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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Brooks graduated from Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, in 1973, with a BS in Ceramic Engineering and concurrently commissioned through AFROTC. In June 1973, Lt Col Brooks entered UPT at Webb AFB, Texas. After graduation, he remained at Webb as a T-38 Instructor Pilot until January 1976. He was next assigned to Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, as an Executive Support Officer in an aircraft maintenance squadron. Later, he became the Tanker Branch Chief in the 43rd Organizational Maintenance squadron. In 1978-79, Lt Col Brooks attended AFIT at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he received his MS Degree in Systems Management. From 1979 to 1984, Lt Col Brooks was assigned to HQ AFMPC, Randolph AFB, Texas, as a systems/requirements analyst for the personnel data system. His responsibilities included the base level Contingency, Operation, Mobility, Planning, and Execution System (COMPES); Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO); and the Advanced Personnel Data System-II (APDS-II). He left the center for Andersen AFB, Guam, in April 1984, where he served as the Chief of the Consolidated Base Personnel Office and Director of Personnel until July 1985. After Guam, he attended ACSC (Class of 1986) and remained as a Faculty Instructor. In the Summer of 1988, Lt Col Brooks left Alabama for Washington DC to work in the Personnel Contingency Operations area. After 10 months, he became the Director of Personnel Plans Executive Officer and six months later was selected as the Assistant Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel. In August 1991, Lt Col Brooks moved into the Colonels' Group as the Chief of the Support Division. He left Washington for Alabama in August 1992 to attend AWC (Class of 1993).

## INTRODUCTION

There have been several major events that have affected the current situation in Turkey--"moved from one historical period to another" (30:i). For example, there are more democratic and free market institutions and values; many areas historically trapped in conflict are moving towards peace; economic and political freedom has reached Central and Eastern Europe; Russia's threat of expansionism has all but diminished and the nuclear war has all but subsided; vital oil is secure; and finally, most of the world recognizes the negatives associated with communism (30:1-14).

As noted by President Bush, the threat of global conflict is reduced, but the potential for very destructive conflicts between nations exist on a greater scale. The collapse of the former Soviet Union has directly impacted the strategic environment that the world has experienced for the last forty plus years. For example, reduction in the arsenals maintained in the WARSAW PACT countries have been greatly reduced (30:1-14). This new world order has directly and indirectly affected the situation in Turkey.

In the next several sections, this paper will address a number of concerns in Turkey. A major portion of the paper will be devoted to the current situation in Turkey followed by a discussion of Turkish Security, the people of Turkey, the Haves and Have Nots in Turkey, religion in Turkey, the Kurds, and finally, water in the region.

## BACKGROUND

A review of Turkish relations on an international scale (especially with the former Soviet Union) is necessary to set the stage for the follow-on discussions. First, Turkish and Soviet relations have gone through four distinct phases between 1918 and 1985. The first phase consisted of suspicion and hostility--historical animosity and Soviet interest in Turkish Armenia. Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk--Father of Turkey), with his path of western modernization, started the second phase--one of cooperation. For example, a treaty of friendship was signed in 1921. Ataturk's death and WWII as well as Turkish direct support of Nazi and Italian ship passage through Turkish Straits resulted in Stalin placing pressure on Turkey to relinquish control of the straits and strained Turkish-Soviet relations. The Truman Doctrine, Turkey joining NATO, and Turkey becoming a principle power of the Baghdad Pact (created to stop Soviet ambition in the Middle East) also deteriorated Turkish-Soviet relations. Stalin's death brought on the fourth phase. In April 1972, the friendly relations previously experienced by Lenin and Ataturk returned. The basis of this relationship was directly related to extension of Soviet economic and technological assistance to Turkey (9:459-462).

