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OF THE PHILIPPINES  
1565-1600

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

NICHOLAS D. PISANO, LCDR, SC, USN  
B.S., University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 1977  
M.A., Pepperdine University, Malibu, California, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
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
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
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
Approved by:

  
\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chairman  
Thomas M. Huber, Ph.D.

  
\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
LTC Roger C. Wilson, M.S.

  
\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
CH (MAJ) Jeffrey M. Young, M.Div.

Accepted this 5th day of June 1992 by:

  
\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

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ABSTRACT

THE SPANISH PACIFICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1565-1600 by LCDR Nicholas D. Pisano, SC, USN, 415 pages.

The last major conquest of the 16th century Spanish period of expansion was the Philippines--a subject that has received little attention and scholarship.

This study takes an ethnohistoric approach to explore the issues of how the Spaniards brought about the conquest and pacification of the Philippines; the role of technology; the methods and organization of the Spaniards used in the conquest and pacification; whether customs and conditions within Spanish and pre-Hispanic Filipino society contributed to the ease of the pacification; and whether the complete pacification of the indigenous population was truly brought about, even in part, and, if so, the depth of the pacification.

The study outlines current scholarship concerning pre-Hispanic Filipino culture, the development of Hispanic culture to the 16th century, the response of Hispanic cultural and political institutions to experiences in the New World, the motivations and events that led the Spanish to the Philippines, and provides an analysis of the impact of the methods used in the conquest and pacification.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest achievements in history was that of the Spaniards who, in the space of less than one hundred years, completed the unification of their country and created the first truly global empire. That they were able to accomplish the building of such a vast empire, not with great armies but with a few hundred men, makes this achievement all the more remarkable. Their failure to hold onto that empire and the squandering of the wealth and power they had amassed over the course of the 17th century, and their decline into the realm of a second class power, is also one of the great tragedies of history. The subject of this thesis is not, however, to discuss and analyze the reasons for the rise and fall of the Spanish empire, though they will be touched upon, but to conduct an analysis of the successful conquest of a people by that empire at the height of its power.

The Philippine Islands, while themselves playing a secondary role in the history of civilization, have served a primary role by providing a stage for some of history's most important events and figures--the competition for the spice trade, Magellan, Philip II, Urdaneta, all have the Philippines in common. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Philippines would serve as a stage for the United States to test its theories of sea power. The vow of General Douglas MacArthur in 1942 to

return to those islands in order to liberate them from their Japanese invaders inspired and steeled the U. S. military at its lowest point during the Second World War. Most recently they have again figured prominently in the controversy surrounding the leasing of military bases in the islands that contributed to maintaining U. S. power in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans throughout the 20th century.

Despite the important role that the islands have played in the history of nations, little is known of their history. The ravages of time and the Spanish invaders destroyed most of the manuscripts from the early history of the archipelago. There are many chronicles from the Spanish colonial period of 1565 to 1898 but few have been published and fewer translated into English or made available for study outside of Spain. Even after the Americans took possession of the islands in 1898, with a few notable exceptions, the flurry of historical scholarship that followed mainly concerned itself with the most recent Spanish colonial period (focusing on its negative aspects) and the natural resources that could be exploited in the islands. The two most popular works of recent publication about the archipelago both from the United States, Stanley Karnow's In Our Image and David Haward Bain's Sitting In Darkness, restrict themselves to more recent socio-political events. Recently, there has been a revival of interest among Filipinos in their history and culture that has produced several significant works, partially correcting the paucity of scholarship in this area. I hope that this work will contribute to that literature.

The questions of nationhood that currently concern the Philippines concern all of the nations of the world that were once under

Spanish hegemony, particularly those in the Americas. The reasons for this are not unrelated to the role of the New World colonies in, and the methods used, during the pacification and later administration of the islands. Consequently, this thesis will concern itself primarily with the Spanish period in the Philippines from 1565-1600.

The central question that I intend to answer is how the Spaniards, with a force never numbering more than 600 soldiers, conquer and pacify a native population estimated to have exceeded one half million people. This was not the first time the Spaniards had achieved conquest in this manner. They conquered both the highly organized, and more populated, Inca and Aztec empires with just as few soldiers as used in the Philippines.

The question that arises is whether the ability to conquer a whole people with a few soldiers was a result of technological differences, the methods and organization of the Spaniards, or whether the answer lies somewhere within the cultural traits of both of the opposing groups. Other subordinate questions that arise in connection to the central question concern the role of the missionaries who accompanied the *conquistadores*, the role of the *encomienda* and other colonial administrative systems in the pacification, how the Philippine conquest and subsequent colonial administration compared to the process used by the Spanish during the Iberian *Reconquista* and in the New World, whether the pacification--that is, the reduction to a subservient state--was actually achieved, even partially, and, if so, the effectiveness of the pacification.

While the main focus of the thesis will be on the period 1565 to 1600, I will provide background information concerning Spanish and pre-Hispanic Filipino history and culture and the European events that led to the discovery and pacification. This is necessary in order to place the significance of the events in proper historical perspective and to provide information that is essential in answering the research questions I have posed.

I have chosen to arbitrarily end this thesis at the year 1600, marking that year as the end of the initial period of pacification. I base this conclusion on several events. In 1604 a Jesuit missionary in the Philippines observed: "It seems to me that the road to the conversion of these natives is now smooth and open with the conversion of the chiefs and the majority of the people . . ."<sup>1</sup> The Royal Decrees of 1595, together with further revisions in 1604, remedied the principal abuses of the encomienda system condemned by the missionaries.<sup>2</sup> Also in 1594 the king of Spain exempted the native chieftains from paying the yearly tribute adding to their already extensive privileges,<sup>3</sup> and in 1599 the Spaniards gathered the chieftains and freedmen of many of the provinces to "election" ceremonies in which they vowed to voluntarily submit to the Spanish king as their lord and sovereign.<sup>4</sup> These events taken together indicate that the process of Christian conversion, excepting in Mindanao, had overcome its greatest obstacles; that the Spaniards had undertaken the process of governing the islands as opposed to subduing them; and that the process of using the ruling native families as the means for political consolidation was well underway. After the year 1600 the main efforts of the Spaniards in the islands

would be devoted to the galleon trade, consolidating power, and defending against the attempts of the Dutch and others to separate them from their overseas empire.

Where the date of 1600 seemed to be arbitrary or restrictive in the exploration of relevant questions concerning the conquest I have taken the analysis past that date. This was particularly necessary for the sections on the Moros and other areas of the archipelago that were never pacified. My objective is to place the individual events and the pacification of the entire archipelago in proper historical context so their, and its, significance can be more fully understood.



## NOTES

1. John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 57.
2. Ibid., 96.
3. Ibid., 122.
4. Ibid., 25-26.

## CHAPTER II

### PRE-HISPANIC FILIPINO HISTORY AND CULTURE

#### Origin Of The Filipino People

Racially the inhabitants of the Philippines are among the most heterogeneous group in Southeast Asia. They are predominantly of Malayan origin but, due to oceanic migrations, possess Negrito, Indonesian, Hindu, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, American, and European blood. The islands, numbering over 7,000 though only about 400 are greater than one square mile, are widely dispersed over an area of more than 100,000 miles. They are centrally located in relation to the centuries old trade routes of the region and helps to explain their heterogeneity.

For most of this century conventional anthropological theory concerning Filipino origins held that several successive human migrations were responsible for populating the islands, and that clear evidence of those migrations survived to this century. According to this theory the first human beings to populate the Philippines were Paleolithic people who migrated 250,000 years ago over land bridges.<sup>1</sup> There are fossil remains of these early people but insufficient evidence exists to determine their forms of social organization. Among the artifacts recovered are crudely made hand axes indicating that economic life was directed by hunting and gathering. No cultural material exists

to indicate a tool tradition<sup>2</sup> nor is it clear whether they possessed a knowledge of fire.<sup>3</sup>

Among the second wave of people to arrive in the Philippines were the pygmies. They arrived about 25,000 to 30,000 years ago also via land bridges from the south. The pygmies, who seem to have survived as a homogenous group, and named "Negritos" by the Spaniards for their dark skin, also possessed a Paleolithic culture. They constructed no permanent habitations, had no organized government, no system of writing, no arts or sciences, and no system of education. Their religion centered around fetishism. Their system of subsistence centered around hunting game and gathering edible tubers and fruit. Their weapons consisted of the bow and arrow and the blowgun. Their clothing consisted of tree-bark and leaves, and their shelters were made up of grasses and tree branches.<sup>4</sup> The Negritos appear throughout the recorded history of the islands and remain culturally separate in the interior countryside on some of the larger islands of the archipelago to this day. Another Paleolithic culture to arrive over land bridges during the second wave were the "Proto-Malay" or "Short-Mongoloid" people. They entered the islands about 12,000 B.C. and their cultural systems were similar to those of the Negritos.<sup>5</sup>

From this point, corresponding to the passing of the most recent ice age and disappearance of land bridges, all further migrations came by sea. Next to arrive were Neolithic peoples who appeared in two waves: the first dating to about 5,000 B.C. and the second about 1,500 to 500 B.C.<sup>6</sup> These people originated in South China and Indo-China though they have also been classified as Indonesian.<sup>7</sup> Recent theory is

that they introduced a more complex culture and lived in grass covered houses with wooden frames, built above the ground or in the tops of trees, but archaeological evidence to support this hypothesis is nil.<sup>8</sup> They practiced dry agriculture and raised rice, taro, millet, yam, and other food crops. Eventually a subgroup of these peoples, identified as the rice-terrace building peoples of northern Luzon, introduced wet agricultural methods into the islands. Their clothing was made of highly decorated bark. They cooked food in bamboo tubes since they did not make pottery. Their implements consisted of stone axes, adzes, and chisels. Bows and arrows, spears, shields, and blowguns were their weapons. The dog was their only domesticated animal.<sup>9</sup> Dr. H. Otley Beyer, the scholar recognized as having fathered Filipino anthropology and who authored Philippine prehistoric migration theory, proposed that one other Neolithic people, called Papuan or Melanesian, drifted from the Pacific islands and settled along the entire east coast of the archipelago.<sup>10</sup>

After these neolithic peoples came several waves of immigrants classified by the archaeological traits associated with their artifacts. Among these are a group arriving from Indo-China between 800 and 500 B.C. who crossed the China Sea and travelled to northern Luzon. They are the people also associated with the rice-terrace builders. The next group arrived about 300 to 200 B.C. from Java or Sumatra and introduced an iron-using culture. A jar-burial people, originating in South China, arrived between 300 and 700 A.D.<sup>11</sup>, though an earlier date has been suggested for this last group.<sup>12</sup>

Recent anthropological and archaeological research finds no supportive evidence for the migration theory of Philippine origin. Much of the evidence for Dr. Beyer's theory relied upon the now discredited methods of race-typing in common use ninety years ago such as cranial measurement and ocular inspection. In addition, the theory assumes that the customs and communities of the immigrants remained homogenous over 2,000 years of history, an impossibility when we study the pattern of Asian migration during historical periods. Beyer's theory is also diffusionist in emphasis, excluding the possibility of indigenous inventiveness and ascribing all technological and societal developments to immigration. F. Landa Jocano, a Filipino anthropologist, recently proposed an alternative hypothesis crediting to the indigenous peoples those traits of development ascribed to the various waves of immigrants in Beyer's theory. Landa's theory, however, suffers from the opposite weakness of not taking into account the effects of migration.<sup>13</sup>

I believe that in looking over the whole of Filipino history, given the existing evidence, the answer lies somewhere between the two extremes. Human migration into the Philippines was probably constant over the entire prehistoric period. Clearly defined waves of immigrants may have entered the islands from time to time due to various calamities or human events. Considering the nature of Filipino settlement, as described by the Chinese and later the Spaniards, a steady trickle of a few individual family groups or small communities entered the islands over time and explains the majority of human migration. The existing community either accepted the immigrants and absorbed them and their customs or, if the immigrant population was sizable (by relative

standards) and displayed group cohesion, the existing community would be displaced.

