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**NORTH KOREAN INTERNAL UNREST  
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON JAPAN**

BY

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Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

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93 5 18 027

93-11066



Unclassified

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <u>Unclassified</u>			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT <u>Approved for public release.</u> <u>Distr. is unlimited.</u> Distribution A		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Root Hall, BLDG 122 Carlisle, PA 17013-5050			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) NORTH KOREAN INTERNAL UNREST AND ITS INFLUENCE ON JAPAN					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Colonel Shingo Nakamura					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 93-04-15	
15. PAGE COUNT 30					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)  See reverse side of this form.					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Lynn B. Stull, COL, SF, Project Advisor			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717-245-3207		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAB

After the Cold War, we have entered a new era which is uncertain, difficult and unstable. However, remnants of the Cold War exist in Northeast Asia, China and North Korea. China's new policies of reform and openness herald the beginnings of change, but North Korea remains committed to socialism and isolation. The demise of communism throughout most of the world invites reform of North Korea's governmental and economic structure. Recent events indicate North Korea may have started a glacial move toward change.

This paper will examine change in North Korea, using the historical models of Vietnamese Reunification, the Romanian People's Revolution and German Reunification. Finally, some recommendations for Japanese strategy based upon change in North Korea are presented.

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NORTH KOREAN INTERNAL UNREST AND ITS INFLUENCE ON JAPAN  
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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15 April 1993

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Shingo Nakamura, Colonel, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

TITLE: North Korean internal unrest and its influence on Japan

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 30

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

After the Cold War, we have entered a new era which is uncertain, difficult and unstable. However, remnants of the Cold War exist in Northeast Asia, China and North Korea. China's new policies of reform and openness herald the beginnings of change, but North Korea remains committed to socialism and isolation. The demise of communism throughout most of the world invites reform of North Korea's governmental and economic structure. Recent events indicate North Korea may have started a glacial move toward change.

This paper will examine change in North Korea, using the historical models of Vietnamese Reunification, the Romanian People's Revolution and German Reunification. Finally, some recommendations for Japanese strategy based upon change in North Korea are presented.

## INTRODUCTION

The Cold War military structure still exists in Northeast Asia, but the Korean Peninsula stalemate has been profoundly affected by changes throughout the world. Free countries in Northeast Asia; Japan, Republic of Korea(ROK, South Korea) and Taiwan, have been developing national economic and political power and stability. The collapse of the Soviet Union appears to have strengthened the People's Republic of China's(PRC) and North Korea's(NK) determination to maintain their communist dictatorships, especially North Korea, which remains virtually isolated from the rest of the world. It will be impossible for North Korea to continue shutting out the rest of world. Some changes in North Korea may occur in the near future. Various forms of internal unrest will possibly occur in North Korea during the process of Korean reunification. Geographical proximity may cause Japan to be influenced by NK internal unrest.

The purpose of this paper is to examine all aspects of Korean reunification, the potential resultant North Korean internal unrest, the ramifications of potential unrest and a unified Korea to Japan, and to propose some strategic options for Japan.

The paper is organized as follows:

- I Trends outside and inside the Korean Peninsula.
- II Scenarios for Korean reunification.

III Analysis of each scenario.

IV The influence of a reunified Korea on Japan.

V Recommendations for Japanese strategy.

VI Conclusion.

## I TRENDS OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The International environment in relation to Korea has undergone recent changes. The former Soviet Union(USSR) opened diplomatic relations with South Korea. At the same time they decreased economic and military support to North Korea, seeking to eliminate, or at least reduce, the economic burden of supporting a client communist state.<sup>1</sup> Russia initiated this relationship with South Korea for several reasons. The most pressing being a need to improve access to economic resources. Russian military support of North Korea has been changed to a straight forward cash sales basis, placing North Korea in the same position as other nations seeking military equipment on the international market.<sup>2</sup> The North Korean government was the only government recognized by the USSR on the Korean Peninsula from the time of partition at the end of World War II until the breakup of the USSR. On November 20, 1992 Russia established formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea(ROK) and recognized the existence of two legitimate governments on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>3</sup> This

historic Russian act may be the initial event which could lead to the eventual destruction and fall of North Korea's government and political/social infrastructure.

