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
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE Spring 1994		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED FINAL	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING - A STRATEGIST, LEADER & CLAUSEWITZIAN				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) SHAW R. TALLANT CDR, USN					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AIR WAR COLLEGE 325 CHENNAULT CIRCLE MAXWELL AFB AL 36112-6427				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Unnumbered AWC research paper	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER N/A	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES PAPER IS WRITTEN TO FULFILL ACADEMIC RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS FOR AN IN-RESIDENCE SENIOR SERVICE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SCHOOL.					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) See page iii <div style="text-align: center;"><div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; text-align: left;"><div style="font-size: 2em; margin-right: 10px;">598</div><div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">94-19199</div><div style="font-size: 1.2em; margin-top: 5px;"></div><div style="font-size: 2em; margin-top: 10px;">94 6 22 116</div></div></div>					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Fleet, King, strategist, Clausewitzian				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 46	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLAS		18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLAS		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLAS	
				20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

A

**STRATEGIST, LEADER &
CLAUSEWITZIAN**

BY

**SHAWN R. TALLANT
CDR, USN**

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

SPRING 1994

FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

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**A Paper Submitted to
the Professional Writing Program of
Air War College - Air University**

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FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

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STRATEGIST,
LEADER,
CLAUSEWITZIAN**

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**A RESEARCH PAPER
AIR WAR COLLEGE - AIR UNIVERSITY**

A-B-S-T-R-A-C-T

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE:

The purpose of this paper is to take an introspective look at the personal leadership style and philosophy of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. The focus has been narrowed down to the subject title and the outline listed in the table of contents.

BACKGROUND:

WWII was the sum of two great conflagrations separated by time and distance in two distinct hemispheres. It is the premise of this paper that in the midst of this, Admiral King became the single most direct influence on President Roosevelt and through him, on Allied military strategy conducted during World War Two. The utilization of four primary pillars will support this theme depicting the man and his influence during this War of Wars. These pillars are (1) King's relationship with President Roosevelt; (2) King as a Clausewitzian; (3) King in relation to the AWC Leadership Model; (4) King as a Human Resource Manager. The following thoughts apply:

- "With the exception of Roosevelt, there was no other strategist of the war who had such a grasp on the relationship on the two hemispheres to each other." (6:193) Or, more importantly, understood the human and material resources available to both hemispheres through the strength of the U.S. People and the Country's industrial might.
- "King's Pacific Strategy was a strong political factor in causing the Normandy invasion to be attempted in 1944." (6:193) This, in conjunction with his "Pacific Also Strategy", was primarily instrumental in shortening the course of the war. (6:187/8:681)

FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING
A
STRATEGIST,
LEADER,
CLAUSEWITZIAN

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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>TERM</u>
Adm	Admiral
AWC	Air War College
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
COMINCH	Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
Gen	General
HQ	Headquarters
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TQ	Total Quality
TQL	Total Quality Leadership
U.S.	United States
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

East Asia and Oceania



PACIFIC STRATEGY CHART

1944

1945

1942

1943

SHIPYARD EMPLOYEES BUILDING & REPAIRING U.S. NAVY VESSELS




FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF SHIPYARD EMPLOYEES (JAN 42 - JUL 43)

MONTHS REQUIRED FOR U.S. NAVY CONSTRUCTION BEFORE AND AFTER PEARL HARBOR




FIGURE 2: TIME OF CONSTRUCTION (1941-1943)

DESTROYERS AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION




FIGURE 3: DESTROYER MONTHLY PRODUCTION (1941-1943)

STATUS OF COMBAT VESSELS US NAVY 1939-1944




FIGURE 4, TONNAGE OF COMBATANT VESSELS (1939-1944)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW

Library shelves hold numerous volumes of literature on the myriad of past leaders who have changed the tides of politics, wars, economics and through it all, history itself. A common leadership trait depicted throughout these historical accounts is the ability of these great leaders to grasp the significance of the moment and translate that into timely effective action. As an individual, their ability to direct this transformation of time and history was magnified by their ability to be the ultimate voice of authority, responsibility and accountability; to be able to command the varied aspects of leadership and to be a conduit for them while in command.

This research paper emphasizes this leadership theory while demonstrating how Fleet Admiral King is personified by its very nature. WWII was the sum of two great conflagrations separated by time and distance in two distinct hemispheres, the European and the Pacific Theaters. It is the premise of this report that in the midst of this worldwide turmoil, Admiral King became the single most direct influence on President Roosevelt and through him, on Allied military strategy conducted during World War II. The emphasis of the discussion contained within will center around four primary pillars chosen to support a leadership theme

depicting the man and his influence during this War of Wars. These pillars are: (1) King's relationship with President Roosevelt; (2) King as a strategist and Clausewitzian; (3) King in relation to the AWC Leadership Model; and (4) King as a Human Resource Manager.

SITUATION: U.S. NAVY

Pre-Dec 7, 1941:

Between WWI and WWII the U.S. Navy was in a trough of physical inadequacy; not enough sailors, not enough ships, and not enough overseas bases. For example in 1939 the U.S. Navy stood at 78% of authorized manpower and a 60% of allowable submarine strength. The naval force in being was insufficient to implement a foreign policy of any kind. (6:165)

What led to such straits? The following summarizes several decades of complex international upheaval and political solutions. While easy to compile years later, it is more difficult to rationalize unless examined from their viewpoint; the viewpoint of a society fresh from the first world holocaust and situated in a depression era. The following reasons apply: (1) The U.S. was bound by constraints imposed by Naval Treaties. U.S, Great Britain and Japan decided in 1921 to impose naval tonnage restrictions upon themselves. The U.S. bore the greatest

restrictions, especially in new construction. (2) There was a national climate of isolationism. Orchestrated primarily by the U.S. Congress, the Nation's chosen path of pacifism and disarmament dictated little military preparedness. As an example of the impact on naval forces, major Protestant Clergy lobbied Congress successfully to block naval construction during the Coolidge Administration. (3) Another impediment to naval preparedness was the insistence by air power advocates that navies were obsolete. Interservice rivalries encouraged ongoing debates rather than serious preparation for war. This trend continued for years, beyond the danger point for National Security. And (4) there was the ill fated overconfidence in the military's hollow force by the Commander-in-Chief. The President did not realize how far the scales had been tipped against the U.S. until after Pearl Harbor. He proclaimed in 1937 that the U.S. Navy could block a Japanese advance and bring them to their knees within a year. (6:166-168)

