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Avraham Horvits
Lt Col, Israeli AF

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
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THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR:
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by

Avraham Horvits, Lietutenant Colonel
Israeli Air Force

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19 April 1993

**The Yom Kippur War: Its Surfacing Strategies
and
Ensuing Peace Process**

The Yom Kippur War stamped its mark on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), on the national psyche, and on the politics of the Middle East for many years. This was the first time Egypt and Syria launched a war against Israel without telegraphing their punch. Their early first-round one-two combination was nearly a complete surprise, almost resulting in a knockout blow before the IDF got its second wind. During the beginning of the bout, it was clear that the combined Arab forces were ahead on points. Israel's military and civilian leaders were shaken, and one heard remarks that sounded ominously like "destruction of the Third Temple," reference to previous Jewish national defeats.

In this paper, I analyze the Yom Kippur War in light of the strategy of the opening phase, regarding resources and objective on the national and the military levels. One main questions that the Agranat Committee investigated was why Israeli leaders made the mistakes they did at all levels. These errors laid a foundation for the large-scale Arab attack in the Yom Kippur War. Reasons for the Israeli intelligence failure are laid out. This failure enabled the opposing forces to open the war with almost total surprise on their side. Clausewitz in On War wrote on the principles of war and emphasized the importance of surprise and the need to attain it. The Egyptians and Syrians used this principle in preparing for and executing this aggression.

This paper assesses key points of strategy decisions made during the war from the perspectives of the major combatants: Israel and the Arabs, specifically Egypt and Syria. It goes on to examine the contrasting superpower policies and their development from the first days of the war until the verge of the superpower confrontation in the war's final stages. It looks at the great impact of the strategy in the opening phase of the war and frequent changes in the major players' strategies (Israel, the Arabs, the US and the USSR) during the three-week war. Each side and its respective mistakes led to the optimum result, which actually was the first tentative step in the Middle East peace process. The question that we ask is whether it was necessary for Egypt and Israel to fight a war to find themselves on the path to peace. This paper evaluates the respective national political backgrounds, the war objectives and strategies, the surprise, the idea of air power employment, the culminating points and the superpower policies. The paper reviews and makes an effort to relate the outcomes of the war to the peace process between Israel and Egypt.

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National and Political Background:

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was fond of saying, "What was taken by force, we'll take back by force." He intended to erase the shame which was part of the Egyptian army as a result of the defeat in the 1967 Six Day War. It became a main, driving obsession. While Sadat visited in Moscow to request Russian

armaments, he was turned down initially. The Russians said "No" because of Egyptian losses to Israel in 1956 and 1967. Putting the matter frankly, the Russians had no confidence in Egypt's ability to do better on a future occasion. On the other hand, the Soviets did not want to risk [a Middle East superpower conflict]. In July 1972, Sadat dismissed most of the Soviet advisors and soldiers from Egyptian territory, expelling nearly 40,000.

Israeli specialists were of the opinion that Sadat's step would harm any chance Egypt might have to wage a war against Israel. From that point forward, more and more thinkers began to push the idea that there were few prospects for a battle or war between the two sides. They used to use the phrase "low probability, referring to Egyptian chances for attack against Israel. Only a few thought the opposite, which meant that their ideas were discounted. Dismissing the Soviets was merely opening maneuver space for Sadat, ultimately increasing chances for war.

An Arab fear during this time was that the Israeli issue would drop from the international agenda, was based on their pessimistic perception of their standing in world opinion. Diplomatic maneuvering aimed at finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was brought virtually to an impasse--Yaring, the UN envoy from Sweden, finished his job without making a recommendation for action. The four-power discussions stopped, too; the summit conference between Nixon and Brezhnev ended with no new developments.

During the autumn of 1973, in the days just before the war, while the attention and resources of Israel were concentrated in other areas, the Egyptians and Syrians were bringing their plan to a head, focussing their resources on the upcoming hostilities. Israel, on its part, remembered the stunning victory of the Six Day War and the precedent-setting performance of air power, for the first time instrumental in winning a war. When the lessons of the impressive achievements of the IDF and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) were absorbed by the Israeli leaders, they set them into an unrealistic doctrine. One example is the amazing blitzkrieg during the Six Day War. Another is the "flying artillery" during the War of Attrition. A third is the deep, penetrating attack which shook Egypt so thoroughly in the opening hours of the Six Day War.

Until the day of Yom Kippur itself, the prospect of a war was not considered in Israel. Only at 0400 on that morning, did it become sure. By Yom Kippur at 1400, while many Israelis were at the synagogues, the whole country was virtually at a standstill, the reality of the surprise attack was making itself felt.

