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QUICK DECISIVE VICTORY- WISDOM OR MIRAGE?

A Monograph
by
Major John M. Peppers
Infantry



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ABSTRACT

QUICK DECISIVE VICTORY - WISDOM OR MIRAGE? by MAJ John M. Peppers, 75 pages.

This monograph explores the US Army's recently announced goal of quick decisive victory. This concept has emerged in the wake of US victories in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM and reflects one of the National Military Strategy's principles - the use of decisive, overwhelming force. Generally this concept calls for an unambiguous victory, rapidly achieved through very precise use of proportional force, and is carefully crafted to insure minimum or no US casualties and limited collateral damage. In view of emerging post Cold War global and domestic situations this is a daunting standard to place before the US Army.

This monograph reviews the definitions and meanings of the phrase "quick decisive victory" in some detail. It then examines two case studies in history where quick decisive victories seemed to occur. Specifically Napoleon Bonaparte's 1805 and 1806 campaigns and Nazi Germany's triumphs over Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 are analyzed. Each case study is evaluated within the physical, cybernetic and moral domains of war for common attributes of these types of campaigns. These are also compared to Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM as more modern examples of decisive campaigns. The proposition that the victors possessed, recognized and exploited major advantages which made their forces asymmetrically superior is explored. The monograph finds that these 19th and 20th century decisive campaigns provide clues and warnings about the pursuit of quick decisive victory in the 21st century.

The monograph asserts that an essential pre-condition of quick decisive campaigns is that military operational end states are closely integrated and aligned within political-strategic aims. Another pre-condition is a minimum of an asymmetrical advantage over the opponent in the cybernetic and moral domains with at least symmetry in the physical domain. These requisite advantages are best measured in doctrine, organization, training and leadership. Finally the monograph concludes that the fleeting and elusive nature of the asymmetrical advantage and quick decisive victory can act as a mirage to national leaders. Its essence is easily misunderstood, misidentified and misapplied. Ultimately the monograph stresses the immediate relevance of these facts to the operational planner attempting to achieve strategic objectives in an atmosphere that presumes and demands quick decisive victory.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Increasingly today's US operational planners must function in an atmosphere of strategic ambiguity. The changing world situation negates much of past US grand strategy and opens to potentially lingering debate, "the proper mix of military, economic and political tools of power."¹ The argument is that:

simply noting a movement away from Cold War priorities, of course, is far from enough. We need to push our thinking still further and explore a range of possible grand strategies for the coming era...(and) also explore the degree of global involvement demanded by changing circumstances.²

Thus a likely trend in US grand strategy for the future will be debate and disagreement. This poses unique challenges to US military strategy, as well as to service enabling strategies and operational methodologies. A key issue is whether the US Army's recently announced goal of *quick decisive victory* (QDV) is wise. This monograph will review the operational definitions of this phrase and carefully examine historical case studies where it seemed to exist. Drawing upon this historical data will allow assessment of the appropriateness of such a strategy.

The Army's adoption of the QDV goal evolves from the establishment of a national military strategic principle of "decisive force" in the 1992 National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). Among other post-Cold War firsts, this document reflects the 1992 National Security Strategy foundations of Strategic Deterrence & Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response and Reconstitution.³ The 1992 NMSD is most often noted for a shift from a global to a regional warfare orientation, for the use of a smaller, streamlined Base Force, as well as an emphasis on strategic agility and adaptive planning to focus on the intangible threats of the uncertain post-Cold war world. Meanwhile the NMSD

implementation methodology of eight strategic principles, including "decisive force," does not draw a corresponding amount of public interest.⁴

The NMSD describes decisive force as: avoidance of half measures and confused objectives, the ability to rapidly assemble the forces necessary to win, and application of those forces within a concept to overwhelm our adversaries and terminate conflict swiftly and with a minimum loss of life.⁵ The term is further defined in the 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment as a force which is, "designed to be powerful enough to overwhelm the enemy's forces and achieve US objectives with low risk and minimal casualties."⁶ While these definitions do not engender much public scrutiny they have been the source of riveting interest to service military professionals and force planners because they set the boundaries for much of the roles and missions debate.

Briefly the debates have raged over such issues as what constitutes a decisive force, and whether a single service or a joint force is necessary to achieve that standard.⁷ Whether the projected Base Force, particularly the Contingency Component, properly represents a fully capable and decisive force is also heatedly argued.⁸ It is in this environment that the US Army term "quick decisive victory" has developed.

The Army's statutory basis — to organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land — is highlighted in the FY 93 Posture Statement.⁹ It is in this document that the first allusions to quick decisive victory are found. Building on the theme of the Army as the "decisive deterrent" and the stated Army characteristic of a capability for "decisive victory", the text frequently ties these notions to those of "rapid deployment" and "responsiveness to

crisis".¹⁰ This emphasis on tying "quick" to the concept of "decisive victory" in Army policy has led to it being included in the Army's emerging doctrine.¹¹ In sum this concept calls for unambiguous victory, rapidly achieved through very precise use of proportional force, carefully crafted to insure minimum or no US casualties and limited collateral damage. This is a daunting standard to place before the US Army. This monograph will examine this concept in both a historical and contemporary context and comment on the wisdom of declaring such a force employment strategy or policy.

The phenomenon of quick decisive or rapid and relatively bloodless campaigns is not new to modern warfare. Though rare, excellent examples have been seen throughout history. Well documented instances occurred in 19th and early 20th century warfare. These include Napoleon Bonaparte's uniquely successful campaigns of 1805 and 1806 and the shocking triumphs of Nazi Germany in 1939 and 1940. While history's lessons certainly are not guaranteed to be those needed for the future, when comprehensively and contextually studied, it does sometimes offer broad guideposts to those discerning enough to find them.¹² Reviewing these case studies and briefly comparing them with the more recent Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM will facilitate investigation of a number of related issues.

The principal issue is whether 19th and 20th century decisive campaigns warn us about the complexities of quick decisive victory in the 21st century. By determining what common characteristics existed in past quick decisive campaigns, it may be possible to facilitate execution of quick decisive victory in the future. The degree to which the various opponents had a contemporary symmetry or asymmetry in war making capability, will

be closely considered. Finally the legacy of each quick decisive campaign will be briefly analyzed to see what results such a strategy wrought.

By this process the monograph will find that a necessary pre-condition for quick decisive campaigns is that military operational end states must be closely integrated within the political-strategic aims. Another essential pre-condition is the possession of an asymmetrical advantage in the cybernetic and moral domains of war and at least symmetry in the physical domain. Further these requisite advantages are best recognized or measured through contemporary doctrine, organization, training and leadership. Finally the monograph will conclude that the fleeting and elusive nature of the asymmetrical advantage, and therefore quick decisive victory, is easily misunderstood. Ultimately the monograph will stress that these facts are of immediate relevance to the operational planner attempting to achieve strategic objectives in an atmosphere that presumes and demands quick decisive victory.

II. DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

To effectively proceed with this investigation some common basis for definition of terms and the analysis methodology must be established. First it is necessary to closely scrutinize and further develop the meaning of the term quick decisive victory. Also the basis for selecting the historical decisive campaigns to be analyzed, will be briefly reviewed. Next, the monograph's analysis methodology must be explained. Finally the concept of "asymmetrical opponents" as a possible necessary precondition to quick decisive victory will be introduced.

QUICK DECISIVE VICTORY-

The United States, a nation born in war, "is also a nation that has grudgingly accepted the irony that the joys of liberty cannot be guaranteed without a willingness to suffer the hardships of war."¹³ The notion of quick decisive victory appears to be the ultimate embodiment of the American way of war. The emphasis on swift results, clearly decided, certainly appeals to any democratic government. Yet the demand for technologically superior combat power or force, overwhelmingly applied, is a very dominant American trait.¹⁴ Also very American is the more recent demand for precise use of proportional force resulting in minimum casualties and collateral damage.¹⁵ So there is a uniquely American aspect to the concept of quick decisive victory. This must be considered when trying to determine its characteristics and results from historical campaigns.

"Quick decisive victory" is a phrase with great potential for confusion stemming from multiple interpretations of its meaning. In order for the term to have meaning in the context of this study, the individual words and the phrase as a whole must be commonly defined. The word "victory" alone has multiple definitions, as does "decisive", while the measure of what is "quick" is always somewhat relative and probably situationally dependent. By interpreting the words individually and then in combination, a common understanding of the phrase will be built.

What constitutes or defines "victory" is usually a source of wide debate in any situation. The debaters often include everyone from the man-in-the-street, to the military professionals and the political decision makers. It is fallacious to assume that a commonly understood frame of reference for this term exists. Victory is a multi-faceted concept which defies simplistic

definition.¹⁶ Bernice Carroll, a noted author on conflict resolution, offers four different views of victory. First is victory interpreted in military means which measures the annihilation, destruction or gradual subjugation/expulsion of the opponent's forces or vital resources. Next is victory as a relationship between parties which encompasses the opponent's capitulation or enduring greater losses. Also valid is victory as a relationship between war aims and war outcomes which can be measured by the attainment, adjustment or frustration of initial war aims. The final view is victory as interpreted in terms of gains and losses, that is relative to the opponent or in relation to the pre-conflict status quo. Usually gains and losses are measured in political, economic, psychological, territorial, or strategic terms as well as in casualties.¹⁷

Thus the phrase "quick decisive victory" is subject to different interpretation on the basis of differing understandings of the word "victory" alone. This monograph will adopt the FM 100-5 (Final Draft) definition which generally adheres to the view of victory in terms of military means and war aims/outcomes, as outlined above. Thus victory, "is a process of visualizing an end state and then designating objectives, tailoring the force and conducting operations to achieve that end state."¹⁸ Please note that this very broad definition includes everything from initial development of the political aim, through translation to military objectives, military planning and finally successful execution.

Next to be explored is the less contentious word "decisive". The primary meaning of decisiveness is the objective measure of conclusively achieving the desired aim or end state.¹⁹ But this nearly repeats the definition of victory just derived, so it is the word's secondary and more subjective, qualitative meaning that

is more useful. In particular the 1992 NMSD, the Army FY 93 Posture statement and FM 100-5 (Final Draft) all emphasize decisive as the ability to "overwhelm, paralyze" the enemy.²⁰ These words extend the American strategic tradition of "crushing, destroying" enemy forces.²¹ Implicitly and explicitly these documents attach a time sensitive aspect to the word "decisive" which leads directly into the phrases other adjective "quick".²²

The final word of the phrase, "quick", emphasizes speed and timeliness of action in relation to achieving the end state, and to the enemy's ability to act/react. In this way it complements the other definitions emphasis on these two subjects. It is important to note that the US Army's position is the "quickest" decisive victories are achieved through *joint* application of force rather than any single service approach. This is because the enemy is overwhelmed more efficiently and completely.²³

To sum up, for the purposes of this monograph quick decisive victory is defined as: the timely application of military force which results in overwhelming paralysis of enemy forces and conclusively achieves military and political end states. This definition can be applied to 19th and early 20th century campaigns with equal fidelity. It is important to note this definition does not reflect the modern era's extreme emphasis on low casualties.

HISTORICAL CASE STUDY SELECTION-

The case studies to be reviewed are Napoleon Bonaparte's campaigns of 1805 and 1806 and Nazi Germany's invasions of 1939 (Poland) and 1940 (Low countries and France). These will then be briefly compared with more recent US Army operations. Each is an example of offensive operational level warfare. Generally the campaigns were oriented on a concept of relative simultaneous operations seeking annihilation, rather than sequential operations

with an attrition focus. Each was selected for its reputation as a clear example of a campaign resulting in *decisive victory*, *quickly* achieved. Each also represents a lopsided ratio of gains to losses (in terms of strategic aims, territory, casualties, etc.) for the victor relative to the vanquished. Indeed on the surface these campaigns seem to parallel the US Army ideal of quick decisive victory.²⁴

It is clear from the FY 93 Posture statement and FM 100-5 (Final Draft) that the results of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM have much to do with shaping that ideal. It is equally clear that the campaigns of Napoleon and Nazi Germany intrigue the US Army's leaders as examples of operational warfare to be emulated.²⁵

METHOD OF ANALYSIS-

Discussion of each campaign will begin with a brief description of the political and military situation as the campaign commenced, followed by a summation of the campaign's main events and results. This method will allow identification of the political-strategic aims being sought, the military end states derived from them, and the process by which they were achieved (the campaign itself). Then the campaign will be scrutinized in each of the three domains of war - physical, cybernetic and moral - to determine the key attributes which shaped the campaign and those that were sources of ultimate success. Finally, the characteristics and sources of success for each will be reviewed to determine which are common to campaigns of decisive victory, quickly achieved. Table 1 (pg 45) reflects this analysis method and subsequent tables will serve as a record of the findings.

