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THE DUAL TRACK DECISION AND THE
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE TREATY
THE ROLE OF THE CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

THE DUAL TRACK DECISION AND THE INF TREATY - THE ROLE OF
THE CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES by MAJOR Russell R.
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This study investigates the relationship between NATO's decision to approach the problem created by the intermediate-range nuclear force superiority of the Soviets and the eventual signing of the INF Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union. The concept presented is that by adopting the dual track decision, (a track for negotiations and a simultaneous track for fielding U.S. INF missiles), the United States was eventually able to conduct arms negotiations from a position of strength. In this way a significant contribution to the INF Treaty negotiation process was made.

The study examines the position of each principal prior to the dual track decision, examines the role each played in that decision, and looks at the actions taken following the implementation of the dual track decision. The study also presents the nuclear background of NATO, and also examines the INF negotiations in some detail. The conclusions provide the current status of the INF Treaty implementation and outlines some lessons which could be applied to future negotiations of this type.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I The Research Problem

On 8 December 1987, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Milhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, signed the Treaty Between The United Sates of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate Range and Shorter Range Missiles. This INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty resulted from over a decade of political and military maneuvering by a multitude of key players.

The purpose of this study is to focus on the issue of intermediate-range missiles during the period from 1979 to 1987, to identify those factors which motivated both parties to eventually agree to the INF Treaty, and to specifically, analyze the impact of the fielding of the Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) on the eventual agreement.

On 12 December 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted its dual track decision: to deploy U.S. Pershing II missiles and GLCMs to certain West European countries while at the same time calling for U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations on INF. The U.S. missiles would not be ready for deployment before 1983 and the NATO decision specified that the interim period would be used for negotiations aimed at limiting, reducing, or perhaps eliminating these missiles systems.

In actuality the actions and reactions of the key players, (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the NATO Ministers) in this super powers' showdown are both fascinating and educational. For almost ten years the U.S. and the Soviet Union stood "toe to toe" with intermediate-range nuclear forces capable of causing the mass destruction of Europe. It is now possible to look back and examine the cause and effect of some of these significant actions and reactions, possibly gain insight and understanding which may be applied to future arms negotiations.

In order to best understand NATO's dual track decision and the implications involved, the reader must first understand the historical background of nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear weapons in Europe. This thesis presents a broad discussion of nuclear weapons in

Europe from 1949 to 1979, the time prior to the beginning of INF Treaty negotiations, as well as develop the background of the key players and weapon systems.

This thesis will develop the specific circumstances which existed immediately prior to the dual track decision. The Soviet Union had already deployed the SS-20 missile system placing NATO at risk. This period included the beginnings of the action and reaction sequence of events.

Next I will examine the 1979 dual track decision, its implications, and effects on the key participants. I will follow the events chronologically, although many occurred simultaneously, after this historic decision.

Then, by examining the period from 1979 until 1987, I will present the relationship between the negotiations to reduce, limit, or eliminate these weapon systems and the actual fielding of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. I will examine what was really being achieved, by whom, and for what cost and/or benefit. Finally, this thesis will examine the situation following the agreement of the INF treaty, providing conclusions.

The Research Question

How did the development and fielding of the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, as part of NATO's dual track decision, impact on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Negotiations?

Subsidiary Questions

1. What position did each of the principals, (the United States, the Soviet Union, and the NATO Ministers) hold prior to the dual track decision?
2. What view did each of the principals have toward the future of intermediate range nuclear weapons negotiations?
3. Precisely what part did the U.S. and West Germany play in the decision to adopt the dual track decision?
4. How did the U.S. and the Allies think the dual track decision should be implemented?
5. What were the actions taken by each principal following the dual track decision?
6. What was the process applied to the INF negotiations?
7. How did the negotiations proceed and to what outcome?
8. How satisfied were the principals with the outcome of the negotiations?

9. What is the current status of the INF Treaty implementation and what are the future implications?

10. Are there any lessons from the dual track decision or the INF negotiations which can be applied to future arms limitation talks?.

Terms

Pershing II Missiles: U.S. ballistic missiles with a range of approximately 1,100 miles, designed to be the successor to Pershing Ia. Extremely accurate and mobile system capable of attacking hardened command and control facilities with pinpoint accuracy.

Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM): U.S. missile propelled by an air-breathing jet engine, extremely accurate, capable of attacking hardened targets with a nuclear warhead.

NATO's Dual Track Decision: The 1979 NATO Ministers' decision to deploy U.S. Pershing II missiles and GLCMs to certain West European countries while at the same time calling for U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations on INF. Also referred to as the double track or two track decision in various sources.

INF Treaty Negotiations: The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union which began in 1981 and concluded with the successful Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The Principals: The United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the NATO Ministers were the key players in both the dual track decision and the INF Treaty.

Review of Relevant Research and Literature

There are a number of impressive and relevant books dealing with both the nuclear arms race and the INF Treaty. Since this thesis is basically a historical approach, most of the relevant literature utilized is factual, historical documentation. A number of primary and secondary unclassified sources are of special value to this thesis and are highlighted below.

John Newhouse's War and Peace in the Nuclear Age is the most current major work of nuclear history. This book examines the crises and confrontations, key decisions, and the personalities behind the development of U.S. nuclear policy. Newhouse, through his exhaustive research and vast background in strategic studies, will serve as a prime secondary source.

Cartwright and Critchley's Cruise, Pershing and SS-20 is a North Atlantic Assembly Report containing a detailed and balanced assessment of the nuclear weapons issues facing the NATO Alliance. It serves as a point of departure because it provides analysis of the politics of nuclear weapons directly related to the INF Treaty for the U.S., Soviet Union, and six NATO member nations.

Other key secondary sources include Schwartz' NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, Davis, Perry, and Pfaltzgragg's The INF Controversy: Lessons for NATO Modernization and Transatlantic Relations, and Angelo Codevilla's The Cure That May Kill: Unintended Consequences of the INF Treaty. The actions of the Soviets can be followed in Leon Sigal's Nuclear Forces in Europe and Alexei Arbatov's Lethal Frontiers: A Soviet View of Nuclear Strategy, Weapons, and Negotiations.

Additionally, there is a vast amount of information available in the technical publications of the Defence Technical Information Center. Also, the Occasional Papers of the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, publications of the Brookings Institution, and various Adelphi Papers from the International Institute For Strategic Studies are filled with INF and INF Treaty related material.

I will examine newspapers of New York, Washington, and elsewhere, as well as scholarly and popular journals, among them the U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, Time, Field Artillery Journal, Army, Aviation Weekly, Foreign Affairs, Current History, The Retired Officer, and others. Finally, I will study the literature related to nuclear weapons and nuclear arms control in general to develop any background information to enhance the reader's understanding.

Section II

Procedure

Conceptual Framework

This thesis is intended to be a historical analysis of the facts related to NATO's dual track decision and the agreement resulting in the INF Treaty. The thesis will answer the major research question and the eleven subsidiary questions. Critical to the success of this thesis is the ability to assess the actions and reactions of the principals involved.

Method of Analysis

The starting point for this analysis will be an analysis of the behavior of the principals. The aim is to try and explain the actions and reactions surrounding the

dual track decision. The aim is to try to explain the behavior, and the technique used will be a variant of what is called "situational analysis," developed by Robert Berkhofer.¹

A series of questions is asked about the behavior of the principals:

1. What were the major actions?
2. Who were the major actors?
3. What did each actor contribute to the action?
4. What alternative did each actor consider?
5. What result did each actor expect to achieve?
6. What were the relationships between the actors at the moment of decision?
7. What influences were brought to bear on each actor?

Using this model of situational analysis, I will examine the dual track decision and the chronological actions of the principals leading up to its successful conclusion.

Sources of Evidence

As mentioned previously, there are two major sources for this study. The first, that of secondary materials, has already been put forth in the "Review of Relevant Research and Literature" section. The second and most important source will be certain archives documents which capture the exact circumstances and actions of each principal for each major event. These sources take the form of speeches, published minutes of meetings and conferences, and written announcements.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

¹Robert Berkhofer, A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis, (New York: Free Press, 1969), 32-44.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND 1947 to 1979

Following the end of the Second World War, the European nations were near complete collapse and in a state of economic disaster. The Soviet Union, a victor bent on westward expansion of its form of communism, was busy drawing Eastern European governments under its control. The United States, having fought two wars in Europe in order to, among other things, maintain a balance of power, was faced once again with the growing threat to the security of the European continent.

During the brief period from 1945 until NATO's founding in 1949, the United States' National Security Policy was derived from the "containment theory" put forth in the Truman Doctrine. As stated by George Kennan, this theory was based on the belief that the most appropriate method for dealing with Soviet expansion was containing it.¹ Although Kennan's intent centered on economic containment, it was broadly interpreted as political and military containment. Europe became the first region

in which the U.S. would implement the policies related to the containment theory. The U.S. policy further served to fill the void left by Great Britain's inability to be the balancing power in Europe.

In the fall of 1947, the United States implemented the Marshall (European Economic Recovery) Plan which provided grants to numerous European countries to assist with their economic recovery. This assistance plan was offered to the Soviet Union, but they refused and began their own recovery plan, the Molotov Plan. With the assistance of the U.S., the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was established to unite the Western European countries economically.

By 1948, the Soviet Union wanted the Western Powers out of Berlin, and placed a land and waterway blockade around the former German capital. The U.S., along with several other countries, responded to this action with the Berlin Airlift. The Airlift emphasized the requirement for a solid means to prevent continued Soviet expansion and the need for more time for Europe's economic recovery. This eventually led to both the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.

The treaty establishing NATO was signed on 4 April 1949. Its purpose was to establish the cooperation of the European member nations and the North Atlantic nations for

their mutual defense. The mainstay of the treaty was the obligation of each signing nation to treat an armed attack against one as an armed attack against all.² While the majority of the land forces would come from the European nations, the United States agreed to provide a protective nuclear umbrella as well as land, air and sea forces.

At the time of the formation of NATO, the U.S. was the only nation possessing nuclear weapons. This situation changed drastically six months later when the Soviet Union demonstrated their nuclear capability by exploding an atomic bomb of their own.³

The NATO nations realized that a mutual defense was essential since no individual European nation could defend itself alone. By the end of 1950, Greece and Turkey joined Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States in NATO. The nations formulated a "forward defense" strategy. This strategy required the defense of Western Europe to be as far to the east as possible, on the Inter-German border.

At a meeting held in Lisbon, Portugal, in 1952, The NATO alliance determined that it required a force structure of 96 divisions to successfully defend itself.⁴ This fueled heated discussions about the rearmament of West Germany. Most agreed that for NATO to successfully

defend its member nations, the West German military structure had to be restored. However, France was apprehensive about West Germany's return as a major military power. The subsequent negotiations were lengthy and time consuming and by the time they were completed in 1953, it had become clear that the cost of 96 divisions was an unbearable economic burden.

In May 1955 West Germany became a member of the Alliance and began to rearm. The NATO nations abandoned the "Lisbon force goals" and planned for a forward defense with fewer conventional forces backed by a large number of tactical nuclear weapons.⁵ Over a period of time, the United States introduced numerous tactical nuclear systems such as the 280mm Atomic Cannon, 203mm and 155mm Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles, and the 107mm mortar. Additionally, the U.S. deployed the Little John, Nike Hercules, Honest John, Sergeant, and other missile systems as well as the track mounted Pershing and wheel mounted Pershing 1a. So after the first six years of its existence, NATO had formed the military structure it would maintain for many years.

At this time in the United States, President Eisenhower continued to review military policies, placing a heavy reliance on relatively cheap strategic and tactical nuclear forces while reducing conventional forces. President Eisenhower had decided that it would be cheaper

to have nuclear weapons than to have a large standing military force. He went to the extent of conducting a massive Reduction in Force (RIF) to be able to fund continued nuclear programs.

Just as the force structure of NATO continued to evolve, so too did its strategy. In the early years, while the U.S. had a nuclear monopoly, NATO strategy was based on the strategy of "massive retaliation" (MC 14/2). The thin line of forward deployed conventional forces would act as a "trip wire," allowing the United States to retaliate with strategic nuclear forces as it deemed appropriate and necessary. As Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1957:

The heart of the problem is how to deter attack. We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to keep the relations more effective and less costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power⁶

The intent was to send a clear message to the Soviet Union that the Soviet homeland was in danger if the Soviet Union should invade NATO territory. Specifically, the U.S. Strategic Air Command would strike targets deep in the Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons if Soviet forces "tripped" the line of forward deployed conventional forces. As the decade of the fifties came to a close, NATO's security was guaranteed by the U.S. nuclear force deterrence. This security became less reliable when the

Soviets, in 1957, launched the first man-made satellite (SPUTNIK), and later the same year demonstrated an inter-continental nuclear delivery capability.