Objectives and Strategies of the War:

Any war serves political objectives, as Clausewitz made so abundantly clear. Military theory separates the military objective of war involving the battlefield from those objectives which look beyond the battlefield to the achievement of desired out-

comes at the negotiation table. The Yom Kippur War was no exception. In theory, a war objective is supposed to be written in advance; however, it can be changed during a campaign relative to warfare achievements and the fluid situation and resulting conditions.

The war objectives of Israel were composed by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense during the summer of 1973. They assumed that a war just now was not advantageous for Israel and that therefore she should make all efforts to avoid one. If one were to start, it would be for Arab political ends; therefore, every effort should be made to maximize any Israeli military achievements, while letting the attackers have their political ends. They thought all along that as a result Israel would come out ahead. From the Israeli strategic perspective, until the morning of the Yom Kippur War, the leaders found themselves burdened with an imprecise war strategy. Once war began, Israel used a defensive strategy to achieve national and military objectives of maintaining the status quo.

Meanwhile, for months, under a cloak of near complete operational security, Egypt and Syria had been planning this moment. Their goals and objectives for starting the war were to regain by force the territory taken from them in the Six Day War. By so doing, they would be restoring the Arab honor which had been so badly tarnished. Sadat reached a real conclusion that "no peace/no war" was favorable only to the ends of the superpowers.

Therefore, only violent enterprise on the parts of the Arabs could change this state of affairs. Egypt understood that based on the last war's experiences they would be unable to use the same thinking that they had during the War of Attrition between 1968 and 1970. This kind of war might bring much more violent reaction from the Israeli side, and the damage that it might cause Egypt could be greater than any other political or military achievement. The Egyptians did not see or believe that they could successfully employ the Israeli blitz against them. From that point, they reached a conclusion that their best chance was to land the strongest first punch which they were capable of throwing. Their solution was to "grind the Israeli rock to powdered sand."

In those days, Syria and Egypt were out of the Federation of the United Arab Republics. Therefore, they felt they could open a two-theater campaign: one from the Egyptian side, the other from the Syrian. In the spring of 1973, they met and presented their assessment of the military capabilities of Israel. They concluded from that meeting that Israel had four basic advantages: air superiority; a technological edge; accurate and efficient training of their forces; and the ability to draw on US military resources. The disadvantages and limitations of the Israeli situation were perceived as being: multiple threats across multiple fronts; difficulty in protecting the supply lines; limited manpower resources which precluded their absorbing great

number of casualties; Israeli economic conditions which made protracted war far more costly for her than an enemy.

To take advantage of a weak point, the Arabs thought that they should force Israel to spread their ability to counterattack across numerous fronts. For that end, they had to use a combined, joint Arab strategy which employed pressures along several fronts, a strategy which in those days was only in its infancy. In the summer of 1973, Egypt and Syria decided on a joint attack which would have as its first phase objective not Israel's destruction and final extermination but reconquest of the territories which Israel had occupied during the Six Day War. The date chosen on which they would act was the one on which they would receive the greatest support of the Arab world opinion--Yom Kippur--the holiest of Jewish holidays.

During those days, Egypt was trying to concentrate Arab forces, including those of Jordan, on a prospective action against Israel. Egypt was reluctant to renew ties with Jordan, but, on the other hand, she realized that the military advantage of involving Jordan meant that Israel would be facing foes on three separate fronts. The mission of Jordan was merely to pose a potential threat since her military strength was insufficient to allow her to participate as an equal partner with Egypt and Syria. She was to tie Israeli defenders to the central front, preventing the IDF's circling into the southern part of Syria.

Strategically, at the national level, the first phase was to recapture the Golan Heights by Syria and a part of the Sinai by Egypt. Their goal was to try to lure the superpowers into the conflict so that later on they could pressure Israel to make other concessions. One result of this was that Israel might withdraw from the other parts of the Sinai and the West Bank. The Arabs based their strategy on the idea that Israel would shrink from a prolonged war, suffering so many casualties and consuming so many resources that surrender would be the only possible course of action.

Analyzing the strategies of the three states--Syria, Egypt, and Israel--at the conflict's beginning, we use the Snyder Model, assessing resources and objectives to find a fitting strategy.