Specifically the former Soviet Union has always had an interest in the Balkans and the Mediterranean--continuously looking for shore facilities for their Navy in the Area (38:20). In addition, its goal has been to restrict the US flexibility in the area. Due to Turkey's role in NATO, the former Soviet Union

has recently proceeded with caution in attempting to strengthen its ties with Turkey. Turkey has been perceived as very important to Russia's foreign policy because the former Soviet Union has viewed the eastern Mediterranean as a forward defense zone (5:143). However, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union constantly reminds Turkey of the ever present Soviet threat (21:194-195).

Additionally, Ataturk decided to give up Turkey's seat as center of the Islamic world and began to face West. These type decisions under Ataturk have resulted in "reorientation of a defeated and dying Middle Eastern Muslim Empire into a nationalist, secular, and westernized modern nationstate (13:1-2).

Aside from these dramatic changes, Turkey's unstable relations with Greece dates back to the Ottoman rule. Their relations have covered the spectrum from good to bad. Turkish leadership still maintains that they desire to resolve the issues (i.e., Cyprus, Aegean, Thrace, etc.) that affect its relationship with Greece (24:22).

Until the Persian Gulf Crisis, Turkey had a very cautious approach in the Middle East. This approach was based on two key principles: (1) Turkey refrained from taking sides in their local disputes and (2) any security cooperation with the West would not damage the security interest of the Arab states (4:46). Now, Turkey is in a position to "be drawn into what can best be described as the vortex of Islamic politics: the only Muslim member of a united Europe, leader of all Turkish peoples, a

leader in the Muslim World, and the mediator between Islam and the West" (17:19). These challenges will continue to result in many tough choices for current and future Turkish leadership.

#### **CURRENT SITUATION**

The next several sections will review and expound on the current situation in Turkey and address the main Turkish interest.

**Black Sea.** Turkey is in hot pursuit of several cooperative initiatives--the Black Sea is just one. Turkey has proposed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project. This project is an attempt to entice the countries surrounding the Black Sea to establish a free trade zone. The infrastructure exists today for such a project (even considering a Black Sea development bank)--for example, six previous Soviet Republics have expressed interest in participating in the project. "The Georgians are eager to learn how to privatize their economy... They admire Turkey's economic success and want to learn from them" (16:2). Moscow has also shown interest in the project and also stands to profit from such an economic venture. For example, Turkish-Soviet trading in the area reached 1.7 Billion dollars in 1990 (47:212).

In addition, this issue has resulted in Turkey becoming an alternative to the Iranian fundamentalist model. Although the success of this political and economic initiative is dependent on Turkey's acceptance in Western Europe, current speculation indicates that this effort strengthens its position for eventual acceptance. Eventually, Turkey would provide an avenue for the

US and Western Europe to interact with the southern republics. This initiative also counterbalances Greek economic interest in the area and could result in Turkey becoming a regional economic power (22:6-7).

European Community. Another area of interest for Turkey is membership in the European Community (EC). The incentive for Turkey pursuing this membership is summarized by Professor Seyfi Tashan's observation that "NATO is our (Turkey's) legal foot in the Western Camp, but the EC is the real one" (22:10).

Turkey is currently unaccepted by the EC and the possibility of that changing in the near term is questionable. It depends on Turkey's economic and political developments as well as the developments of the EC itself. This has directly lead to an extension of the Association Agreement with Brussels that allows a customs union between the EC and Turkey; release of certain assistance funds (Greece has blocked this initiative); and expansion of science, technology and education programs (22:9-11). However, Turkey's stand on human rights, religion, culture, and social biases continue to be barriers to its future membership in the EC (4:48).

Western European Union. Turkey has recently realized that the potential security prospects surrounding its membership with the Western European Union (WEU) are in jeopardy. Reports from Ankara indicate that Turkey sees this as an attempt by Europe to keep Turkey from its legitimate security role in defense of the continent--the Balkan situation adds to this problem (will discuss later). As a result, Turkey's place is not secure in the

WEU (the security arm of the EC) which further reinforces that Europe intends to operate without Turkey as an active participant. Turkey's leadership feels this is a slap in the face based on its efforts in the recent Gulf crisis (22:10-12).

