(2)

STUDY PROJECT

ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION FOR THE POST COLD WAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN C. LATIMER
United States Army

USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS:

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY:

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE:

4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S):

5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S):

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION: U.S. Army War College

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable):

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION:

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): Carlisle Barracks
Root Hall, Bldg 122
Carlisle, PA 17013-5050

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code):

8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable):

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code):

10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification): Army Roles, Missions and Organization for the Post Cold War (U)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S): LTC John C. Latimer

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Study Project	FROM _____ TO _____	93/04/07	47

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION:

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS

21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
COL David E. Shaver	(717) 245-4040	AWCI

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 *Previous editions are obsolete.* SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John C. Latimer, LTC, USA

TITLE: Army Roles, Missions and Organization for the Post Cold War

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 46 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This study reviews current U.S. Army roles and missions, examines the effects of a changed strategic landscape precipitated by the end of the cold war, and proposes changes in roles, missions, and organizations to meet the challenges of a post Cold War world. Specifically, it examines United States foreign policy goals and protection of U.S. vital and major interests; changes in global power following the end of the Cold War; the increase in ethnic and regional strife in Eastern Europe; the changing nature of regional conflict and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons; the emerging role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and peacekeeping; the Army's involvement in the war on drugs; public support and expectations; and, the size, organization and funding of Army forces. The study is not intended, nor does it try to determine roles and functions for the other Services. It does propose the creation of a composite division, made up of both heavy and light brigades, to better fulfill Army roles and missions and increase division utility in an uncertain world.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

Army Roles, Missions and Organization for the Post Cold War

An Individual Study Project

by

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Latimer
United States Army

Colonel David E. Shaver
Project Advisor

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John C. Latimer, LTC, USA

TITLE: Army Roles, Missions and Organization for the Post Cold War

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 46 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This study reviews current U.S. Army roles and missions, examines the effects of a changed strategic landscape precipitated by the end of the cold war, and proposes changes in roles, missions, and organizations to meet the challenges of a post Cold War world. Specifically, it examines United States foreign policy goals and protection of U.S. vital and major interests; changes in global power following the end of the Cold War; the increase in ethnic and regional strife in Eastern Europe; the changing nature of regional conflict and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons; the emerging role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and peacekeeping; the Army's involvement in the war on drugs; public support and expectations; and, the size, organization and funding of Army forces. The study is not intended, nor does it try to determine roles and functions for the other Services. It does propose the creation of a composite division, made up of both heavy and light brigades, to better fulfill Army roles and missions and increase division utility in an uncertain world.

Army Roles, Missions and Organization for the Post Cold War

Introduction

This paper examines current US Army roles and missions, and proposes future roles and missions for the post cold war Army. It is not intended, nor does it try to determine roles and missions for the other Services. As an adjunct, it proposes a change in current division structure to better fulfil Army roles and missions and increase division utility in an uncertain world.

Following World War II there was great debate over service "roles and missions." Not only did the Army and Navy disagree over specific areas of responsibility, but the Army Air Corps argued it should be an independent service. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and established the Air Force as a separate service.[1] The act also established the rationale for the military services and specified the composition, purpose and responsibility of each, but it did not stop the argument over service roles and missions.

In an attempt to reach mutually agreeable positions on service roles and missions, then Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened a conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida.[2] While the Key West Agreement of 1948 further sharpened and clarified service functions, it was not able to adjudicate the conflicting claims to the long-term satisfaction of any of the services. For the services, the argument over

roles and missions was not just one of pride and tradition, but one of power and resources. Control of a mission allowed a service to claim budget resources. Over the years, the emergence of new technologies in such areas as aviation, missiles, and satellites, further clouded the issue and exacerbated the already emotional arguments of the services.[3]

In 1991, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the success of the U.S.-led coalition force in the Gulf War, U.S. national military strategy was refocused to deal with regional crises vice global war with the Soviet Union. The new strategy was based on four critical elements: strategic deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and reconstitution.[4] Evaluation of the force structure needed to support this new strategy response to potential contingencies resulted in dramatic force reductions in all the military services which intensified the debate over service roles and missions.

The American people have never supported a large standing military during peacetime. The end of the Cold War and the spiralling national debt add to this natural phenomenon. This demand for a "peace dividend" has also served to renew and intensify the roles and missions debate and given rise to congressional demands for reexamination of service roles and missions, organization, and intra-service reforms. As a result, the services have scrambled to reorganize and develop new

strategies to demonstrate cost saving efficiencies and force structure utility.

The results of these efforts have been the Air Force's "Reshaping for the Future" white paper, the Navy's "From the Sea" strategy, and the Army's "Strategic Force - Strategic Vision" concept. Unfortunately, none of these attempts adequately address the issue of redefining service roles and missions.

Background

Defining the Terms: Roles and Missions

Over the years, since the Key West Agreement, the division of roles and missions has become blurred. Some critics have argued this blurring has resulted in unnecessary redundancy and duplication among the military services, and excessive costs to taxpayers.[5] As examples of redundancy, these critics often cite the four different "air forces" of the services, and the apparent duplication of ground forces in the Army and Marine Corps. Others, like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, have lodged counter arguments that some redundancy is not bad, likening redundancy amongst the services to the multiple safety features of a modern automobile.[6] Part of the problem concerning roles and missions has been definition.

