

A LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS: LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES
LONGSTREET DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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This thesis is a chronological analysis of Longstreet during the thirteen major campaigns in which he participated: First Manassas, Williamsburg, Seven Pines, the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Suffolk, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Knoxville, the Wilderness, and Petersburg. The primary thesis question is: Was Longstreet's leadership during the war satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100? The nine leadership competencies are the result of a 1976 study group consisting of Army leaders ranking from Corporal to General. The nine competencies are: supervision, soldier/team development, technical and tactical proficiency, use of available systems, professional ethics, planning, decision making, teaching and counseling, and communications. After a discussion of each campaign an analysis of Longstreet's leadership is conducted using the leadership competencies as analytical criteria. A leadership profile of Longstreet evolves as he gains experience during the war and is assigned to positions of increased responsibility. The conclusion of this thesis is that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory during the war when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies. Over the course of the thirteen campaigns mentioned above, Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory or better in a clear majority of the nine leadership competencies. The purpose of this study is to add to the Longstreet debate in a unique way. Longstreet is analyzed using nine doctrinally accepted leadership competencies to provide a constant measurement tool throughout the thesis. This should eliminate some of the emotion from the Longstreet debate.

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
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
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ABSTRACT

A LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS: LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Major Hampton E. Hite, U.S. Army, 122 pages.

This thesis is a chronological analysis of Longstreet during the thirteen major campaigns in which he participated: First Manassas, Williamsburg, Seven Pines, the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Suffolk, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Knoxville, the Wilderness, and Petersburg. The primary thesis question is: Was Longstreet's leadership during the war satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100, Military Leadership?

The nine leadership competencies are the result of a 1976 study group consisting of army leaders ranking from Corporal to General. The nine competencies are: supervision, soldier/ team development, technical and tactical proficiency, use of available systems, professional ethics, planning, decision making, teaching and counseling, and communications.

After a discussion of each campaign an analysis of Longstreet's leadership is conducted using the leadership competencies as analytical criteria. A leadership profile of Longstreet evolves as he gains experience during the war and is assigned to positions of increased responsibility.

The conclusion of this thesis is that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory during the war when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies. Over the course of the thirteen campaigns mentioned above, Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory or better in a clear majority of the nine leadership competencies.

The purpose of this study is to add to the Longstreet debate in a unique way. Longstreet is analyzed using nine doctrinally accepted leadership competencies to provide a constant measurement tool throughout the thesis. This should eliminate some of the emotion from the Longstreet debate.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

James Longstreet is one of the most controversial leaders of the American Civil War. Some historians believe he was one of the best Confederate leaders of the war, while others find considerable fault with his leadership. Differing assessments by two of the war's most noted historians, Douglas S. Freeman and Bruce Catton, illustrate this point. When writing of Chickamauga, Catton says, "Bragg received one enormous asset--James Longstreet in person had arrived on the scene."¹ On the other hand, Freeman writes that Longstreet was "beguiled by circumstances into thinking himself a strategist . . . [and was] mistaken concerning his aptitudes."² Longstreet biographers are also divided concerning his abilities. Longstreet's first biographers, H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad, write that Longstreet "was entirely too confident [and] too reluctant to learn . . . he was not a great commander, not much more really than an average corps general."³ However, Longstreet's most recent biographer, Jeffry D. Wert, writes, "Longstreet, not Jackson, was the finest corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia."⁴

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the scholarly debate concerning Longstreet by critically analyzing his performance during the war using current United States Army leadership doctrine, specifically the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100, Military

Leadership. The primary thesis question is: Was Lieutenant General James Longstreet's leadership during the American Civil War satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100?

The nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100 are the result of a 1976 study group consisting of Army leaders ranking from corporal to general. This study group identified nine competencies that Army leaders must have to be effective. The study group recognized that the need to exhibit these competencies depends on the leaders' position in the unit.⁵ In accordance with this point, some competencies will receive greater attention and analysis based on Longstreet's position in a given organization.

FM 22-100 defines the nine competencies as follows:

Communications. The ability to understand and think through a problem and translate information in a clear, concise, measured fashion.

Decision Making. This refers to the skills needed to make choices and solve problems. A leader must make quality decisions that soldiers accept and execute quickly and allow decisions to be made at the lowest organizational level possible. For this thesis, decision making also includes the strategic and operational decision making normally associated with high ranking officers.

Planning: Planning involves forecasting, setting goals and objectives, developing strategies, establishing priorities, delegating, sequencing, organizing, and standardizing procedures. Planning is intended to support a course of action so that an organization can accomplish its mission.

Professional Ethics: This includes loyalty to the nation, the army, and the unit; duty; selfless service; and integrity. A leader must use an informed, rational decision making process to reason through and resolve ethical dilemmas and then teach subordinates to do the same.⁶ For this thesis, the concept of loyalty also includes loyalty to the senior commander's concepts and plans.

Soldier Team Development. A leader must create strong bonds in the unit so that it functions as a team. A leader must take care of soldiers to build confidence to face the hardships and sacrifices of combat. An effective unit is built on bonds of mutual trust, respect, and confidence.

Supervision. Directing, evaluating, and planning the efforts of subordinates in order to accomplish the mission, to include the efficient use of material, equipment, and operational procedures.

Teaching and Counseling. This is defined as improving performance by overcoming problems, increasing knowledge, and gaining new perspectives and skills. Personal counseling should adopt a problem solving, rather than an advising, approach. Performance counseling focuses on a soldier's behavior as it relates to duty performance.

Technical and Tactical Proficiency. A leader must know his/her job. A leader must be able to train soldiers, maintain and employ equipment, and provide combat power to help win battles. It includes an understanding of warfighting doctrine to discern the commander's intent to help win battles by knowing the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available.

Use of Available Systems: A leader must be familiar with techniques, methods, and systems to give the organization the edge. A leader must know and use every available technique that will benefit the unit.

This thesis analyzes Longstreet's leadership from July 1861 to April 1865, using the nine competencies mentioned above. Chapters two, three, and four chronologically examine Longstreet's Civil War career as a Brigade, Division, and Corps Commander, respectively. After major campaigns an analysis is done using the nine competencies so that a leadership picture of Longstreet emerges as he gains more experience and is assigned to positions of increased responsibility. Chapter Five, Conclusion, summarizes the findings of Chapters Two through Four to provide a leadership profile that answers the primary and two supporting research questions, and supports the conclusions of the thesis. As Chapter Five is a summation of Chapters Two through Four, a comprehensive analysis will be conducted in Chapter Five, and some research from earlier chapters is revisited as a result of this process.

The position of this thesis is that Longstreet's overall leadership performance during the Civil War was satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies. This conclusion was reached using the nine leadership competencies in an analysis of Longstreet during the thirteen campaigns in which he participated during the war. The conclusions, which will be summarized and discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, are that Longstreet was satisfactory in soldier/team development, supervision, teaching and counseling, use of available systems, planning, decision making, and communications. Rounding out the nine competencies, Longstreet was

found to be above satisfactory in technical/tactical proficiency and unsatisfactory in professional ethics. On balance, Longstreet was a satisfactory leader when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100. In a clear majority of leadership competencies Longstreet's leadership performance was satisfactory or better.

The conclusions mentioned above are also supportable when analyzed from the standpoint of the thirteen individual campaigns in which Longstreet participated. In terms of the thirteen individual campaigns, it was determined that Longstreet's performance was above satisfactory at First Manassas, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, the Wilderness, and Petersburg. His performance was satisfactory at Williamsburg, the Seven Days, Antietam, independent command in Virginia (Suffolk), Chickamauga, and independent command in Tennessee (Knoxville). His performance was unsatisfactory at Seven Pines and Gettysburg. The inclusion of the analysis of individual campaigns is intended as additional supporting data for the research conclusion that Longstreet's performance was satisfactory in the context of the nine leadership competencies. As was the case with the leadership competencies, in a clear majority of campaigns Longstreet's leadership was also satisfactory or better when analyzed for each individual campaign.

The supporting data for the conclusions mentioned on page 4 are contained in Chapters Two through Four. The conclusions are expanded upon with a final analysis and summary contained in Chapter Five.

This thesis contains two supporting research questions which are answered in Chapter Five. The supporting research questions are:

1. In the context of the nine leadership competencies, was Longstreet's leadership satisfactory in terms of both offensive and defensive tactics and strategy? The historical perception of Longstreet is that he was a strong defensive tactician and strategist, but a weak offensive tactician and strategist. Some historians support the view that Longstreet disliked offensive battle and avoided it at times to the detriment of his command. This thesis will explore that perception to determine its validity.

2. In the context of the nine leadership competencies, was Longstreet's leadership satisfactory at each level of command to which he was assigned? A second historical perception of Longstreet is that he was a weak strategist and a weak independent commander. Some historians support the view that he was a satisfactory tactical commander, but that due to the shortage of experienced leaders in the Confederacy he was promoted and assigned to positions of responsibility beyond his capacity to successfully perform. This thesis will explore that perception to determine its validity.

Although not analyzed as a supporting research question, this thesis also examines some of the prominent issues that are controversial about Longstreet. A difference exists between this analysis of the historical controversy concerning Longstreet and the primary research question concerning his overall performance in the context of the nine leadership competencies. In Chapter Five, particular emphasis is placed on the leadership competency of professional ethics to address the historical controversy about Longstreet.

The limitation of this study is the subjective nature of the thesis analysis and conclusions. This author's analysis and

interpretation of the historical record presented in this thesis is based on individual research, informed opinion, and professional experience. The attempt here is to provide a standard measurement (the nine leadership competencies) with which to frame a reasoned conclusion based on research concerning Longstreet's leadership performance during the war.

There are three delimitations in this study. First, it will not provide a biography of Longstreet. This study will only analyze him using the nine leadership competencies during the American Civil War from July 1861 to April 1865 and will focus entirely on the thirteen campaigns in which he participated.

The second delimitation of this study is that there is no complete analysis of each campaign, only an analysis of Longstreet's role in the campaigns. Operations, decisions, and analysis of results of campaigns will only be discussed in relation to Longstreet to provide an analysis of him, not other leaders. Obviously, background information on campaigns will be necessary to explain events and results of Longstreet's actions and decisions, but only for that purpose.

The third delimitation of this study is that not all competencies will be analyzed for each campaign, only select competencies based on the available research. Additionally, some competencies are not applicable due to Longstreet's position and rank during particular campaigns. However, each competency will be analyzed several times throughout the thesis.

The importance of this study is twofold. First, it is recognized that leadership is one of the most important dynamics on the battlefield. The Army's cornerstone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5,

Operations, states that leadership is the most important combat multiplier.⁷ Since winning on the battlefield is the Army's most important mission, it is necessary to continue to add to the body of literature on leadership and add to the professional knowledge of leaders.

Second, this thesis will contribute to the Longstreet debate in a unique way. By analyzing him in the context of current United States Army leadership doctrine, this thesis will provide a perspective based on the nine doctrinally accepted leadership competencies. These competencies are timeless to professional armies, and provide a valid, sound measurement of leadership decisions and actions. While the final results of the analysis are subjective, the measurement categories (the nine leadership competencies) remain constant throughout the thesis resulting in an objective research organization.

This thesis contains four assumptions:

1. The nine leadership competencies of the current edition of FM 22-100 are valid measurements to use to evaluate the leadership of Longstreet, who served as a Commanding General at brigade, division, corps, and independent command levels.

2. The historical record of Longstreet's leadership during the Civil War contains an adequate data base to reduce the scope of the research and still successfully utilize the nine leadership competencies in a critical evaluation exercise.

3. The lack of sufficient research data to successfully rate each leadership competency at each campaign will not hinder the attempt to answer the research question. Nine competencies times thirteen campaigns would result in 117 total ratings, and it is the position here

that level of research is not needed to successfully address the research question. Instead, 101 total ratings are provided in this thesis to address the research question.

4. A greater analysis of certain competencies than others throughout the thesis is a necessary outcome of the research process. As Longstreet is promoted and assumes positions of increased responsibility, more research data is available in certain competencies than others. For example, as a corps commander the leadership competency of teaching and counselling does not contain as much material for analysis as planning or decision making would at corps level.

In summary, the purpose of this research is to critically analyze the leadership performance of James Longstreet during the American Civil War, in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100. This thesis will provide a different perspective with which to evaluate his generalship during the war--a perspective based on doctrinally accepted leadership criteria.

CHAPTER TWO

BRIGADE COMMAND: FIRST MANASSAS

James Longstreet, a graduate of West Point's class of 1842, served with distinction as an infantry officer in the Mexican War. After the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, he resigned his commission to join the Confederate Army, assuming he would be assigned to the paymaster department as this was his most recent assignment and current specialty in the Federal Army. However, the Confederacy needed commanders, particularly West Point officers with combat experience. Instead of assignment as a paymaster, Longstreet was given a Brigadier General's commission and command of the Fourth Brigade in General P. G. T. Beauregard's command at Manassas, Virginia.¹

On July 2nd, 1861, forty year old James Longstreet stepped off the train at Manassas Station and into legend. In sixteen days, his Brigade would fire the first Confederate shots in one of the first battles of the war, along a small river called Bull Run. During the next four years he would lead Confederate Divisions and Corps on some of the greatest battlefields in history.

Longstreet was described by one of his staff officers as a superb soldier, strong and active, with exceptional endurance. He was popular with his soldiers and enjoyed their comraderie when occasion and duty allowed. He played poker with his fellow officers and was known to have an occasional drink, although it never "overwhelmed" him. He

seemed to require almost no sleep, and he inspired confidence in the troops. He was also described by one of his staff officers as one of the kindest, best hearted men in the Army, although the staff officer believed Longstreet appeared unfriendly until one knew him better. It was also mentioned by a staff officer that Longstreet at times, "failed to conceal some anger," when he was displeased.²

First Manassas

After assuming command on July 2 Longstreet determined that his command was disjointed, as many of his soldiers were assigned to details apart from the brigade. He appealed for the return of his troops and began drill July 6, drilling three times a day for the next two days.³ On July 8, 1861, Longstreet's brigade was called forward to defend Blackburn's Ford along the Bull Run stream. The ford was a logical crossing point for a Union move from Centerville to Manassas. Beauregard initially wanted Longstreet to organize his 1400 men to defend from the north bank but changed his mind and moved Longstreet to the south bank. The south bank was a challenge to defend, as it lay inside a broad northward curve in the stream, allowing an attacker to strike from either the east or west flank, and the northern bank was fifteen feet higher than the southern bank.⁴

Longstreet placed pickets on both sides of the stream and scouts were sent far north of the stream to provide ample warning. His skirmishers were in a close line south of the stream with two regiments covering the creek crossing, the Seventeenth Virginia on the left, the First Virginia on the right. Four companies from the First Virginia were placed in reserve, and the Eleventh Virginia stretched west to

connect with Brigadier General M. L. Bonham's Brigade at Mitchell's Ford. Longstreet had four artillery pieces under his control; a two-gun section under Lieutenant John Garnett, positioned behind the infantry for support, and a two gun section from Major J. B. Walton's battery, positioned to bring flanking fire on the front of the position. Initially this section was north of the stream, with orders to cover the front and displace only when within range of enemy artillery.⁵

At approximately 1130 hours July 18, 3,000 Union soldiers attacked near Blackburn's Ford. Longstreet withdrew his troops from the north bank and formed a single heavy skirmish line along the south bank. He kept his main force in reserve as his front line skirmishers held off the initial attack, then moved his main force forward to meet the main assault. Musket fire opened along the entire line. Longstreet was among his men, rallying them amid a hail of gunfire. In a letter home, one Virginian said Longstreet "was a good and brave soldier and won the hearts of the men on all sides."⁶

Initially some of Longstreet's men broke and ran for the rear. Longstreet rode among them and rallied them back to the line of battle. He reorganized his defense and approximately one hour later a second Union attack commenced. Longstreet sent in his reserve companies to meet the attack and dispatched a staff officer to request support from the reserve brigade commanded by Brigadier General Jubal Early. Confederate fire repulsed this second advance and when Early's troops arrived Longstreet wanted to cross the stream and establish a defense on the north bank. As Longstreet was moving troops across the stream and assisting Early's deployment, a third Union assault commenced. Longstreet had men on both banks and in midstream. Early's Seventh

Virginia opened fire and wounded several Confederate soldiers. Longstreet hurried to the scene, but had to throw himself to the ground to avoid being hit. After the Seventh Virginia was under control, Early's final two regiments arrived. Longstreet reestablished his line and met the Union assault. The Union forces broke a third time. Longstreet called for a second attempt at a counterattack across the ford. The Union troops retired under fire. After a short pursuit, Longstreet's men withdrew to the southern side of the stream. Blackburn's Ford was secure, at a cost of 68 casualties. Union casualties were 83.⁷