SYRIA

<u>RESOURCES</u>	<u>CONCEPT</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>
*Leadership:	*Coordinate forces	*Return of the
Centralized &	with Egypt	Golan Heights
obsessed w/honor	*Attack w/surprise	*Restore Arab
*Geography:	*Concentrate forces	pride
Golan Heights		*Punish Israel-
*Armed Forces:		revenge
Army -- 100,000		*Help Egypt
Air Force -- 210 a/c		
*Population: 6.5 million		
*Will to fight: high		

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
EGYPT

<u>RESOURCES</u>	<u>CONCEPT</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>
*Leadership:	*Coordinate forces	*Return of the
Ambitious &	with Syria	Sinai
obsessed w/honor	*Attack w/surprise	*Restore Arab
*Geography:	*Concentrate forces	pride
Suez Canal		*Punish Israel-
*Armed Forces:		revenge
Army -- 285,000		*Help Syria
Air Force -- 750 a/c		
*Population: 35 million		
*Will to fight: high		
Egyptian National Objectives:	1) regain occupied territories;	
	2) restore 1967 borders;	
	3) solve the Palestinian problem.	
Egypt's Operational Objectives:	1) cross the Suez Canal;	
	2) overrun the Bar Lev Line;	
	3) disturb & interrupt the IDF.	

Good endeavor

ISRAEL

<u>RESOURCES</u>	<u>CONCEPT</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>
*Leadership:	*DEFENSE	*NATIONAL SURVIVAL
MISINFORMED		*STATUS QUO
*Geography:		*HOLD OCCUPIED AREAS
Strategic Depth-Sinai		
*Armed Forces:		
Army -- 275,000		
Air Force -- 430 a/c		
*Population: 3.5 million		
*Will to SURVIVE		



An observer can see strategy change on the national, the military and, of course, on the operational level. These changes are based on changes in resources and objectives during the course of the war. Israel entered this war in a state of complete surprise with virtually all of the reserve forces dispersed for the holiday. The normal reaction time to recall reservists was 72 hours. By the beginning of the fourth day, however, the IDF military resources changed. After a valiant try holding the Syrian and Egyptian forces, Israel shifted from passive defense to active counteroffensive. Clausewitz in On War explained his idea about defense being the stronger form of war, and Israel used that idea in the first week of the '73 War. In addition, Clausewitz said that going to offensive operations was necessary

to achieve victory, and Israel changed to the attack phase, as well, concentrating efforts on one front at a time. That element emphasized by Clausewitz, as well as Jomini, was a favorite of Napoleon who used it effectively throughout his campaigns.

Surprise:

One extremely important lessons in that war was the strategy of using the principle of surprise. This important principle emphasized by Clausewitz was well applied by the Egyptians and Syrians in planning and execution of the war. History has a way of repeating itself upon the unprepared. The side which holds surprise holds a great initial advantage: Operation Barbarossa by Hitler against Russia; Pearl Harbor by the Japanese; and, in this case, the Yom Kippur War.

Israeli leadership mistook the position presented by intelligence, misreading the real picture during the period before the war. The Israelis had a belief that Egyptians would not declare a war without the belief that they could penetrate deeply into Israel, especially against the IAF bases. The assumption that Syria itself, without Egypt, would fight a war had been true in the past, but it was not true during the Yom Kippur War. The Israeli leaders based their thoughts on their sweet memories of the easy victory in the Six Day War without giving great thought to the changed circumstances of the preceding seven years in terms of security. Until the very day the war broke out, Israeli intelligence said that the probability that a war would open was

a "low probability." In the last details of information of the opening of the war, a critical mistake was made by not calling up the reserves earlier. The magnitude of the surprise on Israel can be measured by a comparison of the duration of this war to those which Israel had fought before. In effect, this was the first time that the IDF had been involved in a war which the first phase consisted of a full-powered attack by the enemy. The War of Independence was opened while the Israeli forces fought in the first phase against the irregular Arab forces, lacking organization and experience. Before Arab forces invaded Israel, the Israelis achieved important positions in geostrategic terms.

In the 1956 Sinai Campaign, Israel had the advantage of surprise on her side in combining their forces against the Egyptians' weaker position. In 1967 in the Six Day War, Israel preempted the Arab forces and brought the war to a stunning conclusion in less than a week. The War of Attrition was opened by the Egyptians, but it developed in stages and never brought all of Egyptian power against Israel at one time. The "historical experience" of the IDF did not vaccinate it against a war that opened with full power by the enemy.