Dec 7, 1941:

The physical military inadequacy, discussed above, was reversed by Japan's colossal blunder at Pearl Harbor, Dec 7, 1941. "They had succeeded in moments the goal of American unity for war, a goal that had thus far eluded the President." (6:169) At what price? The Pacific Battle Fleet was decimated, 18 ships

sunk or severely damaged. The majority of air power in Hawaii was decimated, 188 aircraft destroyed, 159 aircraft damaged. All in all it was a stunning blow to the self respect of the U.S. Navy. 3500 sailors and airmen were wounded or dead. The pride of the Pacific Fleet, moored together along Battleship Row, were shattered, burned out hulks. The great naval base of Pearl Harbor was bleeding and near defenseless, while the country was reeling in a state of shock.

Admiral King, as Commander Atlantic Fleet commenting on Pacific Theater naval preparation, stated, "The basic trouble was the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese could and did do." (6:169) Even after the war warning sent by Washington D.C., Nov 27, 1941, the Navy did not know the Army (Henderson Field) was totally unprepared for an air attack, and the Army didn't know that the Navy was quite unprepared to warn them should one be coming... (6:170)

ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

"When they get into trouble they send for the Sonsabitches."
(6:53)

Indeed the U.S. was in trouble when the War Department brought King back from the brink of retirement, initially to be Commander of the Atlantic Fleet and ultimately to become

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, (COMINCH). Insisting that King accept the position as fleet commander, President Roosevelt acquiesced to his demands of total control of the navy, COMINCH. While fully understanding the design of the designation, this was a title even President Roosevelt had trouble swallowing. His belief was "there should only be one Commander-in-Chief"; the President! (6:194) But, his stronger conviction was in the necessity of ensuring this great leader was in the highest command position, ready to advise him as situations dictated.

Even the naval leadership recognized King as an asset required for victory. For 51 weeks prior to Pearl Harbor, King, as Commander Atlantic Fleet, exercised principle naval command in what many people considered the theater of "greatest danger", the Atlantic Ocean, making the best of limited resources against the German U-boat threat. (4:03) After Pearl Harbor, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Stark believed King was the best man for the overall job of COMINCH; ultimately propelling King to a position senior to Stark himself. Stark said of King; "He will lick them into shape." He had a reputation for toughness with temper that had few equals. Ultimately he would take a Navy at its depths of despair (Pearl Harbor) and lift it to the heights of triumph. (6:159)

CHAPTER II

KING'S OVERALL STRATEGIC VIEW

Admiral King's basic views of strategy were founded in Antoine-Henri Jomini Principles taught through Alfred Thayer Mahan interpretations. Therefore, King's mind was characteristically "Naval". (6:154) He believed that naval strategy is of its nature to be "aggressive". Mahan wrote, "The nation that would rule upon the sea must attack. Ships cannot seize a portion of the sea and hold it as an army can hold a portion of the land. The sea can be held only by crippling any naval force that contests the holding of it with your own." (6:154)

This is typified in the earliest discussions regarding U.S. strategy versus a possible conflict with Japan where King often stated; "In true naval terms, the only way to defend against the Japanese - is to attack them..." (6:154) As WWII progressed, the idea of going on the defensive in the Pacific as a corollary of an offensive on the Atlantic was not kin to King's way of thinking; as it was to General Marshall. (6:154) King believed as Mahan taught; " When suddenly placed on the defensive, with inferior forces (ie.. Pacific Fleet, 1942) then an aggressive response was virtually mandatory." (6:154) Fortunately for the U.S., he had President Roosevelt's ear as his most trusted military advisor and exemplary skills in persuasion.

TOOLS FOR NAVAL STRATEGY - "WAR TO AN ART"

Even though his strategic foundations were based in Jominian precepts, King was much more encompassing. He was not locked into set principles of war. Instead, he used these principles, like many other concepts, as tools to be utilized if a situation and all surrounding conditions liken to it. Otherwise, he maintained the history of wars, their lessons and from them, the existing war doctrines should be studied in preparation of war.

This thought process is typified by King's actions prior to WWII. Prior to war, (1) King became an ardent student of amphibious warfare. He became an attentive and sympathetic observer of amphibious techniques being taught by the USMC. (2) Additionally, he was a prime mover in wartime employment of naval aviation. He believed aircraft carriers should be used independently vice tied to traditional battle groups. As a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Pacific Fleet Battleships were destroyed leaving the carriers as the naval warfighting centerpiece. This resulted in aircraft carriers being utilized in WWII as King had predicted. (3) King was deeply interested in land warfare. He studied all the great wars and strategists, with his deepest interests in the U.S. Civil War and the Napoleonic Era. (4:641) (4) He continuously dealt with measures to put Atlantic ships on a war emergency status prior to U.S. entry into WWII. He was able to accomplish this in the Atlantic Fleet as their Commander. Unfortunately, this

preparedness couldn't be communicated to other fleet commanders. And (5), He held a stringent basic belief in training; more importantly, training to conditions of the next war not the last. Prior to WWII, King ordered the Atlantic Fleet to conduct indepth training in anti-mine, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft warfare practice. (6:156-159)

One of the strategic tools King utilized successfully during the war was the U.S. press services. As it turns out, this became the primary instrument that kept the American public behind naval procurement and utilization throughout the war, for both President Roosevelt and Admiral King. In Clausewitzian terms this use of the press became the perfect device to keep the "paradoxical trinity" balanced between the military and the American people. Prior to this time King had been legendary in his contempt for the press. His advisors convinced him of the advantages of having the press on his side, and King was cunning enough to recognize it as the optimum tool to keep his Pacific military strategies in motion.