By 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was driving his military to become the strongest military power in the world. The Soviets had begun to deploy what eventually totaled 500 SS-4 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Each SS-4 was capable of a range of 1,400 miles and carried a one megaton warhead. The SS-5, with a range of 2,600 miles soon followed. The SS-4 and the SS-5 missiles were targeted against both China and NATO territory. Also the Soviet long range intercontinental missile forces were targeted against the cities of the United States.⁷ The U.S. clearly was no longer alone in nuclear capability and was no longer geographically secure from a nuclear attack against its civilian population.

The most serious confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR up to this point occurred during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet Premier Khrushchev wanted to get the U. S. forces out of Berlin. In an attempt to negotiate from a position of power, Khrushchev tried to place missiles into Cuba hoping his offer to remove them if the U.S. left Berlin would be accepted.⁸ Unfortunately for the Soviet Premier, the U. S. detected the missiles before Khrushchev could make his offer, and President Kennedy responded with a naval blockade around Cuba. President Kennedy publicly stated

that any attack from Cuba on the U. S. would be treated identical to an attack by the USSR and the U.S. would respond in kind. This eventually resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.

At the same time of the massive Soviet buildup of missiles, the U.S. was in the process of removing its obsolete ballistic missiles from Western Europe. These missiles, which had become vulnerable to surprise attack, were withdrawn and replaced with an increased number of shorter-range nuclear projectiles. In 1966 France withdrew its forces from the NATO Alliance and expelled all NATO forces and facilities from France.

During the time from early 1960 until 1967, NATO maintained a strategy of mutual destruction (later known as Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD). This strategy was designed to deter war in Europe by linking any attack on NATO to a strategic nuclear response by the United States.⁹

During this same time frame from 1960 to 1967, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations developed a new strategy of "flexible response." Throughout the Kennedy Administration, U.S.-Soviet tensions ran high as evidenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis mentioned earlier. Kennedy felt that the Eisenhower and Dulles strategies of massive retaliation and mutual destruction were inappropriate given the Soviet nuclear capability. President Kennedy and his

and his defense officials felt that conventional forces should play an important role so the administration initiated major military reforms resulting in a buildup of both nuclear and conventional forces.¹⁰

The concept of "flexible response," developed by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, relied on conventional forces which could deal with varying levels of Soviet aggression. First use of nuclear weapons was not ruled out, but any first use would come only after an unsuccessful defense using conventional forces. In that case, the President might authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Escalation to strategic attacks on the Soviet homeland would be considered as a last resort to avoid total defeat.¹¹ This U.S. strategy was presented to NATO in December 1967 and on 16 January 1968 NATO Military Committee Document 14/3 (MC 14/3) officially adopted the strategy of flexible response.

Finally, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had the first major successes in nuclear arms control. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which put an end to atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, was signed in 1963. In 1967, the Outer Space Treaty, banning deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Lastly, in 1968 the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) was reached, in an effort to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries¹².

By 1969 most of the nations of the world were parties to the NPT. Many of these nations signed the Treaty only after the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to enter into negotiations to limit their own nuclear capabilities. Both sides had privately agreed to begin Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the fall of 1968, but the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, followed by the U.S. presidential elections and a change of administration delayed the actual start of the SALT until late 1969.¹³ The SALT eventually resulted in the SALT I interim agreement on ballistic missiles and the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The SALT I interim agreement stated that the U.S. and the Soviet Union would limit offensive strategic missiles deployed or under construction for a period of five years.¹⁴ The ABM Treaty prohibited each nation from deploying more than two Antiballistic missile systems. This was later modified to one system each.

The SALT I interim agreement caused major problems for the leadership of NATO since it appeared to limit the U.S.'s ability to provide nuclear coverage and did not address the conventional force superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This agreement also revived previous allied fears that the United States was becoming detached from nuclear support to NATO.

Shortly after the SALT I 1972 ratification by the U.S. Senate, SALT II negotiations began. These negotiations eventually led to the 1974 meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok. Their accord included a limit of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles for both nations and also included a limit on those delivery vehicles capable of carrying Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) warheads.¹⁵ Additionally, long-range bombers would be considered strategic delivery vehicles. These agreements were expected to make possible the speedy completion of the SALT II Treaty.

The SALT II Treaty could not be brought to a successful conclusion in 1975 or 1976. Following the meeting at Vladivostok, the Soviets deployed two new systems that targeted NATO: the Backfire Bomber and the medium range SS-18 missile system. This deployment caused serious concerns within the NATO alliance. Another issue impeding the SALT II negotiations was a lack of agreement on the strategic or tactical status of Cruise missiles. Finally, the SALT II process became a volatile political issue for the 1976 Presidential Campaign.¹⁶ A growing segment of the American public was becoming increasingly reluctant to negotiate with the Soviets.

Politically, SALT II negotiations continued as a minor diplomatic undertaking throughout the remainder of the late 1970's. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations were on the

decline due to the Soviet intervention in Angola and Ethiopia in 1976. The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan caused President Carter to indefinitely withdraw the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration. SALT II has never been ratified by the Senate of the United States.

In NATO in the late 70's, the ratio of Warsaw Pact tanks to NATO tanks had widened to 3:1, and the Soviets had made dramatic improvements in attack aircraft and air defense systems. Simultaneously, several of NATO nuclear missile systems (such as Honest John and Sergeant) were fast becoming obsolete.¹⁷

By 1977, most European NATO nations felt that the Soviet military build up was placing them in a precarious position. The efforts to reduce conventional forces, (the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks) were not making any progress. As stated earlier, several nuclear delivery systems were becoming obsolete and the need to modernize the NATO nuclear forces was increasing. This need became increasingly apparent when the Soviets, in 1977, began replacing their SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems with the new SS-20 ballistic missile system.¹⁸

The introduction of the SS-20 missile system was a direct threat to NATO's flexible response strategy and caused significant concerns within the Alliance. Although the SS-20 system had been developed and operational since

1973, replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 systems deployed the SS-20 much closer to NATO territory. Unlike the older, fixed silo Soviet missiles, the SS-20 was mobile and less vulnerable to attack. Also, unlike previous systems, the SS-20 launcher could be fired,, moved quickly, reloaded and fired again. The missile was extremely powerful, capable of carrying three independently targeted 150 kiloton warheads out to a range of approximately 3,100 miles.¹⁹ This provided a range sufficient to target all of Western Europe.

In December 1979, faced with the continued deployment of the SS-20 system, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers agreed that the Alliance would be best served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches. NATO Agreed to modernize its (Intermediate Nuclear Force) INF missile forces by deploying 572 new missiles. This would consist of 464 U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. The U.S. agreed to withdraw from NATO 1,000 older nuclear warheads.²⁰ Additionally, NATO Ministers agreed to support the U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce and limit intermediate-range missiles to equal levels on both sides.

This dual track decision, (deployment and negotiation) made during the Carter Administration and reaffirmed by Reagan, became the genesis for the negotiations that would lead to the INF Treaty. Chapter Three will explore the dual track decision in detail.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

¹Coit D. Blacker, Reluctant Warriors: The United States, The Soviet Union, and Arms Control (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1987), 64-65.

²David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 13-17.

³Teena K. Mayers, Understanding Weapons and Arms Control (New York: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991), 4.

⁴Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Understanding the INF Treaty (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), 3.

⁵Understanding the INF Treaty (1989), 4.

⁶Understanding the INF Treaty (1989), 4.

⁷International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1964-1965 (London, Alden Press, 1964), 22.

⁸John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1988), 165-174.

⁹A.J.C. Edwards, Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror-The Quest for Peace (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 7-9.

¹⁰Mayers, 9.

¹¹Mayers, 10-12.

¹²Mayers, 12.

¹³Newhouse, 219-224.

¹⁴Newhouse, 228-232.

¹⁵Mayers, 16.

¹⁶Newhouse, 230-234.

¹⁷Understanding the INF Treaty (1989), 5.

¹⁸Schwartz, 195-197.

¹⁹Soviet Military Power (Washington DC: 1990), 152.

²⁰Understanding the INF Treaty (1989), 5.

CHAPTER THREE

NATO's DUAL TRACK DECISION

During the period from 1977 through 1979 both NATO and the European Community debated the need for deployment of a new generation of nuclear forces. The final result of this prolonged and complicated debate was the December 12, 1979 Dual Track Decision: Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Modernization and arms control negotiation. On the first track, Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany each agreed to accept American Cruise missiles on their territories. West Germany also agreed to accept the deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles to replace the aging 108 Pershing 1a missiles already deployed. At this same time, the United States agreed to proceed with arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union (the second track). This Chapter will examine the nature of the Dual Track Decision, why the decision was made, and why it had a good chance for success.

During the early 1970s, American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was built upon the concept of detente (the idea of easing East-West tensions). Although detente was tied to economic, political, and social programs, detente was most closely associated with the initial Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or SALT. For the Europeans, SALT had a special importance. The overriding goal of SALT was to stabilize the superpower strategic relationship. Europeans hoped that a stable relationship between the superpowers would eventually lead to ties allowing other negotiations, such as the mutual and balanced force reductions for central Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be successful.¹

In order to fully understand how and why the dual track decision came about it is important to first clearly understand a number of key related events. Events on a world level took place during the preceding three years that played a major role in shaping the attitudes of the key players in the INF Treaty. The first event was the development of the cruise missile, second was the Soviet nuclear modernization program, next was the neutron bomb problems, and the final event was the Carter administration's handling of SALT II. All of these events led to the October 1977 speech by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt which served as the catalyst for the Dual Track Decision.

A cruise missile is essentially a pilotless aircraft armed with a warhead. The idea of cruise missiles is an old one. The German V-1 World War II missile was a form of cruise missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States developed many forms of cruise missiles since the Second World War. Due primarily to technical limitations and the pursuit of ballistic missiles, little was done with the cruise missile idea until the early 1970s when technical advances in jet engine technology and warhead size made cruise missiles highly effective and very accurate.²

By 1973 the United States had cruise missiles in early development. Secretary of State Kissinger was reportedly skeptical of the this new technology but viewed cruise missiles as excellent bargaining chips for the ongoing SALT.³ Kissinger felt that the U.S. could promise to cancel development or deployment of cruise missiles in exchange for Soviet reductions in strategic force deployments. Kissinger successfully pressed for increased funds for continued development.⁴

It soon became evident that the Pentagon claims of a revolutionary technology were true. The U.S. defense community felt that the cruise missile option was a "defense bargain " and not a "bargaining chip."⁵

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks quickly tied in the U.S. cruise missiles. Immediately following the Vladivostok summit of November 1974, the Soviet stated that

the 2,400 limit on strategic nuclear launch vehicles included the American cruise missiles.⁶ This probably came as a response to the U.S. demand that the Backfire bomber be included under the Soviet ceiling. The United States was not willing to accept this Soviet demand initially, but by 1977 the U.S. agreed that cruise missiles could be included in SALT II⁷. These discussions surrounding the cruise missile were being closely followed by European leaders as their interests were in many ways directly affected.⁸

Early in the SALT I process, the Soviets had insisted that any system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead onto Soviet territory, regardless of launch point, was a strategic system.⁹ This definition would include the American Forward Based Systems or FBSs in Europe. These consisted primarily of F-111 aircraft in the U.K. and aircraft on carriers in the Mediterranean which were capable of striking Soviet soil. The Soviet Union had no comparable FBSs capable of striking American soil. The U.S. negotiators were able to focus the Soviets solely on the ABMs, ICBMs, and SLBMs and away from the FBS issue during SALT I but when SALT II began the Soviets revived the issue.

The tremendous imbalance created by lumping the U.S. central systems (ICBM, ABMs, etc., FBS, and the systems of the U.S. allies under one ceiling was completely

unacceptable to the U.S. At Vladivostok, the Soviets dropped the FSB issue but proposed an even more restrictive noncircumvention clause which contained a nontransfer provision. This provision, apparently designed to prevent American cruise missile options by requiring parties "not to transfer strategic offensive arms to other states, and not to assist in their development, in particular, by transferring components or blueprints for these arms". The U.S. immediately rejected this provision.

Although the U.S. had rejected the nontransfer provision of the noncircumvention clause, many Europeans were alarmed. They feared that the United States might come to an agreement affecting European security without consideration for the allies' position. They were particularly concerned with European access to new technology that had applications to the NATO theater. This high visibility issue of SALT II drew considerable attention to the cruise missile and its potential for deployment.

As discussed, the SALT II negotiations appeared to be focused at including the cruise missiles into the arms control agreements. In addition to the cruise missile development in the West, Europeans were concerned with a continued growth of a new generation of Soviet nuclear weapons aimed at Central Europe.