In Europe, socialism collapsed following the breakup of the USSR. West Germany's vision of reunification was realized by absorbing East Germany into the West. The people's revolt in Rumania overthrew the government of Cheausescu, an intimate friend of Kim Il-Sung, on December 3, 1990 and Rumania has been rapidly democratized. These European trends seem to be gradually affecting the Korean Peninsula.

China has been proceeding with economic reform and opening to the world without attendant political and social democratization evolving in the 14th Party Congress. Chinese leadership has also counseled North Korea on the necessity of economic reform and openness.<sup>4</sup> At the same time China established an economic and political relationship with ROK, while maintaining their political relationship with North Korea.<sup>5</sup>

Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru opened negotiations to establish relations with North Korea during his September 24, 1991 visit. North Korean nuclear weapons development kept negotiations from advancing beyond initial stages.

However, the establishment of relations between Japan and North Korea seemed to enhance Korean Peninsula stability,

and to be good support for reform and openness in North Korea. Dialog between the U.S. and North Korea has not been activated, however, they seem to be searching for common ground to establish a dialogue.

Within North Korea, Kim Il-Sung applied a new policy toward Japan when the Japanese delegation visited North Korea. All major policy changes require Kim Il-Sung's consent if the new policy doesn't originate with him. It appears Kim Il-Sung may realize the need for economic openness and introduction of Japanese capital and technology to provide the means necessary to keep his socialist regime viable by revitalization of North Korean national power during his lifetime.<sup>6</sup>

During Kim Il-Sung's meeting with the Japanese delegation he stated he still had the strong intention of reunifying the Korean Peninsula as one nation by 1995. Kim Il-Sung's belief that he could unite North and South Korea by military means was influenced by North Vietnam's success in unification by force because of the similarities in geography, political structure and foreign relationships. It appears he continues to believe in his vision of reunifying Korea under socialism.<sup>7</sup>

In order to maintain the isolation of North Korea's population and protect them from the influence of changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the government has recalled and thought-reeducated North Korean students from

the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and has kept the populace ignorant of foreign matters affecting North Korea.<sup>8</sup> However, these actions have not totally succeeded. It is said a dissident organization was established in North Korea, mainly by executives who once stayed abroad and small groups of dissatisfied people. Members of the bureaucracy, government officers, technocrats, military officers and trade relations personnel who are exposed to foreign information are aware of North Korea's economic crisis and criticism from other nations. Another source of dissident members is the populace which feels dissatisfaction with the quality of life in North Korea.<sup>9</sup>

In the Republic of Korea the bureaucracy has developed diplomatic relations with the Communist block and improved its status in the world based on new diplomatic and trade relations with East European countries in 1988, the Soviet Union in 1991, Communist China in 1992 and Vietnam in January 1993. The ROK economic growth rate was 12% from 1986 to 1988. GNP per capital increased more than three times, from 1,500 dollars to 5,000 dollars during the 80's.

While external relations have contributed to economic growth, domestic concerns have caused political strife. Labor-management disputes, the sudden rise of land prices, student activism on a wide range of social issues and conflict within the new administration's party, the Democratic Party, have affected political stability. As Kim

Young Sam triumphed in the presidential election during December 1992, he inherited a host of thorny issues requiring action. North Korean aggression continues to override these issues and demands the attention of the ROK leadership.

