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

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
**DECIPHERING THE BALKAN ENIGMA:
USING HISTORY TO INFORM POLICY**

William T. Johnsen



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Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy (U)

Jonnsen, William T.

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Balkans; ethnic and religious conflict; NATO;
NATO's Southern Flank; U.S. strategic interests

The author uses historical examination to shed light on the origins and bases of current conflicts in the Balkans. The study first addresses the long history of conflict that has plagued the region and led to violence becoming an accepted agent of change. The author then examines the religious, ethnic, and cultural divisions that undergird the ongoing conflicts in the region. He next explores the evolution of political institutions within the Balkans and how these political developments influence current events. Historical perspective gained is used to conduct a brief assessment of potential policy options for the region. He concludes that, while a number of options are possible, there are no "good" options--all are flawed and fraught with drawbacks, risks, and costs.

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**DECIPHERING THE BALKAN ENIGMA:
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William T. Johnsen

March 25, 1993

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Information contained in the report is current as of March 15, 1993.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also be conveyed directly to the author by telephone: commercial (717) 245-4076 or DSN 242-4076.

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
FOREWORD

Historically, the Balkans have played an important role in Europe. One need only review the clash of empires that took place in the Balkans over the past 2,500 years to grasp the geostrategic consequences of the region. In this century alone, the Balkans sowed the seeds of World War I, reaped the whirlwind of World War II, and participated in the ideologic, if not military, battles of the cold war.

The Balkans remain no less important today. Instability prevails throughout the region, particularly in the former Yugoslavia where war—with tremendous ethnic and religious overtones—threatens to broaden into a major regional conflict. Moreover, should the conflict escalate significantly or spread beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, NATO allies could find themselves on opposing sides. The resultant strain could lead to the unravelling of NATO's Southern Flank, or the Alliance as a whole. Surely, U.S. strategic interests are engaged in the region.

Solutions to these strategic problems will not come easily. Peace plans proliferate, while cease-fires fail. To achieve lasting solutions, policymakers must go beyond the current headlines and acquire a comprehensive understanding of the bases of instability and conflict within the region; the number of issues involved; the individual and collective complexity of those issues; the complicated interrelationships of issues; and the depths of the animosities present in the region. The intent of this report, therefore, is to address these concerns from an historical perspective to gain insights that will help inform the formulation of future policy.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study, in hopes that it may assist those involved in the ongoing debate over U.S. policy in the Balkans.


JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

KEY JUDGEMENTS

Insights to Assist Decision-Making.

The past is always present in the Balkans and defines the future.

- Cannot conduct analysis using linear thinking. Must have a broader context, and think in a connective manner.
- Cultural cleavage within the Balkans and between the Balkans and U. S. leaders is wider than many understand.
 - Occidental vs. Oriental thought processes.
 - Importance of religious and ethnic identity and attendant animosities.
 - Violence is an accepted agent of change.
- Existing political institutions in the Balkans are not likely to contribute to long-term solutions.

Long-Term Solutions.

- Require the region to make a fundamental break from the past along the lines mandated of post-World War II Germany and Japan.
- Must create stable political institutions that reduce ethnic tensions.
- Will require considerable expenditure of political, economic, and military capital—will the United States spend it?
- Commitment in terms of decades, perhaps generations.

Key Questions to be Resolved Prior to U.S. Decision to Commit Forces.

- What are U.S. political objectives? What is the desired end state of the conflict?
- What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to achieve the political objectives?
- How long and to what extent is the United States willing to commit forces to the region?
- If air power is not sufficient, what are the next logical steps? Is the United States willing to take them?

Short-Term Options.

- There are no easy options. All options are flawed; each has drawbacks, risks, and costs.
- The United States cannot abstain from participation in resolving the crisis.
- The ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a human tragedy. But expansion of the conflict could be a strategic disaster. Must prevent spill-over into Macedonia, Kosovo, or beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia.
- Partition and mass exchange of populations are not acceptable solutions.
- Lifting the arms embargo is not likely to produce an acceptable solution.
- Physical containment of the conflict in Yugoslavia is not likely, except at unacceptable costs.
- Participation in peacekeeping operations is possible, but problematic.
 - Enforcing U.N. resolutions means choosing sides in the conflict.

- The United States may have to contribute substantially to exercise leadership within the U.N. coalition.
- Participation in peace-enforcement operations:
 - The United States must realize that a decision to participate requires an *a priori* choice of sides.
 - The United States will not be able to take half measures. Regardless of the level of commitment, the United States must understand that, in the eyes of the participants at least, the United States will be committed. United States should not, therefore, start down the path unless willing to complete the journey.
 - U.S. forces might have to undertake operations against not only Serbs, but also Croats and Bosnians if they refuse to comply with U.N. directives.
 - Peace-enforcement holds the potential to expand the ongoing conflict.
 - Establishment and maintenance of safe havens present the United States with indeterminate commitments and, therefore, are unacceptable.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This is the Balkans—rationality isn't a reliable compass.¹

—A Western diplomat in Belgrade

PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is *not* to argue for or against U.S. military intervention in the former Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Balkans. The intent is to garner insights through historical examination that will shed light on the long-standing bases of the ongoing conflicts in the region. Some might question the relevancy of an historical exploration when the first European war since 1945 engulfs the former Yugoslavia and threatens to spill over to other parts of the Balkans. The purpose of historical study, however, is not simply to understand the past, but to inform the present and, hopefully, prepare for the future.

Nor is this report simply an academic exercise. Policymakers must be cognizant of the background and complexity of issues if they are to make informed decisions. As George F. Kennan cogently noted in his scathing criticism of President Woodrow Wilson's performance at the Paris Peace Conference (1919):

[His was] the colossal conceit of thinking that you could suddenly make international life over into what you believed to be your own image, when you dismissed the past with contempt, rejected the relevance of the past to the future, and refused to occupy yourself with the real problems that a study of the past would suggest.²

Kennan's words could easily apply to those pundits now posing simplistic solutions to the current Yugoslav civil war.

Proponents of "surgical" air strikes, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, or enforcement of "no-fly" zones neither comprehend the complexities of the issues involved nor address the root causes of conflict. At best, these actions defer further violence; at worst, they exacerbate and prolong the suffering of hundreds of thousands.

As anyone familiar with problem solving comprehends, the first step of the process is to define the nature of the problem. When assessing ethnic conflicts, in Barry Posen's words, "Whether one's purpose is to predict, prevent, or resolve such [ethnic] conflicts, one needs to understand their sources."³ Without an adequate understanding of the problem and its ramifications, proposed solutions may not address issues adequately to ensure resolution. Moreover, what on first consideration seems a relatively straightforward solution may actually prove counterproductive when implemented.

The intent of the report is also to get beyond the emotional headlines of the day and to open the eyes of policymakers to local perceptions; as everyone should know, perception is reality in the eye of the beholder. An understanding of perceptions will also help policymakers grapple with the underlying currents which run so deep in the Balkans and avoid the pitfall of mirror imaging their own ideas, values, and perceptions onto a radically different culture. Only through an understanding of these conditions can policymakers make informed decisions on the best ends, ways, and means to resolve the situation. As importantly, historical example may offer potential insights into second or third order consequences that may result from any decisions.

SCOPE

Concisely unraveling the tangled web of the Balkans is no easy task. To avoid oversimplifying highly complex issues, the more critical issues must be discussed in some detail. Issues in the Balkans intricately intertwine and require a greater level of explication to comprehend the relationships and potential consequences.

Limitations of the written word require that issues be addressed in a relatively linear fashion; however, Balkan complexities are anything but linear in their interrelationships. In many ways, therefore, the discussion that follows will be akin to using simple mathematics to explain quantum mechanics. But readers cannot view the Balkans in such a linear manner. They must connect the array of disparate and incredibly complex issues in a broad context that weaves the variegated strands of the Balkans into a coherent tapestry.

The report first outlines a brief history of the region that sets the context for current conditions. The discussion next examines the clash of languages, religions, ethnic groups, and cultures that have shaped the region and brought the Balkan cauldron to a boil. An examination of the political development of the area and its influence on events follows. The study closes with an assessment of potential policy options. Finally, while the study examines the Balkans as a whole, greater attention will focus on matters relating to Yugoslavia.

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this essay, the Balkans encompasses Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, European Turkey, and the states spawned from the erstwhile Yugoslavia—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). (See Map 1.)

Some experts might exclude the European portion of Turkey from the region. Current influence in the region and the fact that many states in the Balkans once belonged to the Ottoman Empire argues, however, for including Turkey. Others might argue for the inclusion of Hungary because of the large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, but Hungary falls more logically in Central Europe. Hungarian minorities within the region will be addressed as required. Romania will not be addressed in great detail largely because of space limitations and because Romania remains generally aloof from the current crises.



Map 1. The Balkans.

Although defining terms runs the risk of pedantry, it may be instructive to clarify terms for American policy makers. Although used almost interchangeably in the United States, the terms "state" and "nation" are not synonymous, and take on important distinctions in other parts of the world: Europe and, especially, in the Balkans. According to Hugh Seton-Watson, a noted scholar of nationalism, "A state is a legal and political organisation [sic], with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens." On the other hand, Seton-Watson defines a nation as "... a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness."⁴

Thus, while it may be possible for a "nation" and a "state" to correspond (hence the term nation-state), the two ideas do not have to coincide and habitually they do not. Indeed, attempts in the Balkans over the centuries to make nations (i.e., a community of people) coincidental with the geographic boundaries of a state (i.e., a political entity) are the root cause of many past, present, and future problems in the region.

Lastly, although the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became Yugoslavia only in 1929, Yugoslavia will be used throughout the report to identify the state after 1918.

CHAPTER 2

THE BALKANS: HISTORICAL BATTLEGROUND

"What happened here yesterday?" you ask the "cleansers" who took over the ruins. "Well, in 1389. . ." explains a Serb irregular fighter while waving a gun. "No, not in 1389: yesterday," you interrupt. . . "Under the Ottoman Empire. . ." he tries again. "No, please! What happened yesterday?" You get impatient. "Because in 1921, they. . ." You cannot give up, of course, so you sigh and try again, until you get his version of the events.

—A conversation in time⁵

An understanding of the past throws light on current conditions in the Balkans. To paraphrase a concept borrowed from social scientist Morris Massey, "What these nations are now depends on where they were when."⁶ The brief historical outline that follows, therefore, offers the reader a sense of the ebb and flow of history across the Balkan stage; of the clash of empires, states, religions, cultures, and ethnic groups that have beset the region. The outline also provides an appreciation of the magnitude and continuous nature of the violence that has swept over the Balkans during the past two millennia.


GEOGRAPHY

An oftentimes overlooked, but key influence over a region's historical development is its geographic character. This condition holds true for the Balkans where geography has played a critical role in the evolution of ethnic and national groups, as well as in the cultural formation of the area. Before delving into the region's history, therefore, a short excursion into its geography is instructive.

Balkan is derived from the Turkish word for mountain and the Balkan Peninsula could hardly be more aptly named: mountains represent the predominant terrain feature in the region.⁷ The great mountain chains crisscrossing the region—the Carpathian Mountains in Romania, the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains of Bulgaria, the Pindus Range of Greece, and the Dinaric Alps of Yugoslavia and Albania (see Map 2)—fragmented not only the geography, but also the ethnic and political development. In the first instance, the isolation and physical compartmentalization of the peninsula mitigated against the emergence of a cohesive ethnic identity. In the second case, the combination of fragmented ethnic identities and geographic divisions inhibited the development of a single large power in the region and led, instead, to a number of smaller, less powerful states.⁸

Paradoxically, geographic circumstances promoted external access to the region. Lying between Asia Minor and the Mediterranean Sea to the east and south and the fertile European plains to the north and west, three major migratory or invasion routes cut across the Balkans. The first route runs along the north shore of the Black Sea and then to the Danube into Central Europe, or alternatively southeast through modern day Bulgaria to Constantinople (Istanbul). A second path flows down the Danube from Central Europe to Nis and diverges along two paths: down the Vardar River through the Skopje Gate toward Thessaloniki; or toward Sofia along the Maritsa River and then to Constantinople. A third route begins in Italy, crosses the Adriatic, moves across Albania and northern Greece, again terminating in Constantinople. Finally, the extensive coastlines of the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas open the Balkans to penetration.⁹ As Balkan historians Charles and Barbara Jelavich pointed out, as a result:

the peninsula is a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Here the peoples and cultures of three continents have met and mingled, or clashed and conquered. The major powers of each historical epoch have made their influence felt here and left their marks upon the peoples. The great imperial powers of the past—Greeks, Romans, Turks, Venetians, Austrians, Germans, French, British, and Russians—all in their turn have dominated or sought to dominate this area.¹⁰



Map 2. Balkans Relief Map.

Of greater importance than the numbers of peoples and powers that have moved through the area, are the turmoil and violence that followed in their wake. The long-term consequences of this violence will primarily concern the discussion that follows.

ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

The recorded history of the Balkans begins with ancient Greece. While much good can be said about the political and cultural roots of ancient Greece, the area seethed with violence. While the Greeks successfully fended off outside, largely Persian, invasion, the century-long conflicts between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies for dominance on the Greek peninsula (most notably, the Peloponnesian Wars [460-404 B.C.]) fatally weakened the Greek city-states.

Taking advantage of Greek vulnerabilities, Philip of Macedon crushed the Greek armies and established Macedonian dominance in the region.¹¹ Upon his father's death, Alexander—whom peers and history would dub the Great—consolidated his hold over the remainder of Greece and rapidly expanded his empire southward through Egypt and eastward through Persia to India. After Alexander's untimely death (323 B.C.), his successors proved unable to maintain his empire which quickly collapsed under internal bickering and war. Elements of the empire survived for a considerable period, but an increasingly expansionist Rome exerted considerable influence in the Balkans and, by 146 B.C., the Romans consolidated their hold over the entire region.¹²

BYZANTINE EMPIRE

The Romans extended their empire over the next century, but *Pax Romana* did not mean an absence of conflict within the Balkans. The Romans came under increasing pressure, particularly from barbarian invasions emanating from Western and Central Europe. The pressure became so intense that in A.D. 326 Emperor Constantine transferred the administrative capital of the empire to Byzantium, on the western shores of the Bosphorus (currently Istanbul).¹³

Divisions between the eastern and western halves of the empire grew rapidly. By A.D. 395, the Roman Empire cleaved in two with the border cutting across modern day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The importance of Byzantium (Constantinople) increased considerably thereafter, and when the western portion of the empire collapsed under the barbarian invasions of the 5th and 6th centuries, the Byzantine Empire emerged as a major actor on the world stage.¹⁴

While the Byzantine Empire retained control of the Balkans for most of the next millennium, continuous conflict raged across the periphery of the empire and then ever closer to Constantinople. Of special concern to the Balkans, Bulgar and Slav encroachments continually pressured the empire from the north, which the Byzantines brutally resisted. Slavery, immense cruelties, or outright annihilation awaited the defeated. For example, one Byzantine Emperor, Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, not content with annihilating his opponents, had 14,000 captives blinded and sent home as an example.¹⁵

Despite pressures from the north, the more critical threat rose in the east, where first Arabs, then Persians and Ottomans assaulted the Byzantines. Inexorably, these groups wore away at the empire, until the Ottomans successfully besieged Constantinople in 1453, putting an end to over 1000 years of Byzantine rule in the Balkans.¹⁶

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The fall of Constantinople firmly established the Ottomans in the Balkans, but did not end the violence that would continue to rack the region. The repressive nature of the Ottoman Empire made violence and brutality commonplace. As Barbara Jelavich noted, for example, "The staking of heads and impalement were regular methods of public control."¹⁷ Not unnaturally, repressive measures led to numerous and equally brutal revolts that the Ottomans savagely crushed.¹⁸ Reprisal begot reprisal in an escalating spiral of savagery that increased in frequency and scope throughout the Ottoman occupation. Sadly, as current reports of atrocities, mutilations, and rapes indicate, such brutality remains far too commonplace.¹⁹

Many peasants took to the mountains to avoid taxes, harassment, and repression of Ottoman rule. To survive, they resorted to banditry. But, because these groups also participated in insurrections against the Ottomans, they acquired the reputation of national heroes rather than mere brigands; a Balkan form of Robin Hood. Hajduks in Serbia, Uskoks in Croatia and Dalmatia, Haiduks in Bulgaria, and Klephts in Greece²⁰ established the long tradition of armed resistance against governments or outsiders. Reinforced by the partisan experience in World War II, this tradition continues with the numerous ethnic and religious irregular forces currently running amok in the civil war in Yugoslavia.²¹

As a result of the ebb and flow of Ottoman campaigns to expand their empire north and west into Central Europe, the Balkans remained the scene of nearly continuous violence for the next six centuries (1400s-1900s). Because the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary abutted the Ottomans, the clash of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires dominated life in the Balkans until the early 20th century.²² While the Ottomans reached their peak at the first siege of Vienna in 1529, the long decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans began only after the Turkish defeat outside Vienna in 1683. Shortly after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699),²³ mutual exhaustion, Habsburg preoccupation with affairs in Central and Western Europe, and Turkish concerns with Russian encroachment from the north stabilized frontiers in the Balkans for nearly a century.²⁴ This stalemate further reinforced the existing religious, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic fault line that cut across the heart of the Balkans from the 4th century and which continues to divide the region to this day.