**Germany.** Germany, which has historically lead the way for Europe in trading with Turkey, recently declined to provide assistance. This represents another strong indicator of Turkey's future position in Europe. Germany's position on the recent Kurd situation has also not helped the Turkish-German relations. In addition, the immigration from Eastern Europe to Germany poses serious labor problems for Ankara. The Germans have historically accepted a large number of the unemployed young Turkish workforce. This reduction has and will have a negative affect on Turkey's economy (22:15-16).

**Greece.** The Turkish-Greek dispute still exists and the prognosis remains unchanged. The constant dispute over Cyprus and the Agean (i.e. air and sea space plus resources) have adversely affected relations with Western Europe (21:175-177). This dispute obviously affects the stalemate associated with Turkish acceptance into the EC. Trace is also a point of contention between Turkey and Greece. A combination of things--the evaporation of the Soviet threat to Thrace and the effect of arms transfer to Turkey--now has Greek planners focusing more on Turkey (22:18-22). This problem directly relates to another Turkish issue--the Balkans.

**Balkans.** Turkey's primary concern is to insure the security and well-being of the Muslim minorities in the Balkans. However,

the West is only concerned with precluding any type conflict from spilling over into Europe (22:40). The reality of the situation in the Balkans is as follows: "The collapse of communism has allowed the Caucasus to revert to type: a violent caldron of 50 nationalities whose dislike of each other is exceeded by a suspicion of their big-power neighbors- Russia, Turkey, and Iran" (10:A1). Turkey may well be a target (31:17), but because of Turkish historical interest and the Islamic population there, Turkey will continue to participate in any attempt to resolve problems in the area (1:165). At the same time, Greece fears Turkey will exploit the area for their own personal gain (23:23).

**Middle East.** Unfortunately, present conditions warrant Turkey shifting its security concerns to the Middle East as opposed to the traditional threats from the Balkans and the Caucasus. The doubts about Turkey's role in European security rest with its relationship with the US and the future of NATO-- this is at best a gray area. Turkey still feels the threat from the former Soviet Union, Russian Federation, and the Republic of the Ukraine. These forces will continue to be the largest military powers in Europe in the near-term (7:57). In addition to these obvious threats, Turkey feels threatened by the Middle East (i.e., Kurdish insurgency from the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) with bases located in Syria and Iraq) (22:23-27). As noted by Mr. Ayaz, Minister of National Defense of Turkey, "This terrorism is a result of the ideology stemming from the aims of separate groups to establish a Kurdish state based on obsolete

Marxist-Leninist principles by breaking away a part of Turkey" (7:58).

United States. Turkey solicits a strong and secure relationship with the US, but realizes the implications of this with respect to Moscow and the southern republics. The large population of Muslims in six of seven former republics of the Soviet Union in Central Asia has contributed to the interest by Turkey to quickly establish itself as a strong political and economic power in this new part of the contemporary Middle East. The turmoil of the area makes it a definite security risk to Turkey as well as the Middle East. With Iran competing for power in the area, the situation is dangerous at best (47:211).

The support of the Greek-American lobbyist also poses a threat to Turkey. This group advocates that Greek and Turkish aid should be linked and the distribution of the aid should be at a ratio of seven to ten. Turkey maintains this is unacceptable and its contribution to the security in the area should be the determining factor instead of influence from third parties or special groups (24:24).

Therefore, caution is the key to a US-Turkish relationship. "Overall, Turkey is pursuing an active program of collaborative defense procurements with its NATO allies, and defense-industrial development will be a leading consideration in the Turkish proposals of bilateral cooperation" (22:39). Therefore, "Ankara will look to the US as a source of strategic reassurance and political and economic cooperation in the future" (22:42).