Adverse to the press in the past, once he had been convinced of their benefit to his military goals he became vigilant in their usage. (6:186-187) King held regular press conferences during which he leveled with the press; good or bad. He relied on them to hold information "in confidence". The result; King and the press both learned to trust one another.

KING'S STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN CONDUCT OF WAR

President Roosevelt was once asked if his chief naval advisor, Admiral King's, war beliefs could be summed up as follows. "Wars can only be won by Sea Power, therefore, the Navy's plans have to be the best. Furthermore, only the Pacific Theater is a Naval Theater, therefore, the Pacific Theater must be the most important." (6:154) As it turns out this was a popular belief surrounding King during this era, but history proves otherwise. President Roosevelt did not dispute that this quote had a lot of King in it, but rather he saw a lot more in the man and his ideas. (This relationship will be discussed in detail in Chapter III of this paper)

WAR STRATEGY

Soon after America entered the war, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill reached a strategic agreement at the "Arcadia Conference" which was to carry the Allied Strategic Banner throughout the duration of the war. Specifically the agreed upon strategy was: (1) Beat Germany first, containing the Japanese; (2) Wear down the Axis strength; and (3), The means to be used: naval blockade, aid to the Russians, strategic bombing, etc...(2:27)

King did not dispute the need to hold the citadel and arsenal of Great Britain. On the contrary, he fully supported it. As the Atlantic Fleet Commander prior to WWII, King was the architect behind the defeat of the German U-boat threat in the North Atlantic. (2:37) Once the U-boat threat was defeated, he recognized the European Theater would be a land battle. On this basis he deferred to General Marshall on numerous occasions during JCS meetings. Additionally, he supported the "Line of British Military effort" in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. (6:173) His major objection was the wording of this and future conferences in regards to "maintaining a defensive posture in the Pacific". (8:683) The specific statement "to contain" the Japanese became the crux of the Admiral's difficulties. King had to continually fight American and British military strategists concerned only with the European theater just "to get enough resources for the Pacific War even to keep pressure on the Japanese". (4:364)

King proposed an "offensive" in the Pacific. His premise was "no fighter ever won his fight by covering up, by merely fending off the other fellows blows." (6:173-174/7:251) Specifically his strategy was: (1) Australia and New Zealand must be held; (2) Hold Hawaii and its approaches (Midway); (3) Maintain a line of communications to Australia by way of Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia by establishing bases. And further, (4) a step by step advance

Northwest from the New Hebrides to the Solomons, etc.. to defeat the Japanese Navy and to isolate them from their much needed resources in the South Asian arena. (4:251)

The Pacific Theater chart (pg vii) depicts the U.S. Pacific Strategy orchestrated by King during WWII. It is a modification of the Navy's prewar, SE Asia contingency plan; "Plan Orange". (7:251/4:531)

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS

Numerous conferences were conducted between the allied powers throughout the war. The primary theme discussed throughout these meetings were the conflicts between resources and strategies to be utilized in the European War. The British backed the "Periphery Strategy" while the American's supported the "Massive Concentration of Forces" strategy employed in a cross-channel attack. (2:03-24/8:679) A continual detractor to this demand for resources in the European hemisphere was King's repeated requests for an additional offensive in the Pacific. It was the growing concern the British felt over a higher prioritized Pacific front that finally aligned them behind the Allied cross channel initiative in 1944. (8:688-691/2:46)

British perceptions of King's views for an offensive in the Pacific were negative. They felt his strategies were colored by what appeared to be his "single-minded absorption in the war

against Japan". (6:183) King did not object to the Atlantic first strategy as General MacArthur openly did. He did feel its elevated precedence was due to the British Empire's own "imperial" interests vice the key interest of the three allies, but he maintained it was a sound strategy. (2:32) King's primary objection was the inference drawn from the European First strategy that the Pacific could be safely ignored until Germany had been defeated. He felt it neither true nor necessary. He based his debate on his belief in the "industrial might" of America. King held from the outset of WWII that U.S. industry could produce enough for offense in both hemispheres. (6:183-187) He became a "master" at recognizing surplus resources in the European theater and redirecting them to the Pacific. (7:339) (See Chapter VI)

Despite British inferences, to say King was exclusively "Naval" or "Pacific" oriented is misleading. "With the exception of President Roosevelt, no other strategist of the war had such a grasp of the relationship on the two hemispheres to each other." (6:193)

CHAPTER III

KING'S WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH:

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Admiral King's relationship with President Roosevelt was close and professional, constantly growing and crossing the bounds the different levels of leadership normally impose; from the operational to the national/military - to the national - to the international levels. Eventually his influence was such that at meetings in Roosevelt's study (especially with Churchill) all King would have to do is shake his head, ever so slightly...

(4:412-413)

This relationship between these two great leaders is one that King built on the basis of blunt speech and demonstrated fitness for the job to be done. King knew where his strength was, and he realized in order to be successful he had to be near the White House. "Where the power is, that is where the HQ has to be." (6:193) He was also shrewd enough to realize his position depended on the President and the President's confidence in him. President Roosevelt was one of King's few unreserved admirers. He supported King because he trusted King's strategic judgement and because King's strategy dovetailed with his own. The President knew what he had in King; a shrewd strategist. He also believed

as King did, that a leaders top advisors had to remain near the seat of power. "You don't send these men to the front lines."