Violence became a way of life along this dividing line, particularly along the Austrian Military Frontier between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. Officially established in the 17th century, the zone originally stretched across what would be the modern day borders between Slovenia and Croatia, and, as Turkish power waned, advanced south into the general area of what today is known as Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁵

Interested in defending their hard fought gains from further Turkish incursions, but increasingly preoccupied with threats

from Central and Western Europe, the Habsburgs populated the region with farmers *cum* soldiers who received land in return for defending Habsburg lands. This practice led to the development of a warrior caste in the region, for even if the two empires did not directly wage "war," both sides skirmished continuously for military advantage and territorial acquisition. Furthermore, as the inhabitants found themselves continuously exposed to violence, they largely became desensitized to it. Peoples along the frontier had long suffered harsh treatment under the Ottomans, and oftentimes responded in kind. The result was that for the next two centuries the Balkans served as a battleground between the two massive empires.

The Napoleonic era brought a surge of nationalist activity and violence to the Balkans. Serbia seethed in revolt from 1804-13 and again from 1815-17, winning partial autonomy.²⁶ The Greek Revolution from 1823-29 cleaved off the lower Peloponnese from the Ottoman Empire.²⁷ These successes did not come without costs, particularly in human lives. Nor were all efforts successful. In Bulgaria, for example, failed revolts in 1834, 1849, 1850, 1853, and 1876 resulted in harsh reprisals.²⁸

Centrifugal and nationalist tendencies also affected the Austrian Empire. With the breakdown of the Concert of Europe after the Crimean War (1856), German domination of Central Europe from 1871, and Russian activity after the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), Austrian attention turned to the Balkans. But, like their Ottoman opponents, the Habsburgs faced the rising power of Russia, which also coveted the Balkans. France and Great Britain saw no advantage to Austrians or Russians adding to their empires at the expense of the Turks. Thus, by the second half of the 19th century, the Balkans had become the central arena of Great Power competition in Europe. These conditions further heightened tensions, and conflicts increased in frequency, size, and intensity as the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires continued to disintegrate.²⁹

Rising tensions came to a new peak with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. While the origins and conduct of the war are not significant for this discussion, it is interesting that, like many

subsequent emergencies, events in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1875 and Serbian attacks on the Ottomans in support of their Slavic brethren in Bosnia-Hercegovina precipitated the crisis. The consequences of the Russo-Turkish War are more important for this analysis. Under the Russian imposed terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), Serbia, Romania, and an enlarged Montenegro received independence. Equally significant, an autonomous and greatly augmented Bulgaria emerged that stretched from Serbia to the Black Sea and included extensive territory in Thrace, abutting the Aegean Sea.³⁰

The remaining Great Powers, particularly Great Britain and Austria, expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty and provoked a European crisis. Again, one need only be concerned with the consequences. At the Congress of Berlin (June 13-July 13, 1878), Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Imperial Germany served as the "honest broker" who crafted a compromise solution for the distribution of Ottoman spoils. While superficially meeting the demands of the Great Powers, the Habsburgs and Russians remained dissatisfied with the results and the seeds of future Great Power conflict had been sown.³¹

The Congress of Berlin also dashed nationalist aspirations of the smaller Balkan states. The Congress cut Bulgaria into thirds with only the territory north of the Balkan Mountains retaining the autonomy granted less than three months earlier under the Treaty of San Stefano. The Greeks received nothing but promises of negotiations with the Turks. While Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania retained their independence, all three lost territory gained under the Treaty of San Stefano. Moreover, the Habsburg mandate over Bosnia-Hercegovina angered Serbia and Montenegro.³² In sum, according to noted European historian Carlton J. H. Hayes, "If before 1878 the 'Eastern Question' concerned one 'sick man', after 1878 it involved a half-dozen maniacs. For the Congress of Berlin drove the Balkan peoples mad."³³

Little time elapsed before the first sparks flew. An unsuccessful revolt racked Albania in 1880, and in 1881 the Ottomans ceded Epirus (with its largely Albanian population, (see Map 3) to Greece, further agitating Albanian nationalists



Map 3. Traditional Place Names.

and raising Albania to the international stage.³⁴ In 1885, Eastern Rumelia revolted and joined with Bulgaria, provoking another European crisis. British and Habsburg opposition to Russian initiatives further increased tensions. The crisis worsened when the Serbs attacked Bulgaria, suffered a drubbing, and were saved only through Austrian intervention.³⁵

Tensions rose further in 1898 when Greece attacked its Ottoman neighbor in support of Cretan *enosis* (union) with Greece. The Turks decisively defeated the Greeks, and subsequently invaded Greece, only to have the Great Powers intervene. In the end, the Greeks lost the war and paid a small indemnity, and Crete received autonomous status, but without union with Greece; a solution that only dissatisfied all participants.³⁶

PRE-WORLD WAR I

By the turn of the 20th century, nationalist passions had reached a fever pitch, and conflicts raged across the region with little respite as nations great and small fought over the carcasses of the declining Habsburg and Ottoman empires. In 1908, Bulgaria gained its independence, fanning nationalist flames throughout the region. More importantly, also in 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, frustrating Serbian nationalist aspirations for that territory and dealing the Russians a humiliating diplomatic defeat, both of which would have severe repercussions.³⁷

Within short order, Southeastern Europe suffered the First Balkan War (1912) between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, on the one hand, and the Ottomans on the other. Rapidly defeating the Turks, the victorious allies soon fell to squabbling over the division of Macedonia and Albania. Serbian and Greek designs on Albania particularly upset Austria and Italy which did not want to see any strong power, specifically Serbia, established on the Adriatic coast. As a result, the Great Powers again imposed a peace settlement on the Balkans that left nationalist expectations unfulfilled.³⁸

Feeling isolated and not trusting its erstwhile allies, Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia, starting the Second

Balkan War (June 1913). In a remarkable turnaround, the Ottomans joined the Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians in quickly defeating Bulgaria. By means of the Treaty of Bucharest, however, the Great Powers again imposed a territorial solution upon the region.

Serbia and Greece received those parts of Macedonia they had seized, but not the full amounts they desired. Bulgaria retained only a part of Macedonia, and kept a small coastline in Thrace along the Aegean Sea, but lost Thessaloniki to Greece. While Greece gained territory at Bulgarian expense, the concomitant establishment of an independent Albania meant Greece received only a portion of Epirus, all of which it coveted. The Ottomans recovered Adrianople and territory up to the Maritsa River, but still suffered the loss of considerable territory relative to 1911. Only the Romanians, who obtained southern Dobrudja, and the Albanians, who achieved their independence, expressed satisfaction with the final settlement. The other states could be expected to seek redress at the earliest opportunity.³⁹

WORLD WAR I

Gavrilo Princip (an ethnic Serb Bosnian terrorist—intent on promoting the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia) provided that opportunity in June 1914, when he assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo. The events that turned the third Balkan War into World War I, as well as the events of the war, are well known and will not be repeated here. However, several key consequences of the war will be examined.

First, the various alignments of the powers during the course of the war, both within and outside the region, contributed to the unresolved tensions that continued to afflict the region after the post-war settlements. For example, Bulgarian support of the Central Powers and murderous occupation of Macedonia and Montenegro only increased Serbian hatred of their eastern neighbor.⁴⁰ Similarly, Greek entry into the war against Bulgaria and Turkey only further sharpened centuries-old animosities.

A second critical consequence of the war was the considerable devastation that significantly set back the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.⁴¹ More importantly, nations in the region paid a high cost in human suffering that fed tensions in the post-war era. The plight of Yugoslavia is illustrative. According to documents provided at the Versailles Peace Conference, Yugoslavia suffered 1,900,000 deaths (from all causes) during World War I. Of the 705,343 men Serbia mobilized during the war, 369,815 were killed or died of wounds. This represented nearly one-half of the young male population—a demographic disaster that continues to plague Serbia.⁴²

Most nations within the Balkans perceived the peace treaties following the war to be imposed and unjust. As a result, they served only to exacerbate old wounds. Bulgarian claims to an outlet on the Aegean Sea, competing claims over Macedonia, and Yugoslav complaints over the Italians receiving parts of Illyria and the Dalmatian Coast only fostered further resentment.⁴³ Territorial settlements created future difficulties as numerous ethnic minority situations emerged from a "fair and lasting peace."⁴⁴

INTER-WAR ERA

While World War I ended in Western Europe in November 1918, war in the Balkans did not. Perceived inequities of the peace settlements, coupled with newly invigorated Turkish nationalism and Greek adventurism in Asia Minor, led to the Greco-Turkish War of 1921-22. Although the Greeks enjoyed initial success, the Turks eventually soundly defeated them. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but Turkish actions in clearing out Greek enclaves in Asia Minor led to many civilian casualties. After routing the Greeks from Asia Minor, the Turks pushed beyond the Maritsa River in Thrace, where hostilities ceased.⁴⁵

The aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War had key consequences that would vex Balkan relations for decades. First, to resolve permanently the intermingling of Greek and Turkish populations, the two nations carried out a mass

exchange of populations. Approximately 1.3 million Greeks and 380,000 Turks were forcibly exchanged. As might be expected, the conditions took a considerable toll in human suffering and the Greeks, particularly, were ill prepared to receive the massive numbers of refugees involved.⁴⁶

But, as noted Balkan historian L. S. Stavrianos pointed out, this exchange represents only the last in a long series of migrations. Approximately 100,000 ethnic Turks fled in the wake of the First Balkan War (1912) and the Second Balkan War (1913) brought the emigration of roughly 50,000 Turks, 70,000 Greeks, and 60,000 Bulgarians. During 1914, roughly 250,000 Moslems fled Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans and approximately 135,000 Greeks left eastern Thrace. Thus, between 1912-23, roughly 2.2 million people were uprooted from homes they had occupied for centuries.⁴⁷

Despite the massive extent of these migrations, approximately 100,000 ethnic Greeks remained in Constantinople (which had not been subject to the exchange) and 100,000 Turks remained in western Thrace to balance the Greeks in Constantinople. Thus, the seeds for future ethnic conflict bear fruit today in continued agitation over treatment of Turkish minorities in Greece.⁴⁸

Second, a resurgent and nationalist Turkey rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. And, although the Turks had triumphed over the harsh Treaty of Sevres, they remained humiliated by their long national decline and defeats during the war. Third, Greek sacrifices during World War I went for naught, as Greece surrendered much of the territory gained under earlier agreements; a humiliation that deeply rankled the country.⁴⁹

Nor did other countries fare well in the inter-war years. Nations experimented briefly with democratic government, but largely exchanged Habsburg or Ottoman authoritarianism for national dictatorships. Ethnic discrimination also increased. The net result was that authoritarian regimes of the inter-war era failed to resolve outstanding religious, ethnic, and nationalist problems left over from World War I. Instead, they barely capped popular rage and problems simmered just below

the surface awaiting the opportunity to burst once again on the European scene.

WORLD WAR II

The opportunity came quickly with the onset of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten* [expansion toward the east]. Although Hitler aimed his policies predominantly at the Soviet Union, he felt unable to advance against the Soviets without a secure southern flank. Germany also needed the key resources of the Balkan region. Throughout 1939 to early 1941, therefore, the Germans cemented their relationships with the other revisionist powers (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) in the region. When, in April and May 1941, Yugoslavia and Greece failed to yield to Hitler's demands, the Germans quickly overran and occupied both nations.⁵⁰

The Balkans suffered during the war years. Even those states that initially sided with the Germans eventually felt Soviet invasion and retribution from German and Russian alike. The Greek and Yugoslav examples represent, perhaps, the most severe cases, because they actively fought the occupier. German and Italian reprisals exacted a tremendous toll on both states, but especially Yugoslavia.

The severity of the Yugoslav case and its effects on the current situation in the Balkans deserves closer attention. Total casualties came to approximately 1.7 million dead out of a population of 16 million.⁵¹ The numbers of wounded and maimed can only be guessed. Continuous fighting decimated the agricultural and industrial infrastructure of the Yugoslav economy. Coupled with the massive losses sustained in World War I, two generations of Yugoslavs had been effectively wiped out.

POST-WORLD WAR II

The years immediately following World War II did not see an end to violence in the Balkans. From 1943-49, civil war tortured Greece. Yugoslavians settled scores of their civil war probably until 1947, when Tito's Communist regime managed to cap the majority of the violence. The extent of the violence

and the strains that divided the Balkans are, perhaps, best summed up in novelist Nikos Kazantzakis' description of the Greek Civil War:

[the inhabitants] were not surprised when the killing began, brother against brother. They were not afraid; they did not change their way of life. But what had been simmering slowly within them, mute and unrevealed, now burst out, insolent and free. The primeval passion of man to kill poured from within them. Each had a neighbor, or a friend, or a brother, whom he had hated for years, without reason, often without realizing it. The hate simmered there, unable to find an outlet. And now, suddenly, they were given rifles and hand grenades; noble flags waved over their heads. The clergy, the army, the press urged them on—to kill their neighbor, their friend, their brother. Only in this manner, they shouted to them, can faith and country be saved. Murder, the most ancient need of man, took on a high, mystic meaning. And the chase began—brother hunting brother.⁵²

The post-World War II division of the Balkans temporarily checked the incessant warfare that has plagued the region. Largely the result of the imposition of Communist regimes in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria and the fear that local conflict could lead to superpower involvement, the region entered a seeming state of suspended historical animation. As the revolutions of 1989 awoke these nations and the specter of superpower confrontation receded, past animosities quickly bubbled to the surface. Conflict first erupted in the former Yugoslavia and threatens to spill over into the Balkans as a whole. Thus, for reasons that will be more fully explored in the next chapter, the region has once again assumed its historical role as the Balkan battleground.

CHAPTER 3

THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT: LANGUAGE, RELIGION, ETHNIC ORIGIN AND CULTURE

Why do we kill the children? Because some day they will grow up and then we will have to kill them.

— A Serbian insurgent in Bosnia⁵³

Just as enormous pressures created the chaotic physical geography of the Balkans, so, too, have language, religion, ethnic origin, and culture exerted great forces on the region. These forces have no less impact today and undoubtedly will continue to vex policymakers as they grapple with the intractable issues that emerge from the flow of history.

Individually analyzing these issues presents a considerable challenge. Within the Balkans, language, religious identity, and ethnic origin are too closely intertwined to be addressed separately and the complexity of assessing these issues assumes an exponential function. Although issues are addressed separately in the discussion that follows, the reader must remain aware that they are not isolated in the real world.

LANGUAGE DIVISIONS

As a result of the massive migrations that passed through the Balkans, a variety of languages are spoken within the region. Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Serbo-Croat (or Croato-Serb, depending upon ethnic origin), Slovenian, and Turkish are official languages. Although many consider Macedonian a dialect, the existence of an independent Macedonia argues for its inclusion as an official language.

Numerous ethnic minorities within the region speak other languages: German, Hungarian, and Italian, for example.⁵⁴

What makes this phenomenon of more than passing interest to policymakers is that language is inextricably linked with religious and ethnic identity. Within the former Yugoslavia, for example, dialects divide the official language along ethnic lines. Even though few distinctions exist (differences between "Croatian" and "Serbian" are oftentimes less than the variations in some dialects of "Croatian"⁵⁵), Croats adamantly speak Croatian, while Serbs and Montenegrins rigidly speak Serbian.

A more distinct difference occurs in the written word where Serbs and Montenegrins write in Cyrillic, while Croats and Muslims use the Latin or Roman alphabet.⁵⁶ The choice of alphabet, then, immediately marks ethnic origin or "national identity." The language or alphabet used may also mark an individual's religious affiliation, as Cyrillic generally is the alphabet of Orthodoxy. And, while the use of the Latin alphabet does not necessarily identify the religious affiliation of the user (i.e., Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims use the Roman alphabet), it does identify what the individual is not: Orthodox or Serb.

The consequences of the proliferation of languages in this area, and, particularly, the establishment of "official" languages along ethnic lines has long exerted strong influences on the region. In the words of Balkan expert Barbara Jelavich:

The efforts of scholars and politicians to divide these peoples by neat lines into Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, and, later, Macedonians, with language as a chief consideration, was to lead to recrimination and hatred in the future.⁵⁷

Unfortunately for policymakers, Jelavich's future is today and will undoubtedly extend further into time.

RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy (subdivided into Serbian, Greek, and Eastern), Islam, and a variety of Protestant sects

are practiced within the region. Religion, like language, is inextricably bound to ethnic issues, as religious identity first served as the basis for determining ethnicity and, later, nationality. Like much of early modern Europe, Christianity based on the Church of Rome predominated throughout the region. Prior to the fall of Rome, Emperor Constantine the Great transferred the seat of government to Constantinople, but the seat of Catholicism remained in Rome. Because of the close links between church and state in Constantinople, church leaders took on increasing importance in the competition between Rome and Constantinople for control of the church. Small doctrinal differences eventually grew to major proportions that culminated in the "Great Schism" of 1054 and the emergence of two separate and doctrinally distinct churches: the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox—which have significantly complicated matters in the Balkans to this very day.⁵⁸

The geographic dividing line between the two churches fell squarely across the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes remained under the religious rule of the Pope in Rome. Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and Orthodox Romanians came under control of the Patriarch in Constantinople.⁵⁹ The two branches of the Christian Church continued to draw apart and Croats have remained overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and Serbs have clung fast to Orthodoxy, further alienating their respective followers from each other.⁶⁰

The religious situation in the region became ever more complicated with the arrival of the Ottomans and Islam. The Turks practiced considerable religious toleration, at least among Jews and Christians who as "people of the Book" (Koran) were not forced to convert to Islam. That said, the Ottomans mistreated non-Muslims who suffered economic and civil discrimination.⁶¹ To avoid such discrimination, voluntary conversions to Islam occurred throughout the Balkans, mostly in Albania and Bosnia.⁶² Some, more radical, Christian Slavs, especially Croats and Serbs, do not consider Muslims a separate ethnic group deserving of its place within the Balkans, but simply apostate Serbs (or Croats) who should be returned to the fold—forcibly if necessary.⁶³

Turkish religious toleration resulted in Christian Churches enjoying considerable autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, which would have important consequences. First, because of the rigidly doctrinaire inflexibility of the Roman Church, aided and abetted by the Habsburg monarchy, many of the Orthodox hierarchy preferred Ottoman rule to expansion of Catholicism.⁶⁴ Second, Ottoman policies had an effect beyond spiritual differences as religions became identified with the various ethnic groups.⁶⁵ For example, when the Patriarch of Pec and 30,000 followers defected to Austria in 1766, the Ottomans replaced him with a Greek. Thereafter, a Greek held the position which caused considerable animus: the Serbs took offense at Turkish interference with the Serbian Orthodox Church and resented the Greeks for being Ottoman stooges. A similar situation occurred in Bulgaria, where Greeks controlled the Orthodox Church and became identified with the ruling Ottoman class.⁶⁶ Religious issues, therefore, reinforced ethnic animosities.