The publication of the *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces*

of the United States in February 1993, defined, for the first time, these two terms.[7] It also defined another frequently used term, "function." The report provides the following definitions:

Roles -- "The broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established by the Congress in law."

Missions -- "Are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs)."

Functions -- "Are specific responsibilities assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles."

For simplicity, clarity, and definitional precision, the remainder of this paper uses General Powell's definitions of "roles " and "functions." As a point of departure for redefining Army roles and functions, it is necessary to determine current Army roles and functions.

Current Army Roles and Functions

Current Army roles and functions come from two basic source documents -- Title 10, *United States Code Armed Forces*, and Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, dated September 25, 1987. Summary extracts of these two documents covering specific assigned roles and functions of the Army are at Appendix

I. The following is a summary of roles and functions currently assigned to the Army:

(1) The Army is responsible for organizing, training and equipping land combat, service and special operations forces (not including Marine forces) to:

(a) Defend the U.S. homeland and territories.

(b) Conduct sustained combat operations on land -- specifically to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.

(c) Protect U.S. citizens and property abroad.

(d) Support the laws of the nation and to suppress insurrection or rebellion.

(e) Provide for the expansion of the peacetime component to meet the needs of war.

(2) In conjunction with the other services, the Army plans for the joint conduct of amphibious, airborne, and space operations.

(3) The Army is responsible for the following special activities:

(a) Authorized civil works activities, including programs for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion, and other water resource developments.

(b) Management and operation of the Panama Canal.

Although not specifically mentioned or assigned as a role or function in the two previous documents, the Army does have

functional responsibilities in several other areas, such as anti-drug operations, peacekeeping, nation building, military support to civil authorities, and military support of civil defense. These functions are covered by other DOD directives, executive orders, or other acts. Due to the changing nature of these documents, and their assignment of functions, a review of these documents is not included. However, the functional areas referenced are discussed and recommendations made concerning the assignment of functions.

Factors Bearing on Defining Post Cold War Roles and Functions

Any cogent discussion of Army roles and functions must consider the following factors:

-- How foreign policy goals and the protection of vital and major interests affect roles and functions (and missions for combatant regional commands).

-- Change in global power following the end of the Cold War; the subsequent increase in ethnic and regional strife in Eastern Europe; and, the changing nature of regional conflict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

-- Emerging role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

-- Army involvement in the war on drugs.

-- Public support and expectations.

-- Size, organization, and funding of Army forces.

A brief discussion of each of these areas of consideration follows.

How Foreign Policy Goals and Interests Affect Roles and Functions

U.S. foreign policy goals fall into two basic categories -- vital and desirable goals. Vital policy goals are:

- protection of the U.S. homeland from attack and destruction;
- preservation of an open international economic order;
- maintain access to Persian Gulf oil; and
- prevent great power wars on the European continent.

Three additional goals, listed as desirable, but not vital are:

- promotion of democratic institutions and human rights;
- reducing the spread of weapons of mass destruction; and
- preventing the slaughter of a nation's citizenry, either by dictatorial leaders or ethnic strife.[8]

Supporting these goals requires the Department of Defense to maintain both strategic defense and conventional forces. For the Army, this translates into an enduring "role" of maintaining a strategic air and missile defense capability and sufficient conventional forces to respond to both regional contingencies and national defense requirements.

Arguably, two other Army functions -- participating in conflict resolution and rendering of humanitarian assistance -- have already been both established and validated by the political

decisions to deploy forces to Northern Iraq and Somalia. The case of Somalia clearly shows that U.S. interests can be critically challenged when regional instability and conflict combine to create human disaster.

Other foreign policy interests and regional defense agreements also impact on Army functions, specifically, peacekeeping operations. In addition to supporting United Nations operations, U.S. Army forces also participate in non-UN peacekeeping organizations, such as The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.[9] These forces are in addition to the approximately 500 individuals assigned to other UN peacekeeping duties.[10] The Department of State also is considering recommending that the United States widen its participation in other UN peacekeeping ventures.[11] Increased participation in peacekeeping (and other types of conflict resolution) operations may require that the Army redefine unit missions, reallocate resources and redirect training to meet peacekeeping requirements.

Training is essential -- especially for combat forces -- for peacekeeping operations to be successful. Training must be conducted to sensitize soldiers to the differences between peacekeeping and warfighting. Such training must cover a myriad of areas, such as: rules of engagement; ethnic and religious customs; language orientation; environmental considerations; situational responses; authority and treaty responsibilities;

organizational chains of command; intelligence requirements; special medical requirements; civil affairs; patrolling; negotiation techniques; surveillance and monitoring techniques; search and seizure rules; supervision and monitoring of prisoners; mine clearing; ordnance disposal; traffic control; force security; and, reporting requirements and procedures. Combat units assigned to peacekeeping duty quickly lose their warfighting edge and require training to return combat skills to acceptable individual and unit standards.

