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Operation Weseruebung: Operational Art in Joint Warfare

by

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This paper is submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	II
I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	1
Introduction	1
Background	2
Studie Nord	4
II OPERATIONAL DESIGN, PLANNING AND COMMAND	6
Krancke Staff Plan	6
Operational Design	8
Command Structure and Final Planning	10
III EXECUTION OF WESERUEBUNG	14
The Germans Strike	14
Evaluation through the Principles of War	17
IV CONCLUSIONS	22

ILLUSTRATIONS

Map of Norway with six main geographic areas	7
Weseruebung Operational Organization	12
Map of Norway with initial German operations	15

ENDNOTES	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY	26

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ABSTRACT

Operation Weseruebung: Operational Art in Joint Warfare.

Within military history the German invasion of Norway is a classic textbook case to study the tenet's of operational art in joint warfare. Although not planned with today's doctrine, many of the principles applied by Hitler and the German High Command in "Operation Weseruebung" parallel U.S. doctrine. The Germans successfully related their limited tactical forces to a strategic objective. Through planning a series of tactical operations based on a combination of speed, maneuver, deception and surprise, they were able to execute a distant strike through a superior naval force and seize Norway. Inadvertently planned by a joint staff and constrained to a limited force; the Germans developed a joint military capability which could not be matched by the single service concept of the Allies. Their command structure, while not unified because of service rivalry, followed through and executed a joint operation due to the coordination and cooperation of the officers involved. Through the principles of war we can examine the campaign and evaluate the Germans application of operational art. They were able to swiftly attain their strategic goals in this operation and the impact was felt by the Allies for the rest of the war. The lessons of this campaign are still relevant over fifty years later and of great value today.

CHAPTER I

OPERATION WESERUEBUNG: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

The German invasion of Norway in 1940 can be considered today a classic example of the use of operational art in joint warfare. This campaign, which was code named Operation Weseruebung, can be considered the origin of what is today termed the operational level of warfare. For the first time, the Germans employed all three elements of modern warfare: air, land and naval forces; and integrated them to achieve a goal thereby developing a joint military capability. Through the use of these tactical forces and a plan that was designed around maneuver, speed and surprise; the Germans were able to capture Norway swiftly and at a very low cost. The purpose of the campaign was to seize the country of Norway which the Germans determined to be of strategic value for several reasons. First, the geographic location of Norway would allow the Germans to outflank the British naval blockade of the Baltic and North Sea which was imposed at the start of the war and it would deny the British access to Germany's northern flank. Second, it secured the iron ore from Scandinavia which was critical for the German war effort. Finally, it severed British war trade with the Baltic nations. Once these strategic objectives were accomplished, the British lost their unchallenged control of the North Sea and any hope of bottling up the German Navy in the Baltic; and control of war materials in the Baltic and Scandinavia. Great Britain would not regain influence in the area again until after the Germans

surrendered in 1945. During the planning for the operation Hitler commented "This operation is particularly daring, in fact, one of the rashest undertakings in the history of modern warfare. Precisely what will ensure its success."¹ While Hitler was correct, there were many more reasons related to the planning and design of the operation that caused its success.

Through the study of the planning of this campaign, a great deal can be learned about operational art and its use in the joint environment. It is full of examples of how to correctly plan and implement the tenet's of operational art. It clearly demonstrates the linkage between strategic objectives, and the tactical employment of a joint force to attain them, otherwise known today as the operational art. Although over fifty years have gone by, this German campaign stands as a classic for study and from which many lessons can be learned.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the start of World War II, Scandinavia was recognized by the Germans for its strategic importance. "Out of a total consumption of 15 million tons of iron ore annually, 11 million tons were imported from Sweden and Norway. Four and a half tons were moved by sea from the Norwegian port of Narvik to Germany."² The geographical position of a then neutral Norway provided protection of these shipments. The Germans prevented British interference with the shipments by using the neutral coastal waters of Norway and Sweden to move the ore south until they reached the Baltic, where the German Navy could provide protection. The British