We know that during historical times there have been continuous migrations of people from the other Southeast Asian islands and the sub-continent. As will be demonstrated in the next section, Hinduized Malays arrived in the archipelago from the Indian Pallava kingdom and its offshoots of the period. These people brought with them the Sanskrit and Hindu style of writing and customs. Further migrations into the islands occurred as a result of the colonizing efforts of the Champa, Sri-Visayan, and Madjapahit empires of Southeast Asia and Malaysia. The Islamic empires of Malacca and Borneo introduced Moslem settlements and influence into the islands.<sup>14</sup> Each new immigrant population was able to prevail over the previous residents because they brought with them better weaponry or societies containing more complex forms of social organization. Intermarriage then occurred between these people and with subsequent and concurrent immigrants from China, Japan, and Arabia. All these populations helped to create the Filipino people found by the Spaniards when they first arrived in 1521.<sup>15</sup>

#### Pre-Hispanic Philippine History

Knowledge about ancient Philippine history is limited since few artifacts have survived the elements, chance, the Spanish missionaries, and the recent depredations of amateur artifact collectors. However, there is sufficient historical information about several significant Asiatic kingdoms that exerted influence in the region prior to the 16th century. These kingdoms recorded economic and social intercourse with

the islands and, in some cases, exercised hegemony over them. As a result, current theory suggests that these empires played a significant role in Filipino cultural development.

From the 2d century A.D. to the 8th century A.D. the Pallava kingdom arose in eastern India around the mouth of the Penner River and expanded to Sri Lanka, southern India, the Malay Peninsula, Cambodia, Java, Sumatra, and other islands in Malaysia. When this kingdom declined new independent states arose such as the kingdoms of Champa and Cambodia, and the Hinduized Malay empires of Sri-Vishaya and Madjapahit.<sup>16</sup> The Champa, Sri-Vishayan, and Madjapahit empires exerted the most influence upon the Philippines until the arrival of the Spaniards.

It is not certain if Hindu influence first came from the Champa Empire (today the southern part of Annam in Vietnam) or the Sri-Vishayan Empire. The first known Hindu settlement was on the archipelago of Sulu, which lies between Borneo and Mindanao, sometime between the 9th and 12th centuries, A.D. The Suluans named the colonists the *Orang Dampuan*. They built several towns and made other improvements but relations with the native inhabitants remained strained. Finally, after a period of friction, the natives killed some of the colonists and a bloody war ensued. After killing as many of the native inhabitants as they could the *Orang Dampuan* burned their towns and withdrew from Sulu.<sup>17</sup>

*Orang Dampuan* literally translated means "Men of Dampa-land," however, when we consider that the d and ch are interchangeable in many Philippine dialects it is possible that *Orang Dampuan* meant "Men of

Champa." Assuming that the colonists were from Champa it seems likely that their main purpose was to establish a trading colony in Sulu as they had done elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Later, when the island came under Sri-Vishayan rule, Champa ships continued to trade there which seems to confirm that the earlier colonists were from that kingdom. An early Sulu manuscript indicates that in the century before the arrival of the Spaniards, from four hundred to five hundred junks arrived annually from Cambodia, Champa, and China. Historical evidence indicates that at the time Sulu was densely populated and one of the principle trading centers of the Philippine islands.<sup>18</sup>

The Sri-Vishayan Empire dominated Malaysia from the 8th century A.D. to 1377 A.D., its capital was located near the present site of Palembang, Sumatra.<sup>19</sup> It derived its name from a royal house in Indo-China from which its emperors claimed descent calling themselves the "Maharajah, King of the Mountains and Lord of the Isles."<sup>20</sup> This empire was Malayan racially, Hinduistic culturally, and Buddhist religiously. Considered a major center of Buddhist teaching and missionary activity, the Chinese pilgrim I Tsing spent seven years in the capital at the end of the 7th century.<sup>21</sup>

By 1180 A.D. the Sri-Vishayan empire controlled Sumatra, Sri Lanka, the Malay Peninsula, western Java, the Moluccas, Celebes, Borneo, the Philippines, and southern Formosa.<sup>22</sup> Their skills in navigation and sea-power played a large role in their success, this made apparent by their ability in the 11th century to conduct a long war with the Chola kingdom of southeastern India, and that for at least a century Ceylon paid tribute to them.<sup>23</sup> In addition, their geographical



position allowed them to control the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, the two main passages from the Indian Ocean to the China Sea. Booty from pirating vessels transiting along the rich Southeast Asian trade routes added to the empire's wealth.<sup>24</sup>

The point at which Sri-Vishayan influence extended to Borneo cannot be precisely determined. However, before the end of the 10th century they were established on both the west and south coasts of the island and were in fairly frequent communication with Sumatra. The number of colonies is unknown but four were of importance: Bandjarmasin, Sukadana, one in southern Sarawak, and Brunei. The first and last established outposts in the Philippines that may have pre-dated Sri-Vishayan hegemony.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, all Sri-Vishayan colonizing efforts into the Philippines originated from these two cities in Borneo<sup>26</sup>--Sulu from Bandjarmasin and the west-central Philippines from Brunei.<sup>27</sup> Wherever the colonists appeared they carried with them the name Visaya, or Bisaya, which we use to this day to describe the islands of the central Philippines and their inhabitants.

The Sulu traditional history is very specific regarding their Bandjarmasin roots. News of the famed richness of the pearl beds and other resources of Sulu had reached southern Borneo, probably through Champa and Chinese traders. They began to visit and trade with Sulu and soon decided to establish a colony there. The Suluans named these colonists the *Orang Bandjar*. After a period of precarious relations between the colonists and native inhabitants, not unlike that experienced during the *Orang Dampuan* occupation, the colonists secured a temporary peace by bringing from Bandjarmasin a princess, reputedly of

great beauty, who married Sulu's principal chief. The treaty of marriage made Sulu a tributary state to the Sri-Vishayan Empire through Bandjarmasin, and secured a permanent foothold for further expansion. Soon the coastal regions of the Sulu Archipelago consisted of a population derived from the surrounding islands--probably Borneo, Celebes and Mindanao, and perhaps Sumatra, Java, the Moluccas and Indo-China. This occurrence repeated a pattern noted throughout the history of the islands: colonists displacing the native inhabitants on the coasts and smaller islands. Sulu became a great trade center and ships from China, Cambodia, Sumatra, Java, and possibly India and Arabia frequented its harbors.<sup>28</sup>

The areas colonized by Brunei are not definitively known but the written records that have survived list Panay, Palawan, Mindoro, and southern Luzon. An ancient manuscript written in romanized Ilongo Visayan and discovered at Panay in 1858 gives a circumstantial, and possibly apocryphal, account of the settlement of the island by natives of Borneo.<sup>29</sup> The major facts it relates are as follows: In the year 1250 A.D.<sup>30</sup>, under the leadership of a *Datu Puti*, a fleet of ten vessels each commanded by a *datu* (a local chieftain) sailed from Brunei to the island of Palawan and then to Panay. The pilot of the fleet is said to have visited that island before and to have known the route--evidence of previous Bornean knowledge of the Philippines. The native inhabitants of the island at the time were known as *Atis* (possibly Indonesians) and, as the natives encountered on Sulu, were of dark complexion. They also possessed houses and domestic animals and practiced crude dry agriculture. Rule of the village was shared by a

*Datu* Marikudo and Queen Maniwangtiwan. The Borneans opened negotiations with these rulers for a place to establish their settlement. The negotiations resulted in Marikudo accepting a gold hat (*sadok*) and Maniwangtiwan a long gold necklace. In return the Atis agreed that *Datu Puti* and his followers could settle in any place that suited them on the island.<sup>31</sup> The Borneans chose the coast and Marikudo and his people moved inland and built another village. The Borneans burned the old *Atis* village and erected a new town under *Datu Puti's* direction.<sup>32</sup>

After the Borneans completed the new settlement, seven *datus* with their families and slaves settled there while *Datu Puti* and two others continued their voyage to southern Luzon. They appear to have sailed as far north as Lake Taal in southern Luzon, spending a month on the journey. Two *datus* settled there with their families and slaves, while *Datu Puti* returned to Borneo to tell of his discoveries.<sup>33</sup> The manuscript makes no further mention of *Datu Puti*. Regarding the Taal settlers it states only that some of their descendants removed to the land of the Bikol and five other places the names of which can no longer be determined.<sup>34</sup>

Interestingly, the personal and religious names of the Panayan colony mentioned in the manuscript are all Malayan or Indian and show no trace of Mohammedan influence. In addition, among religious practices it records certain forms of phallic worship. The colonists brought with them a form of syllabic writing, a well developed code of laws, weights and measures, and other characteristics of civilization, including metal-working and other crafts. Several *datus* founded settlements on other points on the coast and gradually extended their influence to the

entire island. They also established settlements in western Negros and some of the other islands to the north and northwest of Panay.<sup>35</sup>

The competitor with, and later successor to, the Sri-Vishaya Empire was the Madjapahit Empire. This kingdom was founded in Java in 1293 by a Raden Widjaya as a result of a palace coup among the Brahman colonies in eastern Java that the Sri-Visayan Empire was not able to conquer. The king of one of these colonies, Kartanagara, the fifth and last king of Singosari, in the year 1275 sent troops on an expedition to the west coast of Java against Sri-Visaya. This expedition penetrated as far as Menangkabau, and while failing to reach the Sri-Visayan capital, effectively destroyed its power.<sup>36</sup> During his army's absence Kartanagara was killed by a competing ruler. Widjaya, the son-in-law of Kartanagara, by deft maneuvering was able to gain the aid of Kublai Khan against the pretender to the throne. Once firmly in power he turned his forces against the Chinese, driving them from the Javan archipelago, though the Chinese seem to have left of their own accord after profiting from the Javan internal dispute.<sup>37</sup> After the departure of the Chinese Raden Widjaya had himself crowned the first king of Madjapahit in the autumn of 1293. One other matter is noteworthy: the war with the Chinese marked the first use of firearms in the region. This is probably why the Madjapahit Empire eventually extended so far. There are no accounts of the use of firearms in connection with the Sri-Visayan Empire but there is special mention of its use by the Madjapahit Empire.<sup>38</sup>

Seven rulers appear to have reigned in Madjapahit from 1294 until 1451. The greatest was the fourth--named Hayam Wuruk, or Sri

Rajasanagara--and it was during his mother's regency (1334-1350) and his reign (1350-1389) that the empire attained its greatest dimensions. By 1365 the empire extended across the entire Malay Archipelago, excepting only Sri-Visaya and one or two of its strongest and nearest colonies. In 1377 both Sri Visaya and Tumasik (the old Singapore) fell and were so utterly destroyed that no Malay for centuries would inhabit the area where they had stood.<sup>39</sup> The list of tributary states in 1365 between Java and the Philippines included: eighteen on Borneo, six each in Celebes and the Moluccas, one in the Talaut Islands to the south of Mindanao, and three within the Philippines themselves.<sup>40</sup> Remains from the Madjapahit empire exist in Formosa, western New Guinea, and traces of trading contact exist as far as the Marianas.<sup>41</sup>

The chief seat of power in Borneo was Bandjarmasin. After the capture and partial destruction of this former Sri-Vishayan colony, the city was rebuilt and made a viceroyalty; on at least one occasion the favorite son of the Madjapahit Emperor occupied this position. In the north, Brunei early came under Javan control--a force of Javanese soldiers was stationed there for a time and a Javanese princess married a local ruler.<sup>42</sup>

As under Sri-Vishaya, Borneo administered the Philippine colonies accomplishing this task from either Brunei or Bandjarmasin. In a pattern that was to be repeated by the Spaniards, the foreign possessions of the Madjapahit Empire were ruled by governors, who lived at favorable spots along the coast, under the title of "sea-lord" and had both troops and ships under their command. Their most important function seems to have been the export of products and the collection of

the tribute. A *mantri*, or "minister of the interior," supervised the collection of a tax from the inland population. The tax-collectors were often Brahman priests or monks because they knew how to deal tactfully with the people though they were forbidden to interfere with their beliefs. Only the Sivaite monks were permitted to preach Brahmanistic doctrines in those places where the faith had already spread to ensure there was no erosion in the base of believers. The empire restricted the movement of Buddhists, however, allowing them to travel to certain places solely for secular purposes.<sup>43</sup>

The three localities in the Philippines known to have been under Madjapahit sovereignty were Sulu, the region of Lake Lanao in Mindanao, and the vicinity of Manila Bay in Luzon. Because of the strong element of Hindu culture still found there in the beginning of the 20th century there also were probably colonies in the Pulangi and Agusan river valleys in Mindanao, in Palawan, Mindoro, and possibly several of the Vishayan islands. Many of the peoples in these regions still use the old Indian syllabic writing.<sup>44</sup> Sufficient evidence also exists to establish Bantuan as a Madjapahit colony. Gold mining was an important industry throughout the Agusan-Surigao area during the 14th century. A solid gold figure from this period was found in Agusan in 1917 and, though of local manufacture, is a Ngundjuk-type image common to Madjapahit communities.<sup>45</sup>