Impact of a Changing World

"For the world is still a dangerous place. Only the dead have seen the end of conflict. And though yesterday's challenges are behind us, tommorrow's are being born."[12]

President George Bush

With the breakup of the Soviet Union came a corresponding shift in global power and a new American strategy. According to the Secretary of Defense's 1993 Report to the President and the Congress, "The demise of the Soviet Union ended the traditional Cold War threat of global conflict posed by a hostile superpower. But the potential for major threats at the regional level -- typified by Saddam Hussein's attempt to dominate the Persian Gulf through Iraq's invasion of Kuwait -- still exits."[13] The Secretary's report also states, " The nature and severity of low-intensity conflict threats are changing with the passing of

the Cold War and superpower competition. Policy challenges such as peacekeeping, proliferation, terrorism, subversion, coup d'etat, and other low-intensity conflict activities will remain important security concerns for the United States, particularly as they affect U.S. regional security."[14]

While the disintegration of the Soviet Union has lead to a dramatic change in global power, it also has precipitated conflict, and the potential for conflict, in Eastern Europe between historic enemies. Ethnic enemies, once kept in check by the presence of Soviet forces and communist regimes, are no longer constrained. In former Yugoslavia, where the most severe of these struggles is occurring, United Nations peacekeeping forces have already been deployed.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, possession of the Soviet nuclear arsenal split among three states: Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. Although Moscow controls the strategic nuclear force, the control of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine is not nearly so clear.[15] The potential exists for some of these weapons to find their way into the hands of extremist or ethnic groups seeking to assert themselves in national or regional power struggles.

Another indicator of a more dangerous world with the potential for conflict is the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by regional powers. Ten nations reportedly have, or are developing, nuclear weapons, twenty have

chemical weapons, and at least twenty-five have or are developing ballistic missiles.[16] Approximately 56 countries are capable of engaging in mid-intensity conflict with military forces that have at least two of the following: 700 tanks/armored personnel carriers, 100 combat aircraft, 500 artillery pieces, or over 100,000 soldiers.[17]

What effect do these changes have on the role and functions of the Army? While the passing of the Soviet Union has virtually eliminated the prospect of a massive armored ground attack in Western Europe, it has also brought the emergence of a mix of new threats. These new threats cover the spectrum from low, mid and high intensity operations to the threat of missile, air, or ground delivered low yield nuclear weapons. Meeting these threats will continue to require a mix of forces -- only fewer. For the Army, this translates into a requirement to maintain an appropriate mix of forces -- light, heavy, and special operating forces, and their appropriate combat support and combat service support forces, as well as theater air defense forces.[18] Meeting a spectrum of regional requirements -- from conflict resolution (peacemaking and peace-enforcement) and peacekeeping operations to involvement in major conflicts -- requires the Army review its divisional force structure. It should do so with an eye toward creating divisions that can respond to a variety of challenges, without augmentation or reconfiguration. Besides reviewing divisional force structure, consideration also must be given to

increasing active force military police, civil affairs and psychological operations units.

Emerging Role of the United Nations

The success of United Nation's coalition forces in the Gulf War ushered in a new era for the UN. The Gulf War marked the first time in forty years that the U.N. was able to develop an overwhelming consensus for action. Following the war, UN sponsored forces came to the assistance of Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq, and have enforced a stringent no fly zone in the south (a peace-enforcement action). These actions, coupled with the demand for inspection of Iraqi nuclear development centers, have given new credibility to United Nations actions. The war also set the stage for future UN military activities and actions.

While the activity of "peacekeeping" was not originally defined in the UN charter, it has become a primary mission. Since 1988, the UN established fourteen peacekeeping operations, more than in all previous years.[19] Today, peacekeeping is a growth industry. Prior to the most recent intervention in Somalia, the UN had over 50,000 personnel involved in peacekeeping operations.[20] There are several obvious reasons for the expansion in peacekeeping operations, however, the single greatest is that the post Cold War Security Council has become more agreeable to mounting such operations. Besides the traditional peacekeeping role, peacekeepers in the 1990s have

another task -- the protection of the delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians caught up in a continuing conflict -- such as is underway in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.[21] There is no reason to believe that the demand for such operations will not continue to increase. In addition to peacekeeping operations, the UN is increasingly finding more demand in the post-cold war world for conflict resolution or peacemaking forces.

The term "peacemaking" can be interpreted several different ways, and is by various organizations. The UN uses the term to mean diplomatic measures taken to end fighting. A more conventional interpretation, and the one I use in this paper, is akin to the terminology used by many on the Joint Staff for peace-enforcement, being the "physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease fire that does not exist."

It may be that the timing is right to create a standing UN response force.[22] Such a force, some argue, "is likely to be more of a deterrent to aggression than one organized on an ad hoc basis after aggression has occurred, as was the case in the Persian Gulf War."[23]

The possibility of U.S. forces participating in these types of activities -- humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement -- also has an impact on Army roles and functions. Each requires a distinctly different force

and different training. Rendering humanitarian assistance likely will require a mix of forces, but especially combat service support units. Peacemaking and peace-enforcement require combat forces and the application of combat power, while peacekeeping, can, and often should be, conducted by military police forces.

