week period of intense fighting over Sicily. This is the only book by a German flyer that does not cover the author's entire career. Because of the short time span, more details are given, and the reader receives an even more realistic picture of combat conditions.

The Luftwaffe in Sicily is probably weaker than anywhere else at this time. The Germans have just evacuated North Africa, and few planes or supplies are available. Allied heavy and medium bombers can reach all the German air bases in Sicily, and these bases are under almost continual assault, both day and night. Many of the pilots are inexperienced. All of these conditions lead to poor results in air combat. In fact, Göring sends two unprecedented messages, which many members of the Luftwaffe learn of. After

one particularly ineffective attack, in which 100 German fighters managed to shoot down only one bomber, Göring orders that one pilot from each wing will be court martialed for cowardice (63). Each wing leader volunteers to stand charges, but eventually nothing comes of this order. In a second message, Göring says,

> Together with the fighter pilots in France, Norway, and Russia, I can only regard you with contempt. I want an immediate improvement in fighting spirit. If this improvement is not forthcoming, flying personnel from the commander down must expect to be remanded to the ranks and transferred to the eastern front to serve on the ground. (187-188)

Needless to say, national leadership is not a positive motivational factor for Steinhoff. After one staff meeting with Göring in which Göring does not grasp the difference between fighting in WWI and WWII, Steinhoff says, "And ever since then I've known that our Commander-in-Chief doesn't understand our war" (70). Steinhoff spends a great deal of time defending his men. Steinhoff's superiors think that Göring's remarks are nonsense, and try to convince Steinhoff that Göring doesn't mean what he is saying. Steinhoff's men are hurt and insulted (82), and Steinhoff argues that his men's morale and bravery will not improve when they are faced with insulting and degrading reproaches (83).

The primary motivational factor, according to Steinhoff, is the German sense of duty:

> For us soldiers it had hitherto been the only right attitude, indeed the only conceivable one. The obedience practiced for centuries by the German soldier had always been presupposed an unshakable trust that the orders he received would be sensible orders and that the high command would search their hearts very carefully before sacrificing whole formations. And the many who were sacrificed died in the certainty that this was so. (193)

He also claims that his men keep fighting because "no one with any self-respect is going to stand aside while his comrades do the dirty work" (86). Further, on several occasions he

notes that his men are so busy and overworked that they keep fighting without even thinking, doing things more out of rote than anything else (63, 198, 205).

Steinhoff is also the only author who states that many men turn to alcohol to dispel their fear (101). In fact, he deals with cowardice and fear more than any other author, German or American. He describes the temptations each pilot faces after taking off for a mission. Since their equipment is so poor, it is easy to turn back for mechanical reasons. Steinhoff divides those that turn back into three groups: genuine cases, experienced pilots who have "reached the end of their tether" but don't realize it, and young pilots "horrified and utterly overwhelmed by the air war in the Mediterranean" (120). He is the only author who admits that his men are often afraid to fight and will fake mechanical problems to avoid flying a sortie.

He considers leadership to be of little value in boosting morale when the enemy has a technological advantage. In fact, he calls it "utterly useless" (205). Propaganda is also useless and is insulting to men who know what is really happening (240, 252). Primary group ties are useful in motivating men (160, 256) as is the joy of flying (240, 252), but clearly the German sense of duty and honor is primary.

**Conclusions.** Table 6 shows the results of the qualitative analysis, while Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the results of the quantitative analysis. In the qualitative analysis, duty/honor/country was determined to be a major motivational factor for four of the five German flyers. Coercion, ideology, and attitude towards the enemy were each determined to be a major factor for one author. Only for Boener is duty/honor/country not a major factor, and this is due to his hatred for the Nazis. If he had not been forced into fighting

for the Nazis, he too might have been motivated by a sense of duty or honor. Duty/honor/ country rated as a significant factor for the German flyer group because it was a major factor for at least three men.

Figures 4-6 deal with the quantitative analysis. In Figure 4 the total number of references for each factor are shown. In Figure 5 these totals are converted into percentages for each individual, and in Figure 6 the group percentages are shown. Duty/honor/country was mentioned most often by the German flyers, accounting for 19 out of 69 total references to motivational factors. Duty/honor/ country also achieved the highest score (28%) when the group percentages were calculated, double that of attitude towards the enemy, which had the second highest score (14%). Ideology, personal gratification, and national leadership were all tied for third with 12%. This portion of the study found one factor (duty/honor/country) to be significant for the German flyer group, since it scored over 20%.

TABLE 6

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT: GERMAN FLYERS

| | Boener | Heilman | Knoke | Rudel | Steinhoff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Group | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | * |
| Ideology | N | N | ** | * | N |
| Attitudes Towards the Enemy | N | 0 | * | ** | 0 |
| Group Leadership | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| National Leadership | N | N | * | * | N |
| Personal Gratification | * | * | * | * | * |
| Propaganda | N | * | * | * | N |
| Religion | 0 | 0 | 0 | * | 0 |
| Vindictiveness | * | 0 | 0 | * | 0 |
| End War and Go Home | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Coercion | ** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Duty/Honor/Country | 0 | ** | ** | ** | ** |

** Major Factor

* Minor Factor

0 No Factor

N Negative Factor




**Figure 4 German Flyers (Individual Totals)**




**Figure 5 German Flyers (Individual Percentages)**




**Figure 6 German Flyers (Group Percentages)**

## V. Results and Discussion - Ground Troops

### American Ground Troops

**Overview.** The five American ground troops researched are as follows:

1. Paul Boesch, an Army lieutenant in the 8th Infantry division in France and Germany.
2. Robert Leckie, a Marine private in the 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal, New Britain, and Peleliu.
3. Charles B. MacDonald, an Army captain in the 23rd Infantry Division in Belgium and Germany.
4. George S. Patton, an Army general in North Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany.
5. George Wilson, an Army lieutenant in the 4th Infantry Division in France and Germany.