Soon the Madjapahit empire began to weaken. A civil war over the succession to the Madjapahit throne in 1389 weakened the empire. Chinese naval expeditions under the admiral Cheng Ho from 1405 to 1434 brought many of the empire's Malaysian colonies under the suzerainty of

the Ming Emperor of China. This eventually led to the overthrow of the Madjapahit empire by the Mohammedan Rajah Bonang who created the Mohammedan-Malay Empire of Malacca.<sup>46</sup>

Throughout the period of the Sri-Vishaya and Madjapahit empires significant relations also took place between the Philippines and China. Archeological relics found in the Philippines of the Sung and Yuan periods indicate early trade between China and the islands. The earliest contact is described in the T'ung tien, encyclopedia of the chronicler Tu Yu (735-812). In this account a land called *Chu-po*, believed to be Borneo, and two of its vassal states, *Chii-yen* and *Tan-lan*, conducted extensive trade with Funan (Southeast Asia). The two vassal states were believed to be settlements in the Philippines and establish a firm connection with Borneo.<sup>47</sup>

The dynastic annals also indicate direct trade with Luzon merchants as early as 982 A.D.<sup>48</sup> According to this account, a ship laden with valuable merchandise arrived in Canton from a place the Chinese called *Ma-i*. Significantly, the annals describe the traders as Moslem. If true, the entry supports the hypothesis that the alternate trade route around Champa spoken of in other documents of the time did exist and that this trade route went by way of the Philippine archipelago. In addition, the Moslem religion of the trader indicates that this route was one that stretched back to Arabia and probably into the Mediterranean area.<sup>49</sup>

As the Chinese began to become aware of the countries bordering them to the south, significant commerce took place between the islands and China. The name Luzon is probably Chinese in origin. The Chinese

habit of naming things, including places, in pairs makes it likely that *Lui-zong* was a Chinese place name given to match the name *Lui-kiu*, the latter given to the islands north of the archipelago.<sup>50</sup> Because of Chinese tales of ships lost at sea in powerful currents, not unlike the Greek legends of the Pillars of Heracles, the Filipinos probably initiated trade with China before the 7th century A.D. by direct contact<sup>51</sup> and, as demonstrated by the visit cited in the annals, through Moslem intermediaries.<sup>52</sup>

However, by the 12th century the Chinese began to outfit their own trading junks under the command of Arab pilots. Over time this aroused Chinese curiosity about the wealth of the various islands across the seas and soon inspired exploration and scholarly research. A customs collector by the name of Chau Ju-Kuan of Chinchew, the port in the Amov district later made famous by Marco Polo, obtained data about the Philippines and published his investigations sometime between 1209 and 1214. His geography combined western Luzon and the island of Mindoro into an island north of Borneo that he named *Mai*. This place name is amazingly similar to that described in the annals over two hundred years before. The opening description, now believed to refer to Manila, tells of a settlement of about a thousand families who occupied both banks of a river. The traders' ships anchored in front of the quarters of the chiefs and presented them with white silk parasols that seem to have been popular. This landing area became the marketplace and the Chinese allowed the Manilans to mix on board because they considered them to be scrupulously honest--a trait that was to be remarked upon in other chronicles. The trade was conducted through barter; the Manilans



offering yellow wax, cotton, pearls, tortoise shell, medicinal betel nuts, and native cloth, in return for porcelain, trade gold, iron censers, leads, colored glass beads, and iron needles.<sup>53</sup>

The geography of Chau Ju-Kuan also spoke of a country called *San hsu*: "the three islands"--*Ka-ma-yen*, *Pa-lao-yu*, and *Pa-ki-nung*. Contemporary authorities believe these to be the islands of Calamianes, Palawan, and Busuanga.<sup>54</sup> As in Manila, the geography states that each tribe had about a thousand families (which seems to be another way of saying that the settlements were large) and that they lived in wattle huts situated on commanding terrain that made access difficult. The Chinese geographer's informant also took note of the Negritos who, according to the geography, lived in the more remote valleys and nested in trees. He described them as small in stature, with round yellow eyes, curly hair, and teeth exposed by parted lips. They were described as being known for their cunning in attacking unwary wanderers and for their poisoned arrows.<sup>55</sup>

The people of the countryside did not inspire the same confidence in the Chinese as did those of the larger communities. The ships would anchor in midstream and none of the traders went ashore until the natives sent one or two hostages to the ship. These were to be retained until the trading was over. Drum beating announced their arrival and the local traders, carrying samples of raw cotton, cotton goods, beeswax, homemade cloth, and coconut heart mats, would race for the ship. In the case of a disagreement over prices the chiefs of the traders came in person. After the Chinese and Filipinos reached a mutually satisfactory settlement presents would be exchanged--silk

parasols and porcelain from the Chinese, and rattan baskets from the Filipinos.<sup>56</sup> The barter would then be concluded ashore. Three or four days was the usual stop in each place then the ships sailed to another anchorage, for each of the settlements was independent of its neighbors. The Chinese goods were porcelain, black damask, and other silks, beads of all colors, leaden sinkers for nets, and tin. Polilo, on the Pacific coast, was also, but less frequently, visited, to obtain two prized varieties of coral. Local customs and commercial usages were the same as elsewhere in the archipelago but, though the settlements were more populous, the coral was hard to come by and hence there was little trade. The coast too was dangerous, with the sea full of "bare ribs of rock with jagged tooth-like blasted trees, their points and edges sharper than swords or lances."<sup>57</sup>

The next important Chinese manuscript concerning the islands dates from 1349 and was written by a Wang Ta-yuan entitled "A Description of the Barbarians of the Isles" (*Tao-i-chih-liao*). This account of *Mai*, or Manila, credits the people with chaste and good customs. It describes that both men and women wore their hair done up in a knot and clothed themselves in a blue cotton shirt. Ta-yuan's account notes the arrival of Hindu influence by the description of a kind of suttee. Widows would shave their heads and lie fasting beside their husband's corpses for seven days. If still alive at the end of this period they could eat but were never permitted to remarry and many accompanied their husband's body into the flames of the funeral pyre. The region must have been populous because the account relates that,

upon the burial of a chief of renown, the natives entombed two or three thousand of his slaves with the body.<sup>58</sup>

Imports into the islands show more luxuries than described earlier by Ju-Kuan: red taffetas, ivory, and trade silver figuring into the list. The account, in mentioning Sulu, notes that the fields lost their fertility in the third year of cultivation--an indication that shifting agriculture was the farming method used. Sago, fish, shrimp, and shellfish made up the diet of these people who cut their hair, and wore black turbans and sarongs. Among occupations noted were boiling seawater for salt, making rum, and weaving. Dyewoods of middling quality, beeswax, tortoise-shell, and pearls, the last noted for being unsurpassed in roundness and whiteness, were their exports.<sup>59</sup>

Marking the decline of the Madjapahit empire, the first Filipino tribute embassy to China, according to the Ming Chronicles, was in 1372. The writer refers to these people as Luzon-men. The ruler of the Middle Kingdom in return sent an official to the king of Luzon with gifts of silk gauze embroidered in gold and colors. The Ming Chronicles also tell of a Malayan tribe named *P'ing-ka-shi-lan* who lived along the western and southern shores of the Lingayen Bay in Luzon. Because of the similarity of the name and the geographical location the people described are believed to be the Pangasinans.<sup>60</sup> In the early 15th century they evidently had a kingdom of their own, sending an embassy to China in 1406 and presenting the emperor a gift of horses, silver, and other objects and receiving in return paper money and silks. In 1408 another chief arrived, this time accompanied by an imposing retinue of two headmen from each village subject to his authority who were, in

turn, accompanied by a number of retainers. This time the imperial gifts were paper money for the sub-chiefs and for each hundred men six pieces of an open-work variegated silk used in making coats and linings.<sup>61</sup> The Pangasinans' last known embassy was in 1410.<sup>62</sup>

By the year 1405 the Chinese began quickly to bring the former Madjapahit colonies under Ming suzerainty. Emperor Yung-lo dispatched an official to Luzon that year to govern the country. In return a tribute party arrived in China from Luzon headed by a Ko-Ch'a-lao who brought products from his country, among which gold was prominent.<sup>63</sup> The source of this information does not specify the exact jurisdiction of the official but it is significant to note that the Chinese exercised a type of supremacy or at least claimed the right of protection over the islands. These actions of fealty were not uninfluenced by the Chinese fleet under the command of admiral Cheng Ho that visited Lingayen, Manila, Mindoro, and Sulu in 1406-07, 1408-10, and 1417 as well as Borneo, Java, Sumatra, and other islands in Southeast Asia, bringing each of them into the Chinese fold.<sup>64</sup> The Chinese fleet consisted of 62 large ships bearing 27,800 soldiers and the expedition roamed the Indian Ocean as far as the Arabian Gulf.<sup>65</sup>

Further evidence of Philippine vassalage to China during this period is the burial place, found in the Shantung province of China, of a sultan of Sulu who died on a visit to the Emperor Yung-lo in 1417. In the same year, Sulu's eastern, western, and village rajahs with their wives, children, and headmen all came to the Chinese court with tribute, and another mission from Sulu arrived in 1420.<sup>66</sup> The annals of the Ming (the *Ming-shih*) indicate that the Philippines paid tribute from

1372 to 1421. After 1421 the islands paid no more tribute as the Ming dynasty began to retreat from its overseas possessions back into its own borders.<sup>67</sup>

As the Chinese established control over many of the Madjapahit colonies from the north, a threat arose from Arabia through Malaysia, encouraged by China<sup>68</sup>, to complete the destruction of that empire. As noted earlier, from the 7th century onwards the Chinese provided the Arabs with Chinese junks. These vessels were large for the day and were manned by 150 to 200 men--the trading vessel that arrived in Canton in 982 A.D. may have been one of these. By the 10th century the Arabs established themselves as traders in several ports in Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the Philippines. Small Moslem states appeared in Sumatra by 1250.<sup>69</sup> About the mid-14th century an Arabian scholar from Mecca, by the name of Mukdum, reached Malacca and converted the people to Islam. He continued on to Sulu, where he landed in 1380, and continued to convert the natives to Islam.<sup>70</sup>

Shortly after the arrival of this and other Islamic missionaries, Islamic armies began a conquest of the islands of Southeast Asia. These missionaries and armies gained prestige and strength from Tamerlane's victories in India who used peaceful means alternately with force. The Indian impetus helps explain the success of the spread of Islam elsewhere in Southeast Asia since it was a Hinduized Islam that the natives acceded to readily.<sup>71</sup> In 1390 Rajah Baguinda, the Islamic prince of the kingdom of Menangkabaw, Sumatra, led an army to Sulu. Upon his arrival he met hostility from the existing Islamic rulers and, as had the Madjapahit before him, used firearms to great effect in

overcoming the resistance.<sup>72</sup> After peacefully concluding relations with the native rulers, Baguinda replaced their somewhat informal state Mohammedanism with a formal Islamic dynasty.<sup>73</sup>

The Ming dynasty began a slow withdrawal from Southeast Asia after 1435<sup>74</sup> that quickened the pace of the Islamic conquest and consolidation throughout the region, including the Philippines. This trend also received impetus from the Sayyids of southern Arabia, who claimed descent from Mohammed's daughter Fatima, and introduced an evangelical form of Islam into Asia.<sup>75</sup> In 1450, Abu Bakr, an Islamic leader from Johore, arrived at Sulu and married Rajah Baguinda's daughter, Princess Paramisuli. After Baguinda's death he assumed the title of Sultan, remodeled the government into a traditional Arabian sultanate and brought the local customs more strictly in line with Koranic law. He ruled for thirty years, dying in 1480. Sulu would be used as a base for further Islamic conversions throughout the archipelago. Sharif Kabungsuwan, the Moslem leader of Johore, invaded Mindanao. He landed on the islands in 1475 and quickly conquered and converted the populace making himself the first Sultan of Mindanao. Islam continued to spread throughout the islands but, as will be demonstrated, received impetus from two different sources.<sup>76</sup>

By 1478 Madjapahit itself succumbed to the Islamic armies of Rajah Bonang.<sup>77</sup> Thus was born the short-lived Mohammedan-Malay Empire of Malacca. At the height of its power it controlled the former Chinese colonies in Malaysia, Borneo, Sulu, Mindanao, the Moluccas, the north coast of Java, and much of Sumatra.<sup>78</sup> It also controlled the spice trade to Europe and most of the intra-Asian trade. At this point,

however, the Portuguese arrived in Asia. The Malaccans, already hard pressed by competition from the kingdom of Siam, succumbed to the Portuguese invasion in 1511.<sup>79</sup>

As the Portuguese went about the systematic destruction of the Mohammedan-Malay Empire, interest in the Philippines would come from two more directions before the arrival of the Spaniards. Located close to the Philippines, the Islamic Sultanate of Brunei became a small empire in its own right. About the middle of the 15th century a Visayan was king of Brunei. His name was Alak ber Tala, later to be called Sultan Mohammed. He introduced Arabic doctrines into his kingdom and the use of Arabic writing made his reign the beginning of Brunei's local recorded history. His great grand nephew, Nadoka Ragam, became the fifth Sultan of Brunei and was able to extend the influence of his kingdom as the power of Malacca waned during the period 1480-1520 A.D. Ragam was able to bring all of Borneo, Sulu, Palawan, Mindoro, south and central Luzon, parts of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao, and the Moluccan archipelago under his control. As we have seen, the colonizing efforts of the Sri-Vishayan empire were made by way of their cities on Borneo, among these was Brunei. The ties between Brunei and their Philippine dependencies were maintained throughout the Madjapahit, Chinese, and Islamic periods. When the Portuguese arrived in the Moluccas, and the Spaniards in the Philippines, the Brunei Sultanate was their most influential rival in the region.<sup>80</sup>

Tome' Pires, a Genoese pilot who travelled to the Orient during this period, wrote a geography about the region. In his book appears the first written European reference to the Philippine archipelago.