In the early 1970s, the Soviets had deployed a new medium range bomber, the Backfire. While debate raged in

the SALT negotiations as to the Backfire's capability as an inter-continental system, there was no doubt as to its capability to strike targets throughout Central Europe. The basing, training missions, and technical characteristics all led to this conclusion.¹⁰ Eventually, the U.S. dropped its insistence that the Backfire be included under SALT II ceilings. This was done in exchange for a Soviet pledge not to change basing or training to make the intercontinental mission more feasible. This action continued to increase the perception that the U.S. was becoming separated from its obligation to provide nuclear deterrence to NATO.¹¹

In the mid-70s, the Soviet Union began to improve its theater nuclear missile capabilities with the introduction of the SS-20. The mobile SS-20 system was intended to replace the aging silo-based SS-4 and SS-5 systems. As a result of this and the Backfire Bomber deployments, the NATO Alliance began to feel that NATO's strategy of Flexible Response had been seriously weakened. A gap was believed by many to have developed in the area of nuclear systems; the Soviets now had a means to escalate to a level at which NATO had no credible response.¹² This was primarily due to NATO's lack of an INF.

The issue of the enhanced radiation warhead, better known as the neutron bomb, began as a review of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from 1973-1975. One result of this review was a report to the U.S. Congress outlining the

disposition, rationale, strengths and weaknesses of the tactical nuclear stockpile. Another result of this review was a decision to proceed with the development of the enhanced radiation warhead¹³. It was determined to be feasible to build a low-yield, clean weapon which minimized blast and radiation.

During the late 1960s, Secretary of Defense McNamara had resisted the idea of an enhanced radiation warhead because of cost and a belief that a limited nuclear war would be impossible to control and would quickly escalate¹⁴. In the mid-70s, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was more receptive to cleaning up the tactical nuclear arsenal. The idea of enhanced radiation weapons fit with his belief that escalation could be controlled. Schlesinger approved the development of new warheads for both Lance missiles and artillery shells¹⁵. In January 1977, when the Carter Administration took office this modernization was essentially complete.

In June 1977 a series of articles in the Washington POST described the enhanced radiation or neutron bomb and pointed to its projected deployment¹⁶. Shortly thereafter, Georgia's Senator Sam Nunn pinpointed West Germany as the future site for employment¹⁷. This extended press coverage touched off heated debates both at home and abroad over the need for and merits of these new warheads. For President Carter, this touched off an affair

which was "one of the most controversial and least understood issues [Carter] had to face."¹⁸ Carter immediately postponed his decision about deployment

In Europe the debate over neutron bombs was even more heated. For years the Germans had lived with the fact that their countryside was blanketed with nearly 3,500 American controlled nuclear weapons. Opponents claimed that these enhanced radiation weapons would make nuclear war in Europe more likely and increase the likelihood of the destruction of West Germany.¹⁹ The Soviet Union mounted a massive propaganda campaign which was highly successful, terming these weapons as the "capitalist bombs".²⁰

After postponing the deployment decision, President Carter decided that if the Europeans (mainly the Germans) wanted the neutron bomb, they were going to have to ask for it²¹. Chancellor Schmidt on the other hand had been left almost no room to maneuver. Schmidt hoped that the U.S. would make the decision about whether to equip the U.S. artillery with the U.S. warhead. He also warned of trouble if West Germany was to be singled out as the only country in which these weapons were to be deployed.²²

Chancellor Schmidt was reluctant to force a confrontation with the newly elected U.S. President. If President Carter insisted on deploying the neutron bombs in West Germany, Schmidt would ultimately agree, provided other European leaders would join him. For obvious political

reasons, he was in no position to request the deployment of these warheads. But President Carter made this petition for deployment a condition for a positive U.S. decision.²³

It was at this point in time that one of the largest political debacles related to nuclear weapons occurred.²⁴ President Carter decided to go ahead with the fielding of the enhanced radiation bomb if Germany and Britain would support him. Then, while his emissary was en route to Bonn with this message, Carter changed his mind; he would not deploy the warheads. His decision was leaked and appeared in the press on 4 April, 1977, one day before Schmidt was to announce that Germany would support production and fielding of the warheads. For the next several years, the U.S. leader would maintain the status quo on the fielding.

By the summer of 1977, the Carter administration had increased its efforts to work out an agreement with the Soviets on SALT II. During the preceding year a number of proposals by both sides had been put forth and rejected. In an effort to bring the discussions back on track, the U.S. proposed a three tier approach²⁵. The first tier, the formal SALT II treaty placed limits on central strategic systems and expired at the end of 1985. The second tier was a short duration protocol, which placed constraints on cruise missile development and deployment through the end of 1981. The third tier was a statement of principles to guide future SALT discussions.

For the European leaders, the protocol on cruise missiles raised yet again a serious concern that the cruise missile option for Europe was being negotiated away. The central concern was that the protocol would be extended past the time when cruise missiles would be ready for deployment. It was at this time during the summer of 1977 "that European interest in the cruise missile peaked."²⁶ The United States received several requests for detailed briefings from European governments on the cruise missile and any other newly developed systems.

Up to this point the view held by Washington was that cruise missiles were strictly a potential part of the central strategic system and fell within the context of the SALT II. It is possible that the United States was even reluctant to brief European leaders on the cruise missile for fear of further complicating the already jumbled SALT II negotiations.

Regardless of their desires, Washington was left with little option to respond to the direct allies' request. The U.S. State Department was charged with drafting the briefing and included the political, military, and arms control aspects of the cruise missile. The Department of Defense and Secretary Brown argued that the scope should be narrowed to the technical aspects of the system and the briefing be given to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group by Defense officials. A bitter split between the Departments of State and Defense resurfaced with State finally giving the Brief not to the Nuclear Planning Group but rather to the North Atlantic Council.²⁷

The briefing lacked a direction or focus and resulted in the Europeans feeling they were being stalled to gain time for the continuation of U.S. and Soviet SALT II discussions. According to at least one official, [this briefing] "raised suspicions about American intentions that were to plague the entire subsequent process of arriving at a decision on the Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces."²⁸

In early August 1977, another major press leak seemed to confirm the growing apprehension of the allies, particularly those of the West Germans. On August 3, 4, and 5, 1977 the Washington Post ran a series of articles purported to describe the conclusions of a classified interagency review of U.S. defense policy, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10.

PRM 10 was reported by the Washington Post to assume that NATO should accept the Weser-Lech (north to south) line as the forward line of main defense.²⁹ In doing so, NATO would be conceding approximately one-third of West Germany's territory in the event of an attack on NATO. This was in strong contradiction to NATO's plan for forward defense.

The Carter Administration immediately denied that such a conclusion had been reached in PRM 10. Secretary of Defense Brown testified that he would oppose any shift in NATO strategy in an effort to repudiate the reported fall back conclusion.³⁰ These assurances may have gone unheard in Europe and especially in West Germany, but publicly

Chancellor Schmidt made no statements directly responding to the leaked PRM 10. It appeared that a breach in U.S.-German relations was approaching³¹. Chancellor Schmidt made his feelings clear soon after in his October 1977 speech.

On 28 October 1977, Chancellor Schmidt went public with his concerns in his Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture to London's International Institute for Strategic Studies³². In this speech the Chancellor made several general observations regarding Alliance security and world trends in strategic nuclear balance. Much of his speech was devoted to the theater nuclear balance in Europe. In Schmidt's view, a SALT process limited to the superpowers would jeopardize the security of Western Europe because "neutralizing" the strategic nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers magnified the disparities between East and West in tactical nuclear and conventional forces.

To the United States the most important statement by Chancellor Schmidt was the following:

Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.

The speech did not make clear how the disparities to which he referred should be removed. He did comment however that the Alliance "must maintain the full balance of deterrence strategy."

To the U.S. Administration, the German Chancellor's speech seemed to imply that the balance of military forces in the European theater could be considered separately from the overall military balance between the two superpowers.³³ Also the speech appeared to question the ability of U.S. forces outside the European theater, particularly the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, to provide deterrence for Europe.

Without attempting to speculate on the personal reactions of the Carter Administration officials, there was certainly a public reaction. Before the Schmidt speech it appears that most U.S. officials felt that the European fears surrounding the deployment of the SS-20 could be handled quietly through discussions with the respective Governments and the Nuclear Planning Group. Following the speech, the U.S. made no attempt to challenge Schmidt's conclusions and many key officials must have decided the concerns were either valid or worth consideration.³⁴

The Schmidt speech gave momentum to a process which was just getting underway. In May of 1977, NATO had decided to review its nuclear forces as part of a Long Term Defence Programme. The NPG responded by establishing the High Level Group (HLG) as a subordinate body directed to examine the Intermediate Nuclear Forces of NATO and the need for modernization.³⁵ This group consisted of officials from the national capitals and was to be chaired by the U.S.

The first HLG meeting took place in December 1977, shortly after the Schmidt speech. David McGiffert, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs served as the Chair. During this first meeting, at the urging of the European representatives, a consensus was reached that the long-range component of NATO's nuclear forces should be immediately reexamined. The United States was asked to provide options.

American officials returned from the first HLG meeting with the belief that a consensus could be reached within the HLG on what needed to be done about NATO's Intermediate range Nuclear Forces or INF. Pentagon officials developed an option paper for the next meeting to be held in February 1978 offering four possible courses of action³⁶:

do nothing;

build an improved battlefield nuclear capability, without the capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union;

make a modest improvement in long-range theater nuclear weapons;

develop a theater capability to wage a strategic nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

During the February 1978 HLG meeting, it was agreed that a modest, upward adjustment should include the ability to strike targets within the Soviet Union. This basically combined elements of the third and fourth options.³⁷

Thus in a very short time, Assistant Secretary McGiffert had achieved an important consensus. There was a requirement to modernize NATO's long-range nuclear forces, it should be an upward adjustment, and it should allow NATO a capability to attack targets in the Soviet Union.

For the next year in Washington a debate over long-range nuclear forces took place between officials from the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Council. Various arguments were considered regarding modernization and the European situation. There was no interagency consensus reached in part because of a reluctance to undertake another interagency review after what had happened with PRM 10.³⁸

In June 1978, President Carter issued a Presidential Review Memorandum 38 (PRM 38) entitled "Long Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control."³⁹ This PRM was designed to generate a study on the implications of a new Intermediate Range Nuclear Force for NATO. By October, the various meetings related to PRM 38 had resulted in a general consensus. The key points related to NATO's INF were:

the role of central strategic forces for Alliance defense required no revision;

there were both political and military needs for the new INF deployments in NATO;

any arms control efforts to limit SS-20 and Backfire bomber deployments would probably not succeed unless NATO demonstrated its willingness to modernize its INF;

the U.S. should support the HLG, which was moving toward recommending an INF deployment option for NATO.

At the same time as the PRM 38 was being conducted, the United States was conducting bilateral conferences with France and West Germany. U.S. officials met with French officials on 21 June 1978 and with German officials on 31 July. Both nations revealed an uneasiness with the state of nuclear balance in Europe and the progress (or lack thereof) of SALT II. During the 21 June meeting German officials first proposed a sketch that outlined the two-track approach to modernization.⁴⁰

In October 1978, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski made a secret trip to Europe. He had arranged meetings with Britain's James Callaghan, France's Giscard d'Estaing, and Germany's Helmut Schmidt. The outcome of these meetings was an agreement to hold an informal midwinter meeting between the four nations. The result was a meeting held in Guadeloupe, Mexico that was unique in that there would be an absence of ministers, the leaders would be accompanied only by their senior security advisors.⁴¹

Brzezinski later confirmed that the meeting in Guadeloupe produced the decision to field U.S. missiles into Europe⁴². "They [the four heads of state] only discussed the mix of force options. [their concern was] Whether the weapons should be all U.S. and what the mix of GLCMs and Pershing II missiles should be..." according to David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor who played a major role for President Carter at Guadeloupe.⁴³

Aaron says the question of whether or not to field the weapons was never discussed. President Carter recalls the need to apply pressure by pointing out "we must meet the Soviet threat on intermediate range missiles"⁴⁴ when the German Chancellor stated that his main concern was one of singularity, he did not want to be the only Country in which the weapons would be based.

In late January 1979, David Aaron went to London, Bonn, and Paris to present the official U.S. position on INF requirements based on the work of the High Level Group⁴⁵. In London and Paris support was positive, while in Bonn Chancellor Schmidt wanted a guarantee that West Germany would not be the only nation to accept the deployment.

Aaron returned to the European capitals again in March, with a new consensus to meet Schmidt's requirements. In Belgium and the Netherlands political leaders had agreed in principle to the fielding of INF weapons in their countries but for political reasons preferred to wait for a formal decision by NATO before dealing with the issue publicly. In Rome, Aaron was met with surprising enthusiasm by the new Prime Minister, Francesco Cossiga. Cossiga assured Aaron of Italy's interest, support, and participation in future deployments.