**Overview.** The American ground troops provided few references to combat motivation. In fact, George Wilson provides no references to motivational factors. The others provide sufficient references, but this group provided only 43 references to combat motivation, the lowest total for any group. The general tone derived from these works is that the authors view their participation in the war as a necessary and unpleasant job, one which they just want to finish. Because they hated the war, the Americans also hated the Germans, whom they blamed for starting the war. Because the Americans did not want to be in combat (with the exception of Patton), they were unsympathetic to any Germans encountered. Only Patton offered any kind words about the enemy.

The primary group was the most important factor overall at 29 percent. A sense of duty and/or patriotism was second at 18 percent. Religion was third at 14 percent, due

largely to Boesch's heavy emphasis. National leadership was the only factor not mentioned, and group leadership was cited as a negative factor by Leckie and MacDonald, who did not respect their leaders.

**Paul Boesch, *Road To Huertgen.*** Boesch was an Army lieutenant in the 8th Infantry division in France and Germany. He did not participate in the initial D-Day invasion, but fought later in France and Germany. He was injured falling down muddy stairs during an artillery attack, and spent the rest of the war in a training unit in France. He seriously considered going AWOL to return to the front with his best friend, but the opportunity never arose.

Boesch makes more references to religion (five) than any other author in this study. He believes that God gave him the idea for a patrol that allows him to find five wounded men (12). He solicits prayers from people of different faiths (74). He also says of his men, "But no matter what their religion, almost all were closer to their God then they had been for years. . . . The religion of the foxholes was a serious matter to all of us, and no man hid his piety" (22).

A sense of duty was also a crucial motivating factor. "As most GIs will tell you, men went into battle because it was their job. They fought because they did not want to let their buddies down, or the folks back home. . . They felt a surge of patriotism that made it impossible to quit" (114).

Boesch also had a deep hatred for the Germans. On one occasion he watches a man he shot slowly die. "I could stand there and watch him die and feel absolutely no qualms of any kind" (231). He compares his killing this German to a carpenter hammering in a nail.

They both have jobs to do, and Boesch has no feelings for the dying man. Killing him provoked no more emotion than hammering a nail (232). Along these same lines, vindictiveness is mentioned three times (54, 165, 226) as a motivating factor.

**Robert Leckie, *Helmet for my Pillow.*** Leckie is unique in this study in that he is the only American ground troop who fought the Japanese. He enlisted in the Marines in January 1942 and joined the 1st Marine Division. He was involved in fighting at Guadalcanal, New Britain, and Peleliu. He also spent about seven months in Australia with his unit after the Guadalcanal campaign. He was sent to a hospital on Banika due to enuresis (urination during sleep), but he was never cured and was eventually sent back to his unit. He was wounded during the invasion of Peleliu, and was in a hospital (for the tenth time since joining the Marines) when the war ended.

The primary motivating factor for Leckie is the primary group. He describes his unit as a family (22), and towards the end of the war when he is in the hospital on Banika, he is suddenly hit by a strong desire to "rejoin my comrades" (193). He does so in time to participate in the invasion of Peleliu. His friendships were important to him throughout the war.

Another factor mentioned is "the cause." According to Leckie, "If a man must live in mud and go hungry and risk his flesh, you must give him a reason for it, you must give him a cause. . . . Without a cause, we become sardonic" (20). However, Leckie does not believe that he was fighting for a cause, so he does become sardonic. So ideology could have been an important factor, but was not. He does consider being a Marine somewhat helpful, due to what he called the "cult of the Marine." All Marines are volunteers, and

their chosen service has a long and colorful history. This Marine mystique gives Leckie some added motivation to fight, but he does not elaborate on this idea (20).

Leadership was a major negative factor. Leckie repeatedly witnesses situations where he believes the officers either steal from the enlisted men or deny them luxuries the officers enjoyed. After seeing the officers denying seabags to the enlisted men while using them themselves, Leckie notes, "This was the first piece of discrimination which we encountered, the first flip of the Single-Sided Coin, whereby the officers would satisfy their covetousness by forbidding us things rightfully ours, and then take them up themselves" (98).

**Charles B. MacDonald, *Company Commander.*** MacDonald was an Army captain in the 23rd Infantry Division in Belgium and Germany. He did not participate in the D-Day invasion, but joined his unit in October of 1944 as a replacement officer. When the Germans attacked during the Battle of the Bulge, his unit was among those on the front line attempting to slow the German advance until reinforcements could be brought up. He remained in combat until the end of the war, where he participated in the liberation of Czechoslovakia.

MacDonald does not specifically mention any factor as being a primary motivational factor, but his hatred for the Germans is mentioned most often (four times). He has no sympathy for the Germans, military or civilian. He blames them for starting the war, and doesn't care when German civilians are kicked out of their homes or stolen from. "These people had asked for it," is his typical response (219). When a German farmer and his wife cry as their farm is burned down, he laughs and says, "Thank Adolf" (256). In yet

another instance, when he observes severely wounded Germans, he notes, "They moaned so painfully that I knew I would have become nauseated had they been other than Germans (291).

Most of the other references to motivation are nothing more than minor asides. MacDonald does not go into great detail, focusing more on the combat than the factors that drove him to keep fighting. He does refer to a pride that he considers common among soldiers. "I was thoroughly imbued with the spirit common among all infantrymen that 'my outfit is the best outfit in the whole damned Army'" (26).