Dialog between the South and the North achieved new heights. The recently held Premier level dialog occurred for the first time since the cease-fire of the Korean War September 6-7, 1991. This was a dramatic change to NK's previous position of refusing to hold high level meetings with the ROK. Their previous position was Korea should not have two sovereign states because Korea is one nation. The agreement to hold premier level dialogue and to officially call Roh Tae Woo President clearly signals a change in attitude by the North toward the South.<sup>10</sup>

## II SCENARIOS FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION

According to the historical point of view, there are model reunification cases between Free and Communism countries, that is, one side absorbed by the other. By using historical models we can draw scenarios for reunification of the Korean Peninsula in the future:

Scenario 1, Germany type reunification by the ROK

Scenario 2, Rumania type reunification by the ROK

Scenario 3, Vietnam type reunification by North Korea

Since both North and South Korea are now members of The United Nations, another scenario can be created which becomes an alternative to reunification:

#### Scenario 4, Bilateral recognition

### III ANALYSIS OF EACH SCENARIO

Scenario 1, Germany type reunification by the ROK. The time table for this scenario evolves around the year 1995.

Kim Il-Sung will firmly maintain his socialist system until then. Assuming Kim Il-Sung's death occurs in 1995, Kim Jong-Il (son of Kim Il-Sung) will be in power for the next one or two years. During this period there will be a struggle for supremacy between his government and the reformer's group, organized mainly from the middle class of government officials, technocrats, military officers, etc.. At the end of this struggle, the reformers will gain supremacy and will develop reforms and openness policies. This will require three or four years for implementation.

The Reformers will seek reunification by the ROK because of continuing internal struggle, as well as failures and confusion of economic policy. The ROK will unify Korea by absorbing North Korea around the year 2000.

Major aspects of reunification will consist of the

following: Kim Il-Sung will continue to maintain socialism and autocracy while he is alive. His son, Kim Yong-Il, will assume power when his father dies, but middle class bureaucrats, military leaders and technocrats will press for reform.

A struggle for control will occur between the government of Kim Jong-Il and the reform movement. Members of the reform movement will attain power in both the government and communist party, and will exert their supremacy with the support of the Korean People's Army (KPA). They will succeed in expelling Kim Yong-Il and his party.

The new government will establish reform and openness policies and develop a relationship with the ROK. Once confidence in their relationship is developed between the new government and the ROK, new initiatives for cooperation will occur. The new North Korean government's reform and openness policies will create confusion in their society, causing a breakdown of social systems, especially the economic system. Economic reform will cease. The new government will recognize the failure of their policies, especially economic policy, and seek reunification by the ROK.

Unrest created by scenario 1 will consist of several aspects. Control of all elements of the people's lives will be tightened while Kim Il-Sung is alive. The living standard will become lower than before.<sup>11</sup>

An anti-government movement may develop but will be severely suppressed by the security apparatus. The North Korean people will be stunned by the death of Kim Il-Sung, due to his position as the center of state solidarity and reverence, by the populace, as a God. Kim Jong-Il, to ensure political control, will execute the national mobilization plan. He will increase tensions by staging local crises near the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) and raise the spectre of a ROK attack to support his actions.

During the struggle between Kim Jong-Il's party and the reformists, initial violence will be instigated by the Guard Forces for Kim Jong-Il and the Three Major Revolutionary Groups as they attempt to suppress and purge the reformists. The KPA will stand up to support the reformists and become their backbone. If the reformists and the KPA are not able to overcome Kim Jong-Il's group quickly, there will be large scale armed conflict between the Guard Forces and the KPA.

After the reformists assume power, the new government will still be unstable as members of the former government attempt to regain control. The populace's lives will not improve because of the lack of leadership, disorder in the chain of command, and lack of administrative bureaucracy. This will cause the people to revolt, again, against the government. If this situation occurs, the ROK will probably try to achieve unity by entering the North with military power, justifying its action as a request to restore order

by the North Korean people's government. This will cause major armed conflict between KPA and ROK forces, and may be the catalyst for a second Korean War as Communist China would probably support North Korea, based on communist ties and fear of losing their buffer state with the free world Korean state.

If the ROK absorbs North Korea, unrest will continue because people will lose their means of livelihood, control of the North's economy will shift to the South, disarmament of the KPA will not be voluntary, perceived old debts of injury or loss will be settled by southerners and so forth. Additional factors exacerbating unrest will continue due to impeachment of ex-North Korean government functionaries, economic differences between the North and South and local power struggles throughout the North. If this occurs before the ROK's economy is adequately developed, it will be too big a burden to the ROK's economy and will cause suffering in the South as well as the North.