In his report, Early stated that Longstreet "was actively engaged in the thickest of the fire . . . and contributed largely to the repulse of the enemy by his own personal exertions."⁸ Beauregard also had praise for Longstreet, stating in his report that "by his presence at the right place at the right moment among his men . . . he infused a confidence and spirit that contributed largely to the success of our arms that day."⁹

Beauregard then took the initiative and began to transition to the offense for an envelopment of the Union left, using his forces and those of Brigadier General Joseph Johnston whose brigades were hastening to him from the valley. Longstreet was assigned two additional regiments and selected to make the main attack. On July 21, he crossed to the north bank, with two regiments abreast in the main body, a regiment on each flank as security, and one regiment in reserve. Skirmishers were sent forward to cover the crossing, and two officers from the staff were sent well forward as scouts. Shortly after crossing the stream, intelligence reports confirmed Union forces were attacking

the Confederate left. The Confederate offensive was halted. Longstreet was ordered to return to the south side of the stream.¹⁰

As the firing increased on his left, Longstreet sent his scouts on a reconnaissance of the Union lines. They located Union artillery positions and the Union left flank. Longstreet requested and received approval to attack the batteries and the Union left. He commenced to cross the stream a second time and shortly after his brigade had closed on the north bank he learned the Union attack had broken and a Confederate counterattack was driving the enemy from the field. Longstreet received orders to cut off the retreat along the Warrenton Turnpike.¹¹

Moving through the woods toward Centerville, Longstreet met Bonham, who had orders identical to Longstreet. The brigades became mixed and since Bonham was senior to Longstreet, Fourth Brigade waited as Bonham took the lead. This delay allowed the Union forces to regain some command structure but the opportunity to continue the pursuit was still available. Just as Longstreet and Bonham were about to open fire with their artillery, Major W. H. C. Whiting of Johnston's staff arrived and ordered a halt to the pursuit and a return to the south side of Bull Run. Johnston was concerned about a Union envelopment through Union Mills and the feasibility of a pursuit in the dark with inexperienced troops. However, Longstreet saw an opportunity to inflict more damage on the demoralized Union forces to his front. He was about to countermand Johnston's order when Bonham sided with Whiting. Furious, Longstreet threw his hat to the ground and denounced the intelligence that the Union forces were reforming for a counterattack as "absurd." The opportunity was lost.¹²

After the battle Beauregard's command was on outpost duty and Longstreet was responsible for the area near Fairfax Courthouse. Longstreet recommended the appointment of a single commander and on August 27 he was given command of the outposts. By the end of August all positions were reconnoitered with routes to the rear plotted and marked in preparation for the possibility of a forced withdrawal.¹³

The picture emerging of Longstreet after First Manassas was a commander who had demonstrated strength in nearly every leadership competency. However, his lack of experience at brigade level command was evident in his tendency to pursue every opportunity without first analyzing the practicality of the opportunity. On balance, however, Longstreet's first experience serving in the grade of general officer was a success.

During the campaign Longstreet developed a staff, drilled his brigade, and prepared his men to meet the enemy attack, demonstrating strength in several leadership competencies. He recognized the importance of team building, drilling three times a day. Longstreet's supervision skills are also strong, as he supervised the occupation of the defensive position and was present on the field throughout the fighting. His brigade met and defeated three separate Union charges during the day, and Longstreet supervised the reorganization of his troops after each assault. On two occasions Longstreet's inexperienced men broke, but he personally rallied them back to the field. His supervision throughout the engagement directly influenced events on the field.

Longstreet's competence in the execution of brigade level tactics was also strong. He provided security well forward of his

position and on both flanks. The main effort was deployed on the enemy's most likely avenue of approach and he defended along the entire length of his sector, establishing contact with the units on both flanks. He also maintained a strong reserve, and used his scouts to advantage by sending them well forward to gather intelligence.

Noteworthy was Longstreet's use of available systems. The artillery supported the sector by bringing flanking fire on the enemy as well as supporting the infantry with close fires, with two guns forward to provide depth to the battlefield. One section was to displace "when in range of enemy artillery" but in reality it displaced before the enemy came within range and the section obviously had to be emplaced once south of the stream. This caused a delay that led to the section being unable to provide support during the first engagement.¹⁴ It should be remembered that this was Longstreet's first experience as a general officer and brigade commander. It was reasonable to expect a "learning curve" in technical/tactical efficiency and use of available systems as Longstreet adjusted to his new duty.

Longstreet's decision making was effective. During the initial attack he withdrew his skirmishers south of the stream to form one heavy skirmish line, thus reducing the possibility of fratricide, making his command and control easier, and massing his rifles in one area to maximize his firepower. He kept his main force in reserve and when he moved them forward it provided shock effect and depth to the battlefield, causing confusion and the ultimate break in the Union ranks. He held his reserve throughout the first engagement, committing this force only during the second assault which had an effect similar to

the first engagement in that Union soldiers continued to meet fresh Confederate troops, contributing to their repulse each time.¹⁵

Two of Longstreet's decisions are questionable, and these decisions can also be related to technical/tactical competence.

One questionable decision was the one Longstreet made to commit the army's reserve force, a decision that should have belonged to Beauregard. This commitment of the reserve could have proven unfortunate if the attack on Longstreet was only a feint or a supporting attack, and Longstreet had no way of knowing this, nor did Beauregard. As it turned out the decision was correct as Longstreet was in fact facing the main attack on July 17, but the large force available to the Union commander indicates this decision was attributable to good fortune more than any other factor.

A second questionable decision on Longstreet's part was to pursue the enemy after his brigade had repulsed the second Union attack. Longstreet simply had too many "moving parts" at this point in the battle. Early's eager men had been listening to the battle rage only a few hundred yards to their front when Longstreet called them forward. To initiate a stream crossing in pursuit of a fleeing enemy at the same time the excited reserves are rushing up behind the force was risky. There was no attempt made to establish routes to pass Early's brigade through Longstreet's as the plan appears to have been to have Early's brigade join Longstreet's to increase the latter's firepower during the pursuit. This decision had unfortunate consequences as Longstreet lost several men to fratricide and was almost a victim himself.¹⁶

Communication is another leadership dimension for analysis at First Manassas. Longstreet's communication skills appeared to be one of

the strongest dimensions he displayed during this campaign. He was able to effectively communicate his vision for the brigade to his staff and subordinate commanders in a short period of time. He communicated his plan for the defense of Blackburn's Ford effectively. His brigade was in place and ready to execute the mission. During the conduct of the battle he was particularly effective at command and control, as he coordinated and led his brigade during three separate attacks during the day. He moved his reserves into the battle without losing momentum and he was particularly effective at controlling Early's brigade when it opened fire on his brigade. A lack of strong communication skills amid the "fog of war" at that moment could have proven a disaster.

One of the supporting research questions of this thesis is whether or not the historical perception that Longstreet was primarily a defensive fighter is accurate. In his first engagement of the war it appears that was not the case. Longstreet's mission was to defend Blackburn's Ford which he did admirably, but at the first opportunity he attempted a move to the offensive by crossing the ford and pursuing the retreating Federals. As mentioned this was almost a disaster as the attempt was made at the same time that Early was arriving on the field.

Longstreet appeared almost reckless in his attempt to move to the offensive. He did not have a clear picture of the enemy force or what their intentions were, nor is there evidence he coordinated this move with the brigades on his flanks. He attempted this pursuit with Early's brigade close behind him, adding to the command and control problems he would have had with just his own brigade transferring to the offensive in the middle of a battle. The point to be made here is Longstreet, at this stage in the battle, appears aggressive and

offensive spirited. This trend would continued three days later. After the Federals had been repulsed on July 21, Longstreet was ready to attack when he was halted by a member of Johnston's staff and told to cease the pursuit and return to the south side of Bull Run.¹⁷

Longstreet's aggressive stance induced him to ignore the staff officer and continue the pursuit, with Longstreet stating he would take responsibility for disobeying the order. He only halted when told to by a ranking officer who was physically present, and Longstreet continued to protest and became visibly upset with the decision.

However, Longstreet's response to his being overruled with respect to the pursuit brings into question professional ethics. He appeared confident in his judgment and did not stop to analyze the reasons he was halted. His "temper tantrum" in his first engagement as a commander does not reflect favorably on him and is evidence that he sulks when his views are not adopted. This leadership competency (professional ethics) appeared to need improvement in this early stage of the war.

CHAPTER THREE

DIVISION COMMAND: WILLIAMSBURG TO SHARPSBURG

After Beauregard was reassigned to the Army of Tennessee, Johnston reorganized his command by adding divisions to provide command and control to the brigades. Longstreet was promoted to Major General and given command of the Third Division, which consisted of four brigades and a cavalry regiment. During the winter months, Longstreet's division was the only one to conduct drills and he met often with his brigade commanders. This training routine was similar to the pattern he had adopted as a Brigade Commander.¹

A personal tragedy struck the Longstreet family in January, 1862. Three of the four children of James and Louise died in one week during the scarlet fever epidemic that was ravaging Richmond. It is difficult to evaluate the impact this must have had on Longstreet.²

In February Longstreet returned to his division and found the army preparing for withdrawal south of the Rappahannock River to be closer to Richmond to protect the city should the Union attempt an attack from the Virginia peninsula. Johnston delegated the planning for the movement to Longstreet, and on March 28 the army began the movement south toward Richmond.³

While in command, Longstreet had correspondence with Major General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, who was conducting combat operations in the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson contacted Longstreet requesting

reinforcements, but Longstreet proposed instead that the reinforcements he sent Jackson be used for a combined move with Jackson toward Washington. Johnston approved but stipulated that any detachment must remain two days march from the Rapidan River. Since Jackson was skeptical, the plan was never executed.⁴

After Longstreet had moved Johnston's army to Richmond in early April, he was summoned to a council of war with Johnston, President Jefferson Davis, General Robert E. Lee, Major General G. W. Smith, and Secretary of War George Randolph. The discussion centered around the best way to defend Richmond and defeat General George McClellan's Army of the Potomac, now on the Virginia Peninsula. Longstreet remained silent until asked by Davis to express his views. Longstreet believed McClellan would not move before May. He recommended that the heavily outnumbered force currently facing McClellan continue to hold the line of defense along the Peninsula (from the York River to the James River) while Johnston's command moved on Washington. Davis abruptly discounted the idea because of his admiration for McClellan and the decision was made to reinforce Magruder with Johnston's command.⁵

Williamsburg and Seven Pines

Longstreet brought the command from Richmond southeast toward Yorktown to meet McClellan. The Union artillery began to bombard the Confederate positions along with naval support from the York and James. Johnston determined he could not hold the peninsula and began to plan for the withdrawal to Richmond. Longstreet was assigned the mission of rearguard. Longstreet's men maintained superb noise discipline as they moved, clapping hands to maintain unit integrity as they moved through

the woods to reach the road on which they would retreat. McClellan did not learn until the next morning that Johnston's army was withdrawing. He immediately sent his cavalry in pursuit. Heavy rains slowed the movement of both armies, but on the morning of May 5 the Union pursuit closed in force on the retreating Confederates.⁶

When Longstreet's pickets were driven back, Johnston sent A. P. Hill's brigade to reinforce Longstreet. As the Union fire increased Longstreet sent additional brigades into the fight. A stalemate developed and by 0900 hours Longstreet decided to counterattack with two brigades. As his counterattack gained ground, Longstreet received fire in his rear and flank from bypassed units. He called for the deployment of his reserve brigade and requested support. The Union force counterattacked but Longstreet's men held the line. The remainder of Johnston's army moved unopposed west to Richmond.⁷

At approximately 1700 hours Hill received permission from Longstreet to attack a Union artillery battery supported by Union infantry operating on the Confederate left. With the battle won Longstreet initially refused Hill's request to attack, but later that day Longstreet consented so Hill selected Early to lead the attack with his brigade. Longstreet approved with the stipulation that Hill accompany the force, stating "the brigade you propose to use is not in safe hands." Early assaulted across an open field and the attack failed. Notwithstanding Early's ill-fated assault, the Williamsburg battle was considered a significant Confederate retrograde success.⁸

General Irvin McDowell, the Union commander at First Manassas, was now south of the Rappahannock, 50 miles north of Richmond, attempting to link McClellan's right flank with his left flank to

destroy Johnston's army and capture Richmond. To accomplish this joining of forces, McClellan sent part of his force north of the Chickahominy river, a branch of the James River. Johnston and Longstreet saw a chance to attack McClellan's divided army before it could join McDowell, but because of Jackson's activity in the Shenandoah Valley McDowell's force was called back to protect Washington. Over Longstreet's objection Johnston delayed his attack of McClellan from 29 to 31 May and changed the tactical plan from attacking north and south of the river to concentrating on McClellan solely on the south side.⁹

Johnston's objective was to destroy the Union force at Seven Pines. His plan was to attack west to east with Longstreet commanding the southern wing and Major General G. W. Smith commanding the northern wing. Major General D. H. Hill's division of Longstreet's wing was to be the main attack with Major General Benjamin Huger's division supporting Hill and protecting the Confederate right. Two roads led to Seven Pines, the Nine-Mile road in the north and the Williamsburg road in the south. Smith was to take the north road; Hill and Huger the south road. Longstreet was given discretion by Johnston to determine the best road to move Longstreet's division to have it in reserve for the operation.¹⁰

Although his division was camped north of the Nine-Mile road, Longstreet decided to take his division south to the Williamsburg road. As he was in command of the southern wing this movement appeared logical, but Longstreet's division slowed part of Smith's division as Smith's division tried to get into position on the Nine-Mile road and delayed all of Huger's division as it tried to move into position on the Williamsburg road. It was Huger who was to "trigger" the attack once he

was in place and ready to secure the right flank. Due to Longstreet's movement, the army's timing was off and Johnston was having difficulty with command and control. Hill, on the Williamsburg road, launched his attack without either division on his flank in position. Longstreet outranked Hill but allowed him to remain in charge of the fight since Hill was gaining ground. Longstreet remained in the rear of Hill and sent support when requested by Hill or Huger, committing two brigades to reinforce Hill as the main effort and three to support Huger on the right flank.¹¹

Heavy fighting continued throughout the day with neither side able to drive the other off the field before nightfall. Johnston was seriously wounded while riding to the front along the Nine-Mile road and Smith, outranking Longstreet, took command. Smith decided to continue the operation and ordered an attack for the next day. The plan was for Smith's wing to act as the pivot and hold the Union right as Longstreet's wing attacked the Union left to push the enemy into the Chickahominy River. That morning Smith's right brigade, under Brigadier General John Hood, was pushed back just as Longstreet began to move forward, exposing Longstreet's left flank. Longstreet called for reinforcements which never came. By 1300 hours the two-day battle of Seven Pines was over, with heavy casualties on both sides, and no military objectives gained for either side.¹²

After the battle Longstreet authorized streamers to be carried on the regimental flags of those units that had performed well at Williamsburg and Seven Pines. Not all of his regiments were authorized the streamers, for as Longstreet wrote "no regiment of mine can ever

have the name of a battle on a banner if it quits the field before the battle is ended."¹³

In his report Longstreet blamed Huger, saying "The failure of complete success I attribute to the slow movements of General Huger's command."¹⁴

During the period between First Manassas and the Seven Days Battles, the army conducted its first major strategic movement and fought two battles, Williamsburg and Seven Pines. In addition to promotion and command of a division, Longstreet was given responsibility of moving the army during its first strategic move and also assigned the rearguard as the army conducted its first retrograde operation of the war.