Referred to as the Lucoes, a name believed to derive from the island of Luzon, he relates details of the islands in connection with Borneo:

The Lucoes are about ten days' sail beyond Borneo. They are nearly all heathen; they have no king, but they are ruled by groups of elders. They are a robust people, little thought of in Malacca. They have two or three junks, at the most. They take the merchandise to Borneo and from there they come to Malacca.

The Borneans go to the lands of the Lucoes to buy gold, and foodstuffs as well, and the gold which they bring to Malacca is from the Lucoes and from the surrounding islands which are countless; and they all have more or less trade with one another. And the gold of these islands where they trade is of a low quality--indeed very low quality.

The Lucoes have in their country plenty of foodstuffs, and wax and honey; and they take the same merchandise from here as the Borneans take. They are almost one people; and in Malacca there is no division between them. They never used to be in Malacca as they are now; but the Tomunguo whom the Governor of India appointed here was already beginning to gather many of them together, and they were already building many houses and shops.<sup>81</sup> They are a useful people; they are hard working.

The passage above is informative in two ways. The previous section of this chapter discussed the various human migrations to the islands. However, we see that at the same time the Filipinos also migrated westward to many of the islands of Southeast Asia, in this case Malacca. Also illustrative is the Bornean connection to the islands. Pires specifies that trade to Malacca came by way of Borneo, supporting the contention that Borneo was the main organizing force in the islands at that time.

The other power interested in extending influence over the archipelago was Japan. One of the ancient texts of Japan, the *Nihon Shoki*, relates that in 654 A.D. two men and women of the country of *Tokwara* and a woman from *Sae* were shipwrecked at Kyushu. Some Japanese



writers believe that *Tokwara* is the Philippines. In any event the Japanese, either through further visits by Filipinos or other traders, learned of the existence of the Philippines. They attempted to invade the islands in 1540 but failed. In about 1560 Japanese pirates made an attempt to sack Manila but the Filipinos repulsed this threat also. After the arrival of the Spaniards Japanese interest continued. Juan de Salcedo, one of the Spanish conquistadors, fought with three piratical Japanese ships in 1572 off the coast of Pangasinan and in 1582 the Spanish Governor-General Ronquillo (1580-83) sent an expedition to drive a Japanese settlement from the Cagayan Valley of Luzon. The Spaniards also found Japanese settlements in the islands when they arrived in Manila.<sup>82</sup>

This survey of the pre-Spanish period in the Philippines and Southeast Asia illustrates that throughout their history the islands were not a unified culture or civilization but a collection of independent or loosely affiliated coastal city states each under the rule of a chieftain. When one or another of these communities fell under the suzerainty of the empires that from time to time held sway over the region, the main interest seemed to have been the payment of tribute and the maintenance of trade; religious conversion being of secondary importance. The cities under the suzerainty of one or another power represented a small number of settlements, and hence, a small percentage of the population of the islands, as the invading powers chose only the richest and most populace communities for conquest or affiliation. Upon the eve of the Spanish arrival in the islands the Portuguese had smashed the Mohammedan-Malayan Empire of Malacca and the

weaker power of Brunei held influence over these semi-autonomous communities.

### Pre-Hispanic Filipino Culture

In reconstructing pre-Spanish Filipino culture we must keep in mind that most of the information we have in this regard comes down to us in journals, letters, memoirs, and histories of the Spaniards and other western visitors. Few Filipino sources from this period exist. Consequently, the Spaniards and others interpreted what they saw through the lenses of western culture and evangelical Christianity. Many of the indigenous cultural traits observed during the early colonial period were given a Spanish, Western, or Christian bent. The chroniclers saw similarities between Spanish social institutions and those of the natives where none existed, falling prey to the pitfalls of wishful thinking and cultural chauvinism. This misinterpretation was particularly prevalent in the Spanish observations concerning Filipino social stratification and religious beliefs. Many 20th century scholars accepted these misinterpretations and passed them on as historical fact until recent archaeological and anthropological evidence challenged them. Painting an accurate portrait of pre-Spanish Filipino culture is important if we are to answer the central question of this thesis and in understanding Filipino society today.

Pre-Spanish Filipinos lived in small scattered communities called *barangays*.<sup>83</sup> The term *barangay* is similar to the Malay term for boat

(*balanguay*) and is, according to current theory, derived from the conveyance that carried the settlers to the islands.<sup>84</sup> The people located the *barangays* near the sea, rivers, lakes, and off-shore islands. They selected these places for their proximity to the native sources of food, which included fish, shrimp, eels, and shellfish.<sup>85</sup>

The *barangay* was also the basic unit of social organization and usually consisted of from thirty to one hundred families.<sup>86</sup> These settlements were usually lineal, compact communities being extremely rare. In the near-coast and interior regions where wet-rice agriculture formed the mainstay of economic life, some nucleated communities were found on small hills and promontories that had no agricultural value. The majority of the population was widely dispersed, the community nucleation we see now having occurred primarily during Spanish times through the missionary work of the friars.<sup>87</sup> A few sizeable nucleated communities of up to 2,000 people were found near the mouths of big rivers and around bays. These later became major trading centers with more developed political organizations (e.g. Manila, Vigan, Butuan, Cebu, Jolo), a growth due initially to the activities of the southeast Asian empires, the Arabs, and the Chinese.<sup>88</sup>

Leadership in the group was assumed by the oldest, wisest, bravest, strongest, or wealthiest man in the community called the *datu*. In many cases this position could be inherited.<sup>89</sup> A group of elders or nobles usually assisted this leader. They met to settle disputes, as in the case of divorce, aggression, or violence.<sup>90</sup> Despite the civic duties involved, this structure of leadership was social rather than political in nature.

These communities were usually separate and independent social, political, and economic entities. Temporary community alliances were formed by marriage<sup>91</sup> and through the ritual of the "blood-compact" called *kasikai* or *sangdugo* among the families of the *datos*. They accomplished this last ritual by the persons involved cutting their arms or breasts and mixing their blood with water in a cup. They would both drink from the cup thereby becoming "blood brothers."<sup>92</sup>

Social rather than geographical isolation divided communities, even those in close physical proximity.<sup>93</sup> A principle factor accounting for this isolation was that the Filipinos, as in many prehistoric groups today, based their social organization primarily upon kinship ties. The kinship organization was bilaterally structured equally among maternal and paternal lines, uniformly stratified, and traditionally rooted.<sup>94</sup> There were no clans, tribes or similar unilateral groupings.<sup>95</sup> The only evidence of inter-*barangay* confederations was a superficial one among the few coastal cities that traded regularly with Islamic Borneo.<sup>96</sup> Similarity of customs, language, and racial characteristics solely defined tribal groupings. So highly dispersed and variable were these that at the entry of the Spaniards there were at least 87 dialects or languages in the Philippines. The principle languages were Tagalog, Bisaya, Iloko, Bikol, Pampangan, Ifugao, Ibanag, Moro Magindanaw, and Zambal. All of these were, in large part, derived from the Malayo-Polynesian language family.<sup>97</sup>

The basic unit of kinship was the elementary family instituted by marriage, consisting of the father, mother, and the child or children.

The extended bilateral family included the consanguineous relatives of both the mother and father.<sup>98</sup> Genealogical recognition reached to the third ascending generation. Before this level ancestors were either forgotten or associated with deified spirits.<sup>99</sup>

The size and range of the bilaterally extended family was of great importance in order to provide strength and security. The people employed blood pacts and ritually-sanctioned "kinship agreements" to extend lateral relationships similar to the *compadre* system practiced today throughout the islands. This priority of kin-relations over all other forms of social organization led to frequent vendettas between families and kin-groups of different communities that involved head-taking--a practice supported by archeological evidence and early historical records.<sup>100</sup> The family and kin-group assumed collective responsibility for the acts of its members; an offense against one member was an offense against all. A person's self-esteem was always a concern of another, particularly that of a non-relative. To bridge this social distance customs of polite behavior, speech, generosity, and hospitality developed.<sup>101</sup> When a person met another on the road of the same social position each removed his *putong*, a turban-like cloth wrapping, as a courtesy. When a person addressed a superior he took off his *putong*, threw it over his left shoulder, and bowed.<sup>102</sup>

As a result of these characteristics centering on familial relations, it is difficult to define the nature of inter-*barangay* relations. The Western concepts of war and peace do not exactly apply since communities that may have been ostensibly at peace with one

another also may have been in conflict on the kin-group level due to active vendettas.<sup>103</sup>

These societies were further structured by generations and relationships were ordered on the principle of generational respect--the younger individual always showing deference in speech and behavior to the older person. A younger person or one of an inferior social class always addressed his superior in the third person.<sup>104</sup>

In many ways women were the equals of men in Filipino society. Aside from the bilateral nature of figuring kinship, other indications of relative equality are that women could own and inherit property, and engage in trade and industry. If they were the only survivor of a *datu* they could succeed to the throne of the *barangay*. Upon becoming mothers they were the one to name the child.<sup>105</sup> However, in sexual relations the place of the woman was inferior to the man. For example, in marriage, man's demand-privileges were primarily sexual.<sup>106</sup> Laws and customs reflected this tradition and tolerated adultery as long as the guilty party could pay gold to the injured party. Sexual crimes such as concubinage, rape, and incest were not severely punished unless committed by a man of lower rank upon a woman of higher social rank.<sup>107</sup>

The Filipino societies practiced monogamy except in the case of the Moslems who resided in the southern islands and in the Visayan islands of Samar, Leyte, and Cebu in the central Philippines. In the latter case men of means could have as many wives as they could support but the first wife was the primary, legitimate spouse (the *asawa*).<sup>108</sup>

Marriages were usually arranged between parents and involved protracted and elaborate gift-giving. This latter custom is referred to as the "bride-price."<sup>109</sup> During courtship the young man may have been required to render personal services to the woman's family or his kin-folk to provide a sum of gold or other gifts. The bride-price was called *bigaykaya* by the Tagalogs, *bugay* by the Visayans, and *sab-ong* by the Ilocanos. The bride-price consisted of anything of value including slaves, land, or animals. In addition there were several special types of gifts that, according to custom, would be paid: the *panghimuyat*, a sum of money equal to one-fifth of the total value of the gifts paid to the mother of the young woman for all of the sleepless nights she had endured rearing her child; the *bigaysuso*, paid to the wet-nurse for the use of her milk; the *himarao*, paid to the bride's parents as compensation for the feeding of the young woman in infancy; and, in Zambal, the *sambon*, which were petty gifts paid to the bride's relatives.<sup>110</sup>

The part of the bride-price that required the young man to work for a period gratis in his future father-in-law's house provided many opportunities for the young couple to indulge in premarital sexual relations. That a marriage was not normally recognized until a child was born lends credence to the speculation that the ceremonial formalities of marriage may have taken place only after the young woman gave evidence of her abilities to become a mother. As a result of the importance placed on child bearing, divorce was probably common until a child was born to the couple.<sup>111</sup>