While Aaron was conducting high level meetings with the leaders of Europe, the Chairman of the HLG, David

McGiffert and his staff at the State Department were deciding on what the proposed deployment package should contain.⁴³ Eventually they selected one of the packages already proposed in a Pentagon study. This package called for the replacement of the 108 Pershing Ias already deployed with 108 Pershing IIs and for the deployment of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles with 160 in Britain, 112 in Italy, 96 in West Germany, and 48 each in Belgium and Holland. Aaron carried this deployment proposal to the five capitals involved to obtain reactions. The results were much the same as on his previous mission.⁴⁶

At this point Aaron's negotiations on behalf of the United States had overcome most of the bureaucratic and political objections that had previously existed. NATO placed the INF decision on its formal agenda for the December ministerial meeting. One major obstacle remained. All the reports of the HLG and its Special Groups had to be converted into a document to which NATO could agree. Throughout September and October in the United States a series of high level interagency meetings took place to combine all the work to date into what became known as the Integrated Decision Document.⁴⁷ This document was to be presented for approval before the NATO ministers at the December meeting.

This time Aaron and McGiffert travel together to the capitals of the potential host countries in advance of the

NATO meeting⁴⁸. Again Italy, West Germany, and Great Britain raised no problems. In Holland and the Belgium both governments continued to feel hesitant about committing themselves because of political opposition forces.

It was at this time in October that the Soviets presented a diplomatic initiative aimed at destroying the momentum toward a successful NATO meeting in December. Until then, the Soviet leadership had remained surprisingly quiet concerning the NATO initiatives. It is not known whether the Soviet leaders believed that the U.S. President would be incapable of successfully following through on this initiative or perhaps they were reluctant to force a confrontation while the SALT II treaty was making its way slowly toward Senate ratification.

In a speech given by Soviet Premier Brezhnev in East Germany on 6 October 1979, he criticized the Alliance for its determination to proceed with the INF initiative⁴⁹. He further announced a unilateral cutback of up to 20,000 Soviet troops in East Germany along with a withdrawal of 1,000 tanks. Brezhnev also offered to negotiate on the Soviet INF deployments. The speech was immediately followed by a series of public statements warning the Western European nations of the consequences to detente if NATO decided to deploy INF missiles.⁵⁰

Due mainly to the repeated visits of Aaron to the European capitals to coordinate the Alliance position, each

of the principal European nations rejected the Soviet warning with little prompting from American leaders. But the Soviet offer did worsen the situation in both Holland and Belgium⁵¹. In an effort to make it easier for those two nation's governments to agree, the United States added to the Integrated Decision Document a provision for the removal of nearly 1,000 nuclear systems from the European stockpile. This provision made it easier for Chancellor Schmidt to gain acceptance from the liberals of his party but it did little to help Belgium and Holland. In early December, despite assurances from American Officials including President Carter, the Dutch Parliament voted to reject the NATO initiative.⁵² The Belgians remained noncommittal to the end, and when the NATO ministers finally met on 12 December 1979, both Belgium and Holland endorsed the Integrated Decision Document but deferred agreement to participate in GLCM deployments to await demonstrated progress on arms control.⁵³

The Integrated Decision Document adopted at the 12 December meeting of NATO ministers remains classified; however, NATO's communique on the decision is an unclassified document.⁵⁴ Of the five countries that agreed to deploy GLCMs and Pershing II, two of those countries deferred to participate pending progress in arms control.

Noting the Soviet trends in modernization and deployment, the communique stated:

These trends have prompted serious concerns within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in the theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

The communique goes on to outline plans for "pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches to tactical nuclear force modernization and arms control." It also states that 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn "as soon as feasible".

Having endorsed future efforts by the U.S. to negotiate INF, the communique sets forth principles to guide the negotiation:

- A. Any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.
- B. Limitations on U.S. and Soviet long range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.
- C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on U.S. and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.
- D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between both sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.
- E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

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- 33Newhouse, 309.
- 34Schwartz, 216.
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- 36Schwartz, 217.

37Schwartz, 218.

38Newhouse, 314-317.

39The information on PRM 38 is extracted from Schwartz pages 223-225. The author references interviews with high level U.S. officials who talked to him on condition that their statements not be attributed.

40Sigal, 57-58.

41Newhouse, 323.

42Newhouse, 325. Newhouse indicates that Brzezinski revealed this information during a personal interview, March 31, 1988.

43Newhouse, 325. David Aaron provided this information during a personal interview on December 28, 1987.

44Carter, 235.

45Information on the Aaron missions has been taken from Schwartz, 228-231. President Carter confirms that Aaron was dispatched to work with the European Leaders in Keeping Faith, page 236.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Negotiations and Deployment 1980-1983

Section I: The United States

The subject of INF and the Dual Track decision has always been volatile. It has been deeply submersed in layers of politics, public demonstrations and opinion, massive media coverage and vastly differing strategic perspectives. From the U.S. perspective, a large contributing factor to the disarray surrounding this issue results from a lack of consistent policy by the United States. Each Presidential administration had its own ideas about foreign policy. This section will examine the actions of the Reagan Administration following the dual track decision through 1983.

Chapter three examined the course of events which led to the eventual dual track decision: to negotiate and continue with deployment. Even though the dual track decision appeared to offer the vehicle for progress in nuclear arms control, many policy makers were not optimistic. This lack of optimism was for several reasons.

First, the Reagan administration's anti-Soviet posture was well known and did not appear to lend itself to effective negotiations. Second, the Soviet Union already had INF forces and would be bargaining from a position of strength. Lastly, the European leftist parties posed a strong resistance to the deployment of additional nuclear systems.

Among the first major foreign policy decisions of the Reagan Administrations was whether to observe the SALT agreements with the Soviets. As discussed in Chapter 2, the SALT II Treaty had never been taken up on the Senate floor; President Carter had withdrawn it from consideration following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After a good deal of disagreement within the Administration, the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Counsel, Reagan announced on 30 May 1980 that the U.S. would exercise restraint and not undercut SALT agreements so long as Moscow showed similar restraint¹.

The invasion of Afghanistan had also stalled all arms control talks between the two superpowers. By the summer of 1980, the Allies were pushing for a revival of these talks. The Allies had agreed to accept the missiles provided that negotiations to limit or eliminate the need for these missiles would make progress. After SALT II was withdrawn, our European Allies were left in a difficult position. It began to appear that the decision was really on a single track, heading toward missile fielding.

The Reagan Administration had arrived in office with a clear plan to improve the country's nuclear forces before taking part in any efforts to reduce them. The inherited dual track decision created an arms control requirement which the Administration was not prepared to handle early on. The financial cost associated with the build up of nuclear forces was large, and at the same time a growing antinuclear movement was sweeping across both Europe and the United States².

By the winter of 1981, a strong antinuclear movement had taken hold in the United States³. The movement's focus was to freeze nuclear arsenals at current levels. This movement placed pressure on the Administration to take action. The Soviet Union was publicly clamoring for continued talks and further fueling the flames of the antinuclear movements.

During the Administration's first year, the only noticeable step forward in arms control was to rename SALT START or the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. This was much more than just a change of acronym, it represents a fundamental shift in approach. For the Reagan Administration, only reductions would justify the unnatural act of negotiating with the enemy on such a vital subject⁴.

Setting a date to begin the talks also proved to be difficult. Secretary of State Haig met with Soviet Foreign

Minister Gromyko in late January 1982. The Administration had planned to insigate a joint announcement that START discussions would begin on 30 March⁵. The announcement was not made largely due to two articles by Henry Kissinger in the New York Times on 17 and 18 January. Kissinger's articles, both highly critical of the Administration's weak response to the imposition of martial law in Poland and the suppression of Solidarity, intimidated Haig⁶. This allowed Gromyko to announce that the U.S. was not ready to set a date for talks, and Haig was forced to confirm this.

At approximately this same time, the INF talks had begun in Geneva. These talks had started in late November 1981, and like the START, had gotten nowhere. On the 18th of November President Reagan had surprised everyone, including a few of his insiders, by proposing to cancel deployment of all new mid-range missiles if Moscow would dismantle its SS-20s and the older systems they were replacing⁷. This became known as the "zero option" proposal because it would take both sides down to zero weapons, and immediately appeared to capture the high ground for future negotiations. However, experienced officials were not impressed. They saw the zero option speech as little more than a maneuver to buy time. Most agreed that the Soviets would never agree to dismantle existing weapons in return for NATO's pledge to forgo a deployment which appeared to be already in trouble⁸.

Formal INF Talks began 30 November 1981 with Ambassador Paul Nitze serving as the principal negotiator for the United States and Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinsky serving as his Soviet counterpart. At this very first meeting, Ambassador Nitze formally proposed the zero option offer as outlined by the President⁹. The Soviet response was to propose that NATO reduce its combined forces to 300 INF missiles in Europe. The Soviets would then reduce their forces in Europe to the same levels. While the Soviets portrayed their proposal as fair, the coupling of U.S., U.K., and French missiles was totally unacceptable to the U.S. Thus began the first of numerous proposals and counterproposals which would mark the INF Talks throughout.

During the time frame from 1981 to 1983, several key proposals were tabled and rejected. One of the first, and perhaps most famous, was the proposal which originated during the "walk in the woods"¹⁰. In July 1982, Nitze and Kvitsinsky had begun probing one another's directed positions. After a series of informal meetings the two men met for lunch at a Geneva restaurant followed by a stroll in the woods. The two men were able to reach an informal understanding under which each side would be limited to no more than 75 INF weapons systems.

The "walk in the woods" could have been a very good settlement, at least as seen from Allied capitals in Europe. It would have committed the Soviets to a removing

80% of the systems they had targeted against Western Europe. This would have vindicated the dual track decision and eased the pressure on the European governments.

Although Washington had some problems with this package, Nitze was authorized to pursue informal discussions when talks resumed. However, Kvitsinsky did not respond to Nitze's overtures and after several months, the Soviets rejected all the informal "walk in the woods" proposals.

On 30 March 1983, President Reagan announced a new proposal. The U. S. would reduce its planned deployment to a smaller number, if the Soviets would cut their deployment of INF missiles to an equal number measured in warheads¹¹. The Soviets quickly rejected this proposal since their system was equipped with multiple warheads.

In September 1983, the U.S. modified its offer again in an effort to meet the Soviet concerns. First, the United States offered to apportion reductions between the GLCM and Pershing II forces. Second, it offered not to station all of its entitlement of missiles in Europe. And finally, the U.S. would be willing to include aircraft in the INF talks¹². The Soviets refused to consider the proposal and rejected the notion of any new U.S. deployments to Europe.

On 22 November 1983, the West German Bundestag voted to support the deployment of the INF missiles to West Germany¹². The deployment of the U.S. missiles began within a week. At the end of November, the Soviets carried out their threat to walk out of the INF negotiations.

SECTION II: The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union engaged in a major propaganda campaign to prevent the deployment of INF missiles to Europe beginning in late 1979 to November 1983. Soviet foreign policy has long used propaganda as a tool against the NATO allies. During this period the goal of the propaganda effort was to cause a political reversal of the dual track decision¹³.

Soviet propaganda concerning the balance of military forces was continually emphasized, particularly by the diplomats. This effort featured President Brezhnev, General Secretary Andropov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as other party members. These individuals had open access to the western media sources which readily promulgated their propaganda themes. On 2 March 1979, President Brezhnev formulated his claim that military parity existed between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces:

After all, it is a fact that general military equilibrium does exist in Europe, even if there are differences in the structure of the armed forces of each side. And it is from this fact that one should proceed.¹⁴

Brezhnev also attempted to place the blame on NATO and the U.S. for increasing tension in Europe. At the same time he also claimed that only the Soviet Union was trying to reach agreements that would enhance peace¹⁵. This address

occurred nine months prior to the formal decision to deploy new INF missiles, but Soviet efforts were already under way.

In 1980, the Soviets continued to attempt to persuade NATO to abandon the dual track decision to deploy new missile systems. This is evidenced by Gromyko's suggestion that the Soviet Union would attend disarmament talks only if the deployment decision was overturned:

We reaffirm our readiness to attend appropriate talks on the questions of disarmament regarding Europe if the NATO decision on U.S. medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Europe is repealed or at least if its implementation is officially suspended.¹⁶

In this manner, Gromyko was holding future arms negotiations hostage to NATO's abandoning the dual track decision, thereby portraying this decision as an obstacle to future arms reductions.

In July 1980, during a visit to Moscow by Helmut Schmidt, the Soviets dropped their demand that NATO abandon its deployment plan prior to any arms control negotiations. This action led to the preliminary U.S.-Soviet talks in October 1980 in Geneva. At that time the Soviet position was that all U.S. systems capable of striking Soviet territory from Europe should be included in any arms reduction talks. Additionally, the Soviets asserted that both British and French nuclear forces be also included along with the U.S. force totals¹⁷.

In 1981, President Brezhnev implemented a new tactic to stall the NATO INF deployment. During his address to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party on he stated:

Whether one takes strategic nuclear arms or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in both cases approximate equality exists between the two sides. In some types of weapons, the West has a certain advantage. In others we have the edge. This equality could be more enduring if relevant treaties and agreements were concluded....We propose that an agreement be reached to set a moratorium right now on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by NATO countries and the U.S.S.R., that a quantitative and qualitative freeze be put on the existing level of these weapons - including the U.S. forward based weapons in this region.¹⁸

The parity claimed by Brezhnev did not exist. At the time of this address the Soviet Union Had approximately 890 medium-range nuclear warheads deployed compared to zero medium warheads for NATO. The majority of short range missiles also heavily favored the Soviet Union, 1,618 warheads to 380 for NATO (see Appendix A). Thus, a moratorium imposed at this time, prior to the deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs, would have given the Soviets a clear edge in total warheads. The United States and NATO did not accept Brezhnev's offer.