Central Asia and the Caucasus. Although Central Asia has separated from the former Soviet Union, "Russia wants to maintain the tenuous CIS, of which it is the de facto leader" (44:649). Because the area is composed of a number of Russian minorities, Russia has committed upgrade forces for use in the Azerbaijani-Armenian dispute (12:69-70). Because Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia also have a large Turkish population, Turkey has shown a strong interest in the outcome of these disputes (23:28). The most difficult problem seen through Turkish eyes would be an independent Armenia with certain territorial claims to Turkey (23:29). This obviously would jeopardize future Turkish-Russian relations.

In December 1991 (for economical reasons), Turkish-Soviet businessmen meet in response to the areas desire for investment and training--the incentive for the republics was obviously money. In the end, Russia and Turkey both felt they must maintain their important trade links with the area. However, the enormous amount of organized crime and narcotics trafficking in the area has jeopardized these important trade links (35:15;47:211).

Iran and Syria. The outcome of the Gulf Crisis fueled the expansion of both Iran and Syria--they both wanted to obtain a stronger and more influential leadership role in the area (39:30). The potential problems posed by Iran are at best unpredictable. Currently, Iran has created the Caspian Sea Council in an effort to eliminate Turkey as a competitor in the

area and further strengthen its relationship with Russia--Iran definitely poses the biggest problems (47:211).

#### **TURKISH SECURITY**

As alluded to above, Turkey is in a "rough neighborhood" (8:27). Although Turkey does not face a definite threat at the present, its borders face potential hostile areas in every direction. The fact that Turkey currently has an estimated \$9 billion in economic loss due to sanctions against its neighbors adds to this instability of the neighborhood and the Turkish Economy (8:27).

Turkey, like most of the other NATO countries, must down size its force. The army has reduced from 650,000 in 1991 to 496,000 today (450,000 are conscripts). Emphasis is now being placed on a smaller, more professional military. The reduction has affected the other services as well--the air force and navy have reduced to 54,000 each (approximately 38,000 conscripts in each service) (8:27).

The major concern in Turkey is security assistance. The Turks average spending \$6 billion a year on defense--approximately 3.6 percent of GNP and 12.7 percent of their budget. The former US aid to Turkey has changed from FMF to congressional loans--very much a disadvantage for the Turks. However, the Turks have received equipment from the Southern Region Amendment as well as through the cascading of treaty-limited equipment from the central region associated with the CFE treaty. For example, as recent as 15 February 1993, the Turks

were destroying tanks to make room in their inventory for those from the CFE (8:28).

Also, the Defense Industrial Cooperation Programs included numerous items: ammunition production, coproduction of the F-16s, acquiring S-70 Blackhawks and Cobras, ATACMS, stingers, T-38s, and possibly 50 A-10s. This is in addition to the CFE which provides M60s, M48s, M113s, and howitzers. These items came from POMCUS storage in western Europe. Turkey's major interest item is helicopters to counter the terrorism in southeastern part of the country. In addition, their navy is receiving 10 Knox-class frigates, Harpoons, and Sea Sparrows. Their air force is building up its F-16 structure (initial buy of 160 coproduced F-16s was recently extended by another 80 with the possibility of going to 320 total) (8:28).

Although the Turks live in a tough part of the world, they are strong allies and are a model for their secular free market society (8:28). The next section looks at the demographics of the Turkish people.

#### **PEOPLE**

Turkey has been a melting pot for ethnically and culturally different people since prehistoric times. The most influence on the country came from the eastern Turks who brought with them their Mediterranean-Mongoloid origin--approximately the 11th century. Predominately, the country is of Mediterranean-Turkish decent. The western and southern coastal areas are mostly of Mediterranean decent whereas the East and interior are mostly of alpine stock (42:57). In general, the Turks have fair complexion

and dark hair very much unlike the Turks of Central Asia (46:301).

Turkish is spoken by approximately 90 percent of the country. Efforts have been made since the time of the Ottoman Empire to purify the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian words and idioms (43:895). The largest single group of non-speaking Turks are the Kurds. The Kurdish language is spoken by approximately seven percent of the population and the present the rural and migratory populations. They speak a Persian dialect and are about two million strong--very religious group. They are very warlike and resist the efforts of the Turks to convert them (more on the Kurds later) (46:301). Arabic is another language found in Turkey but spoken by less than one percent of the population--primarily by small groups in the larger cities such as Istanbul (42:57).