could not halt these shipments without violating Norwegian neutrality. Admiral Raeder and his staff, the Navy High Command (OKM) recognized prior to the start of the war that a neutral Norway was in Germany's best interest. Britain later opened a diplomatic dialogue with Norway concerning the German use of neutral waters. The Germans feared that the British might obtain exclusive use of the ports in Norway, either through cooperation or force; and would block the iron ore routes and North Sea accesses to the Atlantic from German shipping. Further Britain was receiving raw materials for their war effort from Baltic and Scandinavian countries via Norwegian ports. Exclusive use of Norwegian ports would secure these supply lines for the British. The British diplomatic efforts were successful enough to cause concern to the Germans over the continued neutrality of Norway. "Admiral Raeder, concerned over losing Norwegian neutrality to the Allies reported to Hitler on 10 October 1939 recommending that Norway be invaded."³ By controlling Norway the Germans could secure the iron ore routes, prevent Allied exploitation of the northern flank of Germany, establish naval bases north of the British blockade (gaining free access to the Atlantic and providing a logistical base to launch an invasion of Britain from) and it could cut off British trade with the Baltic and Scandinavia.

Hitler, essentially a land oriented thinker, was preoccupied with the invasion of France (Operation Gelb). He neither liked or understood naval operations or their strategic importance. Showing no interest in Norway he did not respond to Raeder's recommendation.

STUDIE NORD

On 30 November, Russia invaded Finland. The Allies attempted to assist Finland by moving forces and supplies via Norway. This created a fear for the Germans that the Allies may secure ports in Norway as they planned and establish permanent bases which could be used against Germany. Also in December of 1939, Vidkun Quisling, a Norwegian government official who was fearful of a takeover of his country by the Russians, came to Berlin and offered to help the Germans occupy his country in turn for placing him as head of the government. These incidents caused Hitler to reconsider Raeder's recommendation. "On 14 December, Hitler ordered the smallest possible investigation with the smallest possible staff, examine how an invasion of Norway could best be conducted."⁴ Hitler, concerned about secrecy as a result of the Gelb plans having fallen into Allied hands ordered the planning for the invasion not only be kept secret, but limited as well. "To limit service participation in the planning, the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) conducted the initial planning and by the end of the month completed a summary of the main military and political issues relating to Norway and titled it Studie Nord."⁵ On 10 January 1940, the summary was released to the three services. Only the OKM gave it serious consideration as it was the service with the greatest need for the area to be secured for the war effort and expanded the study. The OKM saw the potential requirement for troop landings along the length of the country and determined that surprise would be essential for victory. The staff also identified

the requirement for air operations to be conducted from Denmark to support ground troops along the coastal areas. The airfields in Germany were too far south to support the operation. Where specific landings were to take place and how the Germans would obtain use of the Danish airfields were left unaddressed. Upon completion of the study it was turned over to Admiral Raeder.

CHAPTER I I


OPERATIONAL DESIGN, PLANNING AND COMMAND

KRANCKE STAFF PLAN

In early January Hitler's attention was still focused on the invasion of France (Gelb). However, by the end of the month weather conditions caused Hitler to delay the operation and he turned his full attention to Norway. "On 23 January Hitler ordered the Studie Nord recalled and placed it under his personal supervision in the OKW."⁶ A team of three officers, one from each service, were put together and a small joint planning staff was created. The staff was to design a plan which would focus on how the Germans were to seize the strategic objective of Norway using the tactical forces of the three services. "For the first time direct control of operational planning was taken out of the hands of the services and vested in Hitler's personal staff, the OKW."⁷ Although Hitler's apparent objective in shifting was for security reasons and concerns for the potential loss of focus on Gelb, in actually he created a joint planning staff. The senior officer was Captain Krancke from the OKM and the staff became known as the Krancke staff. The campaign was designated Operation Weseruebung (named for the German river Weser).