Several months later, Brezhnev shifted his propaganda efforts from the military balance theme to a more direct attack on U.S. arms control policy. On 9 June, Brezhnev publicly attacked the Reagan Administration:

It is being alleged in Washington that the United States will shortly start or even has already started talks with the Soviet Union on questions of arms control. Unfortunately these are mere words. I can say definitely: Not a single real step has been made on the part of the United States so far during all the time since the present administration came to power....On the contrary, the Americans are delaying on various pretexts the beginning of such discussions while we, for our part, are prepared for it any time.¹⁹

On 25 July 1981, Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov expanded on Brezhnev's statements. He claimed publicly that establishing a moratorium would be a gesture of goodwill on the part of the USSR. He further stated that the INF missiles were to be used in a U.S. first strike against Soviet targets, not for their stated purpose as a secondary strike retaliatory force²⁰.

In September 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that formal negotiations on arms reductions would begin in Geneva on 30 November 1981. Ambassador Kvitsinsky would represent the Soviet Union.

On 2 November 1981, Brezhnev aimed his propaganda campaign directly at the German people in an interview for the German magazine Der Spiegel. In response to questions of how he viewed East-West relations, Brezhnev responded with comments aimed at continuing the Soviet disinformation²¹. He stated that the Soviet Union was not a threat, is not planning to attack anyone, and that Soviet Military doctrine is strictly defensive. He also directly attacked INF missile deployment stating:

If another 600 new American missiles are additionally deployed in Western Europe, NATO will receive a 50% advantage on missiles and 100% advantage on warheads. ...It is a falsehood that the United States decided to deploy its new missiles in Western Europe only in reply to the request of its allies and being motivated, exclusively, by the concern about their security.²²

On November 18 1981, President Reagan stated his support of the dual track decision and made his proposal which came to be know as the "zero option". This address did not quiet the Soviets and the "zero option" was not considered a serious proposal in the Soviet Union.

Formal INF negotiation began on 30 November 1981 and were recessed on 16 March 1982. During this first round the U.S. presented a draft proposal which represented the "zero option" Reagan proposal. The Soviet position at that time consisted of a moratorium, by both sides, on deployment of any new missiles for the duration of the talks and also equal reductions in systems by both sides²³.

Soviet President Brezhnev officially announced a moratorium on deployment of INF weapons in Europe, during an address to the Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on March 16, 1982²⁴. The intent of this announcement was to convey the impression that the Soviets were willing to take unilateral steps toward a more peaceful world even if the U.S. was not. The Soviets were willing to cease deployment of missiles even as the U.S. and NATO continued to plan the deployment of the Pershing II and GLCMs.

The content of the Brezhnev address received wide dissemination throughout the West, to such an extent that President Reagan answered these charges three days later during a press conference:

A unilateral freeze leaves them [the Soviets] with 300 missiles and 900 warheads aimed at Western Europe - against nothing. But as I say, this is a pretty easy freeze you know, there were 250 of these missiles when we started to negotiate when I made my speech on November 18th. There are now 300. And its pretty easy to freeze when you're 300-0.²⁵

The second round of INF talks began 2 May and ended 20 July 1982. During this round of discussions the Soviets tabled a draft treaty which put forth their position as discussed in the first round. The session ended with no agreement or movement on either of the two proposed draft treaties.²⁶

In November 1982 the leadership of the Soviet Union passed to Yuri Andropov when Leonid Brezhnev died. But the changing of the guard did not signify a shift away from the current propaganda themes. On 21 December 1982, Andropov addressed the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet on nuclear arms reduction proposals. Andorpov's address contained the same themes previously presented.²⁷

On 27 January 1983, a new round of INF talks began. The U.S. continued to push for the "zero option" draft but indicated flexibility was possible. The Soviets modified their position by proposing a reduction of SS-20 missiles to

162 provided no deployment of Pershing II or GLCMS would take place²⁸ (162 equaled a level the Soviets equated to the British and French nuclear forces).

During the next several months a series of proposals and counterproposals were made by both sides. The Soviet officials continued to use the Western media to expand their propaganda program and emphasize their defensive nature and attack the impending dual track decision missile deployment.

Andropov commented during an interview on the lack of progress in INF discussions on 27 October 1983. He proposed to reduce SS-20 missiles to 140, and as usual, continued to blame the U.S. for the lack of progress at the talks.²⁹ Andropov, in concluding the interview, threatened to cancel the talks if new missiles were deployed:

The appearance of new American missiles in West Europe will make it impossible to continue the talks now being held in Geneva.³⁰

On November 14 1983, the first cruise missiles scheduled for deployment arrived in England. On 22 November the West German Parliament approved NATO's deployment of INF missiles.³¹ In response to these events, Andropov carried out his threat of walking out of the INF talks. The NATO dual track decision had survived five years of intense pressure by the Soviet Union.

Section III Federal Republic of Germany

For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the U.S.' Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan together with the upcoming 1980 U.S. presidential election placed an additional burden on a government already moving toward the left. Thus, when Chancellor Schmidt suggested in late April, 1980 that "both sides (East and West), for a certain number of years, give up installation of new or additional weapons and use this time for negotiations"³², The Carter administration was not pleased. NATO had as yet no missiles and it appeared to Washington that Schmidt was about to renege on his commitment, a course which he had been intimately involved in developing³³.

Carter wrote to Schmidt soon after and urged him not to undermine the NATO decision during his upcoming visit to Moscow June 30 and July 1.³⁴ Many believe that Carter already felt that Schmidt was undermining the NATO decision by refusing sanctions on Iran for taking the hostages and on the USSR for the invasion of Afghanistan. Ultimately, Schmidt delivered a tough speech during a state banquet in the Kremlin in which he urged the Soviets to proceed with INF talks without preconditions.³⁵ These INF talks began in November 1981, but by that time the USSR had already deployed 250 SS-20 missile systems.

In part, Chancellor Schmidt's actions were necessitated by the political situation of his coalition party.³⁶ Schmidt's right wing Free Democratic Party partners were emphasizing modernization over arms control. At the same time his political opponents in the Christian Democratic Party were long time opponents of detente. In the 1980 German elections, Schmidt's coalition party had gained a number of seats in the Bundestag. This was a mixed blessing for Schmidt, since it represented a shift away from his traditional supporters to a younger generation of supporters who were much more skeptical of NATO policy. This, combined with the simultaneous election of the anti-Soviet Reagan Administration, combined to make Schmidt's final years as Chancellor increasingly difficult.

For a number of reasons the personal relationship between Schmidt and Reagan was distant at best. Reagan was not supportive of the SALT II, there were numerous opponents to detente in the Reagan administration, and there was no progress being made toward even naming a timetable for arms negotiations with the Soviets. Another problem was the Reagan Administration's linkage of INF discussion to many other Soviet policy actions. Meanwhile, the peace movement in the FRG was growing rapidly as a result of these tensions and the major Soviet propaganda offensive.³⁷

The peace movement received a boost when Brezhnev called for a nuclear weapons deployment moratorium.³⁸

Schmidt quickly rejected this as an attempt by the Soviets to freeze their advantage and split NATO.³⁹ When the dual track decision was debated the following month in the Bundestag, Schmidt managed to barely carry the majority.⁴⁰ The Reagan administration, finally began to realize the political pressure under which Schmidt was operating. In July 1981, Reagan wrote to Schmidt committing the U.S. to opening negotiations before the end of 1981⁴¹. Schmidt's position was also improved by the election of Francois Mitterrand as President of France. Mitterrand was a staunch supporter of Schmidt's position and continually emphasized negotiation from strength⁴².

The parameters of the INF debates within the FRG were most often framed by the growing peace movements which consisted of a coalition of political and church bodies. Anti-nuclear crowds grew to an estimated 350,000 during Reagan's visit to Bonn in June 1982, and over one million Germans signed the Krefeld Appeal against deployment.⁴³

In spite of this opposition, Chancellor Schmidt stood firm against Brezhnev's moratorium offer. Moreover, Schmidt reiterated the "zero option" made by President Reagan in November 1981⁴⁴. He warned that "peace is not created when one renders oneself defenseless against the armament or threat of another". Schmidt dismissed the Krefeld Appeal because it omitted mention of the SS-20 and added that the Appeal was a "tool" of Soviet policy.

In September 1982, Schmidt's Coalition Party fell apart and was immediately replaced by a CDU/CSU coalition led by a new Chancellor, Helmut Kohl.⁴⁵ Kohl emphasized the continuity of German foreign policy and told Soviet officials that the FRG would continue to support the dual track decision. He stated that if the USSR refused missile reductions then INF deployment would proceed.⁴⁶

The German government held elections in March 1983, and Kohl and his coalition party gained additional strength. The election victory permitted Kohl to continue in his policy that INF deployments would take place if negotiations failed.⁴⁷ However, Kohl did continue to urge the U.S. to adopt a less rigid approach to the INF talks and showed his support for the U.S. position that the USSR remove a portion of their SS-20 force in return for a limited and short term INF deployment by NATO.⁴⁸

After months of debate within the various political parties of the FRG, support of the INF deployment came to a vote within the Bundestag in November 1983. The governing coalition, headed by Chancellor Kohl, passed by a margin of 286 to 226.⁴⁹ The arrival of the first Pershing II components began almost immediately. Through the efforts of two powerful political men, Schmidt and Kohl, a fragile policy had been held together, Bundestag support had been achieved and the deployment portion of the dual track decision had begun.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

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⁴Newhouse, 344.

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⁶John Newhouse, "Nuclear Arms Negotiations," The New Yorker (June 7, 1982), 49-50.

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⁸Newhouse, 354-355.

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¹³Charles A. Sorrels, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Soviet Propaganda Against NATO (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Oct 1983), V.

¹⁴U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1979 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1982), 69.

¹⁵Documents on Disarmament 1979, 69-70.

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¹⁷Understanding the INF Treaty, 7-8

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²⁰Documents on Disarmament 1981, 295-296.

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²³Ryavec, 149.

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²⁵Documents on Disarmament 1982, 121.

²⁶Documents on Disarmament 1982, 921.

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³⁴Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 225.

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³⁶Information on the political situation of Schmidt's coalition party is taken from Jacquelyn K. Davis, Charles M. Perry, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., The INF Controversy, Lessons for NATO Modernization and Transatlantic Relations, 12-14.

³⁷Soviet Propaganda Against NATO, 1-4.

³⁸Davis, 13.

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⁴⁰Davis, 13.

⁴¹Newhouse, 355.

⁴²Risse-Kappen, 62.

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⁴⁵Risse-Kappen, 63-65.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Negotiations and Agreement 1984 - 1987

In the preceding chapter, it can be plainly seen that the actions during and surrounding the preliminary negotiations period from 1980 through 1983 laid the foundation for future negotiations. In this chapter the key related events of the period beginning in 1984 until the INF Treaty was signed in 1987 will be presented. Again, this chapter will be formatted in three distinct sections. Each section will concentrate on the negotiations as seen by one of the key players. While some of the information presented may be redundant between the sections, the main difference will be in the viewpoints held by the principals themselves.

Section I: The United States

The Soviet walkout of the Geneva negotiations lasted for over a year, but the international climate surrounding the walkout began to heat up even before the Soviets left

the negotiations. Briefly, in early 1983, events took place which gave the appearance that the two superpowers might be entering a more normal, less antagonistic period.

In late August 1983, President Reagan signed an agreement on grain sales to the U.S.S.R. covering a period of five years. The U.S. entered into negotiations for a cultural exchange agreement. Finally, at Secretary of State Schultz' urging, President Reagan agreed to end the embargo of American Equipment to the Soviets for use in laying oil and gas pipelines.¹

The next logical step toward normalizing relations was to renew the old habit of annual meetings between the American President and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko always came to the United States in September to address the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly and would then go to Washington to visit the President. After the Afghanistan invasion, President Carter refused to receive Gromyko, and President Reagan, primarily because of his hard line approach to the Soviets, had not received him during his first three years either.² Over the summer of 1983, tentative arrangements were made for Gromyko to call on Reagan in September. This was to be the first face to face meeting for President Reagan and perhaps would have served to inaugurate the dawn of a new attitude toward the Soviets. Unfortunately, the meeting would never take place.

On 31 August, just twenty days before Gromyko was due to address the U.N., a Soviet fighter shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007, killing all 269 people aboard. In the immediate aftermath, the governors of both New York and New Jersey refused landing rights at any airport to the airplane carrying Gromyko and his party³. This was the first U.N. opening which Gromyko missed in over twenty years.

