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HERSHEY BAR DIPLOMACY:
THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES
IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

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
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

A superpower is judged not only by its deeds, but also by the world's perception of them. Politicians and national leaders have understood this for centuries and have sought to manipulate images and perceptions to their own advantage. In international affairs this usually has been done in a coercive way, as one government tries--to use Thomas Schelling's classic terminology--to compel or deter another.¹ The literature on this aspect of diplomacy and national security policy is enormous. Less attention has been paid to the more subtle ways in which non-coercive actions can advance the national interest. For example, it is to the United States' advantage that the other nations of the world see the US as the only remaining superpower and that it is ready to use its power for unselfish purposes, such as eradicating hunger and suffering.² This perception makes other nations more willing to accept American leadership across the board. Effective at the international level, this strategy of being (or appearing to be) a benevolent big brother also meets internal psychological objectives, because it bolsters domestic support for the government and its policies. President Ronald Reagan, "the great communicator," was particularly effective in employing those images to mold perceptions which helped to advance his foreign and domestic policies.³

The United States can and has used its military forces in this way. This paper will examine this use of American military forces

and its implications by focusing on the military's role in four recent humanitarian relief operations: Provide Comfort in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, Provide Hope in the former Soviet Union, Restore Hope in Somalia, and Provide Promise in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have chosen these operations because they clearly delineate this US strategy and illustrate how it can effect the employment of joint forces.

Daniel F. Harrington, a historian at USAFE Headquarters, has characterized these operations as "Hershey Bar Diplomacy," highly visible actions the US engages in to make a short-term positive impression.⁴ Through such use of military resources, the US can secure the psychological objectives of national security policy by influencing other nations and securing domestic consensus for its foreign policy. The psychological aspects of national security policy are rather simple and singular; the other nations of the world should see the United States as the only remaining superpower, the benevolent big brother ready and willing to employ its power and provide leadership to secure peace and temporarily eradicate hunger and suffering.

Accomplishing this feat by using US armed forces does not appear at first glance to be particularly difficult: the infrastructure, equipment and availability of personnel appear sufficient for most any contingency, as Colonel Robert E. Lushbaugh has commented:

If you need humanitarian assistance, you need to come to us. The United States military has the ability, experience, infrastructure and the dedicated, disciplined personnel to get the job done. Nobody does it better, faster or more completely.⁵

SECTION II

WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT

Images are the vehicles for perceptions; these perceptions may be the basis for reality, and that reality forms decisions or significantly influences them. In America's highly visual society and in an increasingly visual world, the television has become the principal provider of images containing news and information. Beseated by an almost constant bombardment of visual cues through the Cable News Network and the British Sky Channels, leaders have the unprecedented ability to watch major events unfold as they happen. Furthermore, they can observe and chart the formation of public opinion and concern in realtime. Television has become a very powerful force and every leader is aware of its impact.

Everyone likes to be liked; Americans are especially prone to this tendency. Americans are also more uncomfortable than other nations with the notion of power. We aspire and take pride in being "number one", but condemn power politics. We want to believe that the power we employ on the world stage is used altruistically, in behalf of some greater good. The sources of this trait go back far in our history, some say to Woodrow Wilson,⁶ others trace it to the Puritans.⁷ We need not resolve that question here. In the war we use as a paradigm against which to judge all others, The Second World War, one of the most enduring images is that of the battle-scarred American infantryman sharing Hershey Bars with children amidst the ruins of war.

Colonel Gail Halvorsen, the famous "Candy Bomber" from the Berlin Airlift, evoked that same image a few years later.⁸ That image will always exist within the American consciousness and be part of our national mystique. It sustains a perception of ourselves that we wish to maintain, one of a beneficiary to humankind, using its power for altruistic and noble purposes.⁹ Like all social myths, it contains much truth. As we will see in our case studies, it has led the US Government to deploy US military forces to the far corners of the world, with mixed results.

