United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees

B-2 BOMBER

Logistics Cost Issues and Construction Planning



92-28790

GAO/NSIAD-92-22

GAO

December 1991

AD-A256 733

GAO	United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548	
	National Security and International Affairs Division DTIC GU	
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	December 11, 1991	on For
	The Honorable Sam Nunn Chairman, Committee on Armed Services United States Senate United States Senate	CRA&I
	The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense Committee on AppropriationsBy DistributionsUnited States SenateDistributions	
	The Honorable Les Aspin Chairman, Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives	Avail and/or Special
	The Honorable John P. Murtha Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives	
	As part of our continuing review of the B-2 program addresses the estimated logistics costs for the B-2 b ning for construction of B-2 facilities. This report co logistics costs for the original 132 aircraft program	omber and the plan- ompares estimates of

ning for construction of B-2 facilities. This report compares estimates of logistics costs for the original 132 aircraft program and for the Air Force's current plan to acquire 75 aircraft. Although recent congressional actions on the fiscal year 1992 Defense Authorization Act did not fully approve the Air Force's request for the B-2, the Air Force is still planning to acquire 75 operational aircraft. Therefore, this report is still pertinent.

Background

The B-2 is one of the most costly Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs, and it continues to be a central issue in the debate over future defense needs. It is being developed by the Air Force to be capable of attacking well- defended targets at close ranges during conventional or nuclear wars. The B-2 uses low observable technologies involving control of radar, infrared, optical, electromagnetic, and acoustical signatures to reduce an adversary's ability to detect, locate, track, and shoot at it. For the most part, B-2 logistics—facilities, support equipment, personnel, and spare parts—are required to be available and/or ready for operation when aircraft are delivered to the Strategic Air Command. The first operational B-2s are to be located at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

· ·	In April 1990, the Secretary of Defense revised the B-2 procurement program, decreasing the number of operational aircraft from 132 to 75 and delaying aircraft procurement and delivery dates. Logistics cost estimates provided by the Air Force were compiled, extended, and esca- lated by us using DOD prescribed escalation rates. These estimates indi- cate that logistics costs for 75 aircraft would total about \$28 billion over 20 years. ¹ Estimated logistics costs for 132 aircraft were \$45 billion.
Results in Brief	The cost to logistically support the B-2 depends on the reliability of its subsystems, components, and parts. A history of reliability problems on other weapon systems, however, indicates that the Air Force's reliability predictions and, therefore, its estimates of logistics costs for the B-2 may be optimistic. Undefined maintenance processes for low observable technologies, increased emphasis on using the B-2 in a conventional role, and the continuing need to change the design of the aircraft and its components also indicate that the Air Force may have difficulty achieving its estimates of logistics costs for a 75-aircraft program.
	The Air Force has had difficulty synchronizing construction projects with changing aircraft delivery dates. Because the Air Force had limited flexibility to adjust its approved military construction plans when pro- gram delays occurred, several construction projects at Whiteman Air Force Base were completed at least 3 to 4 years before required. The personnel system can be adjusted more quickly to revised aircraft delivery dates than can construction projects. Air Force planners made substantial changes to personnel assignments that precluded the prema- ture assignment of personnel to Whiteman Air Force Base.
B-2 Logistics May Be More Costly Than the Air Force Estimates	The Air Force's estimates indicate that the logistics costs for 75 B-2s will be about \$28 billion over the first 20 years. If the Air Force's reliability predictions are not achieved, increased quantities of spares, additional test equipment, and a need for more highly trained personnel could cause overall B-2 logistics costs to be higher than the Air Force expects.
	The cost to support a weapon system like the B-2 depends on the relia- bility of its subsystems, components, and parts. Reliable systems require fewer repairs and lower maintenance than less reliable systems. Other aircraft programs have had problems meeting reliability predictions. For

¹This amount includes \$2.6 billion for initial spare parts and \$1.1 billion for construction, which are also considered as acquisition costs in the B-2 acquisition cost estimate of \$64.8 billion.

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	example, during the first 3 years of operation, the F-117A experienced low reliability rates and required large amounts of maintenance time, especially on its low observable features. The logistics costs of the pro- gram increased significantly from initial estimates. Also, the B-1B had reliability problems with parts that increased costs. The estimated cost for contractors to repair parts increased from a 1981 estimate of \$250 million to a 1988 estimate of \$570 million.
	Logistics costs could also exceed estimates if precise maintenance of the B-2's low observable characteristics is required. The Air Force predicts that B-2 maintenance, which involves low observable technologies, will be lower than B-52H and B-1B aircraft maintenance, which involves little or no low observable technologies. However, the Air Force has not yet defined its maintenance processes for low observable technologies involving the B-2's outer surfaces.
	Further, design changes will be required to meet B-2 performance requirements and reliability predictions, which could result in multiple configurations of parts, revised logistics plans, and higher costs. For example, when the B-2 encountered cracking in the rear deck during flight testing, the Air Force had to develop repair procedures it had not anticipated. As of September 1991 the Air Force had identified 8,259 B-2 design changes. The Air Force does not know how many B-2 design changes will be required. The B-1B required over 200,000 design changes by the time all production aircraft were delivered.
	Other factors could also cause costs to exceed estimates. For example, recent Air Force statements indicate the Air Force plans for the B-2 bomber to have a significant conventional role earlier than anticipated. Such a role will require more training, flying hours, and support equipment. The costs associated with the conventional role, however, were not considered in the Air Force's estimates of logistics cost.
Difficulty Synchronizing Construction Projects With a Changing B-2 Program	Military construction projects at Whiteman Air Force Base totaled \$89 million in fiscal year 1988 and \$60 million in fiscal year 1989. Con- struction of fiscal year 1988 projects began in February 1988 and was based on plans that became outdated when the aircraft delivery sched- ules were changed. The Air Force updated its construction plans as delivery schedules were changed; however, it could not always prevent premature construction. Consequently, in some cases, construction occurred 3 to 4 years before required and resulted in facilities, such as the combat crew training squadron and the field training detachment,