As the war opened, Israeli leaders assessed the 15 miles of the Golan Heights with the 130 miles of desert separating the Suez Canal from major population centers and decided to concentrate the initial defense on the more vulnerable region--the north. The forces comparison were amazing. The average ratio on

that front were 1:5 for the Syrians, and in some battles even 1:12. More than once, the scales of battle were tilted in Syrian favor by weight of the sheer numbers of their tanks. Reservists were thrown into battle they arrived at the front as individuals and not as individual units. Thus, they lost the advantage of fighting with those they trained with in drills. Clausewitz said that a strategy of defense could succeed linked with the concept of a culminating point. A good leader has to find the exact period of time which is the culminating point of the enemy attack and use his strongest counteroffensive. Later on, the threat of violence increases quickly into the great battle culminating point. The advantage changes from the attack to the defense, and the latter is going to win, at least so goes the theory. One a leader's greatest skills is to sense the culminating point and turn it to his advantage. In the first five days, Israel had to conduct operations in a defensive war. Good leadership skills had to transition to the offensive while using the culminating point and attacking the enemy in his area and in his land.

The Air Force Test:

After the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force was found unable to meet the expectations that the other forces had of it. In short, the other components of the IDF were disappointed. Their expectations were based on the great achievements by the IAF in the Six Day War blitz and the "flying artillery" of the Attrition War. Now in the Yom Kippur War when it was clear that

it was another "opera," there was disappointment among the services. The roots of that disappointment were different; the surface troops wanted to see more friendly airplanes, and the pilots said that official doctrine was violated by requiring close air support before there was air superiority over the battlefield. Zeev Shiff in his book on the IAF that during a maneuver in the summer of 1972 that the Chief of Staff, David Elazar, summarized that the condition to win the battle and hold the enemy was by achieving air superiority by the IAF. It was clear that the mission of the IAF was to achieve freedom of flight by destroying the enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The great test of that declared concept was in October 1973 while using the IAF to break the concentrations of enemy forces crossing the borders. The Chief of Staff knew that the first air strike in surprise was the optimal way to employ air power. Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor and Mokhed (Six Day War) are the keystones in the modern military history. But Israeli national leaders vetoed his proposal to strike preemptively. It was a very great mistake in retrospect. They let go from their hands a great advantage in the opening of the war.

The IAF story in the Yom Kippur War was a story of running between two fronts, supporting the ground forces, while lacking air superiority. The failure of the SAM site attacks along the Syrian front was bad for the future. The IAF had many casualties in this particular attack, and the results were not proportional.

The General Staff did not want to fight without the IAF because of the needs of the ground forces. Meanwhile, the IAF was suffering heavy attrition and said that at this rate the IAF would reach a critical state before contributing much. No doubt, this attrition was what caused the Chief of Staff to opt for the counteroffensive while still with adequate air power resources.

Limitations of Air Power Employment Strategy During the War:

- a) The National Level: denial of the preemptive option to the IAF, which meant a loss of air superiority at the outset
- b) The Strategic Level: the IAF's being required to supply close air support before gaining air superiority
- c) The Operational Level: pulling the IAF from front to front without coordinating with the ground forces
- d) The Tactical Level: being required to provide support in the SAM envelope caused losses by bad tactical intelligence.

General Monash compared air power to a Stradivarius violin: it must be repaired with care and played by a virtuoso to get the best results. In the Yom Kippur War, one cannot hear the pure Stradivarius tone over the strident noise of the environment.

The Culminating Point and the Strategy Decision:

Arabic:

There were essentially three main decisions made by Syria and Egypt. The first of these was in the matter of a preemptive strike and their military objective. The second was moving up of the timetable of the second phase by Egypt to October 14. The

third was the Egyptian request for a cease-fire on October 20. We can see how each of these marks a change in the Arab outlook in a period of 20 days, just less than three weeks, from that of offense to defense--from a successful aggressor to a battered fighter on the ropes, suing for a cease-fire.

Until the 8th of October, the Arabs assumed that the situation on the battlefield conformed to their war scenario. They forced the IDF to engage them along two separate theaters. The Israeli Air Force could not act at full throttle and, thus, did not hurt the missile sites at all during this period. Above all, the Arab forces held territory in the south of the Golan Heights, in the middle, and along the east bank of the Suez Canal. From their perspective, their battle plan and their execution were entirely congruent. In short, they were getting the results they had planned given the resources they had committed.

From the following day, the 9th of October, there was the first major change. IDF reserve forces reached the field somewhat earlier than the Arabs had anticipated, coming into the war theater and engaging battle. In the Golan, the Syrians started to pull back in the face of counterattacks. In the Sinai, the IDF avoided the Egyptian ploy of engaging in a battle of attrition, where the numerical advantage strongly in Egyptian favor.

These circumstances led to two strategic decisions: on 12 October, the Iraqi forces were committed precipitately, without adequate planning, marking the first time Iraq had been involved;

on the Egyptian decision to starting the second phase of their plan before completing their entire preparations. On October 14, the Egyptians paid a heavy price of nearly 200 tanks destroyed.

