

AD-A264 966



1

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN ALGERIA:

THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC

SALVATION FRONT

DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 26 1993
S A D

APPROVED:

Supervisor: _____

Clement Henry

Clement Henry

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

Elizabeth Fernea

Elizabeth Fernea

93-11703



93 5 25 140

by

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

May 1993

Dist

A-1

93 5 25 140

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee, Professors Clement Henry and Elizabeth Fernea, for their advice, patience, and assistance. I would also like to thank Deborah Harrold, and Greg Noakes, who both provided valuable insight, assistance, and counsel during this project. I want to also thank my wife Caroline and my three children for their patience and understanding. Finally, I want to thank the staff, faculty, and students of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies who provided encouragement and solidarity during this project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.	4
Algeria Up to 1830.	4
Algeria Under the French.	7
Independence	25
CHAPTER 2 CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT	34
Birth of the Islamic Salvation Front	46
The Local and Provincial Elections of 1990	53
The National Assembly Elections of 1991 ..	63
Aftermath of the National Elections	70
The Role of the Military.	75
CONCLUSION	78
APPENDIX A	82
APPENDIX B	84
APPENDIX C	86
APPENDIX D	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY	90

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
Table 1. 1990 Election Results by APW and APC	54
Table 2. 1990 Election Results by Votes Received	55
Table 3. 1990 Election Results: Provinces with Berber Minorities.	58
Table 4. 1991 National Elections First Round Results	64
Table 5. Comparison of Votes Received 1990 vs. 1991	65

INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 1992, Algerian President Mohammed Boudiaf was addressing a crowd in the coastal city of Annaba. As he raised his hand to emphasize his point and said, "We are all going to die," he was struck down by a militant Muslim assassin's bullet.¹ This incident highlighted the ongoing struggle between the Islamic movement in Algeria and the country's relatively secular government. Throughout the Muslim world a resurgence in Islamic political and religious movements has taken place over the past two decades. The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of an Islamic Republic epitomized this trend and, perhaps, has fueled other Islamic movements. Across Muslim North Africa, the governments of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt have been struggling to deal with this Islamic resurgence.

¹"We Are All Going to Die," *Time*, July 13, 1992, p. 18

Nowhere in Muslim North Africa did the Islamists² come so near to acquiring true political power as they did in Algeria. The startling electoral successes in 1990 and 1991 of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)³ in Algeria's first truly democratic elections since it won its independence from France in 1962 came as a shocking surprise to many, both inside Algeria and out.⁴ To some observers, this sudden appearance and success of an Islamic political party was astonishing and unexpected, in a country where the sole political

²I use the term Islamists, which has come into use recently, to refer to the Muslims who seek to establish some form of rule based on Islam. This group is composed of many types of individuals and includes many moderates and those who do not necessarily want to establish a Islamic fundamentalist state. This term is more appropriate than using the current journalistic terms Islamic fundamentalist or Islamic extremists, which appear often in the news media and carry emotional overtones.

³The initials of the majority of Algerian organizations correspond to the groups' French titles. In this case, *Front Islamic de Salut*.

⁴Algeria's ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), predicted that the FIS would win only 20% to 30% of the vote in the 1990 municipal elections. The FIS, in fact, received 54% of the vote, surprising the FLN leadership and others. John King, "Algeria: The New Political Map," *Middle East International*, July 6, 1990, p. 17.

party had followed a socialist path for almost thirty years. How did this group of Islamic politicians develop? How did they win popular support? What conditions paved the way for their success?

The rise of an Islamist political party, specifically the FIS, is a recent phenomenon, although the Islamist movement in Algeria is not new. In the first section of this study I will examine the political, social, and economic conditions which led to the rise of new elites prior to Algeria's war for independence, and those conditions leading up to the rise of the Islamist counter-elites in the 1970s and 1980s which preceded an aborted peaceful revolution at the ballot box in 1991.

In the second section I will examine the creation and development of the Islamist political party, the Islamic Salvation Front, up to the previously mentioned elections, and the ensuing results. I will attempt to explore the party's origins, its methods in establishing a political base, and the party's success at the ballot box.

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

The Algerian Islamist movement began to emerge as a counter-elite in the 1970s and 1980s. This was facilitated by political, social, and economic conditions which were similar in many respects to the conditions which existed in the period leading up to the emergence of the Algerian nationalist movement prior to the Algerian Revolution. In this chapter I will examine the historical development of these conditions, and the rise of the new elites, or counter-elites.

Algeria Up to 1830.

Algeria's history began with the first known inhabitants of the area, the Berbers, who inhabit the area to this day. In the seventh century, the Arab invasion brought Islam and a large influx of Arabs to North Africa. The Arabs conquered the territory and imposed their new religion and culture on the original

Berber inhabitants. Since that time, Muslims have inhabited the area, and Islam has been the dominant religion.

In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire extended its control over the region when Arju and Khair al-Din, local military leaders, asked for the Ottoman sultan's assistance in fighting European invaders, especially the Spanish. The Ottoman sultan gave them assistance in exchange for their recognition of the sultan as suzerain of the area.¹ The Ottoman sultan ruled the area through an appointed representative, the dey², who exercised local power while paying a tribute to the sultan. By the 1800s, as a result of the distance from the seat of Ottoman power in Istanbul and the Ottoman political structure,

¹August Pavy, *Histoire de la Tunisie*, 2 ed., Tunis, Editions Bouslama, 1977, p. 333.

²The term "dey" (literally "maternal uncle") came into use in 1671 when the pirate captains of Algiers staged a coup and replaced the aga (the effective head of the government) with a dey chosen from their own ranks. Previously the leader had been known as the *beylerbey*, sometimes shortened to *bey*. See Robert Rinehart, "Historical Setting," *Algeria: A Country Study*, Harold D. Nelson, ed., 4th ed. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 24-25.

the dey in Algiers had become virtually independent of the sultan in Istanbul.³

The Ottoman government in Algeria from about 1671 to 1830 was essentially a military oligarchy, based upon a foreign army and under nominal suzerainty of the sultan. The small Ottoman administration was assisted by the native urban notables, and had a minor impact on the indigenous society. In the outlying provinces, the provincial governors employed tribal chiefs to keep their areas under control, delegating rule to the Algerian clan leaders. In addition, the Sufi orders with their lodges and shrines (Marabouts) provided functions under Islamic law to the tribes in the country who were outside Ottoman jurisdiction. This practice increased the prestige of the Sufi orders and their Marabouts throughout this period, and they became an important societal force up to the French occupation.⁴

³For a complete account of the Ottoman period see Charles-André Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord: Tunisie-Algérie-Maroc de la conquête arabe à 1830*, 2 ed., Roger LeTourneau ed., Paris, Payot, 1956.

⁴Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib*, 2nd ed., New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 175-177.

At the end of the Ottoman period, the ruling elite was composed of a small Ottoman administration and military assisted by urban notables, provincial tribal chiefs, and members of Sufi orders. This structure would be the target of French efforts to reorganize Algerian society.

Algeria Under the French.

The French conquest and colonization of Algeria was probably the most significant factor in defining the Algeria of today, approached in importance only by the arrival of Islam during the Arab Invasion. The French colonization of Algeria, as we shall see, defined the country's borders, inexorably linked the colony to the colonizer, and changed Algeria's social fabric for ever.

Conquest and Subjugation.

In 1830, the French landed forces near Algiers, beginning the conquest of Algeria. Prior to that time, Algeria was a nominal part of the Ottoman Empire, with ill defined borders, and under the rule of the Dey of Algiers. The dey himself had given the

French the small provocation they needed to justify an invasion. In April of 1827, the dey had struck the French consul to Algiers with his fan.⁵ Three years later, using that incident as justification, the French invaded⁶.

Under the French, Algeria became a part of France, not a colony or protectorate. France replaced the ill defined boundaries of the Ottomans, establishing the country's borders and defining for the first time the area of Algeria. This special distinction resulted in a French policy concerning Algeria that was significantly different from the French policy dealing with its other African colonies. Whereas France could deal with its other African holdings on a relatively unemotional basis, the fact that Algeria was French soil gave any issue dealing with Algeria an emotional dimension, with which the other colonies and protectorates did not have to deal.

⁵The dey was upset over the French government's failure to honor a debt incurred by the French nearly thirty years earlier.

⁶Rachid Tlemcani, *State and Revolution in Algeria*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1986, p.31.

Up to 1870, Algeria was under French military rule. Following the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war in that same year, the French government turned its attention to Algeria, perhaps in an attempt to divert public attention from the loss at the hands of the Prussians. In any event, the centralized administrative system with which France would govern Algeria, from that point forward, took form. Algeria was divided into three administrative *départments*, Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. A civilian governor-general represented the French government in Algeria.

The French policy in Algeria, whether intentional or not, systematically destroyed the native elite. Over the 130 or so years of French colonization of Algeria, elite groups which had existed prior to the French invasion were destroyed. Land was expropriated and distributed to French colonists according to ideas of "individual ownership" rather than the existing communal land-holding system. The native inhabitants, both Arab and Berber, evolved into virtually one social class with little or no indigenous political structures to fall back on after independence. Unlike Algeria's neighbors Tunisia and Morocco, who suffered

much shorter periods of occupation and retained many of their social and political institutions, the French occupation wiped clean the political slate.

Political Conditions

Under the French, the political system was dominated by the European population. A civilian governor-general directed the country from the top as a representative of the French government. As for local governments, the predominantly European areas in Algeria, the *communes de plein exercice*, had their own elected councils and mayors, and ran on the French model. In other areas, with minor European populations, there existed *communes mixtes*. These communities had appointed French administrators, with elected local officials who had limited powers. This assured the dominance of the French citizens over the native Algerians in areas where the French population represented only a small minority. Finally, in the vast southern desert areas the military retained control.

In addition to the division of civil governments into different categories to assure French dominance,

the French established a two tiered system of French affiliation for the native Muslim population. Moslem Algerians were French subjects, but not citizens, from 1865 onward. They were placed in a special, inferior category, and governed by a 'native code', which differed from the laws applicable to French citizens.⁷

As for the representation of Algerians in the French Parliament, only those with French citizenship could vote. For an Algerian to become a citizen he had to renounce his "personal status" under Quranic law, the *Sharia*. To the great majority of Algerians who were Muslim, this was considered equal to renouncing their religion, and consequently very few Algerians took steps to become true French citizens.⁸

The political conditions under which the Algerians found themselves were poor at best. Political participation was limited for most of the native inhabitants, the process dominated mainly by French citizens. Until the beginning of the Algerian Revolution in 1954, Algerian political expression was

⁷Dorothy Pickles, *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, pp. 19-20.

⁸Pickles, p.20.

marginal, and the political system failed as an outlet for the will of the people. At that time, Algerians faced an authoritarian government with only marginal participation in their own governing.