(6:145-154)

As an illustration of the relationship and power King had with President Roosevelt, even as early as 1941; immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Roosevelt asked King to become Commander in Chief for the entire U.S. Fleet (COMINCH). King accepted this post as long as the requisite authority was allotted, and followed with a specific list of requests. Within 48 hours of his designation as COMINCH he had in writing a document signed by President Roosevelt which gave him powers withheld from any CNO since the title was created in 1915.

(7:226) Specifically, King was responsible directly to the President; not the CNO, Secretary of the Navy, the War Department or later the Joint Staff. He exercised supreme command over operating naval forces; for example, the CNO was relegated to making long range war plans, while King as COMINCH was responsible for current operational plans. King was given authority over all the Bureaus of the Navy; military, civilian, procurement, etc.. President Roosevelt in effect handed Admiral King more authority than the existing CNO, Admiral Stark, possessed. As a result, within the first few months as COMINCH, King was operating as the senior naval officer in the Navy, effectively removing Stark from the operational picture altogether. When Roosevelt died, so did King's influence in the White House. (6:171,193/4:350-358)

GENERAL MARSHALL

The introduction of this paper described the relationship King enjoyed with Roosevelt was a primary pillar supporting the overall research paper's thesis. Closely tied to this thought is the contrast in relationship General Marshall, the only other military strategist of the same caliber and positional authority as King, possessed with Roosevelt. As members of Roosevelt's Joint Staff, King and Marshal were equals. The greater strength of voice King possessed lay in his close relationship with the President. Marshal, the consummate professional, refused to maintain a personal relationship with the President. He preferred to remain at arms length. (6:194)

The relationship between Marshall and King is in itself amazing. Probably never in history have two men with such opposite ways of thinking, operating, and methodology been thrust together to work on a military objective where the outcome was so critical to so many. They were never on a first name basis and they probably didn't like each other. (6:193) General Marshall was tactful, reserved, and a superb conversationalist. Admiral King was easy to anger, had little use for small talk and hated public speaking. Yet, somehow they both realized that together they were a formidable combination. Between the two of them, they

commanded almost the total American Armed Forces and their voices spoke with this power. The difference in power is Admiral King's voice was always within the President's inner circle of advisors.

Despite their differences, King accepted Marshall's initial gesture of conciliation early in the war. It seems they both shared the conviction that the two of them must somehow get along, and they united under this bond of necessity. Their greatest fear was if they didn't unite, the British would maintain the upper hand in influence with the President. It was said, numerous times King, the greater strategist, would give way to Marshall, the greater man. (6:193-4)

CHAPTER IV

KING - A CLAUSEWITZIAN

A study of the great strategist, Carl Von Clausewitz, brings to the forefront the foundation of his teachings in the "Art of War". No evidence of King ever studying Clausewitz is presented, however the similarities presented in this chapter signify they are cut from the same cloth. Even though Admiral King was an ardent student of Jomini principles as interpreted by Mahan, the following comparisons indicate that King also came to the realization of this "Art" as Clausewitz preaches.

Simply put, King's understanding of what Clausewitz would call the "Nature and Art of War" carried his strategies to the forefront of the allied struggle against Japan. (1:148-151) The strength of his commitment to these fundamental principles was exemplified in his debates and actions. Since this is not a study of Clausewitz and for the sake of brevity, this section will not re-define individual Clausewitzian precepts. Rather, it will simply state where King's thoughts overlapped and annotate the appropriate cross reference next to each subtitle. The following areas apply:

Trinity: People - Military - Government (1:89)

Similar to Clausewitz, King believed in the necessity of "harmony" between the three key nodes of the people, military and government. In order to be successful and gain support for his strategies King felt that (1) he had to be where the power was located. This concept was successful primarily because Roosevelt held King's opinion in high esteem and King's ideas dovetailed with the President's. (2) He utilized the press to keep the home front behind policy decisions, balancing the people with the military and government. And, (3) King recognized he would have to become an expert at negotiations at the national- military level to obtain desired results. This kept the military and government connectivity in balance and rewarded him with his Pacific offensive at the "Casablanca" Conference

King's strategy to "Attack in the Pacific" was in harmony with the three key nodes. It was what Roosevelt's activist temperament wanted; what the American people desired and what sound Naval Doctrine prescribed. (2:59)

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

BOLDNESS & PERSEVERANCE (1:190-194)

Clausewitz believed the ultimate Commander possessed the qualities of boldness and perseverance. King epitomized this concept. Prior to WWII, as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, King

became an instrument in Roosevelt's policy of deterrence in protecting the high seas. (2:53) It was said, "He conducted an undeclared war against Germany to protect transatlantic convoys; doing so with a boldness and determination that the President's concept of that risky venture required." (6:153)

Eric Larrabee wrote; "Within King some intense spirit burned away. A spirit fed by incalculable devotion to self and to service.... Above and beyond these was resolution: grim, harsh and ruthless.. ". (6:155)

DEFENSIVE STRENGTH - COUNTERATTACK (1:357-409)

Clausewitz teaches that the strength in battle is on the defensive. But, he continues, this is only so that the defensive commander can look for the proper moment to take the offensive away from the opponent, attacking his center of gravity, and sweeping the tide of battle. Simply put, the strength in the defensive position is looking for the optimum counterattack.

As discussed, Naval doctrine is by nature aggressive. King believed, once put on the defensive, immediately look for the optimum place to counterattack. Pearl Harbor put us on the defensive. For King, the only answer was to "look for an offensive in the Pacific, not containment" (6:154) This idea of an offensive in the Pacific was to become the centerpiece in many heated disputes at Allied conference tables from 1941-1943.

CENTER OF GRAVITY (1:456-460)

Clausewitz was adamant in his belief that a military leader's strategy must be focused against the critical node maintaining an enemy's strength. It was only in defeating this center of gravity that a military leader could triumph. In the struggle against Japan, King believed the key or, in Clausewitzian terms, the center of gravity, was the Japanese fleet. Once their fleet was destroyed, the Japanese would be isolated from the rest of the world, a prisoner on their own island and left to the mercy of the remaining world powers. His first step towards defeating the Japanese fleet was defeating the island stronghold of Rabaul, the HQ of the Japanese Fleet.