Military police battalions are uniquely suited to conduct peacekeeping operations. They have as Mission Essential Tasks, many of the tasks which combat arms peacekeepers must be trained to do. Unfortunately, there are not enough military police battalions in the current force structure to meet current requirements and conduct peacekeeping operations.

Each situation is different and while Military Police are uniquely suited to conduct peacekeeping operations, they are not suitable for peace-enforcement operations.[24] Regardless, the Army can expect to be called on to support more UN sponsored humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement operations.

Army Involvement in the War on Drugs

There has been considerable public debate concerning the propriety of using military forces to combat the flow and usage of illegal drugs, but the inescapable fact remains that the military is involved and likely will be more so in the future. The question then, is "what functions should the military --

specifically the Army -- perform in the national anti-drug effort?"

In his letter to Congress forwarding the National Drug Control Strategy, then President Bush stated, "The war on drugs is vital to our country's economy, international competitiveness, and security."[25] Both the National Security and National Military Strategies of the United States support this view, and each addresses military involvement in the war on drugs.

According to the National Military Strategy, published January 1992, "A comprehensive program for attacking the flow of drugs -- at the source and in transit -- has been established. In the United States proper, the military will support local, state, and federal agencies as permitted by law. The US military is fully committed to this effort."[26] Those who argue for increased military involvement suggest the Armed Forces have both the manpower and technology to combat drugs, and in an era of peace, are available. While these assertions may be true, they can perhaps lead to the wrong conclusion.

The military is not a panacea for combatting illegal drugs. In fact, the success the military (including the Coast Guard) has enjoyed, has been relatively limited when compared to expended resources and manpower.[27] The military cannot and should not be asked to close the nation's borders, patrol the adjacent sea or the contiguous skies to stop the flow of illegal drugs -- ***as a primary mission***. The primary purpose of the military is to be

prepared to fight the nation's wars, but there are significant ways in which the military can help in combatting illegal drugs without degrading combat preparedness.

There are many areas where the Army can and likely should contribute to the war on drugs. The Army, in conjunction with the other services, should support the actions of U.S. agencies and the military forces of drug producing countries to interdict export routes and destroy production centers. Developing nations have so far been able to combat threats of drug cartels to overthrow legitimate governments, but the appearance of narco-regimes are real possibilities, particularly without U.S. assistance and action.[28] The illegal drug problem is the result of a demand of 25 million drug using Americans; consequently, the Army and the nation must be willing to pay the price.

The Army also can play an important role in educating America to the perils of drug use and abuse. The Army has junior (high school) and senior (college) Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC) instructor groups, service recruiters and readiness advisors located throughout the nation. These individuals meet the public daily and are conduits for information on military affairs -- why not use them to provide information on the effects and repercussions of drug usage? They are trained and positioned to take a centrally developed anti-drug message to all of America, unfortunately, there are far too few of them.

Besides these older and more senior service members, the military has thousands of young people who have graduated from high school within the last two to three years. Establishment of a policy, similar to the "hometown recruiter" used in the mid-1970s, also could be useful in taking the anti-drug message to American youth.

Besides helping in the area of education, military assets (primarily National Guard forces) should continue to be used in the drug interdiction effort. They should not, however, be used to the extent that such duties cause a serious degradation of readiness within units. Another area where military assets, both active and reserves, can be used is in the area of intelligence. Currently, the Drug Enforcement Agency does not have sufficient analysts to process the 8,000 intelligence reports it receives weekly.[29] Military intelligence analysts could make a major contribution in this area.

Just as the Drug Enforcement Agency does not have sufficient intelligence analysts, local communities do not have sufficient drug treatment centers or medical personnel. It is possible that military medical personnel (both active and reserves) could play an important role in assisting with the medical treatment and care of drug users in treatment centers -- again, a mission which would have to be carefully weighed to ensure readiness.

There are many other areas where use of military personnel and assets could be used to make significant contributions in the

war on drugs. The chart at Appendix II provides other illustrative examples of areas that could be explored to augment or assist the various government agencies in the war on illegal drug trafficking and usage. Many missions, have the potential to both assist in the war on drugs and provide funded training opportunities for units.[30]

Public Support and Expectations

Army forces have historically provided support to civil authorities under a variety of conditions. These include disaster relief operations, emergency assistance measures, arms control activities, emergency medical assistance, and counterdrug operations. The Army is uniquely qualified to deal with these types of activities, and the only federal agency capable of dealing with major disasters. Over the years, Army forces have assisted civil government in many ways, from the removal of snow in Buffalo, NY in the mid-1970s to the recent aid Army soldiers provided the victims of Hurricane Andrew in Florida and Louisiana.[31] Army forces assisted in the cleanup of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, and each summer provide battalions to help in fighting forest fires in the west. When required, Army forces have also assisted civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order, such as was required in Los Angeles following the Rodney King trial.[32]

While the American people may understand that the Army's primary role is to fight the nation's wars, they have also grown to expect that their Army will come to their need during times of natural disaster or national emergency. As evidenced by the recent example of humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the American people also expect their Army to defend American "ideological vital interests" in other parts of the world. At a time when the national deficit has become a platform for political change, some argue that the American people are not willing to pay $250 billion a year for a military they perceive is not very useful.[33] Consequently, it may be time for the Army to focus more on meeting the nation's domestic needs.