MacDonald considers his leaders to be self-centered and out of touch (302,316). He is repulsed by their life of relative luxury and stupid decisions made based on a lack of knowledge of what was really going on at the front line. However, MacDonald is also aware that his own men could be positively influenced by his actions. He overhears two of his men discussing the fact the MacDonald shows genuine concern for his men. Therefore, even though MacDonald himself is not motivated by his superiors, he believes that his men can be motivated by his leadership (96).

**George S. Patton, *War As I Knew It.*** General Patton is of course one of the most famous and flamboyant American generals of WWII. He commanded troops in North Africa, Sicily, and Western Europe. He was a major general when his men invaded North Africa, and he ended the war as a four-star general. Shortly after the war ended, Patton died from injuries received in a traffic accident. This book is a slightly edited version of his diary, which he kept until just before his death. Patton does not deal much with what

motivated him personally, but he does comment on what he thinks is important in motivating his men.

Personal gratification was probably the primary motivational factor for Patton. As he prepares to enter battle in North Africa, he reflects, "It seems that my whole life has been pointed to this moment. When this job is done, I presume I will be pointed to the next step in the ladder of destiny" (6). Throughout his career, he always strove to exceed the accomplishments of those around him.

Patton also believes that coercion is vital. He advocates executing those who sleep on post, go AWOL for "unreasonable time," or shirk in battle. "It is utterly stupid to say that General Officers, as a result of whose orders thousands of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon" (342). He also does his best to punish men with self-inflicted wounds (224).

Patton expresses mixed attitudes towards the enemy. He lauds their efforts if they fight fairly (56), but has no compassion for those whom he believes fight dirty, expressing the belief that they should not be taken prisoner, but rather shot (106). He visits several concentration camps, and makes German civilians visit them to see what their government has been doing (277). Yet he believes that most Germans had no idea what was going on in these camps (280). He also credits the German POW guards for not tampering with Red Cross packages destined for American POWs, even though the German guards did not have enough food (303).

Finally, Patton believes that it is a privilege to be a soldier. He laments the fact that, "We have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier" (318). Finally,

he addresses the theme of this study nicely when he says, "Discipline, pride, self-respect, self-confidence, and the love of glory are attributes which will make a man courageous even when he is afraid" (322).

This researcher believes the inclusion of Patton's book was justified. Patton knew what it was like to be in combat, as he fought in World War I in the Tank Corps, advancing in rank from Captain to the temporary rank of colonel in two years (Farago, 1965:70). He was also in combat situations in World War II, and therefore could describe his motivations *in combat.* He was not a General who stayed safely in the rear areas.

**George Wilson, *If You Survive.*** Like MacDonald and Boesch, Wilson did not participate in the D-Day invasion of France. However, he joined the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry division shortly afterward, in July, 1944. He participated in the fighting during the Battle of the Bulge, and remained in Europe until the German surrender, returning home in July 1945. He was finally released from the Army in September, 1945.

This book provides little data for this research. This is not to say the book is valueless, or that it is dull. On the contrary, it is one of the more interesting books in this group. Unfortunately, Wilson has written a combat narrative with virtually no insights into or explanations of combat motivation. The overall impression is that Wilson is striving to survive (22, 28) but will obey orders and do his duty. He derives no joy in personally killing Germans (20), although he is delighted when Germans are slaughtered by artillery. "To us the artillery strike was more of deliverance than conquest. Those people could

have killed us all" (210). He also meets four fighter pilots in Luxembourg, has a pleasant visit with them, and says that there was no rivalry or envy between them and him (192).

Using the established criteria, no references to motivational factors in Wilson's book were found, and consequently no references to Wilson will be found in the following tables and charts.

**Conclusions.** Table 7 shows the results of the qualitative analysis, while Figures 7, 8, and 9 show the results of the quantitative analysis. Of all the qualitative assessments, this one showed the least consistency. Only one factor, duty/honor/country, was found to be a major factor for more than one man (it was a major factor for two). Religion, primary group, attitude towards the enemy, and personal gratification were each major factors once. None of the factors rated as a significant factor for the American ground troops as a group, because none of them were major factors for three or more men.

Figures 7-9 deal with the quantitative analysis. In Figure 7 the total number of references for each factor is shown. In Figure 8 these totals are converted into percentages for each individual, and in Figure 9 group percentages are shown. Duty/ honor/country scored highest with 19%. The primary group, attitude towards the enemy, and religion all tied for second with 16%. None of the factors scored over 20%, so this portion of the study found no significant factors for the American ground troops as a group.

TABLE 7

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT: AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS

| | Boesch | Leckie | MacDonald | Patton |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Group | * | ** | * | 0 |
| Ideology | 0 | * | 0 | * |
| Attitudes Towards the Enemy | * | 0 | ** | * |
| Group Leadership | 0 | N | N | * |
| National Leadership | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personal Gratification | 0 | 0 | * | ** |
| Propaganda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Religion | ** | 0 | * | * |
| Vindictiveness | * | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| End War and Go Home | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Coercion | 0 | 0 | 0 | * |
| Duty-Honor-Country | ** | * | * | ** |