(6:189)

CULMINATING POINT (1:566-577)

Clausewitz defines the culminating point as the moment in the campaign where the balance of power shifts, along with the tide of war. At this point one side can dictate the terms of the remaining conflict. Just as important, it must be understood that if the victor impudently continues past the culminating point he can strengthen the resolve of the defeated populace and possibly reverse the outcome of the war.

King's strategy, as outlined earlier, was a step by step advance Northwest from the New Hebrides to the Solomons, defeating the Japanese fleet. With the defeat of the Japanese Navy, this drive across the Central Pacific would cut off the Japanese from their source of raw materials in Southeast Asia. At this point an effective air and naval blockade could be established around the island of Japan. Here was King's culminating point in the Pacific theater. (3:250) King believed this was the point to dictate terms. He believed an invasion would not be necessary or desired. King's thoughts paralleled Clausewitz, who would say such an invasion would be a step beyond the culminating point. It would result in an unnecessary battle which was certain to solidify the hatred of the Japanese people against the invading forces, compounding the difficulty and the cost of ending the war.

FOG & FRICTION (1:119-122)

Clausewitz and King both believed that knowledge and experience obtained through training, practice and actual combat are the only ways to fight the unforeseen fog and friction of war. Clausewitz believed fog and friction were everywhere and due largely to chance. King believed in reducing the opportunity for that chance.

King attacked this unknown entity by instituting fleetwide training "prior" to the war. He identified three key warfare areas for his fleet to center their training around; (1) Anti-Mine Warfare, (2) Anti-Submarine Warfare and (3) Anti-Aircraft Warfare. Additionally, King instituted daily exercises at general quarters and damage control with strict attention to written orders and instruction. His intent was for his sailors to respond with trained instinct when the fog of war arose in battle.

(6:159-160)

MORALE (1:184-191)

To Clausewitz and King, morale was the "spirit" that moves an Army. "Make the best of what we have"; was a maxim King instilled fleetwide, prior to the war, when the U.S. Navy was in disarray and at its depths in readiness. "The difficulties and discomforts of this emergency period (prior to the war) must be faced in the same spirit of cheerfulness and willingness with which we would face the hazards and dangers of war - if and when they come." (6:160)

King expected officers to lead in the determination that difficulties and discomforts (personnel, material, operational waiting, etc) shall be dealt with as "enemies", to be overcome

by their own efforts. He believed the greatest characteristic of a naval leader is the offensive spirit, "the will to attack and keep on attacking". His maxims could be summed up as follows; (1) Do the best you can with what you have, (2) Don't worry about water that has gone under the dam, and (3) Difficulties exist to be overcome. (4:639-641)

CHAPTER V

KING IN RELATION TO THE "FIVE" DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP

The Air War College (AWC) highlighted leadership as a primary theme during their 1994 classes, utilizing four dimensions of leadership in their discussions. This report utilizes this model as a third pillar in support of its thesis, slightly modifying the model with the addition of a fifth category concerning "modern warfare and jointness".

In order to support the entering arguments in respect to Admiral King's influence during WWII, it is an integral part of the discussion to depict King's leadership methodology. King, the ultimate leader, crossed all dimensions of leadership. Not, however, always to the liking of everyone in the 1940's and more than likely not to the standards of our leaders in the "sensitive" 1990's.

LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME AND PEACETIME

King was not able to transcend the dimensions of leadership between wartime and peacetime. He was a warrior. He specifically despised incompetence and shoddy performance. He was a harsh taskmaster who defined high standards for his subordinates, then

expected those same high results. To put it bluntly, King was not an individual who would support the style of leadership required in today's "Total Quality Leadership" (TQL).

Chapter One stated that King was brought back from the brink of retirement. He was being readied for retirement prior to the hostilities of WWII primarily because his persona, as already defined, did not fit into a "peacetime" environment. He was being discarded by military leaders during a calm, isolationist period of this country's history. Our government wanted military leaders who personified a blend of diplomacy and strategic foresight; leaders who were gentle in manner and unobtrusive in personality. King did not represent any of these qualities, and quite frankly would go into a rage if compared to those who were. (6:157-160)

Fortunately for the United States and their Allies there was a "sonsabitch" such as King to be brought back during this crisis period. America needed someone who could jar the Navy out of its peacetime ways of thinking, and prepare them for the difficulties of war. (6:158)

LEADERSHIP AT DIFFERENT LEVELS

King's greatest strength lay in his leadership abilities at all levels of military command. He was able to transcend every level of leadership; from the tactical to the organizational, to the national military to the national levels. He could discuss

strategy across each of these levels, essentially because he had held, and excelled at most Naval positions at each level along the way. Few could match the diversity of his naval experience. He had been a surface line officer, aviator, submariner, staff officer, aircraft carrier CO, salvage director, bureaucrat, fleet commander and finally a Joint Chief. (4:ix)

It was this leadership strength, galvanized at the highest national military level that won his Pacific offensive. "He was a hard man at a hard time, well suited to lead a fleet, but also a thoughtful man of a breadth and incisiveness that gave him an early and enduring grip on Allied strategy." (6:185) He was said to have the strongest mind in the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. King won approval for his "Pacific Also" strategy at the international conference at "Casablanca" in 1943, an occasion where every other U.S. leader lost ground to British insistence; including General Marshall. (2:32) The new wording, born in Casablanca and refined at the Quebec Conference, stated the Allied position in the Pacific was to "maintain and extend unrelenting pressure against Japan". King had his Pacific offensive. (3:135)

LEADERSHIP AND ITS ETHICAL DIMENSIONS

King, the ultimate warrior, did not put much stock in the idea of ethical dimensions connected with leadership acumen. His

greatest ethical flaws were other men's wives, alcohol and intolerance. King believed in the philosophy; Work Hard, Fight Hard, Play Hard. He was an assiduous party goer. He told subordinates, "Never trust a man who didn't drink or enjoy the company of women". (6:154)

The opposite of today's TQL leader, King was renown for his intolerance. His daughter once said, "He is the most even tempered man in the Navy, he is always in a rage." (6:154) He did not tolerate laziness or shoddy performance. He could be publicly abusive of subordinates. He rarely dispensed praise; and then in private he went out of his way to find fault. And, he was generally adverse to delegating authority. But once you measured up to his standards his subordinates said he was compulsively considerate and generous and he looked after his own people.