The physical domain of the battlefield is oriented on the whole process of destruction including the effects of weapons, munitions, terrain, weather, logistics and other physical

factors.²⁶ Measurement terms will include manpower, firepower, mobility and logistics. The cybernetic domain is concerned with organization, command, control and communication.²⁷ The moral domain involves the disintegration and breakdown of the individual's and unit's will to fight.²⁸ Measurement terms include quality of soldiers, morale of units and motivation to fight. Clearly a number of terms apply in more than one domain. Leadership, predominantly a factor in the moral domain, has a role in the cybernetic as well. Organization has a role in all three domains, as does doctrine. Training and combat experience apply both in the moral and the cybernetic domains. In analyzing each historical case study such terms will be addressed to accurately reflect the key attributes of that decisive campaign.

THE NOTION OF SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL ARMIES-

This theoretical proposition extends from the notion that warfare's norm is a relative symmetry between opposing nations and their armies. Often at least one side perceives it possesses some physical, moral/psychological or cybernetic advantage over the enemy. On this basis nations go to war.²⁹ Particularly since the beginning of the industrial age, such a perceived advantage has often been absent or fleeting. Commonly the lesser force rapidly closes the gap in overall capability through introduction of more resources, adaptive learning, or technological breakthrough. Then a roughly symmetrical situation arises and attrition warfare sets in.³⁰ One theory even sees this rough symmetry as a pre-condition for operational art in the modern era. Finite resources and the search for alternatives to attrition warfare, leads to the elements of campaign design such as envisioning end states and establishing main effort and risk areas.³¹

This monograph will thoroughly investigate the proposition that on those rare occasions when truly *asymmetrical* armies confront each other, and when it is recognized and exploited in a timely fashion, quick decisive campaigns result. The weaker side is overwhelmed before it can reinforce or adapt.³² Did this happen to Napoleon's enemies in 1805 and 1806?

III. NAPOLION'S CAMPAIGNS OF 1805 and 1806

CAMPAIGN OF 1805-

In the summer of 1805 Napoleon Bonaparte's forces were arrayed along the English Channel coast threatening invasion of the British Isles.³³ Revolutionary France, no longer the military weakling of 1792-94, faced a Europe of monarchical states hostile over the phenomena of social revolution. The strategic situation was that under the leadership of British Prime Minister William Pitt, a Third Coalition with Austria and Russia had been formed in April. Britain partially subsidized their allies land operations while seeking to destroy Napoleon's growing sea capability.³⁴

Napoleon Bonaparte had recently crowned himself Emperor. In this capacity Napoleon's extensive military powers were now completely matched by his political powers.³⁵ Further from 1802 to 1804 Napoleon took his veteran soldiers, added new conscripts and comprehensively trained them in the proven elements of French doctrinal, organizational, and leadership reforms. Thus was molded the powerful formation forever known as the *Grand Armee*.³⁶

The land military strategy of the Third Coalition in 1805 was primarily Austrian. Following extensive debate among his advisors, Austrian and Holy Roman Emperor Francis I directed his initial main effort of 120,000 troops under Archdukes Charles and

John to defend the province of Tyrol and attack French forces in Italy. Meanwhile, beginning 2 September an army of 72,000 would invade the state of Bavaria and the Danube region under the nominal command of Archduke Ferdinand and the veteran General Mack. The Austrian leadership anticipated Napoleon's counterstroke would fall in Italy. General Mack's mission was to coerce the Bavarians into the Coalition and avoid battle, while awaiting the arrival of a Czar Alexander I and Russian armies in mid October.³⁷

By August 1805 it became clear to Napoleon that his plans to invade Britain would remain frustrated, and Austria and Russia were moving against France.³⁸ By the 23rd of the month Napoleon clearly recognized the threat forming against his Bavarian allies and his forces in Italy.³⁹ He resolved to strike first and to do so along the Danube, thereby threatening the Austrian capital of Vienna and crushing the Austrian army in Bavaria.⁴⁰ Napoleon's first military end state was to do this before either the Austrian armies in Italy or the reinforcing Russians could intervene. His overall political aim was to force the Austrian monarch into a subjugated peace, thus splitting the Third Coalition before it became a threat to France. A major consideration throughout was to keep Prussia neutral and outside of these events.⁴¹

A secretive strategic redeployment of the *Grand Armée* from the Channel began on 26 August. After a brief pause at the Rhine, the French crossed on 26 September, and struck into the heart of Germany, closing seven Corps and 200,000 men on the Danube just ten days later.⁴² [See Map A1, pg 50.] The efficiency of this movement points out many of the strengths of the Napoleonic system. Excellent staff work included detailed reconnaissance, and numerous administrative and logistical arrangements which capitalized on the *corps d'armée* system and doctrine of 'march

dispersed, fight concentrated.' Equally important was the superb training and morale of the veteran French units.⁴³

General Mack, deceived by Marshal Murat's Cavalry Corps feints into the Black Forest region, detected far too late Napoleon's main effort descending from the north on his Army's locations at Ulm and Augsburg.⁴⁴ The brilliantly executed 500 mile operational maneuver achieved Napoleon's first military aim. After a series of minor battles General Mack was hopelessly encircled and surrendered 20 October, ending the "Battle of Ulm" and eliminating an army of 60,000 Austrians.⁴⁵

Bonaparte struck out again on 26 October, chasing an army of 40,000 allied troops under the Russian General Kutusov. Napoleon left Augreau's Corps to hold Bavaria and sent Marshal Ney's Corps to protect against returning Austrian forces from the south. Much to the Austrian's dismay Kutusov did not offer a major battle in front of Vienna and Marshal Murat captured the city on 13 November.⁴⁶ Though Napoleon had destroyed a major army and possessed the Austrian capital, Emperor Francis I and Kutusov's army convergence with Czar Alexander and General Buxhowden put an Allied force of 86,000 men in nearby Olmutz. This left the French political aim largely unfulfilled. Thus on 23 November Napoleon moved 53,000 tired, bedraggled veterans to the vicinity of Brunn, dangerously close to Prussian borders and with winters grip rapidly closing out available campaigning days.⁴⁷

The leaders of the combined Austrian-Russian army at Olmutz were well aware of Napoleon's strategic and military situation and were eager for a battle of revenge. The allies watched with keen interest as Napoleon's main body (minus Bernadotte's and Davout's Corps each a day or two away) established itself near the village of Austerlitz. The allies attentively observed as the French

withdrew from the key Pratzen Heights overlooking Goldbach Brook, then feverishly dug defensive positions, while offering parlay and improperly defending their flanks.⁴⁸ Drawn in by Bonaparte's feigned weakness, and against General Kutusov's advice to await further reinforcements, the allies elected to attack. [See Map A2, pg 51.] The attack sought to crush the supposedly weak French flanks, but was conducted in a disjointed manner. With exquisite timing, Napoleon summoned his distant forces so their arrival coincided exactly with the desperate battle for the flanks. Then, carefully gauging the thinning of the allies center along the decisive Pratzen heights, Napoleon launched the smashing blow of Soult's corps and his reserves, splitting the Allied army and driving the majority of it into the frozen Satschan lakes to the south.⁴⁹ The victory of Austerlitz was complete. It not only destroyed the allied army but achieved the political aims of Austrian peace, the collapse of the alliance, and the continued wary neutrality of Prussia.

CAMPAIGN OF 1806-

Electing not to pursue the defeated Russians, Napoleon consolidated the 1805 campaign by implementing the Treaty of Pressburg with the Austrian Emperor and strongly garrisoning the Bavarian region. Significantly Napoleon's attentions had already shifted to Prussia.⁵⁰ In the wake of France's favorable military position following Austerlitz, Prussia was pressured into signing the Treaty of Schonbrunn on 15 December 1805. In this treaty King Frederick Wilhelm III of Prussia gave up control of some lesser German states (which became the basis for the French dominated Confederation of the Rhine the next July) and was forced to accept the state of Hanover in return, thus ensuring an end to trade and relations with Britain.⁵¹ In historian David Chandler's words, to

the eyes of Europe, "never had Prussian prestige been brought so low."⁵² The nation of Europe's greatest soldier, Frederick the Great, would not tolerate this situation for long.

From the Prussian's point of view the strategic situation was dire. Though the British had regained supremacy of the seas following Admiral Nelson's 21 October 1805 victory at Trafalgar, no significant land ally was immediately available. Further the cumulative diplomatic, political and economic effects of Napoleon's machinations were increasingly intolerable. Quite simply the Prussian choices were to attack on their terms or continue in isolation and suffer eventual attack on Napoleon's schedule. The debate raged for some time with the party for war led by the Queen of Prussia herself.⁵³ Finally in July, news of French secret offers to return Hanover to Britain and of an invitation to the state of Saxony to join the Confederation of the Rhine, were too much. Prussian mobilization began on 10 August with a political aim of punishing France and reasserting control of the German states.⁵⁴ The Prussian military end states for 1806 were continuously debated and frequently changed. Ultimately they resolved to strike first by invading Saxony in early September.⁵⁵

Napoleon's statesmanship in handling Prussia is controversial. His view of the situation concluded that France could suffer British domination of the seas for the time being, but any lingering challenges to her continental domination must be met forthrightly or risk further intrigues and alliances. Prussia had to be isolated, and if unruly, dealt with directly and promptly. The political aim was her defeat and a subjugated peace akin to Austria's, leaving France the undisputed continental power.⁵⁶ Militarily three possible courses of action sought the same end state: to force a battle by threatening Berlin in order

to destroy the primary Prussian armies. Napoleon's course of action analysis eliminated a straight forward drive from the west as too direct and a northern envelopment from Holland as too exposed. Instead he chose to strike out of Bavaria and move rapidly through the Thuringian Forest in order to force the Prussian armies to battle by threatening their capital, their lines of communication and any hope of Russian intervention.⁵⁷

Early reports on Prussia's mobilization for invasion of Saxony were initially discounted by Napoleon. He did not believe Prussia would challenge the *Grand Armee`* alone.⁵⁸ As a precaution on 5 September Napoleon directed detailed reconnaissance of terrain north of Bamberg and by 18 September there was indisputable evidence of Prussia's intentions. Between 18 and 19 September Napoleon dictated 102 separate written orders directing assembly of the various Corps of the *Grand Armee`* in the general vicinity of Bamberg and Bayreuth by 4 October.⁵⁹ Brother Louis King of Holland with 30,000 troops was to demonstrate against the Prussians beginning 1 October, while Marshal Mortier's reinforced VIIIth Corps protected the direct route to the Rhine and French soil. Prince Eugene in Italy and General Brune's forces on the Channel were also placed on alert and reinforced.⁶⁰

Meanwhile by late September the much delayed and endlessly debated Prussian preemptive strike strategy, was itself preempted. Now arguing over what defensive scheme to adopt, the principal Prussian dispositions on 4 October placed Duke Brunswick's forces near Weimar, Prince Ruchel's at Erfurt and Prince Hohenlohe's south of Jena on the Saale river. Poor unity of effort between the leaders was becoming quite apparent.⁶¹

On 8 and 9 October Napoleon began his advance from Bavaria in a "battalion square" formation of three columns of two corps

each. [See Map B1 small inset, pg 52.] Napoleon's army advanced to the north with Bernadotte's I Corps leading in the center followed by Davout's III Corps (together 70,000 men). On the left Lannes' Vth Corps was followed by Augereau (total 40,000) and on the right Soult's IV Corps was followed by Ney's VI Corps (total 50,000). Murat's cavalry Corps led and the Imperial Guard followed in the center.⁶² Fighting a cavalry battle at Schleiz and destroying a 9,000 man force under Prussian Prince Louis at Saalfeld on 10 October, the *Grand Armee* emerged from the Thuringian Forest.⁶³ Based on these early battles and a stream of cavalry reports, Napoleon ordered a wheel left for the *Grand Armee* on the night of 11 October, anticipating a battle further west in the vicinity of Erfurt.⁶⁴ [See Map B1 large inset, pg 52.]

In fact Prince Hohenlohe's force continued to be directly on the center axis of this wheel, near Jena. Reacting to events on 13 October Prussian, "confidence of September had given place to near panic-stricken caution in October," and the main army under Brunswick hurried north to Leipzig to avoid battle as Hohenlohe and Ruchel's forces covered the movement.⁶⁵ [See Map B2, pg 53.]