Size, Organization and Funding of the Army

Under the Bush Administration force reduction plan, the active Army was to decrease from 18 divisions and 732,000 personnel in FY 1990 to 12 divisions and 536,000 in FY 1995.[34] Under the new Clinton administration, these numbers could be reduced to 10 or fewer divisions and under 400,000 personnel. Maintaining the ability to meet contingencies across the conflict spectrum at such reduced levels will increasingly become more difficult. In addition to reducing the size of the Army, President Clinton has also announced his intention to reduce the Department of Defense budget -- and therefore the Army's

budget.[35] Unfortunately these reductions come at a time when the Army is being directed to do more.

If the Army is to continue to meet the non-combat requirements of the nation and at the same time, maintain unit readiness for combat, it must find new and innovative ways of training, and reducing expenses. Accordingly, it is time the Army not only reexamines its roles and functions, but reorganizes its divisions to both preserve force structure and training readiness, and to meet the combat and non-combat requirements of a changing world.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Roles and Functions for the Post-Cold War Army

The Army of the 1990's can expect to continue to be charged with the enduring roles of providing air and missile defense (for both the nation and deployed forces), and conventional and unconventional combat, combat support and combat service support forces to respond to regional contingencies. Assigned by law functions -- those found in Title 10, DOD Directives, and Executive orders -- should essentially remain unchanged, with the possible exception of space assigned functions and close air support.[36] In addition to maintaining these functions, the Army should expect to increase its functional responsibilities in several other areas. The Army has acknowledged many of these

areas and is currently drafting doctrine to address its specific functional responsibilities concerning assistance to U.S. civil authorities.[37]

The Army should expect and be given responsibility for support of all diplomatically approved peacekeeping operations to include:

-- Organizing, training and equipping peacekeeping forces.

-- Developing peacekeeping doctrine in coordination with the other military services.

-- Providing civil affairs and psychological operations units to support peacekeeping operations.

-- Developing civil affairs and psychological operations doctrine for peacekeeping.

-- Providing logistical support and developing logistical doctrine to support peacekeeping operations.

The Army should expect and be given responsibility for providing ground forces to respond to a variety of humanitarian disaster needs. Responsibilities should include:

-- Planning for and providing logistical support.

-- Organizing, training and providing security forces.

-- Developing doctrine for responding to humanitarian disasters.

The Army also should expect to be given greater responsibilities in combatting the war on drugs -- and should

actively seek to contribute in selective "non-combative" areas. These functions should include, but not be limited to:

-- Developing doctrine for working with U.S. and other government agencies to combat the flow and use of illegal drugs.

-- In conjunction with the Department of Defense and the other services, develop a public information program to increase drug awareness.

-- Exploring other ways -- such as those provided in Appendix II -- to assist in combatting the flow and use of illegal drugs.

Time for a New Organization

Among the uncertainties of the future are the size and composition of the Army, and the other services. Since the end of the Cold War, the military services have come under increased criticism for failure to change their organizations to meet the future. Only one, the Air Force, has taken any significant steps to restructure its command, management, and warfighting capabilities.[38]

The Air Force has combined elements of three major combat commands into one, the Air Combat Command. At wing level, this reorganization has resulted in "composite wings," under a single wing commander, which include a tailored mix of "strategic" and "tactical" aircraft and appropriate support assets. According to the Secretary of the Air Force, this consolidation allows the

wing to deploy faster, and respond with greater unity of command than at anytime in the past.[39]

If the Army is to control its own destiny, it must, like the Air Force, reexamine its warfighting structure. It must ensure it does not fall into the trap of preparing for the next war based on the last. Meeting the challenges of a changing, and potentially volatile, strategic environment will require a change in the Army's warfighting force structure.

The Structure Problem.

The Army's current divisional force structure is not adequate to meet the demands of the nation's post-cold war strategy. Since World War II, Army divisions (exclusive of specialty divisions) have restructured five times (Triangular, Pentomic, ROAD, Div 86, AOE). Each change has been to increase warfighting capability and efficiency against a well defined threat. In the last twenty years, this threat was the heavy forces of the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

The Army also developed light infantry divisions during the latter of this two decade period. Although not designed to counter Soviet armor, the Army developed light divisions to have applicability across the spectrum of conflict and be rapidly deployable by Air Force C-141 aircraft. Their missions and training have traditionally focused on the low end of the conflict spectrum, however, they have also trained and planned

for employment in the high intensity environment of Western Europe. Although hypothetically useful in all environments, light division forces have participated in only one of the three combat crises of the last decade -- and none saw action in DESERT STORM. In Operation JUST CAUSE, where light division forces did fight, they fought with heavy, airborne, and special operations forces.