It is interesting to note one ethical aspect of King's Pacific strategy. Although no evidence was found to support any examples of personal racial prejudice, it was obvious that King recognized American prejudice, prevalent of the day, and made it part of his strategy. King stated that Australia and New Zealand must be held in the Pacific. His reasoning was that they were white men's countries. Overrunning of these countries by the Japanese would have adverse repercussions among the non-white races of the world". (6:173)

LEADERSHIP AND THE AIR AS A DIFFERENT MEDIUM

Before WWII King recognized the formidable power of the fast carrier and the air wing component. From an early age, he pioneered the strategies for their employment, asserting that they be used independent of the cumbersome battleship groups. (8:700) It wasn't until he was designated COMINCH that he was able to direct this doctrine. Aircraft carriers during WWII did operate in this mode, primarily due to King's insistence and additionally to the significant loss of Pacific Fleet surface assets at Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the Pacific campaign, King recognized he needed to defeat the Japanese Navy, and he needed command of the skies; air superiority. While the Army was still struggling with this concept in the European theater, King recognized the advantages early on in the Pacific and put it to work. As discussed, his strategy was to drive NW from the New Hebrides to the Solomons, and onward to Japan. His leap frog technique enabled him to bypass Japanese strongholds while simultaneously permitting acquisition and construction of airfields from Guadalcanal to Bougainvillea. King had stated that the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul was the key to the Japanese fleet (their HQ). His strategy was to isolate Rabaul, then bombard it from insurmountable land/sea air power. (7:370-371)

King's success is now documented history. By war's end he had complete mastery of the air throughout Southeast Asia. It is

interesting to note that while King's strategy proved the effectiveness of his combined sea/air strategy, the Japanese proved the lack of such a strategy could be disastrous. "Rabaul demonstrated the folly of building up a great overseas base without a navy capable of controlling the surrounding water and air." (6:190)

LEADERSHIP IN MODERN WARFARE AND JOINTNESS

Throughout the history of warfare there are repeated examples of military leaders fighting the last war, vice the next one. Our Civil War leaders fought old assault tactics into the throat of the new rifle technology. The French were preparing for WWII with the outdated doctrine of WWI trench warfare, despite the new mechanized armies being prepared across the globe. King believed throughout his career that it was incumbent upon the military leader to learn from history and be prepared for the next war. (8:696) "King understood the importance in modern warfare of organization, geography, technology and industrial production, and from their interaction he drew conclusions of a vigorous order, expressed in forceful language." (6:156) It was this understanding of modern warfare which enabled King to simultaneously recognize the requirements for both theaters of operation in WWII.

King realized he would not be able to conduct an offensive in the Pacific unless he was able to acquire sufficient war materials in his theater. To be successful King had to understand and then fight the "Germany First" doctrine which he found unnecessary and most other military leaders supported. (7:339) Optimum utilization of all assets became paramount and King recognized jointness was the key. The outcome was the Pacific planning staff under Admiral Nimitz, became the only "true" joint staff of WWII. It was a mixture of experienced officers from the Army, Navy, Marine, Air, Amphibious, Special operations, etc.. The result was the "planning for the Pacific campaigns was one of the marvels of the war. The entire process was an intellectual feat of high order worked out under great pressure. In four months they worked out the logistics, communications, and other specialized tasks (weather, landing craft, underwater demolition, etc...) simultaneous with the strategic/tactical plans themselves." (6:191) Of note; while this was Nimitz's staff, King in Washington maintained close contact and control over their operations. (7:234)

Admiral King recognized the importance of Jointness in WWII and was a pioneer in its employment. He was driven to this concept early on due to the severe material resource constraints in the Pacific theater (See Chapter Six). But, it was his vast military experience which convinced him of the strategic requirement. "King's experience in surface ships, submarines and aviation had convinced him of the necessity of using everything

that could be brought to bear against an enemy." This is the basis for his belief that an airplane by itself would be as ineffective as the surface ship or the foot soldier without air support and reconnaissance. (4:642)

CHAPTER VI

HUMAN/MATERIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: EFFECTIVENESS OF KING IN TWO HEMISPHERES

As stated in Chapter One, the U.S. Navy entered the war on a low ebb. Except for cruisers, few combatant ships were added to our fleet following WWI. With no authorization for construction, advances in technology and naval science were hampered with no opportunity to test new designs. While our naval size remained static, our hardware in many cases was reaching obsolescence. With the power of hindsight, Admiral King said in 1944; " Our failure to build progressively (during this period) was a mistake which is hoped will never be repeated." (5:04)

As the U.S. entered the war in 1941, King was thrust into the unenviable position of having to "hold in the Pacific", while the majority of the allied effort was thrown into the European hemisphere to fend off the immediate German threat. What assets did he have to count on; (1) a decimated Pacific Fleet with all of his battleships sunk or damaged. (2) The U.S. industrial machine just beginning to get into motion, but unable to provide any immediate relief. And, (3) little of the available U.S. or Allied resources coming to his hemisphere.