These maneuvers led directly to the twin battles of Jena-Auerstadt. In contact with the enemy on the night of 13 October and believing this to be the Prussian main force, Napoleon attacked to fix with only three Corps initially, knowing the day would bring him reinforcements as the Army concentrated.⁶⁶ By 12:30 he had 42,000 men in reserve.⁶⁷ Yet Jena was not to be the main battle on this day. Napoleon with 96,000 troops had struck only the Prussian flank forces of Prince Hohenlohe, belatedly reinforced by Prince Ruchel, for a total of 50,000. At Auerstadt Davout, with only his III Corps of 26,000, had struck Brunswick's force of 60,000 and routed them in an amazing display of superior

tactics and courage. This sealed the Prussian's fate.⁶⁸ Napoleon then launched a relentless three week pursuit of the Prussians which extended beyond Berlin, ending the campaign of 1806.⁶⁹

ANALYSIS-

The first issue for analysis is whether these campaigns were examples of decisive victory. As defined this must include the achievement of the political aim and derived military end states. Napoleon's unique combination of political and military power generally insured the aims and end states were closely related and that victory was achieved. The lopsided success at Ulm and the stunning reversal at Austerlitz met the military end state of destroying two allied armies, as well as the political aims of ending the Third Coalition, forcing Austria into a subjugated peace and keeping Prussia neutral.⁷⁰ But some scholars caveat the completeness of the victory in 1806. They argue that the victory was not a full one, because Napoleon's ruthless pursuit of his military end state, the destruction of the Prussian army, had a role in fostering the later rise of Prussian/German nationalism.⁷¹ Contemporarily, however there was little doubt as to the magnitude and completeness of the victory.⁷²

The next issue is "decisiveness", and its inherent controversy over speed or "quickness". Was the nature of the victory "overwhelming" in both comparative gains and losses and speed of execution? Historians agree with Napoleon on Ulm, "never have victories been so complete or less costly."⁷³ Austerlitz is described as, "the thunderstroke victory that destroyed the enemy army in a single clash of arms."⁷⁴ Jena-Auerstadt's citation is, "seldom in history has an army been reduced to impotence more swiftly or decisively."⁷⁵ It is indeed hard to argue that Napoleon did not achieve quick decisive campaigns in 1805-1806.

At this point the issue of *how it was done* logically presents itself. For instance in the physical domain (focused on battlefield destruction) did the *Grand Armee* enjoy some unique advantages? The French initial monopoly on mass armies, so new and decisive at Valmy in 1792, did not exist in 1805 and 1806. The French did not have a significant advantage in number of troops on campaign and were sometimes the smaller of the two forces engaged. Nor did they enjoy a major advantage in weaponry. There were no "secret weapons". Generally the *Grand Armee* possessed the same generation of musketry, cannon and cavalry weapons as the rest of Europe though of marginal superiority.⁷⁶ In the realm of logistics the French innovations were evolutionary and not revolutionary, but did have some effect. Certainly the efforts to do without large baggage trains and attempts to organize for forage on the march, did support a greater ability to project combat power through campaigning.⁷⁷ But these facts are more a reflection of organization. In sum the French can be said to have had a slight advantage in the physical domain of war.

The French advantage in the cybernetic domain of war, however, was complete. First within the broad area of military organizational design, lie many of the demonstrable battlefield advantages of the *Grand Armee*. The Division and Corps systems which Napoleon perfected created Europe's first non-unitary army and directly improved the efficiency of French command and control, combined arms and on-the-march logistics.⁷⁸ Less demonstrable is the impact superior French theory and doctrine had in both shaping Napoleon's organizational design and adapting to the changes these designs wrought on the battlefield. The finest example of this remains the doctrine that gave Corps commanders the independent ability to mass their own artillery or cavalry as

the situation dictated, insuring a more responsive and efficient conduct of the process of physical destruction on the battlefield. Indeed Martin Van Creveld finds Napoleon's revolutionary system of command primarily a case of superior doctrine and organization.⁷⁹

In the more purely cybernetic realm of command and control, the complete unity of command the French enjoyed under Napoleon, from political-strategic considerations to military execution, was instrumental.⁸⁰ The councils-of-war which Napoleon's enemies held prior to Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt were unable to agree upon or implement coherently the required timely and resolute political and military action. Colonel Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Carl von Clausewitz observed this personally.⁸¹ Further in 1805 and 1806 this unity of command advantage was joined with a superior capability to translate those command decisions into unity of effort on the battlefield. Though modern critics find fault with Napoleon's centralization of battlefield control, lack of commanders intent etc... what truly mattered was the merit of his methods relative to his contemporary enemies.⁸² Prussian unity of effort was severely lacking, and the level of cohesion and integration of the Austrian-Russian force at Austerlitz was even worse.⁸³ The very capable group of subordinate marshals in the *Grand Armee* in 1805 and 1806, together with a rudimentary but efficient system of staffs under Chief of Staff Berthier, led to a clearly superior unity of effort.⁸⁴ The French dominance of the cybernetic domain of war in these campaigns was total.

Yet it was the moral domain which points out the strongest reasons for the stunning French successes of 1805 and 1806. French leaders and soldiers were a constant source of French dominance. The soldiers were often combat experienced, imbued with revolutionary zeal and honed to a high state of training and

readiness by 1805.⁸⁵ In the words of a contemporary judge, Carl von Clausewitz, comparing Prussian mistakes at Jena with Napoleon's at the Battle of Leipzig, "if Bonaparte at Leipzig was not as completely crushed as we were in 1806, it was due to the fact that his troops were better..⁸⁶ Clausewitz's view that French soldiers were still superior in 1813 gives clear indication of the qualitative differences that were prevalent in 1806.

The application of the legendary courageous combat leadership of Napoleon and his marshals to this body of motivated, experienced, and *trained* soldiers in 1805 and 1806 explains how the French system formed high performing units. The monarchies opposing France were tied to old unitary army organizations and concepts. They also lacked the combination of trained and experienced forces. Further the monarchies were unwilling to implement major social change to feed motivation. Therefore they remained at a decisive disadvantage in the moral domain of war.⁸⁷

In hindsight the existence of asymmetrical armies here is undeniable. Beyond merely the three domains, the key crossover elements like organization, doctrine, and leadership are clearly in favor of the French. [See Table 2, pg 46.] Further the genius of the Napoleonic system was that it streamlined the French military machine, enhancing its measurable qualitative advantage. As Peter Paret states about the *Grand Armee*, "by placing the resources of France in the service of the new system for a time gave it absolute superiority."⁸⁸

But did contemporary figures recognize this asymmetry and react to it appropriately? It would appear Napoleon sensed the power of the tool he had created before 1805.⁸⁹ Yet contemporary public opinion, always a poor measure of actual military capabilities, continued to doubt French dominance even after Ulm

and Austerlitz.⁹⁰ It is instructive to recall the eager surety of the Austrian and Russian leadership on the eve of Austerlitz and the Prussian's strident, confident stage of September 1806. Each badly misread the relative symmetry of the opposing armies. These are clear indicators of the difficulty in recognizing asymmetry.

Given his knowledge of the French asymmetrical advantage and his achievement of quick decisive victory in 1805-06, how did Napoleon then proceed? By 1809, while once again at war with Austria in the Danube region, he was to remark during the violent battle of Aspern-Essling that the Austrians were, "no longer the Army of Austerlitz."⁹¹ Though he recognized the improved Austrian massed artillery and perhaps their adoption of the corps system, Napoleon never fully recognized that, "as opposing armies modernized the likelihood of winning a decisive battle diminished."⁹² Similarly Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812 sought a major battle in the first 20 days, where he intended to apply his asymmetrical tool to achieve a decisive victory. But the French army invading Russia in 1812 was very different from that of 1805. Like his earlier opponents Napoleon simply did not accept that the asymmetrical gap was closing.⁹³

Nor did Napoleon recognize the limitations of a strategy of quick decisive victory. Over a seven year period Napoleon sent a series of French leaders to Iberia, demanding that each apply the solution of quick decisive victory against an uprising that could not be located. Rapid elimination of conventional forces in Spain in 1808-9 did not achieve his unsound political aim of usurping the monarchy.⁹⁴ Peter Paret and others have criticized Napoleon for failing to realize that unity of command (or quick decisive victory) was no substitute for poor policy. Napoleon's attempt to usurp the Spanish throne led to a different kind of war,

costing France 40,000 casualties a year and an occupation army of 200,000. In many ways it became a two front war by 1812. Here is a political aim for which the military end state must be carefully derived. Napoleon presumed conventional victory would suffice, wholly underestimating the severity of the military task.⁹⁵

Certainly by 1813 and the Battle of Leipzig it was becoming apparent to Napoleon that "quick victory" was no longer possible, though the degree to which symmetry had asserted itself was still hard to admit.⁹⁶ This historical case study raises the issue of whether rare instances of true asymmetrical military capabilities between nations can be reliably monitored. Certainly it was quite difficult in the Napoleonic era. But what of another era?

IV. NAZI GERMANY'S CAMPAIGNS OF 1939 AND 1940

The sweeping victories of Nazi Germany from September 1939 to June 1940 are the 20th century equivalent of Napoleon's triumphs. That brief period included the invasions of Poland (September 1939) and the Campaign in the West (10 May-25 June 1940). The latter achieved in six weeks, what four bloody years of war a generation earlier had been unable to do: drive the British off the continent and secure the complete capitulation of France.⁹⁷ This monograph will review these historical cases as possible examples of early 20th century quick decisive campaigns.

POLAND 1939-

In 1939 Poland's strategic situation was dire and growing worse. Through intimidation of Europe's war weary leaders, Nazi Germany's Adolph Hitler completed a string of bloodless victories by annexing Czechoslovakia in 1938.⁹⁸ Hitler's gaze now shifted to the disputed city of Danzig, the Polish corridor and the German

nationals therein. Under the ploy of unsatisfactory negotiations, German military activity on three sides of Poland increased measurably in the summer of 1939. Germany's unexpected pact with the Soviet Union on the eve of the invasion completed the encirclement, and virtually insured the fourth disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe.⁹⁹

The German political-strategic aim was quite clear: a quick decisive conquest of Poland to avoid a two front war, given British and French strategic awakening and moves toward rearmament.¹⁰⁰ Poland on the other hand, needed a lengthy war. This would give the Poles the benefit of the fall's rain and mud while allowing Britain, and ultimately France, to fulfill their treaty obligations by attacking Germany from the west. Only this development held any real hope for the Poles, but it was not to be.¹⁰¹ Polish military end states were at cross purposes with this strategic aim. Their troop dispositions, essentially a cordon defense at the borders, protected the western industrial centers like Lodz, but gave up the excellent opportunity for a coherent defense behind the Vistula river.¹⁰² [See Map C1, pg 54.]

Germany's military end state meshed with their political-strategic aim completely: the surprise and rapid destruction of the fifth largest Army in Europe. Poland's initial force of 30 infantry divisions and 12 cavalry brigades, grew with mobilization to a force of one million men. But it had only 600 light tanks and 1500 inferior planes.¹⁰³ Taking advantage of their superior mobilization capability and an undetected early start, the flower of the German Army - 1.5 million men in 52 divisions and the finest air force in Europe - invaded Poland at 4:45 am on 1 September 1939. Operating in five armies organized in Northern

and Southern army groups, the Germans planned a grand double encirclement of the Polish forces on each side of the Vistula.¹⁰⁴

By 3 September, under cover of complete air superiority by the Luftwaffe, the 3rd and 4th Armies of Army Group North had joined hands to cut the Polish corridor and were driving towards Warsaw, inflicting heavy losses on the Polish Pomorze and Modlin Armies. The Southern Army Group made steady progress, meeting the stiffest resistance west of Cracow. By 6 September the 10th Army was moving rapidly on Warsaw from the south.¹⁰⁵ On 10 September the bypassed Polish Poznan Army attacked south pinning the northern elements of 8th Army. Eventually even this modicum of success was denied the Poles as Southern Army Group reinforced the flank, drew the Poznan Army further east and then encircled it in the Battle of Burza. The battle ended on 17 September with the surrender of a number of Polish formations and 170,000 troops.¹⁰⁶

On the same day the outer encirclement was equally successful with General Heinz Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps of 4th Army linking up with XXII Panzer Corps of the Southern Army Group just south of Brest Litovsk.¹⁰⁷ Also on 17 September the cautious Russian advance from the east began, and major Polish resistance ended with the fall of Warsaw and Modlin strongholds on 27 and 28 September respectively. In less than a month Nazi Germany had achieved decisive victory at the relatively inexpensive cost of 10,761 men killed and 285 aircraft lost, and was already shifting major forces to the dangerously undermanned Western front.¹⁰⁸