Pure heavy forces have not faired much better than their light counterparts. They did not participate at all in Grenada and had limited participation in Panama where most units were nonmechanized infantry. In DESERT STORM they saw extensive action and fought most of the major ground battles. Although quite successful, some DESERT STORM heavy force battalion and brigade commanders expressed concern over the lack of dismounted infantry available in their units to breach Iraqi defensive positions.[40] Fortunately, they did not need infantry in great numbers.

The two divisions that have had widest applicability across the spectrum have been the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) divisions. Neither light nor heavy, they possess significant infantry and antiarmor capabilities, and have performed well across the conflict spectrum. Unfortunately, there is only one of each in the Army force structure.

Training results also have indicated a need for force structure change. Training rotations at the National (NTC) and

Joint Readiness Training Centers (JRTC) normally use scenarios requiring a mix of heavy and light forces. Unfortunately, units that participate in these rotations rarely have time to train to standard together before going to "battle." Typically, commanders learn the capabilities of their respective light or heavy counterpart at the training center during the rotation.

Besides training problems with light and heavy divisions, the Army is also facing the dilemma of how to provide peacekeeping, security assistance, and army to army support with available light and heavy forces.[41] The Army's new concept of peacetime engagement requires a mix of forces. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans describes our current military strategy as " . . . the idea of having a kit bag of various tools with which we can build a wide variety of flexible response options."[42]

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence appears to agree a mix of forces will be required to support the new national military strategy. He has stated, " . . . the chief threat to the U.S. Army will present itself in the form of mid and low intensity conflicts such as recent experiences in Iraq and Panama. To meet these demanding and diverse threats, the U.S. Army must be able to tailor and deploy a mix of heavy, light and special operations forces in response to radically different scenarios holding the potential for rapid escalation."[43]

As these examples and statements suggest, supporting the new national military strategy requires the Army have a mix of forces that can respond to both peacetime requirements and regional crises. To meet this challenge, the Army must change the divisional force structure of its heavy and light divisions.

A Solution.

The Army cannot afford to have divisions that do not have utility across the conflict spectrum. It is time to put aside parochial viewpoints and practice good stewardship by merging heavy and light units into composite divisions that can be used to respond to peacetime requirements and regional crises. This is not to imply an entire composite division would be deployed in response to a contingency, although it might be, but rather an appropriately tailored response force.

The organization of these proposed divisions could be of two types -- either a composite heavy (two heavy brigades and one infantry), or a composite light (two infantry brigades and one heavy). There are significant benefits to be gained by such organizations.

First is the enhancement of training between light and heavy units. Task organized training can be accomplished year round by composite divisions at home stations, rather than biannually, or less, at the NTC and JRTC. This type of habitual training relationship allows leaders to understand better the capabilities

and limitations of light and heavy forces, and ultimately, improves their ability to employ task organized forces. An additional benefit may be decreased competition for training resources, such as training areas and ranges, due to differences in training requirements between heavy and light battalions. The permanent relationship between light and heavy forces in a composite division also may provide individual training and personnel management benefits.

In the area of individual training, soldiers could be cross trained in both light infantry and mechanized skills and eventually serve in either capacity. No longer would an infantryman be designated light or heavy. Junior officers could be trained and qualified in both light and heavy operations at one location during a single tour.

For field grade officers assigned to composite divisions, the composite division would provide enhanced battalion and brigade command opportunities. The composite division would break the stereotype of "light" and "heavy" tracking for command assignments. Although not within the scope of this paper, the development of composite divisions might warrant the consolidation of infantry and armor branches into a single "ground combat branch."

The composite division also could decrease planning and execution times. By having both light and heavy forces available for mission planning and execution, a division commander may no

longer have to request assistance from the corps when moving or fighting in urban and closed terrain, or contemplating use of infantry to seize choke points to facilitate movement of his heavy forces. This also translates into decreased planning and execution time for the corps. Corps commanders will be able to assign missions to composite divisions that would normally require corps augmentation. Additionally, all divisions could be tasked equally to participate in all types of contingency operations -- from peacemaking and keeping, to regional conflict. The composite organization also removes the need to change command relationships and logistical support requirements.

The composite division also has the potential to decrease unit deployment times. A unit consisting of two heavy brigades and one light would be deployable by both air and sea. From an inland division post, this could decrease the amount of rail transport needed to move to port by as much as one third. The dispersal of composite units also would likely allow for the simultaneous use of more transportation assets and decrease shipment time for all deploying units.

Finally, the composite division structure could increase the Army's ability to respond to domestic assistance needs throughout the continental United States by providing greater flexibility to commanders. The commander of a composite division tasked with the mission of providing "military support to civil authorities" may need significant manpower and at the same time, heavy

engineer assets. Such a scenario recently occurred in response to Hurricane Andrew in Florida, where the 10th Mountain Division deployed to provide manpower support while heavy engineer assets came from other units.

The Pitfalls.

There are obviously some complex issues associated with a composite division concept, however, there are problems with current organizational structure as well. Skeptics may argue a composite division is logistically unsupportable. Since the Army's implementation of the forward support battalion concept, there is no reason a division support command could not be tailored to mirror the combat organization it supports. A composite support command actually may enhance unit logistical support.