SECTION III

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein initiated a series of offensive military actions against the Iraqi Kurdish population. These repressive attacks, centered primarily in the mountainous northwest areas, were intended to subjugate the resurgent Kurdish independence movement. In these actions, the Iraqi troops were particularly brutal and soon the world and western media were filled with horrific pictures and stories of the oppression of the Kurdish population. The immediate response by the Kurdish population was to flee, and so an exodus of an estimated 750,000 Kurds moved toward the Turkish-Iraq border. As the stories and pictures continued to pour in, demands for action rose in the west. Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was blunt:

The Kurds don't need talk, they need practical action. It should not be beyond the wit of man to get planes there with tents, food, and warm blankets. It is not a question of standing on legal niceties. We should go now.¹⁰

Responding to Prime Minister Thatcher's comments, President George Bush ordered the initiation of Operation Provide Comfort. As the President explained:

[Provide Comfort] is an interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need. Our long-term objective remains the same--for Iraqi Kurds, and, indeed, for all Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives.¹¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Alert Order of 5 April 1991 placed in motion the largest, most disciplined and competent organization to save the Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey from starvation and the elements. It is without hyperbole that no other organization could have responded so quickly and massively to the emergency.

The US military's ability to marshal, transport, and distribute large quantities of materiel and to maintain the men and equipment of large units made the difference in saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees.¹²

Operation Provide Comfort brought together not only a joint, but a combined task force of people from thirteen countries with the United States as the leader and principal participant. United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps units worked in tandem with Air Force units as well as soldiers and airmen from the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, France, Canada, Germany, Turkey, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Australia. Thirty countries provided materiel, food, supplies and equipment. Some of the supplies were obtained from allied stockpiles left over from Desert Storm. It is, in fact, the proximity to the Persian Gulf War that made Provide Comfort so successful. It was easy to adapt the organization, techniques and teamwork from Desert Storm and apply them in a new unified effort that employed the machines of war in a humanitarian cause. In many respects, Provide Comfort demonstrated more so than the war itself the unparalleled diversity of air power. Within the air component coexisted the ability to feed, clothe, and shelter thousands of refugees, and to deliver enormous firepower against any Iraqi

forces attempting to interfere with the relief effort.

The airlift portion of Provide Comfort began on 7 April 1991 and continued at an almost unbelievable pace until 19 June. While airlift was not the most efficient method of providing relief, it did superbly demonstrate to the world and to the people of the United States the Task Force's determination to deliver the practical action that Prime Minister Thatcher's statement demanded. In a 24 June 1991 interview Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, Commander of Provide Comfort, explained why the Combined Task Force relied at first on airdrops:

First of all, I think that the decision was made initially to air drop supplies because there was simply no other option... it was the most speedy way to get the necessary basics--food, shelter, clothing--to the refugees. However, there are great limitations to such air drops in this harsh terrain, where there are no readily identifiable drop zones...The result was that you just could not get the right amount of food and shelter to those people... You never knew how much of what you were delivering was getting to the people.¹³

In those seventy-four days, 3,901 sorties were flown providing support to the refugees. In all, the airlift delivered slightly more than 12,683.2 tons of food, medicine, water, and shelter at a rate of 171.4 tons and 53 sorties per day.¹⁴ However that pace was not sustainable, nor was it practical. As General Shalikashvili's comments imply, the operation had to deliver relief supplies to the refugees on the ground. Furthermore, it soon became obvious that the refugees had to be moved to central locations so a more effective and efficient distribution system could be implemented.

As President Bush pointed out:

If we cannot get adequate food, medicine, clothing, and shelter to the Kurds, we must encourage the Kurds to move to areas in northern Iraq where the geography facilitates, rather than frustrates, such large-scale relief efforts.¹⁵

This ensuing aspect of the operation involved the ground transport of more than 4,416.6 tons of relief supplies to dozens of refugee camps scattered throughout southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq by 15 July 1991.¹⁶ The logistics of the operation were overwhelming. More than 1,400 tons of cargo were flown into Incirlik AB every day.

At Silopi, the 66th Maintenance Battalion unloaded 107 truckloads of supplies in a single day. The battalion commander stated that the 66th moved 150 to 200 short tons of relief supplies to the camps every 24 hours.¹⁷

From the beginning of Provide Comfort US officials regarded it as a temporary measure until civilian relief agencies could take over, but getting those agencies involved, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, took longer than expected. Nonetheless, once the international agencies became involved it significantly relieved much of the pressure on the US military.