Reactions of surrounding countries to scenario 1 will probably vary. The CIS will continue to separate themselves from NK while Kim Il-Sung is in power. Once the struggle for power begins, Moscow will move to support the reformists. China will maintain the political and ideological relationship with Kim Il-Sung's government. However, during the struggle after his death, China will try to have relations with both Kim Jong-Il and the reformists. They

will be prepared to influence the new NK government after the power struggle is finished. If the ROK intervention to reunify NK is solely a ROK action China will not hesitate to send their forces in support of NK, and the second Korean War might occur. To avoid a second major conflagration on the Korean Peninsula this century Chinese intervention must be precluded. This means the ROK must carefully consider the effect any armed movement into the North may elicit from China, with the best option being the avoidance of armed intrusion. The ROK should continue to encourage the North to follow an openness policy through dialog. Strong ROK support of the reformists and an openness policy during the struggle after Kim Il-Sung's death will have the best chance of success. The degree of support and methods of assistance by the ROK during this struggle will be closely watched by China. Armed intervention by the ROK while the North sorts out the lines of succession would lead to the worst possible conclusion.

The influence of scenario 1 on Japan would be debilitating. Instability on the Korean Peninsula directly affects Japan by the impact upon Japan's fairly large Korean Community. Aside from the large influx of refugees which could be expected to seek shelter with relatives residing in Japan, the threat of guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks directed against residents, facilities, structures and equipment on Japanese soil is a distinct possibility.

Scenario 2, Rumania type reunification by the ROK. The time table for this scenario generally follows scenario 1. Kim Il-Sung maintains socialism until around 1995. After Kim Il-Sung's death, a People's Revolt will occur and they will come into power within one or two years. The new government will promote reform and an openness policy for one or two years. The ROK will reunify Korea by absorbing the North around the year 2000.

Major aspects of reunification under this scenario are: Kim Il-Sung will continue to maintain socialism and autocracy while living; mid-level bureaucrats will be dissatisfied with the governmental system; continued control of information from the outside world by the NK government, enhanced by strict surveillance of people by the police and public safety system, as well as control of social life; economic stagnation characterized by a lack of consumer products and food. All of these events will increase the populace's dissatisfaction with Kim Il-Sung's government and policies.

The death of Kim Il-Sung will signal the beginning of a people's revolt throughout the North. Major confrontations will occur between the populace and the Guard Forces of Kim Jong-Il. The Korean People's Army will support the people and be the main source of conflict against Kim Jong-Il's party. The people, mid-level bureaucrats and military leaders will cooperate to sweep out Kim Jong-Il, and they

will succeed in establishing their government.

The new government will institute reforms, develop an openness policy and foster a relationship with the ROK. This new People's Government will lack in administrative ability, especially diplomatic negotiation, so negotiations will be controlled by the South and lead to reunification on terms favorable to the ROK.

Unrest due to scenario 2 will begin after Kim Il-Sung dies. Riots and revolt will occur due to dissatisfaction with poverty and meager living conditions, fear and an overarching feeling of freedom from Kim Il-Sung. These reactions will spread throughout the North.

It will take several years for the people to organize and expand anti-government acts. Once the dissident movements surface they will cause large scale civil war. When the civil war ends and a new government is in control the people's life will not improve because of the lack of capable leadership and administrative ability within the new government. This will lead to new anti-government movements among the people. The new government will suppress persons from the former government and the communist party who will be attempting to subvert the new leadership.

After the new government is in control the situation will be like scenario 1 and NK will be absorbed into the ROK. However, this should occur due to negotiation vice armed intervention. As the ROK assumes control via negotiation

instead of force China will not intervene in events.