** Major Factor

* Minor Factor

0 No Factor

N Negative Factor




**Figure 7 American Ground Troops (Individual Totals)**




**Figure 8 American Ground Troops (Individual Percentages)**




**Figure 9 American Ground Troops (Group Percentages)**

## German Ground Troops

**Overview.** The five German ground troops researched are as follows:

1. Ernst Kern, a private in the First Mountain Division on the Eastern front.

2. Siegfried Knappe, an artillery officer who fought in Poland, France, and the Eastern front.

3. Helmut Pabst, a signals NCO promoted to lieutenant who fought and died on the Eastern Front.

4. Guy Sajer, a private, mainly with the Gross Deutschland Division on the Eastern Front.

5. Hans von Luck, an officer (captain through colonel) in Poland, France, North Africa, and the Eastern Front.

The German ground troops provided some of the most detailed insights into combat motivation. They also provided the most references, 115, of the four groups studied. The German ground troops shared a hatred and fear of the Russians and a generally favorable view of the Western Allies. Primary groups were important for four of the five men, and a sense of duty was also important for four of the five. Only one of the five, Pabst, actually seemed to enjoy combat. None of the writers mentioned Nazism as important, and none of them found religion personally useful. Only one, Sajer, considered vindictiveness important, and for him it was a major factor.

Based only on the five books in this section, it appears that Shills and Janowitz's theory of primary group motivation is correct, and Bartov's theory of ideology is unsupported. Four of the five writers were strongly motivated by the primary group, while only two mentioned ideology in a positive way. Even if the writers were attempting

to hide Nazi sympathies, there is no question that the primary group was by far the most important motivating factor for German ground troops. The only man not to mention it, Von Luck, was also the highest ranking. He was a captain when the war started and a colonel when it ended. He had less group interaction than the others, since he was functioning more as a leader than common soldier.

Ideology is mentioned a total of four times, twice each by Sajer and Knappe. None of those references mention Nazism. There is nothing to indicate that political officers or Nazi indoctrination were of any benefit to any of these men. Sajer makes an interesting comment concerning the behavior of the common soldier: "One of the biggest German mistakes was to treat German soldiers even worse than the prisoners, instead of allowing us to rape and steal--crimes which we were condemned for in the end anyway" (166). Bartov does indeed accuse the Germans of raping and stealing, and Sajer seems to agree that these actions would have improved German morale. Of course, it is absurd to assume that just because Sajer never witnessed these crimes that they never happened, and there is ample evidence that such crimes did indeed occur (Humble, 1975: 108; Bartov, 1991a: 53).

**Ernst Kern, *War Diary 1941-45.*** Kern enlisted in the German army upon his graduation from high school in 1941. He volunteered for the mountain infantry, and was assigned to the First Mountain Division. Kern says he volunteered for two reasons, to avoid being drafted by the Waffen-SS, and to "avoid being drafted into the Arbeitsdienst, a mandatory, premilitary, politically oriented labor organization with a deservedly bad reputation" (vii). He spent the entire war on the Eastern Front, mainly in the southern

sectors, including the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Hungary and Romania. As the war went on, Kern became increasingly concerned with the morality of the war. He was also made privy to various acts of sabotage and murder committed by Germans against other Germans in an attempt to hinder the war effort and bring about Hitler's downfall. Kern was unsure what to do, and in 1943 he volunteered for the Medical Corps. In essence he sought to become a conscientious objector and spend the rest of the war treating wounds rather than causing them (100-101). In November, 1944 Kern was wounded and sent home. He was accepted to medical school, and was a student when the Americans occupied his hometown in April, 1945.

Kern is the only German author in this study who admits to seeing any atrocities committed against the Jews. He and his unit know that the SS have recently executed 1,900 Jews. Kern watches as an SS officer kills several Jews by shooting them in the back of the neck. The soldiers were ordered to stay away and seldom spoke about it (6). Kern never comments on the morality of these executions, only expressing his relief that he is not involved.

The primary motivational factor for Kern was the primary group. In fact, there are only three other factors mentioned at all in his book, and each one appears once. "The fighting spirit and morale of any unit was based on the bonding of the men who knew each other well, could rely on each other, and especially knew that one would never be left behind wounded. Compared to this, the quality of the officers was much less significant, as was clearly the case in our unit" (132).

Kern usually has poor leaders in his units, including a cowardly lieutenant whom he later wishes he and his men had shot (124). Group leadership is usually not a positive motivational factor for Kern, though he does mention one corporal whom he respects (30). Additionally, only propaganda (125) and a fear of the Russians (19) are mentioned as motivational factors.

**Siegfried Knappe, *Soldat.*** Knappe began the war as a lieutenant in the 24th Artillery Regiment and ended the war as a major on the German General Staff. He fought in Poland and France, and spent the last years of the war on the Eastern Front, finally surrendering to the Russians during the fall of Berlin. He spent five years as a POW in Russia before returning to Germany.

Even though Knappe thinks parts of the war are justified, such as the invasion of France, he expresses reservations about the war as early as the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, which he considers unjustified (141). He never wavers in his obedience to orders and makes it clear that duty was the primary motivating factor for him. As he ponders what went wrong for Germany, he concludes, "As these things went through my mind, I began to realize that I should have thought them through at the time of their occurrence - but I was a soldier, and a soldier does not question the orders of his superiors" (339). In fact, he considers his participation in the war to have been "noble" (375).

The primary group is also a strong motivational factor for Knappe. He states that combat turns men into brothers who will willingly die for each other. This brotherhood, he claims, is "stronger than flag or country" (220). Further, Knappe says that in combat

only fellow soldiers seem real. Men cannot remember loved ones from home, so the men of the unit become the only loved ones (228). These powerful sentiments are not repeated elsewhere in the book, but still indicate that the primary group was a major motivational factor for Knappe.