Operation Provide Comfort II, which continues to this day, provides a security blanket of air power to guarantee that the humanitarian relief efforts under the auspices of the United Nations continue. With approximately 2,000 US and Allied personnel, and some 75 US, British, and French aircraft flying daily missions over northern Iraq, this deterrence operation demonstrates coalition resolve to ensure that the Iraqi Kurdish population will

not be subject to Baghdad's violence again.¹⁸

The combined task force did not solve the Kurdish problem, but no one thought it would. It did buy time for the Kurds and the Iraqis, so they might work out a political accommodation that would end the violence, dampen suspicion, and temper hatred. If the two proved unwilling or unable to put that time to good use, it was not because the coalition nations or the CTF put obstacles in their path--quite the contrary.¹⁹

Despite the Combined Task Force's efforts, as of the end of March 1994, neither the Iraqis nor the Kurds in northern Iraq seemed to be any closer to a solution than they were at the beginning of Provide Comfort II, 24 July 1991.

SECTION IV

OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE

Operation Provide Hope was the smallest of the humanitarian missions to be reviewed but its significance for the world order was enormous. The attention associated with its beginning has long since been forgotten and overshadowed by both Operation Provide Promise in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. This is especially true in recent days because international media attention has been focused on a preliminary peace accord in the former Yugoslavia between the Bosnians and the Croats as well as, the pullout of virtually all US military forces in Somalia.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev began the process of changing the Soviet Union, "The Evil Empire" as described by President Ronald Reagan.²⁰ Gorbachev's reforms signalled a shift in the world order from a bipolar world of two superpowers to one in which the United States was preeminent. A new chapter in international relations was unfolding. This transformation of superpower relations stemmed from the political, social, and economic bankruptcy of the Communist system in the Soviet Union that Gorbachev struggled in vain to save. The eastern European nations broke away, the Turkic Republics asserted their independence and it appeared that the once-powerful Soviet Union was unable or unwilling to stop its own dissolution. In fact, by January 1992, it was no longer the Soviet Union, but the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Gorbachev was out of power.

Independence had a price, and the former republics could no longer look to Moscow for support. Further, the seventy-four years of Communism's controlled and artificial economic policies left the former republics with little understanding of a free-market system. As a result many people in the former Soviet Union faced the very real possibility of starvation in the winter of 1991-1992.

Anticipating eventual involvement, agencies within the USAF began looking at airlift requirements and from 17 to 22 December flew food and medical shipments to St. Petersburg, Moscow, Minsk, and Yerevan, delivering 230 short tons of supplies.²¹

This preliminary airlift set the stage for Provide Hope by allowing US and CIS officials to iron out the details of the larger airlift. Other countries had also contributed food and medical supplies to the former Soviet Union during late 1991, and this led to some criticism of the United States that it was not doing its share to override the current crisis and provide for a certain amount of stability. In fact, considering the size of the CIS and the enormity of the problem, feeding the population was out of the question.

The intent was to get food and medical supplies to hospitals, orphanages, community shelters, retirement homes, schools, and other charitable agencies.²²

Between 22-23 January 1992, the US hosted a conference in Washington to coordinate further relief efforts among 47 countries and seven international aid organizations. Unfortunately, the conference ended with only a consensus that more should be done. Seizing the lead in the international community, Secretary of State James A. Baker III announced the US would begin to provide

additional aid on 10 February 1992, initially from stocks left over from the Gulf war.²³ That announcement triggered Operation Provide Hope under the auspices of the State Department, encompassing four Governmental agencies and virtually all areas of the Department of Defense.

The JCS issued the Alert Order 29 January 1992, followed by an Execute Order on 5 February 1992. On 10 February 1992, at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany, Secretary Baker attended the ceremony to inaugurate the first flights. During the first phase of the operation from 10-26 February 1992, 65 missions were flown from Rhein Main, Incirlik, and Ankara, Turkey carrying 2,363 tons of food and medical supplies. Phase II of Provide Hope centered on the ground transportation of additional supplies, and between 3 April and 24 July 1992, 19,335 tons were delivered to 33 CIS locations. The airlift portion of Provide Hope, from 10 February 1992 until 1 August 1993, completed 282 missions delivering more than 7,012 short tons (short ton=2000lbs) of food and medical supplies.²⁴

Operation Provide Hope once again demonstrated that the US could take the lead in humanitarian operations, and that other nations looked to the US. Everyone spoke at the Washington conference - but no one acted - except the US. Most importantly, it demonstrated to the nations of the world that the US, through its military, could extend its hand to help a former enemy, and use its military force for peace.