Relationships between husband and wife were remarkably equalitarian. This was due to the bilateral character of the family and the strong blood ties maintained after marriage. The property that a spouse brought to marriage remained an individual possession. If a divorce occurred, the couple divided only conjugally acquired possessions.<sup>112</sup> The community granted a divorce for adultery on the part of the wife, desertion on the part of the husband, loss of affection, cruelty, insanity, and childlessness. If the husband was at fault then the bride-price would be forfeited; if the wife's fault then the bride-price must be returned. If the couple remarried a new bride-price had to be given as if it were a new marriage.<sup>113</sup> The true purpose of the bride-price has never been adequately established but probably the gifts received by a family through the marriage of a daughter would be used to pay the bride-price for the marriage of a son. As a result, the kinfolk of both spouses acquired an interest in their good behavior and the stability of the marriage.<sup>114</sup>

Depending upon the local custom, homes were built of bamboo, wood, and nipa-palm. Many were situated above the ground on stilts and in tree-tops.<sup>115</sup> Most boats of the Filipino societies were small fishing vessels, the trading junks and large war-vessels accommodating one hundred rowers on each side reported by early Europeans were limited to the large communities having ties with the societies in Borneo, China, and Malacca. There were no community structures built of non-perishable materials, such as buildings for religious and political purposes providing further evidence of the absence of higher levels of



social and political development and the result of the widespread practice of subsistence cultivation.<sup>116</sup>

The husband, wife, and older children shared in the labor of extracting a living from the land. They were a people living on a subsistence level within a tolerant and productive environment.<sup>117</sup> Economic activities were highly diversified and included hunting, gathering, farming, and fishing. Though specialists existed--smiths, potters, midwives, traders, religious functionaries--they were not free of daily economic pursuits. Cooperative labor was common. Families cleared fields, planted, harvested, built houses, and hunted with the aid of neighbors and kinsmen, providing, in return, feasts and drinking.<sup>118</sup>

As noted, the interior societies practiced community ownership of land and cooperative labor. Mountain slopes and less arable land was usually the property of the *barangay*. The building of irrigation ditches and water canals were a community responsibility. The size and scope of some of these cooperative ventures were enormous. The famous rice-terraces of the Ifugaos in northern Luzon, first seen upon the arrival of the Spaniards and still in existence, extends thousands of miles around the mountains of the region.<sup>119</sup>

Depending upon the terrain, the Filipinos practiced wet-rice cultivation (*sawah*), and a highly adaptive combination of shifting slash-and-burn and dry agricultural methods (*swidden*).<sup>120</sup> Rice was the staple crop and cooked in pots and bamboo tubes.<sup>121</sup> The major crops of the house-lot gardens and nearby fields were gabi, a number of species of yams, and bananas. This last was a major daily food. Others

were Indian millet and Job's-tear. Most, however, were gathered from nearby streams. Among the fruit trees were a number of citrus, the santol, the mango, the rimas, and the related jackfruit, the lanzones, and a few other indigenous types. Of greater importance to daily economic life were several species of cultivated bamboos, used in all aspects of daily life, and the palms, the betel nut, buri, and the coconut. They made intoxicants from rice, sugar cane, and from the nipa and coconut palms.<sup>122</sup> Indigo, cotton, rami, and hemp were items of foreign trade, as well as for local use.<sup>123</sup>

Animals domesticated for family consumption, ritual purposes, and trade included pigs, chickens, dogs, and carabaos.<sup>124</sup> As noted earlier, fishing was an important activity as indicated by the location of the *barangays* near bodies of water. Early accounts from China and the Portuguese indicate that both fish and pearl farming were practiced, the latter for trade.<sup>125</sup>

The early Filipinos had a tremendous knowledge of wild plants and made use of them in their daily larder, and as medicines, clothing, cordage, construction materials, household utensils, weapons and ornaments. In addition, they exchanged forest products such as gums, rattan, honey, wax, and ornamental woods with foreign traders for cloth, porcelains and stoneware, and metals.<sup>126</sup> Mining was also an early industry; gold having been reported to be throughout the islands.<sup>127</sup>

There were no community or public markets except perhaps in the extreme south. Particular communities, however, specialized in the production of specific material objects--pottery; tools, utensils, and ornaments of metal; wooden objects, mats, baskets, and hats; and sea

products, such as salt and dried fish. Individual traders distributed these products. While trading in distant communities they were protected by "blood compacts." Thus, blood compacts were not only useful for inter-*barangay* and familial alliances but also as "trading pacts."<sup>128</sup> The movement of people cross-country was up and down the rivers and on trails that paralleled the river valleys.<sup>129</sup> Along the coasts people usually travelled by watercraft. Hauling was accomplished by rafts, sleds, and perhaps, carabao since they had no knowledge of wheeled vehicles.<sup>130</sup> This restriction in movement further contributed to barangic isolation.

Class within the *barangay* was stratified into four levels.<sup>131</sup> The *datu*, as already noted, was the chieftain of the community. Early Spanish writers portrayed this person as the absolute monarch of the community and, sometimes, of an entire region. In contradiction of the Spanish interpretation, sufficient evidence exists that suggests the *datu*, with perhaps the exception of some of the Moslem-influenced *barangays*, was a limited chieftain who ruled solely through the cooperation of the other community elders and advisors. First, the *datu's* power was limited by a body of barangic custom and law. Secondly, while the *datu* was the head of the most influential family of the *barangay*, the other elders and advisors were the heads of other major barangic families in their own right.<sup>132</sup> Considering the kin-group orientation of the Filipinos the *datu's* hold on his position was tentative at best. Finally, in addition to fulfilling his executive, judicial, and military responsibilities, the *datu* was expected to farm and make cloth as did all other members of the

community. This last fact, taken with what we know of other aspects of barangic culture, such as the absence of personal monuments, is indicative of the absence of an elite ruling class living off the labors of other members of the community.<sup>133</sup>

Below the *datu* there were the other principal families (perhaps a type of nobility), the freemen, and a dependent class that the early Spaniards referred to as *esclavitud* or slaves. The nobles served the *datu* as warriors and were the class that provided his counselors. These families may have been blood relations of the *datu* or given their position through blood-compact with the *datu*. They would voluntarily perform labor for the *datu* in return for feasting and drinking as has already been noted for other incidences of cooperative labor.<sup>134</sup>

Below the nobles were the freemen, probably the lesser members of the principal families, called *maharlikas* in Tagalog (though sometimes this term also refers to the nobles), *timaguas* in the Visayas, and *timmauas* in Ilocanos. They possessed none of the privileges of the *datu* or nobles and none of the obligations of the dependent class. The members of the lowermost class went by various names. They were called *aliping* by the Tagalogs, *oripuen* by the Visayans, *adipuen* by the Ilocanos, and *oripon* by the Bikols.<sup>135</sup>

Among the Tagalogs there were two sub-levels within the dependent class: the *aliping namamahay* and the *aliping saguigulid*. The first group was obliged to pay their superior one half of the products of their cultivated lands; row his boat whenever he sailed; aid him in the building of his house; and perform, without pay, various household duties. Of every four working days one was required to be spent in

service to the master and if this obligation was neglected, custom required the offender to make payment of ten measures of rice. The wives of the *aliping namamahay* class were obliged to spin cotton for the master one half of the month while the other half of the month could be spent on their needs. The latter group, the *aliping saguiguilid*, most closely approached the western concept of chattel slavery. They did not own houses or property, could not marry without seeking consent from their superior, and, unlike the *aliping namamahay*, could be sold.<sup>136</sup>

The Visayans also had a dependent class but their obligations do not seem to have been as expansive nor their rights as restricted as under the Tagalog system. It consisted of three sub-levels: the *tumataban*, the *tumaranpuh*, and *ayuey*.<sup>137</sup> The first group, the *tumataban*, did not perform household duties for their superior but brought him a present whenever he had a feast and provided a part of the beverages. They worked for him five days a month or paid him five measures of rice at the end of the year. The wives of the *tumataban* spun a skein of cloth every month from cotton furnished by the master. At the death of the *tumataban* the superior was an heir of their estates along with their children. The second group, the *tumaranpuh*, worked one day out of every four for their superior, while the last group, the *ayuey*, three days out of four. In addition, the *ayuey* could not contract matrimony without their superior's consent but, unlike the *aliping saguiguilid* of the Tagalogs, they could own and dispose of property.<sup>138</sup>

A large proportion of the *barangay* population fell into the dependent class. Many judicial sentences among the Filipinos took the

form of fines. Those unable to pay the fine or secure a loan, payable at the end of the harvest season at 100 percent interest, would be consigned to the dependent class. In addition to debtors, captives from raids on neighboring *barangays*, and those convicted of serious offenses contributed to the swelling ranks of these classes.<sup>139</sup> Descriptions of trade in slaves throughout the Southeast Asian region is recorded by early European chroniclers and by the Chinese, no doubt also contributing both to the size of this class and to the racial heterogeneity of the islands.

The social class of an individual was hereditary. Among the dependent class, descendants were classified by the proportion of each sub-group in their lineage. Those considered fully a part of a group were the descendants of parents, both of whom were members of that group, half-freemen were the descendants of one free and one dependent parent, and quarter-freemen were the descendants of one free and one half-dependent parent. So complex was this subdivision that one individual was frequently responsible for providing services to several superiors. Despite the Brahmanistic characteristics of this pre-Hispanic social structure, an individual could emancipate himself and become a *maharlika*. This could be accomplished through purchase, marriage, and the voluntary action of the master. In the first case, which was available only to part-dependents, the individual would pay a set price to obtain his freedom. The price of manumission for a Visayan *tumaranpuh* at the time of the Spanish arrival was equivalent to about twelve Spanish pesos. The second option would be for a couple made up of one free and one dependent parent to designate half their children

dependent and half free instead of granting them all partial free status as described earlier. In the last case, a superior could decide to grant freedom depending upon the custom of the community.<sup>140</sup>

Recent scholars have suggested that the Spanish characterization of the dependent class as slaves is misleading and inaccurate, suggesting that the system has more in common with sharecropping and debt peonage than chattel slavery, lacking much of the harshness and brutality of European slavery. Mention is made of the consanguineous links that arose in many instances between master and dependent to illustrate these differences.<sup>141</sup> However, those who lived under systems of sharecropping and debt peonage might argue that the difference in the nature of their servitude from slavery was only of type, degree, or semantics. In addition, one must question whether consanguineous links were established with the voluntary consent of the dependent persons. Certainly the use of the dependent class in funeral customs, alluded to in the last section and which shall be described in greater detail, indicates a brutality characteristic of systems of slavery.

That this institution had uniquely Asian-Filipino characteristics making it significantly different from the chattel slavery practiced in the West cannot be denied. Most significant, I believe, are the differences noted earlier between the dependency classes in Luzon among the Tagalogs as compared to the Visayas. The Tagalogs at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, as we noted in the previous section of this chapter, were united into a loose confederation with Islamic Borneo. Thus, the systems of dependency noted by the early Spaniards

were probably not only atypical of most pre-Hispanic Filipino communities but also largely limited to those large coastal *barangays* influenced by the Arabs and Chinese. In fact, most of the early Spanish chroniclers limit themselves to describing practices in the larger settlements, thus unintentionally skewing our impressions of those societies should we restrict ourselves to their presentation of the historical evidence.