Even today, no one knows for certain why Flight 007, with state of the art avionics, strayed so far off its course. Although the consequences of the Soviet pilot's actions were tragic, those actions have over time come to be generally viewed as resulting from an honest mistake. The primary result which concerns this paper is the resulting battle between Washington and Moscow to seize the moral high ground. It was, said Reagan on 26 September, a "timely reminder of just how different the Soviets' concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world. Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union will be fulfilled."⁴ The Soviets walked out of negotiations on INF two months later.

Two more international events had considerable impact on the administration before the close of 1983. The first was when the already controversial American military presence in Lebanon was thrown into turmoil. A suicide truck filled with explosives crashed through a barrier in

front of the marine barracks in Beirut and killed two hundred forty-one marines inside. The second event followed a short two days later: the U.S. invasion of the tiny island of Grenada by an overwhelming military force.

The President, in a nationally televised address to the nation, described both the successful campaign waged in Granada and the tragedy in Lebanon.⁵ President Reagan made the announcement of his decision to withdraw the marines from Lebanon on 7 February, 1984. Three days later, General Secretary Andropov died.

Many diplomats had predicted that Andropov's successor would be Mikhail Gorbachev, but Konstantin Chernenko was named instead. Chernenko was seventy-two years old and rumored to be in poor health. Even so, the majority of Brezhnev's political machine continued on, even with a new man at the helm.

In late 1984, after much grandstanding, playing to the galleries, and express-lane tit for tat, the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed to enter into new negotiations. These Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) opened in Geneva on 12 March, 1985. The talks were structured to cover INF, strategic arms, and defense and space issues. INF would be discussed in a separate forum under the NST umbrella of talks.

On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko as the Soviet leader. For months prior much

attention had been focused on Gorbachev. The previous December he had visited London to meet with Prime Minister Thatcher, and it was reported that they got along "famously". After several hours of private conversation (many more than scheduled), Thatcher described him as "someone she could work with."⁶

In 1980, when Gorbachev had become a member of the Politburo, he was forty-nine, eight years younger than the next youngest member, and twenty-one years younger than the average age of its members. It had taken only five years for his rise to the top. He had a novel style which included a vigorous interest in the press, and was often accompanied on official business by his attractive wife. He presented, in the words of one Washington official, the political style of a modernizer and reformer, coexisting within a conventional Marxist-Leninist society.⁷ Within the Reagan administration, the feeling was that now there was someone in power in Moscow who would be around for a while and would be willing to deal politically.

On November 1, 1985, as the NATO missile deployments continued on schedule, the United States tabled a new set of INF proposals. Although the U.S. team made it clear that the U.S. still preferred the "zero option", the U.S. would accept, as an interim solution, a limit of 140 Pershing II and GLCMs and a reduction in the Soviet force of SS-20 missiles (within range of Europe) to 140. The 140 figure

represents the number of INF missiles that NATO would have in place on December 31, 1985⁸. The U.S. proposal also called for proportionate reductions of Soviet SS-20s in Asia, leading to equal global warhead limits.

Also in November 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met for the first time to discuss a broad agenda of U.S.-Soviet relations, including arms control. On November 21, they released a joint statement in which they agreed to commit their two countries to early progress at the Nuclear and Space Talks. Also they agreed to "focus in particular on the areas where there was common ground, including the idea of an interim INF agreement."⁹

On January 15, 1986, the day before talks resumed in Geneva, Gorbachev outlined a Soviet proposal for a program to ban all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.¹⁰ With respect to INF weapons, Gorbachev proposed the elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe over a five-year period. In a change from previous Soviet positions, British and French nuclear weapons would not be counted against U.S. totals in Europe, but they would be frozen at current levels. The proposal did continue previous Soviet positions on linking INF to other negotiations, including space weapons (SDI), and banned the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology to other countries. All this considered, this was the first time that the Soviets appeared willing to consider reciprocal elimination.

In October 1986, President Reagan again met with General Secretary Gorbachev this time in Reykjavik, Iceland. The two leaders agreed in principle to an interim global limit of 100 warheads on intermediate-range missiles for each side.¹¹ The 100 warhead figure had been accepted in concept during meetings throughout the summer, in Washington and Moscow, and had dropped all reference to British and French Forces. The issue of INF missiles in Asia, thought by the U.S. to be a way for the Soviets to circumvent the limits, remained unsolved.

This agreement promised no INF missiles in Europe for the first time since the late 1950s. It also secured Soviet agreement in principle to constrain shorter-range missile systems as a part of the INF agreement, which had been a NATO concern in the dual track decision. On March 4, 1987, the U.S. tabled a draft INF treaty reflecting the areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik.

On March 12, 1987, the U.S. negotiators introduced the basic elements of the U.S. approach to verification. These included detailed provisions for monitoring compliance with the treaty by using on-site inspectors as well as national technical means of verification, principally, photo-reconnaissance satellites¹². Although the Soviets would ultimately accept the most comprehensive verification package ever in an arms control agreement, they were unwilling at this time to go beyond the general statements on verification agreed to at Reykjavik.

Secretary of State Schultz made numerous attempts during the following months to gain Soviet support for the elimination of shorter-range missiles. Then, in a breakthrough, General Secretary Gorbachev indicated in an Indonesian newspaper interview, that he was prepared to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles.¹³ This came shortly after the NATO foreign ministers had announced that they supported the verifiable, worldwide elimination of U.S. and Soviet shorter-range missiles. Gorbachev's interview was well received except that it still failed to agree to effective verification and contained unacceptable demands with respect to the German Pershing 1a missiles.

The West German Pershing 1a issue was a significant one to the negotiations, and prevented further gains in negotiations. Since the U.S. warheads had been provided for the German missiles as a part of a U.S.-German program of cooperation, the U.S. insisted that these missiles should not be the subject of U.S.-Soviet talks.¹⁴

Chancellor Kohl ended the Soviet attempt to portray the Pershing 1a missiles as the major stumbling block to negotiations by announcing that West Germany would dismantle the aging Pershing 1a force once Soviet and American INF missile systems were destroyed and certain other conditions were met.¹⁵ The Pershing 1a warheads would be removed from West Germany to the United States.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Gromyko's successor as Foreign Minister, came to Washington in September 1987 to meet with Secretary of State Schultz. At this meeting the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed in principle to conclude the INF treaty, including President Reagan's July 28, 1987 proposal for implementing a global double zero outcome.¹⁶

After several reversals of position by the Soviets on various issues, including demands against the U.S. SDI program, and numerous discussions on various verification issues, the two sides finally set the date for a summit to be held on December 7, 1987. Finally, after years of intense negotiation and diplomatic effort, the treaty documents were signed in Washington on 8 December, 1987. On June 1, 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev exchanged instruments of ratification in Moscow and the INF Treaty came into force.

Section II: The Soviet Union

In April 1984, Konstantin Chernenko succeeded Yuri Andropov as General Secretary. This change in leadership within the Soviet Union did not result in a shift in position regarding the INF negotiations. Chernenko adopted his predecessor's previous position, insisting that the newly deployed INF missiles must be removed before arms talks could resume.

During an interview with Pravda on 2 September 1984, Chernenko once again blamed the breakdown in negotiations on the U.S.'s insistence for INF weapon deployment¹⁷. He did not, however, mention his previous condition that the missiles must be removed prior to any negotiations resuming.

On 22 November 1984, a joint announcement was made that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to enter into a new series of arms reduction negotiations. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko would meet in Geneva in January 1985 to establish the objectives and subjects for these negotiations. This announcement represented the first easing of tensions between the two superpowers since the Soviet negotiators had walked out of the INF talks two years prior.

Why then, after nearly a year of Soviet propaganda against resuming further talks, did the Soviets decide to return to the negotiating table? First, the Soviet

propaganda had failed to stop the deployment of the GLCM and Pershing II missiles to NATO. Since not negotiating had failed to halt further deployments, it made sense to return to the negotiating table to attempt to halt NATO modernization. Also, President Reagan had just been reelected for another term, and the Soviets were well aware that Reagan would not unilaterally delay or cease deployment. Lastly, the Soviets had come to realize that walking out of INF negotiations had not achieved the desired results. In some ways, it had backfired:

The Kremlin, on the other hand, appears to realize that the tactic of boycotting the U.S. does not pay off. The Soviet obstructionism was intended to serve as a sort of shock therapy on the West European and American opinion. Instead, it was widely viewed in the West as a nasty but cheap brand of blackmail.¹⁹

The 7-8 January 1985 meeting between Schultz and Gromyko resulted in an agreement to form three separate but interconnected arms talks. One would focus on space, one on intermediate-range weapons in Europe, and one on strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviets' prime concern seemed to focus on the space talks; Reagan continued to push "Star Wars", his Strategic Defense Initiative (or SDI). The U.S. on the other hand emphasized the INF and START portion of future discussions. Gromyko stressed the importance of the space portion of future discussions during his remarks after the meetings with Schultz:

The conversation addressed acute problems concerning cessation of the arms race and the removal of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet side particularly stressed the importance of preventing the militarization of outer space.²⁰

On 12 March 1985, the first U.S.-Soviet arms talks opened in Geneva after more than fifteen months since the Soviet walk out. The team from the United States consisted of Max Kampelman (Space and Defense Weapons), John Tower (Strategic Arms), and Maynard Glitman (INF). Representing the Soviet Union were Yuri Kvitsinsky (Space and Defense Weapons), who had previously been chief negotiator in the 81-83 INF talks, Victor Karpov (Strategic Arms), and Alexsei Obukhov (INF), who had been the deputy to Karpov during the 82-83 START talks. Glitman had been the deputy to Nitze during the previous rounds of INF talks from 81-83.

At this same time, on 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was named successor to Chernenko. During his first speech as the Communist Party leader, Gorbachev said he favored a nuclear weapons freeze and a ban on all space weapons.²¹ During a 6 April interview with Pravda, Gorbachev announced a unilateral freeze on deployment of SS-20 missiles until November.²²

This proposed unilateral freeze was viewed as a continuation of the previous propaganda to stop further deployments of GLCM and Pershing II missiles. The U.S. was not interested in a freeze, only in the reduction of the SS-20s.

U.S. deputy press secretary Larry Speaks commented: "If they want to freeze fine, but that's not enough."²³ A Soviet freeze at that time in April of 1985 would have resulted in the Soviets having an advantage of 270 SS-20s deployed versus 54 Pershing IIs and 48 GLCMs.²⁴

The first round of talks ended on 23 April 1985, having made very little progress. Most of the discussions centered around reiterating previous positions. The Soviets continued to tie all three talks together as a package, while the Americans maintained that progress in one area should not be held back by lack of progress in another.

As the second round of talks began on 30 May 1985, Gorbachev repeated a position so often put forth by Andropov: "We would not have a grain more than the French and British have, either in the number of missiles or warheads."²⁵ He also offered to withdraw the SS-20s from Europe if the U.S. abandoned the SDI program, adding that:

We have already suggested that both sides reduce strategic offensive arms by 1/4 by way of an opening move....We have no objections to making deeper mutual cuts....All this is possible if the arms race does not begin in space.²⁶

This second round ended on 16 July 1985, with the Soviets placing the blame squarely on the U.S. for the lack of progress.

The third round of talks opened in Geneva on 19 September 1985. Gorbachev announced in a speech in Paris on 7 October, that the Soviet Union was reducing its SS-20s in Western Europe, and proposed separate talks on European missiles with the French and British.²⁷ Gorbachev also continued his previous proposal for a freeze on European missile deployment.

Following President Reagan's proposal on 1 November 1985 to limit INF missiles in Europe to 140, the Soviets proposed a limit of 120 U.S. GLCMs and 243 SS-20s.²⁸ This Soviet offer would therefore ban all Pershing IIs from Europe. The third round of talks ended on 7 November with these proposals tabled.

On 19-21 November 1985, the two heads of state, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, met in Geneva for a summit conference. Although little was achieved, both men did sign a joint statement calling for a 50% reduction in strategic weapons.²⁹ This joint statement did not address SDI and also called for continuing progress on a INF agreement. Many viewed this as the Soviets accepting the position of separating the INF negotiations from the other two areas.

The fourth round of talks was scheduled to begin on 16 January 1986. The day prior, on 15 January, Gorbachev proposed a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Part of this proposal called for the

elimination of all Soviet and U.S. INF weapons in Europe. This was the first time that the Soviets indicated their willingness to remove their SS-20s from Europe.³⁰

On 6 February 1986, during a visit to Moscow by Senator Edward Kennedy, Gorbachev announced that an INF agreement was possible without a connection to the space talks.³¹ The only condition which Gorbachev called for was that the French and British pledge not to expand or modernize their nuclear arms and for the U.S. not to transfer nuclear delivery systems to them.