The Turkish population is on the rise with a growth rate of approximately 35 percent (higher than most countries) and an average death rate of 11.5 percent--annual growth rate of 2.3 percent. However, 55 percent of the population is below the age of 14. The majority of the population in Turkey have adopted the western ways of life. For example, polygamy is prohibited and the women no longer are veiled (42:57; 46:301).

In the next section, the paper reviews the social structure of Turkey based on the Haves and Have Nots.

#### **HAVE AND HAVE NOTS**

The social structure in Turkey today is based on what has survived from the days of the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, the

empire consisted of two very distinct groups of people--"those made up of the elite from both the civilian and military establishment and a folk stratum of the administered" (26:114). This section focuses on the social changes associated with the late eighteenth century to those of the present.

The Turkish historians of literature saw a very simple two tiered society. This view echoes the initial premise--a high or place culture and a little (folk) culture. The palace culture was "esoteric both in language and subject matter ...comprehensible to but a selected few...unconcerned with the happenings of the day to day life" (26:114). The little were only concerned with people and the basic everyday lifestyle. There were also two sources of law which again reinforces the two-tiered society of the Ottoman Empire. The first, the Seriat, provided the guidelines for everything (political, social, or economic behaviors). The written guidance came from the Koran. The secular law derived from the Kanun was the second law-- "determined by sultanic fiat" (26:115). Religion throughout all of the Islamic world indicated group formation just as the laws of the sultans--the politicians or officials paid no taxes while the folk were over taxed. As an aside, the military schools of this era promoted military fighters as role models for all walks of society (26:116). However, Islam remained the main stay for both the upper and lower classes of the Ottoman Empire. Islam linked the tiers in three ways:

First, there was the constant presence of Islam as an ideal of and for society. Second, Islam was a

discourse which enabled persons of high and low standing to have recourse to the same fund of concepts in organizing their life strategies. Finally, there existed a latent element of permeation of social relations by role models that gave direction to the social action of Muslim Ottomans as it filtered through a standard 'imaginaire' reproduced among the elite as well as the folk culture (26:118).

The early nineteenth century brought on the modernization movement (tanzimat) which focused on secularization of the Ottoman society. The religious courts were replaced by a commercial system. The officials known as administrators (had degrees in Political Sciences) now governed the society (1850s). This affected all three of the Islamic levels (referred to above). These new officials (Non-Muslims) further increased the separation in the society and reduced the duties and responsibilities of the folk--"there communal values lost force" (26:120-121).

The Young intellectuals appeared on the scene in the 1860s and promoted Western-oriented reform policy. They experienced limited success in converting key officials to their way of thinking. The unfortunate consequence of the group induced further separation of the two tiers as opposed to bringing them closer and closer together as they originally thought. However they did leave a mark on society that remains in Turkey today--they founded Turkish journalism and created the critical, analytical style so common in Turkey (26:121-122).

During the 1870s, the interest in science became very prevalent in the Turkish society. By the 1890s, all of the

professional schools (the Military Academy, the schools of Medicine, and the school of Political Science) focused on this positivism or scientific approach to education. Those of the tradition view of society found themselves being replaced. This change further induced separation between the reformist (scientifically minded) and those that were religiously educated. The secular view also progressed during this period and continually moved from the predominant Islamic society into that of a book culture with Westernization as its primary theme (26:124).

The positivist generation had a very nationalist view. This view promoted Turkic as opposed to Muslim characteristics and became known as tribalism. The young Turks and the views shared by Ataturk continued to promote the reforms of the nineteenth century where "correctly instituted order" (26:126) was demanded and further deemphasized the Islamic faith.