In an interesting paradox, the relative religious freedom within the Ottoman Empire and the propensity to identify religious affiliation with a specific ethnic group combined to make local churches the symbol of nationalism within the Balkans. The Serbian Orthodox Church, for example, became the sole remaining expression of anything "Serbian" and, thus, the focus of Serbian nationalism under the Ottomans. Similarly, the Latin Church was a significant element that made the Croats different from Serbs; therefore, the Catholic Church served as the rallying point for Croatian nationalism versus the Serbs.⁶⁷ Unfortunately, this also meant that religious organizations increasingly became drawn into the ethnic and national conflicts.

These difficulties continued into modern Yugoslavia. A telling example of the levels of animosity may be found in the crisis of 1937. In an attempt to appease the Croatian population, the Yugoslav government negotiated a Concordat with the Vatican that would have granted the Roman Church and its adherents greater freedoms within Yugoslavia. When the Concordat came before the *Skupština* (parliament) for approval, a storm of outrage broke over Serbia. The Synod of


the Orthodox Church immediately excommunicated government ministers of the Orthodox faith, as well as parliamentary members who had voted for the Concordat. Moreover, the Serbian peasantry and middle class saw the move as a capitulation to Croatia. Even Croats, who would benefit from the Concordat, viewed the document with suspicion, fearing a Serbian ploy to break their opposition to the government. As a result, the Concordat had to be withdrawn.⁶⁸ Thus, a plan genuinely intended to improve internal relations led instead to increased ethnic, nationalist, and religious enmity.

ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Ethnic diversity represents the most problematic division within the Balkans. Ethnic composition was largely set by the end of the 9th century when the last wave of migrations broke over the Balkans.⁶⁹ But even at this early time, no ethnically pure groups remained in the region. True, a band of Slavic speaking people separated Romanians and Hungarians in the north from Albanians and Greeks to the south, but no group, despite their boasts, could prove ethnic purity.⁷⁰


The expansion and later contraction of the Ottoman Empire significantly increased ethnic intermingling. The Ottomans initially pushed the Serbs north and west, where sizeable groups settled in southern Hungary, Slavonia, western Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. (See Map 3.) Displaced Serbs crowded Croats into Austria, Slovenia, and southwest Hungary. With the contraction of the Ottoman Empire, large segments of the displaced populations migrated southward once again. The net result of this ebb and flow of populations across the Balkans, and particularly Yugoslavia, has been the creation of a patchwork ethnic quilt that continues to this day.⁷¹ (See Map 4 and Figure 1.)

This ethnic patchwork has considerably hindered the development of a harmonious nationalism within the Balkans. As William Pfaff has pointed out: "In . . . Balkan Europe, nationality is identified with ethnic or religious background,"⁷² and these ethnic divisions and distributions frustrated the




Map 4. Ethnic Distribution.

Croatia has an aging population and a fairly low growth rate in part because many Croats emigrate to Europe as guestworkers. If the many thousands of Serbs and Croats who fled Croatia during the war do not return, the growth rate will be even further reduced.




* Preliminary 1991 census data.
† The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its large Serb population, is one of the most countries in the developed world despite constant and fairly heavy emigration of Croats and Serbs to find refuge in public. Massive war-related displacement is still in effect. Instead of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, could have a lasting impact on the population structure.




* Preliminary 1991 census data.
† The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Serbia has experienced a tremendous influx of displaced persons as a result of the war. Many of these immigrants become permanent however, they probably will not significantly affect Serbia's low growth rate. It remains an aging, working-age population.




* Preliminary 1991 census data.
† The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Vojvodina had a negative growth rate between 1985 and 1991, but the region has absorbed tens of thousands of Serbs displaced by the war.




* Preliminary 1991 census data.
† The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Kosovo is the only region of former Yugoslavia experiencing dramatic population growth. At present, only the Albanian population in Kosovo probably close to 90 percent of the population that the official figures of 52 percent, will double by the year 2000. Its proportion of the working-age population is kept low by the large number of children in the population.




* The Albanian population, reported here as 60 percent Yugoslav, includes the case of the Albanian born in the 1940s.
† The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Although many Macedonians immigrate to northern republics in search of work, the growth rate is about average for the developed world, and the age distribution is normal. The Albanians and Muslims are the most rapidly growing ethnic groups and will probably comprise a large share of the population in the 1990s census.



* Albanians, Roma, Gypsies, Serbs, Muslims, and Montenegrins would be a number to see under separate categories in the 1990s census. From the Macedonian population structure in the Republic of Macedonia.
† 1981 census data reported by Central Intelligence Research Bureau of the U.S. State Dept. of the former Yugoslavia.
The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Slovenia's low growth rate is far larger than an aging population, since immigration is so strongly balanced by emigration from southern republics. This low growth will eventually cause Slovenia's large working-age population to decline, although many displaced persons from Bosnia and Kosovo have entered in Slovenia's working-age from the war.



* 1981 census data reported by Central Intelligence Research Bureau of the U.S. State Dept. of the former Yugoslavia.
† 1981 census data reported by Central Intelligence Research Bureau of the U.S. State Dept. of the former Yugoslavia.
The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center (DRC) of estimates for 1980 and preliminary 1991 census data.

Figure 1. Population Resources in the Former Yugoslavia.

ability of nationalism to coalesce around one, single unifying group. Concomitantly, harsh, repressive Ottoman rule posed considerable obstacles to the rise of nationalism, as the Turks crushed political dissent at the earliest opportunity.⁷³ Despite these impediments, nascent nationalism always existed throughout the Balkans. But, unable to consolidate around a single unifying definition of nation, ethnic groups coalesced around their language and religion and hearkened back to the glory days of their respective national kingdoms.⁷⁴

Bulgarians looked to the First Bulgarian Empire (893-927) or the empire of Tsar John Asen II (1218-41), when Bulgaria stretched from the Adriatic to the Aegean to the Black Seas.⁷⁵ Greeks, on the other hand, sought to emulate Alexander the Great and create a nation-state that united all Hellenes in the Balkans.⁷⁶ Croats traced their nationhood back to the *Pacta Conventa* (1102) that established a Croatian state under Magyar rule that encompassed the northwest corner of the Balkans.⁷⁷ Serbs based their national claims on the domain of Stephen Dusan (1321-55) when Serbia included parts of Albania, Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly and extended from the Aegean to the Adriatic; the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth.⁷⁸

Establishment of these independent kingdoms 800-1000 years ago is no mere historical footnote. As Stavrianos pointed out:

First, it should be noted that the past—even the very distant past—and the present are side by side in the Balkans. Centuries chronologically removed from each other are really contemporary. Governments and peoples, particularly intellectuals, have based their attitudes and actions on what happened, or what they believed happened, centuries ago. The reason is that during almost five centuries of Turkish rule the Balkan people had no history. Time stood still for them. Consequently, when they won their independence in the nineteenth century their point of reference was the pre-Turkish period—to the medieval ages or beyond.⁷⁹

Although written in 1958, these sentiments currently reverberate throughout the erstwhile Yugoslavia. A Croatian fighter in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina declares, "Don't forget, this was all part of Croatia in 1101. . . Muslims and Serbs took it away from us."⁸⁰ Or, the Serb irregular fresh from "cleansing" who, when asked, "What happened here yesterday?" replies

"Well, in 1389. . .," or "Under the Ottomans," or "Because in 1921 they. . . ." to justify his actions.⁸¹ The trek of over 1,000,000 Serbs to the "Field of the Blackbirds" in Kosovo in 1989 to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman victory that ended an independent Serbia best illustrates, perhaps, the depth of historical attachment in this region.⁸²

Equally important is that many ethnic groups use these historical claims to justify their current territorial demands; many of which overlap significantly.⁸³ If past or present rhetoric is any indication, no side appears willing to compromise on the extent of its claim. Instead of being a forgotten page of history, these antecedents provide considerable grist for conflict, as the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia graphically illustrates.

Only after considerable decline in Ottoman power (i.e., the late 18th and 19th centuries) could nationalism gather momentum. Indeed, not until the Napoleonic Revolution could the peoples of the Balkans begin to establish and sustain a national identity.⁸⁴ Even then, however, popular expectations went largely unfulfilled. Great Power concerns over the division of Ottoman spoils oftentimes deferred nationalist hopes as boundaries failed to incorporate large segments of an ethnic population. Thus, the continuing—but apparently impossible to fulfill—desire to bring all segments of an ethnic group under one nation only stoked the fires of nationalism until the next conflict inevitably burst on the scene.⁸⁵

The participation of various ethnic groups in World War I increased these strains. Large numbers of Croats fought for the Habsburg Empire against Serbia.⁸⁶ Early in the war, Muslims living in Serbia fought with the Serbs against the Austrians. When Turkey later entered the war, many Muslims believed a secret agreement had been reached between Turkey and Austria that would return Bosnia-Herzegovina to Turkish rule. Many Muslims, therefore, left Serbian service, and fought against the Serbs.⁸⁷

More importantly, for an understanding of current events in Yugoslavia, Croats collected Serbs and Bosnians into as many as seven concentration camps, the most infamous being

Doboj. According to Dedijer, *et al.*, tens of thousands of Serbs and Bosnian Serbs died in these camps, largely through disease and neglect.⁸⁸ The fighting in World War I, thus, took on not only a strong nationalistic, but an ethnic and religious bent.

What one must also remember is that these events are not ancient history. Some participants are still alive. Many of the current generation languishing in the Yugoslav civil war have parents or grandparents who passed on first-hand tales of horror that vividly color current perceptions. Thus, the end of World War I did not end ethnic discontent in the region.

The creation of Yugoslavia in the wake of World War I offers an excellent illustration of the failure to soothe ethnic and nationalist sentiments. Convinced they could not survive as independent states, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina opted for union with Serbia rather than run the risk of being swallowed up by another more powerful and non-Slavic neighbor (e.g., Italy or Hungary). Like most marriages of convenience, the participants entered into the agreement with decidedly different views of the pre-nuptial agreement—one side pursued a Greater Serbia dominated by Belgrade, while the other sought a loose, federal system with considerable autonomy.⁸⁹

Nor were the Yugoslavs the only dissatisfied parties. Romania doubled in size, but only at the expense of other states within the region, particularly Hungary. Greece obtained a small portion of Thrace from Bulgaria, but felt betrayed when denied the full territorial concessions offered to entice Greece into the war. Defeated Bulgaria suffered partial dismemberment that led to discontent and irredentism in the post-World War I era.⁹⁰

Additionally, ethnic discrimination oftentimes worsened in the inter-war era. For example, the Yugoslav government viewed any dissent as treason and took harsh repressive actions. Croats, Albanians, and Macedonians suffered considerably under the Serbian dominated government. The Serbs were not alone in this practice, as other ethnic *cum* national leaders in Yugoslavia took to calling minorities

foreigners, even if ethnic groups had lived in the region for generations.⁹¹

The onset of World War II once again brought forth the ethnic genie in the Balkans. After conquering the Balkans, Germany planned to deport Slovenes from Lower Styria and Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia. Although the massive scale of forced emigration did not occur because of the uprising against the occupiers, the Nazis deported roughly 50,000 Slovenes and another 200,000 Serbs and Slovenes moved of their own accord to avoid the deportations.⁹² Nor were the Germans alone as animosities throughout the region motivated other ethnic groups to settle old scores. Bulgarians carried out mass expulsions of Serbs in Macedonia and introduced large numbers of Bulgarian colonists in the area. Hungarians expelled thousands of Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews from their occupied areas.⁹³

More important for the purposes of this report, the hatred that surfaced during the course of the Yugoslav civil war, which continues to plague that erstwhile nation today, deserves special attention. Within five days of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, the puppet *Ustaši* regime had been established in Croatia. As early as May 2, 1941, Milovan Zanic', Minister of the Legislative Council of the Independent State of Croatia, declared in a note of instruction:

This country can only be a Croatian country, and there is no method we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly Croatian and *cleanse* [added emphasis] it of Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us and who will endanger us again if they are given the opportunity.⁹⁴

Shortly thereafter, reprisals against Serbs and Muslims began. Outright murder and massacres became commonplace. "Ethnic cleansing," the current hot buzz word, began in earnest as the *Ustaši* forced hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Muslims to emigrate from their homelands in Croatia or to convert to Catholicism.

Once the *Ustaši* campaign began, Serbs, most prominently under Colonel Drazha Mihailovic'; and his *Chetniks*, defended themselves. The *Chetniks* held strong nationalistic, Greater

Serbia, anti-Croatian, and anti-Communist beliefs, and seemed only secondarily concerned with the German or Italian invaders. Moreover, Mihailovic' proved unable to control many separate *Chetnik* groups which acted as little more than brigands who attacked whomever happened to be nearest.⁹⁵

During this same time, the largely Communist (but pan-Yugoslav) Partisan movement under Joseph Broz, better known as Tito, began guerrilla operations against the Axis occupiers. Although ethnically Croatian, the strong anti-Communist bent of the *Ustaši* and orders from Stalin drove Tito to take up arms against his countrymen. Initially, he established his forces in and around Zagreb, but *Ustaši* and German pressure forced him to move into Serbian territory, where he set up his headquarters in the vicinity of Belgrade.⁹⁶

This move immediately brought him into conflict with Mihailovic', and by November 1941, the two men and their organizations stood at dagger points. This circumstance initially resulted as much from tactical differences as ideologic ones. The Germans carried out brutal reprisals against any Partisan actions, and, because both resistance groups operated predominantly from Serbian territory, Serbs suffered the brunt of the reprisals. After German raids in Kragujevac resulted in the deaths of over 8,000—including hundreds of children—Mihailovic' suspended operations against Axis forces to avoid further reprisals and focused on survival of his troops until such time that liberation seemed closer at hand.⁹⁷

Tito, on the other hand, continued his operations. These actions, combined with ideological and ethnic differences, resulted in the *Chetniks* actively cooperating with the Germans and Italians in anti-Partisan operations from November 1941 onwards.⁹⁸ Thus began a four way civil war among the *Ustaši*, *Chetniks*, Partisans and rump Serbia under Nedic' that escalated in scope and level of violence until the end of World War II.⁹⁹ An indication of the levels of hatred and nationalist sentiment involved can be found in an anecdote concerning the Croatian leader Vladko Maček and one of his guards, a devout Catholic. When Maček asked the man if he feared God's punishment for his actions, the guard replied:

Don't talk to me about that. . .for I am perfectly aware of what is in store for me. For my past, present, and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least I shall burn for Croatia.¹⁰⁰

The civil and ethnic war quickly spread beyond Croatian-Serbian warfare as both sides also settled old scores with the Muslim community.¹⁰¹ Muslims later joined with Croats in reprisals against the Serbs. Muslims also enlisted in two SS divisions—the Albanian SS "*Skanderbeg*" Division and the Croatian/Bosnian SS "*Handschar*" (Scimitar) Division—that participated in the numerous German anti-Partisan operations and carried out indiscriminate attacks against Partisans and civilians alike.¹⁰² In many ways it became difficult to separate the civil and ethnic wars from the religious aspects of the centuries-old conflicts in the region.¹⁰³

The costs of this civil-ethnic-religious war were staggering. Estimates indicate that upwards of 300,000 Serbs may have been forcibly converted to Catholicism and that between 200,000-600,000 Serbs died in Croatia alone. Jozo Tomasevich notes that Serbs claim between 500,000-700,000 Serbs may have perished in Croatian cleansing campaigns, but concludes that the minimum number may have been closer to 350,000. Nor were Serbs the only victims, as the Germans and their satellites killed large numbers of anti-*Ustaši* Croats, Jews and Gypsies who lived in the Balkans.¹⁰⁴

Precise numbers of Croatian casualties are difficult to determine, and, while likely less than Serbs, they would still be considerable. What is known is that at the end of the war, approximately 100,000 *Ustaši* supporters surrendered to British authorities. The British, per established procedures, returned the personnel to Yugoslav (i.e., Tito; thus, imparting a political/military motive) control, where over the course of roughly six weeks, between 40,000-100,000 (depending upon the estimate) perished.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the greatest consequence of civil war was that, despite the levels of bloodshed, ethnic issues had not been resolved. To the people of the Balkans who either lived through this era or to the current generation who heard, in vivid detail, grim horror stories from parents or grandparents, these

activities are not history, but life as it exists in the Hobbesian sense—"solitary, poor, nasty, cruel, brutish, and short."¹⁰⁶ Moreover, many of these people have a face to put on this misery. A face that belongs to the Croat, Serb, Muslim, Albanian, or Macedonian who participated in, or who is perceived as responsible for the crimes of World War II.¹⁰⁷ As F. Stephen Larrabee aptly pointed out, memories run long and deep in the Balkans.¹⁰⁸

Post-war events, particularly the establishment of totalitarian regimes with an anti-national bent (i.e., Communism) in much of the Balkans and East-West polarity, generally dampened ethnic conflict throughout the region. Yugoslavia again provides an illustrative example of events. In crafting the Constitution of 1946, Tito attempted to establish internal borders based on national or historic bases, but the substantial intermingling of ethnic groups made it impossible to draw lines strictly on ethnic lines. To compensate for this failing, republic borders "were defined as sovereign homelands of sovereign nations: Croatia of Croats, Serbia of Serbs, and so on."¹⁰⁹ Obviously designed to protect ethnic minorities in other republics, this provision also meant that minorities living within one republic also became part of their respective nation; e.g., Serbs in Croatia were still part of the Serbian nation.¹¹⁰ Such a proviso could justify inter-republic interference in the internal affairs of a neighbor in the name of protecting one's ethnic brethren. Serbia's current actions in Croatia and Bosnia can be traced directly to this precedent.¹¹¹

Through a series of constitutional changes (1953, 1963, 1974), Tito attempted to restrain ethnic and nationalist passions by providing greater local autonomy, the most dramatic instance being the Constitution of 1974.¹¹² Tito also periodically purged republic parties that demonstrated too much nationalism, most notably his purge of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian branches of the party in 1970-74.¹¹³ But Tito only succeeded in temporarily capping ethnic animosities.