By the winter of 1939-40 the immediate situation on the Western front was a stalemate, but the Whermacht did not rest on its new found laurels. Undoubtedly spurred by a looming war with more modern opponents, the performance in Poland was analyzed for shortcomings at every level in the German Army. In conjunction

with numerous reorganizations and the Army's expansion, an intense training effort sought to raise reserve officer and NCO performance while improving individual, small and large tactical unit proficiency. Areas of emphasis were unit toughening and seasoning through exercises which featured reconnaissance, night operations, transition from offense to defense, and physical fitness. This organizational integrity insured there were no Potemkin villages in the Whermacht at this time.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile the glib assertions of French generals that Poland was an aberration from which little could be learned presents a stark contrast.¹¹⁰

BATTLE OF FLANDERS AND NORTHERN FRANCE 1940-

The Campaign in the West closely followed the German invasions of Denmark and Norway in April 1940. The campaign was in fact two campaigns with the Battle of Flanders lasting from 10 May to 5 June 1940, immediately followed by the Battle of France 5-25 June 1940.¹¹¹ This monograph will focus on the former and only address the latter in passing. Many historians agree that by the time German forces reached the Channel coast on 20 May, the final outcome of the overall campaign had been decided.¹¹²

Given France's predominance in land power, the Allies strategy was primarily a French strategy which sought avoidance of defeat, rather than the gaining of victory.¹¹³ This was to be done by buying time for strategic rearmament while husbanding manpower and keeping war away from sacred French soil. Militarily this was achieved by imposing the Maginot Line as a barrier to invasion from the east and responding to attacks through the Low Countries with a deployment of the best French and British Expeditionary Force (BEF) divisions to the Dyle Line in Belgium. Later this effort was dangerously extended further north to the Breda Line in Holland. This scheme of protective actions kept the

force of 22 Belgium and 10 Dutch divisions available to the Allies, but cost deployment time, added considerable length to the defense, and precluded the possibility of any sizable reserve.¹¹⁴

German strategy was based on Hitler's simplistic political-strategic goal of a rapid final destruction of Western Powers in opposition to German expansion. A war of long duration was to be avoided for political-economic reasons and shortages of German war making raw materials. Finally the vital Ruhr industrial area had to be safeguarded from any attack, including aerial ones mounted from the Low countries.¹¹⁵ Militarily the method of achieving these war aims was intensely debated. The first plan was largely an updated version of the Schleiffen Plan. Eventually the German's embraced General Erich von Manstein's plea for a "decisive victory," and resolved to indicate a main attack north through the Low countries, while actually conducting it through the unlikely Ardennes Forest region. Known as Plan YELLOW, it called for rapid crossings of the Meuse river to allow a decisive drive to the Channel coast and encirclement to the north, or a turn south to Paris.¹¹⁶ The cumulative effect was to be as a revolving door with the Allies racing north and east for the Dyle-Breda line as the Wehrmacht main effort circled in behind them from the south and eventually the west.¹¹⁷ [See Map D1, pg 55.]

On 10 May German Army Group B of two armies comprising over 29 divisions, attacked spectacularly into Holland and Belgium with a full range of panzer, airborne, and commando operations well supported by the Luftwaffe. By 15 May Holland capitulated and the Allied deployment to the north had been successfully drawn in. In the south Army Group C consisting of 19 divisions probed the main French defenses on the Maginot Line. In the center the three armies and 45 divisions of Army Group A, including a Panzer Group

of three Panzer Corps, achieved the desired effect in the Ardennes, making the vital crossings of the Meuse River on 13 May against disorganized and bewildered French defenses.¹¹⁸ At the critical juncture of this battle, under intense Luftwaffe attack, French artillery and 55th Infantry Division units started a rout, even before the Panzers had crossed the river! A gap between the French 2nd and 9th Armies opened that would never close again.¹¹⁹

Only late on the evening of the 15 May did the French high command discern the true German main effort and the rotten state of their military affairs.¹²⁰ From 14-17 May French armor formations ineffectively confronted the Panzer columns on four occasions, and suffered badly.¹²¹ In the ensuing days the German Panzer columns would strike out in unprecedented fashion for the distant Channel coast, reaching it on the 20 May. Hard marching and fighting German infantry formations of Army Groups A and B rapidly consolidated the gains. Only the nervousness of the German high command, compounded by a mildly effective British armor counterattack at Arras on 21 May, forestalled a complete annihilation.¹²² Rather than slamming, the German door only stuttered closed, and extensive Allied manpower escaped in the evacuation of Dunkirk ending 4 June.

Yet, in less than a month, the Dutch, Belgian and most of the BEF had been eliminated (over 34 divisions), as well as thirty divisions representing the flower of the French army and virtually all of its tanks. The demise of the French Republic was assured.¹²³ Under the ensuing Plan RED the Whermacht turned the juggernaut south. With complete domination in the air and 143 divisions in three Army Groups, they attacked relentlessly against 65 depleted and disheartened French divisions. The Germans captured Paris on 14 June, pinned French formations against their

own Maginot Line and with the Italy's cowardly attack in the south, France sought an armistice which took effect 25 June.¹²⁴

ANALYSIS-

While the long term political-strategic decisiveness of these campaigns may be debatable to some, both achieved their militarily oriented political aims. Arguments that the Battle of Flanders was not decisive, primarily because of Dunkirk, fails to view the events in their total context.¹²⁵ As Brian Bond has pointed out in strategic terms the Battle of Flanders led directly to the downfall of the French Republic, secured the Reich from attack from the West, provided an Axis springboard to pressure Britain's Mediterranean line of communications and did so with a finality that seemed irreversible.¹²⁶ As for the Poland campaign, "the rapidity of Poland's complete destruction came as shocking surprise to the world at large...military history offers no prior example of a conquest so rapid and complete."¹²⁷ The Nazi campaigns of 1939 and the Battle of Flanders 1940 were certainly early 20th century examples of quick decisive campaigns.

Breaking these campaigns down by domain of war reflects this as well. In the physical domain the Whermacht was asymmetrically superior to the Polish army but merely symmetrical to the Allied forces in 1940. Though the Polish army was impressive in size and its soldiers well trained and aggressive, they suffered greatly at the hands of German armored forces and the Luftwaffe's undisturbed attacks. Equally important in the Poland campaign was the German "Wave" mobilization system, a reflection of all three domains at work.¹²⁸ As for 1940, most observers feel the Allies outnumbered the Germans in tanks and artillery.¹²⁹ Robert Doughty in his book The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France disabuses a number of myths, including the belief the Allies were deficient in

quality or quantity of equipment. The myth of Luftwaffe total superiority is also deflated.¹³⁰ Finally the German tactical logistics system for both campaigns was largely horse bound and certainly less modern than those employed by the French and British.¹³¹

Like Napoleon's campaigns it is in the moral and cybernetic domains that asymmetry truly existed. In the cybernetic domain the Whermacht enjoyed complete dominance over the Poles and clear ascendancy over the French. Indeed the Poles have been charged with an, "intellectual weakness," while the Battle of Flanders has been described as a "triumph of the (German) intellect."¹³² In both campaigns the military nature of the strategic war aims were closely supported by the German operational end states derived and achieved. The incongruence of the forward Polish troop dispositions with a strategic aim of a long war indicated that, "the Polish deployment plan had no clear-cut operational objective whatever..¹³³ and their dispositions actually fit around the German plan, "like a glove."¹³⁴ Similarly the flawed 1940 Allied strategy based on the Maginot Line and Dyle-Breda Line deployments insured operational commanders, "could not react adequately to the challenge of the German breakthrough and the massing of her Panzers."¹³⁵ The subsequent, "paralysis of command," afflicted the allies command and control decisively.¹³⁶

Spanning the cybernetic and moral domains is the issue of senior leadership. In the Battle of Flanders Allied senior leaders like Generals Gamelin, Georges and Weygand needlessly shifted reserve formations around. These actions wasted precious time in the midst of the crisis.¹³⁷

Another aspect of the moral domain is the willingness to fight. In Poland some felt the truly decisive element of victory

was the *spirit* of the German troops and units.¹³⁸ But ultimately, "all the dash and bravery which the Poles frequently displayed could not compensate for the lack of modern arms and serious tactical training."¹³⁹ In 1940 incidents like that of the 55th Division rendered the French "will to fight" suspect to many. The famous book Strange Defeat by the Frenchman Marc Bloch examines this issue and the national psyche, but it also mentions lack of training.¹⁴⁰ On this point Doughty agrees strongly stating the 55th's failure is primarily reflective of, "its poor training, poor preparation for battle and its poor leadership."¹⁴¹

The asymmetry between the armies in these campaigns is apparent. [See Table 3, pg 47.] Even at the height of the blitzkrieg myth, knowledgeable contemporary observers discerned the true source of asymmetry:

in this victory the new German air and mechanized forces played an unprecedented part. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say the German success was due to these two arms alone. Simply stated, Germany's stupendous victory may be attributed to the superiority of the entire German Army over the outmoded Polish war machine. Germany's balanced, well-trained, and ably led forces found no match in those of her smaller rival (Poland).¹⁴²

Nor was this asymmetry best measured in new technology or numbers of men or machines. Discussing the Whermacht in the wake of the Poland campaign General Erich Von Manstein states, "while the material achievement of rearmament had certainly been largely due to Hitler's own efforts, material superiority alone would by no means have guaranteed so swift and conclusive a victory."¹⁴³ Rather doctrine, organization, training and leadership continued to be the best indicators of the level of asymmetry.

The campaign in Poland revealed a stark contrast in combined arms organization and doctrine, but it was just as prevalent in

the west in 1940. Doughty notes that there were major differences in German and French doctrine, on everything from artillery employment, infantry tactics, to combat leadership. He forcefully argues the root of most French failures was their doctrinal adherence to a firepower dominated, methodical battle concept, which was tightly controlled, in fact managed, by the senior leadership. This concept was not modern, in the sense of maximizing the new weapons. Modern weapons were better employed in the German breakthrough battle concept which accepted a chaotic battlefield, put a premium on mobility, and advocated individual commander initiative and decentralization as virtues.¹⁴⁴ This was reflected in organizational differences as German Panzer units were much more combined arms in design.¹⁴⁵ Training and leadership reflected these doctrines as well. The contrasted performances of junior leaders of Guderian's attacking Panzer corps and the French 55th division confirmed this during the battle for the Meuse crossings sites.¹⁴⁶

A common perception of historians is that the French were, "outsmarted strategically and outfought tactically."¹⁴⁷ This closely corresponds to the cybernetic (aims, end states, command and control, doctrine, organization) and moral (training, will to fight, leadership) domains. As a result, "the German army had reached a state of combat readiness that was far superior to that of its opponents."¹⁴⁸

This asymmetry of the cybernetic and moral domains was difficult for contemporary national leaders to recognize. Certainly the Polish and French leaders failed to see or acknowledge that the battlefield calculus had changed.¹⁴⁹ Indeed as Matthew Cooper put it in his seminal work The German Army 1933-1945, "the impression on contemporary minds made by these fast and

devastating victories was immense; the contrast with the bitter and lengthy deadlock of the previous World War seemingly inexplicable."¹⁵⁰ This statement not only relates the shock effect of quick decisive campaigns, it implies the desperate, feverish hunt to understand what had occurred - to discover or recognize the essence of the asymmetrical advantage.

It is clear that Hitler did not understand it before, during, or after 1940. Prior to Poland he cited the western powers source of weakness as, "the backwardness of British and French armaments, particularly with regard to air strength and anti-aircraft defence," saying nothing of their doctrine, leadership, or unit cohesion.¹⁵¹ Later in the war Von Manstein felt that Hitler's pet "formula" or solution to any situation was new technology. He felt Hitler had no grasp of the requisite training and unit integration necessary to apply the weapon effectively on the battlefield.¹⁵² This lack of complete understanding and appreciation for the true components of asymmetry reaped Nazi Germany an unsavory legacy from her quick decisive campaigns.

The events following the fall of France show both Hitler's voracious appetite for quick decisive victory and his lack of understanding of it. Hitler's diffused three prong attack into the Soviet Union in 1942 was based on wavering ideological and economic interests. This hopelessly jumbled up his political-strategic aim with his operational end states and banked on operational and tactical success everywhere. He ignored the pleas of his generals to adopt a political aim, such as Moscow or a military end state such as destruction of the Red Army, in order to focus a true main effort. Instead Hitler expected success on all fronts simultaneously, he expected quick decisive victory.¹⁵³

V. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS

After looking at quick decisive campaigns of an earlier era it is appropriate to ask what about those of today and tomorrow? As stated earlier, a primary basis for the US Army's notion of quick decisive victory has been the results of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. To establish a basis for some comparison it is useful to now briefly review these very recent operations.