Knappe considers Communism "repulsive" and believes that the Russian people will be better off without it (202). Early experiences confirm this opinion. For instance, the Germans are applauded by Polish civilians after Germany invades Soviet-occupied Poland. The civilians are happy to see the Germans because the Russians did not allow them to hold church services (206).

Near the end of the war, as the Russians are driving into Germany, Knappe explains that even though the Germans know the war is lost, they continue fighting to keep the Russians out of Germany. The Germans hope that the Western Allies will occupy most of Germany. Germans fear the Russians because they know the Russians want revenge and are committing atrocities against German civilians (294, 305). "When we recaptured a city or town from the Russians, we usually discovered that wanton murder and rape had been the norm while they had been there" (309).

There is nothing in Knappe's book to suggest that Nazi ideology was a contributing factor to the Germans' continuing will to fight. Any tenacity can be attributed to a fear of what the Russians would do to anyone they captured, as well as a deeply-ingrained sense of duty. Knappe took great pride in being a soldier, and accepted no blame for atrocities committed in concentration camps, since he claims he knew nothing about them (365-366).

**Helmut Pabst, *The Outermost Frontier.*** Pabst's book is unique in that he is the only author studied who died during the war. He was a signals NCO in an artillery unit attached to Army Group Centre on the Eastern Front. In 1943 Pabst was promoted to lieutenant and was killed in the fall of 1943.

Although he had also fought in France, this book only deals with Pabst's time on the Eastern Front. The book is a compilation of letters to friends and family that Pabst wrote while on the Eastern Front, so any analysis must be tempered by the fact that censors would have read all these letters. Obviously, under such circumstances, Pabst would not make any overtly negative comments about the war or his leaders.

Once again, the primary group is the primary motivational factor. In fact, Pabst's group even has a nickname. A friend calls this primary group "the mob," and the members of the mob agree that being together makes everything else bearable (99). Pabst says that the war "has shown us the values which count when everything else breaks down: humanity, the brotherhood of suffering, comradeship between men" (155).

Pabst is also the only author who actually seems to have enjoyed being on the Russian Front. Even though he died in 1943, and even though he had to write with the censors in mind, Pabst paints the most glowing picture of the Russian Front of any of the German writers. As a signals NCO, Pabst spent most of the Russian winters in dugouts, unlike the infantry who were usually in open trenches. Still, he experienced the bitter winters, the lice infestations, and the lack of good food, and maintained a cheerful attitude. Perhaps this was an intentional deception, but it seems sincere, at least in the English translation.

Personal gratification was a major motivational factor also. Pabst felt closer to his father because they could now share wartime experiences. "Nothing binds us together more closely than having to endure the same privations and hardships and dangers, and, indeed, we've been literally in the same places" (33). On another occasion, after shooting artillery at some Russian wagons, Pabst writes, "It was fun, Father. It heartened us, and I thought of your stories of Beresina. Didn't you do that sort of thing yourselves?" (100). Finally, shortly before his death, Pabst states, "It fills me with happiness to feel that I have the power to release so many forces for good that men come to me with confidence. . . Isn't it worth it to live a life like this? My days are so full that they seem to run into each other" (169).

Pabst also thought leadership was essential (56, 80, 168). He never spoke negatively about any of his superiors (not surprising, considering the censors) and does mention a Major Christoph, for whom all the men have "respect, love, and devotion" (126).

Pabst enjoyed the Russian peasants, and was certainly not fighting due to any hatred towards Russians. Religion was not a factor for him (67), but he notes that it is important for others (103). Pabst adopts a fatalistic attitude and looks at war as a means of achieving deeper personal understanding of himself (173).

**Guy Sajer, *The Forgotten Soldier.*** Guy Sajer was only half German; his father was French. He chose to enlist in the German Army, and after basic training he was assigned to a transportation unit on the Eastern Front. In the Spring of 1943 he volunteered to join the elite Gross Deutschland division. He remained with this division, fighting on the Eastern Front, until just before the war ended. He was then ordered to the Western Front,

where he was soon captured by the English. Because he was half French, he was released from prison shortly after the war ended.

Sajer seems to have had the roughest time of any of the German authors. Starvation was a major concern, and in the last year of the war, Sajer and his comrades were simply trying to get enough food to survive (384, 388). They were willing to massacre the populations of villages just to get food (384). Even with these drastic measures, many men died of starvation.

Sajer is the only German ground troop to mention vindictiveness, and he mentions it many times (56, 95, 103, 220, 230, 234, 252, 374). This quest for vengeance was due to many things: the men lost at Stalingrad (56), the loss of friends (95), or even one's own death yet to come (220). Sajer also had a hatred for the Russians based on the many reported atrocities they had committed, as well as the treachery of the Partisans (119, 186, 380). At the end of the war, when surrender would have been the obvious course of action, the Germans kept fighting out of fear of the Russians (415, 416, 421).

The major motivational factor for Sajer was also the primary group. Although he and his friends had volunteered for a combat unit, Sajer notes, "I cannot regret having belonged to a combat unit. We discovered a sense of comradeship which I have never found again, inexplicable and steady, through thick and thin" (113). In fact, the only reason that Sajer volunteered for a combat unit was that his best friend was chosen for combat, and Sajer wanted to stay with him. Sajer states that the primary group gave him confidence in combat (178), and his ties to his group were so strong that even when he is deprived of a much deserved leave, he doesn't really mind (311).

Religion offered no comfort to Sajer (94, 423). Coercion was a factor, as Sajer witnessed executions and severe punishments inflicted for relatively minor offenses (167,275, 390). Germans who stole any food from supply trucks, for instance, would be shot. Sajer had an excellent captain who was also a source of motivation (218, 320, 375, 311). Ideology was a small factor, but it was more of a desire to be a good German soldier rather than a devotion to Nazi ideology (291, 324). Finally, a sense of duty was also a factor (221, 399, 414).