King, the ultimate leader, resource manager, and strategist proved to be the best man for the job. With unbelievable

foresight, he built his strategy on an offensive operation, not defensive posture. It was designed around his unshakable belief in the industrial capacity of this nation. He knew there would be enough resources to fight in both theaters simultaneously. As previously discussed, he was given positional authority no previous CNO had ever possessed. He was in complete control of every Naval department; military and civilian, procurement and operational. Additionally, he had the respect and support of the press and through them the hearts of the American people. And, most importantly, he had the undiluted ear and trust of the President. This resulted in the Navy receiving full support of the Nation. The industrial machine went to work and as COMINCH, he was in control of everything naval.

THE BEGINNING; A LIMITED EMERGENCY

The European War began on the 3rd of September, 1939. While not immediately involved, it became apparent to many civilian and military leaders that the war would affect this country to varying degrees; possibly for our national existence. The first step taken by the United States was for the President to declare a "limited emergency". For the Navy, the immediate effect was to increase the authorized personnel strength from 131,000 to

191,000. Additionally, this declaration authorized the country's mobilization; the ability to recall retired and reserve forces to active duty. (5:05)

In January, 1940 the Navy presented concerns of current naval strengths to the U.S. Congress. Aggressor nations were continually disregarding treaties and as such presented a grave threat to our national security. Congress, recognizing that our security would be measured by our ability to defend ourselves, authorized a 11% expansion of combatant ships. Not long after this authorization, the situation in Europe had deteriorated to the point that most of Europe was overrun and Great Britain was threatened. "In view of this alarming situation, the Congress passed the so called Two-Ocean Navy Bill, which was signed by the President on July 19, 1940. The increase in our naval strength authorized by this Act was 1,325,000 tons of combatant ships--by far the largest naval expansion ever authorized." (5:06)

U.S. INDUSTRIAL MIGHT

King was brought onto the scene when he was designated COMINCH following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Taking stock of the situation, he realized that his Pacific Fleet was in shambles. But, more significantly, he understood that the nation had dedicated itself to victory with the Two-Ocean Navy Bill and he designed his strategy around it. This bill meant an expansion of

about 70% in combat tonnage. As a military strategist he saw a sleeping industrial giant just awaking, ready to rise to the occasion. (5:07)

As King foresaw, America's industrial might did explode. In his report to the Secretary of War in 1944, he stated how the industrial base came alive, thereby allowing the early execution of his Pacific strategy. He stated; "Early in the period of the shipyard expansion, it was apparent that as the new programs for cargo ships, tanks, planes, and the Army and Navy equipment of all kinds started to pyramid, the country's latent manufacturing capacity would soon be overloaded. Thus the problem became not merely one of expanding shipyards, but of expanding the manufacturing capacity of industry as a whole to meet the needs of the Navy shipbuilding program. (See Figure 1, pg viii) (5:08)

Simultaneous with this new construction, this industrial pyramid was affecting all aspects of U.S. industry. These included plants producing raw materials to component manufacturers, to sub-contractors, to the largest shipyards. Not only were they getting bigger, they were getting better and faster. Figure 2 (pg ix) shows the decreased time required for ship construction between 1941 & 1943. Figures 3 & 4 (pg x, xi) demonstrate the dramatic increase in numbers and tonnage of shipping during this same period. (5:08-11)

WAR OF LOGISTICS

King built his strategy around the needs of the moment and his belief in the U.S. industrial might to support them. This belief enabled him to take his fight to the enemy. He understood in order to successfully complete his strategy he had to have a logistical system sound enough to support and protect it. "This war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics." (5:22) The ways and means to provide a solid line of communications and resupply system were colossal problems. They had to be orchestrated or all else would fail.

Initially, in the face of non-developed bases in Australia and in the South Pacific, U.S. military strategy was designed to establish bases to provide links for communications and to provide supply staging areas for fuel and troops. This was the foundation for the Navy's island hopping campaign as outlined on the chart detailing the Pacific theater strategy. (pg vii)

Along with the exploding industrial base, the Navy required the matching personnel to man these ships. Following the outbreak of war the American people met the demand. The following table exemplifies the dramatic naval personnel increases from 1939-1944. (5:13)

Sep 1939 Dec 1941 Jan 1944

Navy	126,418	325,095	2,252,606
Marine Corps	19,704	70,425	391,620
Coast Guard	10,079	25,002	171,518

RESOURCE MANAGER'S CONCLUSION

The Japanese Pacific advance was checked as abruptly as it had begun. Once checked, it was necessary to build up military strength to the point where the numerical inferiorities which were so pronounced early on, were reversed. This reversal was apparent in King's report to the Secretary of War in 1944, when he stated; "The Japanese capacity to maintain the war at sea and in her advanced areas has suffered increasingly, due to the loss of vital shipping, while the growth of our power in the Pacific enables us to threaten attack on the Marianas and Carolines and Kuriles, which may be called the intermediate zone of defense of the Empire." (5:56) He predicted our future victory and ultimate place in history when he further added; "For more than two years, the United States has been engaged in world-wide war. Our geographical position, our wealth, resources and industrial development, combined with an unfaltering will to victory have established and enhanced our position as one of the dominant powers among the United Nations." (5:03)

CHAPTER VII

SUMMATION

Fleet Admiral King was the ultimate voice of authority and insight during WWII. He displayed the rare ability to deftly command the varied aspects of leadership and to guide Allied strategic decision making to its sage conclusion. He grasped the significance of the moment and translated it into timely effective action. WWII was the sum of two great conflagrations separated by time and distance in two hemispheres. Recognizing the strategic requirements of both King became the single most direct influence on American military strategy utilized during World War Two.

Through (1) his close relationship with President Roosevelt, (2) his basic naval precepts combined with his innate understanding of the "Art of War", (3) his basic adherence to principles similar to the AWC Leadership Model, and (4) his masterful management of the Pacific theater's human and material resources:

- King saw, understood, and supported the strategies and resource requirements for war in the European Theater, and with this understanding, formulated the same for the Pacific Theater.