During the retrograde Longstreet demonstrated sound decision-making skills in the face of enemy fire. When the Federals closed on the rear of the Confederate army, Longstreet aggressively repulsed the Union force by committing two brigades to the effort. He seized the opportunity to counterattack and committed his entire division as well as D. H. Hill's division. Longstreet avoided "piecemealing" the force at Williamsburg, in fact, he committed one-half the army to the effort and the result was a Confederate victory.¹⁵

At Seven Pines Longstreet's communication with Johnston was weak. It should have been clear to both men which road Longstreet was planning to take to get into position. What is clear is that Johnston expected the attack much earlier than it occurred, and it is also clear Johnston never knew where Longstreet was until mid-morning. Longstreet had to know something was wrong when his column ran into Huger's column on the Williamsburg Road, and yet Longstreet made no attempt to locate

Johnston. Instead, Johnston had to send a staff officer to find Longstreet and this delay had severe consequences.¹⁶

Longstreet's professional ethics were questionable after the battle. In his report, Longstreet shifted the blame for failure to Huger. Longstreet claims that Huger was slow in positioning on his right flank, and that he did not support the attack. In fact it was Longstreet who had sent Huger too far to the right to be in position to support when Longstreet sent Huger to a position that is unclear in Longstreet's order. Curiously, Johnston indorsed Longstreet's report and the eventual result was that Huger was transferred from the army, basically making him the "scapegoat" for the confusion at Seven Pines. On the second day Longstreet's ethics are again questionable, as it would appear he had no intention of following the orders of Smith, who had replaced the wounded Johnston. As soon as the opportunity presented itself, Longstreet halted the advance, claiming lack of support. While this may have been momentarily true, that was no reason to quit the field at 1300 hours.¹⁷

After Williamsburg and Seven Pines Longstreet took the opportunity to authorize streamers for his regiments that had performed well. An important part of team development is setting high standards and by limiting banners to select units Longstreet chose a visible means to recognize performance while simultaneously setting high standards.

Longstreet's correspondence with Jackson concerning a strategic move on Washington was significant, as was his subsequent counsel to Davis concerning holding Richmond with a small force while the army moved on Washington. It revealed Longstreet was thinking strategically in offensive terms.

It is also evident during this period that Longstreet continues to favor offensive tactics on the battlefield. At Williamsburg he transformed his mission of rearguard into a full scale attack against the Union army with successful results. Noteworthy is his decision to allow one of D. H. Hill's brigades (Early's) to attack a Union artillery battery late in the afternoon after the battle had been essentially won. There were no tactical advantages to the attack as the battery was not in position to fire on Longstreet's force.¹⁸ It appears to be a decision similar to the one made at Blackburn's Ford to counterattack-aggressive but reckless.

A final action by Longstreet that reveals a strategically offensive spirit is his counsel to Johnston to attack McClellan on the 29th instead of the 31st, and to attack McClellan's forces on both sides of the Chickahominy River. Longstreet's plan called for an immediate offensive, in contrast to Johnston's plan which allowed more preparation time and greater concentration of combat power against a smaller objective. This is additional evidence of Longstreet's aggressive and offensive nature, but he is still lacking in mature, careful planning skills.

Longstreet's first attempt at division command was not successful. He demonstrated strength in several leadership competencies but failed in communications, planning, and ethics. He appeared to have favored a strategic offensive and his tactical actions on the field were aggressive but at times impulsive and reckless. It is early in the war and this was Longstreet's first attempt at handling large numbers of troops, so his mistakes, with the exception of ethics, are reasonable.

The Seven Days

General Robert E. Lee took the place of the wounded Johnston as commander of the army on June 1. With Longstreet's recommendation, Lee decided to concentrate his army, along with Jackson, against the Union force at Mechanicsville, while McClellan still had his army divided by the Chickahominy River. Since Jackson had the farthest to move and was to trigger the battle, he set the time for attack as the morning of June 25. Longstreet recommended that Jackson give himself more time so the day was changed to the 26th.¹⁹ A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill and Longstreet were in position on the 26th awaiting Jackson's arrival on A. P. Hill's left so the army could begin the attack. At 1500 hours A. P. Hill, on his own initiative, attacked without Jackson. D. H. Hill and Longstreet assumed that Jackson had arrived, and they led their divisions forward. The attack failed as piecemeal attacks against the strong Union position failed. Porter Alexander wrote the Union position was "absolutely impregnable" to attack.²⁰ Lee's first battle had failed and he had no communication with Jackson.

McClellan ordered the withdrawal of the isolated corps from the north to the south side of the Chickahominy river. At dawn the Confederates began the pursuit and gained contact with the Union corps in the vicinity of Gaines Mill. With A. P. Hill attacking the Union center and D. H. Hill attacking the Union right the Confederate army began taking heavy losses in more piecemeal attacks. The terrain favored the Union position even more than the day before.²¹

Longstreet, in reserve, was ordered by Lee to demonstrate on the Union left to relieve the pressure on the attacking divisions. As he moved forward he came under heavy artillery fire. "I was, in fact,"

Longstreet wrote later, "in the position from which the enemy wished us to attack him." Longstreet decided that an attack, not simply a demonstration, was necessary to relieve the pressure.²² As Longstreet sent his brigades forward Jackson finally arrived and positioned his forces between A. P. Hill and D. H. Hill. From the Confederate right to left Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Jackson, and D. H. Hill defeated the Union force in a coordinated attack.²³

Lee continued his pursuit of McClellan, sending Longstreet and A. P. Hill on a march around the Union left while Lee moved the rest of the army in pursuit. Lee's plan was to attack McClellan as he moved south near Glendale. As Union infantry moved forward Longstreet sent three brigades into battle, but support never came. His brigades were being repulsed, so he sent his remaining four brigades into the fight. Severe combat erupted along the entire line. Lee was unable to coordinate support for Longstreet and Hill, so Longstreet called his reserve and four more brigades were committed to the battle. After some of the most vicious fighting of the war, Longstreet's outnumbered men held the field. General Lee reported "could the other commands have co-operated in the action the result would have proved disastrous to the enemy."²⁴

Longstreet was placed in reserve as Lee continued his pursuit of McClellan's retreating force, which was now in a defensive position at Malvern Hill. Lee sent Longstreet on a reconnaissance and Longstreet reported the hill could be taken and that he had located a position for artillery and infantry. Lee accepted Longstreet's counsel and by early afternoon on July 1 the divisions were deployed right to left. Longstreet and Hill were in reserve.²⁵

The plan was to assault Malvern Hill in echelon from right to left on the northern slope. The slope is a long, gradual incline with a superb field of fire for the defensive force. The superior Union artillery opened the battle by destroying the Confederate artillery in the position Longstreet had selected.²⁶ Lee decided to conduct a reconnaissance with Longstreet of the Union left to determine if there was an opportunity to turn the Union position. While on their reconnaissance Brigadier General Lewis Armistead's brigade of Huger's division attacked, committing Lee's army to battle on the original plan. The result was a Confederate disaster as piecemeal brigade attacks failed to take the hill. McClellan continued his movement south to the James River and established a strong position at Harrison's Landing. Although Longstreet believed another attack could succeed, Jackson did not and Lee accepted Jackson's advice. The Seven Days Battles were over.²⁷

During the Seven Days Battles, Longstreet began to display a more careful approach to committing units to battle. However, his offensive spirit remained evident and he still displayed a tendency to conduct aggressive offensive operations.

At Mechanicsville, his counsel to Jackson to allow more time to reach the field is an example of his developing appreciation of the time involved to successfully move large numbers of troops, and his counsel to Lee to concentrate all of his combat power north of the river is an example of his growing appreciation for the effectiveness of massing troops on the battlefield. Longstreet appeared to be gradually becoming more conservative and cautious in his decision making, as this latter

example of advice to Lee is exactly opposite the advice he gave Johnston a month earlier.

At Gaines Mill, Longstreet's tactical competence was evident when Lee ordered him to demonstrate but Longstreet attacked instead to avoid the heavy casualties he was taking from artillery fire. This decision met Lee's intent to relieve pressure on Hill and helped to carry the day when Jackson arrived shortly thereafter. Glendale demonstrated Longstreet's willingness to take the offensive when necessary. Badly outnumbered, he committed his entire command in a desperate attempt to hold the field, demonstrating sound decision making skills under the pressure of battle. The Battle of Glendale was basically a draw and had Longstreet taken a more conservative approach and held his reserve out of the fight the outnumbered Confederates would have faced even worse numerical odds.

At Malvern Hill, Longstreet's counsel to Lee to continue the offensive had dire consequences. His poor planning and tactical competence in the selection of fighting positions for the infantry and artillery proved disastrous. This recklessness was costly to Lee's army as Longstreet served in a position of increased responsibility.

The best description for Longstreet at this stage of the war is inconsistency in decision making, planning, and technical/tactical competence. In some battles, such as Glendale or Gaines Mill, Longstreet performed like a seasoned general officer. In other battles, such as Seven Pines and Malvern Hill, he seemed to lack an appreciation for what would or would not work on the battlefield. As the Peninsula Campaign is Longstreet's first attempt at command above brigade level,

with the associated movement of large bodies of troops, this lack of consistency is understandable.

At Harrison's Landing, Longstreet's counsel to Lee in the presence of Jackson to continue fighting even after the carnage of Malvern Hill is noteworthy. Lee and Jackson are both historically portrayed as audacious and favoring offensive battle, while Longstreet is perceived more cautious. However, at a point early in the war when the Confederacy had a potential opportunity to bring McClellan's army to further battle, perhaps even culmination, both Lee and Jackson chose to halt. The main point here is not what might have happened but rather to underscore Longstreet's offensive spirit and aggressive position at this stage of the war.

Finally, Longstreet's professional ethics will be analyzed here in the framework of executing a commander's intent. At Gaines Mill and Glendale, Longstreet did not follow the letter of the commander's orders but instead endeavored to meet the commander's intent of pursuing and destroying a retreating army. This is a trait Longstreet had displayed since his first battle, as it will be remembered he was prepared to countermand Johnston's orders in order to pursue the enemy at Manassas. At Gaines Mill, Lee ordered Longstreet to demonstrate, but Longstreet, judging that a demonstration was not adequate, chose to attack. At Glendale, Longstreet's mission was to block the Union advance. Instead, a meeting engagement developed, and he committed his entire force to battle. The decisions and technical/tactical competence are debatable, but Longstreet's ethical position is sound in that he is clearly trying to bring the enemy to battle to meet the commander's intent. As defined in FM 22-100, professional ethics includes using an informed, rational

decision making process while being loyal to the unit. Longstreet appeared to be meeting this definition in his actions on the battlefield.

After the Seven Days, Jackson was sent north while Longstreet remained in Richmond to watch McClellan. Once it was determined McClellan was moving north to reinforce Pope, Longstreet was also sent north. When he arrived on July 13th Jackson reported to him offering command. Since Lee would arrive in a few days, Longstreet left Jackson in command to reduce command turmoil.²⁸

Second Manassas

While Longstreet's troops were in camp waiting for the move north, Lee and Longstreet rode through the camps and observed the soldiers gambling with dice. Lee asked Longstreet to look into the matter. Longstreet agreed to but never did since he believed the men would continue the practice regardless of orders.²⁹

Lee's plan was to attack Pope to push him out of Virginia. When his command arrived south of the Rappahanock River, Longstreet assigned two regiments from Brigadier General Robert Toombs brigade to picket the road to Raccoon's Ford. When Toombs arrived and learned that two regiments were serving as pickets under Longstreet's orders Toombs ordered the pickets back to camp saying the road could be guarded with considerably less force. The next morning Union cavalry came down the unguarded road and captured a Confederate staff officer who had a copy of Lee's plan. Longstreet relieved Toombs and placed him under arrest.³⁰

Pope, now aware of Lee's plan, moved north as Lee began a cautious pursuit. Jackson succeeded in moving behind Pope and Longstreet moved to join Jackson. A chokepoint on Longstreet's march was Thoroughfare Gap, a pass in the Bull Run Mountains that was reported open. Longstreet sent a division forward in spite of the report to seize the pass and cover the army's movement. A brigade of Federal cavalry was guarding the pass. After several hours of fighting the Federals were forced to retire and Longstreet continued his march to Jackson.³¹

On the morning of August 29 Longstreet arrived on Jackson's right flank. Jackson's divisions were engaged and Longstreet had arrived on the Union left flank practically undetected, forming a right angle with Jackson with Pope caught in the middle. Longstreet deployed his command using the woods as concealment.³² By noon he was ready to attack and Lee urged him forward to support Jackson and take advantage of the opportunity to assail Pope's left flank. Longstreet wanted a more thorough reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy positions to his right. Longstreet received permission from Lee to delay the attack and Longstreet conducted a personal reconnaissance. He found two divisions on his right and reported this to Lee. Lee was anxious to support Jackson who was now heavily engaged, but accepted Longstreet's advice that more time was needed to examine the Federal positions. After his reconnaissance, Longstreet reported to Lee the Union force to his right was of no immediate threat.³³

By late afternoon Lee urged Longstreet forward, but Longstreet suggested waiting until the next day so a reconnaissance in force could be conducted during the night of the Union position and the ground to

Longstreet's immediate front, saying to Lee that it was necessary to wait until daylight to attack. Lee reluctantly agreed. At 1300 hours August 30 Pope attacked Jackson with a corps supported by two divisions. Jackson requested support and Longstreet called the artillery, positioned at the apex where Longstreet's left met Jackson's right, into action.³⁴

Longstreet placed more artillery into the battle and sent orders for his entire line to counterattack into the exposed Union left flank. He ordered Hood's division to lead the assault with the objective being Henry Hill. Longstreet reminded the aggressive Hood not to outrun his support as Henry Hill was a mile from Hood but a mile and a half from the division on the Confederate right flank.³⁵ The battle raged for four hours with Longstreet moving artillery forward and directing infantry brigades into the battle and when it was over the Union force had been swept from the field.³⁶

Longstreet's performance at Second Manassas is heavily debated, as some believe he was slow in coming to Jackson's aid on the 29th, while others believe he acted prudently. There is a legitimate reason to support the latter opinion. Longstreet did not have adequate knowledge of the enemy on his right flank. An attack against the Union left to support Jackson would have exposed his right flank. Longstreet's caution is an indicator of his maturation process since First Manassas. Prior to Second Manassas Longstreet never demonstrated this level of caution. It would appear Malvern Hill had a profound effect on his tactical beliefs. In fact, there were two divisions on his right on the 29th, so his caution was prudent.³⁷ Longstreet's decision making and competence deserve commendation.

Longstreet's discussion with Lee in camp concerning soldier gambling reveals a leader in touch with his soldiers and aware of reasonable expectations, an important quality in team building. However, Longstreet's ethics are questionable as he deliberately misled Lee as to how he would handle the situation. He should have chosen a different course of action than to mislead the Commanding General.

Longstreet's decision to relieve Toombs was exceptionally good. He sent a clear message that insubordination was intolerable, as well as reinforcing the importance of security in base operations. In this action Longstreet displayed strong team building, communications, and decision making.

At Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet's decision to secure the gap in spite of intelligence reports demonstrates strong competence and planning. It was a chokepoint he could not afford to have in the control of the enemy so he took no chances, displaying his growing mature and deliberate leadership style.

During the battle Longstreet's use of available systems, particularly artillery, was superb. He opened the battle with artillery to great effect before committing his infantry. The positioning of the artillery was sound, as was the positioning of the infantry, as both were able to move on to the battlefield without being detected. The use of stealth in moving to attack positions was commendable. Longstreet's guidance to Hood showed strength in supervision. It was important to control the movement to avoid piecemealing the attack, another lesson learned at Malvern Hill.³⁸

Second Manassas appeared to be a turning point in Longstreet's career. The carnage of the Seven Days, which can be characterized as

one vicious attack after another with little prior planning, would not be repeated for the remainder of Longstreet's career. Henceforth, caution and deliberation would characterize Longstreet's conduct prior to battle, with aggressive action on the field once the battle is joined.