In addition to the social and economic differences engendered by the growth of dependency, wealth distinctions also arose among freedmen and nobles, particularly among the wet-rice agriculturalists, which led to the formation of amorphous and mobile social classes. The support groups for the wealthy man in these societies consisted of his kinship group and the societal leaders. Though power ultimately evolved from force--the bolo or the spear--leaders usually maintained their position by sharing their wealth. This was usually accomplished by giving ritual-feasts for kinsmen and followers, as well as for their gods and spirits, in which the consumption of meat and intoxicants such as rice wine, played an important role. Because of the subsistence nature of their farming methods, the Filipino people normally used the pig, the chicken, the dog, and the carabao solely as ceremonial animals; to be consumed only during rituals and festivals, not as a daily source of food.<sup>142</sup>

The *datu*, with the consent of the *barangay* elders, established the laws of the early Filipino societies.<sup>143</sup> As with present day prehistoric cultures, they established most laws through oral tradition, having kept no civil records and confining the use of their writing to



religious and cultural expression.<sup>144</sup> The larger, more highly developed cultures, however, recorded their laws. Most of these written records have been lost with the exception of the Sumakwel Code, written in 1250 A.D. by the *Datu* Sumakwel, one of the Bornean *datu*s who colonized Panay; the penal code of Rajah Kalantiaw of Panay, written in 1433 A.D. and submitted to his overlord Rajah Besar; and the Moro laws of Mindanao and Sulu.<sup>145</sup> Crimes specified in these codes fell into the categories of serious and minor offenses.<sup>146</sup> They reflect a combination of traditional societal values overlaid with "colonial" Bornean and Moslem influences.<sup>147</sup>

The settlement of legal cases or disputes demonstrated the rudimentary stage of societal development of the various societies. As noted earlier, the *datu* sitting as judge and the *barangay* elders sitting as jury settled these cases. Cases between *datu*s or members of different *barangays* were usually determined by arbitration, with *datu*s and elders of other *barangays* acting as the arbiters, thereby avoiding war. Trials were held openly and cases made verbally by the plaintiff, the defendant, and their kin-groups.<sup>148</sup> After the presentation of proofs the judge and jury decided the verdict. In criminal cases, if there was doubt about the guilt or innocence of the party, the community availed itself of various types of trial by ordeal.<sup>149</sup>

The religious practices of the natives were of much interest to the early Spaniards. There were various religious practices described throughout the islands. Generally it appears that the majority of the islanders believed in some sort of supreme god known by different names between different communities.<sup>150</sup> A document of anonymous authorship

concerning the conquest of Luzon written in Manila on April 20, 1572, and entitled the "Conquista de la Isla de Luzon" relates:

. . . they (the natives) call God Batala, and the chief Idol which is thus named; but others call him Diobata, at least among the Pintados (Visayans) they give him this name. The natives of this island (Luzon) usually call him Batala and consider him God of all creation.<sup>151</sup>

Thirty years later, in his chronicle of the Philippines published in 1604, the Jesuit priest Chirino stated that among their gods the natives:

. . . set up one as the chief and superior to all. This deity the Tagalogs call 'Batala Mei kapal', which means "God the Creator or maker; the Bisayans call him 'Laon', a name which denotes antiquity.<sup>152</sup>

In all of these cases the Spaniards describe the early Filipinos' beliefs concerning a supreme being similar to their own and those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. This is natural enough given the concepts of "supreme god" and "creator" communicated by the natives. However, the Spaniards refused to recognize the significance of the multiple uses of this and other terms to describe natural events that the natives could not explain. Among the Tagalog societies, as it related to the name *Bathala*, this described a bird, comets and other heavenly bodies, and any other occurrences they believed foretold future events.<sup>153</sup>

As noted in the previous section of this chapter, the introduction of Hinduism, Brahmanism, and a Hinduized Islam into Southeast Asia came through India, Malaya, and then, presumably, into the Philippines. Strong linguistic evidence exists that tends to confirm this contention. With the exception of the Igorots of the northern extremity of Luzon, significant Sanskrit and some Hindu influences, which includes the term *Bathala*, appear throughout the

recorded religious vocabulary of the native societies from the period of the Spanish occupation.<sup>154</sup> Consequently, the religion of the pre-Hispanic Filipino societies, rather than being strictly monotheistic, was a synthesis of monotheistic, polytheistic, and animistic influences accepted from a multiplicity of sources--a strategy that tended to reduce conflict in a kinship-based society.

Islamic influence in Luzon and elsewhere, with the exception of the southern islands and Mindanao, was superficial, and only recently introduced at the time of the Spanish conquest. The author of the "Conquista" confirms this. He relates:

. . . they do not know or understand the law of Mohammed--only in some of the villages on the seacoast they do not eat pork, and this for the reason that they have had dealings with the Moros of Borneo . . .<sup>155</sup>

This same author later goes on to remark, "if one asks them who Mohammed was and what his law commands, they say they do not know . . ."<sup>156</sup> The former statement is enlightening in its observation of a dilution or absence of Islamic customs as one travelled into the interior. The latter observation may simply have described a very polite people dealing with a very rude question or an intimidated people replying to an invader they know to be hostile to Islamic custom. In all probability, however, the writer of the "Conquista" is accurate in this observation since the Islamic natives of the southern islands, as I shall illustrate, did not deny their beliefs and successfully resisted conversion to Christianity and Spanish rule.

Unlike western tradition, religion was so interwoven with the daily lives of the natives that it is difficult to distinguish what was

social and what religious. The Filipinos practiced elaborate rituals in connection with planting, harvesting, traveling, and many other daily pursuits. The *baylans* (priests and priestesses) performed all community religious ceremonies. Elderly women most commonly held these positions, the few men practicing this function usually being transvestites. The people believed they possessed extraordinary powers, among these to cure illness, speak with the spirits, and provide protection through charms and amulets.<sup>157</sup> They also interpreted omens, auguries, and dreams connected with any of the auspicious occasions of the community. Generally being aware and sensitive persons they solved many of the social and psychological problems of the community members. Thus ritual beliefs and societal values were closely intertwined.<sup>158</sup> The Filipinos' belief in the *baylans* to be people possessing benevolent powers predisposed a belief that malevolent beings--sorcerers and witches--existed. These usually took the forms of animals and caused the death of their victims.<sup>159</sup>

In addition to *Bathala* were a plurality of gods and goddesses. The Tagalogs had a god of love and generations and a god of agriculture; the Visayans a Charon who ferried souls to the netherworld, a god of death, a goddess of fire and the harvest, a pair of gods of the underworld, and a rainbow god; the Bagobos had a war god as did the Pangasinans; the Zambals a god of power and strength; the Tagbanuas a god of the sea; and the Suluans a fire god.<sup>160</sup>

Below the gods were various spirits called *anitos* or *diwatas*. Good *anitos* were the spirits of dead relatives while bad *anitos* were the spirits of enemies.<sup>161</sup> There were also different *anitos* for different

purposes: an anito of the field, of the ocean, and of the rain.<sup>162</sup>

Unlike their gods, who pursued their interests indifferent to man, the daily welfare of the natives rested in the hands of the *anitos*. As a result a system of sacrifices, prayers, and gifts developed in an attempt to influence them. The *baylans* would perform these sacrifices offering food, drinks, fruit, gold, and animals (but not human victims).<sup>163</sup>

In addition to formal gods, *anitos*, and people with supernatural powers, the natives believed that the earth was a stage upon which the spirit world acted on them.<sup>164</sup> Thus objects such as the moon, the stars and constellations<sup>165</sup>, the sun, the rainbow, caves, mountains, rivers, plants, trees; and animals and birds, such as the crocodile, crows, turtle-doves, and sharks, all could be inhabited by spirits and bring good or evil.<sup>166</sup> As a consequence, no event in their daily lives lacked significance. The squealing of a rat, the howling of a dog, the singing of a lizard, and the crashing of a tree in the night were bad omens presaging death or misfortune. They also examined the entrails of animals to foretell events.<sup>167</sup>

This belief in spirits residing in everything affected their concept of death, including the belief in an afterlife. There was little difference between the living and the dead--the difference being the living were visible and the dead invisible. They viewed the union of the soul with the body as a natural state, and death not caused by battle or accident, was caused by the wind or evil spirits.

<sup>168</sup> The western concepts of heaven and hell were never a part of Filipino religion despite this assertion by certain historians. The

first mention of this concept came from Fray Francisco de Santa Ines in 1676. The earlier chroniclers, however, make no mention of it. By the time Santa Ines wrote about the islands the Spanish missionaries had already been spreading the Christian faith in the islands for over one hundred years; the Judeo-Christian concept of heaven and hell obviously had been introduced by the Spanish missionaries.<sup>169</sup> It was the belief of the ancient Filipinos, instead, that the dead went to one of a number of skyworlds and underworlds, the cause of death predetermining the soul's destination. There, the dead became *anitos* and lived in the same manner as they had on earth.<sup>170</sup> As a result, an incentive existed, for those able, to achieve social and economic upward mobility since poverty or dependency would not only bring misery in this life but also in the next.<sup>171</sup>

Because of their belief in an afterlife as a continuation of life on earth, the Filipinos surrounded death and burial with a great deal of ceremony. According to Chirino the natives:

. . . anointed the body with aromatic balsams which prevent corruption, especially with the juice of a sort of ivy which grows there abundantly, and is truly a very valuable drug, which they call buyo (betel). . . . With the juice of this plant, then, they anointed the dead body, and so injected it through the mouth that it penetrated the whole body. Thus prepared, many bodies have been found uncorrupted after a lapse of many years.<sup>172</sup>

In addition to embalming their dead the Filipinos, as noted by Wang Ta-yuan in 1349, buried with the corpse all of the things they believed the deceased would need to maintain his or her social status in death, this included killing and burying with the corpse the dependent members of the household. Chirino states that a *datu* had been buried with his vessel and rowers so that they might serve him in the voyage to

the other world. He also states they would place gold in the mouths of the corpses and lay other items of value with them.<sup>173</sup>

During the time of the preparation of the corpse the Filipinos conducted highly ritualized mourning. According to the social position of the deceased, the family would sometimes be joined by professional mourners who would chant the virtues of the deceased. Corpses, laid in wooden coffins, would normally be buried beneath the deceased's home; if buried in a field the decedents would burn fires beneath their homes, set guards, and took other measures to keep the dead man from returning to carry away his relatives. To signify mourning the Tagalogs would wear black and the Visayans white. The latter also practiced hair tearing during mourning.<sup>174</sup>

After the burial of the deceased, the initial period of mourning ended and a time of feasting followed in which there was much eating and drinking but, otherwise, the proceedings were solemn. Chirino observed that the members of the primary family normally avoided participating in the feast. Upon the death of a noble, the *barangay* enforced silence until announcement of the end of the mourning period; the length of the period of silence depended upon the position of the deceased. Any member of the community who broke this edict would be severely punished. The *barangay* also placed warnings to passersby. Chirino gives an example of a *barangay* located on a river placing a signal on its banks to inform strangers that no one was to pass and disturb its silence under penalty of death, which they executed vigorously.<sup>175</sup>

Those who died in war would be honored in song extolling their bravery and an extended feast would be held in their honor after the

burial ceremony. As noted earlier, those killed by violence of any sort would be avenged by their kin-group in bloody vendettas. During the period of the vendetta the edict of silence and period of mourning would be observed for a time determined by the kin-group.<sup>176</sup> The early chroniclers noted that many times these vendettas would extend to past enemies not connected with the death. The Pangasinans would behead a member of the dependent class. These practices, in light of the belief that the deceased would return to carry off a living relative, probably developed in order to appease the dead.<sup>177</sup>

The agricultural practices of the Filipinos tended to influence the form of their religious and social cosmology and recent anthropological evidence suggests that a transformation of society was underway in Luzon. The *sawah* cultivators of the island developed a system of wealth based upon holdings of terraced land. As a result, the acquisition of wealth could only be accomplished by marriage or inheritance. This development transformed the perception of the living members of the community in regard to their dead. No longer were the recently deceased seen as malevolent since the inheritance of wealth derived from their largesse. A god-like paternalistic culture-hero developed in these cultures and it is this development that probably contributed to their receptivity to Christianity by the time of the arrival of the Spaniards.<sup>178</sup>

Their literature reflected the permeation of religious significance in all phases of their lives. The early Spanish chroniclers record a rich oral tradition that consisted of songs, sagas, proverbs and fables, riddles, epic and lyric poetry, and myths and



legends which must have been repeated in their written literature.<sup>179</sup>

The following incident related by Chirino during one of his visits to Manila is sufficient to illustrate the fate of these manuscripts:

Another Indian had a book containing certain verses of poetry, which they call Golo (the name of a charm for lovers)--most pernicious, because they included an express compact with the devil; this its owner freely gave up, that it might be burned, which was done.<sup>180</sup>

The early Filipino societies informally educated their children in their homes and, later in the life of the child, used a kin-related tutor. As in most primitive cultures, and as we have seen in other aspects of Filipino life, religious instruction was an important element in the perpetuation of skills to the next generation. Methods of agriculture, the use of weapons for boys, customs, kin-group trades, and domestic skills for girls, were all taught in this manner. In Panay, and other places where Mohammedanism was well established, there were regular schools, called *bothoan*, conducted by formal teachers. The subjects taught in these schools consisted of reading, writing, math, religion, swordsmanship, and the art of acquiring amulets (*lubus*).<sup>181</sup>

Thus our portrait of Filipino civilization and society at the eve of the conquest reveals that, unlike the peoples encountered in the Americas, those of the Philippines were continually influenced by Eurasian culture throughout their history.<sup>182</sup> Political development remained on the most basic level because of the very nature of kin-group culture. Despite attempts by Philippine nationalists to embellish the history of pre-Hispanic culture, there is no evidence of a developing indigenous confederation of *barangays* or tribes. All forms of inter-*barangay* political organization throughout the history of the

islands was imposed by other societies, most notably the Islamic empire of Malacca by way of Borneo just before the arrival of the Europeans. As we have seen, the majority of Filipinos confined their use of writing to religious and cultural expression, political writing and record-keeping being a trait of the Moslem settlements. The Islamic influence provided the southern islands, in particular Mindanao, with the basis for a separate tribal identity that persists to our time.