- He directly supported the European Theater by designing and then orchestrating the Naval Strategy leading to the German U-Boat defeat in the Atlantic.
- His understanding of the politics in the national - national/military arenas was so innate that he became the consummate diplomate. His strategy won at Casablanca and other conferences where the other JCS Officers' strategies often failed. He won "his" offensive in the Pacific at a conference table.
- His ideas were far reaching. As a close advisor to the President he had immediate and undiluted access to him. As such, he had a direct conduit to and impact on the actions of WWII.
- To say King was exclusively "Naval" or "Pacific" oriented is misleading. With the exception of President Roosevelt, no other strategist of the war had such a grasp of the relationship on the two hemispheres to each other. Or, more importantly, understood the human and material resources available to both hemispheres through the strength of the U.S. People and the country's industrial might.

- King's Pacific Strategy was a strong political factor in aligning the Allied forces behind a U.S. sponsored cross channel invasion in 1944. As a result the Allied offensive timetable was advanced, enabling the combined allied forces to drive the Germans back across Europe at an earlier date and ultimately accelerating the end of the European war.
- Through the implementation of his "Pacific Also Strategy", King was directly instrumental in shortening the course of WWII. If the original Allied strategy to "hold in the Pacific" had been carried out, the U.S. would have been faced with another long campaign in the Pacific following the defeat of Germany. Instead, following King's offensive strategy the U.S. was only months away from victory in the Pacific following Germany's surrender.

There is an interesting sidenote to consider. Would the U.S. people have had the will to continue the war into the Pacific if the original Allied strategy had been complied with until Germany's defeat? Truman was President. The American people had spent four long years at war, fighting on foreign soil at a terrible cost of money and lives. To continue the war in the Pacific the U.S. would have had to send their battle worn warriors around the globe to fight a strong and entrenched

Japanese war machine. The U.S. people would have had to face the strong possibility of the Pacific war exacting the same price from them as the European war.

King did win his offensive in the Pacific therefore this scenario was never played out. If it was not for King's persistence and leadership skills this predicament could have come to pass with a potentially dramatic twist of fate. It is possible that King's strategic contribution was a lot larger than this paper or even history allows.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Presently the Western World is basking in an euphoria as a result of the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet communist block. The resulting new world order has left fewer demands for a large U.S. military structure. As America responds to these world events by withdrawing increasingly within its borders and downsizing its military, it is hoped that their leaders do not forget the many lessons contained within. History shows the memories of the American people and their elected leaders are short. The cost in American lives will be great if past lessons have to be relearned. Two key lessons can be gleamed from this research; First, the true reason for jointness in today's armed forces; Second, the caution required in emphasizing a civilian managerial technique into a military art.

Jointness is the ultimate challenge of our future military. The American public has decided to focus their attention on internal social problems, cutting funds in defense spending to pay for them. Despite dramatic military downsizing, military leaders are being asked to accomplish the same military missions with fewer resources. Currently all military Service Chiefs have lauded "jointness" as the solution to the problem and are vocal in their support. It is interesting to note that today's

military is still adjusting to the same concept of jointness Admiral King was forced to recognize in WWII, and for the same reasons; scarcity of resources. The real lesson portrayed here is the hope that military leaders will relearn the true reason for jointness which was annotated in WWII. In King's report to the Secretary of Defense in 1944, he made the following statement; "As to the purely military side of the war, there is one lesson which stands out above all others. This is that modern warfare can be effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the military power of the Nation on the ground, at sea, and from the air." (5:03)

The second lesson which can be carried over from this research is tied into today's leadership concept of Total Quality (TQ) management in the Armed Forces. There is much that can be gained by the idea of TQ being adopted in the military. During peacetime, the military has the luxury and indeed the responsibility of utilizing a standard managerial approach in order to streamline existing procedures and to make military production more efficient and cost effective. The end result can only enhance military performance in future conflicts. The caution that arises is the distinction in decision making the military requires in wartime. It is important to remember, as Deming states, TQ is a production oriented philosophy not one perfected for the military.

Operational readiness and the keen fighting spirit are just as important as lower costs and efficiency in today's military. The military can not forget to teach their people the lessons that have been learned in "blood" over the years. As Clausewitz and King would emphasize, war is an art which requires a leader: ready to be the voice of authority, responsibility and accountability; ready to translate decisions into timely effective action. In the heat of battle there is no time to form a working group or committee to guide decisions. The military chain of command becomes directive and authoritarian in combat. When this moment arrives, the soldiers, sailors and airmen must be ready to react to the fog and friction of war. This will happen only if they have trained like they will fight. For the past two years military leaders have loudly supported TQ decision making throughout the military; from top to bottom, with zero discussion in reference to wartime decision making. It has become politically correct to speak in quality decision making terms throughout all levels of the military. Not a factor now, but what about 10 years from now ...Vietnam will be 30 years in the past... Desert Storm will be a brief moment in history. What will the military's core thinking process or experience be? Will their troops be nursed on managerial thoughts and procedures only, or will they be allowed to train as they will fight? It is incumbent upon military leaders to preach this "distinction" in leadership as well as the benefits this new TQ managerial tool brings to the military.

The recommendations are simple. 1) When the military educates its people in TQ, they must simultaneously emphasize the "distinction" between peacetime managerial thinking and war fighting decision making. Explain that TQ is a management tool to make existing procedures more efficient, but, when the balloon goes up, they take the now "updated" military procedures and go to war. 2) Continue all training exercises (ie.. Red Flag, Ocean Venture, etc..) as an operational exercise, run under war command structure; but designed to train as they will fight. Test quality procedures after the exercise. 3) As Clausewitz and King would say, we have to think as warriors, not just managers! And finally, 4) One of the key lessons of American history is that the American people demand the ruthless commander in wartime, but discard him in peacetime, saying, "there is no place for him". Remember, "When they get into trouble they send for the sonsabitches". There isn't much room for a "sonsabitch" in "Total Quality" concepts.

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