Sharpsburg

After the victory at Second Manassas, Lee decided to invade the North. Longstreet supported the idea of invasion, later saying " the situation called for action . . . across the Potomac."³⁹ Longstreet ordered an inspection of all artillery batteries, to include their horses, limbers, and cannon.⁴⁰ On September 6th, 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia splashed into Maryland. Over Longstreet's objection, Lee decided to divide his force and send Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry, D. H. Hill to guard the Confederate rear at South Mountain, and Longstreet to move to Boonsboro. Lee adopted Longstreet's plan to keep Longstreet and Hill close together until Jackson's seizure of Harper's Ferry was complete.⁴¹

During the evening of September 13 Lee learned McClellan (back in command of the Union army) had a copy of Lee's plan and was advancing on his rear toward Hill at South Mountain. Lee ordered Hill to hold the pass in the mountain known as Turner's Gap and ordered Longstreet south to reinforce Hill. Longstreet disagreed and urged that South Mountain be abandoned and that all forces move to Sharpsburg to link-up with Jackson.⁴²

Lee decided to follow his own plan and Longstreet's men completed the uphill fifteen mile march where in places the dust was

ankle deep. By late afternoon on September 14 Longstreet's men were deploying to the right and left of Hill's badly outnumbered division. Hill held the pass but Longstreet advised Lee the pass could not be held long without reinforcements, so Lee approved a withdrawal to Sharpsburg.⁴³

Jackson had captured Harper's Ferry and was enroute to reinforce Lee, and by the evening of September 16 Lee's army was positioning west of Antietam Creek oriented to meet the Federals approaching from the east, with Jackson (when he arrived) on the left, D. H. Hill in the center, and Longstreet on the right. Longstreet had spent the day supervising the deployment of the divisions in his sector. He also advised Lee on the positioning of D. H. Hill's and Jackson's commands. Longstreet's instructions to the artillery were to "put them all in, every gun you have, long range and short range."⁴⁴

The battle exploded at dawn, September 17th on the Confederate right against Jackson. Longstreet sent a division and three brigades from D. H. Hill as reinforcements to assist Jackson on the right. After three hours of intense fighting Jackson's line held. The Union main effort moved to the center, so Longstreet sent a division to support Hill's line and also sent two regiments against the Union left flank. After initially gaining ground the regiments were repulsed by a Union counterattack. Longstreet concentrated his artillery and the Union assault stalled.⁴⁵

Now the Union attention turned to Longstreet's depleted forces on the right. By mid-afternoon the Union army was turning the Confederate right flank, and Longstreet was using his last available division. As disaster seemed imminent, troops appeared to the right

rear of Longstreet's sector. A. P. Hill's division arrived from Harper's Ferry, and they repulsed the Union forces.⁴⁶

In the words of his chief of staff, "Longstreet's conduct on this great day of battle was magnificent . . . He seemed everywhere along his extended lines"⁴⁷ Lee called a meeting of his senior lieutenants on the evening of 17th. Longstreet was late as he had assisted a family whose house was on fire in Sharpsburg. When he arrived at the meeting Lee embraced him saying "Here's my old war horse at last. Let us hear what he has to say."⁴⁸

During the first Northern Invasion, Longstreet continued to display his strategically offensive thought. He realized that a constant policy of defending on Virginia soil would eventually take its toll on the Confederacy, and his support for Lee's invasion demonstrated sound decision making skills at the strategic level. His objection to Lee's decision to divide the army is also supportable as it would make it more difficult to mass and concentrate combat power, as became evident during the battle. Lee did not have time to prepare a strong defense, and the casualty rate was very high. At Antietam, Longstreet displayed his growing caution and appreciation for the tactical defense, and his decision making and planning skills reflect patience and mature thought.

Longstreet's orders to inspect the artillery before the movement north showed strength in setting the example for priorities, an important quality needed in teaching and team development. Placing a high priority on weapon systems can help build confidence throughout the unit. The troops know the leader's "head is in the game," by focusing

effort on weapons and warfighting. The order showed a leader who emphasized the basics and was setting the standard for the unit.

The difference in Longstreet's actions and counsel to Lee when Hill was at South Mountain versus the battle at Antietam showed strong competence, decision making, and communications. He opposed Lee's decision to hold the pass because of the divided force. Once McClellan was able to concentrate his army it was reasonable to predict a bad outcome for Lee. Plus, Longstreet's troops had to march from Boonsboro to South Mountain, then back to Antietam. If they could have marched directly from Boonsboro to Antietam they would have been more rested and had more time to prepare a defense. Longstreet appears cautious at South Mountain, but at Antietam he was bold and aggressive, as he detached nearly all the forces under his command to help the right and center wings, risking his own left wing. Longstreet wanted to avoid battle but was aggressive and competent once he realized battle was unavoidable.

A final observation was Longstreet's humanitarian assistance to a family in Sharpsburg. As a leader he set the example that even in war one can take the time to help noncombatants, another important team building demonstration.

CHAPTER FOUR

CORPS AND INDEPENDENT COMMAND: FREDERICKSBURG TO APPOMATOX

Both armies spent the next several months refitting and reorganizing. By the end of October Lee's army had nearly doubled in size to 80,000 and was formally divided into two corps commanded by Lieutenants General Jackson and Longstreet, the latter designated as the senior subordinate in the army. To meet the demands of corps command Longstreet nearly doubled his staff to a total of 18 officers by the end of November 1862. Longstreet's commissary, ordnance, and medical staffs were considered by many as the best in the Confederacy.¹

Fredericksburg

On November 19 Longstreet began the march to meet the Union army that had advanced to Fredericksburg. Heavy rains slowed the march and at night Longstreet rode among the cold and tired troops, many still without shoes, and told them to rake the ashes from their campfires into beds and sleep on them.²

Longstreet began occupying the high ground south and west of the town. For two days Longstreet's men applied resistance with sniper fire to the Union engineer effort to cross the Rappahannock River. Longstreet's sector contained three hills, and he placed one division on each hill and a fourth division in the valley to the south that connected his right flank with Jackson. He placed his fifth division in reserve in the center, with the artillery dug in with several cannons

forward in the center of the line along a sunken road that was protected from attack by a stone wall. Prior to the battle he ordered trenches and fieldworks constructed. He ordered food, water, and ammunition to each battle position and at the stone wall.³

At noon on December 13, the Union forces attacked against Longstreet's line, moving east to west out of Fredericksburg. The Union commanders conducted a piecemeal attack against Longstreet's line, with the objective being the stone wall. Longstreet reinforced the men at the stone wall with infantry and artillery throughout the battle.⁴ In McLaws's estimate only one Federal soldier made it to within 30 yards of the wall before being killed.⁵ In the words of Longstreet's chief of artillery, Porter Alexander, Fredericksburg was "the easiest battle we ever fought."⁶

Jackson's success on the right had been similar to Longstreet's on the left. Throughout the 14th and 15th neither side advanced and on the morning of the 16th the Union Army moved back across the Rappahannock.

Both armies went into winter quarters for the next several months. Longstreet's wife came to Fredericksburg and they spent most evenings together. As Longstreet would ride from the house where his wife was staying to his headquarters, soldiers playfully threw snowballs at him. He tolerated this activity for several days and then put a stop to it.⁷

Longstreet's staff enjoyed evenings of drinking and poker. On occasion Longstreet would join the activities, and one night after drinking he rode "piggy-back" on a staff officer until both collapsed in laughter on the ground.⁸

During the winter of 1862-63, Longstreet constructed what became known as the line of Fredericksburg, a series of trenches and field works that ran along the Rappahannock River from Fredericksburg to Spotsylvania Court House. As the Union artillery had greater range than Confederate artillery, counterfire was a problem along the line. Longstreet constructed short rifle trenches to replace the long pits, with traverses separating the short trenches to give lateral protection from the burst of Union shells.⁹

During the winter months Longstreet corresponded with a member of the Senate about his corps moving west by rail to reinforce the Army of Tennessee while Jackson's corps held the line at Fredericksburg. He also suggested this to Lee, but Lee rejected the idea.¹⁰ Lee was concerned about another Union advance and was also constantly besieged for troops by the Richmond government to reinforce state militia.

The Fredericksburg Campaign offers more insight into Longstreet's leadership characteristics. The example of his visiting cold troops in the field and offering advice on how to stay warm showed a leader who was involved and cared about his people.

The atmosphere Longstreet established in camp was positive. He seemed to adopt the "work hard, play hard" philosophy. He required strong defensive fortifications and quality staff work, but he would also let troops show their spirit by tossing snowballs him, as well as allowing staff officers to drink and "blow off steam." The team atmosphere in First Corps seemed positive at this stage of the war.

For the Fredericksburg battle, Longstreet balanced his corps throughout the sector, leaving no weak points for enemy exploitation and successfully linked his corps to Jackson. The decision to pre-position

supplies forward avoided the need to expose troops for resupply operations and kept the force supplied throughout the battle. The artillery was effectively utilized through positioning and timely execution, and the reserve was positioned to lend effective support anywhere in the sector. The choice of terrain proved correct, and Longstreet deserves primary credit for successfully choosing and holding the ground prior to battle.

The positions for the infantry, particularly along the stone wall, proved ideal for massing combat power forward to prevent any Union attack from gaining momentum, and provided protection to the defending force.

Longstreet's defensive line constructed after the battle showed superb competence and planning. Since Union artillery was superior, he successfully devised a technique to counter that advantage with short trenches instead of long pits. When cannon balls hit the long pits, they could kill as many soldiers as the shrapnel may hit in the pit. Not only were the short trenches harder to hit, it also wouldn't cause as many casualties since not as many soldiers were in a short trench as in a long pit.

Longstreet continued to display strong strategic thinking in calling for a move to the west. This was the third time that he had advocated an offensive into Union territory since the war began. It was further evidence of his advocacy of the strategic offensive.

Fredericksburg is often considered the pinnacle of Longstreet's career. This thesis supports that view, along with the Battle of the Wilderness in May 1864. At Fredericksburg, Longstreet utilized all of

the tactical skills and judgment that he had gained since the start of the war to great advantage.

Suffolk

In February 1863 Longstreet was sent to Petersburg, Virginia, to assume command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, an area command that extended from Richmond to Wilmington, North Carolina. His primary mission was to protect Richmond, with a secondary mission of gathering foodstuffs and subsistence from the fertile counties of southeastern Virginia and North Carolina, which were relatively untouched by the war. Longstreet's command totalled over 40,000 troops, in twelve brigades.¹¹

To successfully accomplish his two missions (protecting Richmond and foraging) Longstreet determined that Confederate offensive operations needed to be conducted against Union held territory. Suffolk, Virginia; New Bern, North Carolina; and Washington, North Carolina, were Union fortifications from which Union combat operations were being conducted on southern soil. This situation caused deep concern among the southern population, as well as caused a strategic dilemma for the Richmond government. The Richmond authorities supported Longstreet's judgment that operations against these fortifications were needed to halt Union expansion, which in turn would make protecting Richmond and foraging operations easier to do.¹²

In early March, Longstreet dispatched two brigades for foraging operations, and sent one brigade to reinforce D. H. Hill's division for an offensive to retake New Bern, North Carolina. Hill was unsuccessful so Longstreet sent Hill 30 miles north to attempt to take the other

Union garrison in Hill's sector in Washington. This effort also failed, but the presence of Confederate troops throughout the state slowed Union advances, making the foraging operations successful.¹³

Meanwhile, Longstreet and Lee exchanged a series of letters in which Lee expressed his desire that Longstreet remain poised to return to Lee quickly should Hooker move against Lee. Lee also told Longstreet to maximize his department's efforts to obtaining all the supplies possible. Longstreet replied "I can get all of the supplies . . . but [if my forces are held in reserve] to join you . . . I can do nothing."¹⁴

Suffolk, located at the mouth of the Nansemond River, had been under Union control for nearly a year and was an impediment to Confederate foraging operations. With a year to prepare, the Union defenses of Suffolk were formidable, with eight forts located at strategic positions supporting the entrenched rifle pits protecting the city.

Longstreet requested naval support for an assault against Suffolk but his request was denied. He estimated 3000 casualties in an assault without naval support so he opted for a siege instead. For three weeks in April 1863 Longstreet's forces laid siege to Suffolk. Casualties on both sides were light with sniper fire the usual form of combat. Meanwhile, Longstreet placed his commissary chief, Major Raphael Moses, in charge of collecting foodstuffs and supplies. Longstreet sent every wheeled vehicle available to support Moses and the effort yielded enough to feed Lee's army for two months, with which Lee was "completely satisfied," and Longstreet only abandoned the effort at

the end of April when he was recalled to join Lee to meet Hooker's advance.¹⁵

When Hooker crossed the Rappahannock on April 29, Longstreet's wagon trains were scattered across the countryside collecting supplies so he ordered them secured and moved rapidly east. On May 3, Longstreet began his withdrawal from Suffolk to join Lee. By May 6 most of his command was in Richmond as the battle of Chancellorsville ended.¹⁶

Throughout the period of his independent command, Longstreet conferred regularly with the Richmond authorities and Lee concerning moving Longstreet's corps west to join Johnston's Army of Tennessee. Longstreet favored joining his corps with Lieutenant General Braxton Bragg to destroy the Union army under Major General W. S. Rosecrans, then join with the remainder of Johnston's army to move into the Ohio valley, causing the army under General U. S. Grant to abandon the siege of Vicksburg to pursue Johnston. Longstreet believed Lee could continue to hold the line of the Rappahannock while the Ohio invasion took place.¹⁷

Gettysburg

Instead, the decision was made to conduct an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. After Jackson's death at Chancellorsville, Lee divided his army into three corps, with three divisions each. The invasion began in late June as Lieutenant General Richard Ewell's Corps crossed the Potomac, followed by Lieutenant General A. P. Hill's Corps, with Longstreet's Corps in the rear. When Lee learned of the location of the Union army, he ordered his three corps to converge to the vicinity of Gettysburg. In spite of Lee's orders not to bring on a

general engagement, elements of Hill's Corps engaged the Federals west of Gettysburg on July 1 along the road between Gettysburg and Cashtown. Ewell, who was north of Gettysburg, attacked the Union right flank. By late afternoon the Union troops were in retreat through the streets of Gettysburg, taking position in the hills south of the town. Longstreet had ridden back to his Corps, which was working its way toward Gettysburg along the Chambersburg Pike, to hurry his Corps to the battle.¹⁸

When Longstreet joined Lee on a ridge due west of the position the Federal army occupied, Longstreet surveyed the terrain through his field glasses. After several minutes he turned to Lee and said, "We could not call the enemy to a position better suited to our plans. All we have to do is file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital." Lee answered, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him." Longstreet responded, "If he is there it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him . . . a good reason, in my judgement, for not doing so."¹⁹

Lee's plan was to attack the Union left with Longstreet's Corps as the main effort as early as practical on July 2, with Hill supporting in the center and Ewell supporting against the Union right. Lee had still not heard from his Cavalry so he could not be certain of the Union strength. In the early morning of July 2 Lee and Longstreet met again on the ridge and for the second time Longstreet expressed his opinions, and for the second time Lee rejected the proposal to move around the left.²⁰ Lee ordered a reconnaissance of the Union left and at approximately 0800 hours the report indicated the two large hills on the southern end of the Union position were unoccupied.²¹ Major General

Lafayette McLaws of Longstreet's Corps arrived on the ridge for orders and Lee told McLaws how to position his division, pointing to the Emmitsburg road which ran south from Gettysburg and west of the Union position. Lee wanted McLaws perpendicular to the road. Longstreet leaned down, drawing a parallel line with his finger, and told McLaws to position exactly opposite Lee's guidance. Lee quickly corrected Longstreet and McLaws then requested permission to conduct a reconnaissance and Longstreet denied the request.²²

Longstreet's Corps began moving into attack position at noon with McLaws in the lead with Major General John Hood's division following. Longstreet's third division under Major General George Pickett was still enroute along the Chambersburg road. Longstreet rode with Hood and let Lee's staff officer who had conducted the reconnaissance lead the march. When the column came in view of the enemy position, McLaws ordered a halt. Longstreet rode to the front and ordered a countermarch. The countermarch in this case was an operation in which McLaws' division retraced its steps back to near the original starting point as Hood's division waited in place and then fell in behind McLaws. As the senior division commander, McLaws had insisted that he remain in front and Longstreet allowed him to do so. This countermarch caused considerable delay in the movement to the attack positions.²³

The countermarch took several hours. It was approximately 1500 hours when Longstreet's Corps closed on the assault position. Longstreet rode to McLaws and asked how he was going in. McLaws replied: "That will be determined when I can see what is in my front." Longstreet replied there was nothing to his front and McLaws answered,

"Then I will continue my march in columns of companies and after arriving on the flank as far as is necessary will face to the left and march on the enemy." Longstreet replied: "That suits me," and rode away.²⁴

Longstreet was wrong about the enemy situation to McLaws' front. When McLaws was in position, he saw a Union Corps to his front. McLaws deployed his division parallel to and west of the Union position to take advantage of the terrain.²⁵ This deployment was as Longstreet had suggested earlier that morning but Lee had overruled him and ordered McLaws perpendicular to the Union position.