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	not being used or being used only on a limited basis. In addition, \$500,000 of B-2 construction funds was spent for an engine test facility that is no longer needed for the B-2 because the Air Force later decided not to do B-2 engine repairs at the operating base. According to the Air Force, the engine test facility can be used for A-10 engine testing and T-38 maintenance.
	Air Force managers responded to delivery schedule changes by adjusting personnel assignment plans. For example, the original staffing plan was revised to reduce the number of B-2 personnel at Whiteman Air Force Base from 1,248 to 136 personnel in fiscal year 1991. Thus, the Air Force tried to ensure that personnel levels were based on current needs.
Scope and Methodology	To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials at the B-2 Systems Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; the Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; the first operational base, Whiteman Air Force Base, Mis- souri; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska; and the Departments of Defense and the Air Force, Washington, D. C. We per- formed our review from August 1990 to September 1991 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
	In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense con- curred with some of our conclusions but disagreed that B-2 logistics may be more costly than the Air Force estimates and that B-2 facilities con- struction was based upon outdated plans. (See app. I for a copy of the Department's comments and our evaluation.)
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	We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties.
	Please contact me at (202) 275-4268 if you or your staff have any ques- tions concerning this report. Other major contributors to this report are Robert D. Murphy, Assistant Director, and Roger L. Tomlinson,

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Evaluator-in-Charge, Gary L. Nelson, Evaluator, and Robert W. Jones, Evaluator, Kansas City Regional Office.


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Nancy R. Kingsbury Director Air Force Issues




Detailed DoD comments on the report findings and recommendation are provided in the enclosure. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Sincerely, Charles E. Adolph By Direction of the Secretary of Defense


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	because it exceeds Air Force requirements and the levels experienced for the B-52H and the B-1B. The GAO also pointed out that the B-2 is expected to require precise maintenance of its low observable characteristics, which is not required for the other two aircraft.
v on pp. 2 and 3	The GAO reported that the Air Force believes the B-2 reliability and maintainability predictions are not unreasonable, considering the intense development testing and the environmental test screening performed on individual aircraft components. The GAO observed, however, that if the predicted levels are not achieved, increased quantities of spares, additional test equipment, and a need for more highly trained personnel could cause overall operating and maintenance costs to be higher than Air Force estimates. The GAO pointed out that problemssuch as those encountered with cracking in the rear deck during flight testing, the complexities associated with maintaining the B-2 radar cross section, and the complexity and diversity of computer softwaremay also make it difficult to achieve the Air Force cost estimate. The GAO concluded, therefore, that operating and maintaining the B-2 may be more costly than the Air Force estimates. (pp. 4-5/GAO Draft Report Summary)
comment 2.	<u>DoD Response:</u> Partially concur. The DoD concurs that the Air Force predictions of B-2 reliability and maintainability costs are <u>not</u> unreasonable. The DoD does <u>not</u> , however, concur with the GAO conclusion that operating and maintaining the B-2 may be more costly than the Air Force estimates. That conclusion is based on GAO skepticism that predicted levels of reliability and maintainability will be achieved.
	The GAO has only identified several <u>potential</u> problems and observed that the Air Force expects to exceed reliability and maintainability levels achieved on the B-52 and B-1B bombers. In fact, discovery and analysis of the problems during Full-Scale Development has led to proposed solutions, and should help ensure that the cost estimates projected by the Air Force are achieved.
	 FINDING C: Need To Synchronize Construction Projects With The B-2 Program. The GAO reported that military construction projects at Whiteman Air Force Base totaled \$89 million in FY 1988 and \$60 million in FY 1989. The GAO found the construction that began in February 1988 was based on outdated plans. The GAO pointed out Air Force policy requires that logistics plans be updated as major program changes occur. The GAO found, however, that although B-2 delivery schedules slipped, the Air Force could not always adjust approved construction plans. According to the GAO, some of the construction projects at Whiteman occurred



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Now on p. 4.	tried to ensure that personnel levels were based on current needs. (p. 5/GAO Draft Report Summary)
	<u>DoD Response:</u> Concur

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	Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense
	The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter dated September 23, 1991.
GAO Comments	1.In a draft of this report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force develop procedures to ensure that logistics and construction plans are updated as major program changes occur. That recommenda- tion has been deleted from the report. After considering the Department of Defense's (DOD) comments, GAO clarified its report to recognize that premature completion of many projects was unavoidable and to identify contractual obligations and other factors that caused some facilities to be completed before need dates. Nevertheless, GAO believes DOD should continue to be very cautious in initiating construction projects when major weapon programs are undergoing changes.
	2.After considering DOD's comments, GAO clarified its report to show that solutions to development problems cause design changes that can result in multiple configurations, revised logistics plans, and higher costs. GAO's report also shows that the Air Force has a history of reliability problems and higher than predicted logistics costs on other weapon sys- tems. If precise maintenance for low observables is required, costs may increase. The increased emphasis on using the B-2 in a conventional role also indicates that the Air Force may have difficulty achieving its cost estimate. Accordingly, GAO has not changed its finding that the Air Force's logistics cost estimates for the B-2 may be optimistic.
	3.In a draft of this report, overall logistics costs for 75 aircraft were stated at about \$30 billion over 20 years. That estimate included escala- tion rates that were higher than rates currently being used to develop cost estimates. Using the escalation rates currently prescribed by DOD, GAO revised the estimated logistics costs for the B-2 to about \$28 billion over 20 years.