JUST CAUSE AND DESERT STORM-

In December of 1989 President George Bush ordered 27,000 US troops into Panama for the political aim of overthrowing dictator General Manuel Noreiga. This was due to Noreiga's indictment for drug trafficking in the US, to protect American lives in Panama, and to restore democratically elected officials of the Endara government.¹⁵⁴ The military operational end state was the rapid elimination of the dictator's primary source of power and control, the Panamanian Defense Force or PDF, and the capture of Noreiga.¹⁵⁵ In what has been described as, "a special operation mission writ large," US forces struck dozens of enemy positions in a single night using surprise, mass, and mix of conventional and special operation forces.¹⁵⁶ JUST CAUSE should be judged a quick decisive victory because, "measured as military operation Just Cause was clearly a success, even a masterpiece,"¹⁵⁷ and the operation insured, "the rapid, overwhelming application of combat power ended the fighting as soon as possible with minimum loss of life."¹⁵⁸

Operation DESERT STORM began on 17 January 1991 to achieve the political war aims of the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of that countries legitimate

government. From 7 August 1990 to 15 January 1991 Operation DESERT SHIELD had largely achieved the other US political-strategic aims of deterring, and if required, repelling further Iraqi aggression and protecting the lives of American citizens.¹⁵⁹ The operational end states were the aims with the addition of eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and regional offensive capabilities.

Within the context of an unprecedented coalition force, Operation DESERT STORM was accomplished through a dynamic US joint campaign. Largely executed as planned, the Coalition conducted a massive air operation to gain air superiority, subsequently attacked Iraqi command and control, strategic infrastructure, cut off tactical forces and began to destroyed them.¹⁶⁰ Synchronized with the final portions of the air campaign, the ground operation commenced 24 February 1991 with Coalition and Marine forces conducting supporting attacks due north into Kuwait. Meanwhile, following an undetected 300 mile shift to the west, two US corps attacked the flank and rear of the Iraqi main defenses in a 100 hour lightening strike.¹⁶¹ DESERT STORM was a decisive campaign. Even the harshest critics concede that the triumph on the battlefield was beyond doubt.¹⁶² The campaign fully achieved its objectives of eliminating Iraq's offensive capability and ejecting its forces from Kuwait.¹⁶³

ANALYSIS-

In these operations the US Army dominated the physical domain of war. In JUST CAUSE a chief source of success was the technological ability to fight at night.¹⁶⁴ In both cases, but particularly DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver and apply firepower through the air was completely controlled by the US.¹⁶⁵ Further the strategic, operational and tactical logistical power

of US forces was a case of overmatch and surprise to both Noreiga and Saddam Hussein.¹⁶⁶ Indeed it was the logistics underpinnings of the "Hail Mary" play in DESERT STORM which provided the basis for real surprise and victory.¹⁶⁷

The cybernetic domain reflects the same situation. US political aims and guidance were clear to those commanders who needed it, when they needed it. From this a superlative job of deriving military end states to form the basis for planning and execution occurred.¹⁶⁸ Unity of command and unity of effort in the case of the DESERT STORM coalition, led directly to an advantage over the enemy's ability to react to changing events.¹⁶⁹

Once again the moral domain is where the difference in capability and performance is most starkly contrasted. The quality of US service members is consistently cited as an unequivocal source of success in both operations. This is especially true relative to their opponents as many of the PDF were simply, "bad soldiers," and the Iraqis "unskilled."¹⁷⁰ For large numbers of the PDF and Iraqi soldiers the motivation to fight was also lacking. Surrendering without a fight was common in both conflicts.¹⁷¹

The elements of superior doctrine, organization, leadership, and training were all inherent to a very clear advantage in all three domains of war. For instance in both operations US doctrine and organizations provided a clear advantage in synchronizing and applying combat power.¹⁷² Also advanced levels of individual, crew and unit training were cited repeatedly as a clear difference between the US and their opponents and an absolute source of success.¹⁷³ Finally US leadership and commandership far surpassed that present in the PDF or the Iraqi forces.¹⁷⁴

The enumerated "sources of success" to these quick decisive campaigns make it clear the US enjoyed significant advantages in all three domains. [See Table 4, pg 48.] The asymmetry between US forces, the PDF, and (in hindsight) the Iraqi forces is undeniable. Given these more recent campaign results what can be summarized about the common characteristics of quick decisive campaigns?

CHARACTERISTICS OF QUICK DECISIVE CAMPAIGNS-

This review has revealed some common characteristics between Napoleon's 1805 and 1806 campaigns, the campaigns of Nazi Germany in 1939 and 1940 and Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. The two most significant characteristics in common are the correct integration of military end states within political-strategic war aims and the existence, recognition and exploitation of significant advantages in the domains of war. In fact these characteristics are so pervasive in campaigns of this type that these become essential pre-conditions, for the successful conduct of quick decisive campaigns.

Analysis has verified Clausewitz's point: that war is an extension, and therefore a reflection, of policy.¹⁷⁵ If the policy, that most far-reaching act of judgment is sound, the war and the campaign can be sound. If war can ever be thought of as 'good', good policy can lead to good war. The decisive campaigns have each been within the framework of sufficiently sound policy, which selected a political-strategic war aim the military element of national power could achieve. Each campaign in turn derived, integrated or "nested" military operational end states which corresponded as closely as possible with achieving the war aims. It is not an unimportant sidelight that each of the campaigns studied had sufficient time to allow this crucial step to be done

thoughtfully and correctly. The marriage of war aim and operational end state insures the basis of "decision" and "victory," in the political-strategic sense, is primary. Victory in military terms or victory in terms of gains and losses, can only have decisiveness when the political is predominant. This alignment of the aim and the end state is so fundamental, it is an essential pre-condition for quick, decisive campaigns.

The intellectual effort required in selecting achievable war aims and then military end states that support them is often lacking. In 1808 and 1809 Napoleon's policy decision about the Spanish throne and its derived military end states were incorrect. Hitler's policy judgments of 1941, declaring war on the US and while invading the Soviet Union, were similarly flawed.

Indeed the campaigns of 1806, JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM have been criticized by some as flawed on this same basis. The former has been previously discussed.¹⁷⁶ In the case of the latter two, the announced political war aims were met by the military end states achieved. It is perhaps too soon to tell if those war aims contained the far-reaching vision for long term national interests that some are quick to demand. It should be remembered, however, that the political leader must balance such ideal considerations with the pressing demands of the moment, like protecting his citizens lives.

The next, and most dominant, characteristic of quick decisive campaigns is the qualitative disparity between the opposing armies at the start of the campaign. This significant relative imbalance, or asymmetry, provides the very basis in military capability to perform the campaign quickly and decisively. Generally this asymmetrical situation between the two opposing militaries can be assessed in the three domains of war -

moral, cybernetic and physical. Review of the case studies has revealed that quick decisive campaigns require an asymmetrical advantage in the moral and cybernetic domains, with a minimum of symmetry in the physical. [See Table 5, pg 49.]

It is logical that prerequisites for quick decisive campaigns are asymmetrical advantages in the moral and cybernetic domains, with only symmetry required in the physical domain. The physical domain is about the destructive process on the battlefield. A marked disadvantage there will routinely presage defeat and certainly preclude any rapid and conclusive success. More common, however, is a rough symmetry in destructive capability between opponents. Then the other domains become critical. Ultimately it is the willingness (moral domain) and ability (cybernetic domain) to apply that destructive process, that will determine which side prevails. To prevail in a swift, dominant manner requires a marked advantage in these two domains to apply the destructive process more precisely and efficiently than the opponent. This is the description of the asymmetry that is a precondition to decisive campaigns as defined in this monograph (i.e. low casualties not a requirement).

In each campaign examined the victors enjoyed a clear advantage in the moral domain of war. Ultimately Napoleon's and Hitler's armies enjoyed the benefit of better quality soldiers, more highly trained, imbued and inspired by superior confidence in their doctrine, organizations and their leaders. The result was an increased confidence and willingness to fight. Similarly in the years preceding JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, the US Army fully incorporated the idea that, "people win wars; machines do not."¹⁷⁷ Recent results have vindicated this policy.

In the cybernetic domain the armies of Napoleon and Nazi Germany were superior to their opponents in every instance studied. The significant improvements of the *Grand Armee`* in organization, command and control and combined arms doctrine, when focused by the native military genius of Napoleon, forged a cybernetic combination initially beyond the reach of other European powers. Similarly the organization and doctrine surrounding the "blitzkrieg" of Nazi Germany's forces held complete sway for a time as well. The equivalent modern achievement by US forces in DESERT STORM insured, "the synchronization of air, ground and sea resources completely disrupted the enemy's plans, precipitating the quick and decisive capitulation of his forces."¹⁷⁸

For the *Grand Armee`* and the Whermacht the physical domain was no doubt important, but not to the same degree as the other domains of war. Certainly they needed a physical destruction capability at least equal to their opponents, but they achieved quick decisive campaigns with little more than that. The review has pointed out that in 1805 and 1806 the French advantages in weaponry and logistics were only slight, and that the masters of blitzkrieg actually were inferior in tanks and logistics in 1940. On the other hand US forces in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM had domination of the physical domain of war. It is instructive that the analysis indicates, when physical asymmetry is added to the others, decisive campaigns approach the ideal of quick decisive victory - small numbers of casualties and amounts of damage. Relative to DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE, earlier campaigns were much more costly to the victors in loss of life and equipment. [Review Tables 2, 3, and 4, pgs 46-48]

ASYMMETRY EXPLAINED-

Often attempts to describe and understand the phenomena of military asymmetry are put in the more widely used terms of doctrine, organization, training and leadership. For instance Van Creveld asserts the superiority of the *Grand Armee* stems from its doctrine and organization.¹⁷⁹ Another way to appreciate the complexity of military asymmetry is to think of its raw materials as theory, technology and the broad influence of the other elements of national power; its tools of manufacture as doctrine, organization and training; and its tools of application as material, soldiership and leadership. These analogies may assist civilian and military leaders trying to go about the very difficult task of recognizing asymmetry.

It is the inability to accurately recognize asymmetry that causes many regimes to fail to achieve decisive victory. It must be understood that asymmetry is a discrete measurement relative to only a single opponent. A nation's military might be asymmetrical to one opponent, such as the US versus Iraq, while simultaneously symmetrical with another, such as US versus the USSR. Further, analysis of the case studies strongly indicates that asymmetry is not constant and will change over time. Napoleon's expectations of quick decisive campaigns in 1809 and 1812 presumed the same levels of asymmetry the French possessed in 1805-1806. In reality the situation relative to the Austrians in 1809 and the Russians in 1812 had changed significantly in each case.¹⁸⁰

In the final analysis it is this ability to discern the existence or non-existence of the requisite asymmetry that should concern every military leader and operational planner. Review of the historical case studies has shown numerous examples where this ability was lost or not assiduously pursued, with the result being

disaster. In addition to the Prussians in 1806 and the Iraqis in 1990 Napoleon's Leipzig campaign is an example where the true nature of his military capability was not discerned.¹⁸¹ Hitler fell prey to a similar problem when he repeatedly refused commander's requests to surrender terrain for a better defensive posture on the Eastern Front. Hitler believed German asymmetry still existed and would suffice.¹⁸²

Nor is it any easier today. On the eve of the Gulf War Iraqi leaders continued to believe the US forces would not and could not fight. On 9 January 1991 in the final discussions in Geneva, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told Secretary of State James Baker that it would be a short war because American soldiers did not know how to fight in the desert.¹⁸³ Nor could the Iraqi's former Soviet allies convince them of their incorrect view of the battlefield asymmetry.¹⁸⁴ Also in spite of the White House and Pentagon wanting to send a message of imminent and overwhelming military superiority, in the days immediately preceding the war statements by top US commanders inexplicably emphasized they expected a tough fight of six or more months, and that the US forces still needed time to be ready.¹⁸⁵ Apparently the US commanders did not recognize the total asymmetry they possessed. Measuring asymmetry is indeed a difficult task.

This monograph has pointed out historical and modern instances where quick decisive campaigns and victories have been dramatically achieved. Often contemporarily referred to as revolutions in warfare, these campaigns are indeed wondrous examples of the military art at its peak, and they represent worthy models for nations and militaries to attempt to emulate. But understanding the essence of this military strategy and especially achieving its essential pre-conditions are not simple

tasks. It is equally clear that there are some inherent dangers involved with dealing in the mercurial world of asymmetrical armies and strategies of quick decisive victory.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Historically the phenomenon of quick decisive campaigns have been most strongly characterized by an army's ability to swiftly and comprehensively exploit an asymmetrical advantage over their opponents in the domains of war.