Lee approved the redeployment based on the new information of the enemy's location.²⁶ Longstreet sent orders to McLaws to proceed at once to the assault. McLaws sent word back to Longstreet that Longstreet needed to come forward and see the enemy position for himself. Longstreet sent a second command back to McLaws that Lee was "impatient that the charge was delayed," so McLaws prepared to attack. McLaws received a third message from Longstreet to wait until Hood was in position on his right flank and was attacking before he began his attack.²⁷ Longstreet rode to McLaws and ordered a battery placed on the high ground. McLaws responded it would draw the enemy's fire but Longstreet ordered the cannons brought up. Federal artillery soon opened on the exposed guns.²⁸

Hood arrived on McLaws's right and deployed his division south and east of the Union left flank, located on the two hills known as Round Top and Little Round Top. Hood sent scouts forward and they reported that Hood could move around the right of the hills unopposed and strike the Union rear. Hood requested permission from Longstreet to

move to the right but Longstreet denied the request saying Lee's orders were specific, that the attack must come up (south to north) the Emmitsburg Road. Three times Hood made the request and three times Longstreet said no.²⁹

The great battle exploded at 1600 hours. Twenty minutes later Hood fell as an artillery shell shattered his arm. Across the now legendary Peach Orchard, WheatField, and Devil's Den, Longstreet's First Corps sent the Union troops reeling in a vicious attack. Longstreet was at the front all day as Lee wanted Longstreet to remain with McLaws and Longstreet in turn promised Lee he would take personal responsibility for the performance of McLaw's division.³⁰

Seeing Longstreet at the front, a Federal prisoner remarked: "No wonder we are thrashed upon every field, there is not in the whole of our army a Lieutenant General who would have risked his life in such a charge."³¹

After three hours, Longstreet withdrew. He later wrote: "We felt at every step the heavy stroke of fresh troops . . . we received no support at all, and there was no evidence of co-operation on any side. To urge my men forward under these circumstances would have been madness, so I withdrew them in good order to the Peach Orchard."³²

Instead of his usual practice of going in person, Longstreet sent an aide to Lee's headquarters that night. Lee wanted the attack to resume at dawn, but the details were not determined, other than Pickett's fresh division, which had marched to a position near the battlefield late in the afternoon, was to spearhead the attack. When Lee arrived at Longstreet's position at dawn on July 3, he was surprised to find Pickett's division not in position and Longstreet with no

preparations for the attack. When asked to explain, Longstreet replied, that he had his scouts out all night, and that there was still an excellent opportunity to move to the right and maneuver Meade into attacking. Lee rejected the proposal and pointed toward the center of the Union position and said that he would attack the Federals there. Longstreet replied he did not think the position could be taken with the available Confederate forces. Nevertheless, Lee decided to continue the attack, and planned to use First Corps in the assault. Longstreet argued that Hood's and McLaws's divisions were worn from the previous day and that to move either division would expose the Confederate right flank. Lee agreed and assigned two of Hill's divisions to attack with Pickett.³³

Although in charge of the entire attack, Longstreet spent most of his time overseeing the employment of Pickett and the artillery. This lack of supervision proved costly as the brigades moved into attack position. The brigades on the left were arrayed in line with no reserve and were also behind Pickett, exposing Pickett's left flank as he moved across the open valley.³⁴

Longstreet sent a message to the artillery commander Colonel Porter Alexander to advise Pickett not to make the charge if the artillery did not have the desired effect of greatly degrading the enemy, and if it did have the desired effect to let Pickett know when to begin the charge. Alexander was surprised at the message as he felt Longstreet was shifting responsibility for initiating the attack to him, and he replied that if there was any alternative to the attack it should be carefully considered before opening fire, for Alexander believed the attack would take all the artillery ammunition that was left.

Longstreet quickly clarified the message, stating that the intent was to attack and for Alexander to keep he and Pickett informed of the artillery's effectiveness and ammunition status.³⁵

At 1300 hours the cannons roared into action, and the Federal guns responded. As the firestorm swelled, Longstreet rode calmly along the front of the Confederate line of battle.³⁶ One Virginian thought Longstreet was one of the bravest men he ever saw. As the ammunition ran low, Alexander sent a note to Pickett who was with Longstreet, and Longstreet reluctantly approved Pickett's advance.³⁷

As Pickett moved forward, Longstreet went to Alexander who informed Longstreet that the artillery ammunition was out, the reserve guns had not arrived, and it would take at least one hour to replenish the ammunition.

Based on this new information, Longstreet considered halting the advance. He remarked to Alexander: "I don't want to make this attack, I believe it will fail . . . but General Lee has ordered it and expects it."³⁸ With little artillery support, the Confederate advance continued. Federal artillery continued throughout the charge.

As the day before, the attack was not coordinated. Ewell's support on the Union right flank began before the advance and was little more than a skirmish when Pickett moved out. Hill's support in the center never materialized. The divisions on the left and right of Pickett could not keep up under the fire hitting their flanks. By the time Pickett's men reached the Union position both flanks were open. After initial success Pickett was surrounded, and withdrew his men.³⁹

Longstreet moved the artillery and troops in position to meet the anticipated Federal counterattack. He assisted in rallying the broken ranks and preventing a flight to the rear.⁴⁰

Lee placed Longstreet in command of the withdrawal to Virginia, and by late July the army was establishing defensive positions behind the Rappahannock. As the troops spent the next weeks recovering, Longstreet allowed his corps respite from the war. Whiskey, girls, and fiddles were common in the camps of First Corps.⁴¹

Few Civil War battles provoke more controversy than Gettysburg. Longstreet's performance was unsatisfactory. His main shortcoming in terms of leadership dimensions was professional ethics. The historical perception that Longstreet "sulked" is supportable. His initial counsel to Lee to avoid attacking was probably sound, but to object repeatedly was unprofessional, particularly his remarks to Alexander on the third day.

Longstreet's conduct at Gettysburg with respect to Lee will always be debated. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to say Lee's desire to take the offensive given the circumstances was not sound. Given this situation, Longstreet was basically faced with four decisions with respect to Lee's orders. He could have resigned, he could have respectfully asked Lee to relieve him of command and let a court of inquiry determine his fate at a later date, he could have sulked and allowed himself to become distracted in his preparations for battle, or he could put all his effort and energy into preparing his battle plan to make the best of the situation. To resign might have done considerable harm to the army. The perception among the soldiers that great disharmony existed between the senior officers would have

certainly impacted the soldier's performance in the battle. The option of relief was perhaps an option that Lee and Longstreet could have chosen. The two men could have reached some sort of agreement once Lee fully realized that Longstreet's conscience would simply not allow him to carry out the plan.

Of course, the best option would have been to give his best effort to carry out Lee's intent. However, the historical data supports the fact that he sulked. His attempt to countermand Lee in front of McLaws was unprofessional, and his refusal to allow McLaws to conduct a reconnaissance of the ground may have been the direct result of sulking.

His decision to ride with Hood, who was behind McLaws in the order of march, was not only poor supervision and decision-making, but probably due to sulking as much as any factor. He wasn't acting like he was in charge. The corps commander needed to be with the lead division unless there was a compelling reason that he couldn't be, and there is no evidence that a compelling reason existed.

One of his worst actions of the battle was on the second day with his abrupt response to McLaws that nothing (no enemy) was to his front. This was not the same Longstreet who was so careful in his reconnaissance at Second Manassas. When McLaws and then Hood both repeatedly announced their concerns, Longstreet did nothing, refusing to even move to the front to see things for himself. He cited "Lee's orders" as both division commanders objected to the plan of attack. It was Lee's intent to defeat the enemy with offensive operations against the Union left. He initially gave specific guidance as to how McLaws should deploy but allowed him to adjust based on the enemy situation. It is reasonable to infer that Lee would accept further alteration to

the plan, as long as it still met Lee's intent of offensive operations against the Union left, based on what is known of Lee's leadership style. Longstreet simply disagreed with the intent, and for the first time in the war appears determined to follow the letter of the plan, not the spirit of the plan. This is not the same Longstreet who operated so freely within the commanders intent at First and Second Manassas, Williamsburg, Gaines Mill, Glendale, Antietam, Fredericksburg, or even Suffolk.

While Longstreet's courage (team development) is admirable as he leads from the front in battle, his supervision was misdirected. He needed to be in the rear coordinating support for the attack, not up front deploying the brigades. If he felt he had to be up front, then he should have been with Hood's division since Hood was wounded.

On the third day, his actions are again subject to criticism. He didn't go to headquarters the night prior to the battle, and all his effort the following morning was toward his plan of moving around the Union army. Longstreet's failures resulted in an uncoordinated attack.

Longstreet's performance at Gettysburg is a significant turning point in this thesis. As mentioned in Chapter One, there are some prominent issues that are controversial concerning Longstreet. Until the analysis of Gettysburg, there is no data in this thesis to support a controversy concerning Longstreet. However, based on his performance at Gettysburg, his professional ethics can be questioned. The most damaging criticism of Longstreet for this study is professional ethics on the second day. After both McLaws and Hood expressed their doubts, Longstreet's duty was to see the field for himself, and take Lee with him. Not only did Longstreet fail to pass the reports to Lee, he did

not go himself. He simply cited "Lee's orders" to both men and ordered the attack. Had he been informed of the new information of the enemy's location and strength, Lee would have at least had the option of considering another course of action. However, at this point Longstreet appeared exasperated with Lee (or at least Lee's plan) and did not pass on the new information concerning the enemy.

At First Manassas, Longstreet was willing to alter Johnston's orders and pursue the Federals toward Centerville. At Gaines Mill, he altered the plan of demonstration to a full attack. At Groveton, he pushed hard for an extra day to prepare the attack. At Suffolk, with conflicting priorities, he chose to spread his army for foraging instead of consolidating to reinforce Lee. Longstreet had demonstrated a propensity to make his own decisions, and Lee was comfortable with Longstreet in this regard. In the early hours of Gettysburg, however, Longstreet and Lee disagreed about strategy, and it appears Longstreet became frustrated with his inability to change Lee's mind. This frustration is understandable, but should not effect a leader's performance in such a profound way.

In Longstreet's own words he claims to have disagreed strongly with the plan but had no choice but to carry it out. On numerous fields before he had disagreed and showed much greater initiative in performing his duties. At Gettysburg this initiative was absent, and the only available evidence for this sudden lack of initiative is his frustration with not having his way on strategy. This is unsatisfactory professional ethics.

Chickamauga and Knoxville

After Gettysburg, Longstreet revisited his plan for moving his corps west to reinforce Bragg. Lee, on the other hand, wanted to attempt another offensive against Meade's army along the Rappahannock River. Lee wrote, "I can see nothing better to be done than to . . . crush his (Meade's) army while in its present condition."⁴² Longstreet disagreed with Lee's strategy and told Lee he believed more could be accomplished by sending two corps to Tennessee while leaving one corps on the defensive in Virginia. Longstreet added in a letter dated September 5, 1863, "I doubt if General Bragg has confidence in himself or his troops either. He is not likely to do a great deal for us."⁴³

After a conference with Davis, Lee approved the detachment of Longstreet with two divisions. Longstreet detrained with two members of his staff at Catoosa Station in northern Georgia on September 19, 1863. There was no guide to meet him, and it was almost midnight when he finally located Bragg. Bragg briefed Longstreet on his plan, which was to assault the Union position west of the Lafayette Road in division echelon from right to left, with Longstreet commanding the left wing.⁴⁴

After a few hours sleep, Longstreet went in search of his command. When he met Hood, the two had a warm reception. Hood recalled later that Longstreet "responded with that confidence which had so often contributed to his extraordinary success . . . he was the first General I had met since my arrival who talked of victory."⁴⁵

To better understand the terrain, Longstreet spoke to a Confederate soldier whose family farm was located near the enemy's position. This conversation helped Longstreet orient the direction of

his attack, and to determine the point where he would concentrate his force.⁴⁶

Longstreet discovered his lines misaligned. He did not locate all his divisions until dawn and still had not located the right wing. Longstreet made slight adjustments but essentially left the units in place. Longstreet's intent was for five divisions (there were six divisions in his left wing) to be on line with one division in reserve. The divisions were to be arrayed with two brigades in the first echelon and one brigade in the second echelon, unless a division had four brigades, and in that case there would be two brigades in the second echelon. Hood, with four brigades, was to be the main effort. However, before Hood was able to move into position, Bragg ordered Longstreet's wing forward.⁴⁷

The result was fortuitous, as Longstreet basically had a column of eight brigades (the front line division, Hood's division, and the reserve division) attacking along a narrow front. This narrow front was also open, as Major General W. S. Rosecrans was shifting forces from the Union right to the Union left to meet Polk's advance on the Confederate right wing. A gap was created in the Union lines and Longstreet's divisions poured through.⁴⁸

The Union lines were now split and the Union right wing, weakened and isolated by the shifting of troops, was driven from the field. The original plan was to turn south once a penetration of the Union lines was accomplished, but, on the advice of his division commanders, Longstreet turned his attention to the Union left wing and assailed it's right flank. Rosecrans had already retreated to Chattanooga with the Union right wing, but the Union commander on the

left, Major General George Thomas, met the Confederate assaults throughout the afternoon. The casualties on both sides were staggering. Longstreet recommended to Bragg a movement around Thomas's rear to block his escape route. Brass replied that the right wing was not capable of supporting the effort. By late afternoon Thomas, surrounded on three sides, conducted an orderly withdrawal and rejoined his routed commander in Chattanooga.⁴⁹

After the fighting, one lieutenant wrote: "Longstreet is the boldest and bravest looking man I ever saw. I don't think he would dodge if a shell burst under his chin."⁵⁰ Bragg's veterans gave Longstreet a new nickname, "Bull of the woods."⁵¹

After the battle, Longstreet ordered his divisions to establish hasty defenses, round up stragglers, redistribute ammunition, and prepare to continue the attack in the morning.⁵²

After the battle, Longstreet recommended to Bragg a move north of Chattanooga to cut off the Union army's line of communication. Instead, Bragg began siege operations and Longstreet would not conceal his disappointment. He urged a more aggressive course of action but the relationship between Bragg and Longstreet deteriorated to the point where cooperation between the two was impossible. Longstreet wrote the Secretary of War, saying "nothing but the hand of God can save us as long as we have our present commander . . . can't you send us General Lee."⁵³

In a conference with other senior officers, Longstreet remarked: "Bragg was not on the field [at Chickamauga] . . . and Lee would have been."⁵⁴ The situation was so bad that Davis felt it necessary to visit the army. During a meeting with Bragg present,

Longstreet told Davis that "Bragg would be of greater service elsewhere than commanding the Army of Tennessee."⁵⁵ Neglecting Longstreet's advice, as well as the advice of others at the meeting, Davis left Bragg in command. Late in October, Davis assigned Longstreet an independent command in eastern Tennessee. Burnside had occupied Knoxville, and Longstreet was to move against him while Bragg withdrew further south to the vicinity of Missionary Ridge.⁵⁶

Longstreet's march to Knoxville was slow, as he had no maps or guides, and the food, shoes, and other supplies were critically low. He sent pontoons by rail and then had no wagons to haul them from the rail station. As might be expected the cooperation between Bragg and Longstreet was poor. Longstreet sent repeated requests for reinforcements and supplies and Bragg would answer that he needed Longstreet to be ready to move to reinforce him at any moment.⁵⁷

Burnside had skillfully established his defensive fortifications around Knoxville. Longstreet realized he would need to make a frontal assault to defeat Burnside if he had any hope of returning to Bragg before Bragg was attacked. Longstreet had his force ready on November 21 but could not decide on the best place to attack. He conducted numerous reconnaissances, made several requests for reinforcements, and repositioned troops and artillery. The new artillery positions proved to be harmful as it increased the range to the maximum range for the cannons, and the old shells often exploded at the muzzle due to the extra powder needed to make the cannon balls travel that far.⁵⁸

During a reconnaissance Longstreet observed a Union soldier walking through one of the Union defense trenches and noticed it was

waist deep and required no ladder or assistance to move through. Longstreet ordered a more detailed reconnaissance of this position, known as Fort Sanders.⁵⁹ This effort revealed that the ditches were deeper than Longstreet had thought but he ordered the attack anyway. The plan was altered to be based on surprise so no artillery was to be used and the assaulting force was to move to the Union defensive lines before first light. McLaws was the main effort with three brigades in column conducting the attack, as a supporting brigade moved east and to the rear of the fortification while another supporting brigade conducted a feint below the fort. One brigade was kept in reserve. McLaws's brigades were organized in columns of regiments to add depth and shock effect and were to concentrate on the northwest corner of the fort.⁶⁰

The attack was delayed several hours, and when McLaws (who had formed several hundred yards from the Union position) moved, his troops were in clear view as they moved forward. Surprise was lost. His columns soon found themselves trapped in a ditch not waist deep but eight feet deep, and the Union side of the ditch was too steep to climb. No ladders were available. Longstreet had ordered no artillery support to aid the planned surprise attack. Eight hundred Confederate men were casualties in twenty minutes, but Union casualties numbered only fifteen. Longstreet ordered a halt to the debacle.⁶¹

That same day Longstreet learned of Bragg's defeat at Missionary Ridge, and was given broad authority by Davis to determine his best course of action. He could move south to join Bragg, move east to join Lee in Virginia, or remain in place to continue to threaten Burnside and prevent the Union from claiming all of Tennessee.⁶²

Longstreet decided to remain even though he knew Grant would soon be in pursuit. Grant sent three columns in pursuit of Longstreet under the commands of Major Generals W. T. Sherman, W. L. Elliot, and J. G. Foster, respectively. Longstreet's plan to meet this threat was to move his force north of Knoxville to defeat Foster, send a detachment to slow the advance of Sherman, then defeat Sherman after the defeat of Foster, and finally defeat Elliot who had the farthest to travel.⁶³

A heavy snowstorm prevented any further action and both armies moved into winter quarters. Longstreet's mission was to protect the Cumberland Gap entry to Virginia. Isolated, Longstreet's main problem in the winter of 1864 was to keep his army fed and clothed. Longstreet utilized his cavalry for most of the foraging operations to protect his poorly shod infantry from having to do this.⁶⁴

Longstreet's performance in the West is debated. In the context of leadership dimensions his performance at the Battle of Chickamauga was sound. His ability to arrive on the field after dark and lead an entire wing to a resounding victory the next day is commendable.