SECTION V

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

If Operation Provide Comfort demonstrated to the world that the United States could provide leadership for a humanitarian effort, and Operation Provide Hope demonstrated our resolve to help our former enemy, then Operation Restore Hope demonstrated there were limits to the price the United States was willing to pay in such operations. The controversy involving the deployment of US military forces to Somalia was widespread and continuous. It pitted America's desire to respond to the anarchy and starvation as depicted by the news media and those, both inside and outside the Government, who believed the dual mission of peace-making and humanitarian relief was a prescription for disaster.

As the controversy continued, so too did the media images of the dead and starving Somalis, testament to the catastrophe that was occurring each day. Like the images of Vietnam two decades earlier, Americans had the tragedy before them on the 6 O'Clock News. The United Nations along with the rest of the world seemed powerless to act. It was not just a case of providing humanitarian relief, the private relief agencies were in Somalia. The problem was the absence of any government control. American public opinion swelled to support committing US troops to bring peace and allow resumption of humanitarian assistance.²⁵

Once again, the US took the lead with President Bush sending in 25,000 Marines in December 1992. The amphibious landing on international television was impressive. The disarming of the

"technical" and the return of some modicum of peace in the streets was impressive. Most impressive, however were the images of Somali men, women, and children recovering from starvation and gaining hope.

The figures associated with the relief effort were equally impressive: Operation Provide Relief, the C-130 mission out of Mombassa, Kenya flew 3,295 missions, into Somalia carrying 1,019 passengers and delivering 31,622 tons of supplies between 21 August 1992 and 28 February 1993; Operation Restore Hope, from 9 December 1992 through 4 May 1993, flew 2,433 missions, carrying 51,950 passengers and delivering 37,305 tons of supplies; and Joint Task Force Somalia, from 5 May 1993 through 31 March 1994, flew 1,424 missions in five different types of aircraft, carrying 33,914 passengers and delivering 22,368 tons of supplies.²⁶

On one level the US goal in Somalia was patently clear: Feeding starving Somali citizens and preventing hundreds of thousands of deaths in the Horn of Africa was a noble, urgent purpose. The misery, chaos and anarchy in Somalia had defeated non-governmental aid organizations. However, on another level, intervention in Somalia was an opportunity to be embroiled in a civil war of enormous proportion with no honorable way out. This was exactly what happened. The deaths of American servicemen, accompanied by televised scenes of their mutilated bodies being dragged through the streets were too much.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle concluded:

the American people and Washington wanted the leadership position, but saw in one day [3 October] that the price to retain it was just too high.²⁷

A sense of futility and failure loomed in spite of President Clinton's efforts to put the situation in the best light:

We have done our job there and then some... The United States and then the United Nations went in there to give the people of Somalia a chance not only to save lives...but to give them a chance to work out their own problems in a different way, and I think we have given them that chance.²⁸

As the images of dead bodies were impressed on the minds of the world, so too, were the figures and pictures coming out of Somalia in support of the humanitarian relief: US Marines feeding and providing medical aid to Somali children, US Air Force aircraft flying into Mogadishu, US Navy ships near Berbera and Kismayu, and US Army infantrymen guarding relief convoys and patrolling city streets. The images were evocative and reinforced the perception that the United States could and would employ its military forces to stave off starvation and chaos.

SECTION VI

OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE

Operation Provide Promise was initiated as a humanitarian response to the suffering caused by the Yugoslavian civil war. The origins of the ethnic tensions at the root of this war are found more than 600 years ago with the Ottoman Turk conquest of the Balkans in 1389. Since then, a rivalry has endured among Slavs which is drawn along religious lines: Roman Catholic Croats, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Muslim Bosnians.²⁹ For the most part, this ethnic rivalry was held in check until the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 and further exacerbated by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence and fighting broke out between the Serbs and the Croats. The conflict quickly spread to the other provinces.