Reagan responded on 24 February 1986 by proposing two options for Geneva.³² The first was a phased reduction to 140 launchers on each side during the first year, a reduction to 70 on each side the second year, and a reduction to zero the third year. The second option was to make reductions in Europe first, followed by a 50% initial reduction of SS-20s in Asia, where the Soviets had a considerable number of SS-20s deployed. This proposal was not well received in Moscow and the fourth round of talks concluded 3 March 86.

The fifth round commenced on 8 May 1986. The Soviets began the round by tabling a draft treaty calling for the elimination of all INF missiles from Europe. This was a formal version of Gorbachev's January offer. It called for the elimination of all INF missiles over a period of five to seven years. The round ended 26 June 1986.

The sixth round began 18 September 1986 with both sides making proposals. The Soviets proposed a ceiling of 100 INF warheads for both sides in Europe, and offered token reductions for Asia. The U.S. counter offer was 100 warheads in Europe for each side and 100 Soviet warheads in Asia.³³ The U.S. would be permitted to match the Soviet allowance in Asia with a force located outside Europe, presumably in the U.S. Both these offers were tabled in Geneva when Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik for a second summit.

On 11 and 12 October, 1986, the two leaders conducted a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. While there were no final agreement reach on arms reductions, Reagan and Gorbachev very nearly reached an agreement on the zero option proposal for INF missiles in Europe.³⁴ The agreement was prevented by Gorbachev's insistence that the proposal must be linked to restrictions on SDI. Reagan refused to allow any linking of limits on SDI to any other arms reduction talks, and no agreements were concluded.

The Soviets presented a proposal to the Geneva INF talks on 7 November 1986, based on Gorbachev's summit plan, that stated that INF could not be separated from other arms reduction packages. This proposal continued to call for the elimination of all INF forces from Europe but did not mention any limits on Asia. The sixth round closed on 13 November 1986. Although a special meeting was held on

2-5 December in order to advance the negotiations, the only agreement which could be reached was that the talks were at a stalemate.

The seventh round of talks began 17 January 1987. Negotiations began to improve when, on 28 February, Gorbachev reversed his position on linkage to SDI.³⁵ He announced that the problem of medium range missiles in Europe could be separated from other issues, and that a separate agreement on INF could be concluded without delay. On 2 March the Soviets formally presented an offer to this end and suggested that the current talks be extended three additional weeks. The Soviet offer tabled was similar to the Reykjavik proposal without the SDI linkage. This round closed with a U.S. counter proposal tabled and without revision to the previously tabled proposal.

During a meeting between George Schultz and Gorbachev in Moscow on 14 April, 1987, the Soviet leader proposed a new plan for European missile reduction. Tass reported on 15 April that Gorbachev offered to "eliminate all Soviet shorter range missiles from Europe within a relatively short and clearly defined time frame and also eliminate battlefield tactical [nuclear] weapons."³⁶

The key event of the eighth round occurred when the Soviets issued a new demand. The Soviets now insisted that the West German Pershing 1as be eliminated for an agreement to occur. This demand was immediately rejected by the

U.S. State Department. Spokesman Charles Redman of the State Department commented: "The Soviets have not previously raised the question (of West German missiles) and for them to raise the issue now suggests a lack of serious intent."³⁷

On 16 June 1987, the U.S. team presented a new offer calling for the global elimination of both U.S. and Soviet INF. This global zero option had been previously proposed by NATO's defense ministers on 15 May. NATO's foreign ministers had met in Reykjavik 11-15 June and endorsed the global zero option.

Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to break the deadlock in late July when he announced his acceptance of the global zero option. In an interview with the Indonesian newspaper, Merdeka, Gorbachev stated:

I can tell you that in an effort to accommodate the Asian countries and take into account their concerns, the Soviet Union is prepared to eliminate all of its missiles in the Asian part of the country as well, that it is prepared to remove the question of retaining those 100 warheads which is being discussed with the Americans at the negotiations in Geneva, provided of course, the U.S. does the same. Shorter range missiles will also be eliminated. In other words we will proceed from the concept of "global double zero". We do not link this case with the U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, or Diego Garcia. We would like to hope, though, that it at the least, will not grow.³⁸

The Soviet negotiating team formally presented the global zero option proposal in Geneva on 23 July 1987. At this time the key stumbling block to successful

negotiations remained the West German Pershing 1as. This was overcome on 26 August when Germany announced that it would dismantle the its missiles.³⁹ The West German announcement was hailed by both the U.S. and the Soviets.

After the West German announcement a blur of meetings were held between the negotiating teams. This culminated with a meeting in Washington D.C. between Secretary of State Schultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on 13 September 1987. After working out some protocol agreements the two issued a joint statement declaring that the two Nations agreed in principle to an INF treaty.⁴⁰

Schultz meet with Gorbachev on 23 October and was surprised when Gorbachev once again linked SDI to an INF treaty. Gorbachev claimed that a summit would be possible only if the U.S. agreed to limit SDI testing. Schultz refused to agree to any ties between SDI and INF and left Moscow without a summit date set.⁴¹ He made the following comment during a press conference prior to leaving Moscow:

Mr Gorbachev, as it emerged, is apparently not yet satisfied, particularly in the area of space and defense that the state of things is such that he is comfortable in visiting Washington, contrary to what was sent out when Mr Shevardnadze visited Washington.⁴²

On 30 October, 1987 Shevardnadze met with President Reagan in Washington. After the meeting Reagan announced:

I have just finished meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and he presented a letter to me from General Secretary Gorbachev: who has accepted my invitation to come to Washington for a summit on

December 7. At that time we expect to sign an agreement eliminating the entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF.⁴³

On 8 December 1987, after nearly 6 years of negotiation, General Secretary Gorbachev signed the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles". The previous presentation of the Soviet negotiating positions reveals that the main objective of the Soviets was to remove the threat posed by U.S. Pershing II and GLCM nuclear missiles while maintaining overall correlation of forces in favor of the U.S.S.R. Another objective was to achieve limitations on, or if possible, the cancellation of, the Strategic Defense Initiative. In some ways, both objectives were obtained.

Section III:

NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany

Following the beginning of deployment of INF forces to NATO and the Soviet walk-out from the Geneva negotiations, the European allies remained committed to the continuation of negotiations. In the view of the NATO governments, there was no reason to rethink their position at this point. It was up to the Soviets to make the first move to return to the negotiating table. Even with that said, those same governments were more than willing to urge the U.S. to adopt a moderate stance toward the Soviet Union to allow the Soviets some room to maneuver.⁴⁴

During the period of the walk-out, Belgium and the Netherlands continued to debate on allowing eventual deployment to their soil. Neither country had reached a final decision on whether to consent to the deployment of 48 GLCMs respectively on their territories. On 15 June 1984, the Netherlands government temporarily postponed the decision on deployment on the condition the U.S.S.R. would forgo deploying any further SS-20s. On November 30, the Belgian government did the same.⁴⁵

On March 20 1985, the Belgian Chamber of Deputies approved the deployment of the first 16 missiles. Six months later, after coming to the conclusion that the Soviets had indeed continued SS-20 deployments, the Dutch

Government gave its final approval for missile basing.⁴⁶ The Dutch were the fifth and final country to accept modernization on their soil.

When the INF negotiations final resumed in March 1985, there were approximately 54 Pershing II missiles in Germany, 32 GLCMs in Great Britain and 16 in Italy for a total of 102 INF missile systems. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had 414 SS-20 missiles with 1,242 warheads deployed against Europe.

In a speech to the French National Assembly in Paris on 3 October 1985, Secretary General Gorbachev "delinked" INF from the space negotiations and START, and announced Soviet willingness to work out a separate agreement on INF. He also proposed direct negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France on the limitation of nuclear weapons. Both Great Britain and France adopted their traditional stance that they would be prepared to enter into such negotiations once both superpowers had made drastic reductions in their strategic weapons.⁴⁷

The next major event for the Allies came with the summit held in Reykjavik, Iceland and Gorbachev's zero option for Europe proposal. After nearly five years of negotiations, Gorbachev's proposal appeared at first to be a substantial concession. After some initial delight, the European governments were ultimately responsible for a six month delay in the U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle.

First the British government expressed its reservations regarding the zero option. They were concerned about the Soviet conventional superiority and argued that elimination of the Pershing II would leave a gap in nuclear escalation options. Also, they were concerned that the U.S. might get "decoupled" from Europe. The French also voiced strong reservations. And while the Belgian government supported the zero option, the Dutch expressed criticism, fearing that the zero option could jeopardize deployment of the GLCMs which it had finally approved.⁴⁸

The West German government accepted the zero option proposal with hesitation. However, the Germans continued to maintain that any INF treaty should include limitations on the shorter-range missiles also.⁴⁹ The U.S. eventually reached a decision which took into account the reservations voiced by London, Paris, and Bonn.

During the subsequent negotiations both superpowers made concessions and the two sides drew closer and closer together. The U.S. took up the old proposal for a global zero option including a new step by step plan which incorporated details to ease most of the fears created in the NATO allies. Gorbachev on the other hand finally agreed to drop the condition for including French and British nuclear systems. Gorbachev also accepted the principal right of the United States to compensate for the Soviet weapon systems based outside Europe (i.e. Asia).

Following the second summit in Reykjavik, the U.S. and NATO had reached almost all of their negotiating objectives from the dual track decision of 1979. The tentative accord following Reykjavik included an equal global ceiling for INF as well as drastic reductions of the SS-20s based in Asia. And finally, third party systems had been excluded from negotiations.

Examining the starting positions of both sides in 1981, the Soviet Union had clearly made the most substantial concessions. Having dropped their insistence on including French and British nuclear weapons, the Soviets came to the summit prepared to drastically reduce SS-20s based in Asia. However, the Soviets were able to achieve a long standing goal: there would no longer be U.S. ground launched missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union from Europe.

NATO was finally able to declare its support of the global zero proposal in June 1987, again in Reykjavik. The NATO Council of Foreign Ministers expressed its support for the worldwide elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 Kilometers.⁵⁰ With this formally stated support from its NATO allies, the United States was now free to proceed with negotiations toward finalizing a treaty.

One more stumbling block remained in the way for the NATO allies, principally West Germany. The Soviet Union

continued to call for the destruction of the 72 U.S. warheads for the 72 Pershing 1a missiles belonging to West Germany. The U.S. government had continually rejected any such provision as a requirement against an existing bilateral agreement, the U.S.-West German program of cooperation.

However, it became clear over the course of the summer that the Soviets call had to be taken seriously and was not just another negotiating tactic. The only solution would be for the Germans to declare a unilateral renunciation of the Pershing 1a. Debate raged in West Germany for several months between the various political parties.

In the end, it was Chancellor Kohl who brought the problem to conclusion. After consultation with the U.S. government, with the German Foreign Minister, and with the leaders of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU), but without informing his political adversaries, Kohl declared on August 26, 1987:

If an agreement on the worldwide ban of medium-range missiles is reached in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the U.S.,....and if, the contracting parties keep the agreed timetable for the elimination of their weapons systems, under these conditions I am prepared to state today, that, with the definitive elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, the Pershing 1a missiles will not be modernized but dismantled.⁵¹

Thus the problem of the Pershing 1a missiles was largely resolved. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both welcomed Kohl's decision unanimously. This decision, although not at all popular within the CDU/CSU coalition, cleared away the last major obstacle within the European Allies and allowed the United States to begin finalizing the final proposal leading to the signing of the INF treaty.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In order to present the conclusions reached on the research question, I will first address each of the subsidiary questions in the order which they are put forth in chapter one. By answering these subsidiary questions, my analysis will follow both a logical and chronological analytical approach to the basic research question: how did the development and fielding of the Pershing II and GLCMs, as part of NATO's dual track decision, impact on the INF Treaty negotiations?

Prior to the dual track decision, the three principals, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the NATO ministers (chiefly West Germany) each held distinctly different positions toward future negotiations on nuclear arms control. They also held differing positions toward the overall balance of the INF within Europe.

For the United States prior to the end of 1979, the focus for nuclear arms control was contained within the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks or SALT, I and II, which centered on strategic missile systems. During the previous decade, the U.S. had been able to conclude several agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty are examples. The SALT negotiations, while extremely important to the few officials involved, continued as a minor diplomatic effort throughout the late 1970s. Militarily, the U.S. was a key member of the NATO alliance as well as its principal nuclear power.

For the Soviet Union, U.S.-Soviet relations were on the decline due to the Soviet intervention in Angola and Ethiopia in 1976. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 caused President Carter to indefinitely withdraw the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration. For the Soviets in 1979, the ratio of conventional armed forces in the Warsaw Pact was greatly in their favor. They were well underway for both their continued conventional buildup and their deployment of the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 multiple warhead intermediate-range missile.

NATO was well aware of the Soviet capability provided by the SS-20s and Backfire bombers. The bombers, while posing a threat, were something which could be defended against. The SS-20 buildup, on the other hand, was considered to place the European community at a grave risk.