A strategic change occurred 18 October, when Egyptian forces trying to maintain a bridgehead on either side of the Suez Canal failed, resulting in President Sadat's being faced with a dilemma of an IDF assault on the very area the Egyptians had thought was secure. More than that, his limited military achievements made in the first few days of the war, were now in danger for the first time since the war had begun. This circumstance led Sadat to change his strategy and to request a cease-fire.

Israeli:

While assessing the Israeli decision, one has to open by considering the main strategic mistake to have been a misreading of the seriousness of the threat. Consequently, because of this serious underestimation, the IDF reserve forces were not called into action until the battle was engaged on two simultaneous fronts. This oversight proved extremely damaging to Israel, especially in the opening stages of the hostilities. A few more strategic decisions were taken at the beginning, and the surprise phase of the Arab attack was effective.

On the morning of October 6th, the War Cabinet decided to override the recommendation of the Chief of Staff to undertake a preemptive air strike against the Syrian forces across the lines. By giving up the element of surprise in her defense, Israel was

put in a position to avoid being called an aggressor nation, but the net result was tremendously costly. Once the knowledge was certain that the war would commence there can be only two assumptions for their decisions: first, that avoiding the war was possible at this time without a preemptive air strike and without activating the reserve forces; and, second, there was reason to assume that if Israel were to take the role of initiating the war, aid from the US would not be forthcoming. More than this, it was clear that the job of the defense would be on the shoulders of the small active duty forces positioned in forward lines, who would be fed to a meatgrinder until they could be relieved by fresh reserve forces.

From the second day of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force was committed on two fronts. The IDF was at a point of dilemma. After suspicion that Jordanian forces would be involved in that campaign, it was not known that Egypt had transitioned that day to the phase of consolidation. Contrarily, the assumption was that they would take the full advantage of the small forces facing them, rolling them up and taking their own forces through the two main Sinai passes: Mitla and Gidi.

For the first time in the Yom Kippur War there was a concerted effort to decide just what the Israeli war objectives were. The Chief of Staff thought that until that time the IDF had waged only a war of survival. Results of this line of thinking were that Israel could not achieve the basic war objec-

tive, in other words to gain any basic military achievements. When it was possible to draw a breath and decide how the war would be pursued, the choices were essentially to engage the Egyptian 3rd Army directly or to encircle them. If the former choice was successful and Israel was victorious, Israeli losses would be horribly high.

On the other hand, if the second option were followed, the Egyptian army could be neutralized as a fighting force and, while this option would not be so sweet as an unconditional victory, it still would be a long way from being an Israeli defeat. Looking at it another way: "A half a loaf is better than none."

Two factors clearly are at play. First is the "friction" in war, and second is the change in the objective and strategy of war relative to the military achievement. Clausewitz's use of the term "friction" in war reflects that what is planned cannot always be predicted as the outcome. In battle, we act in a resistant environment, and a minor change in any given component might well affect the final outcome of the battle in a way that could not be predicted.

Superpower Policies:

The Yom Kippur began over the protests of the two superpowers, neither of whom saw any good coming from it. In the period before the war, the US and the USSR appreciated that another conflagration in the Middle East might create conditions that might well result in a direct superpower conflict which would be

perilous from the prospect of a nuclear exchange leading to a holocaust. Nonetheless, they were unable to forestall the war or even to contain it. By the end game, the two found themselves drawn into a dangerous situation where their own level of conflict had reached levels of maximally dangerous tension. One can divide the superpower political acts into three main phases:

- a) 06-13 October (until beginning of the American airlift)
- b) 14-19 October (until beginning of the Arab oil embargo)
- c) 20-25 October (until beginning of the Soviet-US conflict)

US involvement can be summed up as one of escalating from impartial observer in the first phase, to that of supportive participant in the second, to potential combatant in the third. During the same periods, the Soviets essentially followed the same pattern without consciously being aware of it. In other words, each of the superpowers followed the lead of the other in relation to the scale of events in the region, and, in so doing, each was drawn to the brink of nuclear war.

Turning to the first phase (06-13 October), one can see from the very beginning of the war that the Washington decisionmakers wanted to avoid giving the impression to Israel that aid would be forthcoming. However, on the other hand, Israel's weakness and the fact that Israel was a US client and partner in the region had great potential impact on American control of events in the Middle East. The clear result of this ambivalent outlook was that the US tried walk a very narrow political tightrope. They

tried to convey a sense of having a "balanced policy." This seemingly balanced policy had three components:

- 1) to avoid creating a conflict condition with the USSR;
- 2) to create an image of US evenhandedness in Arab eyes;
- 3) to avoid greatly weakening the position of Israel.