The plan designed was based upon speed, maneuver and surprise. It divided Norway up into six main geographic areas which were fairly small in size. They contained most of Norway's population, industry, key communications facilities and transportation centers.

They consisted of the following: the Oslo Fjord region; Bergen and its environs; the coastal strip of southern Norway from Kristiansand to Stavanger; Narvik; the Trondheim region; and the Tromso/Finmark region.



OPERATIONAL DESIGN

The Germans, not having a great number of military assets at their disposal (as most were dedicated to Gelb) had to accomplish their plan with minimal assets. To compensate for this the staff planned on simultaneous assaults by troops transported via air and sea into the above areas. They focused on the unique war fighting capabilities that were required by the forces rather than individual service roles. This created a joint planning effort and if successful the Germans would capture over half the Norwegian Armed Forces, all its artillery, the coastal defense sites and most of the operational airfields in the country.

Hitler's restrictions and his order for use of minimal troops, forced the staff to apply what we know today as the operational art to their planning. As a result, the staff designed a modern day campaign; which FMFM 1-1 defines as "a series of related military operations designed to achieve a strategic objective within a given space and time". Several key concepts of Weseruebung included today's campaign designs, such as decisive points, center of gravity and lines of operation. We know today that maneuver, mobility and simultaneous operations are the keys to a swift and decisive campaign victory. Within the design of their campaign plan the Germans identified six key areas or decisive points they needed to strike swiftly and simultaneously through maneuver; to gain control of Norway. Once captured, they would provided the German commanders with a marked advantage over the Norwegians. To meet their objective of the simultaneous capture of these areas

(decisive points) speed was critical to attain surprise. The fastest mode of transport the Germans had was air. Initial review of this requirement indicated there was insufficient transport aircraft to move the entire force and limited air access to the key areas. To compensate for these potential shortfalls, scarce air transport was assigned to the optimum areas. The remaining areas were assigned to seaborne assault troops embarked on combatant ships for greater speed and assault protection. Thus the plan was capability based rather than by just service interest.

Hitler's goal was to induce the Norwegians to surrender quickly and with minimal fighting. He saw the Norwegian Government and the monarchy located in Oslo as the Norwegian center of gravity; as the hub from which the Norwegians would draw their strength to fight. By using the decisive points as objectives and seizing them, the Germans could attain the initiative and render Norway's center of gravity (Oslo) vulnerable. Once the decisive points were held, the Germans planned a political solution to the war. The intent was to allow the monarchy to remain and provide economic aid in return for Norwegian cooperation. "To ensure this Hitler ordered the immediate capture of the king. He believed that seizing the monarch would shatter all resistance at the outset and lead to a bloodless occupation."8 As stated in FM 100-5, the operational art lies in being able to mass effects against an enemy's source of power or center of gravity. A key concept of campaign design is how the operational planners address the center of gravity and its relationship to the decisive points. In planning

Operation Weseruebung the Germans succeeded in defining this concept and were able to exploit it.

The Germans also planned for the lines of operation based on a modern day campaign. They applied their tactical force "to focus combat power throughout the three dimensions of space and over time in a logical design that integrated firepower, deception, special operations and maneuver forces to converge on a center of gravity."⁹ The Germans were planning to operate on exterior lines to converge on the Norwegians in the six areas they determined to be the key to securing the center of gravity. While the German plan was not designed using today's operational doctrine, it did follow the concepts. With the success the Germans enjoyed we can draw the conclusion that our basic doctrine is sound and that the Germans proved it long before we wrote it.