**Hans Von Luck, *Panzer Commander.*** Von Luck was unique in this study in several respects. First, as already mentioned, he was the highest ranking of the German ground troops studied. Second, he was the only one who did not mention the primary group as a motivational factor. Finally, he was the only one to serve under Rommel, one of the most popular German leaders. Von Luck served with Rommel both in France and North Africa. Not surprisingly, group leadership was a prime motivational factor for Von Luck. On five occasions Von Luck described how loyal he and his men were to Rommel, and how they would fight for him because of their loyalty (38, 41, 45, 120, 143). "We believed in him, trusted him, and went along with him" (41).

As seems typical for the Germans, their attitudes towards the enemy depended on which enemy was being considered. Von Luck has no hatred for the British. In fact, when fighting in North Africa, Von Luck and the British (the Royal Dragoons) establish many unusual truces and rules for combat. For instance, fighting would cease each evening at 1700, and at 1705 both sides would exchange information about prisoners taken that day. Towards the end of the North Africa campaign, Von Luck receives a

letter from the commander of the Royal Dragoons, which reads in part, "I should like to thank you and all your people, in the name of my officers and men, for the fair play with which we have fought against each other on both sides" (128). Conversely, Von Luck is well aware of the atrocities being committed by the Russians against German civilians (215, 240, 254).

Von Luck also stresses the importance of duty. In December of 1944, he says, "We didn't know how things would go, but we understood nevertheless that the war was no longer to be won. We only knew that we had to do our duty" (224). This sense of duty is important, because Von Luck believes the war is senseless (31,40). The only reason he really has for continued participation is this sense of duty.

Von Luck also witnesses the severe coercion that occurred on the Eastern Front near the end of the war. Von Luck sends one of his best sergeants to the rear area to bring some vehicles up to the front line. This sergeant is found by a judge advocate, who has him shot because he does not have written orders to be away from the front lines (249).

Von Luck offers some insights as to why the Wehrmacht never confronted National Socialism. He maintains that the army was required by the Treaty of Versailles to be nonpolitical. Hitler's initial successes also inspired loyalty. Many of the early recruits came from the Hitler Youth, and the members were Nazis or at least sympathetic to the Nazi cause. Most importantly, the oath of allegiance was very important to the officer corps, and Hitler knew this and exploited it (22).

**Conclusions.** Table 8 shows the results of the qualitative analysis, while Figures 10, 11, and 12 show the results of the quantitative analysis. In the qualitative assessment, the

primary group was a major motivational factor for four of the five German ground troops. Only von Luck did not mention it, and speculations as to why this is so were given in the overview to this section. Duty/honor/country was a major factor for two authors, while personal gratification, vindictiveness, and group leadership were each major factors for one man. As already mentioned, von Luck's emphasis on group leadership refers to his service under Erwin Rommel. The primary group rated as a significant factor for the German ground troops as a group because it was a major factor for at least three men.

Figures 10-12 deal with the quantitative analysis. In Figure 10 the total number of references for each factor are shown. In Figure 11 these totals are converted into percentages for each individual, and in Figure 12 the group percentages are shown. Shils and Janowitz's findings concerning the importance of the primary group are reinforced by this study. The primary group scored 25% on the group ratings, clearly the most influential motivational factor for the German ground troops. Duty/honor/country scored 17%, while attitudes towards the enemy (in this case, the Russians) scored 16%. Bartov's theories about the importance of ideology are not supported by this study, as ideology scored only 4%. This portion of the study found one factor (primary group) to be significant for the German flyer group, since it scored over 20%.

TABLE 8

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT: GERMAN GROUND TROOPS

| | Kern | Knappe | Pabst | Sajer | von Luck |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Group | ** | ** | ** | ** | 0 |
| Ideology | 0 | * | 0 | * | 0 |
| Attitudes Towards the Enemy | * | * | 0 | * | * |
| Group Leadership | N | 0 | * | * | ** |
| National Leadership | 0 | N | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Personal Gratification | 0 | * | ** | 0 | 0 |
| Propaganda | * | N | 0 | 0 | N |
| Religion | 0 | 0 | * | N | 0 |
| Vindictiveness | 0 | 0 | 0 | ** | 0 |
| End War and Go Home | 0 | 0 | 0 | * | * |
| Coercion | 0 | 0 | * | * | * |
| Duty-Honor-Country | 0 | ** | * | * | ** |

NOTE: "Attitudes Towards the Enemy" refers only to the Russians

** Major Factor

* Minor Factor

0 No Factor

N Negative Factor




**Figure 10 German Ground Troops (Individual Totals)**




**Figure 11 German Ground Troops (Individual Percentages)**




**Figure 12 German Ground Troops (Group Percentages)**

# VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

## Overview

In this chapter the scores for the four groups are compared. Furthermore, the scores of four more groups (Germans, Americans, flyers, and ground troops) are calculated. This calculation is done by totaling all the references to a particular factor within a group, and dividing this number by the total number of references to all factors within that same group. Four groups comparisons are made, German and American flyers, German and American ground troops, Germans and Americans, and flyers and ground troops. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for further research are presented.

## American and German Flyers

The information presented in Figure 13 shows a comparison of the group scores for American and German flyers. Personal gratification and duty/honor/country were the two most important motivational factors for both the American and German flyers. Personal gratification was primary for the Americans with a score of 52%, while duty/honor/ country was the most important for the Germans, with a score of 28%. Duty/honor/ country was second for the Americans at 12%, while attitude toward the enemy was second for the Germans with a score of 14%.