Social Conditions

The French sought to undermine the traditional judicial system. In 1873 a land law was passed which removed the authority of the tribal judge, the *cadi*, over land tenure issues, and French courts replaced the *djemma*, or tribal assembly, in ruling on local affairs.⁹

The French also worked to limit the power of the religious elite. From the initial occupation onward, the French took control of the traditional Islamic religious endowments, the *habus* lands, depriving the Algerian religious leadership of support for its charitable institutions and religious schools. The French administration severely limited Quranic schools, harassing and monitoring some, and closing others. As a result, the religious traditional

⁹Tlemcani, pp. 41-42.

religious scholars and interpreters of Islamic law, the *Ulama*, were unable to continue to recruit normally and their numbers diminished.¹⁰ The French administration slowly established influence over the Muslim clergy, who were trained in three French controlled religious schools, known as *madressas*, and paid by the French. The Muslim clergy was used to offset religious orders and brotherhoods outside French control or influence, but it did maintain a degree of independence and it never developed a reputation for having cooperated with the French. As the French put pressure on the religious brotherhoods, these groups' prestige and authority slowly diminished as a result of the compromises they made with the French.¹¹ When Islamic religious orders again began to rise within the Algerian society in the late 19th century, the French allowed them to exist while influencing the elections of religious officials. By the beginning of the 20th century, these religious leaders were all that was left of the country's

¹⁰Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine (1830-1970)*, 4th ed., Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, pp. 64-65.

¹¹Ageron, p. 65.

traditional elite. Their influence did decline, however, and a new nationalist elite eventually replaced them.¹²

French policy in regard to schooling of Algerian children also led to changes in the society. In 1881, new legislation concerning education was applied to Algeria. French schools were opened, and by 1890 10,000 Muslim school children attended French public or private school.¹³ Through schooling in French, and the use of French by the colonial administration, the Arabic language was not only devalued, but gradually supplanted by French, especially among a majority of the educated Algerian population. Not only did this affect the formation of Algerian elites, as French now became the language of the educated and the French education system replaced the traditional Islamic schools, but the change was also effective in isolating Algerians from other parts of the Arab speaking world. The significance of this change in the country's language extends into the present, and

¹²Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970, pp. 42-43.

¹³Ageron, pp. 69-70.

continues to tie Algeria to France, its former colonizer. As we shall see, it also continues to divide the country along linguistic lines.

Economic Conditions

The indigenous elites suffered economically under the French colonization, as well. The Arab population was subject to an additional tax, the *impôts arabes*, which did not apply to European colonists, and were above and beyond the normal French taxes and duties.¹⁴ In addition, the French colonists undermined the native population's economic base by acquiring Algerian land for their own use. Religious trust lands, known as *habus* land, which were religious endowments and provided income to religious and welfare organizations, came under control of the colonial land department, the *Domaine*, in 1843. A governmental decree the following year allowed colonists to gain possession of *habus* lands. Algerian tribal lands, whose ownership had been non-transferable prior to the French invasion, also came

¹⁴Ageron, p. 67.

under attack. To acquire these tribal lands, the colonists employed an argument based loosely on an interpretation of Quranic law that states that the victor in battle has the right to seize conquered lands. A decree of July 1846 defined land not in use as vacant and subject to acquisition by the *Domaine*, while also defining grazing land as land not in use. Under this procedure, the *Domaine* seized 200,000 hectares of land within a period of a year, redistributing the vast majority of it to the European settlers.¹⁵ Acquisition of Algerian land by the French continued unabated, with over 2,462,000 hectares belonging to Europeans by the mid-1930s, over half having been acquired through official colonial policy.¹⁶ The land held by the French colonists produced two-thirds of the agricultural output, produced virtually all of the agricultural export, and represented upwards of 30 percent of all arable land in the country, including the most fertile areas and those under irrigation.¹⁷ Although a very small group

¹⁵Abun-Nasr, pp. 248-249.

¹⁶Ageron, pp. 52-54.

¹⁷Rinehart, p. 41.

of Algerians did gain from some of these policies, the vast majority suffered under the colonial economic system. The taxes and land policies effectively eroded the economic base of the indigenous population, and reduced a great majority of the traditional elite to the same economic level as the rest of the native population.

At the time of the Algerian Revolution, Algerians had little say politically in the governing of their country. Socially, the traditional society was laid waste and native Algerians were a second class to the French. Economically, the Algerians were reduced to a poor lower class, supporting the French run system. The French colonization of Algeria had ripped the social fabric of the traditional society. The traditional elites were effectively subdued, if not eliminated, as their roles in society were taken over by the French colonial administration, and their economic base was eroded by the colonial land policies. The replacement of traditional leadership positions, such as the *cadi* and the *djumma*, by French administrators resulted in a loss of these elite positions. Control over the religious leadership

weakened these elites. Taxes and land confiscation reduced the traditional economic elites to second class status. A political vacuum had developed, with no group representing the Algerian people. The political stage was set for the emergence of a new group of Algerians to replace the traditional elites.

The New Algerian Elite.

By the turn of the century virtually the entire economic and social structure of Algeria had been altered, and the traditional institutions destroyed. As a result of the political vacuum, a new Algerian political structure began to emerge. In response to the changes in Algerian societal structure, and as a response to colonialism and growing nationalism, three nationalist groups arose. These were the liberal assimilationists, the traditionalists, and the populists.¹⁸ Nationalism developed as the ideology with which the Algerians could challenge colonialism.

¹⁸For a discussion of these three groups see John P. Entelis, *Comparative Politics of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 30-32.

The liberal assimilationists were sons of influential and well-to-do Algerian families who became Westernized, admiring and imitating the French. They were Francophone Algerians who had received their education under the French and worked within the system. The path to political power and economic success, if limited, under the French was through the French educational system and into a position within the colonial government, or into a position as a doctor or other professional. The assimilationists sought to work within the system to gain their political rights, and accepted the links between France and Algeria.

The most prominent of the liberal Algerian assimilationists was Ferhat Abbas. The feelings of Abbas and many Algerians were reflected in an article by Abbas entitled "La France c'est moi" which was published in 1936. In this article he refuted the existence of an Algerian nation, and emphasized the link between the Algerian people and France.¹⁹ In

¹⁹David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970., p. 46.

1942, Abbas led a group which requested the creation of a constituent assembly, elected by universal suffrage. His efforts were met with little action on the part of the French. Later, after the war for liberation began, Abbas and his followers would finally demand national self-determination, but until that time they worked within the system.²⁰

The assimilationists failed to gain real political power, or to lead the Algerian people to freedom because they were never accepted by the French colonists, nor were they accepted by their own countrymen. They "simply ended up as privileged Westernized natives virtually cutoff from their own society."²¹

The traditionalists were the educated, scholarly, urban families who, through the revival of Algeria's Islamic heritage and emphasis on Arabization, sought to protect the Algerian national identity. This group was represented by the Islamic clergy which began to play a larger role in shaping the Algerian identity.

²⁰Heggoy, pp. 12-13.

²¹Entelis, *Comparative Politics*, p. 31.

As already indicated, the religious leadership had come under French influence during colonization. The Ulama's independence was restricted as the *habus* lands that traditionally provided their income and funds for their religious and charitable work were taken away by the French. The French did allow the Ulama to continue to perform their religious and charitable works under scrutiny by the government. Meanwhile, the French targeted the Sufi orders and their wandering mystics, and in fact the French were successful in discrediting these last two groups.

The Islamic religious leadership organized under the Association of Algerian Reformist Ulama, beginning in the early 1930s. Abdal Hamid Ben Badis founded the group in 1931 as a religious organization, not a political party, with the goal of reforming Islam. This group organized religious schools, in which students learned Arabic and received an Islamic education. This contrasted significantly with the French run schools of the time, which taught French and had a secular curriculum. The Association also called for the return of the *habus* lands, the recognition of Arabic as an official language, and

attacked the Sufi orders as a corruption of Islam.²² It was this group which laid the groundwork for the future development of the Islamist movement.

The Association of Ulama initially sided with the assimilationists who wanted to work within the French system. Ben Badis, the Association's leader, died in 1940. Later, at the outbreak of the war for independence in 1954, the Association of Ulama changed its position and joined the struggle on the side of the revolutionaries.

The Association of Ulama was important in that it reestablished a base for Algerian nationalism through its traditional teachings and the use of Arabic, not French. The number of students produced by its schools was small in comparison to Islamic schools in Tunisia and Morocco at the time, yet the impact was significant. Their slogan, "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland,"²³ helped to inspire Algerian nationalist spirit.

The traditionalists, however, failed to gain real political power or lead the Algerian people to

²²Abun-Nasr, p. 321 and Heggoy, p. 68.

²³Heggoy, p. 68.

independence because they could not build a political base sufficient to challenge the French colonial organization of the time.²⁴ In addition, the assimilationist position taken by the Association of Ulama did little to win support for the group in the struggle for independence, its leadership preferring to work within the system.

The last group to emerge were the populists. They were European educated, although generally to a lesser degree than the assimilationists, and trained Algerians who were inspired by the liberal trends and ideas that they had encountered while laboring in Europe. The populists had a broader political base than either the assimilationists or the traditionalists, and were prepared to take action to attack the colonial system and French domination.

Populist groups emerged throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. The North African Star, a political party led by Messali Hadj, laid the groundwork for this movement. Messali called for socialism, Islam, and Maghrib unity, and for the

²⁴Entelis, *Comparative Politics*, pp. 30-31.

removal of French troops from Algerian soil and the total independence of Algeria. The North African Star was disbanded by the French, and later evolved into the Algerian People's Party (PPA). These organizations prepared the way for other populist movements to lead the revolution.²⁵

The group that was to lead Algeria to independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN), evolved from a series of populist groups. Frustrated by the lack of success in the political arena, dissidents from the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties formed the Revolutionary Committee for Unity (CRUA). This group comprised the nine 'historic chiefs' of the Algerian revolution, who had four common traits. They had all come from peasant or working class backgrounds, they had all been soldiers in the French military, they were all members of the *Organization Spéciale* founded by Ahmed Ben Bella, and all had served time in French prisons.²⁶ The FLN initiated the Algerian revolution on November 1, 1954, with a call to all Algerians to

²⁵Entelis, *Comparative Politics*, p. 40.

²⁶Entelis, *Comparative Politics*, p. 43.

rise and fight for independence. The FLN constituted a government in exile in 1958, and negotiated a ceasefire on March 19, 1962. On July 3, 1962, Algeria was declared independent, and the FLN took over the reins of government.

Independence

At the time of Algerian independence in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella emerged as leader of the FLN, with the help of the military led by Colonel Boumediene. Ben Bella became Algeria's first president and presided over the creation of a one-party state based on a vague form of socialism with Islamic overtones.²⁷ The new Algerian government under Ben Bella quickly established its control over religion through acceptance of Islam as the state religion,²⁸ the

²⁷For an account of the life of Ahmed Ben Bella see Robert Merle, *Ahmed Ben Bella*, trans. Camilla Sykes, New York, Walker & Co., 1967.