With Tito's passing in 1980, the body politic of Yugoslavia proved unable to withstand the internal assault of nationalism and ethnic strife that has engulfed the nation. Given the ethnic

groups within the former Yugoslavia that have close ties with neighboring nations, the possibility of the conflict spreading throughout the Balkans runs high. This potential for expansion is what the policymakers of today must contend with. But, in developing their policy options, decision makers must understand the depths of the ethnic animosities that exist within the Balkans and the second and third order consequences that might result from policy initiatives.

CULTURE

The linguistic, religious, and ethnic issues outlined above constitute the fundamental elements of culture,¹¹⁴ and for the purposes of this report offer a largely complete picture of the clash of cultures that has taken place (and will likely continue) in the Balkans. That said, three additional points critical for decision makers' fuller understanding of policy shoals in the Balkans require explication.

First, policymakers must understand that violence is ingrained in the cultures of the region. This statement is not intended as a value judgement, but rather as a recognition of the influences that have shaped the region. Nor should this result be surprising: for over two millennia, the Balkans not only has been the major battleground between competing Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires, but also the killing ground for World War I, World War II, and numerous civil wars.

Second, no one culture dominates the region. The Balkans contains a melange of Albanian, Greek, Italian, Croatian, Slovenian, Romanian, Byzantine, Ottoman, Magyar, and Slav cultures, to name only the major contributors.

Third, the region suffers from a cultural cleavage of substantial proportions. The reasons for this condition are manifold and must be understood if policymakers are to make informed decisions. Populations were first separated along the border between Rome and Byzantium, which also became the cultural dividing line between Occident and Orient. Cultural differences sharpened as a series of conquerors passed through the region and Magyars, Venetians, Italians, and

Germans left their cultural imprint. But, the key cultural abyss resulted from the clash of Ottoman and European cultures whose dramatic differences in government, language, religion, and customs could not have been any more distinct. As L. S. Stavrianos pointed out, this clash resulted in

. . . a cultural dividing line [albeit murky and ill-defined, that] runs across the peninsula with Catholic Christianity, the Latin alphabet, and Western cultural orientation on one side, and Orthodox Christianity, the Greek alphabet, and a Byzantine cultural pattern on the other.¹¹⁵

Finally, the various cultures are exclusive in nature. If an individual does not display all necessary prerequisites, i.e., language, religion, and ethnic origin, he or she is excluded from membership. Moreover, there appears to be no room for compromise. Even should an individual speak the language or convert to another religion, ethnic origin appears to be a distinctive difference that cannot be overcome.¹¹⁶ Literally, an "us versus them" cultural mentality exists and, given the rising levels of violence, is not likely to change in the near future.

The ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is instructive in this regard. Bosnia-Herzegovina has largely been a geographical-political expression vice a nation or national identity. As a result, Bosnians have been unable to develop either an independent culture or one that conforms to one or the other cultures in the region. Thus, they have been denied entrance into either. Indeed, the Bosnian state may likely be viewed as antithetical to the interests of the other competing cultures. The existence of an independent Bosnia will, therefore, remain problematic as cultures within the region continue to clash. Undoubtedly, this condition will vex policymakers as they attempt to craft a comprehensive settlement to the violence in the former Yugoslavia or its successor states.

Nor is the situation in former Yugoslavia unique. Similar divisions afflict other nations within the region, (e.g., Romania, Bulgaria, Greece) and cultural differences will likely continue to raise temperatures.

The most effective long-term solution to this clash of cultures is the development of political institutions that will safeguard the minority rights of the various ethnic and religious groups. Neither the recent nor distant past offers much hope that such a political solution will be found quickly, however. The rationale behind this pessimistic assessment will be explored next.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND MISTRUST

*Balkan politics—frequent and haphazard changes of government and general corruption.*¹¹⁷

An understanding of the historical factors that have influenced political outlooks and governmental institutions in the Balkans is essential to grasping the complexities of current difficulties within the region. Without a thorough understanding of the past political development of the region, policymakers may neither comprehend the complications of the present nor identify a successful path to the future.

With one or two key exceptions, political developments within the Balkans tend to follow similar paths. Therefore, the report will focus first on the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and then trace the general political development of the states within the region from the time they escaped the bonds of empire to the present day. Finally, the investigation will focus more sharply on the political development of Yugoslavia.

THE OTTOMAN HERITAGE

At the upper levels of government, the Ottomans established the precedent of arbitrary, authoritarian, thoroughly repressive, and violent rule that tightly controlled state policies. If individuals or regions failed to pay taxes, offer suitable tribute, or provide sufficient sons to meet the levies for the Janissaries, retribution came swiftly and violently.¹¹⁸

Contrary to their tight hold at the state level, the Turks only loosely controlled local government, which enjoyed considerable autonomy. After conquering an area, the

Ottomans desired no direct control over their subject populations and preferred to rule indirectly through intermediaries.¹¹⁹ Under the *millet* system, the Turks eliminated any residual local secular government and replaced it with a religious authority of local origin, or at least congruent with local confessions, that also had civic responsibilities.

Within the Balkans, this system resulted in the Orthodox Church serving as the Ottomans' agent for regional and local governments.¹²⁰ Equally, this led to the Orthodox Church being identified with the Ottoman state. Thus, when nationalism began to emerge within the region, non-Orthodox groups saw the Orthodox Church as an obstacle to their ethnic, nationalist goals.¹²¹ Religion, therefore, tended to reinforce ethnic differences, exacerbating societal divisions and complicating political development.¹²²

Finally, the Ottomans bequeathed a tradition of corrupt government. Within the late Ottoman Empire (late 1600s onwards), office holders viewed their position as a means of amassing personal wealth as opposed to providing a service to the governed. At lower governmental levels, wages and salaries were ridiculously small, encouraging rampant corruption (the concept of paying *baksheesh*, for example) to obtain even the most fundamental services. These traits passed on to succeeding governments.¹²³

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AFTER OTTOMAN RULE

As states emerged from Ottoman rule, they tended to follow similar paths. Nationalist awakenings and repressive Ottoman practices stirred local populations first to agitation, then to revolt. Initially, insurrectionists did not achieve full independence, but obtained limited autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, often under the rule of a local prince.¹²⁴

To achieve full independence, these emerging states generally required assistance from an outside power that frequently left them beholden to their patron, if not under *de facto* control.¹²⁵ This dependency resulted in two interesting phenomena. On the one hand, the requirement to conform to their patron's desires oftentimes constrained the princes'

ability to influence the international arena. On the other hand, because the princes could rely on outside support, they did not have to develop stable internal political institutions and, instead, could rely on outside support to prop up their regimes.¹²⁶

Most nations evolved into monarchies with strong centralizing tendencies.¹²⁷ Although states declared themselves constitutional monarchies in name and form, monarchy normally prevailed over constitution, at least through World War II. Political parties, nonetheless, did come into existence and their rise led to conflicts between monarchs and emerging political elites. While these conflicts sometimes curtailed monarchical power, more often than not they only further alienated the parties involved.¹²⁸

World War I provided a watershed for the growth of political institutions within the Balkans. The Ottoman and Habsburg empires disappeared, and their territories and nationalities were distributed among the victorious powers or the nations within the region. The territorial distribution did not, however, satisfy many of the ethnic-*cum*-nationalist aspirations in the region.¹²⁹ The most pressing issue in the immediate post-war period, then, became how to integrate politically these disgruntled groups.

An increasing number of political parties considerably complicated this integration process. Because of the manner in which countries had been cobbled together (or taken apart), parties in most states spanned the political spectrum: communists, agrarians, populists, moderates, and rabid nationalists, few of whom could agree on much of anything.¹³⁰ Their diversity and political opposition to the increasingly centralizing nature of the monarchies caused them to fragment, leading, in turn, to increased weakness of the parliamentary factions.¹³¹

More importantly, perhaps, this political fragmentation resulted in an inability to resolve the vast problems left over from before World War I, as well as the dilemmas generated by the war and the peace that followed. In short, throughout the Balkans, political parties failed to govern effectively. As a

result, internal political instability and economic crisis led to the demise of democratic government.¹³²

The economic disasters of the Great Depression brought matters to a head. Throughout the region, right wing, authoritarian dictatorships stepped in to end ethnic violence, political instability, and economic crisis. The facade of democracy might have been maintained, but the dictators ruled with a strong hand, effectively emasculating any opposition.¹³³ The events leading up to World War II, particularly the rise of fascism, only further contributed to the accretion of dictatorial power within the region.

The German conquest of the Balkans clamped the region ever more firmly in the grip of authoritarian regimes. The occupied countries of Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia suffered varying degrees of harsh occupation. Bulgaria and Romania initially enjoyed considerable freedom from German interference, but the exigencies of war inevitably led to a tightening of the dictatorial grips of their rulers.

The end of World War II brought mixed results for the political development of the region. In Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia, Communist governments established a dictatorial hold that exceeded that of the right wing dictators. While Tito's variant of communism may have been considerably more gentle than that of nearby Stalinist clones, Yugoslavia was still Communist. As Barbara Jelavich noted, the establishment of Communist regimes in the Balkans created a political dividing line in the bipolar world that reinforced existing cultural, religious, and linguistic divisions¹³⁴ and would not be breached for over 40 years.

Nor did Greece and Turkey easily escape from the clutches of authoritarianism. Greece fought a brutal civil war against a Communist insurrection from 1944-49. After conclusion of the civil war, a relatively stable and democratic government emerged that would last for nearly two decades. By the mid-1960s, Greek politics began to fragment, primarily over the failed union with Cyprus and the rapid rise of Andreas Papandreu.¹³⁵ With the emergence of a dysfunctional government, the Greek Army once again took matters into its

own hands and for 7 years Greece lived under a harsh military dictatorship. Greece returned to a democratically elected government in 1974 and has subsequently maintained a stable and open political system.¹³⁶

After World War II, Turkey followed a regular cycle of civilian government, increasing political polarization, decreasing ability to govern, rising radical violence, and military intervention in a series of coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980.¹³⁷ In all cases, military leaders stated their aim to restore civil peace and prepare the country for the rapid reintroduction of civil government under the rule of law. In each instance, the military yielded power to civil authorities as promised.¹³⁸ These actions did not, however, entirely remove the specter of future military intervention which still hangs over Turkey.¹³⁹ While Turkey has made tremendous strides in this century, it continues to struggle toward full democracy.

THE YUGOSLAV EXAMPLE

The rationale behind a sharper focus on Yugoslavia is severalfold. First, Yugoslavia represents a microcosm of the various general trends of the region. Second, Yugoslavia (initially in the form of an autonomous and then an independent Serbia) arrived first on the international stage and set precedents for others to follow. Third, the Serbian nationalist drive throughout the 19th century exerted tremendous influence over the political development of other emerging nations within the region. Finally, the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia is, in many ways, an extension of the long historical battle between the political concepts of a highly centralized "Greater Serbia" and a loose federal union of South Slavs. An examination of Yugoslavia's political development may shed light on the efficacy of potential solutions to the current crisis.

The origins of the modern Yugoslav state can be traced to 1804, when Djordje Petrovic' (Karadjordje or "Black George") led a decade-long revolt against oppressive Janissary rule in Serbia. Initially successful, the movement captured Belgrade and liberated large portions of Serbia, but lost momentum after Russia failed to provide promised support and the Ottomans

awoke to the threat. Forced to flee to the Austrian Empire in 1813, Karadjordje could still claim considerable success in mobilizing Serbian nationalism. Moreover, he left behind a legacy of limited Serbian autonomy under his personal rule, as well as a large number of trained and motivated supporters who would bide their time until the next revolt.¹⁴⁰

The next rebellion was not long in coming, for in 1817 Miloš Obrenović, one of Karadjordje's rivals, led another, more successful revolt. The circumstances surrounding it are quite interesting. In return for helping the Ottomans put down a local revolt in 1814, the Porte named Obrenović supreme prince of Serbia and granted him limited autonomy in the collection of taxes and the conduct of local government.¹⁴¹

Miloš received the right of personal, not hereditary rule. Dissatisfied with these circumstances, he commenced a long campaign to expand Serbian borders, increase his authority, and establish his own hereditary line, which he declared in 1817. In one of his first acts to cement his rule, Miloš had Karadjordje (who had returned in the wake of Miloš' success) beheaded, supposedly in retaliation for the suspected poisoning of Miloš' half-brother. This event set in motion the long political and blood feud between the Karadjordjević and Obrenović families that would debilitate Serbian politics for nearly a century.¹⁴²

Largely because of Russian intercession on Miloš' behalf and Turkey's defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, the Ottomans granted Serbia full autonomy in 1830 and Miloš received the right of hereditary rule. Under the terms of the Porte's agreement, Miloš shared power with the *Skupština*, an assembly of notables whom he attempted—with some success—to eliminate one by one. Miloš' arbitrary, violent, and corrupt rule precipitated numerous revolts and, finally, outside intervention in 1838 that resulted in a new constitution. Miloš refused to cooperate with the Serbian oligarchy as stipulated in the constitution and abdicated in favor of his son, Milan.¹⁴³

Figure 2 summarizes the confusing succession to the Serbian throne throughout the 19th century and can also be used to derive insights into the political development of Serbia

| Years of Rule | Ruler | End of Reign |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1804-1813 | Karadjordje | Defeated by Turks. Later beheaded by Miloš Obrenović. |
| 1817-1839 (first reign) | Miloš Obrenović | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1839 | Milan Obrenović | Died from disease. |
| 1839-1842 (first reign) | Michael Obrenović | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1842-1858 | Alexander Karadjordjević | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1858-1860 (second reign) | Miloš Obrenović | Died of natural causes. |
| 1860-1868 (second reign) | Michael Obrenović | Assassinated by Karadjordjević faction? |
| 1868-1889 | Milan II Obrenović | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1889-1903 | Alexander Obrenović | Assassinated by army officers. |
| 1903-1921 | Peter I Karadjordjević | Senile from 1914. Died of natural causes. |
| 1921-1934 (regent 1914) | Alexander Karadjordjević | Assassinated by Macedonian terrorist. |
| 1934-1945 | Peter II Karadjordjević | Prince Regent Paul Karadjordjević overthrown by military coup, 1941. Monarchy abolished 1945 |

Source: William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History*, 5th ed., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972, p. 760.

Figure 2.
Rulers of Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1804-1945.

from Miloš' abdication through the assassination of Alexander Obrenović (1903). First, the figure reflects the bitter political rivalry between the Obrenović and Karadjordjević families. Second, it provides an indication of the long struggle between the *Skupština* and either very weak or capricious authoritarian rulers who were forced to abdicate. Third, the figure reveals a predilection toward violence as the means of political change. What it does not indicate, but which is also important for an understanding of political developments, is the tradition of corrupt and repressive government that resulted from the continuous political instability during this period.

Shortly after Alexander Obrenović's assassination, the Skupština elected Peter Karadjordjević, then age 60, to the throne. Peter I returned from 45 years exile and immediately revitalized Serbia. Internally, Peter ruled as a constitutional monarch in close cooperation with a *Skupština* controlled by the Radicals, predominantly under the leadership of Nikola Pašić. From 1903 to the outbreak of World War I, Serbia enjoyed a period of relative calm and prosperity that saw the country make tremendous strides in civil liberties, economics, education, and national prestige.¹⁴⁴

After Peter's accession, Serbian foreign policies became decidedly nationalistic and anti-Austrian. The Austrians exacerbated conditions through the so-called "Pig War" (a tariff war in 1906 designed to halt Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement) and the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, two traditionally South Slav provinces, in 1908. After the Bosnian crisis (1908), Serbian-Austrian relations had reached the point of no return.¹⁴⁵

Denied access to the Adriatic Sea by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Serbs turned their attention to the southeast. Here Peter I helped construct the Balkan League which first successfully dismembered much of the European portion of the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War of 1912, and later stopped Bulgarian aggression in the Second Balkan War of 1913. Three key results emerged from these successes. First, Serbia nearly doubled in size. Second, the Serbian victories electrified Slavs under Austrian domination who began to look to Belgrade for salvation.¹⁴⁶ Third, the combination of these circumstances set Serbia and Austria on a collision course that culminated shortly thereafter in Sarajevo, where Gavrilo Princip (a Bosnian Serb working for the Serbian society Union or Death, better known as the Black Hand) assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and lit the powder trail that exploded into World War I.