Although not rated in the same order, personal gratification, duty/honor/country and attitude towards the enemy were in the top three scores for both groups. With the exception of Knoke and Rudel, who were more sympathetic to the Nazi cause, there was a strong similarity between the German and American flyers. However, there were some

notable differences. Ideology, national leadership and propaganda were significant factors for some Germans, while they were not factors for any Americans. Americans rated the primary group more highly than the Germans, which was unexpected. Above all else, however, is the feeling that all of these men loved to fly and were determined to do their duty as soldiers, while trusting their leaders to make the correct philosophical and political decisions. Despite the differences between Nazism and democracy, the motivational factors for these men were similar.




**Figure 13 Comparison of American and German Flyers**

**American and German Ground Troops**

Figure 14 shows a comparison of the scores of American and German ground troops. The primary group was rated highest by the Germans (25%), followed by duty/honor/country second (17%), and attitudes towards the enemy third (16%). The Americans rated duty/honor country highest (19%), and rated religion, attitude towards the enemy, and primary group as tied for second (16%). National leadership was the only factor never mentioned by any of the ground troops, while propaganda and the desire to end the war and go home were mentioned only by the Germans.

As with the flyers, three factors were the highest rated for both groups, though not in the same order. Duty/honor/country, primary group, and attitude towards the enemy were the highest factors for both groups. These findings suggest that there was little difference between the motivations for German and American ground troops, despite the political systems of their countries. For ground troops in combat, the people around them became very important, and group unity could be a powerful motivating factor. A sense of duty or honor, and a love for one's country were also important. Finally, a hatred for or fear of the enemy was a major motivating factor. These findings also suggest that political indoctrination and propaganda were of little value, unless they reinforced a sense of duty to one's country. No German ground troop mentioned Nazism as a motivating factor, and no American mentioned democracy.




**Figure 14 Comparison of American and German Ground Troops**

**Ground Troops and Flyers**

In this section, the scores for American and German ground troops were combined and compared with the combined scores of American and German flyers. The results are shown in Figure 15. Some major differences were found when comparing these two groups. Flyers were most strongly motivated by personal gratification (almost always a love for flying) which scored 29%, while ground troops were most strongly motivated by the primary group, which scored 23%. However, we find that personal gratification is of little importance to ground troops (only scoring 9%), while the primary group was of little importance to flyers (scoring 4%). The second most mentioned factor for both groups was duty/honor/country, and the third for both groups was attitude towards the enemy.

These findings suggest that flyers take pleasure from combat more than ground troops. At first this delight may seem unusual, because combat is not often considered enjoyable. However, even amidst the terrors of war, these flyers usually found combat exciting, even when it was terrifying. The flyers often remarked on the joys of flying, even when about to enter combat. Ground troops, on the other hand, found their friendships with other members of their units to be extremely important in getting through the trials of warfare. Often they would fight when the odds seemed hopeless, simply because they did not want to let their friends down.

There was almost no envy expressed by ground troops towards flyers. In fact, ground troops were usually far more envious of rear echelon support troops than they were of flyers. Conversely, flyers expressed no particular desire to be fighting on the ground.

This lack of envy is not unexpected, because all the flyers in this study volunteered for flying duty.




**Figure 15 Comparison of Ground Troops and Flyers**

**Americans and Germans**

The scores for this section were derived by combining all the American scores (flyers and ground troops) and comparing them to the combined German scores. The three most mentioned factors for the Americans were personal gratification (33%), duty/honor/ country (15%), and attitudes towards the enemy (13%). The three highest rated factors for the Germans were duty/honor/country (21%), primary group (17%), and attitudes towards the enemy (13%). None of the Americans mentioned national leadership or propaganda as a motivational factor. All of the factors were mentioned at least once by one of the Germans. Ideology and national leadership were of little importance overall to the Germans.




**Figure 16 Comparison of Americans and Germans**

## Conclusions

Four factors stood out, both in number of references and intensity of the descriptions, as being key in combat motivation. Personal gratification, duty/honor/ country, primary group, and attitude towards the enemy were the major factors that motivated the men in this study.

Shils and Janowitz's findings were largely confirmed in that the primary group was important in motivating the German ground troops, as well as the American ground troops. However, there was little to support their contention that most German soldiers had an intense devotion to Hitler. Ian Kershaw's assertion that an almost religious adoration of Hitler existed was not supported by any of the German works . Bartov's claims that ideology was a major motivational factor was also largely unsupported by this study. None of the Germans said they were fighting because of Nazism. There was a strong sense of nationalism, but it was focused only towards Germany, not towards any political ideology. Weaknesses in the *American Soldier* studies were also apparent, because neither the primary group nor personal gratification was analyzed in detail in that study. This study showed both to be vitally important.

No statistical claims can be made due to the small size of the study. It is not possible to ensure that these 20 authors were a truly representative sampling of their respective populations. Even though the men who wrote these books did not do so primarily to explain their motivation to fight, these motivations were usually discussed. The value of this study was in examining these written works, which often provide thoughtful and

detailed examinations of what motivated these men to fight. Their insights were arrived at over the period of time necessary to write personal accounts, rather than the short period of time necessary to fill out a questionnaire or participate in an interview. The fact that four factors did indeed stand out suggests that this study has validity and that further research should be conducted in this vein. Similarities were found among the various groups studied, and these similarities have been discussed in previous sections. This study successfully identified one primary motivational factor for every group except the American ground troops (see Table 9). The fact that no primary factor was found in the American ground troop narratives could have been because Wilson did not discuss combat motivation. Despite the lack of a clear motivational factor for the American ground troops, content analysis of memoirs, autobiographies, and combat narratives may provide a new focus for the study of combat motivation.