Surrounding countries will react to this in various ways. Russia will be on the people's side of the revolt and urge the NK government to eschew armed suppression. China will be on the side of Kim Jong-Il in principal, but urge the government to avoid armed suppression. They will not give direct support, such as material or military units, to Kim Jong-Il. China's actions will be oriented on a future relationship with whichever side eventually becomes the victor. The ROK will support the people's side and supply them with material and weapons. The ROK will become a haven for refugees, training some as clandestine agents and returning them to NK.

The effects of scenario 2 on Japan will evolve from refugees trying to go South and to Japan in various way to avoid the civil war. The historical example of Romania, were 100,000 people demonstrated at Timisoara (population about 300,000) and approximately 100,000 people demonstrated at Bucuresti (Capital, population about 2,000,000) on December 22 1989, with a total of about 70,000 injured people, provides insight on the effects of a developing civil war.<sup>12</sup> If a nationwide peoples' uprising occurs in NK, there will be millions of people demonstrating and hundreds of thousands will suffer injury. As a result, large quantities of refugees will come to Japan to escape. Japan is not prepared for this eventuality, so it will be

necessary to provide emergency housing, food, clothes and medical support.

If refugees seek to stay in Japan permanently, the government will have to take actions providing for changes in citizenship and creation of livelihood opportunities. All actions concerning long term assimilation will have to be kept in balance with existing refugee policies for other supplicants. An additional worry would be members of the former government entering Japan as refugees. They may attempt to establish a provisional government in Japan and continue their conflict on Japanese soil. That would become a political problem.

Scenario 3, Vietnam type reunification by North Korea. The time table for scenario 3 also assumes the death of Kim Il-Sung around 1995, with socialism firmly entrenched during his lifetime and the subsequent transition to his son. The ROK's new President, Kim Young-Sam, emplaces a new government bureaucracy and policies. Unfortunately, his internal policies fail, primarily his economic program, which lead to labor and management problems. Around 1996/1997, internal politics become unstable.

By 1998, Kim Dae-Jung returns to ROK politics, wins the presidency and opens his government with strong support of the people, plus covert North Korean support. Around 1998 to 1999, Kim Dae-Jung's government asks the U.S. to execute

the 3rd stage of the reduction plan for U.S. forces in Korea. As a result, the majority of U.S. forces are withdrawn. At the same time, he implements policies which destabilize the South, to the delight of the North.

These actions lead to a North Korean invasion of the South. The political and social unrest in the South create a climate advantageous to the North's aggressive invasion, resulting in total occupation and eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula under North Korean terms.

Unique aspects of this reunification are: the government of Kim Il-Sung and his son Kim Jong-Il continues, as does intense ideological education, control of foreign intelligence and internal surveillance against the North Korean populace; the Kims' regime remains in strong command and control of their military forces; the North Korean economy succeeds due to a change in national policy allowing limited economic interface with the outside, made possible by Chinese economic support and Japanese fiscal aid provided as post World War II reparations; in the ROK, distrust of the government increases due to confused internal politics, a dissident movement and frequent labor-management disputes; nongovernment parties and elements of the government party unite with Kim Dae-Jung as the central feature, followed by a governmental change from Kim Young-Sam to Kim Dae-Jung. President Kim Dae-Jung adopts policies in favor of the North, he asks the U.S. to execute the 3rd stage of the reduction

plan for U.S. forces in Korea, and the main U.S. forces withdraw; a military coup is attempted by those dissatisfied with Kim Dae-Jung's policies, which causes him to request military intervention by the North; North Korea conquers Seoul quickly, taking advantage of slack defenses due to the coup and unstable social conditions; Kim Dae-Jung declares reunification of Korea by North Korea following occupation and control of South Korea by North Korean forces.

Unrest due to scenario 3 will start with dissident activities in the ROK intensified by the lack of the leadership from the Kim Young-Sam government. This will throw the national assembly into chaos, characterized by increased disputes between government and non-government parties, military forces operating independently, labor-management disputes, intensified anti-government activities by students and the general populace and a state of unrest becoming the norm.

Other influences which could exacerbate the situation would be a worsening Middle East situation leading to increased oil prices, decreased exports caused by the internal turmoil, increased unemployment and a general decline in the economy from all these factors. Instability in the South will be heightened by increased terrorists activities executed by northerners within the South.