The major events of World War I are too well-known to be repeated here. But it is important to understand the levels of Croat-Serb mistrust generated during the war. First, of the South Slav states, Serbia suffered the brunt of the casualties of the war.¹⁴⁷ Second, many Croats fought for the

Habsburgs.¹⁴⁸ Third, under the terms of the secret Treaty of London (1915) that brought Italy into the war against Austria-Hungary, the allies granted much ethnically Croat and Slovene territory to Italy. Well founded rumors circulated that Serbian Premier Pašić would acquiesce to the agreement so long as Serbia gained territory populated by Serbs or Orthodox followers, as well as access to the Adriatic.¹⁴⁹

By the summer of 1917, however, the various nationalities felt compelled to reach some form of agreement on the future of the South Slav peoples. The Habsburgs and their allies had driven the Serbian Army and government into exile on the island of Corfu. Isolated, knowing the terms of the Treaty of London, and in need of allies, the Serbs pursued negotiations with the Yugoslav Committee on the formation of a South Slav state.¹⁵⁰ Croats and Slovenes realized that, individually, each was too weak to withstand the Habsburgs or Italians. An alliance with Serbia within the construct of a Yugoslav state offered the only viable alternative and they, too, sought the good offices of the Yugoslav Committee.¹⁵¹

This convergence of interests resulted in the Corfu Declaration of July 1917, where the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee agreed to the creation of a Yugoslav state as a constitutional monarchy under the Karadjordjevic dynasty.¹⁵² While perhaps not a "shotgun" marriage, the agreement certainly represented a marriage of convenience. On the one hand, the Serbs compromised because they needed allies and U.S. approval, but looked to establish a "Greater Serbia" that included all Serbs whose land would be dominated by Belgrade. On the other hand, the remaining ethnic groups, particularly Croats (who wanted a Croatian state, but realized some form of autonomy within a confederation was the only practical option), feared a Serbian-dominated state and wanted a loose confederation that would grant relative autonomy to the various elements of the South Slav state.¹⁵³ These attitudes undoubtedly sowed the seeds of future estrangement, and, it is worth pointing out, much of the impetus behind the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia stems from this very point: perceived Serb domination versus independence and autonomy.

Despite these misgivings, the new state took life in the waning days of World War I. On October 29, 1918, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs meeting in Croatia announced the founding of the "State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs." Less than one month later (November 24) the Kingdoms of Montenegro and Serbia merged with the new state. Shortly thereafter the National Council's delegates in Belgrade opted to accept the Karadjordjević dynasty as ruler of a joint state. Thus, the state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs merged with Serbia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes emerged on the world scene on December 1, 1918, with Prince Alexander Karadjordjević of Serbia as king.¹⁵⁴ Little noticed at the time, however, Stephen Radić, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, and who would rapidly emerge as the dominant Croatian leader, refused to sign the agreements, and instead called for an independent Croatia.¹⁵⁵

Political developments in the inter-war era generally can be divided into three periods. Almost immediately, disputes arose over the question of centralism versus federalism. Put simply, the Serb view of centralization triumphed and Belgrade dominated the government of the new state.¹⁵⁶ These circumstances created considerable tensions between the Serb-dominated government and the increasingly frustrated Croats, who, having fought for centuries to achieve their freedom, felt cheated of even the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Habsburgs. But the Croats proved unable to unite sufficient opposition to Serb centralizing policies. Moreover, the Serb-dominated government suppressed opposition parties, initiated repressive measures, and labelled any criticism of the government or constitution (which, of course legitimized Serb domination) as treason.¹⁵⁷ The combination of repressive measures, obvious election chicanery, and unfulfilled Croatian expectations only heightened animosity that would continue to grow throughout the 1920s. Political tensions gradually increased to a fever pitch until June 1928 when a Montenegrin delegate opened fire on the Croatian Peasant Party delegation in the *Skupština*, killing two delegates (one of whom was Radić's nephew) and wounding three, including Stephen Radić, who died a few weeks later.¹⁵⁸

Not surprisingly, Croats reacted violently to Radic's death, demanded a free Croatia, and the Peasant Party once again boycotted the *Skupština*. Vladko Maček, Radic's successor, met with King Alexander in January 1929 and demanded a new constitution based on federal principles that would grant Croatia nearly complete internal autonomy (government, military, economic, currency, etc.). When Serbian members of the government refused to accept Croatian demands, Alexander abolished the 1921 constitution, dissolved the *Skupština*, suppressed all political parties, and established his personal dictatorship.¹⁵⁹

Alexander's dictatorship ended in true Yugoslav political tradition with his murder in Marseilles in October 1934. Ominously, Italian and Hungarian authorities had aided and abetted his Macedonian assassin. More importantly for Yugoslav political developments, the Croatian nationalist group, *Ustaša*, also assisted in the assassination.¹⁶⁰

Alexander's death briefly united the country, but the opportunity for conciliation passed. The new king, Peter II, was only 11 years old at the time of his father's death and, therefore, a three man regency council headed by his uncle, Prince Paul, guided the government. Prince Paul held genuinely liberal views, but given the tense political situation and his own tenuous hold on the regency, he moved slowly. Conditions did improve as Prince Paul lifted press restrictions and eliminated many repressive practices. He also granted a general amnesty and held new elections to the *Skupština* in 1935. Despite a bare plurality, stacked electoral laws gave the Serbs and their parliamentary allies two-thirds of the seats. As a result, the Croats, once again under Maček's leadership, refused to participate in the *Skupština*, governmental deadlock continued, and nationalist tensions rose.¹⁶¹

The government remained split until August 1939 when most parties finally recognized the rising threats from Germany and Italy. After 6 months of negotiations with Prince Paul, Maček turned his back on his old Serbian opposition allies and signed an agreement (*Sporazum*) that, if fully implemented, would have established a new federal system that granted significant internal Croatian autonomy. Maček also became

one of two Yugoslav vice-premiers.¹⁶² Importantly for present conditions in Yugoslavia, the agreement also joined Croatia, Dalmatia, and seven largely Croatian districts in Bosnia-Hercegovina into one administrative unit.¹⁶³ With this agreement, internal politics largely stagnated, as the nation focused more and more on the course of World War II.

The German invasion of Yugoslavia temporarily, at least, resolved the issue of centralism versus federalism as the Germans and Italians dismembered the country. After dividing the spoils among themselves, the Axis Powers and their allies left only a rump Croatia and Serbia. And, while Croatia enjoyed relative autonomy under the control of Ante Pavelić and his *Ustaši*, Serbia remained under the tight control of German occupation forces. This control became ever tighter as the Partisan and *Chetnik* uprisings began.

The resulting Yugoslav civil war needs no further elaboration beyond one key observation: the intense frustrations and hatreds that had simmered since the inception of Yugoslavia boiled over from 1941-45. Serb fought Croat, Communist fought Royalist, *Chetnik* fought *Ustaši*, and Catholic fought Orthodox, while both fought Muslim. That tempest of blood which plagued post-World War II political developments continues to this very day.

By the end of World War II, Tito's Partisans had won the civil war and firmly controlled Yugoslavia. In November 1945, the Anti-Fascist Council held national elections that, unsurprisingly, voted overwhelmingly for the official list of candidates and Tito's Communists cemented their control over the country. Shortly thereafter, a constitutional assembly met, disbanded the monarchy, and began drafting a new constitution. In crafting this document, Tito attempted to devise a political settlement that would preclude the ethnic and resultant political tensions that had plagued Yugoslavia in the inter-war era and spilled so much Yugoslav blood during the war.¹⁶⁴

The new constitution clearly established a federal basis for the state, which was divided into six republics: Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,

Serbia, and Slovenia. Within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo hypothetically enjoyed autonomous status. The constitution recognized four major languages (Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, and Slovenian) and Hungarians and Albanians could speak their native tongues in their respective autonomous areas. Theoretically, the state remained responsible only for finance, economic planning, foreign policy, defense, communications and legal matters. The republics would retain all other government functions.¹⁶⁵

Reality proved much different, however. As in the early years of the state, Belgrade maintained tight control over all aspects of Yugoslav society (although the basis was different—Communism, not nationalism). As Tito broke from the Stalinist Bloc (from 1948), centralized control relaxed somewhat and the republics assumed greater influence over their internal affairs throughout the 1950s, and over the federal government under the constitution of 1953.¹⁶⁶ Conditions continued to improve when Tito promulgated a new constitution in 1963 that further decentralized government and established considerable legislative independence at the republic level.¹⁶⁷

Despite the considerable gains made in establishing republican autonomy from the central government in Belgrade, Croatia and Slovenia ceaselessly demanded and received greater decentralization. Moreover, as Barbara Jelavich points out, discussions took on an increasingly nationalistic tone, as republics once again aired grievances against Belgrade's (i.e., Serbian) centralization.¹⁶⁸ By 1971, according to some observers, Yugoslavia verged on disintegration and only Tito's prestige held the country together.¹⁶⁹

Tito acted quickly to stave off further fragmentation. First, he severely purged the Croatian branch of the party and removed the separatist factions. Second, in 1974, he proclaimed a new constitution designed to appease republic demands for increased autonomy. In the first instance, his actions may have bought time, but he succeeded only in further alienating Croatian nationalists who resented the reinstatement of centralized control of the party from Belgrade.¹⁷⁰ In the second instance, the increased autonomy granted under the

new constitution only accelerated centrifugal forces already at work within Yugoslavia. And, while Tito could keep the lid on because of his immense personal prestige, he would not live forever and, eventually, these cracks could no longer be papered over.¹⁷¹

Tito's death in 1980 set in motion the slow, painful demise of Yugoslavia. In a gradual process, republic leaders increasingly focused on local and republic issues at the expense of the state as a whole. According to Sabrina Petra Ramet's article in *Foreign Affairs*, the unravelling of Yugoslavia began in April 1981 when ethnic Albanians in Kosovo rioted to protest their economic straits and demonstrations took on an anti-Serb tone. As rumors spread of supposed Albanian atrocities, Serbian nationalism steadily grew until March 1986 when the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences declared Serbs to be the oppressed minority in Yugoslavia.¹⁷²

At this point, Slobodan Milošević entered the Serbian political scene. Milošević professed a simple platform: unrestrained Serbian nationalism that sought to overturn the existing system and restore Serbs and Serbia to their "rightful place." Within 2 years, Milošević seized control of the Serbian Communist Party organization, eliminated his rivals within Serbia, and gained support of the Yugoslav Army.¹⁷³ In short order, Milošević then brought down the governments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and replaced them with loyal supporters. Then, in February 1989, Milošević succeeded in eliminating the constitutional provisions guaranteeing autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina and reincorporated them into Serbia.¹⁷⁴

These events obviously had considerable consequences for Yugoslavia. First, as Yugoslav commentator Branka Magas pointed out, eventual Federal sanction of Milošević's actions legitimized Serbian nationalism, as well as the use of extra-parliamentary action and violence to attain that goal. Second, because of the violent Kosovar reaction to the loss of their freedom, the Federal Yugoslav Army occupied Kosovo in 1990, establishing the precedent of using the army against a fellow Federal member. Third, Serbia kept the votes of Vojvodina and Kosovo within the collective Federal

Presidency, providing Serbia with a disproportionate influence in that body.¹⁷⁵

These events produced anxiety throughout Yugoslavia, as the other republics feared Milošević's centralizing tendencies.¹⁷⁶ Indeed, there was legitimate reason for concern. Throughout 1989, Serbian nationalists argued that the internal republic boundaries artificially divided the Serb nation, and that Serbia reserved the right to speak for all Serbs, not just those that lived within Serbia.¹⁷⁷

By autumn 1989, matters worsened when Slovenia instituted a series of internal constitutional reforms, the most important being the right to secede from the federal state, the exclusive right to declare a state of emergency (to forestall actions similar to Milošević in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro), and the exclusive right to authorize the presence or use of the Yugoslav military in Slovenia.¹⁷⁸

By the end of 1990, the disintegration of Yugoslavia accelerated. With the exception of Kosovo (under military occupation), republics held elections that resulted in non-Communist governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, and a Communist-controlled minority coalition in Macedonia. Moreover, Croatia and Slovenia expressed interest in coordinating their defense and security policies, which smacked of a mutual defense pact against Serbia.¹⁷⁹

None of these republics had any desire to accede to Milošević's demands for increased centralization. The leaders of the six republics held a series of meetings intended to find a way out of the impasse between Serbian demands for centralization and equally strident demands (predominantly from Croatia and Slovenia) for increased decentralization. When Milošević showed no signs of yielding his strong nationalist position, Croatia and Slovenia declared that if a new inter-republican agreement had not been reached by June 26, 1991, they would leave the federation.¹⁸⁰ Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist on June 27, 1991, when "Yugoslav Army" tanks invaded independent Slovenia.

Almost 2 years of internal war in the former Yugoslavia represent a continuation of the centuries-old quest for a "Greater Serbia" and the violent reaction to the Serbian crusade. Despite recent international interventions,¹⁸¹ no end of the civil war is in sight. Moreover, internal political difficulties within Serbia (i.e., Kosovo and Vojvodina) portend further conflict that may exceed the current scale of violence.

Nor is the Yugoslav example dramatically different from other nations within the Balkans. Indeed, through the end of World War II, political developments in much of the region closely paralleled those of Yugoslavia as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania succumbed to totalitarian communism that stifled their political development for more than 40 years.

Political developments in other parts of the Balkans offer a more positive, but still spotty, picture of political development. Greece has demonstrated considerable dedication to democratic ideals since the Colonels' Revolt of 1967 and the return to democratic institutions in 1974. Despite repeated military intervention and the ongoing PKK revolt, Turkey appears to be on a solid path toward increased democratic reform.

Revolutions in former Communist states also offer a ray of hope for further evolution of democratic institutions within the Balkans. But developments may be more problematic in these nations, as nascent and fragile freedoms face considerable internal, as well as external, instability that threatens the growth of democracy. Despite executing Ceausescu, for example, Romania appears merely to have changed the name of the ruling party apparatus. Albania struggles with immense economic difficulties, a potential war with Serbia over Kosovo, and a total absence of any democratic history or institutions. And, while Bulgaria offers the most positive example, the final vote on democracy is still not in.

The general historical development of political institutions in the Balkans offers little optimism for dramatic improvement in political conditions. Indeed, the course of historical development is more a study of instability, authoritarianism, and violence. To overcome this tragic history, Balkan leaders

will have to break from their past and establish dramatically new political patterns. Only the test of time will determine whether the Balkans, as a whole, can overcome its political heritage and establish lasting political systems based on democratic tenets. At this point, expectations should not be raised too high.

CHAPTER 5

POLICY INSIGHTS AND ASSESSMENTS

All that is required for evil to flourish is that good men do nothing.

—Edmund Burke

The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world.

—John F. Kennedy¹⁸²

As stated in the introductory section, the intent of this report is not to argue for or against military intervention in the Balkans, or, specifically, Yugoslavia. Nor has the purpose of this historical examination been simply to chronicle the woes of the region. The intent has been to provide policymakers with an understanding of the depths of the issues, to offer insights into the perceptions of the participants, and to provide greater comprehension of the root causes of conflicts. Such an understanding can then allow policymakers to make informed decisions on potential policy choices.

INSIGHTS TO ASSIST INFORMED DECISION MAKING

In assessing conditions in the Balkans, analysts must think in a broader context that weaves the variegated strands of Balkans into a coherent tapestry. They must identify, examine, and connect an array of disparate and incredibly complex individual issues (e.g., language, religion, ethnic origin, and culture) in a manner that produces an accurate and coherent articulation of the problems. Without such an understanding, policymakers may not fully comprehend the consequences of their decisions.

In the Balkans, the past—no matter how distant it may appear to Americans—is inextricably entwined with the present and extends into the future. Analysts must understand this history, and the local perceptions that enshroud it. The past is not the collective record of the region, but the fragmented history of competing religious groups, ethnic tribes, and political factions, each of which bears an historical grudge or claim against one or more groups. To deny such rancor as anachronistic or irrational is to underestimate seriously the depths of Balkan conflicts.

One should not minimize the depths of religious animosity in the Balkans. This statement is more than a truism. Western analysts must comprehend the importance of "identity" to the inhabitants of the Balkans and how religion contributes to ethnic and national identity. Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic and Serbs are Orthodox; they have been in conflict since the "Great Schism" of 1054 and show no sign of compromising. Equally important, both groups consider Bosnian and ethnic Albanian Muslims apostate Serbs (or Croats) who expediently converted to Islam and should be returned to the fold—by force, if necessary. The religious overtones of the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia have brought Europe to the brink of its first religiously-defined war since the Thirty Years War ended in 1648 and should underscore the importance of this issue.

The patchwork quilt of ethnic groups in the Balkans complicates conflict resolution more than many understand. Ethnic animosities have developed over centuries and will not be resolved quickly, if ever. Short-term expedients may only worsen conditions. An "us versus them" situation offers little room for compromise. Finally, one must understand that any policy will leave one or more parties dissatisfied, and they will likely blame the United States—no matter how well-intended U.S. policies are.

Cultural cleavages—whether within the Balkans or between Balkan and U.S. leaders—are wider than many analysts comprehend. Although impolitic to say, substantial dissimilarities exist between Occidental and Oriental cultures and mind sets. These markedly different civilizations meet in

the Balkans, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, where religious and ethnic frictions exacerbate the clash of cultures. In addition, American decision makers must understand that—whether at the individual, national, or international level—violence has been and undoubtedly will continue to be an accepted, perhaps preferred, vehicle of change for over 2 millennia.