²⁸Article 4 of the Algerian Constitution adopted in 1963 states, "Islam is the religion of the State. The Republic guarantees to each one respect for his opinions and beliefs, and the free exercise of worship." For an English translation of the Constitution see Joachim Joesten, *The New Algeria*, Chicago, Follet Publishing, 1964, pp. 193-201.

establishment of a Ministry of Traditional Education and Religion responsible for all religious matters, and the government's adulation of religious reformists, especially Ben Badis, gave "the state a complete hold over the religious means of production."²⁹

Thus, in newly independent Algeria, the state co-opted the political trappings of religion and prevented their use by other political groups through control over the country's religious structures. This monopoly would remain in effect for a decade, at which time cracks would begin to appear in the government's religious foundation.

As the new government assigned responsibilities, a split developed between the modernist Francophone party members, and the Arabophone members. The latter were given control over religion, justice, and education.³⁰ This division of responsibilities gave the power to educate the country's rapidly expanding population to the Arabists, who sought to Arabize the

²⁹F. Colonna, "Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria," *Economy and Society*, August 1974, pp. 248.

³⁰Colonna, p. 247.

nation and create a more Islamic state. The short term effect was negligible, but over the long term, as more students were educated in the system and became Arabized, the shift toward Islamist tendencies would gain momentum.

Political Conditions

In the post-independence period, Algeria developed political, social, and economic conditions similar to those that had existed under the French. Politically, the FLN had established itself as the sole ruling party at independence. The government was authoritarian, controlled from the top. Although candidates competed in elections for office, all were selected by the party. The party's control over the political process remained strong into the seventies and eighties. "Algerian politics in the Boumediene period (65-78) were dominated by a relatively small yet stable civil-military oligarchy with remarkably little participation on the part of the masses."³¹

³¹John P. Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," *Political Elites in Arab North Africa*, New York, Longman, 1982, p. 93.

After Boumediene's death in 1978, this trend continued under President Chadli Benjedid. Over time the FLN lost credibility with the Algerian masses and the government represented the will of the people less and less. Political participation was limited for the majority of Algerians, the process being dominated by the FLN. The lack of political participation by the populous was represented, to a degree, by the October 1988 riots in which the rioters expressed their displeasure over price reforms and government austerity programs through violence³² as the only means left to them.

Social Conditions

Socially, the society split along several lines. In the universities a split occurred between the Arabized and Francophone students. The latter usually received degrees in technical fields, including medicine, leading to well paying positions in government and the private sector. The majority of those jobs were out of reach of the Arab speaking

³²"A State of Siege in Troubled Algeria," *Newsweek*, October 17, 1988, p. 41.

students, many of whom received degrees in law and literature, instead. These Arabic speaking students found themselves under employed in a job market which had reached its saturation point.³³

In addition to the social inequities of the university, the society was split along the same lines socially as it was politically. The FLN, along with the military and the government technocrats represented an upper class separate from the majority of Algerians. They enjoyed status and privileges from their positions, including better educational opportunities for their children which would lead to better jobs.³⁴

Economic Conditions

Economically, the society developed into two classes. The upper class consisted of the FLN party members, the military, and government technocrats, along with veterans of the revolution, the *Moujahidin*. The upper class received privileges and benefits as a

³³Entelis, "Technocratic Rule," p. 118. and Burgat pp. 155-156.

³⁴Entelis, "Technocratic Rule," pp. 119-120.

result of their political and governmental positions.³⁵ In January 1992 the situation was summed up by Zwawi Ben Hamadi, a writer and editor of *Alger Actualité*,

We are looking at a society where one million people at most are living within what we call civilized norms, which means that they have fairly decent salaries, they have accounts in a bank, and they take vacations once in a while. The rest of the population are at or below subsistence levels.³⁶

The underclass had enjoyed some economic progress in the post-independence period, aided by increased government revenues from oil sales. With the fall of oil prices in 1986, government revenues fell and the economic situation of most Algerians suffered. The situation was further exacerbated by high unemployment, estimated at as high as 30

³⁵As an example, the government usually follows a preferential policy of employing at least ten percent veterans (*Moujahidin*), and the military enjoy special recreational facilities and extensive fringe benefits accorded only to them. Entelis, "Technocratic Rule," pp. 120-124.

³⁶Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algerians, Angry with Past, Divide Over Their Future," *New York Times*, January 19, 1992, sec. 4, p. 3.

percent.³⁷ Algeria's exploding population only served to magnify the problem. Seventy-five percent of the population is under 25 years of age, and each year a new, larger group of young workers graduate into the workplace, exceeding the capacity of the economy to produce new jobs, and hence greater unemployment.

At the time of the rise of the Islamist movement in Algeria, most Algerians had little political say, as the FLN controlled the political process. Economically, while the small upper class enjoyed the benefits of their positions, the under class suffered under high unemployment and, after 1986, dropping oil revenues. Socially the society was split along linguistic lines. Additionally, the FLN, the military, and technocrats comprised an elite upper class which enjoyed privileges, while the rest of Algeria represented a underclass. It was under these conditions that Islam emerged as an ideology which could respond to the failed nationalist ideology of the FLN. Additionally, as in the period prior to the

³⁷Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algeria in Ferment--A Special Report: In Algeria, Hope for Democracy but Not Economy," *New York Times*, July 26, 1991, p. A1.

Algerian Revolution, a political vacuum had formed, with no group representing the underclass.

Rise of a Counter-Elite

The Islamists moved to fill the vacuum. They developed as a counter-elite to the ruling FLN as Islamist leaders began to speak out against the government and on behalf of the people. The Islamists also went to work at the local level, creating neighborhood associations and establishing mosques. These developments will be examined in the next chapter.

The conditions in Algeria at the time of the rise of the Islamists parallel those at the time of the Algerian Revolution. Under the French, the majority of Algerians had no say in the political process. Under the FLN, once again the majority of Algerians were excluded from politics. Economically, under the French, the Algerians had been reduced to second class status and suffered under special taxes and loss of properties. Under the FLN, Algerians suffered under a new economic burden, that of high unemployment, and a depressed economy after the drop in oil revenues.

Socially the French had stripped the society of its traditional structure and replaced the elites with French officials. The FLN, along with the military and the technocrats, essentially replaced the French as the ruling elites, while the majority of Algerians remained at the same social level as under colonialism. The same conditions which led to the rise of the Algerian nationalist movement existed at the time of the rise of the Islamist movement.

CHAPTER 2

CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

In part one, the conditions leading to change in Algerian government were examined. In this second chapter, in an effort to understand the rise of the Islamist movement, I will explore the development of the Islamists and the emergence of the Islamic Salvation Front, to include the Islamist trends and methods in establishing their political base. I will also examine the elections of 1990 and 1991, and their aftermath.

Post-Independence

Algerian Islamists, as a group, were slow to emerge after Algerian independence due to several factors. In addition to the state's domination of religion, Algeria had no traditional Islamic center as did its neighbors; Tunisia with its Zitouna University and Morocco with its Qarawiyyin University. The lack of an Islamic center to educate the Ulama and act as a

focal point for the Islamic movement in Algeria hampered organization and led to inconsistencies among the religious leadership. Moreover, the Algerian Ulama were, in general, poorly schooled in matters concerning the Quran and the Sunna.

In 1986, an Islamist, Doudi Mohamed al Hadi, described the situation in Algeria up to the 1970s,

The Islamic movement in Algeria remained dispersed and unorganized. There was no solidarity, no unity, no cooperation, no concertation between the preachers to realize the objectives which we wanted to attain...The problem in Algeria is that the preachers, at least the great majority of them, do not have the required level [of education]. We take the example of Sahnoun, or Sheikh Abdellatif Soltani, or Abbas Madani...If we look closely, even at these men, they do not have the required level. The majority of them have not left the country, they do not know what is going on in the Islamic world, they do not know what goes on outside the country.¹

Individual activists had agitated for a more Islamic state, with only limited success. Abdellatif Soltani and Mohammed Sahnoun are both considered by

¹My translation of Doudi Mohamed al Hadi, as quoted by François Burgat in *L'islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du Sud*. Paris, Karthala, 1988, p. 161.

some to be the founders of the Algerian post-independence Islamist movement. In one of the first outspoken attacks on Algerian Socialism, Soltani published an article in 1974, while in Morocco, entitled "Mazdaism is the Source of Socialism." This article attacked the government's use of imported, foreign principles, and equated Algerian socialism with Persian Mazdaism. Soltani was also critical of the country's deteriorating moral values. Soltani, having since returned to his native Algeria, was placed under house arrest in 1980, and died in 1984.²

The Islamist trend, following the revolution, was represented by the Ulama. The Association of Ulama, which had existed since the 1930s, emerged from the war in fairly good position, thanks to their support of the FLN during the struggle. However, following the first FLN Congress and the adoption of the Charter of Algiers in 1964, it became evident that the government was going to follow a secular course. In addition, the Association of Ulama made the unfortunate mistake of siding with the Democratic

²Burgat, pp. 146-150.

Union for the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) whose leader, Ferhat Abbas, had just been imprisoned.³ Thus, the Association's political influence declined.

A further attempt by Islamists to organize was the religious association *al Qiyam*, or Values. Established in 1964, this association addressed the rehabilitation of Muslim values in Algeria.⁴ The group sought a conservative interpretation of the Quran, and strove to influence the secular government by employing the Islamic themes of the nationalist movement. *Al Qiyam* spread its message through its publication "Review of Muslim Education." The organization did succeed in influencing some government actions through its efforts. The government disbanded the group in 1966 for its support of Egyptian Islamists who were being persecuted by Egyptian President Nasser.⁵

³Burgat, 145-146.

⁴Burgat, p. 150.

⁵Moore, p. 205, and Burgat, pp. 150-153.

The Mosques.

The establishment of mosques outside government control, or under marginal government control, laid an important part of the foundation for the Islamic political movement in Algeria. These mosques, created from the early 1970s onward and known as 'free' mosques, became part of the network through which the Islamists could and did disseminate their politico-religious message.

From the time of the Algerian Revolution to the early 1970s, there was little activity outside the government in the creation of new mosques. To be sure, the government had converted some churches and synagogues into mosques following Algerian independence, but these were safely under government control. Two complementary laws, one dated December 3, 1971, and one dated June 7, 1972, established the legal framework for the creation, government approval, and government supervision of cultural, artistic, sports, and religious associations. These laws sought to integrate any newly formed associations into the mass organizations already subordinate to the ruling FLN. The laws also required the new organizations to

obtain the approval of three different government offices, prior to the government's granting final approval of the association. Approval had to be given by the appropriate supervising ministry, the Ministry of the Interior, and the local representative of the Interior Ministry.⁶

The door was now open for the formation of religious organizations. Despite the bureaucratic restrictions, the Islamists set out to establish mosques under their control, all under the auspices of the two laws governing religious associations. The mosque and its faithful would be registered as a religious association, in much the same way as a professional association would register, and thereby gain government approval.