The American administration was very firm in establishing that it would not provide any significant measure of support to Israel until such time as the Soviets might provide it to Arab countries. America was adamant that comprehensive aid to Israel was out of the question and that aid would be proportional to that needed for survival and not to gain an overwhelming advantage in the conflict. Argument was especially sharp after the failure of the Israeli counterstrike in the Sinai on the 8th of October.

The evening of the 9th of October or the morning of the 10th seemed to show that Israel's maximum effort directed toward Syria was about to be fruitful, having pushed their forces from virtually all of the Golan Heights with IAF strikes into Syrian territory. The Syrian leaders were apprehensive that they were about to suffer reverses that were untenable. At this point, they asked Moscow urgently for aid.

Soviet leadership on 10 October assessed the situation and concluded that for Israel to roll over Syria would be a catastrophe of the greatest magnitude. Consequently, they resolved to undertake a massive airlift to resupply the Syrians and forestall a complete rout. This very crucial decision ended the first



phase of the Yom Kippur War. From this point on, superpowers involvement was a foregone conclusion, escalating exponentially.

From the US point of view, they thought they must convince the USSR that massive military aid to the Arabs would bring the superpowers to the brink of a dangerous confrontation. In that phase, there were two main components of the American policy toward the Soviets. The first was their coming to an agreement on the temporary limitations of the superpower Middle East arms race. The second was to see the two powers coming to an agreement that a cease-fire in place was to the best interests of all parties. Both components were failures. It was clear to the American administration that a Soviet-only airlift to the Middle East would cast a shadow of doubt on US ability to fulfill its superpower role in a serious international crisis. More than the local impact of this situation, it was seen as a test of US resolve and credibility to provide aid to allies in time of need.

On 13 October 1973, when the first week of the Yom Kippur War ended, important changes took place in the "superpower game." For the first time, the US changed its passive policy of careful neutrality and employed large airlift as support to Israel. After 72 hours, the airlift reached 1,000 tons of war materiel per day. This American act surprised the Arab world. Actually, the earliest employment was in answer to the Soviet airlift, but the Arab countries saw this as a threatening act was designed to snatch the fruits of victory from them. One can say that there

was a change in the US position. Until the 10th of October, the US had sought to minimize involvement and maintain a low profile. Later, as the Soviets employed the airlift to the Arab countries, the US put her efforts to trying to achieve a mutually satisfactory cease-fire. The USSR agreed to decrease the volume of weapons they were flowing to the Middle East. While the political efforts of the administration failed, observers can clearly see that the position was solidifying into a firmer stance. From that point the US adopted a more hardline attitude, speaking to the USSR and the Arabs from a position of power.

This demonstration of US intent to increase its Middle East policy, it was of great concern to the various Arab countries. Those countries which produced oil tried to respond to US actions. Arab objectives were to try to change the American position by threat and pressure. These indirect tactics failed to produce the desired results; in fact, they acted as a boomerang on them. The American response was embarrassing and tough. It almost said to the Arabs that the US could "live without the Arab oil" and that it would be better for the Arab countries to give up their delusions. In effect, the US was saying that oil would not influence their policy in the Middle East. This response pushed the Arabs to increase their efforts towards effective discussion with the US.

Egypt, as well, was involved in these attempts to speak to the hearts of the Americans, trying to convince them to stop the

policy of supporting Israel. During the war, Egyptian President Sadat made a speech proposing to have a Middle East Peace Committee to work the issue, with the participation of the Arab countries and Israel. He called on the US to examine her new way in the theater. Sadat's speech during the war described the multiple complexities Egyptians faced vis a vis the superpowers, Israel and the rest of the Arab world. It clearly explained that despite the massive Soviet support to the Egyptians during the war she would rather not favor one superpower over the other. More than that, the speech was a truly visible clue of Sadat's offering of a political relationship with the US if the US would act in an even-handed way in the Middle East

From the Arab perspective, it became more and more apparent that the American policy was intended to let Israel built her entire power and thus let her enter any political negotiation with the upper hand. More and more it seemed clear to them that any threat of the use of the oil weapon was not working. The American position was that no one was going to constrain the US range of activity that would in any way diminish American credibility to act as a superpower.