Once Kim Dae-Jung assumes power, the government and the military will oppose each other. A request by Kim Dae-Jung

for North Korean assistance to suppress a military coup will be the pretext for North Korea to invade the South. This will allow North Korea to achieve reunification using the method they have advocated for more than forty years. This scenario must occur before the economic gap between South and North grows so large that the North can no longer catch up. Reunification by force would require support by other communist countries, China being most likely.

North Korean military intervention would become the second Korean War, more intense and rapidly concluded due to modernity and enhanced lethality of forces. The damage to Seoul (population twelve million) would be the ruin of the ROK since so much political, economic and social power is concentrated in the urban sprawl of Seoul.

After reunification by NK, severe population control would be imposed on the South. Extreme devastation to land and property in the South will cripple the economy.

Reactions of surrounding countries will support a rapid conclusion of events. The CIS and China will overtly support NK's military invasion and urge other countries to localize the military conflict between the South and North. However, both countries will provide support, material and manpower, in a limited manner to the North. They will endeavor to maintain relations with Kim's government.

Japan's reactions will begin after Kim Jong-Il relaxes his economic stance and diplomatic relations will be opened

with North Korea. Japan will agree to give the North economic aid. Aid will be cut off when it becomes clear it was used for war preparation. Western countries and Japan will ask the CIS and China not to intervene and not to provide support to NK for war with the ROK. If CIS and China give assistance, Japan will have to reassess its economic policies toward them. If Kim Dae-Jung adopts policies favorable to the North, Japan will have to reevaluate the relationship with the ROK.

When the North invades the South, guerrilla and terrorist attacks will be directed against Japan. Japan will protect both property and population. U.S. forces will be committed to support South Korea. This will make Japanese support for U.S. forces in Japan under the current U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty difficult because the treaty is for the defense of Japan. Fear of future Korean actions against Japan will probably cause a legal debate on U.S. use of support facilities for any involvement in Korea.

However, if China enters the conflict, it will probably become a global war. Global warfare would cause the Japanese Diet to rethink and probably change Japanese policy on use of military force outside of Japanese territory.

Scenario 4, Bilateral recognition. This scenario's time table begins with Kim Il-Sung executing his reform and openness policies until approximately 1995. During this time the North will recover their national strength and succeed in developing a new socialist country. Kim Il-Sung's son, Kim Jong-Il, will continue the new socialist system and achieve stability. Both the South and the North will continue to co-exist from Kim Il-Sung's death until around the year 2000, at which time the situation will move to scenario 1, 2 or 3, depending on the environment after 2000.

Aspects of the bilateral recognition scenario are: Kim Il-Sung will weigh the facts and determine there will be no way to avoid international isolation and economic collapse unless he carries out a reform and openness policy, giving up his goal of forcible liberation of the ROK. North Korea will approach western countries seeking economic support while avoiding international isolation.

Kim Il-Sung's leadership and personal charisma will be the glue which holds the North together during the shift to a new governmental structure. He will overcome the people's distrust of him and his son by the following.

The state ideology and leadership, called CHUCH'E, will undergo radical change to support reform and openness so the state can grow and implement its new structure.

Through four decades of rule, Kim Il Sung had

developed a despotic, totalitarian regime through the development of a personal ideology into state dogma (CHUCH'E), highlighted by the most intense personality cult in modern history, a xenophobic fear of foreign influence and a total domination and control of all aspects of society.

CHUCH'E can be loosely translated into a doctrine of self-reliance. A more formal definition states that CHUCH'E "...approaches revolution and construction by oneself in a self-reliant manner..." (13)

The main ideology of the North is Kim Il-Sung's CHUCH'E so there is no relationship between the collapse of socialism and CHUCH'E. As Northern economic development is retarded compared with the South, economic openness will enable the North to catch up with the South. The North will apply economic assistance from Japan to aid their economic recovery. Western countries will recognize the changes in the North, change their policies of enmity and begin economic relations with the North. The new reform and openness policies will be firmly established in both the economic and political infrastructure of the North several years before the death of Kim Il-Sung. Kim Jong-Il will succeed his father smoothly after his death, and will continue to shelve the ideal of a "Reunified Korea" and recognize "Two Countries, Two Structures and Two Governments in the Korean Peninsula". Both states will co-exist in peace and mutual prosperity.