The leaders of the mosque associations overcame the government's system for granting approval by reversing the process. They would first build the mosques in an open area, usually from sheet metal and other scrap they could obtain, then apply for approval

⁶Ahmed Rouadjia, *Les frères et la mosquée: Enquête sur le mouvement islamiste en Algérie*, Paris, Karthala, 1990, pp. 13-14.

after the fact.⁷ The Loqman mosque in Constantine is cited as an example of this process. The mosque was built without prior authorization. The government ordered the unapproved mosque closed in 1979, on the grounds that the sheet metal structure occupied public land. The mosque organizers circulated a petition to save the site, and obtained the signatures of the local population and religious leaders. Through the pressure of public opinion and the work of the mosque faithful the government rescinded the order. The Loqman mosque was saved, and the Islamists gained an important victory.⁸

These newly established mosques had several advantages over government run mosque for the Islamists. First, the members of each congregation usually knew the other worshipers. This hampered any government attempts to infiltrate the mosque, as the government agent would have easily been spotted as an outsider. Second, the Ministry of Religion dictated the weekly Friday sermon at the government mosques. The independent mosques were not part of that system,

⁷Rouadjia, p. 15.

⁸Rouadjia, pp. 16-17

and thus could address other topics. These sermons became a means of disseminating the Islamist ideology.

Popular support behind the Islamists movement and their methods of securing a base of popular support using the mosque was further exemplified by events in and around the city of Tlemcen. Sidi Bou Said, a housing project in the area, and Boudghéne, a squatters' town of ramshackle huts, both saw the emergence of the Islamists along a typical pattern. Both areas were overcrowded, due to the migration of Algerians from the countryside to the city and the country's high population growth rate, and were economically depressed, thus ripe for the arrival of the Islamists.

First a "charitable" neighborhood association sprang up in Boudghéne, organized by Islamists. The association worked at building the neighborhood mosque, using funds collected door-to-door, and with volunteer labor. The association then progressed to a network of neighborhood committees, spreading the influence of the Islamists, with the mosque as its base. After the political process was opened up in

1989 and the FIS legalized, the association was incorporated into the FIS national organization.

Following the municipal elections, the local Islamists, now part of the FIS, won control of the local municipal council. They then set about cleaning up the housing areas and planting greenery to improve the quality of life. The FIS in Sidi Bou Said, once in control, took over a "farmer's market" that the FLN had started but never completed. The FIS built small shops in the market and gave them to unemployed youths that were partial to the organization. This gave the FIS and its Islamists the reputation of being able to get things done in areas where the FLN had done little, resulting in increased prestige for the Islamists.

Support for the Islamists came from many directions. In Sidi Bou Said, after the FIS came to power, they worked to clear out the city square that had been occupied by fountains built by the FLN. The FIS controlled municipal government removed the fountains and rebuilt the road that had run through the square previously. They did all this with virtually no funds by calling on volunteers, along

with the cooperation of two large private companies which provided the heavy equipment for the project at no cost⁹, indicating that the Islamists had support from businesses as well as individuals.

By slowly building a base of support around the mosque at the grass-roots level, the Islamists succeeded in supplanting the FLN. These independent mosques provided a platform for militant Islamists. Through the independent mosques the Islamists built their political foundations, which they would profit from in later years.

Other Islamic Activism.

The Islamists were active outside of the mosques as well, from the seventies on. In 1982 several events occurred which demonstrated that the Islamist movement was growing, and the government was losing its monopoly over religion as a political tool. In July the *Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armé* (MAIA) was formed from members of another group, the *groupe*

⁹See Rabia Bekkar, "Taking Up Space in Tlemcen," *Middle East Report*, November/December 1992, pp. 11-15 for this account of FIS development.

Bouyali. On November 8, the group acquired 160 kilograms of explosives and a quantity of other weapons. While transferring the weapons to a cache on the south side of Algiers, members of the group were stopped at a police check-point. An MAIA member killed a policeman as they fled the check-point. A month later, on December 8, the government arrested 23 suspects in connection with the incident, followed by a round-up of 80 more ten days later.¹⁰ This group had held its first meeting in early 1979 at the el-Achour mosque. Preachers came from the capital region and a number of other Algerian cities, and represented a wide spectrum of Islamic ideologies. The group eventually came to be known by the name of its leader, Mustapha Bouyali, who had been elected *emir* in July 1982. The group's message was very fundamentalist, reflecting the ideology of Bouyali who led the group until his death in a police ambush on February 3, 1987.¹¹ Bouyali and his followers exemplified the Islamists willingness to quickly resort to violence on behalf of their cause. This trend to violent

¹⁰Rouadjia, pp. 257-259.

¹¹Burgat, pp. 159-167.

confrontation was further demonstrated by university Islamists.

In November 1982, clashes between Islamists and Francophone students at the Ben Aknoun campus of the University of Algiers ended in an attack by the Islamists, armed with swords, crowbars, and hatchets. One Francophone student was killed along with a number of wounded. In a continuation of the unrest, several days later on November 12, an estimated 5,000 Islamists jammed the university's prayer hall to hear Abassi Madani and Sheikhs Shanoun and Soltani. In their speech they called on President Chadli to end mixed (coed) education, to ban alcohol, and to apply several aspects of the government's Arabization program that had gone unimplemented. The government arrested the three speakers that evening, releasing all but Madani the following month. Madani, considered the instigator, was held for two years.¹²

The political vacuum that the FLN filled at the time of the revolution began to reappear as the programs of the FLN failed to meet the demands of

¹²Rouadjia, p. 259 and Burgat, pp. 162-164.

Algerian society. As both unemployment and a growing public perception of the government as corrupt grew, the way was open for the emergence of a new political movement to lead the disillusioned members of society.

Birth of the Islamic Salvation Front

The catalyst for the emergence of new political groups was the riots of October 1988. The riots began on the fourth of October and lasted for five days. Economic conditions in the country played a significant role in the unrest. Algeria had lost \$US 7 billion annually since oil prices collapsed in 1986, causing a major decline in government revenues and consequently in spending.¹³ The rioters were mainly young Algerians protesting against the government's economic austerity program, food shortages, an unemployment rate of 30 percent, and a growing gap between the privileged few and the poor.¹⁴

The Islamists capitalized upon the unrest, especially an outlawed group known as the Movement for Algerian Renewal, led by Ali Belhadj. Many of the

¹³King, p. 18.

¹⁴"A State of Siege in Troubled Algeria," p. 41.

rioters claimed to have followed the instructions of the Islamic clergy once the riots had gotten underway. "The fundamentalists didn't start things, but once the unrest got going, they exploited it, encouraged and incited young people," claimed a Western diplomat.¹⁵

The clergy eventually called for an end to the riots, a move aimed at achieving government concessions to their demands. Not all of the religious leadership used the riots for the advancement of their political platforms. Sheikh Fidel Amaas, head of the Scala mosque, was more cautious about the riots. He did say, however, that there were legitimate issues behind the unrest that needed to be addressed by the government. By the end of the five days of rioting, an estimated 250 people were killed, the majority being young men, nearly 1,000 had been wounded, and 3,000 arrested.¹⁶ By Friday prayers two weeks later, Ali Belhadj had produced a list of demands which he presented during his sermon. The demands included the right to

¹⁵"A State of Siege in Troubled Algeria," p. 41.

¹⁶"Algeria Riots Said to Bolster Islamic Militants," *New York Times*, October 16, 1988, p. A6.

proselytize, the elimination of all anti-Islamic references in the Algerian constitution, an increase in the minimum wage, and a demand for freedom of speech and of the press.

The October riots led the government of President Chadli Benjedid to seek out spokesmen for the rioters in an attempt to address the grievances which caused the riots, and to regain control of the situation. The government looked to the Islamists as the only group that could, through its organization and network of mosques, act as a voice for the rioters and at the same time help control events.

The Algerian government identified three men as representatives of the Islamists: Abassi Madani, a professor and preacher; Ali Belhadj, a teacher, preacher, and the Imam of the Bab-el-Oued mosque; and Mahfoudh Nahnah, also a professor and preacher. These three representatives met with President Chadli shortly after the riots, and discussed the issues which stemmed from the uprising.¹⁷

¹⁷Mustafa Al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau, and Franck Frégosi, *L'Algérie par ses islamistes*, Paris, Karthala, 1991, p.29.

By meeting with these three Islamists leaders, Chadli Benjedid had recognized their positions as political counter-elites. This recognition also gave the Islamic movement credibility in the eyes of the people, as the Islamists could be seen as the representatives of the discontented, supplanting the FLN in its role as the peoples' representative. It was also important in that it represented the emergence of the Islamists on to the official political stage, and foreshadowed the group's future political activity.

Using the October 1988 riots as justification for his actions, President Chadli began to liberalize the political process. He began by first allowing the creation of vocational groups outside FLN control. When these groups began clamoring for a multi-party political system, Chadli responded by presenting a new constitution incorporating this idea. In February of 1989, 73 percent of the Algerians who cast their vote approved the new constitution. Article 40 of the new constitution allowed "association of a political nature", thus opening the door to the creation of numerous political parties, including the *Front*

Islamic de Salut.¹⁸ In June, the Algerian National Assembly approved a law allowing for the creation of opposition parties, and 30 groups quickly applied for recognition.¹⁹

The creation of the FIS began as the idea of one man, Ali Belhadj. In anticipation of the coming political changes, Belhadj had called for the creation of an Islamic political party. He invited all Muslim clerics to join. The first to answer the call was Abassi Madani, who along with Belhadj had been one of the Islamists who met with President Chadli after the October 1988 riots. On March 21, 1989, the FIS came into being.²⁰

Numerous groups came together to form the newly created FIS. The four primary groups were the *Jamaat at-Tabliq* (Society of the Message), *Ahl at-Talia* (People of the Vanguard), *Jamaat al-Jihad* (Society of the Holy War), and *Dawa* (The Call, also known as Propagation of the Faith). At-Tabliq and al-Jihad

¹⁸"Algeria: Neatly Done," *The Economist*, March 4, 1989, p. 42.

¹⁹"Algeria," *Africa Insight*, July 2, 1989, pp. 249-259.

²⁰Al-Ahnaf, p. 30 and p. 313.

were groups that had been largely confined to the mosques and workplace. Dawa had focused its efforts on infiltrating the army with Islamists, but had been rather ineffective.²¹ Other groups were represented as well. Hocine Abderrahim, previously imprisoned for his involvement in the *groupe Bouyali*, joined the FIS and would later become the *chef de cabinet* for Abbasi Madani.²²

Numerous Islamic leaders declined the invitation to join, however. Sheik Abdallah Djaballah, the head Imam of Constantine, called for patience, instead. Mahfoudh Nahnah, who had also been present at the meeting with President Chadli, rejected the idea of an Islamic political party. He felt that, "an Islamic party should be lead by an elite of religious thinkers and not by a group of kids."²³ He went on to form his own organization, the Hamas Party, which advocated

²¹Rouadjia, pp. 245-246.