As a result, the societies of Turkey today are not much different than those of the Ottoman Empire (two tiers) with religion being a key variable separating the culture of Turkey. The next section elaborates on the religious issues in Turkey today with emphasis on the period of rule from Ataturk to the present.

#### **RELIGION**

"On 29 October 1929, Turkey was proclaimed as a republic with Ataturk as president" (46:305). The government under Ataturk was very nationalistic. Ataturk's reforms included the revival of the Turkish language and the reduction of Islamic

influence upon the nation. For example, he abolished the office of caliph (spiritual and civil head of a Moslem state), suppressed religious orders, and closed religious schools and law courts. These are just a few of the drastic changes made by Ataturk that directly affected the practice of religion in Turkey (46:305).

Under the structure of the Ottoman Empire, "Islam was a highly formalistic and demanding religion" (43:896). It imposed many duties and responsibilities on the men and women of the Islamic faith. For example, worshipers had to keep themselves in a "state of ritual purity, pray five times a day, fast for a month every year, and strive, if possible, to visit Mecca at least once in a lifetime" (43:897). More than 99 percent of Turkey's population are Muslims.

The Sunni rite is predominant with the Shiite a close second. In addition, a small number of practicing Christians and Jews coexist in Turkey but their locations are limited to Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (43:897).

A great deal of tension exists among the believers of Islamism, secularism, and nationalism. Each of these differing beliefs affect religion in Turkey. However, the major factor to consider in this secular culture is still religion. The following represents the religious struggles in Turkey today: the relationship between religion and Islamic fundamentalism, and the cultural aspects of family and gender within the context of religion, and finally, the ethnical fight for Turkish religious identity (27:505).

The Turkish constitution as recent as 1982 asserted that "the republic is secular, that political parties must be secular in aim and no one may attempt to acquire political influence by claiming that the fundamental social, economic, political, and legal order should, even partially, be based on religious tenants" (18:550). Consequently, the issue of Islam in Turkey is still very much open and a methodology of coexistence has not been reached (18:550).

Other religious groups do exist in Turkey. For example, religious brotherhoods in Turkey promote beliefs and practices differing from those of a pure secular, fundamentalistic Turkish society. The Nurdju's are a brotherhood that supports reforming society by placing emphasis on the individual--similar to the relationship between individual and state during the Ottoman Empire. These different brotherhoods (Nurdjus, Nakshibendis, and Buleymanjis) also advocate Islamization through the field of education. In addition to the Prosperity Party (the only open Islamic Party in Turkey) and the brotherhoods, a new group of "Islamic intellectuals, trained in Western Social Science, and often Marxists, that favor some secularism, has recently appeared in Turkey. They specifically call upon each person to bring their behavior into accord with the faith" (11:34). For example, the women of this group support the right to cover their heads with the traditional Islamic head scarves. They also advocate the belief that "Islam can allow us to attain Western technological progress" (11:34). Although these two views seem

contradictory based on Turkish history, it indicates a new and different view on the horizon within Turkey.

Christians also exist in Turkey but are very limited in numbers and places where they are allowed to practice. Recently, the Christians have received a great deal of attention. For example, in 1988, a group of Christians in Turkey challenged their legal right (constitutional right to freedom of religion). Several investigations resulted from this. As a result, a number of Christians were charged with "subverting the nation's secular principles for their own religious ends or violating the laws forbidding the use of religious propaganda for personal or political gain" (2:44). Several of the arrested Christians opened civil cases to change their identification cards to reflect Protestant--a public declaration of their beliefs. Nonetheless, the Christians feel that this movement is strengthening and hope that soon the underground church will go away and be replaced by a government recognized Turkish Protestant Church. This will obviously take time but the Christians believe that the infrastructure is there and will continue to openly practice Christianity in Turkey (2:44).

The Kurds are another Turkish group that pose religious problems as well as others to Turkey and will be discussed in the next section.

### **KURDS**

Under Ataturk's rule, the Turkish state that he created was made up of only Turks. No other ethnic background was accepted

or made any difference (28:75). Consequently, this decision has caused much strife among the Turks and Kurds over the years.