On the 20th of October 1973, Saudi Arabia announced that she had reached a decision to cut all oil supplies to the US absolutely. The Arab decision to make an embargo of oil exports to the US was a direct result of an escalating political process. This process was characterized in the challenge that the US put

to the Soviet and Arab countries that in her superpower policy in the Middle East "position of power" and large-scale support in Israel. Actually, it created a spiral of American action and Arab counteraction that might lead both sides to negative positions that perhaps neither wanted from the very beginning. It was an unwanted process for the US because it put against her the pro-West countries in the Arab world. In that position, from the American point of view, it became necessary to reach a quick conclusion to the war in the Middle East. This was especially true when it became clear that Israel was on the verge of a military victory. Such a victory could lead to a superpower conflict with the USSR and the issue of the relationship of the US with the other nations in the Middle East.

Despite the Security Council decision on the cease-fire, the war still continued on the southern theater. On the 22nd of October, it seemed that Israeli forces acted toward surrounding the Egyptian Army and tried to beat the city of Suez. After great threat of the Egyptians and Soviets, the Americans put forth Proposal 339 before the Security Council, calling for all sides to return to the positions they had occupied before the last cease-fire. Later on, after the New York decision, Israel said that she had conquered the Port of Adabia in the Suez Bay and had surrounded the 3rd Army. The US responded very aggressively, and the US president sent a clear message telling the Israeli government that they stood to lose all US aid and support

if they did not cease military action. On the night of the 24th of October, the battles ended in the Suez theater. On the other hand, at that time, the US and the USSR were on the runways of the superpower conflict.

The American-Soviet conflict's roots on the 25th of October were actually based on the Egyptian leadership's position estimate which concluded that the military acts of Israel were to try to destroy the 3rd Army. Two messages came to the US president. One Egyptian message and the other Soviet proposed that the US deploy together with the Soviets to the Middle East. One explanation of these letters was that the Egyptians and Soviets were seeking international justification for deploying Soviet troops to the Middle East. This interpretation is based primarily on the political acts of Egypt and the USSR, something the American leadership found true when they considered intelligence analyses detailing Soviet military steps to deploy. These steps were mainly increasing the alert status in the airborne brigades, in the cutting of flights AN-22 heavy airlifters, the massing of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, the reconnaissance flights of MiG-25 Foxbats over Egyptian skies by Soviet pilots. The American response was very quick. On the night of 24 October, the US military went to DEFCON 3 in portions of the US Army units. Until the early morning of the 25th, it extended to the Strategic Air Command and Panama Command. In that frame, stood the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina and 50 B-52 bombers

received orders to redeploy from Guam to the mainland. At the same time, President sent a communique to Brezhnev in which he emphasized once again that the US could not tolerate unilateral Soviet actions in the Middle East. This demonstrated to the Soviets that the US were not prepared to abide any untoward Soviet actions in the region. In the evening of the 25th of October, the Soviets agreed with the US and wrote a decision proposing that the emergency forces that would deploy the Middle East would not include forces from the Big Five Powers. When that decision (340) passed the Security Council, it ended the superpower conflict and marked a special phase in the Middle East crisis.

Summary:

The Yom Kippur War ended when the superpower conflict ended. At the end of the war, it was clear that the influence of the superpowers in the Middle East was at an all-time high. The political cost-benefit ratio was against the Soviets and her position in the theater was damaged severely. The Soviet's client states say that they could not lean on her in time of need. She suffered the kind of credibility that the US had feared. She was not able to act in an efficient way for real Arab political benefit on Israel's account. The US on the other hand profited greatly from the conflict. In the beginning, she used passive positioning, but as the situation escalated and the Soviet airlift deployment was increased, the US response became

increasingly dynamic and forceful. First of all, the US demonstrated its capacity to conduct large-scale military aid to Israel. It should where the American administration stood in face of the Arab regimes, maintaining her policies under the threat of the Arab oil embargo. This initiative policy came to a peak of American involvement in a conflict with the USSR on the 25th of October and came to be very useful in the final analysis. She exposed the Soviet weakness and proved once again that the US is the single reliable player who can be counted on to influence the policy of the State of Israel in direct aid of the desired direction by the conflicting countries.

Once the Arabs recognized the abovementioned fact, they turned to the US to play the role of peace broker. The US became from the same time crucial to Israel in providing large support during the war and to the conflict countries who needed her to help them "erase the military achievements of Israel." Later on, they relied on her to wring political concessions from Israel. It seems that from that position the American policy took her real power and her real capability to act as a mediator in our area in the post-war period.

There is no doubt that the peace process between Egypt and Israel is the result of two critical factors: 1) the strategy as a result of the war; 2) two influential, charismatic leaders (Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin) and the mediational role played by the US.