²²Eileen Byrne, "The Debate on the FIS," *Middle East International*, October 23, 1992, pp. 9-10.

²³Al-Ahnaf, p. 31. My translation. "Un parti islamiste doit être dirigé par une élite de savants religieux et non par des 'gosses'".

coexistence of Islamic parties with secular parties in a democratic system.²⁴

Once established, the FIS was run by a council of 14 members. The two dominant leaders were Abassi Madani, and Ali Belhadj. Madani earned the reputation of being a moderate, and was perceived as the head of the party's political movement. Belhadj, on the other hand, was considered a *tête brûlée* (hot head). He called for the strict application of Islamic law and traditions, and was often in conflict with the more moderate elements of the FIS. It was Belhadj who was the mobilizing force behind the young Muslim masses who flocked to the FIS, and it was his words that inspired these Algerians who had little to lose by taking an extremist line.²⁵ As mentioned earlier, the Algerian unemployment rate was estimated as high as 30 percent, and the ranks of the unemployed consisted mainly of young men. These unemployed provided many of the able-bodied, disaffected men who joined the new party.

²⁴Ibrahim, "Algeria in Ferment", p. A1.

²⁵Al-Ahnaf, pp. 32-33.

The Local and Provincial Elections of 1990

In accordance with the democratic reforms undertaken by President Chadli, the government scheduled local municipal elections for June 1990. The results of the elections surprised many observers. Going into the elections the FLN was predicting winning at least 40 to 50 percent of the vote, with only 20 to 30 percent forecasted for the FIS. Actual election results were significantly different. In some areas the FIS won as many as 80 percent of the offices up for election, and received 54 percent of the total vote. The ruling FLN won only 28 percent of the overall vote.²⁶

The results of the 1990 local and provincial elections revealed strong popular support for the Islamic Salvation Front across the heavily populated areas of Algeria (see appendix A for local and provincial election results). The elections were for control of 48 provincial assemblies, the *Assemblées Populaires de Wilaya* (APW), and 1539 municipal councils, the *Assemblées Populaires Communales* (APC).

²⁶King, p. 17.

Table 1. 1990 Election Results by APW and APC

	FIS	FLN	RCD	IND	Other Parties	Total
APW	32 (66.67%)	14 (29.17%)	1 (2.08%)	1 (2.08%)		48
APC	853 (55.43%)	487 (31.64%)	87 (5.7%)	106 (6.89%)	6 (.39%)	1541*

Source: Algerian Interior Ministry as quoted by *El Moudjahid*, 16 June 1990, p.3 and *Révolution Africaine*, June 21-27, 1990, pp. 34-35 as cited by Gregory C. Noakes, "Political Elites and Popular Discontent: Political Discourse in Algeria," MA diss, University of Texas at Austin, 1990, p. 145. * The official results of the APC elections do not add up to the reported total of 1541.

Table 2. 1990 Election Results by Votes Received

Party	Votes Received	Percent of Total
FIS	4,331,472	54.25
FLN	2,245,798	28.13
Independents	931,278	11.60
RCD	166,104	2.08
PNSD	131,100	1.64
PSD	84,029	1.05
PRA	65,450	.82
PAGS	24,110	.30
Others	10,650	.13
Total	7,990,000	100.3

Source: *Revolution Africaine*, June 21-27, 1990, pp. 34-35, as cited by Belkacem Iratni and Mohand Salah Tahi, "The Aftermath of Algeria's First Free Local Elections," *Government and Opposition*, Autumn 1991, pp. 466-479.

Of the 24 largest provinces (top half of all provinces) the FIS won control of 21 APWs, the ruling FLN won control of only two APWs, and the Kabyle Berber party, the *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie* (RCD) won control of one (see appendix C). In the race for control of the APWs, the FIS did best

in the highly populated provinces. The FLN, on the other hand, did well in the least populated provinces. In provinces under 460,000 inhabitants (lower half of all provinces) the FLN won control of 12 of 24 APWs, accounting for all but two FLN triumphs at the APW level.

The FIS and the FLN did proportionally the same in the urbanized areas (see appendix D).²⁷ In the top 50 percent of provinces by degree of urbanization, the FIS won control of 16 APWs, half of their total. The FLN won control of 7 in the top 24, half of their total.

Geographically, the FIS did well in the coastal areas of the North. The Kabyle Berber party, the RCD, won the Kabyle province of Tizi-Ouzou, also on the coast. The FLN won control of the sparsely populated Southern provinces, and the provinces in the Aures

²⁷Urbanization, as I have used the term here, is based on the 1987 Algerian census and the definition of urbanization defined by the Algerian *Office National des Statistiques*. Degree of urbanization includes population, economic activity, infrastructure, population growth rate, and administrative position of the area. For the complete definition see *Statistiques: Armature Urbaine 1988*, Algiers, Office National des Statistiques, 3rd Qtr 1988, pp. 30-33.

mountain region in the North-east, near Tunisia. The FLN also won one coastal province, Bejaia, situated in the Petite Kabylie mountain region. The FLN success in the Northern provinces corresponds to the areas inhabited by the country's Berber minorities (see table 3).²⁸ In Bejaia, home to many Kabyle Berbers, the FLN won the APW, while the RCD took control of the majority of the local APCs (31 of 49). In the Aures mountain provinces where the FLN also won the provincial assemblies, there is a large Chaouias Berber population. The FLN also won control of the provincial government of Batna, but was challenged by the FIS which had a strong showing in at the municipal level, winning control of 35 APCs to the FLN's 24 APCs.

²⁸For a description of Algeria's Berber minorities see LaVerle Berry, "The Society and Its Environment," *Algeria: A Country Study*, Harold D. Nelson ed., 4th ed., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 115-121.

Table 3. 1990 Election Results: Provinces with Berber Minorities.

Province	Berber Minority	APW Winner	APCs By Party			
			FIS	FLN	RCD	IND
Bejaia	Kabyle	FLN	1	17	31	
Tizi-Ouzou	Kabyle	RCD	2	17	44	4
El-Tarf	Chaouias	FLN	8	16		
Souk- Ahras	Chaouias	FLN	4	17		5
Tebessa	Chaouias	FLN	5	16		7
Batna	Chaouias	FLN	35	24	1	1
Biskra	Chaouias	FLN	11	19		3

Overall, the FIS had done well in the densely populated north, taking control of the coastal plane and upland plateau. It is in this area, on 17 percent of the country's total land area, that 87 percent of the population lives.²⁹ The FIS did poorly in the Kabyle region, where the RCD and the FLN dominated.

²⁹Berry, p. 114.

In the Aures region, as well as in the South, the FLN did well. Independents won 106 of the APCs and one APW, which, according to one observer, "probably indicates less preference for the political programmes presented by the Independent candidates and more a definite dislike for partisan politics."³⁰ Overall the FIS emerged victorious from the elections, while the FLN received a vote of no confidence.

Once in office, the Islamists began to implement their vision of Islamic government. In some areas where the FIS had come to power they made efforts to impose certain parts of Islamic law, the *Sharia*. Four months after the 1990 election, the FIS moved to ban alcohol at a number of tourist hotels in Algiers.³¹ In the city of Constantine, the FIS was reported to have outlawed mixed schooling, and in the city of Tipazza, local leaders banned the wearing of shorts and swim suits by tourists and locals alike.³²

³⁰Belkacem Iratni and Mohand Salah Tahi. "The Aftermath of Algeria's First Free Local Elections," *Government and Opposition*, Autumn 1991, pp. 466-479.

³¹"Algeria's Anti-Alcohol Forces," *Wall Street Journal*, October 18, 1990, p. A13.

³²"FIS Enacts New Islamic Measures in Cities," *Paris AFP in English*, 1645 GMT 15 July 1990, Foreign

As late as December 27, 1991, one of the most outspoken members of the FIS, Mohammed Said, told a crowd that it was time that the women in the cities and towns, long thought to be too Westernized, go back to wearing veils and covering their hair. The FIS leadership added that they would seek the immediate segregation of men and women in workplaces and schools, and ban the consumption of alcohol.³³ The Islamists, however, did not implement any far reaching social, political, or economic changes at the local or provincial level. Rather, they, "have shown themselves to be more concerned with small-scale symbolic issues ... than with radical changes in state, society and economy."³⁴

Islamic Salvation Front leader Abassi Madani called a strike in late May 1991, to call for election

Broadcast Information Service - Near East and South Asia: Daily Report, 17 July 1990, p. 5.

³³Youssef M. Ibrahim, "In Algiers, Clear Plans to Lay Down Islamic Law," *New York Times*, December 31, 1991, p. A10.

³⁴John P. Entelis and Lisa J. Arone, "Algeria in Turmoil: Islam, Democracy and the State," *Middle East Policy*, Spring 1992, vol. 1, no. 2., p. 29.

reforms and to demand an early presidential election. The event that triggered the move by the FIS was the addition of seats to the National Assembly by Prime Minister Hamrouche, who pushed the redistricting bill through the FLN controlled Assembly. Under the plan the Assembly would have increased from 295 seats to 542, with the vast majority of new seats located in southern Algeria, an area where the FLN felt it could win an election.³⁵ The strikes lasted for 12 days, into June, and took place on the eve of elections for seats in the Algerian National Assembly, scheduled for June 27, with the run-off election scheduled for July 18. The FIS failed to "shut down" the country during the first few days of the strike, so they increased their activities. Having started by pressuring shop owners to close, and workers to stay home, the FIS changed tactics and moved to occupy the May First Square and Square of Martyrs in Algiers. The FIS followed this with demonstrations in the streets of the capital and a number of other cities. On June 3,

³⁵Robert A. Mortimer, "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, Democracy, and the Military," *Current History*, January 1993, p. 39.

when Mohammed Salah Mohanmedi, Algeria's Interior Minister, called out police and military forces to clear protesters, the protesters responded by reforming the following day. Violent encounters between government forces and the FIS supporters broke out. The government eventually restored order, and in further response to the unrest President Chadli Benjedid declared a state of emergency, placing the country under martial law, and postponed the elections.³⁶

Following the unrest, both Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj continued to challenge the government and the state of emergency imposed after the unrest. The government finally took action and arrested the two leaders of the FIS on August 31, 1991, following fiery speeches by both Madani and Abassi, including a Friday sermon by Madani on August 29, in which he threatened a "holy war" against the government unless martial law was brought to an end.³⁷

³⁶Alan Riding, "Military Restores Order in Algiers," *New York Times*, June 6, 1991, p. A10.