The Kurds, through numerous terrorist acts (a very violent campaign since 1983), have placed tremendous pressure on the Turkish government (36:14). They support three ideologies: Marxism, ultranationalism, and fundamentalism Islam. In general, Iraq, Syria, and Iran provide the additional support for these groups--the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) is the largest group of Kurds receiving this support. These countries are noted for their support with weapons sales, logistics, and, in some cases, infiltration into Turkish politics (45:574-576). With the massive arms sales that Russia sponsors, it is not surprising that many of these weapons are Russian made. At best, the gap between Turkey and the Kurds is expanding--talks have all but stopped (37:15). "The internationalism of the Kurdish refugee problem and the talks between Baghdad and the Kurdish leaders in Iraq regarding Kurdish autonomy have spurred Turkish Kurds into political activism and into an accelerated PKK violence" (39:30).

This has resulted in Kurdish issues receiving a lot of bad press over human rights violations. For example, there is strong speculation that Turkey has constantly used the stick approach as opposed to the carrot approach with the Kurds (32:65). Because of this, the Turkish government has worked extremely hard in an effort to get the world to view the PKK as a terrorist group or organization and not as freedom fighters. The program waged by the Turks has been quite successful. Also, this effort is

complimented by how the Turks are widely advertising the changes to their laws which support human rights (8:29).

In addition to the human rights issue, Turkey fears that the Kurds are striving to create an independent Kurdish state within Turkey or northern Iraq--a result that directly conflicts with their interests. Operation Provide Comfort has added to this problem. It has directly resulted in a split between the Turkish government and parliament. The government on the one hand understands the rationale for controlling the flow of refugees but....

the parliament focussed on the drawbacks in the operation: that it provides an umbrella for the PKK; that it eliminates Saddam's ability to control them; that it creates a transparent double standard, contrasting the aid for the Kurds against the ineffective efforts to help Bosnian Moslems; and, as noted above, the prospect of creating an independent Kurdistan with its own sources of oil to guarantee economic stability. These issues were recently debated in parliament as the government requested, and won, a six month extension to the program; they are now busily seeking an alternative before the next debates in June (26:35).

"The Kurds have suffered from decades of official repression of Kurdish national and cultural identity" (25:9). Their demands are equal rights, independent schools, and their own newspaper--they no longer want to be second class citizens (33:51;19:22). The current feeling indicates that the Kurds will "not accept something from the (Turks) because if they (Turks) give them (Kurds) something, they (Turks) always take it back. If the Kurds take it themselves, then they (Kurds) can keep it" (36:14).

Consequently, the Kurds continue to take bigger and bigger steps. For example, the Kurdish movement continues from the mountains to the cities and villages (36:15).

If Turkey does not change its position with respect to the Kurds, it may be faced with the same problem as many of its neighbors--constant ethnic feuds. Ironically, the crises it faces today has simmered for the past several decades since the formal recognition of the republic (28:73-74).

In the next section, this paper addresses the importance of water to Turkey and the surrounding countries as well as the current problems associated with it.

#### **WATER IN THE REGION**

"The wars of the future will not be fought over old-fashioned things like oil, land, or money. Water, the essential resource, is the thing to watch" (41:59) For example, "In the arid lands of the Middle East, water is a (that) precious resource" (34:9) The Arab summit meetings on numerous occasions revolve around the water security of the area. Ironically, one of the three main sources of water for the Middle East (the Euphrates) is controlled by a non-Arab country--Turkey. Turkey's control of the Euphrates directly affects its neighbors--Syria and Iraq (34:9).

Turkey's Grand Anatolia Project (GAP), which will "radically and permanently alter the landscape and culture of a large area of southeastern Turkey" (6:6), is the current reason that Syria and Iraq are concerned. This project encompasses a total of 22 dams. From this massive construction effort, the Turks plan to

harness the Euphrates to create fertile agricultural land. This project will enable Turkey to supply the much needed fruits, grains, and vegetables to the Middle East (3:68). It also provides hydroelectric power to the southeastern part of the country--estimated that it will produce 9 billion kilowatt hours yearly (6:6).