Longstreet's supervision, however, is debatable. After the initial success, Longstreet appeared to play little role in the battle against Thomas on Snodgrass Hill. His decision to allow his division commanders to fight their battles with little interference may have been a trait learned from Lee, but continuous assaults with heavy casualties was not a Longstreet trait. He could have been more involved in the battle and given more specific orders. On the other hand, he recognized the fact that the division commanders had been on the field, knew the enemy and terrain better than he, and were on the verge of a great

victory. It is difficult to expect Longstreet to have known what a superb stand Thomas' isolated corps would make. On balance, his supervision was satisfactory.

Longstreet displayed sound decision making throughout the day. First, his decision to allow the units to move forward even though he hadn't completed his alignments proved to be the turning point in the battle. Had Longstreet halted the advance because he wasn't yet comfortable with his attack formation, the opportunity to exploit the gap in the Union lines could have been lost. While it is true Longstreet did not create the gap nor give the order to begin the attack, he displayed a good sense of battlefield awareness in letting the attack go forward. His experience as a battlefield commander was a major factor in the Confederate good fortune of being in the right place at the right time.

Second, after the initial breakthrough, Longstreet adjusted the plan of attack to continue to aggressively exploit the opportunity created by splitting the Union army. He allowed his division commanders to turn against the right flank of Thomas. Although Thomas held, Longstreet's plan to envelope Thomas was sound and could have resulted in a devastating blow to the Union. As mentioned, Longstreet's supervision in this effort could have been better. His third sound decision was the counsel to Bragg to block Thomas' retreat. After realizing Bragg could not defeat Thomas, Longstreet's advice to block his escape route could have prevented the reuniting of Thomas with Rosecrans.

Longstreet's competence, planning, and decision making are also evident at Chickamauga. Investing an isolated Thomas with control of

the lines of communication was a good tactical plan. Bragg's decision to ignore the advice and allow Thomas to retreat in good order to Rosecrans was a lost opportunity of the campaign.

However, between the end of the battle and his deployment to Knoxville, Longstreet once again demonstrated poor professional ethics. Longstreet's words with fellow general officers concerning Bragg are at best insubordinate and at worst illegal. Longstreet practically instigated a revolt against Bragg within the army. Longstreet should have demanded a transfer from Bragg's command once it became obvious the two could not work together. After Chickamauga, the Longstreet-Bragg situation was the beginning of the end for the Army of Tennessee. Although Longstreet may have been correct in his choice of strategy, he did not have the authority to undermine Bragg in such a deliberate manner. The decision to divide Bragg's army made little tactical or strategic sense. The enemy situation in Knoxville was not fully developed when Longstreet deployed, and Grant's intent was unknown as well. To divide the Army at this stage is difficult to support. The decision appears to have been made more to divide Longstreet and Bragg than to divide the army, with the loss at Chattanooga the result.

It is also interesting to analyze Longstreet's desire to replace Bragg as the army commander. In a letter dated August 18, 1863 to Senator Louis Wigfall concerning his desire to operate in the west, Longstreet wrote that he had "no personal motive . . . for Bragg's army."⁶⁵ However, in a letter to Wigfall dated September 12, 1863, Longstreet wrote to Wigfall saying, "I don't think that I should be under Bragg, and would fight against it . . . [but] the world might say

I was desirous of a position which would give me fame."⁶⁶ It is noteworthy that in a letter to Wigfall dated February 4, 1863

Longstreet proposed that he and Bragg switch jobs, a move Longstreet said could yield "opportunities for all kinds of moves to great advantages."⁶⁷

Finally, in the letter to Lee mentioned on page 61 (dated September 5, 1863) in which Longstreet questioned Bragg's confidence in his troops and himself, Longstreet had added, "I feel that I am influenced by no personal motive in this suggestion (to operate in the west)."⁶⁸

Longstreet's repeated mention of Bragg's command is enough by itself for one to question his motives, and when that evidence is added to Longstreet's actions (to undermine Bragg) after Chickamauga it is arguable Longstreet was after Bragg's job. There is adequate evidence to question Longstreet's professional ethics in this regard. His comments to fellow general officers, his letter to the Secretary of War, and his counsel to Davis all clearly indicate Longstreet wanted Bragg out of command. When Davis allowed Bragg to remain in command Longstreet's next best option was the independent command in Knoxville. With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see what a poor decision it was to divide the army to give Longstreet a command. However, it is the opinion here that Longstreet was a strong enough strategist and tactician (even if Bragg and Davis were not) to realize at the time that to divide the army was an incredibly risky venture. Longstreet's failure in professional ethics after Chickamauga can be indirectly linked to Bragg's crushing defeat at Missionary Ridge.

On the other hand, Longstreet's independent command at Knoxville is often perceived as a failure, and, along with Suffolk, proof that he was unfit for independent command. The evidence does not support this view. Although he experienced several problems, on balance Longstreet's independent command at Knoxville was satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies.

The march to Knoxville was the first time in his career that he failed to logistically prepare a unit for movement. The move was slow and disorganized, but once in position his deliberate and careful style returned. He was reluctant to make the frontal attack at Knoxville. He adjusted the plan, delayed the attack, and carried it out only when he thought it had the best chance for success. The tactical employment of McLaws was sound, adding depth to the assault and incorporating deception in the plan. He failed in one important battlefield operating system, intelligence. The obstacle was not constructed as he thought. His supervision of McLaws' initial assault position was also unsatisfactory, as he should have been on the scene to insure McLaws was positioned properly. Once it was determined the assault was a failure, he made the right and timely decision to call a halt.

After Knoxville, he made the one strategic decision that would cause Grant the most trouble, and was also the most audacious. By remaining isolated he forced Grant to chase him, but also risked defeat in detail. This delayed decisive attacks by the Union in either theater, buying time for both Confederate armies. Both Lincoln and Grant were concerned about Longstreet's presence. Grant wrote Lincoln, "If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley (eastern Tennessee), I do

not think it unlikely that the last great battle of the war will be fought in east Tennessee."⁶⁹

Finally, Longstreet's failure to return to Bragg prior to Bragg's defeat is criticized. Although the initial decision to divide the army was poor, once the "die was cast" an attempt by Longstreet to reach Bragg would have risked attack from Grant's vastly numerically superior force, and the potential of piecemeal defeat of both wings of Bragg's army. Longstreet's decision to remain in Knoxville was supportable.

In March, 1864, Longstreet was called to a council of war in Richmond and enjoyed a reception with Lee, whom he hadn't seen in seven months. Once again, Longstreet shared his strategic vision with the Confederate high command. Longstreet recommended a move with his corps into Kentucky. Longstreet believed an invasion into the Ohio valley might bring about the political defeat of Lincoln in the 1864 elections. Instead, Davis wanted Longstreet to reinforce Johnston (now in command of the Army of Tennessee) to continue operations there.⁷⁰

Wilderness

In April, Grant located his headquarters with Meade. Longstreet was ordered back to Lee, who had established his defensive lines along the south side of the Rapidan River, with a front exceeding sixty miles. This front was necessary for foraging and to counter Grant's 120,000 man army. In early May, Grant began his move around Lee's right flank, moving south toward Richmond. Lee moved against the Union right flank using two parallel roads, and Longstreet, in reserve, was ordered to move quickly to reinforce A. P. Hill. After a forced

march throughout the night of May 5, Longstreet's corps arrived on the field shortly after daybreak on May 6. Lee's right flank was routed and he was in danger of an envelopment. Many of Hill's men were in full retreat, causing Lee to remark to one brigade commander: "My God, General McGowan, is this fine brigade of yours fleeing like wild geese?"⁷¹ Longstreet's Corps went to a double time and shifted into a battle formation with the forward ranks being deployed as skirmishers due to the thick and heavily wooded terrain. His ranks opened on the road to allow Hill's to move through and then smashed into the enemy in one of the best counterattacks of the war. Longstreet's Chief of Staff remarked later: "the forming line, in the dense brush, under fire of the enemy, amid Hill's routed men was the (best) thing the Corps ever did. To their chief was due that steadiness as always."⁷²

Longstreet followed his success by shifting four brigades to the north and attacking the left of the Union force along the Orange Turnpike road. The Union commander on the Orange Turnpike road remarked after the war: "You rolled me up like a wet blanket."⁷³

Longstreet continued to push his success. The remainder of the Union army was east of the battlefield along a north-south road known as the Brock Road. He wanted to attack their left flank in a fashion similar to the attack he used on the Union force on the Orange Turnpike. As Longstreet rode forward to find a route for this attack, friendly fire rang out and a bullet found Longstreet's throat and lodged in his right shoulder. His aides lifted him from the saddle and lay him beside a tree. He called for Major General Charles Field and placed him in command and with blood flowing from his mouth Longstreet explained to Field his plan for continuing the attack. As he was being carried to

the rear soldiers remarked he was dead. With his left hand he lifted his hat and the soldiers burst into cheers.⁷⁴

With Longstreet's fall the momentum of the attack stalled. Lee reformed his command in the confusion of the "wilderness" but by the time the renewed assault commenced the Union forces were reorganized. After the war, Alexander wrote Longstreet "intended to play his hand for all it was worth and to push the pursuit with his whole force."⁷⁵ A member of Lee's staff later wrote: "A strange fatality attended us [after Longstreet's wounding]."⁷⁶

After five months of recovery, Longstreet was back in command of Lee's First Corps. One staff officer wrote: "When Longstreet rode along the lines for the first time, the men reacted with wild enthusiasm."⁷⁷

Longstreet's performance at the Wilderness is one of the best of his career. Often considered by critics as too slow to move into battle, Longstreet's timely movement here may have prevented the defeat of Lee's army, as Hill's routed corps left Lee's left flank, Ewell's corps, isolated against Grant's army. Longstreet's control of troops conducting a passage of lines with a routed unit under fire is remarkable, and demonstrates strength in several leadership competencies, particularly supervision. Another negative perception of Longstreet is that he lacked aggressiveness. Nowhere is this more disputable than at the Wilderness. Late in the war he turned a near defeat into a victory and pushed the attack "for all it was worth," as evidenced by his plan to assault the Union left in an attempt to follow up the initial success. After his wounding, Longstreet's guidance to

Field gave evidence of his strong battlefield competence, as he realized that command and control was crucial at that stage of the battle.

As mentioned on page 68, Longstreet again displayed his strategic vision by his advocacy of a strategic move in the west, this time into the Ohio River Valley. What might have happened is hard to say, but it is more evidence of Longstreet's strategic thinking, which continued to be offensive and audacious in nature.

A final area for analysis during this period is Longstreet's popularity with his troops. There are numerous accounts of Longstreet's popularity, and several are noteworthy during the Wilderness campaign. Although popularity is not a requirement for success, it does demonstrate that he had developed teamwork and comraderie within the corps, and that soldiers trusted him. These admirable relationships had been developed during the previous three years as he had shared the hardships and frustrations of battle with his men.

Petersburg

By the time Longstreet returned to duty in October, 1864, Lee had been forced to retreat to defensive lines around Richmond and was under siege from Grant's huge army. Longstreet was assigned Lee's left wing which was comprised of the forces north of the James River and three miles south of the James to the peninsula known as Bermuda Hundred. In late October the Union forces attempted to break the center of Longstreet's lines in the area just north of the James. A strong feint on Longstreet's far left (which was also the extreme left of Lee's defenses) was to mask the main effort. However, Longstreet correctly identified the feint due to the lack of Union infantry on his left and

shifted his troops to his center. Using cover and concealment Longstreet's men were in position to crush the Union attack by striking the Union's right flank, causing 1,000 Union casualties while suffering less than 100. It was Grant's last attempt to break the Confederate left held by Longstreet. The Union effort to break the Confederate lines ended for the winter. Henceforth, the Union efforts at Petersburg were directed against Lee's right.⁷⁸

During the winter of 1864-1865 it became clear that the Confederacy was doomed. The Army of Tennessee had been destroyed at Nashville and Sherman was marching through Georgia and the Carolinas to join Grant. Desertion in the face of hunger and defeat was taking a toll in Lee's army.

Nevertheless, Longstreet continued to improve his position. He utilized plows to dredge the roads into his position and constructed roads in his interior lines to facilitate moving artillery and supplies in his sector. He reinforced the trenches with logs and brushworks. After the retreat from Petersburg in April, the Union forces who passed through Longstreet's lines called them "perfect."⁷⁹

Throughout the winter Longstreet continued to serve as one of Lee's most trusted subordinates. Lee was continually besieged by Richmond to detach troops to meet threats all over the south. Longstreet responded that Lee's troops were needed to break through the Union lines to make a turning movement and strike the Union right flank and rear.⁸⁰ Lee asked Longstreet to attempt this maneuver, but Longstreet felt the attempt must be supported by attacks all along Lee's front, to occupy Grant so Grant could not reinforce Longstreet's main attack, and also to keep the Union force oriented to the north making

the right flank assault possible. Lee no longer had the numbers in his force to attempt the maneuver.⁸¹

On April 1, Lee's right was broken at the battle of Five Forks. Longstreet arrived at Lee's position to lead the retreat. He posted one division in the front to slow the enemy's advance, and throughout the movement heavy skirmishing occurred as the retreat was continually blocked by Grant's cavalry. On April 5 Longstreet sent his cavalry forward to secure the bridge near Sailor's Creek, a chokepoint on his march. He then turned his army north to meet the Union attack which he expected on his right flank due to the detachment of his cavalry. The Union attack never materialized and he continued the retreat. To Longstreet's rear marched Ewell, and on April 6 the pursuit overtook Ewell and forced the surrender of his corps. Lee received a note from Grant on April 7, and Lee asked for terms April 8. A final breakout was attempted on the morning of April 9 but was useless, as lines of Union infantry surrounded the Confederate army, waiting the word from Grant to attack. As Lee rode to meet Grant, James Longstreet prepared his last defense. His final counsel to Lee: "If he doesn't give us good terms, come back and let us fight it out."⁸²

For the final stage of the war Longstreet continued to display strength in all leadership competencies analyzed here, just as he had in the first stage of the war at Bull Run. It is interesting to note that he led the army's first strategic maneuver from Manassas to the Peninsula in 1862, and the final tactical movement from Petersburg to Appomattox.

Longstreet's strong defensive line that defeated the Union attack in October, 1864, is a commendable display of soldier/team

building. A poor attitude at that stage of the war, under the terrible conditions at Petersburg, was surely difficult to avoid. However, there was no negativism in Longstreet and he continued to motivate his men to perform to their potential, culminating in the superb defense north of Bermuda Hundred. There was still fight left in the First Corps, and Longstreet deserves recognition for this. The fact that no further attempts to break the lines in Longstreet's sector were made is evidence of the enemy's respect for his corps' abilities, and Longstreet's tactical and technical competence.

Longstreet's actions during the movement west from Petersburg, particularly the securing of Sailor's Creek bridge and orienting the army north, were sound planning and tactical competence principles that assisted Lee in this desperate situation. Both men were still holding out hope for a breakthrough.

Longstreet's plans prior to April for a breakout of the defensive lines are yet more evidence to support the position that Longstreet was continually thinking in terms of strategic initiatives that were offensive in nature. This was a pattern displayed by Longstreet throughout the war. To remain behind the lines was to await defeat, and even at Petersburg he advocated an aggressive movement to regain the initiative.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The primary research question for this thesis asked: Was James Longstreet's leadership satisfactory during the American Civil War when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100? The answer to this question is that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory over the course of the war when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies. The table on page 77 visually displays the satisfactory nature of Longstreet's overall leadership. As one can see, however, he was unsatisfactory in the leadership competency of professional ethics over the course of the war as well as unsatisfactory during two campaigns, Seven Pines and Gettysburg. However, he was satisfactory or better for the other eight leadership competencies over the course of the war, and was satisfactory or better during the other eleven campaigns in which he participated during the war. On balance, these findings support the research conclusion that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory during the war when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies.