Despite their lack of complex political forms, we can see that, on a different level, Filipino customs displayed a complexity rooted in their religious beliefs and their concept of the universe. The calendar systems of the various groups, particularly the Ifugaos, displays an intimate rapport with the environment. Superficial comparison to the Aztec and Inca empires concerning religious organization would lead one to underestimate the complexity of the Filipino religions since they lacked the large temples of worship found in the Americas. However, when seeing the land through the eyes of the natives one finds temples everywhere--in volcanos, caves, giant trees, and special groves.<sup>183</sup> These religious beliefs affected the Filipinos' kinship-centered orientation. Religion among these societies was more highly personalized and lacked the coercive and power-based natures found in the more highly organized indigenous American and Eurasian religions. In those cases where Islam was superficially introduced, such as in Luzon, the observance of Islamic custom seems to have been related more to the desire for trade than any real belief. As noted earlier, the islanders had developed many traditions in order to prevent potential conflicts that could evolve into bloody vendettas. Given the steady

stream of immigrants, as noted in the first part of this chapter, tolerance to different customs was the only alternative to continual conflict. As a result, Filipino society seems to have been extremely malleable in adapting to any outside force, eventually absorbing its influence and, in the process, creating a cohesive cosmology.

## NOTES

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## CHAPTER III

### HISPANIC EXPLORATION AND SOCIETY TO THE 16TH CENTURY

#### The Road to The Philippines: The Age of Discovery

The reasons for the discovery and pacification of the Philippines are inextricably tied to the competition for the spice trade between Portugal and Spain in the 15th and 16th centuries. This period is known as the "Age of Discovery."<sup>1</sup> Understanding the significance of the political and social events of this period is critical if the context of the Philippine discovery and pacification is to be assessed accurately.

The Seljuk defeat of Byzantium brought about the Christian military crusades to recapture the Holy Lands. Beginning with the First Crusade in 1099 A.D., which recaptured Jerusalem<sup>2</sup> from the Moslems and established a Christian kingdom, and ending with the conquest of the Frankish states of the east in 1291 A.D.<sup>3</sup>, the intercourse directly brought about by these expeditions, and the religious pilgrimages they spawned, expanded the European concept of the known world as spices, silks, and other oriental wares were introduced into Europe through Moslem intermediaries.<sup>4</sup> While the caliphates along the Mediterranean tolerated trade with the Europeans, they jealously guarded the secrets of their trade routes to the Orient. The city-states of Italy, in

particular Venice, became the centers of European trade in this traffic and, as a result, thrived.<sup>5</sup>

They thrived mostly from the spice trade. The importance of spices to the people of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries is hard for us to understand today. Probably the best comparison to make is the competition for oil and other raw materials in our own time--the recent cause of war in Iraq. The word "spices" to the European of the time meant pepper, cloves, cinnamon, and nutmeg though others were used to a lesser degree. There are two kinds of pepper: the black variety which was originally found in the Malabar region and later in abundance in Sumatra and other islands of Southeast Asia; the white variety, also known as the Guinea pepper, was not discovered until the 15th century A.D. in west Africa where it is widely grown. Cloves, found only in the Moluccas, were introduced to Europe as a result of the Crusades. Nutmeg was found only in the Banda islands, south of the Moluccas, and was also introduced to Europe as a result of the Crusades. Cinnamon is the oldest known spice, described in the Bible, and is made from the sweet bark of the cinnamon tree found in tropical Asia.<sup>6</sup>

Once introduced to Europe on a large scale, spices immediately became an essential commodity in Medieval life. They were used by druggists in medicines, and in cooking, preparing, and preserving food. As a result, demand grew among the upper and rising mercantile classes and so the spice trade boomed.<sup>7</sup> There were three main trade routes from the east. The first route, known as the northern route, began in North China, passing through the cities of Samarkand and Bokhara in the heart of Asia, around the Caspian Sea and through Constantinople to the

Mediterranean region. The second route, called the central route, started at Malacca going west across the Indian Ocean to India, through the Persian Gulf to Baghdad, and through Constantinople to the Mediterranean. The third route, known as the southern route, also started at Malacca, went across the Indian Ocean to southern India, along the coast of Arabia to the Red Sea, and through this sea to Cairo, Egypt. As noted in Chapter 2, two routes to the seacoast of China that linked up with the central and southern routes also existed. Venetian ships carried spices for distribution throughout Europe from the terminus of Alexandria, depot of the central and southern seaborne trade routes, and from ports in Asia Minor, termini of the overland northern route.<sup>8</sup>

Coincident with the events described, the empire of the Mongol Khans swept across the steppes to the Danube. By 1259, when Genghis Khan assumed the Mongol throne, the empire stretched from the Yellow River of China in the east to the Danube in the west, and from Siberia in the north to the Persian Gulf in the south. The Mongols conquered much of the territory of the Seljuks and Mamelukes, raising the Moslem curtain that had stood between Asia and Europe. As a result, Europeans were able to travel freely over well-protected Mongol roads to the Chinese shores of the Pacific Ocean to establish direct links to the oriental trading centers. The Christians also found a willing ally in the Khan against the Moslem states, then in decline.<sup>9</sup>

However, the Pope and Christian princes decided that they must first convert the Khan and other Tartar princes before embarking upon a final crusade against the Moslems. Numerous Franciscan missionaries

were sent to the Tartar capital to bring about this conversion.<sup>10</sup> John of Pian de Carpine delivered Pope Innocent IV's message of friendship to the Khan at his court at Karakorum in 1245; William of Rubruck visited the court in 1253 as envoy of Louis IX of France; John of Montecorvino delivered Pope Nicholas IV's letter in 1295 inviting Genghis Khan to convert to Christianity; and Giovanni Marignolli was Pope Benedict XI's archbishop in China between 1338 and 1353.<sup>11</sup>

With these missionaries travelled many merchants, eventually establishing small European enclaves in the main trading centers in China.<sup>12</sup> Some of these travellers published their journals and the impact upon European society was revolutionary. The first widely read travel narrative was that of John of Pian de Carpine entitled the "Book of the Tartars."<sup>13</sup> Other journals were published by Odoric of Pordenone, Nicolo de' Conti, Ibn Battuta, and under the pseudonym Sir John Mandeville--the last a collection of journals.<sup>14</sup> Most influential, however, was the book "A Description of the World"--the adventures of Marco Polo as transcribed by the novelist Rustichello. Written about 1298, while the Venetian Polo shared a Genoese prison cell with Rustichello, the book contained tales of innumerable peoples and exaggerated accounts of great wealth that inflamed imaginations and sparked a boom in European travel to the east.<sup>15</sup>

Also springing from this period was the legend of Prester John, supposedly a great Christian King who lived beyond the Moslem barrier that hemmed in Christian Europe. Manuscripts alleged to have been written by this king asking for help against the Moslems began to appear throughout Europe in the 12th century. When they made contact with the



Tartars the Europeans first thought that the Khan was this Christian king. When they learned that he was not, instead of putting an end to the legend, the search for the kingdom was refocused to the African continent.<sup>16</sup>

Just as abruptly as they had opened, the spice routes closed to European travel about 1350. The Mongols found that the vast territory of the Eurasian continent could not be governed as easily as it had been conquered, particularly China. The end came in 1368 when Chu Yüan-chang became leader of the Chinese rebellion and founded the Ming dynasty in China. Local Mongol and Chinese princes fought among themselves over the remains of the Khan's empire and expedited its disintegration.<sup>17</sup> Tamerlane, operating from Samarkand, built his Persian Islamic empire upon what had been the southwestern quarter of the former Mongol empire. By 1400 the Empire of Timur, stretching from the Black Sea to the Indus River, sat astride the area through which the trade routes passed. The form of Islam practiced in Timur was Shiite, at that time one of the more tolerant sects, and as a result for a time the trade route to Tabriz in Persia was kept open. Concurrent with these developments was the rise of the Ottoman Turks, practicing an intolerant kind of Islam under the Sunni sect, who overtook the Seljuks as the dominant political faction in the eastern Mediterranean. The Empire of Timur competed with them for hegemony over Asia Minor but, by 1405 Tamerlane was dead, Samarkand in ruins, and the Turks free to range to the north and south.<sup>18</sup> They destroyed the remaining Mameluke caliphates thus closing the Levantine trade to the Italians, causing the decline of these city-states.<sup>19</sup> In 1358 they seized the peninsula of Gallipoli.

Pushing westward they overran the Balkan Peninsula, annexing Serbia and Bulgaria, and crushed the Hungarian forces of King Sigismund in 1396 on the banks of the Lower Danube. On May 29, 1453, Constantinople fell. They continued their conquests, taking Trebizond in 1461, Lesbos in 1462, Chios in 1466, Kaffa in 1500, Damascus in 1516, and Cairo in 1517. Being hostile to all forms of Christianity, they wiped out autonomous Christian communities in Asia Minor and Syria. Thus, the Europeans were not only cut off from direct access to the spice trade, they were denied it completely.<sup>20</sup>

The major impetus for the discoveries that gave birth to the period called the Age of Discovery came from the two nations of the Iberian peninsula only recently under Moslem rule--Portugal and Spain. As referred to earlier, the Moslem ruler of Tangier crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and invaded Iberia, bringing the entire peninsula, with the exception of the mountainous northern regions, under his rule by 713 A.D., and established the Caliphate of Cordoba, governed under the dependence of the Caliphs of Damascus.<sup>21</sup> The Christian mountain kingdoms of the peninsula almost immediately began a guerrilla war for the reconquest of the lands from the Moslems, called Moors by the Iberians. Over time the peninsula was divided into petty kingdoms and these reconquered by the Christians in turn over a period of seven hundred years. The most important of these kingdoms were Lusitania, Asturias, León, Castile, Navarre, Aragon, and Cataluña.<sup>22</sup> Castile became the strongest of the kingdoms, absorbing Asturias and León through royal kinship, and the seacoast province of Lusitania through conquest. However, a split within the Castilian families in the 12th

century led to the establishment of the kingdom of Portugal from the former province of Lusitania. By 1248 Castile regained control over the central portion of the peninsula with the exception of the southernmost kingdom of Granada, which remained in Moorish hands. Portugal also continued the reconquest in the south along the coast and by the end of the 13th century the work had largely been accomplished.<sup>23</sup>

It is from the latter kingdom that the man called the pioneer of the Age of Discovery springs--Prince Henry of Portugal (1394-1460), dubbed the Navigator.<sup>24</sup> An enterprising Renaissance noble, Henry gathered the leading cosmographers and navigators of his age to his castle at Sagres in the south of the peninsula.<sup>25</sup> Between 1415 until 1460, the year of Henry's death, the Portuguese steadily continued down the African coast. The impetus behind these voyages of exploration were varied. The desire for spices and gold, to press further crusades against the Moors in North Africa, and to find a route to the legendary kingdom of Prester John, who would be persuaded to open another front against the Ottomans, all played a role.<sup>26</sup>

Despite growing Castilian competition, especially through its claim to the Canaries, the Portuguese became so identified with the new discoveries, aided by intensive lobbying efforts in Rome, that the Pope, in the bull *Romanus Pontiflex* (1455), recognized Portuguese claims and reserved for them any lands that would be discovered between Cape Non on the west coast of Africa and India, excepting the kingdom of Prester John, which would remain outside their control.<sup>27</sup> The next year the Pope issued another bull granting to the Portuguese Order of Christ, of which Henry was commander, the responsibility for the spirituality of

all the lands discovered by Portugal. Therefore, the conquest of these lands was endorsed provided they were not Christian, thereby linking the commercial goals of the Portuguese with the spiritual goals of the Catholic Church.<sup>28</sup>

After the death of Henry the commercial impetus for the establishment of trading posts continued. The exact number of voyages down the African coast during this period is not known because of the Portuguese policy of secrecy concerning the African trade. Fearful of Castilian competition should they obtain this navigational knowledge, many voyages were not recorded. Tremendous profits accrued from the trade spawned by these discoveries, swelling the royal treasury. Soon each region came to be known for the commodities they produced--the Ivory Coast, the Grain Coast (for Guinea pepper known as "Grains of Paradise"), the Gold Coast, and the Slave Coast.<sup>29</sup>