Potential unrest associated with scenario 4 would begin in the North. Even with Kim Il-Sung's personal leadership and charisma, institution of a new policy supporting

democratization and openness in the North may not succeed due to public distrust of Kim's regime, based on the disparity between the ideal and reality. Particularly if North Korea officially recognizes the ROK as a sovereign state given the present situation, this means giving up the slogan of a "Sole Korea" advocated by Kim Il-Sung. This will weaken the North Korean people's confidence in Kim Il-Sung.

If the prosperity of the ROK becomes widely known among North Korean people, it will be proof of Northern economic policy failure and will lead to degradation of the North Korean government. If North Koreans rebel, NK will move to scenario 1 or 2. After NK opens their markets, products from western countries will sweep away North Korean products, and NK companies will be in danger of failure. The economic situation may be confused. This may lead to scenario 1 or 2.

If North Korea recovers its national power through economic aid from Japan and other western nations, it is possible North Korea will purchase advanced western weapons with foreign currency, try to build up its military power again and revive its ambition of armed invasion of the ROK.<sup>14</sup> In this case, North Korea will move to scenario 3.

The reaction of surrounding countries to scenario 4 will be supportive. The CIS will welcome the North Korean reform and openness policy and provide vigorous support. China will also welcome this change in policy, but China

will be concerned about North Korean political openness because China fears the collapse of their socialist regime. The ROK will be a showcase for prosperity to North Korea and will work hard providing intelligence and capital for reforming and opening the North to democracy and free markets. In the short term, the most desirable feature is that both NK and the ROK coexistence and prosper.

The influence of scenario 4 on Japan will be varied. Mutual recognition and efforts to ensure coexistence and prosperity by both North and South will achieve "Cross Recognition", which is the desired solution for the initial state or reunification. This will stabilize Northeast Asia and cause the Japanese people to think the confrontations between east and west have been solved, the threat to Japan has decreased and no future requirement exists to continue the Japanese defense buildup. The Japanese people will have to be reminded that North Korea has never given up forceful reunification of Korea. To guarantee stability on the Korean Peninsula, it will be necessary to establish multinational organizations for arms control and arms reduction consultation among Japan, the U.S. the ROK, the CIS, China and North Korea.

#### IV INFLUENCE OF A REUNIFIED KOREA ON JAPAN

A reunified Korea will be a state with one race, characterized by diligence, high education standards and a population of approximately 70 million people. Politically, Korea will be susceptible to influence by China and the CIS due to geographical proximity. Domestic/social unrest could continue incessantly after reunification because of accusations concerning responsibility for the Korean War, economic disparity between the North and South and local power struggles. Koreans still retain anti-Japanese sentiments due to Japanese control of Korea in the past. They have relatively favorable feelings for China and the CIS based on historical support for the North and opening of diplomatic relations with the South in the early 1990s.

Economic features of this scenario may be the focus of success or failure. Korea, like Japan, has an industrial structure oriented on import/export because of a lack of natural resources. As a consequence, Korea is very likely to compete with Japan. When the ROK absorbs North Korea, it will be a heavy burden for the ROK economy. Economic improvement, at least in the near term following reunification, will be unlikely. If a Vietnam type armed reunification occurs, South Korea's economic base may be destroyed.

Military aspects will depend on which reunification

scenario happens. A unified Korea as a member of the free world will face China and the CIS with a long border between them. A unified Korea as part of a socialist world will face Japan across the Tsushima Strait.

Regardless of whether the political system is Free or Socialist, military leaders of a unified Korea will have an influential role in politics as they will have the backing of a powerful military structure. However reunification occurs a strong military will still be required to keep balance against cross border opposition.