³⁷Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Opposition Leaders Arrested in Algeria; Tanks Are Called In," *New York Times*, July 1, 1991, p. A1.

The National Assembly Elections of 1991

The elections for the Algerian National Assembly, postponed after the May-June strikes, were rescheduled by President Chadli, and took place on December 26, 1991. Forty-one political parties vied for the 430 seats up for election, comprising all the seats in the Assembly. Seats would be awarded to the candidate who received a simple majority of 50 percent of the votes plus one. Any seat for which no candidate received a simple majority would be voted on in a second round of run-off elections. After the votes were tallied, it was clear that the FIS had posted another stunning electoral victory. The FIS won 188 of the seats outright. The next largest block of votes went to the Berberist Front for Socialist Forces (FFS), led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, with 20. The ruling FLN won 16 seats. The over 200 seats remaining, for which no candidate had a clear victory, were to be contested in a run-off election on January 15, 1992.³⁸

³⁸"Algeria," *Africa Report*, January/February 1992, p. 7.

Although the FIS won 81 percent (188 of 231) of the seats won in the first round of the elections, they received only 47.27 percent of the vote (see table 4). This was almost seven percent less than they had received in the 1990 elections. The FLN received 23.4 percent of the vote, but won only 15 seats (6.5 percent).

Table 4. 1991 National Elections First Round Results

Party	Votes	% of Vote	Seats Won	% of Seats
FIS	3,260,359	47.27	188	81.38
FLN	1,613,507	23.40	15	6.49
FPS	510,661	7.40	25	10.82
IND	309,264	4.48	3	1.29
Others*	1,203,928	17.45	-	-
Total	6,897,719	100	231	100

Source: *El Watan* and *Alger républicain* January 1, 1992, and *Algérie actualité* (Algiers), January 2-8, 1992, as cited by Mohand Salah Tahi, "The Arduous Democratisation Process in Algeria," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3, p. 407. *(The RCD received 200,267 votes, but did not win any seats.)

The election results, when compared to the results of the previous election, showed a decrease in both the percentage of votes and total votes going to the two main parties, the FIS and the FLN (see table 5). The Berberist FFS party was the beneficiary of much of those votes, succeeding in surpassing the other Berberist party, the RCD, in both votes and seats won. The FIS had won the lion's share of the seats in the first round and had soundly beaten the other rivals. But it did not receive the overwhelming mandate from the Algerian people as the number of seats won would indicate, having received less than half of the total vote.

Table 5. Comparison of Votes Received 1990 vs. 1991

Party	Votes 1990	Percent	Votes 1991	Percent
FIS	4,331,472	54.25	3,260,359	47.27
FLN	2,245,798	28.13	1,613,507	23.40
RCD	166,104	2.08	200,267	2.90
FFS	-	-	510,661	7.4

Heading into the second round of voting, the FIS needed only 28 more seats to have a controlling simple majority in the Algerian National Assembly, and it appeared that they were well on their way to acquiring those seats and more. The three winners in the first round, the FIS, FLN, and FFS, were the only parties eligible for the second round. Smaller Islamist parties eliminated in the first round would have probably thrown their support behind the FIS. Other parties, such as the *Parti d'avant garde socialiste* (PAGS), and the RCD, began to call for the annulment of the elections.³⁹ In any event, if the FIS received only 14 percent of the remaining 199 seats it would acquire a majority in the Assembly. Based on the FIS record up to that point, even if they dropped seven percent as they had from 1990 to 1991, they still would have received 40 percent of the vote (79 seats, for a total of 267), enough to secure many more than the 28 seats for control of the Assembly, and almost enough to secure a two-thirds majority (284 seats) in

³⁹Mohand Salah Tahi, "The Arduous Democratisation Process in Algeria," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3, p. 406.

the Assembly (284 seats). With a two-thirds majority the FIS would have been able to amend the Algerian constitution, and this may have played a part in later events.

Following the first round of elections, cracks began to show in the FIS foundation. The patchwork nature of the FIS, a result of its composition of numerous ideological Islamist groups and individuals, became evident as contradictory statements attributed to the party multiplied following the first round of elections. Abdelqader Hashani, a 35 year old engineer who had become chief spokesman for the FIS after the imprisonment of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, presented a moderate stance,

We guarantee freedom of opinion in Algeria. Our purpose is to persuade not oblige people into doing what we say. I challenge anyone to prove that so far we have repressed any other political tendencies. You must remember we have won control of some 800 municipalities in elections more than a year ago. We have a record of tolerance that no one can deny.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Islamic Plan for Algeria Is on Display," *New York Times*, January 7, 1992, p. A3.

Other statements attributed to the FIS were not so moderate. A FIS poster stated that under an Islamic government the state would necessarily have to "propagate the faith inside and outside the country by persuasion or terror."⁴¹ Slogans included "democracy is blasphemy" and "no charter, no constitution, just the word of Allah." Shortly after the December 1991 round of elections, FIS politician Said Mohammed Said stated, "The people must be prepared to change their clothing and eating habits."⁴² Furthermore, comments by Ali Belhadj prior to his arrest indicated the position he would take upon the FIS gaining power,

We are going to catch all of the thieves and sell everything they own to pay their debts. There will be no forgiveness. The ministers and the military will be tried for having killed and tortured Muslims.⁴³

⁴¹Rachid Khiari, "Algerian Fundamentalists Say Islam will cover All Facets of Life," *Associated Press*, January 7, 1992, AM cycle.

⁴²Alfred Hermida, "Democracy Derailed," *Africa Report*, March-April 1992, p. 14.

⁴³Radio France International, Paris, in French, 0530 GMT, May 12, 1991, *British Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 15, 1991, p. ME/1072/A/1.

As the second round of elections approached, the Algerian Army took steps to prevent the FIS from another electoral victory and a National Assembly controlled by the Islamist party. The first step in the military's move to seize power was to force President Chadli Benjedid to resign. On January 11, 1992, President Chadli submitted his resignation during a live television broadcast, saying, "Please consider this resignation a sacrifice on my part in the interest of the stability of the nation."⁴⁴ Two days later the government, led by Prime Minister Ghozali and an interim president, announced the annulment of the December 26 elections and the cancellation of the second round of elections that were to have taken place on January 15. The Army deployed armored cars and troops throughout the capital and other major cities, but there was little initial violence.

Certain electoral irregularities were discovered in the December 1991 round of elections. Only 59

⁴⁴Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algeria's Leader Quits, Citing Fear of Political Chaos," *New York Times*, January 12, 1992, sec. 1, p. 1.

percent of the registered voters turned out to vote, and thus the 47 percent of the votes won by the FIS represented less than 25 percent of the total registered voters. In the West, the relatively low turn out would not be considered unusual, but in Algeria where the authorities had boasted of over 90 percent of voters casting their votes in previous elections, the turn out may have worried government leaders. In addition, it was discovered that local governments had failed to issue some 9,000 elector cards, mainly in areas controlled by the FIS. This had the effect of disenfranchising voters in areas where the FLN had been hoping for a shift in voting away from the FIS.⁴⁵ These irregularities, coming on the heels of a resounding FIS victory, did little but to reinforce the military's decision to abort the elections and prevent the FIS from making further gains.

Aftermath of the National Elections

Since the annulment of the national elections, most of the FIS leadership has been rounded up by the

⁴⁵Mortimer, pp. 39-40.

Algerian military and police forces and placed in detention camps in the Sahara desert. The government officially banned the FIS on March 4, 1992. This was but one step in an on-going campaign against the FIS conducted since the aborted elections. A major round-up of Islamists in December 1992 involved over 30,000 army troops and policemen, and was a climax to the nearly year-long campaign against the Islamist movement which had already seen an estimated 9,000 people arrested and detained. At the same time, the government ordered the dismantling of all groups affiliated with the FIS, to include the approximately 200 local municipal councils where FIS representatives had won seats and had continued to participate in local government.⁴⁶

The Islamists' response to the canceling of elections and the detention of numerous FIS officials and sympathizers has taken two forms. Officially, the FIS was, "not directly involved in violence," according to Anwar Hadam, a FIS spokesman who was

⁴⁶Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algeria Begins a Crackdown on Fundamentalists", *New York Times*, December 6, 1992, p. A9.

elected as a representative of the Tlemcen during the first round of national elections.⁴⁷

In an effort to gain international support for the FIS and to put pressure on the military backed government, a group of FIS politicians visited Europe and the United States in the spring of 1992. The delegation was led by Anwar Haddam, who had been a university lecturer in physics prior to the national elections.⁴⁸ In an attempt to appeal to more moderate elements abroad, the statement issued by the "parliamentary delegation of FIS on visit in Europe and the US" and signed by Haddam, states the party's desire to maintain and respect the democratic institutions in Algeria. The statement says, "The political program of the FIS aims at institutionalizing a stable governing system. The means to achieve this is through political pluralism which fully guarantees, implements, and preserves

⁴⁷"Fundamentalists Said to Favor Rights", *Africa News*, July 6, 1992.

⁴⁸Phil Davison, "Algeria's FIS Leader Fears 'Iron Curtain'," *Independent*, May 13, 1992, p. 9. and Greg Noakes, "Algerian FIS Spokesman Calls for Bridge between West and Islam," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, November 1992, pp. 40-41.

minority rights." The statement goes on to say, "The FIS puts the freedom to express views, the freedom to form political parties, and the freedom to hold elections as prerequisites to the achievements of its unique and genuine solution to the multidimensional crisis that Algeria is agonizing in." Additionally, it states, "The ideological frame presented by the FIS is based on the fact that Algeria is part of the Islamic nation. At the same time the FIS does not intend and will not attempt to build a theocratic system." In regard to relations with the West, the statement acknowledges that Algeria must continue to participate in the global economy and that the party, if it came to power, would honor the country's foreign debts.⁴⁹

Unofficially, a sustained campaign of violence has been waged against the Algerian regime. The attacks were highlighted by the bombing of the Algiers airport on August 26, followed on the same day by the bombing

⁴⁹Anwar Haddam, "The Islamic Front for Salvation: The Algerian Odyssey, the Upsurging Muslim World, and the New World Order." Paper from the Islamic Salvation Front delegation visiting Europe and the United States, Washington, 15 June 1992, pp. 2-3.

of the Air France office in downtown Algiers.⁵⁰ Daily attacks occurred against government officials, police, and the armed forces. A year after the military's move, militant Islamists were still active. To mark the beginning of 1993, militants attacked a police station killing five policemen and making off with several automatic weapons. Since the violence began, the government has reported that 270 security officers have been killed.⁵¹ The military regime drove the Islamists underground by suspending the democratic process and their heavy-handed detention of FIS leaders and supporters. By eliminating any legitimate means of FIS political participation, the Algerian government forced the moderate Islamists to the sidelines, if they were not already in the government run detention camps. The Islamist movement has become radicalized. "We operate in tiny cells now. I only deal directly with two other people, so if I am caught

⁵⁰"Blast at Algiers Airport Kills 9 and Wounds 100", *New York Times*, August 27, 1992, p. A5.