COMMAND STRUCTURE AND FINAL PLANNING


On 14 February 1940, the German tanker Altmark, with 300 captured British sailors from the commerce raider Graf Spee aboard, made her way down Norwegian waters while returning to Germany. Enroute she encountered the Forth Destroyer Flotilla, lead by the HMS Cossak, and was forced aground, boarded and all British sailors were removed. "This incident convinced Hitler the British would not respect Norwegian neutrality nor territorial waters. He demanded an acceleration of the planning for Weseruebung. Hitler appointed General Falkenhorst, Commanding General of the XXI Group and commander of Operation Weseruebung; based on his mountain warfare expertise and previous Nordic experience in 1918."¹⁰

General Falkenhorst and his staff reviewed the Krancke Plan. While keeping the bulk of the plan intact, the General made two major changes. First, the question of air operations out of Denmark was decided; Denmark would have to be occupied. In conjunction with the occupation, aviation support from the Jutland would be provided for the invasion of Norway. On 28 February Weseruebung was divided into Weseruebung Nord (Norway) and Weseruebung Sued (Denmark). As the invasion of Denmark had to be swift (near simultaneous to Norway); two additional divisions were added to the plan for seizing Denmark. The second change was Weseruebung could be run independently from Gelb. Prior to this the operations were tied to each other by the requirement for the parachute troops and air transport in each plan. Force structure changes were made to allow Weseruebung to be conducted independently. The focus of this paper will remain on Weseruebung Nord.

On 1 March, Hitler established the requirements for Weseruebung and authorized the start of operational planning. In his directive Hitler reiterated "the force to be employed in Weseruebung is to remain as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring action and surprise execution."¹¹ The Commander XXI Group would remain directly subordinate to Hitler. The Army (OKH) and Air Force (OKL) objected to the operation as their staffs were previously left out of the planning process. Despite Hitler's desire to place the operation under a single commander, he conceded to the OKL's (Goering) requests that the air assets remain under air force control. Naval

assets were left under the control of the OKM.

This resulted in the command structure outlined below.



The advantages of having what we would term today a unified command were lost. "General Falkenhorst was designated the senior commander, exercising no direct command authority over naval or air forces."¹² This was inadvertently over turned by Hitler without realizing it when he ordered the force to be as small as possible; ensuring close coordinated planning and operational support. Since no single service was strong enough to carry the day, they were dependent on each other; thus in the Group XXI after action reports it was noted "the harmonious cooperation which was achieved by the engaged forces was a compliment to the personalities and professionalism of the commanders involved, but not a result of command arrangements, which were recognized to be unsatisfactory."¹³ There was a joint effort by the forces involved

and two examples of this stood out in the operation. The first occurred during the assault on Oslo when "due to heavy fog in the area the air force had ordered all aircraft to return to Germany and Denmark. All air elements complied except for the First Transport Group. This element was under the command of the Transport Chief (Army) and landed the battalion it was transporting in Oslo which were some of the first and most critical forces to arrive."¹⁴ This was accomplished because the air commander understood that his capability was critical to the ground commander at the time. The second is when "the Germans demonstrated for the first time that air power could neutralize sea power when enemy ships were in narrow seas within range of land based aircraft."¹⁵ During the day, the Luftwaffe used air assets against ships in confined areas (ports/fjords) where they could not maneuver. While initial German losses (21 ships) were heavy; once operational from Denmark, the protection the Luftwaffe provided balanced the naval power and kept German losses from becoming greater; except at Narvik which was out of range. This was the first incident of its kind in modern warfare. Both these examples help show how the German commanders' cooperation developed a joint atmosphere. This allowed for force application based on capability and enhanced combat power. While not a truly unified command or joint operation by today's standards, Weseruebung is still a good campaign to study. It demonstrates the weaknesses of a non-unified command, the strength of joint operations based on capability and the strength of centralized planning for a decentralized execution.

CHAPTER III


EXECUTION OF WESERUEBUNG

THE GERMANS STRIKE

On 1 April, Hitler reviewed Operation Weseruebung with his senior officers. Weseruebung had to occur prior to 15 April in order to maintain the cover of the naval portion of the operation. After that date, the nights in the northern latitudes would be too short. Hitler then designated 9 April as the invasion date.