Under current divisional structure, a light division, given any heavy assets, cannot support a single heavy battalion with its existing support structure. This deficiency has been noted during many JRTC rotations. The opposite is not true, however. National Training Center rotations have shown a heavy brigade can support a light battalion with almost no augmentation.

A second argument against the composite division likely will be, "it does not provide sufficient firepower when only heavy forces are required, or sufficient manpower when only light forces are required." The counter to such an argument is simple.

It is always easier to combine similar units, when more are required, than to meld altogether different capabilities. (E.g., heavy to heavy and light to light versus light to heavy or heavy to light).

There is also the argument of stationing. Some will argue there are not enough CONUS locations to offer adequate housing, training areas, ranges, and departure airfields to such divisions. For political reasons, this may be the most complex of the issues facing development of composite divisions. Forts Hood, Stewart, Polk, Lewis, Riley, and even Carson, have maneuver space and training areas for both light and heavy forces. Unfortunately, due to technological advancements in both direct and indirect fire systems, there are few CONUS bases which offer adequate firing ranges for either light or heavy forces.

Finally, there is the pitfall of mindset -- "Because we have always done it this way." The ability to project creditable forces rapidly to areas of vital U.S. interest is the keystone of our new defense strategy. If the Army is to meet the demands of today's dynamic world, and the uncertainty of the future, it must not continue to live in the predictability of the past. Change for the sake of change may not be good, but change to operate more efficiently and effectively in a world of uncertainty is change that is needed.

Conclusion

The world today is "still a dangerous place" and both the Army and the nation must be prepared to meet it. However, there also are other challenges -- those of diminishing resources and force reductions. If the post cold war Army is to meet these challenges, it must overcome the skeptics and accept and begin planning for new, nontraditional roles and functions, and it must develop composite divisions today for the uncertainty of tomorrow.

APPENDIX I

Army Roles and Functions

Section 3062. "Policy; composition; organized peace establishment," Title 10 United States Code, states:

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of --

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

(2) supporting the national policies;

(3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the

expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 provides the following primary functions of the Army:

(1) To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.

(2) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrine.

(3) To organize, equip, and provide Army forces, in coordination with the other Military Services, for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines. Specifically, the Army shall:

(a) Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.

(b) Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army

shall have primary responsibility for developing those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

(c) Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army forces in the conduct of space operations.

(4) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

(5) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.

(6) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.

(7) To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

(8) To develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Military Services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating on land, except that the development of doctrines and procedures for organizing, equipping, training, and employing Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Marine Corps coordinating, as required, with the other Military Services.

(9) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate land lines of communication.

(10) To conduct the following activities:

(a) Functions relating to the management and operation of the Panama Canal, as assigned by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

(b) The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

(c) Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

In addition to these primary functions, the Army has a collateral function to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land. It also has responsibilities in support of space operations to include the following:

(1) Organizing, training, equipping, and providing Army forces to support space operations.

(2) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Army forces for the use in space operations.

(3) Conducting individual and unit training of Army space operations forces.

(4) Participating with other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.

(5) Providing forces for space support operations for the Department of Defense when directed.

With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Army has specific responsibility for the following:

(1) Providing, in accordance with inter-Service agreements, communications, personnel, and equipment employed by Army forces.

(2) Conducting individual and unit training of Army forces.

(3) Developing equipment, tactics, and techniques employed by Army forces.

Military Assistance Examples



ENDNOTES

[1] National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, July 26, 1947.

[2] Epley, William W., Roles and Missions of the United States Army, p.213; Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 1991.

[3] Nunn, Sam; Floor Speech to The US Senate, July 2, 1992, p. 2

[4] Cheney, Dick, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," (January 1993) p. 3.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Powell, Colin; New York Times, December 31, 1992, "Joint Chiefs Head Challenges Calls to Revise Military," p. A1

[7] Powell, Colin L., "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," Office of the Chairman, Washington, D.C. (February 10, 1993) p. iv.

[8] Art, Robert J., "Strategy and Management in the Post-Cold War Pentagon," US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, (June 22, 1992) p. 2-3.

[9] Note: The Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) was established as part of the Camp David Accords. The three signators are the U.S., Egypt and Israel. The U.S. Army currently provides one logistics support battalion and one light infantry battalion to the organization. Ten other nations also provide forces or staff to the MFO.

[10] These individuals are assigned to specific UN Peacekeeping organizations across the globe and are not part of U.S. units assigned to UN operations.

[11] This statement is based on the non-attributable comments of a highly placed diplomat with the U.S. Department of State.

[12] George Bush, "State of the Union Address," (1992): To the Congress and people of the United States.

[13] Cheney, p. 3.

[14] Ibid, p. 20.

[15] Dimitri K. Simes, "American and the Post-Soviet Republics," Foreign Affairs, Summer Vol. 71, No. 3 (1992): p. 343.

[16] "Concepts and Issues," United States Marine Corps (1992): p. 8.

[17] Michael P.W. Stone and Gordon R. Sullivan, Strategic Force, Strategic Vision for the 1990s and Beyond: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1993, Posture Statement presented to the 102d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1992), p. 20.