Most of the conservative Ministers and their respective heads of government realized that NATO, in the late 1970s, had no means to counter the SS-20 threat and possessed no clear deterrence option short of relying on the strategic capability of the United States. The question for many Europeans was whether the United States would place its cities at risk or had the U.S. become severed from the European continent?

Prior to the dual track decision, the Europeans viewed the nuclear arms negotiations process between the two superpowers with a great deal of scepticism. Little, if any, progress had been demonstrated on strategic arms negotiations, and talks on INF had not even been proposed. West Germany and its leader, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, took the lead to apply pressure on their NATO ally to seek some form of negotiations on INF. A number of other key factors, such as the neutron bomb and the development of the Cruise missile, caused the Europeans to strongly favor beginning INF negotiations.

For the United States, there was no question within the Administration that the balance of military forces in Europe should not be considered separately from the overall military balance between the two superpowers, including strategic nuclear forces. But as the Europeans began to openly question the U.S.' ability to provide deterrence, the Administration came to the realization that the

European concerns were both valid and worth considering. By the end of 1979, the United States had led the way on a process to examine the need for an INF component for NATO. This process would eventually lead to an important consensus within the Allies that there was indeed a requirement to modernize NATO's nuclear forces.

The Soviet Union had rapidly established a true gap in INF forces and continued to build on their strength. The Soviets viewed their advantage in INF forces as an offset to the technological advantage held by the United States in the form of the Cruise missile. During the previous negotiations on arms control, the Soviets had continually attempted to tie the U.S. Cruise missile to strategic talks, primarily because there were no ongoing talks concerning INF. The Soviets had achieved a perceived position of power from which to negotiate and for them any future negotiations on INF would have to be on their terms.

During the period from 1977 through 1979, the United States would lead NATO's Nuclear Planning Group through the process of an upward adjustment of NATO's nuclear forces. Over the two year period, it was determined that there were both political and military needs for the INF deployment, and that any efforts to limit the Soviet SS-20 and Backfire bomber deployments would probably not succeed unless NATO demonstrated its willingness to modernize its INF.

The political decision on whether or not to field U.S. missiles was more or less formulated during the informal midwinter meeting at Guadeloupe, Mexico between the heads of state for the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany. From this point, an agreement in principle had been reached and the U.S. Departments of State and Defense would work to resolve the details with the various countries involved.

West Germany, led by Chancellor Schmidt, provided the emphasis on the negotiation track of the dual track decision. Through his efforts, two key issues evolved. The first was West Germany's ability to share the deployment of the new INF missiles with other countries of NATO; Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Great Britain. In this way, a general consensus between the active participants was assured. Secondly, because Germany considered itself to be geographically in the center of any military conflict in Europe, the Germans had the most to gain by forcing a negotiations track on the dual track decision. Many believe that the idea of fielding and negotiating simultaneously belonged to Schmidt early on and grew from there.

Beginning shortly before the dual track decision and continuing for several years following, the Soviet Union implemented an intensive propaganda effort to stop the dual track decision, and when that failed, to prevent the actual fielding of the Pershing II and GLCMs. For the Soviets, the

best thing which could happen would be to divide the European countries over the INF issue and preclude any fieldings, thus maintaining their INF advantage and their position of strength. Additionally, the Soviets did agree to enter into negotiations. This allowed the Soviets another means of attempting to stall or prevent U.S. fielding and continue their propaganda efforts.

For the United States, the actions following the dual track decision coincided with the election of a new President and his new administration. President Reagan inherited the dual track decision and the requirement to begin negotiations from the Carter presidency. Reagan's tough anti-soviet position and his decision to immediately begin a military buildup did not dovetail well with beginning negotiations on INF with the Soviets.

Eventually, after nearly a year in office, Reagan's administration began INF talks. These talks, which would last until the Soviet walkout in 1983, would accomplish almost nothing other than determine how widely split the two superpowers were on the issues.

While these initial talks were going on between the two superpowers in Geneva, the European governments involved as host countries for the eventual INF deployments proceeded to gain national support for their decision. For Great Britain and Italy, this did not present a major problem. For West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium on the other

hand, it was a drawn out and hard fought battle between the conservative and liberal parties within each Government. West Germany would eventually approve fielding in late 1983, while Belgium and the Netherlands would not approve fielding until late 1985.

The INF negotiating process was established early on during the initial meetings in 1981 and 1982. Each side would be represented by a negotiating team led by a chief negotiator. The goal of the negotiations would be to reach an agreement in principle on limiting or eliminating INF missiles. This process would be supported by the tabling of proposals and counterproposals by each side. Each round of talks would be for a specific period of time and have an established beginning and ending date. This process of negotiation followed the historical pattern of previous negotiations on the SALT talks.

How the negotiations proceeded must be divided into two distinct portions. First, the negotiations prior to the beginning of the fielding of Pershing II and GLCMs and the subsequent Soviet walkout. And second, the negotiations after the Soviets returned. This second portion must also be viewed, at least from the Soviet viewpoint, as the Gorbachev era.

The initial efforts toward negotiation were minor at best. The Soviets continued to hope that by delaying NATO's fielding and continuing their propaganda efforts, they could

continue their advantage. While there were some bright spots during this period, such as the "walk in the woods", for the most part no serious progress was made toward INF limits or reductions. In a way, this lack of progress aided the fielding of INF systems to NATO. If some form of progress could have been seen by the Europeans, the final agreement to host the U.S. missiles may have been even more difficult to obtain.

This period was also one of change within the Soviet Union itself. From 1980 to early 1985, the Soviet Union had four different General Secretaries. Also, the hundreds of billions of rubles spent each year on the arms race with the United States had taken a heavy toll on the Soviet economy. With Mikhail Gorbachev leading the Soviet Union, the stage was set for potential progress in arms control negotiations.

After the fielding began and the Soviets returned to the negotiating table in 1985, the INF negotiations took on a new dimension. Rather than the minor role of diplomatic negotiations of the first period, during the second period the INF negotiations became a center stage affair. This was primarily due to the direct involvement of the two heads of State.

Both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev played important roles in shaping the negotiations. Both negotiating teams became extensions of the arms control policy of their respective leaders.

An example of this was Gorbachev's proposal for a program to ban all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This proposal was made on 15 January 1986, the day before negotiations would resume in Geneva. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet negotiations team tabled a proposal outlining Gorbachev's plan. The U.S. President did much the same thing on numerous occasions. In this way, the negotiations took on the personalities of the two superpower leaders.

Once a few key concessions were made by General Secretary Gorbachev, the negotiations proceeded to a rapid conclusion. These key concessions included not linking SDI to INF negotiations, not tying third party INF forces to the negotiations, and agreeing to include all SS-20 systems in the agreement rather than just those positioned in Europe. Gorbachev seized the initiative on several issues also. The global double zero was a spin-off of an early Reagan initiative, but the way it was finally applied to the INF agreement was put forth by the Soviet leader. The elimination of the Pershing 1a system from West Germany was an initiative of Gorbachev's also.

The INF Treaty which was eventually signed by both parties on December 8 1987, required both the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy nearly 2,700 missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The range limits covered by the Treaty were for those systems with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It dealt only with

systems which were ground launched. It also banned the two nations from ever flight testing or producing these kinds of weapons again. It also included the most comprehensive package of verification procedures ever included in an arms agreement.

While the INF Treaty applied only to the United States and the Soviet Union, the Pershing 1a missiles belonging to the West Germans have since been destroyed and the associated warheads belonging to the U.S. have been returned to the continental U.S. The continent of Europe is now free of any missiles with the range capability covered by the Treaty.

After the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate on 27 May 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev exchanged INF Treaty Instruments of Ratification at a Moscow Summit on 1 June 1988. The Treaty required destruction of all the missiles and all their spare stages within three years. Pieces of the last Soviet and U.S. missiles, which were destroyed in the spring of 1991, are on display at the Aerospace Building of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C.

The only remaining facet to the INF Treaty which is still underway is the compliance inspections. These inspections continue to take place by both U.S. and Soviet teams. For the United States, the organization responsible for carrying out these inspections as well as escorting

their Soviet counterparts is the On-Site Inspection Agency located near Dullas airport in Washington D.C. For the first three years of the treaty, both sides were entitled to twenty short-notice, on-site inspections at active missile bases or recently deactivated bases. For the current five years, from 1991 through 1996, both sides are entitled to 15 short-notice, on-site inspections each year. For the future five years, both sides will be entitled to another ten inspections per year. Even with the break up of the U.S.S.R., the independent states of the Commonwealth have chosen to continue to abide by these provisions.

The future implications of both the destruction of INF missiles which took place from 1988 through 1991, and the ongoing short-notice, on-site inspections are twofold. First, both sides have had the unprecedented opportunity to assure themselves that INF missiles no longer exist for the superpowers. The second major implication is that with an inspection program which will continue for a least another ten years, each side may continue to gain short-notice access to any base at which they might feel a Treaty violation is taking place.

In the broad sense, this Treaty holds a more significant place. The recent events in the former Soviet Union, including the breakup of that superpower to form new, independent nations, has left the United States in a position which makes unprecedented change possible. Since

this thesis was begun, the U.S. President has taken the Strategic Air Command off twenty-four hour alert status, manning of strategic missile bunkers has been reduced, the U.S. Army will soon lose its organic offensive nuclear delivery capability entirely. These, and many other recent changes, did not occur because of the INF Treaty. Rather, they are all, including the INF Treaty, a result of the rapidly changing world in which we exist.

There are three basic lessons which can be carried away from the study of the INF Treaty process and the dual track decision. The first and most important is that in order to achieve agreement in principle, both sides must reach a point where they feel that their objectives, whether they be strategic, political, or national are met. The second lesson is that in order to conduct effective negotiations, those political, strategic, and/or national goals and objectives must be clearly defined by the head of government for the negotiating team. Lastly, the Soviet Union would never have been willing to give up its position of strength until the United States and her Allies demonstrated a consolidated and unified effort, which was steadfast in its determination, and willing to approach the problem head-on.

There were a myriad of forces at work to bring about or to change the possible outcome of a successful treaty on the intermediate-range nuclear forces. There were

geopolitical events such as the nuclear freeze movement, there were unrelated events like the downing of Korean Airliner KAL 007 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There was a changing of the guard in the United States when Reagan replaced Carter, in the Soviet Union when Gorbachev replaced Chernenko, and even in West Germany when Kohl replaced Schmidt.

Without the continuous military buildup of conventional and nuclear forces of the 70s, NATO may have never perceived the gap between overwhelming Warsaw Pact conventional forces and the deterrence of Flexible Response. But that perception did in fact come to be. The fielding of the SS-20 missile system by the Soviets, did, in fact, create a need to respond with something that would shift back the balance of power. For NATO, there was only two possible solutions. Either the two superpowers had to reach an arms control agreement which included INF systems, or some type of NATO capability for INF had to be obtained.

The Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile systems were the logical step for NATO's capability. Fortunately, a few far-sighted men, led by West Germany's Chancellor Schmidt, realized that it would be better to encourage negotiations toward limiting or eliminating these systems than to encourage increased hostility. The end result of that type of thinking was the dual track decision.

The fielding of the U.S. systems to NATO as a part of the dual track decision did not bring about the eventual INF Treaty. What it did do however, was to overcome the obvious position of INF superiority enjoyed through 1983 by the Soviets. In this way, the fielding provided a lever to which other forces could apply pressure on the Soviet Union. Additionally, there were forces from within the Soviet Union, under the leadership and vision of Mikhail Gorbachev, which allowed an agreement to be reached. All of these factors, internal and external, leadership, a changing world environment, and the fielding of the U.S. INF systems, combined at the right moment in time to make possible the most detailed and complete arms agreement ever between the two superpowers.

APPENDIX A

INF NUCLEAR BALANCE 1979

SOVIET UNION - WARSAW PACT

<u>IRBM/MRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SS-4	500	1,200	500
SS-5	90	2,300	90
SS-20	100	4,000	300
<u>SRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SS-1B	440	50	440
FROG-7	474	45	474
SS-1C	554	185	554
SS-12	100	500	100
SS-21	50	65	50

NATO

<u>IRBM/MRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
NONE			
<u>SRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
HONEST JOHN	54	25	54
P1a	180	450	180
LANCE	98	70	98

(Figures compiled from Military Balance 78-79 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979)

APPENDIX B

INF NUCLEAR BALANCE 1987

SOVIET UNION - WARSAW PACT

<u>IRBM/MRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SS-4	112	1,200	112
SS-5	0	2,300	0
SS-20	441	4,000	1,323

<u>SRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SS-1B/C	143	50	143
FROG-7	214	45	214
SS-12/22	77	500	77
SS-21	350	65	350
SS-23	375	230	375

NATO

<u>IRBM/MRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
PERSHING II	108	1,125	108
GLCM	208	1,400	208
<u>SRBM</u>	<u>#DEPLOYED</u>	<u>RANGE(Mi)</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
Pla	72	450	72
LANCE	108	70	108

(Figures compiled from Military Balance 86-87 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1987)

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