In this chapter, the primary research question will be discussed first, and the two supporting research questions, along with an analysis of the Longstreet controversy, will be discussed later in the chapter. Although not a supporting research question, the thesis will conclude

with a brief discussion of the usefulness of the nine leadership competencies for a study of this nature.

The table on page 77 is intended as a visual aid to allow the reader to readily see the results of the thesis. No weights are assigned to the competencies, as the matrix is only intended to depict trends and not absolute values. The horizontal column contains the nine competencies and the vertical column contains the campaigns analyzed in the thesis.

Abbreviations for the nine competencies are as follows:

soldier/team development (ST), supervision (SU), technical and tactical competence (TT), teaching and counseling (TC), use of available systems (US), planning (PL), professional ethics (PE), decisiveness (DE), and communications (CO). The "+" rating indicates a satisfactory observation, "++" indicates a positive observation, and a "(-)" rating indicates a negative observation. A blank space indicates not enough data was available to assign a rating for that competency for that campaign, or that it was not necessary to assign a rating to successfully conduct the analysis. Numbers correspond to campaigns as follows: First Manassas (1), Williamsburg (2), Seven Pines (3), The Seven Days (4), Second Manassas (5), Antietam (6), Fredericksburg (7), Independent Command- Suffolk (8), Gettysburg (9), Chickamauga (10), Independent Command- Knoxville (11), The Wilderness (12), and Petersburg (13).

TABLE 1
LONGSTREET LEADERSHIP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
ST:	++	+	+	+	+	+	++		(-)	+		+	+
SU:	++	+	+	+	++	++	++		+		(-)	+	+
TT:	++	+	(-)	++	++	+	++	+	(-)	+	+	++	++
TC:	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	(-)			++	++
US:	+				++	+	+	+	+	+	+		+
PL:	++	+	(-)	(-)	+	+	++	+	(-)	+	(-)	+	++
PE:			(-)	+	+	+			(-)		(-)		++
DE:	+	+	+	+	+	+	++	+	+	+	+	++	+
CO:	++	+	(-)	+	+	+	+	++	+	+	+	++	+

Leadership is an art. No attempt has been made here to scientifically evaluate leadership. As mentioned, the table provides a graphic illustration of the results of the thesis, and depicts trends. It is not intended as a scientific method to evaluate Longstreet.

This chapter focuses on defending the answer to the primary research question, and defending the answers to the two supporting research questions. The primary research question is addressed initially, and the supporting research questions are discussed later in the chapter.

At First Manassas in July, 1861, Longstreet excelled in soldier/team development. He built a team through drill and discipline,

At First Manassas in July, 1861, Longstreet excelled in soldier/team development. He built a team through drill and discipline, setting the standard for the unit by insisting that training be conducted three times a day. This development was evident in the manner the brigade defeated the Union assault.

Longstreet's plan for the defense along Bull Run indicates excellence in technical and tactical competence and planning. Longstreet's defense was well organized. He established a main effort in the center of his sector and maintained adequate coverage throughout his area of responsibility. His use of reserves, scouts, and skirmishers was tactically sound, indicating satisfactory command of his available systems. His supervision and communication skills were superb. He prevented a retreat when the troops initially broke for the rear, and these skills were particularly strong when Early's brigade rushed on the field committing fratricide. He demonstrated excellence in planning and technical competence in offensive tactics, similar to the excellence displayed for the defense. His plan for force protection, scouts, and skirmishers was sound, particularly for the stream crossing. His decision to continue the pursuit displayed aggressiveness and an ability to grasp conditions on a fluid battlefield, an indication of his bold decision-making skills.

His use of available systems and decision making during the defense on July 17 indicate a lack of experience. His artillery did not play a significant role in the battle due to the fact it was moving when the attack came. The details in the use of this system, artillery, needed improvement. His decision to call Early forward at the same moment he was conducting a pursuit across a stream was a questionable

decision. In the first engagement of the war, a more conservative thought process was needed. However, on balance it is inappropriate to assess an unsatisfactory rating for these two competencies because of strength displayed in them at other times during the campaign.

The next campaign for analysis is the Peninsula Campaign, which includes Williamsburg, Seven Pines, and the Seven Days Battles.

Longstreet was satisfactory in soldier/team development throughout the Peninsula Campaign. Prior to Williamsburg, he continued to maintain the standard for training he established at Manassas. After Seven Pines he authorized streamers to build morale and reinforce standards, and during the intensity of the Seven Days the teamwork in the unit was evident throughout the struggle, culminating in the defeat of the Union force at Glendale. Longstreet had built a trained force that would fight together and hold the field.

Longstreet was also satisfactory in supervision throughout the campaign. At Williamsburg and throughout the Seven Days, he was personally on the field committing brigades and directing the attacks. At Seven Pines, Longstreet's lack of supervision of D. H. Hill was in fact the proper thing to do. In the midst of the confusion, Longstreet was correct not to interfere with a subordinate who was getting the job done, supporting Hill but not interfering with his progress.

Longstreet's technical and tactical competence during the campaign was inconsistent. At Williamsburg, he displayed competence in determining the amount of force needed to defeat the Union in his rearguard mission, and during the Seven Days he was superb in directing troops and applying combat power in the victories at Gaines Mill and Glendale. However, at Seven Pines he was unsatisfactory. He failed to

clarify orders, failed to keep his chain of command informed, and failed to fight his unit in a coordinated attack. Longstreet's planning was unsatisfactory at Seven Pines and at Malvern Hill. At Malvern Hill, he was responsible for position selection for Lee's army, and was also the primary supporter of Lee's decision to attack.

In this crucial battle Longstreet failed to display satisfactory planning skills. His planning during the Seven Days including Malvern Hill was not detailed, as each engagement was characterized by aggressive action in frontal attacks and meeting engagements but little prior planning.

Longstreet's decision-making was sound throughout the campaign, as was his communication, with the exception of Seven Pines. His failure to report to Johnston when his command intermingled with Huger was unacceptable, and prevented Johnston from exercising command and control.

Longstreet's professional ethics after Seven Pines were unsatisfactory. In his report he blamed Huger for the problems without acknowledging his own failures in the battle. It may have been fair to question Huger's aggressiveness in supporting the attack, but to attempt to blame him for the lack of complete success was unprofessional.

Longstreet learned many lessons during the Peninsula Campaign, and put these lessons learned into practice during the next three campaigns of 1862; Second Manassas, Maryland, and Fredericksburg. During these three campaigns the Confederacy enjoyed some of its greatest successes. In this research all the observations for Longstreet's leadership in terms of the nine leadership competencies during this time were positive. The primary traits Longstreet gained

were a greater appreciation for careful planning and deliberate decision-making. For the remainder of the war he was very careful in the commitment of troops to battle. He wanted every available advantage before the battle, and was reluctant to accept risk unless there was no alternative. He has been criticized for being slow to give battle but there is good reason to view him as a prudent leader, with sound insight into what would or would not work on a battlefield.

At Second Manassas, Longstreet's soldier/team development skills were displayed in his recognition of his troops' desire to gamble in camp. It was a decision to help morale, without negatively affecting combat readiness. As mentioned in Chapter Three, he should have chosen a better method to communicate his concern to General Lee, as Lee wanted to put a stop to it. However, in this matter it is not significant enough to warrant an unsatisfactory ethics finding for the entire campaign. His decision to relieve Toombs was also sound soldier/team development in establishing unit standards, and showed strength in supervision and teaching and counseling. Longstreet's planning and decision making were displayed in his decision to secure Thoroughfare Gap prior to the arrival of the main body. Longstreet had learned that intelligence reports were not always correct. His controversial decision to delay the attack to conduct additional reconnaissance and planning was the result of lessons learned at Malvern Hill, showing strong planning and technical/tactical competence, as well as sound communication with Lee. His use of artillery was superb, and his counsel to Hood to monitor the speed of the advance was excellent supervision for the circumstances. His personal, "on the scene" direction of the battle shows strength in supervision and team

development. Second Manassas was Longstreet's chance to display the skills at the division command level he gained on the Peninsula, and he took advantage of it.

During the Antietam campaign, Longstreet continued to excel. The training and maintenance that his units were noted for continued prior to the Maryland invasion, as evidenced by his command directive to conduct complete artillery inspections.

He continued to serve as one of Lee's most valued advisors, and his counsel not to divide the force had merit. His forthright communication with Lee was proper, and his counsel to abandon the South Mountain passes once Hill was engaged is further evidence of his careful and deliberate decision making process. Once the battle began, his strong supervision, use of artillery, and tactical competence were evident. He was a bold risk-taker on the 17th mainly because he had no choice. The army was in danger of defeat in both Jackson's and Hill's sectors so Longstreet nearly depleted his entire force to support their sectors, displaying his strong tactical competence and decision making skills. As on every battlefield before, except Seven Pines, Longstreet's supervision skills revealed a leader directly involved by his presence on the field. At Antietam, Longstreet continued to excel as a division commander.

At Fredericksburg, Longstreet's first attempt at formal corps command was a resounding success. It should be noted that since the Peninsula Campaign he had often been responsible for the deployment of more than just his own division, as both Johnston and Lee entrusted other divisions to Longstreet's supervision in battle, but this was the

first time he was formally in the chain of command of other divisions and not directly in command of his own division.

His counsel to the troops to use ashes for warmth shows a caring leader aware of the hardships of war. Allowing soldiers to toss snowballs at him and "horsing around" with his staff are traits that permeate a sound command climate, as long as the mission is accomplished, which it was. Soldier/team development, teaching and counselling, and supervision were strengths for Longstreet at Fredericksburg.

Longstreet's selection of terrain, organization for the defense, execution of the battle, and subsequent defensive line construction are strong evidence of sound technical/tactical competence, use of available systems, planning, and decision-making. Fredericksburg is arguably Longstreet's finest performance.

In his first attempt at independent command at Suffolk, he is often considered a failure. This thesis does not support that conclusion. As mentioned in chapter four, a review of the official records reveals Longstreet basically had five missions: foraging, seizing Union held terrain, halting Union expansion, protecting Richmond, and serving as Lee's operational reserve. He succeeded in foraging, halting Union expansion, and protecting Richmond. He didn't have the opportunity to complete his siege of Suffolk, and he wasn't alerted in time to join Lee at Chancellorsville. He displayed technical/tactical competence in the administration of prioritizing his missions and the execution of the duties of a large geographical command. His use of available systems, particularly his wagons, was adequate, and his communication with Lee concerning the competing

priorities of his command insured Lee was aware of his situation.

Though he did not excel in his first independent command, on balance his sound decision-making led to a successful command.

Gettysburg, on the other hand, is Longstreet's worst performance of the war. He appears to neglect many of the leadership competencies that had brought him earlier success.

Throughout his tenure since the Seven Days Battles, and particularly at Thoroughfare Gap and Groveton, Longstreet displayed strong tactical competence in the battlefield operating system of intelligence. He was very careful to fully develop the enemy situation.

During the second day at Gettysburg, this care in evaluating the intelligence situation was missing. He refused to let McLaws conduct a reconnaissance, instead relying on old information. When both Hood and McLaws counseled that the enemy position was too strong to attack on the original plan, he took no action.

Additionally, there is no evidence Longstreet took action to effectively coordinate the supporting attacks of Hill and Ewell. A sound planner at this stage of his career, he appears to have "assumed" that the coordination was being done for him. A follow up action on Longstreet's part concerning the supporting attacks, with both Hill and Ewell, or at least with Lee, would have been an appropriate thing to do.

His supervision and actual physical location on the battlefield was not as sound as it needed to be with the supporting corps as far away from him as they were. However, Lee had asked him to remain with McLaws, and Longstreet was in fact following Lee's directive. It is also a supportable position that Longstreet was leading by example, bravely remaining up front to share the same hardships as his troops.

Since he had been against the attack in the first place, and felt that his men were being asked to accomplish the impossible, his conscience may have in fact led him to the conclusion that he needed to be up front. This is certainly admirable, and deserves mention in the context of professional ethics. However, it must be remembered he was the corps commander, leading the main attack, and responsible for the entire operation. Admirable as it may seem, he had no business acting like a squad leader, so to speak. His command would have been better served with him in the rear using his considerable influence to "wake up" Hill and Ewell.

Longstreet's planning for the third day is worse than the second day. Since Lee had taken command, Longstreet had served as one of his most trusted advisors. He was always the senior subordinate on the field. Not since Seven Pines had Longstreet failed so badly to communicate with his commander. To make no attempt to go to headquarters the night before Pickett's charge is unacceptable. This lack of coordination and planning contributed to the disaster the next day.

Why this sudden lack of energy and initiative? It appears the only evidence available is Longstreet's paralyzing disappointment with Lee's strategy, as this greatly effected his leadership in terms of the leadership competencies. Whether Longstreet was correct or not is another story. Once the decision was made to attack, his troops deserved his best effort of the war. He was far too experienced not to grasp the strategic importance of Gettysburg, and too caring a leader not to give his men their best chance for survival given the fact that Lee was committed to the offensive.

In terms of leadership competencies, Longstreet's use of available systems, particularly artillery on the third day, and communication, especially the forthright opinions he provided to Lee, are both satisfactory. His use of artillery improved from the second day to the third day. While the artillery was not particularly effective on the third day, it is not appropriate to lay the blame with Longstreet. He made a strong attempt to have it influence the battle, but the Union commanders did a good job of negating its effects with sound force protection techniques. For soldier/team development and teaching and counseling, Longstreet made no attempt to build confidence in McLaws. He micro-managed McLaws and ignored his counsel several times.

The competencies of decision making, professional ethics, planning, supervision, and technical/tactical competence were mentioned earlier. On balance, Longstreet's leadership at Gettysburg was unsatisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies.

Longstreet rediscovered those leadership competencies which served him so well prior to Gettysburg when he was sent to reinforce Bragg. His disappointment with Lee's strategy seemed to have had a significant impact on his initiative during Gettysburg, but that initiative returned in the West. In a letter to Senator Wigfall, Longstreet stated, "I fear that we shall go . . . till all will be lost. I hope that I may get west in time to save what there is left for us."¹ When he finally got his wish to operate in the Western Theater in September 1863, Longstreet seemed to regain his fighting spirit and initiative at the great battle of Chickamauga. He "talks to victory"

with Hood, as the Army of Tennessee won one of its greatest battles at Chickamauga with Longstreet having arrived on the field just that morning. While his leadership was questionable in the competency of supervision during the assaults on Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge, his overall leadership in the battle was a considerable improvement over Gettysburg. As mentioned, it was fortuitous that Longstreet had eight brigades formed in column at the same position where there was a gap in the Union lines. However, Longstreet's intuitive knowledge of battlefield dynamics in terms of the leadership competencies of planning, communications, and decision making were evident throughout the battle. His soldier/team development was sound as he trusted his subordinate division commanders to accomplish the mission, and after the battle as he issued exact guidance to his command to prepare for continued operations, further developing a solid team atmosphere.

Longstreet's performance after Chickamauga was unsatisfactory in professional ethics. He deliberately undermined Bragg's authority. In less than three months, Longstreet allowed his personal disagreement concerning strategy to adversely affect his relationship with the commanding officers of both Confederate Armies. While it is honorable to express views forthrightly, which Longstreet did, once a decision was made he was bound by duty and regulation to support that decision. He failed to do this at Gettysburg and after Chickamauga, and because of his rank and influence in the Confederacy the effects of this failure were considerable.

In addition to unsatisfactory ethics, Longstreet's independent command at Knoxville resulted in unsatisfactory planning as well. The movement to Knoxville was poorly planned, as was the assault on Fort

Sanders. No ladders, little artillery, and poor execution led to the defeat. His supervision of McLaws's assault was marginal. In Tennessee, Longstreet appeared to have adopted Lee's philosophy of letting commanders fight their own battles. While this is sound strategy when it works, a commander must be able to supervise when necessary. Longstreet deserves supervision credit for halting the assault quickly. Longstreet's tactical competence was acceptable in the organization for the Fort Sanders assault. A balanced attack with brigades in depth utilizing a feint to aid in surprise was a sound method to penetrate the fort, but once again reliable intelligence was lacking. Longstreet's deliberate decision making was evident as he desired to attack only when conditions were most favorable. Finally, his use of cavalry to forage that winter instead of using poorly shod infantry was sound use of his available systems, as well as evidence of additional soldier/team building skills.