There are at least two essential pre-conditions for quick decisive campaigns. The first, a requirement for unity of effort in any campaign, is the intellectual integration or alignment of military operational end states to support achievement of the nation's soundly derived political-strategic war aims. This pre-condition directs the entire military effort efficiently, and therefore rapidly. The second precondition is possessing significant asymmetrical advantages in the cybernetic and moral domains of war, with at least symmetry in the physical. This pre-condition provides the basis for domination of the enemy in the theater of war, theater of operations or on the battlefield.

There are two dangers inherent in a military service implementing strategy of "quick decisive victory" and each is tied to the essential pre-conditions. The first danger is that such an intriguing military strategy, especially once successfully demonstrated, will act as a mirage to the political leader and become a poor substitute for the wise determination of legitimate political-strategic aims. Dictators like Napoleon and Hitler are especially prone to drifting into this trap of substituting quick decisive victory for sound strategic considerations. As Russell

F. Weigley has eloquently argued, war is not policy by other means, it is the bankrupting of policy. Weigley's advice that the strongest nations have been those that minimize their use of war as policy, is sound counsel to all national leaders, particularly those possessing the capability for quick decisive victory.¹⁸⁶

The second, and more likely danger for a democratic military power, is to presume that the asymmetry requisite to perform quick decisive victory is somehow permanent or constant. Napoleon and Hitler failed to react appropriately to the coincident deterioration in their own capability and enemy improvements. They failed to anticipate the return of war's natural state of symmetry, which Weigley labels, "the recalcitrant indecisiveness of war."¹⁸⁷ Having possessed quick decisive victory once, neither would acknowledge that it had become a mirage of their more glorious pasts and beyond the reach of their harsh new reality.¹⁸⁸ Peter Paret assessment of Napoleon's ability to recognize the asymmetrical conditions of quick decisive victory was that:

More accurately than others he recognized the military potential of changes taking place, and brought them together into a system of unexcelled destructive power. For a time he rose above events, shaping and driving them forward, until in his later years he sank back again into the stream of general historical development...¹⁸⁹

Because asymmetry is so fleeting, a strategy of quick decisive victory will demand a heavy price to achieve or maintain it. In a time of relative peace that price will be hard to justify in a democracy, because the asymmetry is difficult to demonstrate or measure to the satisfaction of the general public.

However if a policy of serious pursuit of quick decisive victory is in effect, the key aspect on which an operational planner should focus is the "decisiveness". Any focus on

"victory" may suffer from the very nebulousness of the concept, while a focus on "quick" is often an open invitation for controversy and debate. The lingering debate over the speed of execution of DESERT STORM's ground campaign is such an example. Yet the operational planner cannot just measure decisiveness in military terms. Overwhelming the enemy rapidly can never become an end unto itself, but rather must be an intermediate end state tied to clear achievement of the political-strategic aim.

In the final analysis, any act of war, and especially overwhelming successful war, carries an inherent cost to the acting nation.¹⁹⁰ Therefore such an act should be decisive, avoiding gradual or prolonged warfare because the size of that cost increases over time. But that decisiveness must first equate to political victory defined as achievement of the overarching, farsighted war aim which has been determined to be in the nation's best interests. Victory in military terms must subordinate itself to victory in terms of political-strategic war aims in all cases. If the overarching political war aim will allow it and if the military tool can achieve it, only then can victory in terms of vast gains for negligible losses be reasonably pursued. National leaders, as well as operational commanders and planners, must keep this hierarchy of victory in sharp focus. They must understand well the heavy price that has to be paid in peace, if victory of every kind is to be won in war.

TABLE 1 ANALYSIS MODEL				
DOMAINS:	<u>-Physical-</u> Firepower/Mobility Logistics Manpower	<u>-Cybernetic-</u> Intellectual Depth Method of Control System of Command	<u>-Moral-</u> Quality of Soldiers Motivation to Fight Morale of Unit	Sources of Success
CASE STUDY:	<-----Doctrine-----> <-----Organization-----> <-----Experience/Training-----> <-----Leadership----->			
<u>Napoleon</u> 1805 -Ulm/ Austerlitz 1806-Jena/ Auerstaedt				
<u>Nazi Germany</u> 1939 -Poland 1940- France				
<u>US Army</u> Just Cause Desert Storm				
Common Characteristics				? ?QDV? ?

TABLE 2 ANALYSIS MODEL				
DOMAINS:	<u>-Physical-</u> Firepower/Mobility Logistics Manpower	<u>-Cybernetic-</u> Intellectual Depth Method of Control System of Command	<u>-Moral-</u> Quality of Soldiers Motivation to Fight Morale of Unit	Sources of Success
CASE STUDY:	$\longleftrightarrow$ Doctrine $\longleftrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Organization $\longleftrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Experience/Training $\longleftrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Leadership $\longleftrightarrow$			
<u>Napoleon</u> 1805 -Ulm/ Austerlitz 1806-Jena/ Auerstadt	Slightly better weapons and logistics	Political War Aims = Military End State Advanced Organiz : corps de armee & staff systems Superior Combined Arms Doctrine	Revolutionary Zeal & Will to Fight Trained Soldiers & Units (1802-1804) Combat experience Outstanding Leaders	Organization Doctrine Soldiership Leadership
RESULTS: <u>Ulm- 191</u> French: 2,000 KIA Austrians: 4,000 KIA 60,000 POW <u>Austerlitz-192</u> French: 1,305 KIA 6,940 WIA 573 POW Russian & Austrian: 15,000 KIA est. 23,500 WIA 12,000 POW <u>Jena/Auerstadt-193</u> French: 12,052 all types Prussian: 38,000 all types on 14 Oct; for 1806 overall 25,000 casualties, 140,000 POW, 250 colours & 2,000 guns				


TABLE 3 ANALYSIS MODEL				
DOMAINS:	-Physical- Firepower/Mobility Logistics Manpower	-Cybernetic- Intellectual Depth Method of Control System of Command	-Moral- Quality of Soldiers Motivation to Fight Morale of Unit	Sources of Success
CASE STUDY:	<----- Doctrine -----> <----- Organization -----> <----- Experience/Training -----> <----- Leadership ----->			
<u>Nazi Germany</u> 1939 - Poland 1940- France	Air superiority Inferior Logistics Equivalent Weapons	Political War Aims = Military End State Superior Command & Control Combined Arms Doctrine & Organiz	Outstanding Training Leadership Initiative Small Unit Cohesion Combat Readiness	Combined Arms Doctrine & Organiz. Combat Leadership Extensive Trng
RESULTS: <u>Poland-194</u> German: 10,000 KIA 30,000 WIA 3,000 POW Polish: Army of 1 million annihilated; 600K in 30 Div & 12 Cav Bdes destroyed; 400K never able to mobilize. <u>France 1940-195</u> (thru Fall of France) German: 27,000 KIA 111,000 WIA 18,000 POW & 1,284 Aircraft, 50% armor veh. French: 90,000 KIA 200,000 WIA 1.9 million POW & 560 Aircraft (2,400 captured) British: 68,000 all types/931 Aircraft Belgian: 23,000 & Dutch: 10,000 all types; Allies armor veh losses near 100%				

TABLE 4 ANALYSIS MODEL				
DOMAINS:	-Physical- Firepower/Mobility Logistics Manpower	-Cybernetic- Intellectual Depth Method of Control System of Command	-Moral- Quality of Soldiers Motivation to Fight Morale of Unit	Sources of Success
CASE STUDY:	$\longleftrightarrow$ Doctrine $\longleftrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Organization $\longleftrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Experience/Training $\longleftrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Leadership $\longleftrightarrow$			
US Army Just Cause Desert Storm	Air Superiority Logistical Overmatch Fight at Night Technology	Political War Aims- Military End State Battle Command Doctrine & Organiz. Synchronization & Unity of Effort	Advanced levels of Training Soldiers Motivation to Fight Unit Leadership in Battle	Soldiership Doctrine Leaders & Commanders High Technology
RESULTS: <u>Just Cause 196</u> US: 23 KIA 3 Civ KIA 324 WIA PDF: 314 KIA est 202 Civ KIA unknown WIA <u>Desert Storm 197</u> US: 148 KIA 3001 WIA 10 POW Iraqi (estimates): 25,000 KIA 50,000 WIA 80,000 POW 43 divs engaged, 25 destroyed, 18 attrited 3,847 tanks 1450 APC 2917 arty 500 Aircraft				


TABLE 5 ANALYSIS MODEL				
DOMAINS:	-Physical- Firepower/Mobility Logistics Manpower	-Cybernetic- Intellectual Depth Method of Control System of Command	-Moral- Quality of Soldiers Motivation to Fight Morale of Unit	Sources of Success
CASE STUDY:	$\longleftrightarrow$ Doctrine $\longrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Organization $\longrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Experience/Training $\longrightarrow$ $\longleftrightarrow$ Leadership $\longrightarrow$			
<u>Napoleon</u> 1805 -Ulm/ Ansterlitz 1806-Jena/ Auerstadt	Slightly better weapons and logistics	Political War Aims - Military End State Advanced Organiz. : corps de armee & staff systems Superior Combined Arms Doctrine	Revolutionary Zeal & Will to Fight Trained Soldiers & Units (1802-1804) Combat experience Outstanding Leaders	Organization Doctrine Soldiership Leadership
<u>Nazi Germany</u> 1939 - Poland 1940 - France	Air superiority Inferior Logistics Equivalent Weapons	Political War Aims = Military End State Superior Command & Control Combined Arms Doctrine & Organiz	Outstanding Training Leadership Initiative Small Unit Cohesion Combat Readiness	Combined Arms Doctrinc & Organiz. Combat Leadership ExtensiveTng
<u>US Army</u> Just Cause Desert Storm	Air Superiority Logistical Overmatch Fight at Night Technology	Political War Aims = Military End State Battle Command Doctrine & Organiz. Synchronization & Unity of Effort	Advanced levels of Training Soldiers Motivation to Fight Unit Leadership in Battle	Soldiership & Tng Doctrine Leaders & Commanders High Technology
Common Characteristics	Minimum of Physical Symmetry	Clear Cybernetic Asymmetry	Clear Moral Asymmetry	QDV is Cybernetic & Moral Asymmetry Measured by: Doctrine Organization Training Leadership Soldiers




Austerlitz: Plans of the Opposing Armies




From the book CAMPAIGN SERIES Z - AUSTERLITZ 1805 by David G. Chandler, ~~two~~ maps pp. 14 and 50-51.



From the book THE WEST POINT MILITARY HISTORY SERIES - ATLAS FOR THE WARS OF NAPOLEON, edited by Thomas E. Griess, two maps numbered 27 and 30.



From the book THE WEST POINT MILITARY HISTORY SERIES - ATLAS FOR THE WARS OF NAPOLEON, edited by Thomas E. Griess, two maps numbered 27 and 30.



From the book THE WEST POINT MILITARY HISTORY SERIES - ATLAS FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR - EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, edited by Thomas E. Griess, two maps numbered 4 and 10.

ENDNOTES

¹Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Grand Strategy and the Structure of U.S. Military Forces," Strategic Review, Vol 20 no. 2 (Spring 1992): 43.

²Ibid, 43.

³Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (C,JCS - General Colin Powell), National Military Strategy 1992, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 29 January 1992), 6.

⁴Brigitte Sauerwein, "US Military Strategy 1992: Coping with 'Come-as-you-are' Crises," International Defense Review, Vol 25 no. 5 (May 1992): 409. Sauerwein's review of the NMSD cites all the features mentioned and covers each of the strategic principals except decisive force; Richard Cheney, "US Defense Strategy for an Era of Uncertainty," International Defense Review, (Defense 1992): 7-9. Not surprisingly the Secretary of Defense's discussion of US grand strategy and military strategy to a largely NATO audience also bypasses discussion of the principle of decisive force. ADM David E. Jeremiah, "Beyond the Cold War," Proceedings, Vol 188 no. 5 (May 1992): 52-57. It is interesting that in a much more purely military audience the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff again avoids any discussion of this characteristic of US military strategy.

⁵C,JCS National Military Strategy 1992, 10.

⁶Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J8), Joint Military Net Assessment 1992, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 21 August 1992), p. 9-2.

⁷LTC James M. Dubik, "Military Force: Preparing for the Future," Military Review, Vol 72 no. 3 (March 1992): 79,80,82. (Hereafter cited as Dubik-"Military Force").

⁸MAJ F. G. Hoffman, "The New National Security Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 76 no. 2 (February 1992):51-53.

⁹US Army, The United States Army Posture Statement FY 93-Trained and Ready, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993): 2.

¹⁰Ibid, 1 (for rapid, decisive victory), 3 (for decisive deterrent), 12,15 (for decisive victory capability), 13-15 (for numerous iterations of "respond to multiple contingencies", "respond rapidly", "deploy rapidly" etc).