Most of the international community originally considered the crisis a Yugoslavian internal matter, but the European Community took an active role trying to negotiate a cease-fire in July 1991. A series of UN resolutions and an EC sponsored peace conference were ineffective in controlling the conflict. By April 1992, the independence of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia had been recognized by the EC and the US. The fiercest fighting, in actuality, "ethnic cleansing," was centered in Bosnia, and the Serbs laid siege to the Muslim capital of Sarajevo. The Bosnian conflict was riddled with 39 failed cease-fires and UN authorities reported that more than 7,400 people had died in the destroyed

city.³⁰ The fighting had created food, medical, fuel, and water shortages and, had displaced more than two million people.³¹

To this point, the US had remained in the background watching the Europeans in concert with the United Nations attempt to solve the problem. US involvement began with a JCS Execute Order on 14 May 1992, which authorized the release and turnover of excess DOD food and medical supplies to the UNHCR. In addition, United States European Command (USEUCOM) was to deploy airlift support teams and communications equipment to Zagreb, Croatia. USEUCOM was also to airlift 80,000 pounds of Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) to Zagreb so that the UN could truck them to Sarajevo. On 16 June 1992, the JCS issued a Warning Order to USEUCOM instructing it to act as the US agent for humanitarian support to the UN and to plan airlift relief operations into Sarajevo. The US effort was called Operation Provide Promise.

On 29 June 1992, UN peacekeepers took control of Sarajevo Airport and negotiated protected corridors so that humanitarian assistance could be delivered to the city. The Sarajevo airlift was an international operation conducted under the auspices of the UNHCR. On 1 July 1992 the UN asked the US to join the effort, involving 14 other countries, which had been underway for three months. Two days later, on 3 July 1992, the Airland segment of Operation Provide Promise began.³² Since its inception, 1,588 missions have been flown, delivering 42,843 tons of food and medical supplies.³³

On 9 July 1992, President Bush told the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

We should see...that relief supplies get through...[and] UN sanctions are respected, no matter what it takes.³⁴

By autumn's onset, the war had largely destroyed rural Bosnia; "ethnic cleansing" by all sides had shred the fabric of the villages and small towns and hundreds of thousands of civilians were starving. The crisis demanded more effective means to aid the refugees' plight. In late February 1993, the JCS directed "short-term emergency" airdrops to augment existing UNHCR humanitarian relief operations. On 28 February, the first Airdrop mission was conducted utilizing three USAF C-130s delivering nine bundles of MREs and three bundles of medical supplies. The Airdrop missions were extremely difficult. Aircrews dropped blind; there were no ground crews to guide the aircraft and few, if any, markings on the drop zones. Because of the delivery method, Lieutenant General James E. Chambers, Provide Promise Air Component Commander, was concerned for the safety of the refugees:

We're dealing with some awfully small patches of ground. I want to be damned sure that the drop zones meet all reasonable safety restrictions. The last thing we need is for CNN to run pictures of a 2000-pound blivit sitting in the middle of a school or hospital with a bunch of dead bodies around it. If the drop zones don't look good to me, I'll refuse the damned mission.³⁵

Begun in the glare of publicity, the Airdrop missions soon became routine. Through 27 March 1994, the Airdrop fleet located at Rhein Main Air Base, composed of three German C-160s, one French C-160, and forty US C-130 aircraft have flown 2,752 missions, dropping 31,415 bundles containing: 16,916 tons of food, 159 tons of medical

supplies, and 485 tons of weather protection material.³⁶

Unlike Operation Restore Hope, the attendant media coverage regarding the US military involvement in Operation Provide Promise has been an unending series of positive images. But this may be due primarily to the nature and extent of the US involvement. The US military is assisting the UN and not engaged in the activities on the ground. The pictures of Army parachute riggers, USAF loadmasters, and the joint makeup of the support elements in Germany and Italy are all positive images. However, the most positive image was the return of the "Candy Bomber" of Berlin Airlift fame to Rhein Main Air Base. There, once again, was Colonel Gail Halvorsen teaching young aircrew members how to rig small parachute packages filled with candy, this time, for Bosnian children.³⁷

SECTION VII

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

It is no longer a simplistic world, and perhaps, it never was. The United States has demonstrated over the past four years that it will employ its military forces in a coercive sense, as in the Persian Gulf war, and in a non-coercive sense through humanitarian relief efforts. The demonstrations are apt, but future applications of military organization, power, and infrastructure in humanitarian missions must be more carefully considered.