[18] According to the SECDEF's "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," (January 1993), p. 75., "Maintaining a force with a broad mix of capabilities is critical to meeting the diverse types of threats for which we must now prepare."

[19] These include operations in: Angola; Cambodia; Cyprus; El Salvador; Golan Heights; India and Pakistan; Iraq and Kuwait; Lebanon; Middle East; Mozambique; Namibia; Somalia; Western Sahara; and Yugoslavia.

[20] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, Vol. 71, No. 5 (1993): p. 89-90.

[21] Ibid, p. 91.

[22] Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 78.

[23] Art, p. 34.

[24] While the term "peace-enforcement" is neither doctrinal or frequently used, its use in this context is intended to be analogous to the current enforcement of the "no fly zone" in southern Iraq.

[25] George Bush, US National Drug Control Strategy, (1992): Forwarding Letter to Congress.

[26] Colin L. Powell, United States National Military Strategy, (1992): p. 15.

[27] Note: In 1991, 6,729 potential drug-smuggling planes were identified. Of this number, only 49 planes were successfully interdicted of the 661 attempted. "Congressman Schumer Blasts Bush's War on Drugs," Tactical Technology (Potomac, MD: Philips Publishing, 4 March 1992), pg 3.

[28] Stone, p. 20.

[29] Gustavo A. Gorriti, "How to Fight the Drug War," The Atlantic Monthly (July 1989): p.70

[30] For example: The assignment of an infantry battalion to conduct patrolling operations along the southern U.S. border in conjunction with U.S. Drug Enforcement agents, or Border Patrol personnel.

[31] Cheney, p. 75.

[32] Elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) deployed to Los Angeles to assist civil authorities.

[33] Les Aspin, "With the Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US Forces?," ROA National Security Report (November 1992): p.4.

[34] Cheney, p. 75.

[35] William Jefferson Clinton, "President's Address to the 103d Congress," February 17, 1993.

[36] In his February 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended the Air Force be assigned proponency for space operations. General Powell also recommended all services be assigned close air support responsibilities as a primary function.

[37] The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command is currently writing FM 100-19, Assistance to US Civil Authorities, to address Army assistance to U.S. civil authorities under a variety of circumstances. Specifically, it is intended to outline Army doctrine for the support of civil authorities, and how the Army approaches and conducts such operations. Final publication of FM 100-19 is scheduled for July 1993.

[38] Nunn, p. 6.

[39] Donald B. Rice, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, "Reshaping the Future," (20 February 1992): p. 9.

[40] This statement is based on conversations with several commanders from the 1st Infantry Division who were in command during the war, and whose units were reponsibile for breaching the initial Iraqi defensive positions

[41] J.H. Binford Peay III and Jack A. LeCuyer, "Gearing the Force for Crisis Response," Army (October 1991): p. 153.

[42] Ibid., p. 154.

[43] Charles B. Eichelberger, "Versatiltiy is Key in Mission of '90s," Army (October 1991): p.163.

Bibliography

Art, Robert J., Davis, Vincent, and Hunington, Samuel P., eds. Reorganizing America's Defense. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985.

Art, Robert J. Strategy and Management in the Post-Cold War Pentagon, A Study prepared for the U.S. Army War College Third Annual Conference on Strategy. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. (A Rand Corporation Research Study) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

Bush, George, President of the United States. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: The White House, 1993.

Cheney, Dick. "A New Defense Strategy for Changing Times." Defense March/April 1991. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1991.

_____. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Orginally published 1833.

Epley, William W. Roles and Missions of the United States Army. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History, 1991.

Fisch, Arnold G. The Department of the Army. Know Your Government Series. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1988.

Gordon, Michael R. "Joint Chiefs Head Challenges Calls to Revise Military," New York Times, 31 December 1992, p. A1.

Hadley, Arthur T. The Straw Giant. New York: random House, 1987.

Hendrickson, David C. The Future of American Strategy. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987.

_____. Reforming Defense. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988.

Lewis, Paul. "U.N. Rules Out A Force to Halt Bosnia Fighting," New York Times, 14 May 1992, p. A1.

Luttwak, Edward N. The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

Powell, Colin L., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, Report for the Secretary of Defense. Washington, 10 February 1993.

_____. National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992.

_____. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5 Winter 1992/93

Record, Jeffrey. Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988.

Russett, Bruce, and Sutterlin, James S. "The U.N. in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs, Vol 70, No 2, Spring 1991, 69-84.

Snider, Don M. and William J. Taylor. "Needed -- a Pentagon Prepared to Wage Peace." Washington Post, 9 August 1992, p. C1.

Snow, Donald M. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, A Study prpared for the U.S. Army War College fourth Annual Conference on Strategy. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

Stone, Michael P.W., and Gordon R. Sullivan. ARMY Focus 1992, Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 1992.

_____. Strategic Force, Strategic Vision for the 1990s and Beyond: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1993. Posture Statement presented to the 102d Cong., 2d sess. Washington: U.S. Department of the Army.

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

U.S. Department of the Army. The Army. Field Manual 100-1. Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, December 1991.

Department of the Navy. The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2. Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 21 June 1991.