⁵¹Alfred Hermida, "A Bloody Start to '93," *Middle East International*, January 8, 1993, p. 15.

and tortured they can't get much from me," said one militant leader in December 1992.⁵²

The Role of the Military.

The surprising success of the Islamists, essentially in the form of the FIS, in the 1990 local elections along with their apparent success in the aborted 1991/92 national elections demonstrates how near the FIS was to replacing the ruling elite, represented by the FLN. A peaceful revolution had almost taken place in Algeria. Only through the use of force by the military was the process stopped. The ensuing ban on the FIS and jailing of the party leadership has allowed the military to retain its hold on power and remain as the ruling elite group in Algeria.

The military's importance cannot be overlooked. They have played an important role in Algerian politics since independence. The military was instrumental in supporting Ben Bella as the nation's first president. It provided the power to allow

⁵²Chris Hedges, "Rise of Militants Seen in Algeria as Junta Falters," *New York Times*, December 29, 1992, p. A1.

Boumediene to replace Ben Bella, and subsequent leaders have risen to power through the military. Chadli Benjedid was a Colonel in the Algerian military, and succeeded Boumediene, then ruled until his forced resignation in January of 1992 and replacement by a military Council of State.

What motivated the military to move against the FIS was the uncertainty of what the FIS victory and the resultant FIS government would have meant to the country. The FIS would certainly have won a simple majority in the National Assembly, and may have even won a two-thirds majority. If they won two-thirds of the seats, they would have been in a position to change the Algerian Constitution which would have had unforeseen consequences, and was certainly a threat to the military's position in society. The previously mentioned statements by the more outspoken FIS personalities, such as Ali Belhadj's statement to try government ministers and military leaders, certainly had an impact on the military's decision. In addition, other countries across North Africa had been fighting their own battles against Islamist movements, to include Algerian-Tunisian cooperation in

controlling the movements,⁵³ and may have encouraged the Algerians to take action to prevent a "domino affect" across the region. Last, the divisions within Algerian society between secularists and Islamists ran deep. A demonstration of 135,000 Algerians on January 2, 1992, in the streets of Algiers following the first round of elections was evidence of this split, as marchers demonstrated against the FIS and demanded a halt to the elections.⁵⁴ These factors all worked to influence the military to move against the FIS. The military has traditionally played the role of "king maker", and this was seen, perhaps, as a further extension of this role. The situation facing the military after the abrogation of the elections and the suppression of the FIS was different, the government having lost a large degree of its support to the FIS, and the military may find maintaining control without FIS participation a difficult task.

⁵³Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algeria and Tunisia Intensify Anti-Fundamentalist Efforts," *New York Times*, December 19, 1991, p. A10.

⁵⁴Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algiers Marchers Oppose Militants," *New York Times*, January 3, 1992, p. A3.

CONCLUSION

This study has focused on the Islamist movement in Algeria and the conditions which gave rise to it. The apparent resurgence of Islam as a political ideology was embodied by the Islamic Salvation Front, which appeared suddenly on the Algerian political scene in 1989. The rise of the FIS as an Islamist political party was a relatively recent phenomenon, although it was based upon the historical development of the Islamist movement in the country. From the seventh century onward, Islam has been a thread that has connected Algeria's past and present. The French occupation of Algeria, and the concomitant destruction of the traditional elite, wiped the slate clean and set the stage for the rise of the modern Algerian elites. The poor political, social, and economic conditions which led to the rise of Algerian nationalism and the Algerian struggle for independence while under French colonization, led to the rise of a nationalist elite, represented by the FLN. The

Islamic leadership was battered by the French colonization, but emerged in the 1930s as the Association of Reformist Ulama.

Political, social and economic conditions similar to those preceding independence reappeared in the post-independence period, this time under the FLN government. These conditions gave rise to the Islamist counter-elite, embodied by the FIS. The Islamist movement grew under these conditions by using the under-class as a base, and through a process of establishing Islamist bases of support, namely the independent mosques.

The riots of 1988 acted as a trigger to changes in the political system. Adroit political maneuvering by Islamist leaders following the riots gave the movement increased credibility and exposure. Following the riots, the door was opened to political participation by the Islamists, as well as others, and the Islamic Salvation Front was born. The FIS successes in the elections of 1990 and 1991 indicated the measure of popular support they had garnered through their work at the local level, including the establishment of mosques and community associations. The FIS success

also highlighted the failure of the ruling FLN. The failure of the FLN and its ideology left a vacuum which the Islamists readily filled.

The military's abrupt intervention and abrogation of the elections, followed by suppression of the FIS, returned Algeria to the poor political, social, and economic conditions which had existed previously. The violence which followed the annulment of the electoral process indicated that the FLN failed to neutralize the FIS and the Islamist movement, in spite of their use of force.

Algeria's future is uncertain. The military led government must address the political, social, and economic conditions which gave rise to the Islamist movement if they are to retain control of Algeria. The elections of 1991 represented a peaceful revolution of sorts, and a second, violent revolution may be looming in the future if the government fails to alleviate these conditions.

In conclusion, the Islamist movement, often under the label of fundamentalist movement, is not new in Algeria, but has strong pre-colonial roots and has developed from the nation's historic ties with Islam

and, by implication, its indigenous political and social institutions.

APPENDIX A
June 1990 Election Results

<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>APC</u>	<u>FIS</u>	<u>FLN</u>	<u>RCD</u>	<u>FRSD</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>PRA</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>APW</u>
Adrar	28	2	25					1	FLN
Chlef	35	31	3					1	FIS
Laghouat	24	6	16					2	FLN
Oum el-Bouaghi	29	16	9					4	FIS
Batna	61	35	24	1				1	FLN
Bejaia	52	1	17	31				3	FLN
Biskra	33	11	19					3	FLN
Bechar	21	2	19						FIS
Blida	29	29							FIS
Bouira	45	25	10	6				4	FIS
Tamanrasset	10		9					1	FLN
Tebessa	28	5	16					7	FLN
Tlemcen	53	46	7						FIS
Tiaret	42	17	22					3	FIS
Tizi-Ouzou	67	2	17	44				4	RCD
Alger	33	33							FIS
Djelfa	36	14	16					6	FIS
Jijel	28	28							FIS
Sétif	60	38	13	4				5	FIS
Saida	16	9	7						FIS
Skikda	38	27	7		1			3	FIS
Sidi Bel-Abbès	52	38	11					3	FIS
Annaba	12	8	3					1	FIS
Guelma	34	13	17		1			3	FIS

<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>APC</u>	<u>FIS</u>	<u>FLN</u>	<u>RCD</u>	<u>FRSD</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>FPA</u>	<u>IND</u>	<u>APN</u>
Constantine	12	12							FIS
Medea	64	46	14				1	3	FIS
Mostaganem	32	28	3					1	FIS
M'sila	47	22	18					7	FIS
Mascara	47	36	8					3	FIS
Ouargla	21	4	17						FLN
Oran	26	24					1	1	FIS
El-Bayedh	22	2	14					6	FLN
Ilizli	6		6						FLN
Arreridj	34	15	17	1				1	FIS
Boumerdes	38	36	2						FIS
El-Tarf	24	8	16						FLN
Tindouf	2							2	IND
Tissemsilt	22	15	7						FIS
El-Oued	30	11	13			2		4	FIS
Khenchela	20	5	13					2	FLN
Souk-Ahras	26	4	17					5	FLN
Tipaza	41	28	10					3	FIS
Mila	32	30	1					1	FIS
Ain-Defla	36	30	3					3	FIS
Naama	12	4	5					3	FIS
Temouchent	28	19	8					1	FIS
Ghardaia	13		8					5	FLN
Relizane	38	38							FIS
Total	1541	853	487	87	2	2	2	106	
Wilaya:	48	32	14	1				1	

Source: Algerian Interior Ministry as quoted by *El Moudjahid*, 16 June 1990, p.3 and *Révolution Africaine*, June 21-27, 1990, pp. 34-35 as cited by Gregory C. Noakes, "Political Elites and Popular Discontent: Political Discourse in Algeria," MA diss, University of Texas at Austin, 1990, p. 145.

APPENDIX B

Urbanization, Population, and Annual Population Growth

	<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>Urbanization Level</u>	<u>Population 1987</u>	<u>Ann. Growth 77-87</u>
01	Adrar	27.2	217678	4.65
02	Chlef	34.0	684192	3.30
03	Laghouat	52.7	212388	3.61
04	Oum el- Bouaghi	52.3	403936	2.79
05	Batna	48.5	752617	3.85
06	Bejaia	31.7	700952	3.16
07	Biskra	54.7	430202	2.66
08	Bechar	75.5	185346	3.85
09	Blida	60.6	702188	3.39
10	Bouira	23.6	526900	3.44
11	Tamanrasset	33.1	95822	8.48
12	Tebessa	62.3	410233	2.91
13	Tlemcen	46.9	714862	2.89
14	Tiaret	47.8	575794	3.48
15	Tizi-Ouzou	23.4	936948	2.89
16	Alger	99.0	1690191	0.62
17	Djelfa	53.7	494494	4.00
18	Jijel	25.5	472312	3.23
19	Sétif	32.2	1000694	3.80
20	Saida	48.9	235494	5.00
21	Skikda	42.5	622510	2.88
22	Sidi Bel- Abbès	51.7	446277	3.28
23	Annaba	80.9	455888	2.65
24	Guelma	46.8	353309	2.43

	<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>Urbanization Level</u>	<u>Population 1987</u>	<u>Ann. Growth 77-87</u>
25	Constantine	84.3	664303	3.30
26	Medea	28.6	652863	3.18
27	Mostaganem	32.7	505932	3.40
28	M'sila	38.2	604693	3.75
29	Mascara	38.4	566901	3.31
30	Ouargla	60.3	284454	3.68
31	Oran	86.5	932473	3.00
32	El-Bayadh	40.8	153254	2.90
33	Ilizzi	39.2	18930	4.54
34	Bordj Bou Arrerridj	36.4	424828	3.19
35	Boumerdes	39.6	650975	3.96
36	El-Tarf	40.6	275315	3.55
37	Tindouf	79.6	16428	8.19
38	Tissemsilt	24.6	228120	2.93
39	El-Oued	48.6	376909	3.74
40	Khenchela	47.0	246541	2.66
41	Souk-Ahras	46.5	296077	2.72
42	Tipaza	47.4	620151	3.21
43	Mila	32.6	511605	3.02
44	Ain-Defla	30.3	537256	3.18
45	Naama	57.4	113700	3.22
46	Ain Temouchent	59.0	274990	2.26
47	Ghardaia	91.3	216140	2.86
48	Relizane	32.4	544877	3.94

Source: *Statistiques: Armature Urbaine 1988*. Algiers,
Office National des Statistiques, 3rd Qtr 1988.