The Ataturk dam is the ninth largest in the world and the centerpiece of this project. In July 1990, the countries of Syria and Kuwait protested when Turkey shut off the flow of the Euphrates (75% reduction in flow to Syria and Iraq) for 30 days to fill the Ataturk Dam (its turbines finally began to turn successfully on 25 July 1992) (29:52;40:57). In addition, an underlying goal of this project is to unite Turkey politically through this extremely challenging agricultural and electrical power production effort (29:52).

Many Turks have expressed dissatisfaction with the cost of this project--9.3 billion so far and an estimated project cost of 23 billion. Turkey has had to finance this effort internally (tremendous tax burden for the Turks) due to the negative international attention the project has received. A social revolution may be required (i.e., major effort to train villagers in the affected area to transition from dry farming to wet farming) (29:52).

The potential for friction between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq should reach its height in 1994 when the flow of the Euphrates will again be restricted. The concerns of Syria and Iraq are real. For example, Syria's employs over half of its workforce in

agriculture and the Euphrates supplies most of the water. Syria also fears that Turkey plans to use the control of the Euphrates as a deterrent to the Syrian support of the Turkish Kurds. Turkey in turn feels that Syria will use its support for the Kurds as its trump card in water negotiations in the future. Unfortunately, Iraq faces a doubled edged sword. Not only are they concerned with Turkey, but in 1975, Syria constructed its Al-Thawra Dam and subsequently reduced the flow of water to Iraq. Although this passed without a confrontation, Iraq did place troops on the border. As an aside, Syria is presently constructing another dam (34:10).

Turkey thus far has justified the project due to the seasonal flooding of the Euphrates. Turkey feels the water should be trapped in the cooler areas where it is plentiful. This reduces the loss from evaporation and consequently, more water is available for agriculture and the production of electrical power. Turkey does agree with Iraq's threatened position and supports Iraq constructing a dam on the Tigris to divert a portion of it into the Euphrates. As recent as 1990, Turkey did offer to provide electrical power to Syria and Iraq in an effort to reduce tempers (40:57). However, despite the apparent water problems, these three countries signed an Euphrate-sharing agreement on 16 April 1990 (34:11).

The problems between Turkey and Syria date back to the days of the Ottoman Empire (1916) when Syria and several other Arab countries declared their independence. As already noted, there has been constant strife between these countries to include Iraq

since then. As a result this problem is viewed more as a political problem than anything else. However, the Arab world still sees the efforts by Turkey to restrict the flow of the Euphrates as a threat to Arab security (3:68). Even though President Ozal of Turkey said, "His country would never use the the river's waters as a threat" (15:41).

### CONCLUSION

In summary, Turkey faces many future challenges from security to religion. The current leadership in Turkey feels the problems in the Gulf and the Middle East will not be solved in the future through security arrangements but through economic cooperation and cultural exchanges (14:49). "One is constantly reminded that Turkey must live with the geopolitical reality of Russian power on its borders" (23:28). Clearly, the past arrangements with NATO and the US have benefited Turkey. However, Turkey now fears the potential loss of these relationships as well as the absence from any European relationships.

In the Balkans and the Caucasus, the end of the Cold War disrupted its delicate balance (20:42). Now, the political and economic disorder of the area are Turkey's newest challenges. Turkey will probably follow a path of crisis diplomacy based on short-term as opposed to long-term solutions.

In addition to the external factors affecting Turkey, it has much internal strife with the Kurds, water problems and the heavy taxes required to support their efforts, and religious concerns from the different religious groups. Each of these problem areas

must be addressed in the near-term and the only resolve for both these internal and external factors appears to be dependent on obtaining regional and international economic and political stability--**Turkey's next and biggest challenge.**

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