"The Germans had good intelligence that led to an accurate appreciations of enemy strengths and weaknesses, thereby enabling them to focus on critical enemy vulnerabilities."16 "This combined with the poor state of readiness of the Norwegian forces was a significant factor in the planning and actual success of the campaign"17. As early as 3 April supply and tanker ships moved from northern German ports unescorted to the Norwegian ports where the Germans planned to land. The Germans had to supply their landings and have fuel for their destroyers to return to Germany. They realized they could not move a single force that size without arousing the suspicion of the Royal Navy. Their plan called for moving these ships into the neutral ports just prior to the invasion and have the invasion force link up with them. This deception would maintain both security and surprise. Deception was a critical factor in the operational plan just as it is today. The force which was moved by sea left German ports on 7 April. Reinforcements would later move via troop transports. The Germans lost

supply ships and troop transports to the Allied fleet while moving to their targets, however the invasion occurred on schedule. The Norwegians gained information that the invasion was in progress from many sources; to include the capture of German soldiers from sunken ships, but either did not or could not act upon the information.



The Germans attacked on 9 April. Their initial strikes (see map pg 15) were so swift and diverse that the Norwegian military and population was completely shocked. Denmark was quickly over run and the Luftwaffe immediately began close air support and bombing operations in Norway out of Jutland. Initial Allied support to Norway was limited due to the complete surprise of the German action. The Norwegians put up a limited resistance from fortifications along the fjords but soon were overwhelmed. The Germans then occupied the forts and prepared for an Allied counteroffensive. Although Norwegian Monarchy escaped the government, left in confusion, collapsed once the Germans captured Oslo. "By the evening of the 9th of April the Germans had secured five major population centers and ports, two major airfields and Narvik. It was achieved through speed, coordination and effrontery."18

The Allies responded to the invasion in the central and northern areas of Norway. In early April four brigades were landed around Trondheim. In this first attempt, German forces meet the Allies and inflicted a major defeat on them, forcing their evacuation on 3 May 1940. The key to this victory was the major role the Luftwaffe played in supporting German forces in Trondheim. Staunch Allied support was evident when in May the Allies landed 24,500 British, French, Polish and Norwegian troops in Narvik area. The German forces there (roughly 5,000 soldiers and sailors) found themselves cut off. Narvik was too far north to provide the cover the Luftwaffe was able to at Trondheim. This caused great

great consternation for the High Command as Narvik was one of the strategic objectives of the campaign. By mid-April the High Command was contemplating giving up Narvik. "The decision to give up Narvik was so desperate that Hitler was to have a nervous collapse. Again air was a key to the operation, Hitler ordered the reinforcement of Narvik with paratroopers which enabled the Germans to hold until the invasion of the Low Countries forced the Allies to abandon Norway. On 8 June 1940 the Allies secretly evacuated the Narvik area."¹⁹ On 9 June the Norwegians signed an armistice with Germany ending the conflict.

Evaluation through the Principles of War

From the execution of this operation it is very apparent the German planners and commanders were masters of the operational art. "Throughout the campaign, they ensured that tactical concerns were subordinated to strategic and operational requirements. Proper understanding of the strategic resources plus the knowledgeable flexibility to translate this understanding rapidly into meaningful operational and tactical elements were at a premium."²⁰ They knew how to employ tactical resources to gain their strategic goal. We can evaluate how the Germans executed their operational plan through the principles of war. This is appropriate as the principles are applicable at all levels of war and are fundamental to any successful operation.

The first of these is the objective. The Germans had a clear strategic purpose in invading Norway. They had identified six

critical land areas which if captured simultaneously would give them control of the country. All levels of war were linked together and focused on the strategic aim. This was not only clear in the planning but the execution. They designed tactical operations which would build their campaign and achieve the strategic goal they desired. The swift invasion, occupation and defense against Allied counter-operations in Norway is proof of this.