¹¹US Army, "FM 100-5 Operations (Final Draft)," (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 19 January 1993): pgs

1-4, 1-7, 2-3, 2-5, 2-17. The term is most prominently discussed on page 2-5.

¹²Dubik - "Military Force," 77. Dubik reiterates 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume's challenge to the assumption that the future will resemble the past.

¹³MAJ Charles H. Jacoby, "In Search of Quick Decision: The Myth of the Independent Air Campaign," (Advanced Military Studies Program Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1991): 3,4.

¹⁴Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War," in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986): 441-443. (Hereafter cited as Weigley "American Strategy") Weigley discusses the American strategic tradition for decisive victory and overwhelming force.

¹⁵US Army, FM 100-5 (Final Draft), pg 1-4, states the American public's desire for decisive victory as well as the more modern requirement for low casualties.

¹⁶LTC Michael R. Rampy, "The Fallacy of the Quick Victory (Revised Draft - 6 July 1992)," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992): 1.

¹⁷Bernice Carroll as cited in LTC Rampy's "The Fallacy of the Quick Victory," 2-3. These passages on victory are taken directly from LTC Rampy's very detailed and insightful discussion of "victory" as a term and a concept.

¹⁸US Army, FM 100-5 (Final Draft), 2-16.

¹⁹Jacoby, 6.

²⁰C, JCS, NMSD 1992, 10, 26; US Army, Posture Statement FY93, 2; US Army, FM 100-5(Final Draft), pg 2-5, 2-17. See these citations for references to overwhelming and paralyzing the enemy.

²¹Weigley "American Strategy", 441-443, extols the strategic tradition of US Grant and traces it as the basis for US Army military thought up to WWII.

²²C, JCS, NMSD 1992, 10, 26; US Army, Posture Statement FY93, 1, 15; US Army, FM 100-5(Final Draft), pg 1-4, 1-7, 2-3, 2-5 (sudden), 2-17. See these citations for references to rapid, swift, sudden or quick "decisive" action against the enemy.

²³Dubik, "Military Force", 82 and US Army, FM 100-5 (Final Draft), pg 1-1, 1-7, 2-3.

²⁴US Army, FM 100-5 (Final Draft), pg 1-7 sets the "ideal" of decisive victory rapidly achieved.

²⁵US Army, Posture Statement FY93, 1,2,3,4, especially pg 6,7,8; US Army, FM 100-5 (Final Draft), pg 2-16,3-2,7-24/25/26/27, 9-2. These page references all include allusions to success in DESERT STORM and implicitly or explicitly hold it up as one example of decisive victory, quickly achieved. GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "Doctrine: A Guide to the Future," Military Review, Vol 72 no. 2 (February 1992): 3, 8,9. As Chief of Staff of the US Army GEN Sullivan's article on the importance of doctrine, begins and ends citing the successes of the armies of Nazi Germany in 1940 and Napoleonic France in the early 19th century as "decisive victory."

²⁶James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Paper #3 - The Theory of Operational Art," (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988): 6. (Hereafter cited as Schneider #3)

²⁷Ibid, 6,7. Please note that terms of measurement are derived for this monograph's analysis and are not part of Schneider's definitions.

²⁸Ibid, 7.

²⁹Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1988): 122-124. This passage is merely the military aspect (one of the seven key factors) in Blainey's assessment of what leads to war or peace between nations as they review the Abacus of Power.

³⁰James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Paper #4 - Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art," (Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991): 2-23,35. (Hereafter cited as Schneider #4) Schneider acknowledges the existence of a constant battlefield symmetry but does not address directly any asymmetrical situations. His focus is to differentiate the nature of the symmetry occurring in the pre-industrial age and the classical paradigm (strategy of a single point, Lanchesterian law, torque analogy and the concentrated battle) with that found in the industrial age and the new paradigm (marked by the birth of operational art, the empty battlefield, analogy of pressure, and the distributed operation).

³¹Ibid, 22-35.

³²Dr. Robert M. Epstein, School of Advanced Military Studies instructor, 13 November 1992 lecture to the Advanced Military Studies Program, covering Course #4 "The Historical Practice of Operational Art" Lesson 4-3 Emergence of Modern War I and accompanying handout entitled "The Transformation of Warfare 1763 -1805". Epstein's handout and discussion introduced the notion of symmetry between specific armies on specific battlefields. This

differs from Schneider's more generic paradigm oriented symmetry discussed in the previous two endnotes. The monograph's notion of decisive campaigns resulting from correctly identified asymmetrical situations primarily reflects Epstein's concept of symmetry between armies, but is also intended as an equally rare counterpart to Schneider's view that the answer to modern battlefield symmetry is operational art.

³³David Chandler, Campaign Series 2, Austerlitz 1805: The Battle of the Three Emperors, (London: Osprey Publishing, 1990):7. (Hereafter cited as Chandler Austerlitz)

³⁴Alfred Sidney Britt III, The Wars of Napoleon, series edited by Thomas Griess, Department of History, United States Military Academy, (Wayne, NJ.: Avery Publishing Group, 1985):42.

³⁵Chandler Austerlitz, 6.

³⁶John R. Elting, Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee, (New York: The Free Press, 1988): 59, 60; Chandler Austerlitz, 6; David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: MacMillan, 1966):332,333. (Hereafter cited as Chandler Napoleon)

³⁷Britt, 42,43.

³⁸Elting, 60; Chandler Austerlitz, 8 and 11.

³⁹Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War," in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986): 123; Chandler Austerlitz, 9,10.

⁴⁰Robert M. Epstein, "The Different Levels of War in the Napoleonic Age," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992): 10. (Hereafter cited as Epstein "Levels")

⁴¹Chandler Austerlitz, 8.

⁴²Epstein "Levels", 11.

⁴³Chandler Napoleon, 385-387, 391; see also Elting, 83,84 for discussion of the staff philosophy of Berthier and the highly successful use of a system of general officer and lesser aide de camps by Napoleon.

⁴⁴Britt, 46.

⁴⁵Epstein "Levels", 12.

⁴⁶Britt, 49,50.

⁴⁷Britt, 51; Chandler Austerlitz, 18; Chandler Napoleon, 408.

⁴⁸Chandler Napoleon, 410-412.

⁴⁹Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfield to Waterloo, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991): 386-389. (Hereafter cited as Weigley Battles)

⁵⁰Chandler Napoleon, 443-447.

⁵¹Britt, 58.

⁵²Chandler Napoleon, 447.

⁵³Roger Shaw, "Austerlitz and Jena," Armor Vol 60 no. 4 (July-August 1951): 28.

⁵⁴Britt, 58 , 59, 61.

⁵⁵Weigley Battles, 393, 394 and Chandler Napoleon, 456,458.

⁵⁶Weigley Battles, 391 and Chandler Napoleon, 444, 447-450.

⁵⁷Paret 133,134 and Chandler Napoleon, 463,464.

⁵⁸Chandler Napoleon, 453 it is becoming more than apparent that Napoleon knows he has an asymmetrical advantage over other European armies. See also COL Thomas M. Hall, "Napoleon's Jena Campaign: A Critical Analysis," (Individual study project, US Army War College, 15 April 1992):10 in which he cites The General Service Schools, The Jena Campaign: Source Book, trans. COL Conrad H. Lanza, et. al. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1922):101, 152, 164, 217, 229 for specific examples of French leaders derision of military capabilities of Prussian forces. (Hereafter cited as the Jena Source Book)

⁵⁹Chandler Napoleon, 460 (recon efforts), 460-462 (evidence, orders, assembly).

⁶⁰Ibid, 465,466.

⁶¹Britt, 62,63 and Chandler Napoleon, 454, 455, 458, 469.

⁶²Hall, 12, 13.

⁶³Ibid, 13, 14.

⁶⁴Chandler Napoleon, 471, 472.

⁶⁵Ibid, 473.

⁶⁶Britt, 69,70.

⁶⁷Chandler Napoleon, 485.

⁶⁸Britt, 71.

⁶⁹Hall, 17-21, 30.

⁷⁰Britt, 55.

⁷¹Ibid, 21, 38, 39; Chandler Napoleon, 505, 506; Weigley Battles, 398. Hall argues that by not demonstrably taking Berlin in the midst of his pursuit Napoleon under cut his political-strategic aim for the sake of his military end state of destruction of the Prussian armies. Chandler and Weigley on the other hand are more cautious in there criticism, tending to cite the very nature of the victory as being inherently and perhaps unavoidably unacceptable to the Prussian leadership and populace.

⁷²Shaw, 28 - in discussing the surrender of the celebrated Prussian Guards during the pursuit following Jena, Dr. Shaw equates it with a modern hypothetical surrender of US Marines to Nicaraguans - such was the shock and devastation to Prussia and to Europe.

⁷³Napoleon as quoted and assessed in Chandler Napoleon, 402 and in Weigley Battles, 389.

⁷⁴Weigley Battles, 389.

⁷⁵Chandler Napoleon, 502.

⁷⁶Britt, 31; Chandler Napoleon, 341; Chandler Austerlitz, 27; Elting, 477. Britt and Chandler assess French weapons as not particularly good though superior to most European armies, in particular the Austrian's in 1805. French advantage in artillery is the most prevalent at this time, though much of that stems from organization. Elting calls French weapons, "as good as as those of other European nations."

⁷⁷Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, (New York: Cambridge University, 1977): 74 (Hereafter cited as Van Creveld Supplying). Elting, 559, agrees citing, "nothing new in this system of letting war support war."

⁷⁸Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, (Bloomington, IN: 1984):19 discusses Napoleon's inheritance of the French division system and other innovations; see also Paret, 124,125 and Chandler Napoleon, 149; Epstein "Levels", 2 discusses non unitary army; Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985): 96,97 (Hereafter cited as Van Creveld Command)and Chandler

Napoleon, 153 discuss the command and control advantages of the Grand Armee non unitary army/corps system relative to other enemy formations. Epstein "Levels", 5, lays out the advantage of the combined arms nature of the corps; Logistics simplicity on the march is laid out in Van Creveld Supplying, 74 and Chandler Napoleon 149.

⁷⁹Van Creveld, Command, 101. Also Chandler Napoleon, 136 lays out the French theory and doctrine legacy which Napoleon inherited. Elting, 58 similarly emphasizes the independence of the corps and the relative inflexibility of the Allied formations in 1805 (pg 496) and Prussians in 1806 (517).

⁸⁰J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992): 44,45.

⁸¹The Jena Source Book, 543,544 Clausewitz relates Scharnhorst's derision of the ineffective and dysfunctional councils-of-war command practice; see also Britt, 62 and 63 for the severity of Prussian army command problems. Leslie Anders, "Austerlitz - A Clash of Command Systems," Military Review Vol 38 no. 3 (June 1958): 51. Dr. Anders highlights the detrimental impact of Austrian Colonel Weyrother's combined military incompetence and undue influence on Czar Alexander I in the councils-of-war preceding the battle of Austerlitz.

⁸²For criticisms of Napoleon command and control practices see Hall, 38,39 and Fuller, 53.

⁸³Elting, 516 describes the Prussian senior command as, "many elderly generals, with leather lungs and entirely unjustified illusions of infallibility, who insisted on arguing over their orders rather than obeying them." Anders, 50,51 briefly recounts the rampant distrust between Austrians and Russians and the ad-hoc nature of their command.

⁸⁴COL Wesley W. Yale, "Command and Control in The Grand Armee," Armor Vol 78 no. 5 (September-October 1969): 2-5; Note also Anders, 54 which points out that on the eve of Austerlitz every French battalion commander had been briefed on the plan while Allied corps commanders received their copy of the plan an hour after their attack had started the next morning. For Elting's view see Endnote #43.

⁸⁵Shaw, 25 for revolutionary zeal; Britt, 30, 31 for combat experience; Chandler Austerlitz, 2, 25 for training; Elting, 59,60 for a masterful discussion of all three.

⁸⁶The Jena Source Book, 600,601.

⁸⁷Anders, 50 for Kutusov's assessment of his Russian forces; Shaw, 25 for status of Prussian and Austrian forces relative to the French. See also Fuller,46,47 and Chandler Napoleon, 454,480.

Finally Elting's assessment of the less capable leadership and soldiery facing the Grand Armee in 1805 and 1806 is brought out in his review of the Austrians (498-their poor leadership), the Prussians (516-leadership, 517-poorly motivated, drilled not trained soldiers) and the Russians (525-high command described as "rattlesnakes den", 526-poor troops at Austerlitz).

⁸⁸Paret, 127.