Freed from Cold War restraints and obligations, the American military may turn out to be the ideal organization for global humanitarian emergencies. Somalia could be the turning point in the Pentagon's search for new missions. It could revive and give content to the idea of an American-led new world order.³⁸

The American character is idealistic and highly activist with a powerful sense of moral obligation according to Hartman and Wendzel.³⁹ This must be weighed against the admonishment of Richard Perle that taking the lead in world affairs incurs some costs.⁴⁰ Will the US military become the defacto humanitarian enforcement arm of the United Nations for violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as was suggested in the pages of the International Herald Tribune?⁴¹ Or, do we accept the characterization voiced by Ron Redmond of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: "the military - it is they who have become the humanitarians."⁴² The question posed to Washington policy-makers is: Is the increased prestige at home and abroad produced by these operations worth the price in resources, especially the lives of American servicemen?

SUCCESS OR FAILURE

The image that Redmond's comment conjures up may be the key. The US military has certainly had the opportunity to display its capabilities, and it cannot be denied that the employment of US military forces in humanitarian relief operations has been largely responsible for saving lives. The power of images discussed earlier is underscored here; Images are the vehicles for perception; these perceptions may be the basis for reality; and that reality forms decisions, or significantly influences them. The scorecard probably looks like this: Provide Comfort I - the image of Kurdish refugees being fed is a winner. Provide Comfort II - an image no one can remember unless personally involved. Provide Hope - the image of the US extending its hand to a former enemy is a winner, but it is blurred by the aborted October 1993 Russian Coup. Restore Hope - the images of starving Somalis being fed, a definite, resounding success overshadowed by burning helicopters and the US withdrawal. Provide Promise - perhaps too soon to tell, thus far, the images are winners, but without real peace, the humanitarian effort will be lost in the carnage of that civil war.

SECTION VII

CONCLUSION

The United States has employed its armed forces effectively to meet the psychological aspects of its national security strategy on four successive occasions in the past four years. In each of these instances the United States has used the military to meet short-term internal and external psychological objectives. As Hugo Nectarlin stated, "nations will do what they perceive is necessary to accomplish that which is in their best interests."⁴³ The psychological dimension here--what nations perceive--takes on a far greater importance than we often realize. Aristide Capellini used to teach that "A man's perception is his reality."⁴⁴ How we view ourselves as well as how we, as a nation are viewed, bolsters our position in the world order. Perhaps the eyewitness account of Dr. Bonnot from the office of the French minister of Humanitarian Affairs during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq places appropriate emphasis on perspective:

He said the refugees grew quiet as they watched the aircraft, waiting to see if its door would open, and then cheered and cried as the parachutes floated down. Dr. Bonnot said he felt proud to be part of such an effort.⁴⁵

In each of the humanitarian operations we addressed, the United States not only provided a stable environment for nourishment of a people besieged, but also met to a certain extent its national security objectives. It reiterated to the world assemblage its preeminence in world affairs. This could only have been

accomplished through the employment of its military forces to fight hunger, provide medical aid, and secure temporary stability within each of the countries assisted. However, as we have seen in the case of Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, the humanitarian mission was successful and achieved, the peacekeeping objective was not.

"Hershey Bar Diplomacy" as Daniel Harrington has called it, in and of itself, cannot occur in a vacuum, it must be matched with equal or greater diplomatic effort to ensure that the desired national objectives are achieved.⁴⁶ We have found it is easier to save lives than to save societies. Devising a political strategy that tackles the underlying social and political problems that caused the humanitarian crisis is easier said than done. Yet it remains a prerequisite for effective humanitarian intervention. Riding to the rescue simply because it looks good in the short run risks long-term failure and, ironically, damage to those very psychological objectives the US sought.

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