Japan will be influenced by any form of reunification. If the ROK absorbs North Korea as in scenario 1 or 2, North Korea will disappear and socialism will be supplanted by democracy. Japanese public opinion will demand a reduction of the defense structure based on a reduced threat. Furthermore, Japanese and U.S. public opinion will insist that the necessity for deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and Korea has disappeared due to Korean reunification. As an intermediate step tripartite security cooperation between the U.S., Japan and a reunified Korea will be necessary. The U.S., as focal point of security treaties for both Japan and the ROK, will have to be the catalyst for this interim measure. After implementation of a tripartite security arrangement, Japan and a unified Korea will have to negotiate a bilateral security treaty to allow withdrawal of all U.S. forces. As the common friend between both

countries the U.S. will have to assist Japan and Korea in this effort, overcoming strong anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea and fear of Korea as a competitor in Japan.

If the Korean peninsula is socialized as in scenario 3, Japan will be faced with a communist Korea having a strong military, in both quality and quantity of equipment and personnel, across the Tsushima Strait. Japan will have to reexamine its defense posture, now oriented on the Northern part of Japan. This will require development of plans and force structure oriented on a Korean threat to the west.

#### V RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JAPANESE STRATEGY

Patient dialogue is better than pressure on NK. North Korea is clearly worried about, and fears, the demise of their establishment. They have always tried to be isolationist and lockout their country from the world. If the isolation of NK is increased by western pressure they might commit their military forces in an effort to maintain their supremacy. Dialogue without haste is a better way to maintain communications and the relationship with NK, and has the best chance of causing NK internal change. Causing war and conflict on the Korean Peninsula is the worst choice for Japan.

Strengthening the political relationship among the U.S., the ROK and Japan will be beneficial. Bilateral

relationships between the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan have been strengthened economically and politically. But a close relationship between the ROK and Japan has just begun to develop in 1992. Negotiations between all three countries on Northeast Asian Security have yet to occur. The probability for success of three way negotiations on this issue may be greater than continued discussion on reunification between North and South Korea, and may be more important to regional peace and security in the long run. Developing a vision of trilateral peace and prosperity may be the best strategy for improving relationships.

North Korea's choice of a political and social system is their own. Judging from history, socialism will not endure, there is no need to be hasty in negotiations with the NK. North Korea is at the peak of national power. With the flow of time, the necessity of change will occur in the NK. External intervention, with pressure for North Korean political and ideologic change, will just add to the confusion. Military pressure is out of the question. It is better to provide space for NK to choose their political and social system based on the North Korean people's intentions.

Maintaining and verifying the non-nuclear weapons status of both Koreas is vital to continued peace on the Korean Peninsula. Both North and South Korea declared themselves free of nuclear weapons on the last day of 1991.

To ensure the non-nuclear status continues, mutually agreed upon inspections and unlimited access to suspected manufacturing or storage sites must be instituted, with no exceptions. Japan should support this position.

## VI CONCLUSION

Japan will have to keep a careful watch on developments between North and South Korea. The situation will reach a turning point around the year 2000. No matter which scenario becomes fact, we must undertake all possible efforts to avoid a Second Korean War, utilizing our wisdom and assets to build a more stable and prosperous Northeast Asia.

## ENDNOTES

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2. Ibid., p. 77

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4. "Chinese Congree Endorses Deng Xiaoping's Reforms," Daily YOMIURI (press), Oct. 13 1992,

5. "China and South Korea establish foreign relation," Daily YOMIURI (press), Aug. 23 1992,

6. Shushinkai: p. 77

7. Ibid., p. 78

8. Ibid., p. 78

9. Ibid., p. 76

10. "Korea-North," Far Eastern Economic Review ASIA 1991 YEARBOOK (Hongkong: Review Publishing Company Ltd., 1991), p. 139

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12. "Timisoara Incident," Asahi Gendai Yougo CHIEZO 1991 (Tokyo: Asahi Press., 1991), p. 1117

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