TABLE 9

SIGNIFICANT MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS BY GROUP

| Group | Qualitative Study | Quantitative Study |
|---|---|---|
| American Flyers | Personal Gratification | Personal Gratification |
| German Flyers | Duty/Honor/Country | Duty/Honor/Country |
| American Ground Troops | None | None |
| German Ground Troops | Primary Group | Primary Group |

In six out of eight categories, a significant motivational factor was found. For all four groups, the qualitative and quantitative results were the same. This apparent success in identifying significant motivational factors indicates that further research into content analysis as a means of examining combat motivation is warranted.

**Recommendations**

This research strongly indicates that content analysis can be used to determine a significant motivational factor within a specific group of combatants. Further research expanding the size of the sample is called for. Obviously with the current sample size, aberrations are a real possibility, as was pointed out with coercion in the German flyer group. However, the fact that four main factors were discovered is encouraging.

Problems will be faced by anyone wishing to expand on this research. Autobiographical accounts in English written by Germans who fought in WWII are not numerous. There are several by German generals and field marshals, but these men seldom if ever fought on the front lines, so their books have a different focus. Finding appropriate books may be difficult. Accounts by American participants should not be difficult to find. Appendix A contains a bibliography of narratives that could be used to expand this study.

Further research should also be conducted to determine if any other research of this type has been or is being conducted. Because the methodology was not based on any previous studies, further research could refine the methodology, possibly improving techniques to identify references to combat motivation in literature.

*Appendix A: Combat Motivational Factors*

Primary Group - (Henderson, 1985: 6, 10, 14, 18-19, 47, 63, 165; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 280-292).

Ideology - (Henderson, 1985: 26, 56, 57, 60, 75-77; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 284, 303).

Attitude Toward the Enemy - (Henderson, 1985: 63; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 292).

Group Leadership - (Henderson, 1985: 9, 11, 15, 29, 50, 63, 78, 108; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 297-300).

National Leadership - (Henderson, 1985: 77, 99; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 304-306).

Personal Gratification - (Henderson, 1985: 22, 42, 50, 57, 58, 164; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 298).

Propaganda - (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 308-310).

Religion - (Henderson, 1985: 26, 77, 82, 84, 92, 94).

Vindictiveness - (Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and others, 1949:167).

Desire to End the War and Go Home - (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 284).

Coercion - (Henderson, 1985: 11, 16, 25; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: , 290-291, 295, 307-308).

Duty/Honor/Country - (Henderson, 1985: 17, 23, 79; Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 292-294).

*Appendix B: Bibliography for Expanded Research*

This is not meant to be an exhaustive bibliography. Rather, it is a list of books discovered during the course of this research. These books would have been appropriate for this study, but are by no means the only ones useful for further research. They are provided merely as a starting point for anyone wishing to continue this research.

**American Flyers**


Blackburn, Tom. *The Jolly Rogers.* New York: Pocket Books, 1989

Boyington, Gregory. *Baa Baa Black Sheep.* New York: Bantam Books, 1977.

Buell, Harold. *Dauntless Helldivers.* New York: Dell, 1992.

Ciardi, John. *Saipan: The War Diary of John Ciardi.* Fayetteville AR: The University of Arkansas Press, 1988.

Stiles, Bert. *Serenade to the Big Bird.* New York: Norton, 1952.


**German Flyers**


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Galland, Adolf. *The First and the Last.* New York: Ballantine Books, 1963.

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**American Ground Troops**


Murphy, Audie. *To Hell and Back.* New York: Bantam Books, 1983.

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Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982.

Kennett, Lee. *G.I. The American Soldier in World War II.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987.

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Klinkowitz, Jerome. *Their Finest Hours.* Ames IA: Iowa State University Press, 1989.

Knappe, Siegfried. *Soldat.* New York: Dell Publishing, 1993.

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*Vita*

Capt Traversa was born on 28 February 1962 in Rome, New York. He graduated from Brandon High School in 1980 and entered undergraduate studies at Clearwater Christian College in Clearwater, Florida. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in English Education in May 1984. He received his commission on 4 May 1989 upon graduation from Officer Training School. He has had two assignments as a logistics plans officer at Mountain Home AFB and Grand Forks AFB. In May of 1994 he entered the School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Force Institute of Technology.

Permanent Address 217 Troy Drive
Dayton, TN 37321

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**13. ABSTRACT** *(Maximum 200 words)*

To determine whether content analysis could be used to successfully identify major combat motivational factors for individuals, this research focused on soldiers who fought in World War II. Combat narratives written by men who fought in World War II were examined. Ten German and ten American works were examined. Of these, five of each were the works of flyers and the other five were the works of ground troops. The following factors were examined: "primary group" influence, ideology, attitudes toward the enemy, group leadership, national leadership, personal gratification, propaganda, religion, vindictiveness, desire to end the war and go home, coercion, and duty/honor/country. References to these motivational factors were tallied, and these results converted into percentages for each group. A qualitative judgment was also made as to the most important factor for each individual. Personal gratification was the primary motivational factor for the American flyers, while duty/honor/country was the most important for the German flyers and American ground troops. The primary factor for the German ground troops was the primary group. The methodology employed successfully identified common combat motivational factors within each group, yet found different factors when contrasting different groups. Further research into this methodology is recommended.

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