The peace talks between Israel and Egypt started in November 1977 were a culminating point in the Middle East. Negotiations between the two countries have had great importance for them, for the region, and for the whole world. Many attempts by Zionists to reach Arab recognition in the Middle East failed. The failures were a direct result of their belief that they could destroy the state of Israel. They thought that manpower and the economic potential, along with the support of their allies, would help them to get the quality of their forces equal to that of the IDF. Between 1948 and 1977, Egypt clung to this hope. Perhaps they changed their ideas on that issue in a paradoxical way, especially after the Yom Kippur War when their army succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal. Their intent was to break the stalemate and to press for a political solution which will meet the conflicting countries' needs. Egypt's strategic mistakes in the second phase of the war, allowed Israel to turn the table. The final results of the war are well-known. The Egyptians came to the conclusion that if they could not defeat Israel on the battlefield under the most optimistic circumstances, with the advantage of complete surprise, and if Israel could force them at the end of the war to stay on defense lines 101 kilometers from Cairo, Egypt had better play a different card. Therefore, they felt that they regained their pride which they had lost following their initial great success in the beginning of the conflict.

Following the Six Day War, during the early 1970s, and especially following the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptians began to accept Israel. When President Sadat landed in Israel, Zionists could sense that they had attained an important achievement. The most important Arab leader recognized Israel and the requirement to live in peace.

The Yom Kippur War changed the direction of politics in the Middle East. This was the first time Egypt and Syria launched a war against Israel that came as a complete surprise. Their early successes were impressive, almost resulting in a rout for the IDF. From the outset, it was clear that the combined Arab forces were making strong gains. Israel's military and civilian leaders were shaken and on the verge of despair.

The State of Israel fought for her life. The Third Temple was no longer in danger. However, the attendants were deeply wounded in mind and body. There is no war without casualties, but the Yom Kippur War took too many lives. Thousands of fine young men gave their lives. Their faces were the real participants in the government meetings and inside the Israeli prime minister's head. Menachem Begin led Israel for the first time to history to a peace treaty, steering the ship of state to a safe harbor.

The Yom Kippur War was clearly one of the most bitter and hard fought campaigns in either Israeli or Egyptian history. Only four years passed, however, and in 1977 a peace treaty was

signed between Israel and Egypt. One has to ask a piercing question: Is it necessary to pass through such a frightful war to attain peace?

very
A well -
written paper.

Excellent
I especially give
the 'uncompromising
& the 'unyielding
the model for
the perspectives
of Syria, Egypt
& Israel.

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
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THE OCTOBER WAR, 6-24 OCTOBER 1973

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Miles


- The de-facto frontiers of Israel from 11 June 1967 to 6 October 1973
- Deepest penetration of Arab forces, 6-8 October
- ▨ Furthest limits of Israeli counter-attacks, 8-24 October
- ↗ Soviet arms supplies, 8-24 October
- ↘ United States arms supplies, 12-24 October
- ↖ Other Arab contributions of fighting troops and tanks
- ⊙ Syrian and Egyptian towns and ports bombed from the air or bombarded from the sea by Israeli forces




When President Sadat said the other day that war must go on, and he is prepared to sacrifice a million men every year, one shudders not only at the thought of a million men giving away their lives, but that the head of a people can say it, that he can make this statement is something that makes one shudder. We don't want dead on our side, we have no joy in causing the death of others. But this people, small as it is, surrounded as it is by enemies, has decided to live. And if we have to pay the price for living, we have to pay it. ISRAELI PREMIER GOLDA MEIR, 13 OCT

Our forces will continue to pursue the enemy and strike at him... until we restore our positions in our occupied land. After that, we shall continue until we liberate the whole land. PRESIDENT ASSAD OF SYRIA 16 OCTOBER 1973

The great historic fact is that they did have the opportunity to negotiate, they chose war. They could have talked. They decided to shoot. ABBA EBAN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER, 24 OCT



The Egyptian's attack - SINAI





The Syrian's attack - Golan Heights

THE EGYPTIAN FRONT AT THE CEASE FIRE OF 24 OCTOBER 1973

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
Both Israel and Egypt accepted a United Nations cease-fire call on 22 October 1973, when Israeli forces west of the Suez Canal were still advancing southwards towards the town of Suez. But this first cease-fire was soon broken, and fierce fighting continued until 24 October, when a second cease-fire came into force





THE SYRIAN FRONT AT THE CEASE FIRE OF 24 OCTOBER 1973

- Border between Israel and Syria, 1949-1967
- Territory of the State of Israel from the cease fire after the Six-Day War of June 1967, until the Syrian attack on 6 October 1973
- Syrian territory held by Israel at the cease fire of 24 October 1973



During the fighting 15,000 Syrian civilians fled from the area shown in black