This leads to the principles of mass and economy of force. These two were closely related in their application by the Germans. FM 100-5 states synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is mass. Mass must also be sustained so that the effects have staying power. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces in order to achieve mass at the decisive point on the battlefield. Hitler had directed a limited force for Weseruebung which the German Staff compensated for that through the application of these principles in their planning. The proper tailored forces were used to seize the decisive points in the country with minimal damage; yet it was strong enough to hold and even repel the Allies. The plan called for a total force package, using all three elements of warfare (joint) based on capability. This capability is what allowed the Germans to seize and hold Norway. While Allied ground and naval counteroffensive forces were numerically superior, the combined combat forces the Germans coordinated was a superior force. Mass seeks to smash the enemy, it is the result of the proper

combination of combat power and when combined with economy of force, it is used in the most effective way possible.

Next I would like to examine the principles of the offensive, maneuver and surprise. The Germans interrelated them in their planning to the point that they became the heart of the plan and critical to its execution. The Germans carried the offensive to the enemy. Admiral Raeder stated in a report to Hitler in March; "The operation itself is contrary to all principles in the theory of naval warfare. On many occasions in the history of warfare those operations were very successful, provided they were carried out by surprise."²¹ Through the use of surprise, which placed the enemy in a situation for which he was unprepared, the Germans seized the initiative and were able to maintain freedom of action in the offensive. The principle of maneuver was integrated through the use of speed and the flexible application of combat power. This gave the Germans positional advantage early in the operation which they used to keep the Allies and Norwegians off balance and enhanced their ability to seize the initiative achieving decisive results.

The next principle is unity of command. Our doctrine as stated in FM 100-5 states that unity of command requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose. It further states that it requires cooperation and coordination among all forces even though they may not necessarily be part of the same command. The Germans failed to develop a unified command suited for this operation. Hitler held supreme command through the OKW. "This was not because of his

foresight in planning, but because being the first joint operation the Germans were to take in the war, he did not trust the planning to any of his service chiefs."22 Hitler later started to move in a unified direction with the appointment of Falkenhorst and his staff as the command element. However, the political impact of that proved to be more than Hitler was willing to deal with. Therefore he conceded control to the services. General Falkenhorst as senior commander only had direct control of the ground forces. As previously stated, Weseruebung enjoyed the success it did because of the individual cooperation between the commanders at the tactical level. Just as the second half of the definition states, it requires cooperation and coordination among all forces. Specific examples of this were outlined earlier in the paper. Had this not occurred at the tactical level, the Germans may not have enjoyed the success they did.

The principle of security was applied well by the Germans. In their planning and execution their primary concern was the response of the Allies. The Germans saw the requirement to be immediately prepared for a counteroffensive while planning the invasion. They planned to ensure the Allies would not gain an advantage while they were initially disorganized after the first days of the invasion. To accomplish this the Luftwaffe immediately provided air cover over most of Norway. The army occupied the defensive fort system along the fjords which they intentionally captured intact. Because the bulk of the German ground force moved on combatants, the German Navy was in a position to try and counter any moves by the Royal

Navy. While this plan worked particularly well at Trondheim, it almost failed at Narvik. Narvik's location was just too far north for continuous air and naval support for the ground force.

The final principle is simplicity. At the operational level, the plan appeared complex, however I would argue it was fairly straight forward; it allowed for decentralized operations, it provided clear and attainable objectives and allowed for commanders to exercise initiative. At the tactical level there was confusion during the execution but it was limited to what is associated with the fog of war. The decentralization of the operation allowed the tactical commanders the latitude to react to this and compensate. The fact that by the evening of the 9th of April the Germans had consolidated most of their positions supports this. Throughout the planning and execution of Operation Weseruebung, the Germans applied the principles of war as we know them today. This was another key to their success and reason for our continued study of the campaign.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Hitler stated after the capture of Norway, "The whole history of warfare teaches us that carefully prepared operations usually succeed with relatively insignificant losses."²³ This was true of Weseruebung as neither side had significant troop or air losses. The German Navy however suffered ship losses that it could not recover from during the war. The Germans accomplished their strategic objectives; they retained access to the iron ore they needed to continue their war effort, they denied war materials from the Baltic nations to Britain, they outflanked the British blockade and harassed convoy's in the North Atlantic throughout the war. The Luftwaffe was now in striking range of convoy's and the British Fleet from land. This effected British strategy in the area for the rest of the war. Finally, they prevented the British from attaining the northern flank. The significance of these goals in the war effort can and have been debated. If the Germans were less decisive in their victory in France, Norway would probably have had a greater significance for the German Navy. The swift capture of the France surprised Germany. With access to French Atlantic ports, Norway's importance decreased. Had Operation Gelb been protracted or failed, Norway with its access to Atlantic ports would have been of greater strategic importance to the Germans.