Analysts and policymakers should not assume that Balkan politicians follow Western European or American logic. This is not to imply that Balkan leaders are irrational, but to point out that they have different values that may drive an entirely different thought process. What may look irrational to a Western interlocutor may be absolutely credible in the eyes of a Balkan leader. American decision makers must understand that such dichotomies will occur and, rather than dismissing them out of hand, learn to bridge the gap between Balkan and Western logic.

Occidental analysts must also be careful not to mirror image their own values onto Balkan political leaders. Such an assumption could lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of an interlocutor's negotiating position or room for political maneuver. For example, many Balkan politicians (e.g., Milošević of Serbia, Mitsotakis of Greece) have painted themselves into a corner because their rhetoric has stirred up a whirlwind of passion from which they are now unable to disengage, let alone control.

Existing political institutions in the Balkans are not likely to contribute to the peaceful resolution of tensions, as the political development of the region is but a long history of instability and violence. From the Byzantine Empire through the 1980s, corrupt and repressive governments have been the norm. The region largely lacks the precedent of the peaceful transfer of power. Large segments of the population see democracy as an institution of chaos. Additionally, Balkan politics historically have exerted divergent rather than unifying forces which endure today as evidenced by the centrifugal forces that shattered Yugoslavia.

Compromise represents weakness, particularly to politicians who think only in zero-sum game terms, and where in the past, defeat has frequently meant death. Moreover, compromise is difficult when matters of principle are involved on such major issues as historical rights, territorial boundaries, national states, and sovereignty, much less ethnic, religious, and cultural beliefs. Negotiators must be prepared for difficult and protracted dialogue. Progress will occur only in an incremental and discontinuous manner. Considerable backsliding may occur. Diplomats and leaders, therefore, must display considerable patience and be prepared for a painfully slow process.

POTENTIAL LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

As George Schultz has pointed out, the basic problem to be overcome in the Balkans "... is learning how to govern over diversity: Ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic diversity."¹⁸³ Under the best of conditions, diversity alone poses significant challenges to finding tolerable solutions. But the history of the region exponentially complicates the ability of leaders to devise acceptable ones.

Only a fundamental break from the past offers the possibility of a viable solution. Forging a new path will be difficult, however, for the people of the Balkans hold their history close to their hearts. If long-term solutions are to succeed, a thorough reform of political systems and institutions must occur. Long-term progress will be possible only if governments can instill sufficient confidence in their populations to overcome the profound mistrust and deep animosity that have developed over the centuries. Ethnic and religious minorities will have to be convinced that governments will safeguard their interests. Nationalist and irredentist demands, particularly the long drive for a "Greater Serbia," will have to be contained. At the same time, the fears of Serbs in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Croatia will have to be addressed.

To effect this break from the past, the United States and Europe will have to invest considerable economic, political,

intellectual, and military capital to support the development of democratic institutions within the region. Given the past history of the Balkans and the current ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, this course will prove daunting. The level of political, economic, and intellectual commitment needed, however, cannot be forecast with any accuracy.

The degree of military commitment required could vary considerably. In the best case, if current peacemaking/peace-keeping initiatives succeed, no substantial deployment of U.S. forces would be necessary. In the worst case, that of peace-enforcement operations against recalcitrant Serbian and Croatian forces, significant U.S. forces likely would be required.¹⁸⁴ The level of forces and the duration of employment of those units could vary considerably, depending on the degree of force applied and resistance encountered. That said, even if peace-enforcement operations succeeded quickly, a large contingent of U.S. military forces likely would be required to sustain the peace.¹⁸⁵ And, as other peacekeeping examples (Northern Ireland and Cyprus) indicate, such an obligation could be open-ended.

Substantial time—perhaps decades or generations—will be necessary to build and sustain the political ethos needed for a lasting solution in the Balkans. Problems that developed over centuries cannot be transformed overnight. This is not to argue that long-term solutions are not possible, but only to point out the difficulties involved. The post-World War II Franco-German¹⁸⁶ model offers hope, but even that example indicates the time, effort, and leadership dedicated to good will that will be required.

Should U.S. political leaders decide to intervene, they will have to convince the American public that it is in U.S. national interests to make the size of investments—intellectual, political, economic, and military—required to achieve an acceptable solution in the Balkans. This effort will prove to be no easy task if the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with its own difficulties. But, without such a level and duration of commitment, acceptable solutions may not be found.

ASSESSING SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONS

In the near term, pressures will build for the United States to do something to stop the suffering and killing in the former Yugoslavia. An array of options are available for policymakers to consider.

Option 1: U.S. Abstention.

Leaving matters solely in European and U.N. hands is not in U.S. interests. Ignoring the situation will not make it go away. Should the conflict continue, even if only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, public opinion (as in the case of Somalia) may eventually pressure the United States to take action. Better to be involved earlier in the process when a variety of alternatives are available, than later when many options might be foreclosed. Furthermore, if an explosion of violence eventually forces the United States to intervene, conditions may be far worse than at present.

While credit must be given to European and U.N. attempts to resolve the crisis, those efforts have failed thus far and show little potential for success. If the crisis is not resolved quickly, considerable potential exists for fighting to spread beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina to Macedonia or Kosovo. Should either of those possibilities happen, the war is likely to expand beyond the former Yugoslavia. Particularly disconcerting is the possibility that Greece and Turkey could enter the conflict on opposing sides, with the potential for unravelling the NATO Alliance. Nor should one rule out the possibility of a resurgent, nationalist, and Pan-Slavic Russia renewing old ties with Serbia,¹⁸⁷ a specter that would send shivers throughout Europe and North America.

U.S. refusal to participate in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world. What would such a move say of U.S. support of European integration, a European Defense Pillar, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? Could the United States expect allies, particularly Muslim allies, to support the "no-fly" regimes in Iraq when the United States is unwilling to underwrite similar action in the Balkans? Allowing the violence

to continue also sets a poor precedent for other ongoing (e.g., Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia-South Ossetia, or Moldova) or potential (e.g., Ukraine-Russia) ethnic conflicts in Europe. If the United States wishes to prevent future occurrences of ethnic violence, now may be the time to send an appropriate message.

Option 2: Partition and Mass Exchange of Populations.

A second option might be to partition the territory of the former Yugoslavia and conduct a mass exchange of populations. Indeed, the current U.N./E.C. peace plan for establishing ethnic enclaves in Bosnia could be considered a variation of such an option.¹⁸⁸ *Such a proposition is a chimera fraught with difficulties.* Given that ethnic identity is based, in part, on territorial aspirations, boundary lines that satisfy all parties will be nearly impossible to draw, and are likely, therefore, to be drawn arbitrarily and so may simply hone animosities.

The human costs of a population exchange would be staggering, as the historical examples of the massive Greco-Turkish exchanges in the post-World War I era, the population shifts that accompanied the division of India and Pakistan, and the 45 years of war that have followed the partition of Palestine clearly indicate. And should one or more groups refuse to move into the new zones, would populations be forcibly exchanged?

Such an option once again sets a very bad precedent that could be viewed as little more than *aiding and abetting the Serbian "ethnic cleansing" campaign.* Other ethnic groups in Europe could use such a solution as a pretext to initiate conflict in hopes of obtaining a similar solution.

Option 3: Lift the Arms Embargo.

Some pundits argue that the best option available would be to lift the arms embargo and allow the Bosnians to equip themselves for a "fair" fight.¹⁸⁹ *While understandable, perhaps, such an option may be wrongheaded,* and will neither solve the underlying political conflict nor bring the civil war to military

resolution for several reasons. First, unless the Bosnians receive arms to match their opponents' (e.g., tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, and helicopters), the fight would hardly be fair. Second, an even match might only increase casualties and lead to a stalemate that would prolong the conflict and its attendant suffering. Third, the West would have to assume at least partial responsibility for any atrocities that would likely occur as a result of the influx of arms. Fourth, should the Bosnians be successful, the Serbs might turn on Kosovo or Macedonia, with all of the consequences previously described.

Option 4: Containment.

To preclude the conflict from spreading beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia might require some form of physical containment that would free the combatants to carry the war to its conclusion without the threat of spillover. But as argued below, *whether from a practical or humanitarian perspective, containment cannot work except at an unacceptable level of death and suffering.*

This option would require the physical presence of forces around the perimeter of the former Yugoslavia: Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. As current evasions of the U.N. sanctions indicate, it is highly unlikely that all of these named states would tightly enforce the containment perimeter.

Even if all states agreed to enforce containment, some countries might not have sufficient forces to seal the perimeter. A danger would exist, therefore, that the war could spill beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia. At the very least, states along the perimeter could suffer considerable fighting in their borderlands and might bear numerous casualties. Such potential outcomes would undoubtedly influence their decision whether to participate in such an operation.

This option could only further escalate the killing. How long will the world community stand passive and watch atrocity after atrocity or genocide take place? Such scenes would not contain the conflict, but would undoubtedly widen the war as

fellow Muslims or fellow Slavs or fellow Catholics felt compelled to take action to save their brethren from massacre.

Option 5: Join Ongoing Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Efforts.

The United States could boost support of the ongoing peacemaking efforts of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance. Sanctions could be tightened or new provisions with increased teeth could be added.¹⁹⁰ *As the current rhetoric indicates, however, such constraints may have little or no effect on Serbian or Croatian operations in Bosnia.* On the other hand, given the historical precedents of the region, these actions might spur Serbs to exact further retribution against Bosnia or expand the conflict into Kosovo or Macedonia. Policymakers must be prepared for such an eventuality.

The United States could also exert considerable economic and diplomatic pressure to ensure more complete compliance with U.N. resolutions by states within the region. This might require the United States to bring pressure on some of its Balkan allies, as well as some newly-found friends in the region whom the United States is trying to influence. Such efforts might conflict with other ongoing initiatives in the region, but the importance of ending the conflict in Yugoslavia, before it has a chance to spread, should be the overwhelming priority.

American participation in the peacekeeping effort is problematic. First, this option presupposes that all sides in the ongoing conflict will allow the peacekeeping process to continue. Second, it assumes that fighting will not escalate to the point where peacekeeping forces would have to be withdrawn for their own safety. Neither of these assumptions should be taken for granted.

More important, perhaps, is the question of what form the U.S. contribution to peacekeeping operations should take. *American leaders must understand that this may require the commitment of air and ground forces.* In assessing the level of contribution that the United States is willing to make, several points need to be considered. First, the level of influence within most decision-making bodies is proportional to the amount of

participation and the degree of risk assumed. In short, the United States will have to pay the piper if it wants to call the tune, and a substantial U.S. force may be required.

Second, conditions in Yugoslavia will not be resolved quickly and *a long-term commitment of forces will likely be required*.¹⁹¹ Given existing U.S. commitments, anticipated draw down of military forces and resources, and potential trouble spots around the world (especially Iraq, the Middle East, and Korea), the United States must carefully balance the levels of forces and the duration of commitment required in the Balkans against anticipated worldwide requirements to ensure that U.S. capabilities are not overstretched.

Third, *once U.S. forces commence peacekeeping duties, principal parties in the conflict will no longer consider the United States an unbiased observer*. Regardless of how evenhanded Americans try to be, the perception (Bosnian or Serb) will be that the United States has chosen sides—against the Serbs.¹⁹² Remembering that perception is reality in the mind of the beholder, the United States must recognize that participation in peacekeeping operations may forfeit the U.S. role as an honest broker and undermine U.S. influence in mediating a peace settlement.

Option 6: Peace-Enforcement Operations.

If peacekeeping fails to halt the killing and suffering in Yugoslavia, the issue immediately arises whether the United States will be willing to participate in peace-enforcement operations. Before reaching a decision to commit U.S. forces to peace-enforcement, one key question must be answered: *What are the U.S. **political objectives** to be achieved?* Only with clearly articulated answers to this critical question can supporting military objectives be determined and appropriate operational plans developed. *Without clear responses to this query, U.S. forces should not be committed.*

Because peace-enforcement normally requires action against an identified aggressor, *any U.S. participation in peace-enforcement means that the United States will be forced to choose sides in the ongoing conflict* (another good

reason to have clear political objectives before operations commence). Initially, at least, operations would have to be undertaken against Serb forces (both irregular and regular)¹⁹³ who might be fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Should Croatian forces currently occupying Bosnian territory refuse to withdraw, operations might have to be carried out against them as well. Thus, *peace-enforcement holds the potential to expand the conflict from a Yugoslavian civil war to a major regional conflict*. This may represent a larger commitment than the United States or its allies are willing to make at this stage.

A number of ways are available to enforce the peace in Yugoslavia. An exhaustive assessment of all options is not possible given the constraints of this report. The analysis will highlight, therefore, three possible alternatives that fall across the spectrum of options.

Alternative 1: Use of Air Power.

When considering the use of air power as the initial step in peace-enforcement operations, a key question should immediately arise: *What if air power is insufficient to enforce the peace?* Once the United States or a coalition commits air forces to peace-enforcement operations, the Rubicon may have been crossed. If air power fails to yield a satisfactory response quickly enough, or results in escalation of the conflict (i.e., increased killing in Bosnia-Herzegovina or spillover to Kosovo or Macedonia), pressures will build to commit ground forces to enforce the peace. What further steps would the United States and its allies be willing to take? These steps should be assessed before U.S. air forces are committed.

The use of air power for peace-enforcement also raises a host of questions. What level of force should be applied? What should be targeted: Serbian irregular or regular forces; tanks, artillery, or units; supply lines, depots, and airfields; government centers (if appropriate ones can be identified¹⁹⁴) and command and control facilities; or power grids, fuel supplies, and other dual civil-military use resources? What should be the priority? Should dual use facilities be struck? Answers to these questions, as well as potential second and

third order consequences, must be considered before the commitment of U.S. aircraft.

Use of air power appears to offer the safest, most effective means to enforce the peace. But appearances may belie reality. For example, many observers, to include then President-elect Clinton, have called for strict enforcement of the U.N. "no-fly" zone over Bosnia.¹⁹⁵ Enforcement of the "no-fly" zone does not appear to present significant challenges, particularly since reports indicate that the Serbs are not the party violating the "no-fly" zone.¹⁹⁶ Thus, one must ask: "What enforcement of the 'no-fly' zone would accomplish beyond labelling peace-enforcement operations as 'anti-Serb'?" Additionally, tanks and artillery pieces make fine targets only if they can be detected and attacked before they disperse. The mountainous terrain, considerable foliage, and weather conditions in Yugoslavia, along with the difficulties experienced in locating and destroying SCUD missile launchers during the Gulf War, should provide some pause for the vocal advocates of such an option.

Air interdiction of supply lines may also work, but may not be as effective as many believe. Certainly, air power may be able to deal a crushing blow to the mechanized forces of the Serbian Army, but irregular forces will be much more difficult to target and pursue. While the danger of abusing historical analogy is always present, one should not forget that air power has rarely been effective in dealing with lightly armed, highly mobile forces operating in either mountainous terrain or an urban environment. The U.S. experience in Vietnam and the British ordeal in Northern Ireland should prove instructive in this regard.

Alternative 2: Establish and Maintain Safe Havens.

One aspect of the recent Vance-Owen peace proposal calls for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 separate, autonomous areas formed around territory where one ethnic group predominates.¹⁹⁷ These autonomous provinces would provide safe havens for the various ethnic groups. *Because safe havens might temporarily halt or reduce the violence, this*

option has considerable emotional appeal, but holds little potential for a long-term solution, and may only aggravate the situation.

Such a plan simply would reward Serbian aggression and tacitly condone the Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing." This alternative also suffers from all of the problems outlined in Option 2 (Partition and Population Exchange). Furthermore, while safe havens might temporarily halt the violence, they may only sow the seeds of future conflict as one side or another seeks to squeeze an opponent or expand its zone of control. Under foreseeable circumstances, the less numerous and poorly armed Muslims would undoubtedly be the ones squeezed. Such outcomes would do little to relieve the long-term pressures that have been building in the region for intervention on behalf of the Muslims, and run the risk of expanding the conflict.

The establishment of safe havens would require commitment of ground forces to protect the various zones. To allow the ethnic groups to defend themselves makes little sense, as violence would likely occur along the line of contact as various parties probed the edges of their zones. Outside, "neutral" forces would have to be physically interposed between the warring parties. Given the size and the number of safe havens under discussion at the peace talks in Geneva, a substantial number of forces—upwards of 60,000 according to reports—would be required.¹⁹⁸

Because of the size of the forces required to cordon off or patrol safe havens, U.S. ground forces would undoubtedly be required to participate in the peace-enforcement operations. Nor is it likely that such a plan could be initiated without the commitment of U.S. ground forces to serve as the critical impetus to motivate others to participate. U.S. involvement also may be required to convince the Serbs and others that the U.N. coalition is intent on enforcing the peace.¹⁹⁹

*A key question that must be answered **before** U.S. forces are committed is how long the United States might be willing to sustain the military effort to protect the safe havens? This alternative could very well result in a large and open-ended*

commitment to the region. Indeed. Clinton administration officials are talking of a 10 year commitment of forces to supervise the peace in Bosnia.²⁰⁰ If long-term resolution of the conflict cannot be reached between the warring parties (and one seriously doubts that safe havens will provide a long-term solution), then defenders cannot withdraw without endangering inhabitants of the safe haven. Thus, *American ground forces could become hostages to events and the United States would surrender the initiative to others in the region.*²⁰¹

The potential exists that even the "protected" could come to resent the presence of those sheltering the safe havens. American forces, therefore, run the risk of being caught in the middle, unable to satisfy either side. Nor should one forget that the various parties in the former Yugoslavia are formidably armed.

Alternative 3: Restore the Borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This alternative would be a significant undertaking that would undoubtedly require commitment of U.S. forces to air, sea, and ground combat operations. It is inconceivable that U.N. coalition forces would be committed without substantial participation of U.S. ground troops.