⁸⁹Chandler Austerlitz, 2; Napoleon's pre-1805 campaign comment that, "once we had an Army of Italy, of Germany and of Switzerland. Now we have only a single army (the Grand Armee)- and soon we shall see it in action," is definitely enthusiastic, but not stridently so, though he rarely lacked for confidence. See Endnote #59 which emphasizes Napoleon's post-Austerlitz confident derision of the fabled Prussian army developed by Europe's most renowned soldier, the long dead Frederick the Great.

⁹⁰Shaw, 28; Chandler Napoleon, 453 (Prussians), 603 (Godoy). Shaw relates the active, confident, martial spirit of Prussia in the summer of 1806 with the theaters nightly resounding with patriotic war songs and fiery Junker youths whetting their sword blades on the French ambassador's stoop. Chandler discusses the overconfident Prussian nation and offers the example of Godoy in Spain moving against French possession on the basis of his personal certainty that Prussia will defeat France in 1806.

⁹¹Robert M. Epstein, Eagles Triumphant, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992): 241,242. (Hereafter cited as Epstein Eagles)

⁹²Ibid, 236 and 277 (reference artillery), 243.

⁹³Chandler Napoleon, 775 (20 days); Addington, 26 and Elting, 64 (French army in 1812); Paret, 136 (closure of the asymmetrical gap).

⁹⁴Addington, 29,30.

⁹⁵Paret, 129 (poor policy); Chandler Napoleon, 601 (the costs of mishandling the Spanish throne), 611 (military task underestimated); Elting, 62 (two front war).

⁹⁶Addington, 37 and Paret, 136; Elting relates the dilution of the Grand Armee was already apparent to Marshals Marbot and Grouchy in 1808 but not to the Emperor (pg 61), and that the inability to, "replace enough of those graying regimental officers and NCOs who had marched away from the English Channel in 1805" (pg 63), was such that by 1813, despite the exciting and brave performance of the rabble cobbled into formations on the march, the new Grand Armee could not be anything but raw and ultimate inadequate for the massed armies of Europe(64).

⁹⁷Matthew Cooper, The German Army 1939-1945, (New York: Stein and Day, 1978): 113 (Hereafter cited as Cooper Army) discusses the four campaigns described.

⁹⁸Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk. (New York: Ballantine, 1979): 57-62.

⁹⁹Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans. and edited by Anthony G. Powell, (Novato, CA: Persidio Press, 1982): 23-30 (corridor issue, military activity, encirclement); Deighton, 63 (fourth partition of Poland).

¹⁰⁰United States Military Academy, Department of Military Art and Engineering, The Campaign in Poland, 1939, (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy Adjutant General, July 1941): 8. (Hereafter cited as USMA, Poland)

¹⁰¹Deighton, 68, 69.

¹⁰²USMA Poland, 10, 11; see also Deighton, 73 and Cooper Army, 170.

¹⁰³USMA Poland, 2 (fifth largest Army in Europe), 5 (1 million man Army), 8 (German end states).

¹⁰⁴Cooper Army, 170, 171.

¹⁰⁵Thomas E. Griess, editor, "Germany Invades Poland" in The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean, (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, Inc): 21-22.

¹⁰⁶Deighton, 71, 72 and USMA Poland, 23.

¹⁰⁷Deighton, 72.

¹⁰⁸Griess, 23.

¹⁰⁹Williamson Murray, "The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism," Armed Forces and Society, Vol 7 no. 2 (Winter 1981): 286 (reviews performance in Poland), 291-292 (training methods/areas), 295 (no Potemkin villages).

¹¹⁰Alstair Horne, To Lose a Battle - France 1940, (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 165-167; Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1990): 326. (Hereafter cited as Doughty Breaking) Doughty drew similar conclusions from the same evidence.

¹¹¹MAJ John T. Nelsen, "Strength Against Weakness: The Campaign in Western Europe, May-June 1940," (Advanced Military

Studies Program Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1987): 1, 2.

¹¹²Deighton, 253; Cooper Army, 218; Brian Bond, "Battle of France," in Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air, edited by Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (New York: David McKay Co., 1976): 102.

¹¹³Doughty Breaking, 8.

¹¹⁴Horne, 157, 158 (French political-strategy aim), 161-162 (Dyle-Breda deployment), 158, 164 (numbers of divisions, lack of reserves).

¹¹⁵Doughty Breaking, 19, 20.

¹¹⁶Horne, 185 (Manstein wants "decisive victory"); Deighton, 180-190 (the plan evolves); Cooper Army, 208 and Horne, 199-200 (to the Channel or otherwise).

¹¹⁷Horne, 195.

¹¹⁸Bond, 106-107.

¹¹⁹Deighton, 226-228.

¹²⁰Horne, 430, 431.

¹²¹Deighton, 230-236 includes: 14-15 May non-attack by the French 3rd Armor Division at Sedan due to command confusion emanating from Generals Huntziger and Flavigny; 15 May 1st French Armor Division is ambushed by Rommel's 7th Panzer division at Morville; 15-16 May 6th Panzer Division splits French 2nd Armor Division in a meeting engagement vicinity Signy-l'Abbaye; 17 May de Gualle's ad hoc armor force is beaten back at Montcornet.

¹²²Cooper Army, 227 (Arras counterattack), 236-7 (recounts a series of 'slowdowns' and 'halts' by the German high command, culminating in the famous stop at the edge of Dunkirk from 24-26 May).

¹²³Bond, 110, 112.

¹²⁴Nelsen, 35-38.

¹²⁵Cooper Army, 236, 237 (cites the victory as overwhelming but not 'decisive' because of the Allied escape; not 'total'); Deighton, 276 (stresses that the escape of the British was a 'fatal flaw' in the German victory; the implication is it was therefore not decisive)

¹²⁶Bond, 112.

127 USMA Poland, 2.

128 Von Mellenthin, 3 (size of Polish army), 30 (effect of Luftwaffe); Cooper Army, 169 (trained Polish soldiers), 170 (German "Wave" mobilization system).

129 Cooper Army, 214; Bond, 104; Deighton, 172.

130 Doughty Breaking, 3 (on Luftwaffe he cites the myth of the effectiveness of Stuka's as overdone); Deighton 269, 270 (in an interesting accounting trail of the French air force reveals it was probably numerically equal to the Luftwaffe, without the RAF numbers considered; apparently the majority of planes sat idle throughout the Battle of Flanders).

131 Cooper Army, 172 (Poland) and 211 (1940).

132 Von Mellenthin, 4 (intellectual weakness which manifested itself in a failure to appreciate the influence of firepower on modern tactics and in the field of strategy); Nelsen, Abstract 4th paragraph.

133 Von Manstein, 41.

134 Von Mellenthin, 4.

135 Doughty Breaking, 325.

136 Deighton, 271.

137 Horne, 426-428 (shifting formations); Deighton, 260 (Weygand wastes time on fruitless travels at height of crisis).

138 Von Manstein, 62.

139 Von Mellenthin, 4.

140 Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940, trans. by Marc Hopkins, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968): 132, 133.

141 Doughty Breaking, 4; Robert M. Epstein, "The Forces that Foster and Inhibit Change: The French and German Armies in the Inter-War Years," (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992): 5, 3-7. Epstein joins Doughty in deemphasizing the French collapse of will theory.

142 USMA Poland, 2.

143 Von Manstein, 62, 63.

144 Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster, (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985): 109, 179 (on French and German concepts

of the battle), 105,106 (on artillery employment), 107,108 (on infantry tactics), 110 (on combat leadership) (Hereafter cited as Doughty Seeds); Doughty Breaking, 325 (the root of most French failures was doctrine).

145Von Mellenthin, 28-29 and Bond, 118.

146See Endnote #109 (reference training between campaigns); Doughty Breaking, 329-331 (leadership reviewed, including unit performance without the leader).

147Doughty Seeds, 189 and Doughty Breaking, 4; Bond says it similarly: "out generaleed and out fought", 104.

148Murray, 294.

149Nelsen, 39.

150Cooper Army, 113.

151Von Manstein, 29.

152Ibid, 179,180 (formula), 280 (lack of understanding of training and unit integration).

153Ibid, 175-178, 274, 276-280.

154Lawrence A. Yates, "Some Thoughts on U.S. Interventions Since World War II," in Syllabus/Book of Readings C610 The Evolution of Modern Warfare, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, 1992): 449.

155Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth et.al., Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991): 59. (Hereafter cited as Donnelly, Roth et. al.)

156Ibid, 399 (special operation mission writ large) and Yates, 450 (Surprise, mass,...).

157Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 398; see also 393 (unquestionable military victory), 401 (overall success); Yates, 450.

158Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 400.

159Richard L. West and Thomas D. Byrne, "Special Report: The U.S. Army in Operation Desert Storm," (Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, June 1991)in Syllabus/Book of Readings C610 The Evolution of Modern Warfare, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute,

Command and General Staff College, 1992): 504, 510. (Hereafter cited as West and Byrne)

¹⁶⁰James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (New York: Bantam, 1991): 118,119.

¹⁶¹West and Byrne, 513-519.

¹⁶²U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory, (New York: Times Books, 1992): 400. The book's thesis that "victory" was not achieved in the Gulf War of 1991, demonstrates that the authors clearly have not attempted to master the multi-faceted concept the word evokes. A bit more of a struggle on their part would have been more academically honest. This monograph at least attempts to do so.

¹⁶³Blackwell, 212.

¹⁶⁴Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 402-404.

¹⁶⁵Ibid, 402-406; West and Byrne, 511,512.

¹⁶⁶West and Byrne, 508,513.

¹⁶⁷Ibid, 512(GEN Schwarzkopf credits the logistical effort).

¹⁶⁸Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 57-62, 75; U.S. News, 164-170.

¹⁶⁹Blackwell, 205 (recounts how Saddam Hussein and Iraqi commanders could not react to events); Donnelly, Roth, et. al, 109 (Recounts Noreiga's lack of control over his forces), 400 (cites smooth functioning US C2 from JCS to JTF commander).

¹⁷⁰Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 401 (bad soldiers); U.S. News, 321 (unskilled).

¹⁷¹Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 350-352 (JUST CAUSE); U.S. News 334, 361 (DESERT STORM).

¹⁷²West and Byrne, 523 (on the effectiveness of doctrine in DESERT STORM) 524 (on organization); see also David H. Hackworth, "The Lessons of the Gulf War," Newsweek (24 June 1991): 22; Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 393, 399 (a common frame of reference), 404, 409&400 (a doctrinal downside was post-conflict stability operations).

¹⁷³Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 398,399 (integration, synchronization brought about by commanders confidence in each other and training), 406-408 (this reflects the extensive training: BCTP, NTC, joint rehearsals & live fire)also Yates, 453; Blackwell, 218 (credits US forces investment in training as a key to success).

174West and Byrne, 523 (CSA General Vouno is quoted on leaders-"quite simply the best we have ever had"); Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 399, 401 (PDF leaders run away), 408.

175Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976): 87,88.

176See Endnotes #71 and #75.

177Hackworth, 22; GEN Frederick M. Franks, "Introduction" to Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, (Ft Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992): pg viii.

178West and Byrne, 523.

179See Endnote #79.

180See Endnotes #92 and #93.

181See Endnote #96.

182Von Manstein, 278-281.

183U.S. News, 205 (Aziz) and 153 (Saddam Hussein).

184 LTC Timothy L. Thomas, "The Soviet Military on "DESERT STORM": A Preliminary Report," (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Command, August 1991): 3, Thomas quotes a Soviet General Staff Academy instructor's view that the Iraqi's were, "unable to comprehend the nature of the threat" they were facing, and because of this the USSR was unable to stop a war before it started, "by demonstrating to Hussein that he was in a no win situation due to the overwhelming might of the threat before him." Saddam would not accept the asymmetry confronting him.

185Ibid, 190; General Schwarzkopf and his deputy commander Lieutenant General Waller expressed the six month estimate and the need for additional 'get ready' time respectively.

186Weigley Battles, 543 (bankruptcy) and 539 (least use of war as policy).

187Ibid, 539 (the recalcitrant indecisiveness of war).

188Chandler Napoleon, 814 (see Napoleon in Moscow);

189Paret, 142.

190Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare" in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986): 575 and 581-593.

191Epstein, "Levels," 12 and Chandler, Austerlitz, 15.

192Chandler Austerlitz, 86 and Chandler Napoleon, 432.

193Chandler Napoleon, 488, 495, 502.

194USMA Poland, 2, 5, 26.

195Bryan Perrett, Knights of the Black Cross: Hitler's Panzerwaffe and its Leaders, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986): 73 and Deighton, 270.

196Donnelly, Roth, et. al., 390.

197U.S. News, 373, 404-409 and Blackwell, 212.

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