From a military perspective several things stood out in the operation; first the operation was joint; second it showed the decisiveness of air power against sea targets, it demonstrated the use of air as an element to support maneuver in transporting troops and swiftly enhancing ground combat power; and finally, it demonstrated the advantage of the application of operational art. The Germans employed the smallest possible force and compensated for it with daring and surprise, just as Hitler directed. It enabled the Germans to carry the fight through a superior Allied naval force operating in its home waters and smartly executed a ground operation through the use of speed and maneuver. The Germans knocked the Norwegians out before the war could begin. They captured a nation with over 1,200 miles of coastline and defended it against an Allied counteroffensive with a force half the size. Compared with the other campaigns Germany carried out during the war, Weseruebung was a minor operation. But, it remains important because of the success the Germans had in applying the operational level of war in a joint environment. The Germans never again duplicated this type of operational planning. I believe the political infighting between the services and Hitler's focus on land warfare prevented future planning of this type. Had the Germans adopted the lessons learned from this operation I believe they would have been a much more formidable enemy. Weseruebung is an interesting case study and a classic for studying the operational level of warfare.

ENDNOTES

1. Francois Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (London:Collins, 1990), p. 49.
2. Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and his Admirals (New York: E.F. Dutton and Co. Inc., 1949), p. 43.
3. Ibid. Martienssen, p. 44.
4. Kersaudy, p. 42.
5. Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater Of Operations 1940 to 1945. Department of the Army Pamphlet, No. 20-271, Wash. D.C., 1959, p. 11.
6. J.L. Moulton, The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (London: Eyre and Spottiswode, 1966), p. 52.
7. Ziemke, p. 14.
8. Kersaudy, p. 49.
9. Operations, Army Field Manual 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Wash, D.C., 14 June 1993, pp. 6&7.
10. Ziemke, p. 16.
11. Ziemke, p. 17.
12. Christopher Conglianese and Dr. Richard D. Hooker, "Operation Weseruebung and the Origin of Joint Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993, p. 104.
13. Ziemke, p. 32.
14. Ziemke, p. 52.
15. Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1979), p. 103.
16. Conglianese and Hooker, p. 101.
17. Kersaudy, p. 68.
18. Moulton, p. 99.
19. Donald S. Detwiler, World War II, German Military Studies (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1979), p. 26.

20. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War," The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., p. 20.
21. Moulton, p. 65.
22. Detwiler, p. 21.
23. Kersaudy, p. 129.
24. Provided by the Operations Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1993.
25. Maps on File, Martin Greenwood Associates Inc., New York, New York, 1993, map of Norway.
26. Barry Pitt, "The Bunglers of Narvik", The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Vol 5/No 3, Spring 1993, p. 56.

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4. Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg, From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1979.
5. Detwiler, Donald S. World War II, German Military Studies. Vol. 7 (Northern Theater of Operations), New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1979.
6. Hooker, Richard D. Jr. and Coglianesse, Christopher. "Operation Weseruebung and the Origin of Joint Warfare", Joint Forces Quarterly Summer 93/no. 1, National Defense University, pp. 101 to 111.
7. Kersaudy, Francois. Norway 1940. London: Collins, 1990.
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11. Martienssen, Anthony. Hitler and his Admirals. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co. Inc., 1949.
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14. Pitt, Barry. "The Brave Bunglers of Narvik" The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 1993/Vol 5/No 3, pp. 52 to 61.
15. Taylor, Telford. The March of Conquest. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958.
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