Initial operations would likely be carried out against Serbian forces, either irregulars in Bosnia-Herzegovina or with main elements of the Serbian Army that might come to their aid. Concurrent operations might also have to be conducted against Croatian forces that refuse to leave Bosnian territory. On the one hand, the Serbs might swiftly fold, the Croats might quickly withdraw, and restoration of Bosnian borders might proceed apace. Conversely, this rosy scenario might not play out.

While U.N. and U.S. forces would likely prevail, the price could be considerable. Given the terrain and the Serbian and Croatian regular and irregular forces available, ground operations would not resemble the U.S. experience in Panama or Somalia. Nor would operations be similar to Operation

DESERT STORM, where a clearly delineated battlefield and open terrain allowed the allied coalition to bring overwhelming force to bear to rapidly defeat the enemy.

Neither potential casualties nor resource costs that might be associated with U.S. participation in peace-enforcement operations can be forecast with any accuracy, largely because the extent of a possible U.S. commitment is not known. But, none of the options and alternatives outlined above comes without cost. *The key question is how much the United States is willing to pay in terms of political capital, national treasure, and, most importantly, lives of its young men and women?*

Even if casualties are low, and they might not be, expenditures would be considerable. The current official estimate for the cost of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, for example, is \$583 million, and this for an operation of less than 4-months duration.²⁰² Certainly, peace-enforcement operations in Yugoslavia would be on a much larger scale, against a well-armed and organized opponent, would last much longer, and could prove a considerable drain on a reduced defense budget. In fact, such operations could exert significant influence over the entire budget process.

An equally important, but rarely asked question is what are the potential returns for the considerable investments that might be made? This is not to argue that the United States should not exercise one or another option for humanitarian reasons. However, leaders must make a reasoned policy choice that addresses both solutions to the problems and the resultant effects on U.S. national security and domestic interests. While policymakers should not engage in absolute worst case planning, neither should they indulge in best case scenarios. The gods of fortune may smile upon efforts to halt the killing, but such an assumption should not guide U.S. leaders.

Even should operations initially succeed, allied forces could remain within a sea of hostile populations. Given the distant and recent history of the region, irregular operations, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism should not be ruled out. This is not an attempt to conjure up ghosts of the past (either the U.S.

experience in Vietnam or the Yugoslav Partisan experience during World War II), but merely to indicate that conditions may not be as simple and clear-cut as some pundits would lead us to believe.

Finally, even if operations are an overwhelming success, *how long will the United States and its allies be willing to maintain forces in Bosnia to keep the peace?* As the aftermath of the Gulf War indicates, the U.S.-led coalition is still ensnared by events in the region, and no end of a substantial commitment is in sight. Given the history of the Balkans, how much time might elapse between the departure of peace-enforcement forces and a resumption of hostilities? One would guess: not much.

CONCLUSIONS

Should current levels of violence continue or escalate in the former Yugoslavia, pressure will undoubtedly build for the United States to intervene militarily in the crisis. Before deciding whether the United States should become engaged, several general points must be understood. *First*, whether we admit it or not, *the United States is already involved*. *Second*, there are *no easy answers and solutions could be painful*. *Third*, *all short-term options are flawed*: each has drawbacks, costs, and risks that must be weighed against the potential gains. Indeed, short-term options may only exacerbate conditions, delay long-term settlement, and draw the United States further into Balkan conflicts than national leaders originally intended. *Fourth*, there is *no agreed-upon script on how these options will play out*. Analysts, therefore, must understand the second and third order consequences of their decisions and be prepared to implement alternatives.

Before policymakers appraise the various alternatives available, they need to consider the following key questions:

- What are the political objectives to be achieved? What is the desired end state of the conflict?
- What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to achieve political objectives?

- How long and to what extent is the United States willing to commit forces to the region?
- If air power proves to be insufficient, what are the next logical steps? Is the United States willing to take them?

The reasons for asking these questions are well known, but deserve repeating. If policymakers do not clearly understand their goals and possible directions their decisions may take them, the United States runs the risk of its policy being controlled by, rather than controlling, events. If not careful, the United States could be incrementally drawn into the miasma of the Balkans with no clear idea of how it got there or how it can get out.

As leaders assess the various options they must keep in mind that the ongoing human tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is exactly that. Spoken coldly, the magnitude of the human suffering is heart rending, but the civil war in the former Yugoslavia currently represents only an indirect threat to the vital interests of the United States.

Conversely, an expansion of the war outside the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia would be a strategic disaster. The war could engulf the entire Balkan Peninsula or expand, perhaps, into Central Europe via Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina. NATO allies might find themselves drawn into opposing sides of the conflict which could lead to the unravelling of NATO's Southern Flank and, perhaps, even the collapse of the Alliance. Pan-Slavism could once again stalk the European stage. First priority for policymakers, therefore, must be to ensure that the war does not spread beyond its current confines. While arguably a harsh choice, it is also represents strategic reality.

But U.S. leaders may not, and perhaps should not, be able to look at the options outlined above from the cold detachment of harsh strategic realities. The leadership role of the United States has been built not only on its political, economic, and military power, but on American moral values. As internal and external pressures build for the United States to exercise its leadership role, American policymakers will have to factor this

critical moral imperative into their strategic decision-making calculus.

ENDNOTES

1. Attributed to an unidentified Western diplomat in Belgrade in Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "History's Lessons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1992, p. A1.

2. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 69. Also cited in William Pfaff, "Reflections: Absence of Empire," *The New Yorker*, August 10, 1992, pp. 59-69, p. 68.

3. Barry Posen, "Realist Theory and the Assessment of Ethnic Conflict," typescript, version June 29, 1992, p. 1.

4. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977, p. 1.

5. Anna Husarska, "No End of Troubles in the Balkans," *The Washington Post*, Book World, November 1, 1992, p. 5.

6. Morris Massey, *The People Puzzle: Understanding Yourself and Others*, Reston, VA: Reston Press, 1979.

7. Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 3.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, p. 8, and Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 3.

10. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 2-3.

11. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, *Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 4-7, and William L. Langer, *The Encyclopedia of World History*, 5th ed., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Press, 1972, pp. 68-76. For a brief description of the wars and conflicts in this era see R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *An Encyclopedia of Military History*, 2d rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp. 29-33 and pp. 41-47.

12. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 7, and Langer, *Encyclopedia of World History*, pp. 78-80 and 91-92.

13. L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1958, p. 22.

14. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 7-13.

15. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 26.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-32.

17. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 232.

18. For example, in suppressing the uprisings of 1875, the Bulgarians estimate the Turks killed between 30,000-100,000 Bulgarians. Contemporary American and British estimates ran between 12,000-15,000 and are probably closer to the mark. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 347-348. Nonetheless, the number of deaths and undoubtedly higher numbers of wounded and dispossessed are still quite high. Moreover, these took place in the late 1800s when outside observers could report to the outside world. One can only imagine numbers of earlier, less tolerant periods.

19. Unfortunately, far too many examples exist. For more recent accounts see, for example, Lance Morrow, "The Ruin of a Cat, the Ghost of a Dog," *Time*, December 14, 1992, pp. 36-38, and "Rape After Rape After Rape," *The New York Times*, December 13, 1991, p. E17

20. For brief discussions of the background to these groups, see Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 32-33; Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmecic, *History of Yugoslavia*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, (hereafter cited as Dedijer, *et al.*) pp. 192-193; Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 375-376; and Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 111.

21. See descriptions of irregular forces contained in Roger Cohen, "Serbs Defy Belgrade to Join the Fighting in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, September 28, 1992, p. 5; Judy Dempsey, "Weekend 'Chetniks' on the Warpath," *Financial Times* (London), August 21, 1992, p. 2; or Blaine Harden, "Bosnia Bleeds Under Serb 'Purification,'" *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1992, p. A1.

22. Examples stem from the early efforts to halt the Ottoman advance of Suleiman the Magnificent after his victory at the battle of Mohács in Hungary (1526) (Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 34) through the events leading up to World War I.

23. Under the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottomans lost Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, and all of Hungary, save the Banat [province] of Temesvar. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 171-177.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

25. Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 74-81, contains a brief description of the purpose and organization of the Military Frontier. See also, Dedijer, *et al. History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 233-235 and 313-315, which contains a description of the Military Frontier, as well as brief overview of the conflicts and violence that took place in this volatile region.

26. For a description of events see Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 261-276. For a more dispassionate view see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 240-250.

27. For a detailed description of events, to include foreign intervention, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 269-292.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 375-380. In suppressing the revolt of 1875, the Turks inflicted between 12-15,000 deaths according to the more reliable sources. *Ibid.*, p. 380.

29. A description of the growing Great Power competition over the carcass of the Ottoman Empire and the tensions created can be found in chapters 3, 4, and 11 of A.J.P. Taylor, *Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.

30. An excellent description and analysis of events surrounding the Russo-Turkish War is in *ibid.*, pp. 228-254. Russia also received considerable territories along the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, as well as a huge indemnity.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-254.

32. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 360-361.

33. Carlton J.H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900*, New York: Harper, 1941, p. 33.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 361-366, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 496-506.

35. Information on these crises may be found in Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, pp. 303-306.

36. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II: *Twentieth Century*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 41-44.

37. For a description of the events and consequences, see René Albrecht-Carriè, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 259-272.

38. For a description of events and consequences of the First Balkan War, see *Ibid.*, pp. 280-284 and Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery of Europe*, pp. 483-496.

39. For a discussion of the Second Balkan War and its consequences, see Albrecht-Carriè, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, pp. 284-288 and Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, pp. 497-510.

40. As Stavrianos notes, the Bulgarians turned the occupation of Macedonia over to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and "In this task it distinguished itself by its irresponsible violence and terrorism." Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 649. Moreover, in January 1917, Montenegro rose in revolt to protest Bulgarian conscription in the area. In reprisal, the Bulgarians razed villages and upwards of 20,000 innocent civilians died. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 492-493.

41. As Stavrianos notes, war in the Balkans began in 1912 and did not end until termination of the Greco-Turkish War in 1923. He also notes that, per capita, Serbia suffered 2.5 times the casualties of France and 3.0 times those of Britain or Italy. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 632-633.

42. Additionally, Serbia lost roughly 600,000 civilian casualties. Similarly, Montenegro lost about 63,000 people, or roughly 25 percent of its prewar population. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 501. While some might question the Yugoslav figures, Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, pp. 222-226, offers a dispassionate survey that largely confirms the numbers.

43. The disappointments of the various nations with the post-war settlements are outlined in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 121-125.

44. The dismemberment of Hungary is, perhaps, the most striking example. Under the Treaty of Trianon (1920), within the Balkans alone, Hungary surrendered Croatia, Slavonia, and Vojvodina to Yugoslavia, as well as Transylvania and a portion of the Banat to Romania. These cessions created sizeable Hungarian minorities in these states. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 576-578.

45. A brief description of events may be found in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 172-175, or Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 587-590.

46. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 174.

47. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 590.

48. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 174. For more recent Turkish concerns on treatment of ethnic Turks in Greece, see Ankara TRT Television Network, 1700 hours, April 17, 1992 in *FBIS-WEU-92-076*, April 20, 1992, p. 41 and Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network, 1800, GMT, November 24, 1992, in *FBIS-WEU-92-231*, December 1, 1992, p. 69. See also F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans," *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 44 and 49 (note 20).

49. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 172.

50. A brief, but excellent account of the events leading up to and the conduct of the German Balkan campaign can be found in Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-260, *The German Campaign in the Balkans (Spring 1941)*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 1953. For greater details, see Martin Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy: The Balkan Clue*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. After long experience with German interference in Serbian/Yugoslav affairs (1878, 1908, 1914-1918) it should not be surprising that the Yugoslav Army, with its high density of Serbian officers, would refuse to accede to Hitler's demands. Nor should the Federal Republic of Germany's recognition of Croatia in 1992 be depreciated as a contributing factor in the inception of the current crisis.

51. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 415.

52. Nikos Kazantzakis, *The Fratricide*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964, p. 8, cited in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 314.

53. Frank Havlicek, "Riding Shotgun in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1992, p. C2.

54. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 2.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 2. According to Aleksa Djilas, the principal difference in the dialects is found in the word used to pose the question: who? Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 3. Barbara Jelavich, on the other hand, cites differences over the pronoun: what. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 306-307 (note 2). Regardless, neither issue appears significant to an outside observer.

56. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, pp. 2-3.

57. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 177.

58. For background to the religious, as well as political differences between the various branches of the church and the division, see Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, 7th ed., New York: Alfred Knopf, 1992, p. 25. A brief description of current religious

enmities can be found in Roger Cohen, "Cross vs. Crescent," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1992, p. 14.

59. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 12.

60. Wayne S. Vucich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 3 and 282, respectively. See also, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 12.

61. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 40.

62. Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 179-180 and Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 261. Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced conversion rates of approximately 70 percent. On the other hand, conflict—military as well as religious—between Roman Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs that resulted in considerable destruction and suffering in Bosnia and Albania may have promoted conversions, in that local populations that bore the brunt of the fighting may have converted to gain Turkish protection. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 26.

63. See Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "History's Lessons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1992, p. A1ff.

64. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 53.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-94 and 95-97.

67. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, p. 7.

68. R.W. Seton-Watson and R.G.D. Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," in Stephen Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966 (hereafter cited as Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*), pp. 170-207, (hereafter cited as R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars"), pp. 194-195; Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 630; and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 203.

69. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 15-23, contains a brief overview of migrations and conquests from the Greeks to the Bulgars.

70. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 27.

71. Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 140. As Peter Sugar concludes, this patchwork quilt may be the most crucial legacy of the Ottoman Empire. See, Peter Sugar, *Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, pp. 283-284 and pp 221-224.

72. William Pfaff, "The Absence of Empire," *The New Yorker*, August 10, 1992, pp. 59-69, at p. 60.

73. Even in the 19th century, Turkish reprisals remained harsh. For example, after crushing a Bulgarian rebellion in April 1875, roughly 12-15,000 civilians were killed. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 347-348. Dusko Doder relates a visit to the town of Nis (Serbia) where, after suppressing a revolt in 1804 the Turks built a large tower out of the skulls of the defeated peasants. Dusko Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, New York: Random House, 1978, p. 19.

74. For example, intense Serbian nationalism goes well back to the early Middle Ages and a rejection of the failings of the Byzantine Empire. Thus, by the time of the Ottoman invasion, Serbs had already developed a strong national character. Invasion by the dramatically different and oppressive Ottomans only served to intensify desires to maintain a Serbian identity. Equally important, this nationalism focused on a strongly chauvinistic Serbian Orthodox Church which served as a beacon for nationalist sentiment over the centuries, thus further entangling the question of religion and ethnic identity. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, pp. 218-219. Other national groups underwent similar circumstances.

75. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 15; and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 17.

76. Seton-Watson contains a discussion of the concept of *Ellinismos* and the idea of a greater Greece. See H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp. 110-117.

77. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, pp. 5, 103, and 112; and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 23-25.

78. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 19.

79. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 13.

80. Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "History's Lessons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1992, p. A1. Nor is this an isolated incident. As Anna Husarska has noted, journalists in Yugoslavia rarely get a direct answer to any question without some form of historical background being interjected into the answer. "Everything has a historical dimension, explanation, or excuse, and it is a very complicated history indeed." Anna Husarska, "No End of Trouble in the Balkans," p. 5.

81. Anna Husarska, "No End to Trouble in the Balkans."

82. J.F.O. McAllister, "Ever Greater Serbia," *Time*, September 28, 1992, p. 56.

83. For example, Serbs and Croats claim territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina; Transylvania has long been contested by Romania and Hungary; Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey have quarrelled over Thrace; and Serbs, Greeks, Albanians, and Bulgarians have quarreled over Macedonia.

84. Hugh Seton-Watson notes that "A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness." And, while the peoples under Ottoman domination exhibited these qualities throughout their repression, they were not yet able to fulfill the requirements of a national state, which Seton-Watson defined as "a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens," because of Ottoman power. Both quotes from H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 1.

85. For example, Bulgaria and Serbia after the Treaty of San Stefano (1878); establishment of Albania at Great Power insistence (1912); or the post-World War I territorial settlements.

86. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 479-480.

87. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 270.

88. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 494-495.

89. While John Zametica plays down Serb-Croat differences in the pre-war and inter-war eras, other observers, such as Barbara Jelavich, have taken a much less optimistic view. See John Zametica, *Adelphi Paper No. 270, The Yugoslav Conflict*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1992, pp. 6-7. Jelavich's discussion of the inter-war struggles can be found in B. Jelavich, Vol. I, pp. 143-157 and 200-204. Indeed, Zametica's own description of Slovenia's rationale for originally joining Yugoslavia in 1918 and concerns about Serbian domination undercut his own argument. Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, pp. 12-13. See also B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 147 and H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 139.

90. For Yugoslav and Romanian satisfaction with agreements, see Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 81 and 82, respectively. For Bulgarian and Greek dissatisfaction see B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 125.

91. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 134-136.

92. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 579-580.

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 580-582 and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 772.

94. Cited in Djilas, *The Contested Country*, p. 120 from *Novi list*, June 3, 1941, in V. Novak, *Magnum Crimen*, Zagreb: 1948, p. 606.

95. Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 59-118, p. 82. The term, *Chetnik*, was derived from "...a member of the *Cheta* or a military detachment that fought against the Turks in the nineteenth century." Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 773. For a description of *Chetnik* ideology, see *ibid.* and Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 361.

96. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 773.

97. Mihailović believed that to avoid substantial casualties from inevitable Axis reprisals, actions should be taken only in close proximity to an allied invasion of Yugoslavia. Thus, he adopted a minimalist approach designed to save Serb lives. Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia in the Second World War," pp. 90-91; Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 361; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 775.

98. Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia in the Second World War," p. 92, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 780-781.

99. For a brief summary of *Chetnik* and *Partisan* differences and consequences for Yugoslavia, see Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia in the Second World War," pp. 88-97. The best treatment of the conflicts in Yugoslavia during World War II can be found in Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

100. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 266, cited from Vladko Maek, *In the Struggle for Freedom*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1957, p. 245.

101. For example, when Bosnian Serbs erupted in a spontaneous revolt against the *Ustaši* in August 1941, they also turned their frustrations on their Muslim neighbors. As one report to Tito indicated: "The insurgents had plundered Muslim villages and thereby turned the entire Muslim population against themselves." Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 596.

102. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 359, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 772. Descriptions of the SS divisions can be found in George Stein, *The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 180-184. The Scimitar Division was so ill-disciplined that the Nazis disbanded the unit in November 1944.

103. Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 591-592, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 772.

104. Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," pp. 78-79.

105. Under the terms of the post-war agreements, all prisoners were to be returned to their home nation or the nation they had fought against. Information taken from *ibid.*, pp. 112-113, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 272.

106. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Gateway ed., Los Angeles: Henry Regnery, 1956, p. 113.

107. As Vojo Kupresanin, a Serb leader in Banja Luka noted, "World War II was bitter here. ... Serbs were butchered, and many families were left with only one male member. Now these people are the soldiers and carrying guns. Now the chance has arisen for people to take revenge." Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs' Gains in Bosnia Create Chaotic Patchwork," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1992, p. 1.

108. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 58-91.

109. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, pp. 161-162.

110. Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 114-117.

111. Roger Thurow, "Divisive Populist," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 1991, p. A1, A10, contains one of many of Milošević's justifications for actions to protect all Serbs.

112. The Constitution of 1974 greatly increased the power of the republics and autonomous regions at the expense of the central government. In many ways, according to Zametica, the Constitution fragmented the Communist Party and "feudalized" Yugoslavia. Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, p. 10.

113. *Ibid.*

114. Culture is defined as "the body of customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits constituting a distinct complex of tradition of racial [ethnic], religious, or social group," *Webster's Third International Dictionary*, Springfield, MA. Merriam-Webster 1986, p. 552. The discussion that follows is not intended as a value judgement on the culture or cultures within the region. Rather, the discussion seeks to identify critical elements of the culture, explain how events contributed to that cultural development, and help policymakers understand these cultures to improve the output of the decision-making process. Comments that follow should be viewed in that context.

115. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 12. For a similar view, see Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 98-99. Because of the ebb and flow of the Ottoman Empire, divisions fell less upon a definable line than in a broad band between the eastern and western cultural zones. Unfortunately, the occupants of that band, the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina, have borne the brunt of the clash of cultures, for as Stavrianos pointed out:

Between the eastern and western zones lay Bosnia, sunk in its mountains and pursuing its own religious beliefs [Islam], equally distant from East and West. Consequently, its culture, bearing strong patriarchal legacy, reflected both cultural trends, neither of which gained precedence.

Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 98.

116. For example, Serbs (or Croats) view Muslims as apostate Orthodox (or Roman Catholic). See Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "Hostile Forces," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 1992, p. 1. See also Blaine Harden, "Bosnia Bleeds Under Serb 'Purification,'" *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1992, p. A1. Nor does ethnic/religious inter-marriage appear to make much difference. See, Peter Maass, "Serbs Strike Fear in a Bosnian City," *The Washington Post*, August 12, 1992, p. A1.

117. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 1.

118. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 298-299, and Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, pp. 143-144.

119. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 39-62, contains an excellent overview of the Ottoman system of government. See, particularly, pp. 57-62 for local government.

120. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 48-53.

121. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 28.

122. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 52-53.

123. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 607-608. Stavrianos notes that in the 1930s, for example, the Greek government controlled the distribution of quinine and was found to be dispensing a worthless powder, while 20 percent of the population suffered from malaria. *Ibid.* See also B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 298-299.

124. See the Serbian example, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

125. Great Power intervention that assisted Greek independence and then Greek dependence on British and French naval assistance; Russian domination of Romania, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria; and Austrian and Russian influence over Serbia are pertinent examples.

126. The Russian-Serbian example under Prince Milan Obrenović is an excellent example. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 259.

127. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 298.

128. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299. In the period leading up to World War I constant Great Power competition over the remains of the Ottoman Empire resulted in near continuous interference. Best examples, perhaps, are the Habsburgs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Russians in Romania.

129. The post-war territorial settlements satisfied no one in the region, largely because significant ethnic minorities remained outside national boundaries. For a description of how the territorial settlements were fashioned, see Alan W. Palmer, *Lands Between: A History of East-Central Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1970, pp. 150-173. Kemalist Turkey, successor to the Ottoman Empire, represents an exception to this general rule.

130. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 608-615, offers an overview of political trends in the region. Over 40 parties participated in the November 1920 election for the constituent assembly in Yugoslavia. Wayne S. Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia," p. 7. For specific examples, e.g., confusion in the Yugoslav parliament, Romanian government, or Bulgaria, see Palmer, *Lands Between*, pp. 190-194, 197-201, 203-206, respectively.

131. The Romanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian examples are the most prominent.

132. The Turkish example under Ataturk provides an alternative option. Relative to the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk and his followers ruled well and enacted numerous reforms. Still, the Ataturk state was based on one party, authoritarian rule. For a description of the tenets and workings of the early Kemalist state see, Paul Pitman III, ed., *Turkey: A Country Study*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, pp. 48-54.

133. This should not be taken to mean that all of the governments were unpopular. Some populations welcomed the internal stability and improved economic conditions that sometimes emerged. Serbians, for example, widely supported Alexander's dictatorship, hoping it could bring order out of chaos. R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," pp. 176-178.

134. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I. p. ix.

135. Andreas Papandreou is the son of George Papandreou, leader of the Social Democrats. American educated, indeed a naturalized American citizen, Andreas returned to Greece while his father was Premier and advancing in age. Thus, it appeared that Andreas, after many years absence, would step up to his father's position without having paid his dues. His rapid rise to the top levels of Greek politics created considerable jealousy, that Papandreou compounded with his increasingly anti-American and radical positions. Having, like his father, served as Premier, Andreas continues to exert no small influence in Greek politics. For a fuller explication of events see *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 423-426.

136. For a description of the hurley-burley of Greek political behavior and actions since World War II, see *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 406-438.

137. In all, the military has intervened in governmental affairs eight times since the advent of Republican Turkey. Not all of these interventions were full-fledged coups, however. For the role of the military in Turkish government and society, see George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping With Crisis*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 153-173.

138. For a brief description of the events leading up to each crisis, the conduct of the coups, and the military hand over to civil control see, Pitman, *Turkey*, pp. 55-62, 64-72, and 77-83, respectively. See, also Harris, *Turkey*, pp. 55-68. It is also important to note that in many instances the population generally took a positive view of the military interventions. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 159-160 and pp. 171-172.

139. This is especially true in southeastern Turkey which is under de facto martial law due to PKK terrorism. Nor is it likely that the current Premier, Suleiman Demirel, or many of his contemporaries have forgotten their past brushes with the military.

140. Palmer, *Lands Between*, p. 34. For a fuller description of Karadjordje's exploits and their effects, see B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 196-204.

141. Curiously, the Porte's grant of powers failed to establish the precise geographic borders of Serbia or delineate the extent of Miloš' powers. See Palmer, *Lands Between*, p. 34, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 239.

142. For Miloš' declarations see B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 240. For Karadjordje's murder see, Palmer, *Lands Between*, p. 34, or Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 761. For the effects of the blood-feud on Serbian politics, see H.C. Darby, "Serbia," in Clissold, ed., A

Short History of Yugoslavia, pp. 87-134, p. 118. (Hereafter cited as Darby, "Serbia.")

143. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 279-282, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, pp. 238-242.

144. Darby, "Serbia," pp. 127-128 and B. Jelavich. *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 33. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 457-461, contains a brief description of Serbian economic development during Peter's rule.

145. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 456-457 and 528-531, and Darby, "Serbia," pp. 129-130.

146. Darby, "Serbia," pp. 130-133, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 95-100, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 532-543.

147. See Chapter 2.

148. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 478-479.

149. Darby, "Serbia," pp. 160-161.

150. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 618. The Yugoslav Committee consisted largely of Habsburg South Slav exiles. For a discussion of the Yugoslav Committee and its influence, see Gale Stokes, "The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugoslavia," in *The Creation of Yugoslavia: 1914-1918*, ed. Djordjević, Santa Barbara: CLID Books, 1980.

151. James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 4, July-August 1992, p. 292.

152. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 145-146, and Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 497-498.

153. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 616; Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," p. 292; and Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 497. As Dedijer, *et al.*, point out, Serbia and Croatia were the primary actors and the interests of the remaining Slavic nationalities were largely ignored. Dedijer, *et al.*, p. 492. Nor, as Stavrianos points out, should this surprise anyone. All areas had fought for and received varying levels of autonomy and had no desire to trade Ottoman, Austrian, or Hungarian oppression for Serbian domination. Nor did Serbs wish to trade independent nation-statehood for anything less.

154. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 503-504. Although King Peter of Serbia still lived, he had been mentally incompetent for quite some time and Alexander had served as regent since 1914.

155. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 149, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 619.

156. Serbs dominated the government for a number of reasons. Designation of the Karadjordjević dynasty as the ruling house and availability and experience of Serbian institutions led to early Serb control of the government, which they translated into permanent dominance. Croatian and other armed forces were disbanded while the Serbian Army, which owed its allegiance to King Alexander, metamorphosed into the Yugoslav Army. In true Balkan tradition, the Serb-dominated government doled out patronage and corruption to co-opt the business community and government bureaucracies. An indication of Serbian dominance from December 1918-January 1929 can be found in the following statistics of Serbian control of key positions: Premier, 117 of 121 months; Minister of Army and Minister of Navy, 121 of 121 months; Minister of the Interior, 111 of 121 months; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 100 of 121 months; and Minister of Education, 110 of 121 months. All of this information is taken from Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 624-627. See also, Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia," pp. 10-11.

157. One example tells the tale. As a result of Radić's trip to Moscow in July 1924, Prime Minister Pašić (a Serb) outlawed the Croatian Peasant Party and jailed Radić and his fellow leaders. Elections held in February 1925, unsurprisingly, returned a Serb dominated *Skupština*. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 151-155.

158. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 626-627.

159. *Ibid.*, p. 627.

160. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 201 and R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," p. 188.

161. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 629, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 201-203.

162. R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," pp. 192-201, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 631-632.

163. Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia," p. 30, and Jacob B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 154.

164. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," pp. 293-294, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 296, and Stephen Clissold, "Occupation and Resistance," in Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 208-235, pp. 236-239. (Hereafter cited as Clissold, "Occupation and Resistance.")

165. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, pp. 296-297, and Phyllis Auty, "The Post-War Period," in Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 236-264, pp. 239-240. (Hereafter cited as Auty, "The Post-War Period.")

166. Woodford McClellan, "Postwar Political Evolution," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 119-153, pp. 134-137 contains an excellent overview of the decentralization process and the rationale behind it. See also, Auty, "The Post-War Period," pp. 252-257.

167. Auty, "The Post-War Period," pp. 257-258. See also McClellan, "Postwar Political Evolution," pp. 141-147.

168. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," pp. 293-294, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 293.

169. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," p. 294.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 397.

171. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," pp. 294-295 and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. II, p. 397.

172. Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 1992, p. 82. For a more detailed analysis of the political events leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, see Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 7-53.

173. *Ibid.*, p. 83, and Branka Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, Winter 1991, p. 34.

174. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 34, and Ramet, "War in the Balkans," pp. 83-84. See also, F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans," p. 40.

175. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 34.

176. Ramet, "War in the Balkans," p. 85.

177. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 35.

178. Ramet, "War in the Balkans," p. 84.

179. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 35, and Ramet, "War in the Balkans," pp. 85-86.

180. Ramet, "War in the Balkans," p. 85.

181. For example, U.N. economic sanctions, cease-fire resolutions, or the declaration of a "no-fly zone" over Bosnian air space apparently have had little effect.

182. Suzy Platt, ed., *Respectfully Quoted*, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989, p. 122.

183. George Schulz, "Why Bosnia needs NATO and U.S. forces," *The Washington Times*, January 11, 1993, p. E4.

184. Although no official military estimates of forces required are available in the open press, civilian commentators have forecast the possibility that, depending upon the level of peace-enforcement, between 90,000-200,000 troops would be needed. See, for example, Barry Posen, "A Balkan Vietnam Awaits 'Peacekeepers,'" *Los Angeles Times*, February 4, 1993, p. 11. Recent reports on reductions of European forces and the inability of European allies to commit substantial forces against Iraq indicate that the United States likely would have to bear a major burden of providing forces. See, for example, Lance Gay, "Confrontations with Iraq show allies are unprepared," *The Washington Times*, February 4, 1993, p. A9.

185. Current estimates indicate upwards of 20,000 U.S. troops would be required, with an additional 50,000 available to ensure the rotation of units. See Richard H.P. Sia, "U.S. Troops in Bosnia Envisioned," *Baltimore Sun*, March 1, 1993, p. 1.

186. Some might argue that the Franco-German example is *sui generis*, brought about due to the unique conditions of the time: a thoroughly defeated and bankrupt Germany, unparalleled leadership on both sides, and the massive Soviet threat.

187. See, for example, recent rumblings from Russian ultra-nationalists in Russell Watson with Margaret Garrard Warner and John Barry, "Where the World Can Draw the Line," *Newsweek*, January 4, 1993, p. 35, and Gerald Nadler, "Russian Die-Hards Create Mounting Troubles for Yeltsin," *The Washington Times*, January 19, 1993, p. 7. See also, Lally Weymouth, "The 'Russia Factor' in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, February 8, 1993, p. A19; V.P. Gagnon, "Serbia and the Moscow Connection," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1993, p. A19; and "Russia Supplying Weapons to Serbs, Report Says," *Harrisburg Patriot-News*, March 1, 1993, p. A4. For Yeltsin's recent comments concerning the Russian ties to Serbia,

see Serge Schemann, "Yeltsin Critical of U.S. Role in Balkans and Iraq," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1993, p. A6, or Fred Hiatt, "Yeltsin: U.S. Likes to 'Dictate,'" *The Washington Post*, January 26, 1993, p. 12.

188. "Bosnia Waits for Clinton," *Newsweek*, January 18, 1993, p. 32.

189. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Arm the Bosnians," *The Washington Post*, December 28, 1992, p. A15. As a candidate, then Governor Clinton supported lifting the embargo. President Clinton has now backed away from any proposals to lift the arms embargo. Irvin Molotsky, "Serb Gains a Fact, Christopher Says," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1993, p. A6.

190. The Clinton administration, in principle, has decided to support the Vance-Owen proposal, but details remain to be worked out. See, for example, Daniel Williams, "Clinton's Policy in the Balkans Puts U.S. Prestige on the Line," *The Washington Post*, February 11, 1993, p. A35, and Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Backs Bosnian Peace Plan; Serbs May Keep Occupied Land," *The New York Times*, February 11, 1993, p. A1.

191. U.S. and NATO military planners indicate that a commitment may last up to 10 years. Sia, "U.S. Troops in Bosnia Envisioned," p. 1.

192. The Bosnians would perceive the United States has intervened to save them and the Serbs would, at least, view such interventions as opposing their interests in the area.

193. The question immediately arises: Which Serbs? The answer is convoluted: Serb irregulars from Serbia, Serb Army forces, ethnic Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of the above? How does one determine which forces to strike? Can the United States or its allies attack targets in Serbia if ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are the only ones engaged in fighting? The complications are endless.

194. For example, if Serb irregular forces in Bosnia are fighting and the Serbian Army is not, could the United States or its allies legitimately bomb government centers in Serbia?

195. Dan Oberdorfer, "U.S. Toughening Policy on Balkans, To Urge 'No-Fly Zone' Enforcement," *The Washington Post*, December 13, 1992, p. A1.

196. For example, Michael Gordon reports in "Military Officials Say U.S. Role in Balkans Would Help Little," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1993, p. A4, that the Serbs are largely obeying the provisions of the "no-fly" zone. Apparently, the majority of the violations are committed by Croatian aircraft.

197. Elements of the Vance-Owen proposal may be found in John F. Burns, "Bosnia 1992: The Paradox of Swords to Plowshares," *The New*

York Times, December 31, 1992, p. A1; David Binder, "Balkan Peace Talks Inch Forward, But Vance May Issue Ultimatum," *The New York Times*, January 29, 1993, p. A3; John Darnton, "Bosnia War: Quagmire or Just Cause?," *The New York Times*, February 4, 1993, p. A10; and Peter Maass, "Bosnian Peace Plan Fuels Warfare," *The Washington Post*, February 9, 1993, p. A12.

198. "Bosnia Waits for Clinton," p. 32. The figure of 60,000 is drawn from estimates provided by NATO planners. See Sia, "U.S. Troops in Bosnia Envisioned," p. 1.

199. Sia, in "U.S. Troops in Bosnia Envisioned," p. 1, reports that the Clinton administration is considering commitment of 20,000 troops, and that as many as 75,000 troops may be involved.

200. *Ibid.*

201. The British experience in Northern Ireland may prove instructive in this regard.

202. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Job in Somalia is Growing in Cost," *The New York Times*, January 17, 1993, p. 7, and Elizabeth A. Palmer, "Cost of Kindness Unbudgeted," *The Washington Times*, January 25, 1993, p. A1.

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