APPENDIX C

Population Vs. Winner of APW

	<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>Winner APW</u> <u>(Wilaya)</u>
16	Alger	1690191	FIS
19	Sétif	1000694	FIS
15	Tizi-Ouzou	936948	RCD
31	Oran	932473	FIS
05	Batna	752617	FLN
13	Tlemcen	714862	FIS
09	Blida	702188	FIS
06	Bejaia	700952	FLN
02	Chlef	684192	FIS
25	Constantine	664303	FIS
26	Medea	652863	FIS
35	Boumerdes	650975	FIS
21	Skikda	622510	FIS
42	Tipaza	620151	FIS
28	M'sila	604693	FIS
14	Tiaret	575794	FIS
29	Mascara	566901	FIS
48	Relizane	544877	FIS
44	Ain-Defla	537256	FIS
10	Bouira	526900	FIS
43	Mila	511605	FIS
27	Mostaganem	505932	FIS
17	Djelfa	494494	FIS
18	Jijel	472312	FIS

	<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>Winner APW</u> <u>(Wilaya)</u>
23	Annaba	455888	FIS
22	Sidi Bel- Abbès	446277	FIS
07	Biskra	430202	FLN
34	Bordj Bou Arrerridj	424828	FIS
12	Tebessa	410233	FLN
04	Oum el- Bouaghi	403936	FIS
39	El-Oued	376909	FIS
24	Guelma	353309	FIS
41	Souk-Ahras	296077	FLN
30	Ouargla	284454	FLN
36	El-Tarf	275315	FLN
46	Ain Temouchent	274990	FIS
40	Khenchela	246541	FLN
20	Saida	235494	FIS
38	Tissemsilt	228120	FIS
01	Adrar	217678	FLN
47	Ghardaia	216140	FLN
03	Laghouat	212388	FLN
08	Bechar	185346	FIS
32	El-Bayadh	153254	FLN
45	Naama	113700	FIS
11	Tamanrasset	95822	FLN
33	Ilizzi	18930	FLN
37	Tindouf	16428	IND

APPENDIX D

Urbanization Vs. Winner of APW

	<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>Urbanization</u> <u>Level (%)</u>	<u>Winner APW</u> <u>(Wilaya)</u>
16	Alger	99.0	FIS
47	Ghardaia	91.3	FLN
31	Oran	86.5	FIS
25	Constantine	84.3	FIS
23	Annaba	80.9	FIS
37	Tindouf	79.6	IND
08	Bechar	75.5	FIS
12	Tebessa	62.3	FLN
09	Blida	60.6	FIS
30	Ouargla	60.3	FLN
46	Ain Temouchent	59.0	FIS
45	Naama	57.4	FIS
07	Biskra	54.7	FLN
17	Djelfa	53.7	FIS
03	Laghouat	52.7	FLN
04	Oum el- Bouaghi	52.3	FIS
22	Sidi Bel- Abbès	51.7	FIS
20	Saida	48.9	FIS
39	El-Oued	48.6	FIS
05	Batna	48.5	FLN
14	Tiaret	47.8	FIS
42	Tipaza	47.4	FIS
40	Khenchela	47.0	FLN
13	Tlemcen	46.9	FIS

	<u>Wilaya</u>	<u>Urbanization</u> <u>Level (%)</u>	<u>Winner APW</u> <u>(Wilaya)</u>
24	Guelma	46.8	FIS
41	Souk-Ahras	46.5	FLN
21	Skikda	42.5	FIS
32	El-Bayadh	40.8	FLN
36	El-Tarf	40.6	FLN
35	Boumerdes	39.6	FIS
33	Ilizzi	39.2	FLN
29	Mascara	38.4	FIS
28	M'sila	38.2	FIS
34	Bordj Bou Arrerridj	36.4	FIS
02	Chlef	34.0	FIS
11	Tamanrasset	33.1	FLN
27	Mostaganem	32.7	FIS
43	Mila	32.6	FIS
48	Relizane	32.4	FIS
19	Sétif	32.2	FIS
06	Bejaia	31.7	FLN
44	Ain-Defla	30.3	FIS
26	Medea	28.6	FIS
01	Adrar	27.2	FLN
18	Jijel	25.5	FIS
38	Tissemsilt	24.6	FIS
10	Bouira	23.6	FIS
15	Tizi-Ouzou	23.4	RCD

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. *A History of the Maghrib*. 2nd ed., New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine (1830-1970)*. 4th ed. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.
- Al-Ahnaf, Mustafa, Bernard Botiveau, and Franck Frégosi. *L'Algérie par ses islamistes*. Paris, Karthala, 1991.
- "Algeria." *Africa Insight*, July 2, 1989, pp. 249-259.
- "Algeria." *Africa Report*, January-February 1992, pp. 7-17.
- Algeria: Country Profile 1991-92*. London, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991.
- "Algeria: Neatly Done." *The Economist*, March 4, 1989, p. 42.
- Amin, Samir. *The Maghreb in the Modern World: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco*. Translated by Michael Perl, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1970.

Bekkar, Rabia. "Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamic Occupation of Urban Algeria." *Middle East Report*, November-December 1992, pp. 11-15.

Brett, Michael. ed. *North Africa: Islam and Modernization*. Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass, 1973.

Burgat, François. *L'islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du Sud*. Paris, Karthala, 1988.

Byrne, Eileen. "The Debate on the FIS." *Middle East International*, October 23, 1992, pp. 9-10.

"A Call: To All the Right Honourable Parliamentarians of the World." Issued at a meeting of the elected representatives of the Islamic Salvation Front on January 10, 1992, Algiers.

"Chadli Looks Forward to Elections," *Middle East Economic Digest*, August 10, 1990, p. 8.

Colonna, F. "Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria." *Economy and Society*. August 1974, pp. 233-252.

Entelis, John P. *Comparative Politics of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia*. Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1980.

Entelis, John P. and Lisa J. Arone. "Algeria in Turmoil: Islam, Democracy, and the State." *Middle East Policy*. Spring 1992, vol. 1 no. 2., pp. 23-35.

Esposito, John L. *Islam: The Straight Path*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1991.

Etienne, Bruno. *L'islamisme radical*. Paris, Hachette, 1987.

_____. *L'Algérie: Cultures et révolution*. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1977.

"FIS Enacts New Islamic Measures in Cities," Paris AFP in English, 1645 GMT July 15, 1990, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Near East and South Asia: Daily Report*, July 17, 1990, p. 5.

Gellner, Ernest. *Muslim Society*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Haddam, Anwar. "The Islamic Front for Salvation: The Algerian Odyssey, the Upsurging Muslim World, and the New World Order." Paper from the Islamic Salvation Front delegation visiting Europe and the United States, Washington, June 15, 1992.

Heggoy, Alf Andrew and Robert R. Crout. *Historical Dictionary of Algeria*. Metuchen, New Jersey, The Scarecrow Press, 1981.

Hermida, Alfred. "A Bloody Start to '93." *Middle East International*, January 8, 1993, p. 15.

_____. "Democracy Derailed." *Africa Report*, March-April 1992, p. 14.

- Hunter, Shireen T. ed. *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988.
- Iratni, Belkacem and Mohand Salah Tahi. "The Aftermath of Algeria's First Free Local Elections." *Government and Opposition*. Autumn 1991, pp. 466-479.
- Joesten, Joachim. *The New Algeria*. Chicago, Follett Publishing, 1964.
- Julien, Charles-André. *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord: Tunisie-Algérie-Maroc de la conquête arabe à 1830*. 2 ed. Roger LeTourneau, ed., Paris, Payot, 1956.
- El-Kenz, Ali. *Algerian Reflections on Arab Crises*. Translated by Robert W. Stookey, Austin, Center for Middle Eastern Studies at The University of Texas at Austin, 1991.
- Khiari, Rachid. "Algerian Fundamentalists Say Islam Will Cover All Facets of Life." *The Associated Press*, January 7, 1992.
- King, John. "Algeria: The New Political Map," *Middle East International*, July 6, 1990, p. 17.
- Lazreg, Marnia. *The Emergence of Classes in Algeria: A Study of Colonialism and Socio-Political Change*. Boulder, Westview Press, 1976.

Lenczowski, George. ed. *Political Elites in the Middle East*. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.

Moore, Clement Henry. *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970.

Mortimer, Robert A. "Algeria: The Clash between Islam, Democracy, and the Military." *Current History*. January 1993, pp. 37-41.

Munson, Henry Jr. "Morocco's Fundamentalists." *Government and Opposition*. Summer 1991, pp. 331-344.

Nelson, Harold D. ed. *Algeria: A Country Study*. 4th ed. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

Noakes, Gregory C. "Algerian FIS Spokesman Calls for Bridge between West and Islam." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, November 1992, pp. 40-41.

_____. "Political Elites and Popular Discontent: Political Discourse in Algeria." M.A. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1990.

Ottaway, David and Marina Ottaway. *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.

Pavy, August. *Histoire de la Tunisie*. 2 ed. Tunis, Editions Bouslama, 1977.

- Pickles, Dorothy M. *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
- Piscatori, James P. ed. *Islam in the Political Process*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Political Elites in Arab North Africa*. New York, Longman, 1982.
- Radio France International, Paris, in French, 0530 GMT, May 12, 1991, *British Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 15, 1991, p. ME/1072/A/1.
- Redjam, Abderrazzak. "Statement No. 21." Algiers, Front for Islamic Salvation, Interim National Executive Bureau, March 5, 1992.
- _____. "Communiqué No. 34." Algiers, Islamic Front for Salvation, National Provisional Executive Bureau, July 20, 1992.
- Rouadjia, Ahmed. *Les frères et la mosquée: Enquête sur le mouvement islamiste en Algérie*. Paris, Karthala, 1990.
- Shepard, William E. "Islam and Ideology: Toward a Typology." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. ed. Peter von Sivers, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 307-336.

Statistiques: Armature Urbaine 1988. Algiers, Office National des Statistiques, 3rd Qtr 1988.

Tachau, Frank, ed. *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East.* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Schenkman Publishing, 1975.

Tahi, Mohand Salah. "The Arduous Democratisation Process in Algeria." *Journal of Modern African Studies.* March 30, 1992, pp. 397-419.

Tlemcani, Rachid. *State and Revolution in Algeria.* Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1986.

"We Are All Going to Die." *Time*, July 13, 1992, p. 18

VITA

Norman Raymond Larson was born in Detroit, Michigan, on October 15, 1960, the son of Joan Coulton Larson and Norman Martin Larson. After graduating from Clarence M. Kimball High School, Royal Oak, Michigan, he entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in July of 1978. He graduated from the Academy in May 1982 with a Bachelor of Science degree and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army. During the following years he served in Army units in Germany, and Texas. He entered The Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in January of 1992.

Permanent address: 5015 Elmhurst Avenue
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073

This thesis was typed by the author.