The final episode for analysis in Longstreet's second independent command is the fact that he prevented all of Tennessee from falling into Union hands. By sustaining a force north of Knoxville for six months, he was able to aid the Confederate cause by keeping both Grant's and Meade's armies occupied with the threat of an Ohio Valley invasion. Davis gave Longstreet several options, and he chose the most difficult one in terms of force sustainment, and the most difficult one for the Union to plan for in terms of operational strategy. While the need to establish an independent command for him in Knoxville was questionable in terms of the ethical relationship between him and Bragg, Longstreet's independent command was an operational success in the Cumberland Gap region of Tennessee and Virginia. Notwithstanding the

debacle at Fort Sanders, his performance demonstrated that he was capable of independent command.

Longstreet's return to Lee in April of 1864 was another turning point in his Civil War career. For the next year, until 9 April 1865, there is no evidence of negative leadership competencies. Longstreet had one of the finest performances of his career in early May 1864, at the Battle of the Wilderness. In the thick woods just west of Chancellorsville, he conducted a forced march east with his corps to arrive on the field just as Hill's routed corps was falling back to the west. He then conducted a passage of lines with Hill and defeated the Union force in a pitched battle, employing the brigades in depth strategy used so well at Chickamauga. In terms of leadership competencies, technical/tactical competence and decisiveness were both positive, while soldier/team development, supervision, planning and communications were satisfactory, as discussed in Chapter Four.

In the final stage of the war along the lines at Petersburg, Longstreet displayed positive leadership traits in all nine leadership competencies. He accomplished his moral responsibility to the men in the face of overwhelming odds by insuring that they accomplished the mission of force protection. His overwhelming defeat of the Union attack in October 1864, and the superb defensive positions throughout his sector were fine examples of his planning, competence, and team building skills. It is noteworthy that the final break in the Confederate lines was not in his sector.

The position of this thesis is that Longstreet's leadership during the war was satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies. On balance, the table on page 77 supports the

following conclusions: Longstreet performed above satisfactory at First Manassas, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, Wilderness, and Petersburg; He performed in a satisfactory manner at Williamsburg, the Seven Days, Antietam, independent command in Virginia (Suffolk), Chickamauga, and independent command in Tennessee (Knoxville); His performance was unsatisfactory at Seven Pines and Gettysburg. It also supports an above satisfactory rating in technical/tactical competence, and an unsatisfactory rating in professional ethics. All other competencies are rated satisfactory.

The first supporting research question is: Was Longstreet's leadership satisfactory in terms of both offensive and defensive tactics and strategy when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies? In relation to this first supporting research question, an analysis has been conducted to determine the validity of the historical perception that Longstreet disliked offensive battle and avoided it to the detriment of his command. The answer is that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory in both offensive and defensive tactics and strategy.

In fact, this author is at a loss to explain where the perception that Longstreet was primarily a defensive fighter originated. The best answer this research can produce is that Longstreet enjoyed perhaps his greatest victory on the defensive at Fredericksburg in 1862. This, followed by his famous counsel to Lee to assume a defensive posture at Gettysburg in 1863 and the strong fortifications at Petersburg in 1864, must be how this perception originated. However, a study of Longstreet reveals that he normally fought on the offensive and always preferred strategically offensive action.

Of the thirteen campaigns in which he fought, only two major battles can be classified as defensive operations, Fredericksburg and First Manassas. Antietam was a meeting engagement that culminated in a hasty defense, and Petersburg was basically trench warfare. In the Maryland campaign, actually both invasions, he counseled fighting on the tactical defensive because the obvious concern over extended lines of communication indicated to Longstreet offensive action on Union soil was a risky venture.

It is true Longstreet did not like to take unnecessary risk, but that is no indication he was not a proponent of offensive warfare. Some of his greatest battles, the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness were offensive actions which either Lee or Bragg chose to halt, over Longstreet's protests, due to the inability to continue for logistical or other concerns. Even his subpar performances at Seven Pines, Gettysburg, Suffolk, and Knoxville were offensive in nature. At First Manassas, he transitioned to the offensive at the first opportunity, and at Petersburg he was looking for a way to break out of the lines. At Suffolk, Gettysburg, and Knoxville he was reluctant to employ offensive operations, but for tactically sound reasons.

Longstreet was an aggressive warfighter who selected the best tactics, whether offensive or defensive, to accomplish the mission. His normal trait of conducting deliberate and careful operations prior to battle should not be confused with a reluctance to attack. He would attack with full vigor if he thought it would succeed and he spoke his mind if he thought offensive action would fail. Longstreet was sound at applying the proper tactics in the proper situation.

The second supporting research question asked: Was Longstreet's leadership satisfactory at each level of command to which he was assigned when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies? In relation to this second supporting research question, an analysis has been conducted to determine the validity of the historical perception that Longstreet was simply promoted beyond his capacity to successfully perform his duties.

The answer to the second supporting research question is also that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory at each level of command to which he was assigned. However, unlike the first supporting research question, it is understandable that an historical perception exists that Longstreet was a failure as an independent commander. The finding here is that Longstreet was satisfactory at both Suffolk and Knoxville, although that subjective conclusion can easily be debated in terms of the leadership competencies, particularly at Knoxville. In fact, the table on page 77 shows that Longstreet's performance at Knoxville is clearly vulnerable to the subjective conclusion of unsatisfactory in terms of the nine leadership competencies.

On the other hand, Longstreet's performance at Suffolk was clearly satisfactory. He accomplished his specified missions of foraging, protecting Richmond, and halting further Union occupation of southern territory. He is remembered, however, for failing in his implied task to take Suffolk and for failing to return to Lee in time for the battle at Chancellorsville. He laid siege to Suffolk, preferring that to a frontal assault of a fortified position that had been a year in preparation. This tactic cannot be faulted as human resources were becoming an issue in the South in 1863. As for returning

to Lee before Chancellorsville, he continually expressed his concern to Lee over the competing missions and Lee's guidance was to continue foraging. Longstreet could not do that with his wagons in one place in preparation for a hasty return to Lee as the operational reserve. It must be remembered that Hooker successfully gained Lee's flank without Lee fully aware, and when Lee notified Longstreet to move it was too late for Longstreet to get there. Lee absolved Longstreet in his report.²

At Knoxville, many of the difficulties he encountered were beyond his control. Although he failed to accomplish the mission of defeating Burnside, he was dispatched with 12,000 troops to attack Burnside with 23,000. This alone foretold problems. His careful and deliberate preparations to attack Knoxville were well founded but his plan was simply ineffective. Longstreet's Tennessee command is remembered for the awful attack on Fort Sanders, and he should accept much of the blame, but Fort Sanders is only part of the historical context of the command. Longstreet should never have been detached from Bragg in the first place, but Longstreet alone is not to blame for that. His professional ethics in the campaign have already been discussed. His primary contribution, and why he is considered satisfactory in this thesis, is the operational problem he created for Grant by operating in east Tennessee.³

Longstreet successfully sustained his isolated force for six winter months. This Confederate presence in the state, while important for political reasons, also prevented any major winter offenses by Grant with either Sherman or Meade. Grant could not be sure where, or if, Longstreet would strike. It can be argued Longstreet prolonged the war

by his strategic location between the two armies. There is no evidence to support that, only the author's opinion. Longstreet failed to accomplish his primary tactical mission of defeating Burnside, but he was successful in the operational mission of slowing Union offensive actions.

However, the primary reason this research supports Longstreet as a strong operational commander was his strategic insight into tactics at the operational level of war. From his early days as a division commander, Longstreet favored taking the fight to Union soil. It will be remembered that as early as April, 1862, at his first council of war with Davis, Longstreet recommended holding McClellan with a small force on the Peninsula because he didn't believe McClellan would move before May, and moving on Washington with the rest of the army. Davis abruptly dismissed the idea. McClellan moved in May. It is interesting to speculate what might have happened with a plan that bold.

This is only one of several examples. His letter to Jackson a few weeks before the council with Davis concerning the same movement is further evidence Longstreet was thinking operational offensives early in the war. Additionally, Longstreet supported Lee in the operational decision to invade the north on both occasions, and although they were to disagree on tactics both times, Longstreet was in favor of invasion. Four times Longstreet asked to go west to augment the Army of Tennessee: after Fredericksburg, before and during Suffolk, and after Gettysburg. One wonders what might have happened if Longstreet had his way prior to Gettysburg.

Finally, while in command at Knoxville in the winter of 1864-1865, Longstreet advocated an invasion of the Ohio Valley with the

Army of Tennessee, even suggesting all available horses be sent to him so the invasion would be totally mounted. Longstreet's intent for the plan was to create a situation unfavorable to Lincoln prior to the 1864 elections.⁴ The intent here is not to support the soundness of the plan or its logistical considerations, but that Longstreet was capable of thinking at the operational level of war. On balance, the historical perception that Longstreet was limited above the tactical level is not supportable given the two "opportunities" he had at independent command and the depth of his strategic and operational planning skills.

The remainder of this chapter examines some of the prominent issues that are controversial about Longstreet. Particular emphasis is placed on the competency of professional ethics to address this issue.

At Gettysburg, and also in Tennessee, Longstreet allowed his personal views to impede his decision making skills. His disagreements with both commanders greatly effected his performance. This lack of professional ethics is perhaps the primary reason for the Longstreet controversy. In fact, Longstreet was found lacking in professional ethics early in the war. He displayed a considerable lack of professionalism at First Manassas in July, 1861, when he was ordered to halt his pursuit. While at his level it may have seemed reasonable to continue the pursuit, he did not have access to the operational concerns that caused the decision to be made. He should have made an attempt to understand these concerns before "flying" into a temper tantrum.

Additionally, in June, 1862, Longstreet's report after Seven Pines basically shifted the blame for the lack of success in the battle to Huger, and the result was Huger was soon transferred from the army.

In fact, the research shows Longstreet was as much to blame as anyone. Yet, he does not acknowledge any fault of his own.

In Tennessee, Longstreet's attempts to undermine Bragg were detrimental to the army. As mentioned in chapter four, Longstreet may have had a "hidden agenda" when he went west, an agenda to replace Bragg as army commander. Even if he didn't want the command for himself, he certainly wanted Bragg out. At this point in the war, Longstreet's rank and reputation were such that his opinions were heard and respected throughout the south, particularly in the army. Lee, for example, seemed to clearly grasp how great his (Lee's) influence was and was very prudent in his statements and actions. Longstreet, at least in Tennessee, seemed to lack this appreciation of the impact he could have on an army. The decision to divide Bragg's army was an indirect result of Longstreet's constant complaints about Bragg. Granted, Longstreet cannot be blamed for the fact that Bragg was (by all historical evidence) a buffoon, but a greater attempt on Longstreet's part to cooperate and make the best of the situation may have prevented the disaster at Missionary Ridge.

However, the primary reason a controversy exists is the collapse at Gettysburg of the superb Longstreet in nearly every leadership competency. His disagreement with Lee should not have affected his leadership in such a profound way. He failed (among others) in planning and technical/tactical competence, normally two strengths for him. The failure in these two competencies seemed to be a direct result of his great disagreement with Lee's strategy.

In fact, to apply the term "sulking" to Longstreet at Gettysburg would be appropriate. He simply did not apply the effort, energy, and

commitment to the planning and execution of Lee's concept that was needed for success. Lee and the army were counting on Longstreet, and they simply didn't get the effort he was capable of giving.

This same "sulking" term can also be applied to Longstreet in Tennessee. Bragg did not get the effort, energy, and commitment he needed from Longstreet, either. Longstreet at least appeared to respect Lee, and this is more than can be said for Longstreet's relationship with Bragg. Longstreet's strong reputation made the situation for Bragg almost hopeless, as Bragg did not enjoy the same respect in the Army of Tennessee as Lee enjoyed in the Army of Northern Virginia. Bragg didn't have a strong reputation to fall back on during his confrontation with Longstreet. Lee would not have had that problem, and one can speculate if that concept entered Longstreet's mind, in view of the fact Longstreet never publicly challenged Lee as he did Bragg.

The failure of Longstreet in ethics came at two critical junctures of the war and had a profoundly negative impact on both the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. This factor adds support to the Longstreet controversy. It must be added that ethics is the one competency in which a leader must never fail. As strong and consistent as Longstreet's leadership was during the entire war, it must be stated that his professional ethics were unsatisfactory at two critical times during the war.

As a final addition to this thesis, a short analysis of the usefulness of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100 is helpful. This analysis is not appropriate as a supporting research question because the depth of research required to successfully address it would

probably constitute a thesis by itself, but the position here is it might be useful to the reader as a short addition to this study.

This research project supports our current leadership doctrine. Each of the nine competencies proved helpful in answering the research questions, as Longstreet's actions could always be categorized in one or more competencies, providing a useful framework for the study.

At first glance, the nine leadership competencies appear to be more applicable to lower grade leaders than general officers. Vision, influence, and initiative were three categories this author wanted to analyze for a senior officer that at first glance don't fit into any particular competency. With further thought, however, vision fits into the category of planning, decision making, and technical/tactical competence rather easily. Influence is actually linked to all the competencies. If a leader is strong in all the competencies, then it follows that the leader's influence will be strong as well. Initiative, similar to influence is also linked to the other nine competencies. It requires initiative for a leader to become strong in a competency, and it requires initiative from the leader to remain strong in competencies as the leader progresses through periods of change and is confronted with new situations and technologies.

The nine leadership competencies proved to be an effective method to facilitate this research. There are no recommended changes to the competencies as a result of this thesis.

ENDNOTES

Chapter One

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- ⁴⁹Longstreet, MA, 452.
- ⁵⁰London Times, November 24, 1863; Wert, Longstreet, 320.
310. ⁵¹Cozzens, This Terrible Sound, 315, 317; Wert, Longstreet,
- ⁵²Sanger, James Longstreet, 210.
- ⁵³OR IV, Vol 30, 705, 706.
- ⁵⁴OR IV, Vol 30, 742.
- ⁵⁵Longstreet, MA, 465, 466.
- ⁵⁶OR I, Vol 31, 455-461.
- ⁵⁷OR III, Vol 31, 680, 681, 686, 687.
- ⁵⁸Longstreet, MA, 492-494.
- ⁵⁹OR I, 31, 460, 461; Longstreet, MA, 501, 502, 503.
- ⁶¹B & L, Vol III, 749, Sorrel, Recollections, 205.
- ⁶²OR I, Vol 31, 461-464.
237. ⁶³OR I, Vol 31, 466, 499, 500, 546; Sanger, James Longstreet,
- ⁶⁴Longstreet, MA, 524, 525; Sanger, James Longstreet, 240-242.
- ⁶⁵OR II, Vol 29, 699.
- ⁶⁶Longstreet- Louis T. Wigfall, September 12, 1863, Wigfall Papers, Library of Congress; Wert, Longstreet, 305.
- ⁶⁷Longstreet- Louis T. Wigfall, February 4, 1863, Wigfall Papers, Library of Congress; Piston, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, 219.
- ⁶⁸OR II, Vol 29, 699.
- ⁶⁹Longstreet, MA, 516.
- ⁷⁰OR II, Vol 31, 541, 566, 654.
- ⁷¹Annals, 496.
- ⁷²Sorrel to Longstreet, July 21, 1879, Longstreet Papers, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina; Wert, Longstreet, 384.
- ⁷³Longstreet, MA, 568.

⁷⁴Sorrel, Recollections, 233, 234; Longstreet, MA, 564-566.

⁷⁵Gallagher, ed., Alexander, 360.

⁷⁶Taylor, Four Years, 236, 237.

⁷⁷Goree, Letters, 232-233.

⁷⁸OR I, Vol 42, 871, 1182; Sanger, James Longstreet, 284; Eckenrode and Conrad, James Longstreet: Lee's War Horse, 323.

⁷⁹Eckenrode and Conrad, Lee's War Horse, 323, 324; OR I, Vol 42, 871, 872.

⁸⁰OR I, Vol 42, 1864, 1280; Sanger, James Longstreet, 285.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Longstreet, MA, 628; Wert, Longstreet, 403.

Chapter Five

¹Longstreet to Louis T. Wigfall, August 18, 1863, Wigfall Papers, Library of Congress; Wert, Longstreet, 300.

²OR I, Vol 18, 1049.

³OR I, Vol 31, 288, 289, 291, 292, 339, 403, 671.

FIGURES




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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