Further exploration, however, was postponed due to Portuguese involvement in Castilian succession upon the death of Enrique IV who ruled Castile from 1454 to 1474. Throughout their histories both countries attempted to intervene in the internal affairs of the other, hoping for an eventual union of the Iberian peninsula under a male heir in its own favor. After a short war the different factions settled their differences in 1479 in the Treaty of Alcasovas. In this treaty the Portuguese recognized Castilian sovereignty and gave up their claims to the Canaries. In return, Castile recognized the Portuguese sovereignty of the Azores, Madeira, and all trade south of the Canaries.<sup>30</sup>

Internal matters having been settled, by the time of John II's accession in 1481 the circumnavigation of Africa to reach India by sea was on the agenda of the Portuguese ruler.<sup>31</sup> John, as Henry before him, collected experts from around the world--this time in Lisbon. He placed this group under the leadership of two Jewish astrologer-mathematicians, recently expatriated from Spain, naming them the *Junta de Matematicos*.<sup>32</sup> Spain, united by Castile and Aragon, was in the midst of the suppression of the Jews. Portugal, at least temporarily, profited from Spanish intolerance. The first task of this commission was to solve the problem of determining latitude upon reaching the Equator since, upon reaching that point, the North Star is no longer visible. Joseph Vizinho, one of the heads of the Junta, decided to apply the tables on the declination of the sun written by his mentor, Abraham Zacuto, from his days at the University of Salamanca. He undertook a voyage in 1485 to verify the accuracy of the tables and to make any necessary corrections. He then translated this work, the *Almanach Perpetuum*, into latin. It was Vizinho's translation that would successfully guide Portuguese pilots on their travels for the next fifty years.<sup>33</sup>

Coincident with scientific research, maritime exploration continued. In 1482 John II dispatched Diogo Cao down the west African coast. During this voyage some natives brought presents inscribed with small crosses from a kingdom the Portuguese interpreted as the kingdom of Prester John.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, in 1487 John II decided to settle the matter of contacting his African Christian ally by a two-pronged strategy. Bartolome Dias was sent by sea to find a way around Africa to

this kingdom. In this voyage he was provided with two caravels of fifty tons each and, for the first time on any expedition, a stores ship. The addition of the last vessel would enable the expedition to range further than any that had preceded it. Dias sailed in his two exploring caravels as far as 20 degrees south along the coast. A storm suddenly developed and drove the tiny ships further and further south. For fourteen days Dias steered toward the winds before the storm finally abated. Finding himself in cold climates very different from the tropical heat experienced just a few days previously, he steered east with all sails but sighted no land and so decided to turn north. Upon reaching Africa again he was dumbfounded to see that the shoreline was on the port bow. Dias realized that he had cleared the tip of Africa and anchored in Mossel Bay on February 3, 1488, about two hundred thirty miles east of present day Cape Town. He wanted to go onward to the India but his captains and crew began to protest. Provisions were low and could only be replaced by finding the supply ship which had been left far behind. Finally, after his captains signed a document affirming their decision to turn back, Dias coasted back around the Horn of Africa. They found the supply ship, left behind nine months before manned nine men, worm-eaten and with only three survivors. After transferring the remaining supplies, they burned the supply ship, and continued on the return trip, arriving back in Lisbon in December, 1488.<sup>35</sup>

The other leg of John II's plan was to dispatch two emissaries by land. These were Jews disguised as Muslim merchants--Pero de Covilha and Affonso de Pavia. Covilha had served John II before as his spy at

the Spanish court of Isabela and Ferdinand, and as a diplomat to the Barbary States of north Africa. During a time when most Portuguese also knew Arabic, Covilha's contemporaries praised him as a man familiar with all of the languages spoken in Christian, Moorish, and heathen lands. In contrast, little is known of Pavia except that he was a gentleman of the court and spoke both Spanish and Arabic.<sup>36</sup>

The mission of these two as they left Santarem on May 7, 1487, was to take the overland route through the Middle East, determine if a way around Africa to India was available, and contact Prester John, this last even more important for the establishment of a way station should a sea route around Africa be found. The spies traveled through Valencia, Barcelona, Naples, Rhodes, Alexandria, finally reaching Cairo. Covilha proceeded to Aden, and in February, 1489, shipped aboard an Arab dhow for the Malabar coast, inspected Cananore, Calicut, and Goa and other Indian and Persian Gulf ports, and returned to Cairo. There he met two other Jews who had been dispatched to Cairo from Lisbon to search for him and Pavia. They returned Covilha's intelligence that reported the availability of abundant supplies of cheap spices in Malabar. The southern tip of Africa, he wrote, could be rounded without fear, and, once at Sofala, the course across the Indian Ocean to the shores of Hindostan was easy. Under instruction from John II delivered by the two Jewish emissaries, Covilha continued to Ethiopia to search for the legendary Prester John, arriving there in 1493, which he found ruled instead by Alexander "Lion of the Tribe of Judah, and King of Kings." He became so useful to the Ethiopian king that he was forced to settle there and take a native wife. Destined never to leave Africa, he died

sometime after 1526. The fate of Covilha's associate Pavia is not certain. The two men contracted fever in Alexandria and almost died. Whether Pavia died in Cairo or Aden, or continued south in search of Prester John is still a matter of historical conjecture. However, by the time Covilha's intelligence reached the Portuguese monarch, Dias had already doubled the Cape and, as a result of one very important voyage to the west, the world looked very different.<sup>37</sup>

During the latter half of the 15th century, before Columbus' expedition to the west, there was much speculation regarding the existence of lands across the Atlantic Ocean. Some evidence indicates that during this period the Portuguese reached the Sargasso Sea and spotted the American continent in the distance before turning back in fear. The Portuguese monarchs granted several charters giving rights of lordship to any who would explore these lands that had supposedly been seen from a distance. For example, in 1474, two noblemen, Joao Vaz Corte Real and Alvaro Martins Homem travelled west and explored a land they called Codfish Land (believed to be Greenland or Newfoundland), and in 1485, while Columbus was attempting to obtain backing from the Portuguese court, John II authorized Fernao Dulmo and Joao Estreito to find the legendary island of *Antillia* (or Atlantis) in the Western Atlantic. This last expedition departed in 1487 and was never heard from again.<sup>38</sup>

The rejection of Columbus' expedition by the Portuguese has been a topic much given to histrionics. Contrary to the legend that has grown up around the voyage, the *Junta de Matematicos* did not believe the world to be flat. On the contrary, the sphericity of the earth had been



recognized in Renaissance scientific circles for many years and, as already noted, was the basis of the Portuguese voyages of discovery. Columbus proposed to the Junta that the island of Cipangu (Japan), on the outer edge of India, could be reached in a voyage of just a few days. He based this conclusion upon two incorrect assumptions. First, he accepted the estimates of the Florentine cosmographer Paolo del Pozzo Toscanelli and the French theologian-astrologer Pierre d'Ailly that the Eurasian continent extended 225 degrees to the east. Secondly, he grossly underestimated the extent of the Atlantic Ocean and thus, the circumference of the world. When asked the question "how far west?", he supposedly had answered not more than 2400 miles. This figure was inexplicably less than the estimate of the world's circumference established by Eratosthenes<sup>39</sup>. When Dias returned in 1488 the Portuguese decided that the eastern route was shorter and surer and so Columbus' application was turned down by John II's ministers. Leaving Portugal, Columbus went to the French, English, and Spanish courts, hoping to win support for a competing expedition to the west from these Portuguese rivals. Isabela of Spain, the niece of John II, listened to Columbus and, in the process, changed the source and shape of exploration.<sup>40</sup>

In April 1493, Columbus returned in triumph to Isabela at the royal palace in Barcelona<sup>41</sup>--having discovered a new continent, he died in 1506 still believing he had reached India. When the explorer paid a call on John II, the Portuguese monarch reminded him that the Treaty of Alcasovas ceded to the Portuguese all lands south of the Canaries and informed him that his discoveries fell within that zone. John sent an

envoy to the Spanish monarchs and began outfitting an expedition under Francisco de Almeida to forcibly take possession of the islands.<sup>42</sup>

War being imminent, Isabela forestalled John II's plan by immediately conducting negotiations with Portugal and convincing the Spanish Pope Alexander VI to issue his famous bull *Inter Cetera*. Many scholars of the Philippines assert, and I agree, that the history of the archipelago in relation to Spanish history begins with this document. From this point questions regarding the *Inter Cetera* are at the center of all of the issues concerning the Age of Discovery and directly provide the incentive to Spain for the discovery and colonization of the Philippines.<sup>43</sup> Alexander issued the bull on May 3, 1493, though it seems that the document was drafted prior to Columbus' discovery. It proclaimed Spain's right to all discoveries made towards the west.<sup>44</sup> The father of Cesare and Lucretia Borgia, and a native of Valencia, Machiavelli described the scheming Alexander VI as one who "best showed how a Pope might prevail both by money and by force."<sup>45</sup>

The *Inter Cetera* constitutes the document originally referred to and a series of bulls issued by Alexander VI over the course of two years. The titles of these bulls and what they said is presented as follows in chronological order: the original *Inter Cetera* issued May 3, 1493, assigned all lands discovered sailing west to Spain; the *Eximiae Devotionis* issued the following July but fictitiously backdated to May 3, 1493, assigned all the rights and privileges in the western sphere to Spain on a par with those assigned Portugal in Africa; later another *Inter Cetera* was issued backdated to May 4, 1493, establishing a boundary line--the meridian one hundred leagues west of the Azores--in

which everything west is Spain's and everything east Portugal's; finally, when it began to be apparent that Columbus had not reached the Indies, the *Dudum Siquidem* dated October, 1493, was issued which affirmed the *Inter Cetera* on all lands sailing west even if they turned out to be the Indies. This last declaration was obviously intended to undercut Portuguese claims to exclusive rights in the Indies as a result of previous papal decrees.<sup>46</sup>

While intending to prevent war by having the Holy Pontiff act as arbiter, the combined affect of the bulls actually heightened tensions between Portugal and Spain as John II saw his commercial empire dissipate with the issuance of a few pieces of paper in Rome.<sup>47</sup> In addition, the Declaration of Alexander VI left several ambiguities. One in particular was the location of the meridian one hundred leagues west of the Azores, since a reliable method of determining longitude had not been developed. Such a narrow lane enraged the Portuguese monarch, particularly since the establishment of this boundary negated the Treaty of Alcasovas.<sup>48</sup> The idea for the establishment of this line seems to have originated with Columbus; based upon his questionable geographic knowledge of the extent of the Atlantic Ocean and his nonsensical belief that upon passing one hundred leagues past the Azores the climate suddenly changed, becoming mild--absent of a summer or winter, and that the ocean became filled with "weeds."<sup>49</sup>

Isabela had achieved her primary objective of establishing Spain's rights to exploration but Portugal still had the superior navy and could act on its threats of war. As a consequence, she continued diplomatic talks with her uncle. The result was the Treaty of

Tordesillas of 1495 which restored to Portugal those rights it already had in the East prior to the issuance of the last Papal bull, and in which the nations agreed to compromise on the details of the dividing line--relocating what is called the Line of Demarcation 370 leagues west of Cape Verde. War was averted and the treaty was ratified into international law through the Brief *Ea quae* issued by Pope Julius II in 1506.<sup>50</sup>

At the time of the treaty it seems not to have occurred to anyone that the Line would need to be continued around the world to the other side of the globe. Instead, the arrangement contemplated a free field for the exploration and conquest of the unknown parts of the world, to the east for Portugal and to the west for Spain, the priority of discovery determining ownership if they crossed each other's tracks. Later when it became apparent that a New World had been discovered and that Columbus had not touched upon Asia, theories concerning the extension of the Line around the world began to be promoted. At the center of this issue was the debate over which side the Line lay the Moluccas--the coveted spice islands of the Orient.<sup>51</sup>

The Declaration of Alexander VI is also significant because it bestowed authority on the Spanish sovereigns to colonize the undiscovered lands of heathen peoples provided they preached the Gospel, sent missionaries, built churches, and did everything necessary to spread the Faith among the people of these newly discovered countries. Though the *Romanus Pontiflex* thirty eight years earlier had established a similar precedent in regard to Portuguese colonizing efforts, a school of thought grew out of the *Inter Cetera* that Spanish colonial enterprise

was subordinate to evangelical considerations, and it was to have a powerful influence on the pattern of Spanish colonizing efforts and the administration of their colonies.<sup>52</sup>

The Portuguese on the other hand never placed great importance on religious conversion. Maintaining their trade monopoly, continuing the crusade against the Moors, and reaching the kingdom of Prester John were their stated goals. Wholesale colonization, conquest, and conversion were not in the interests of a nation containing a small indigenous population and interested in healthy commercial relations. The usual Portuguese pattern was to establish a trading post on an uninhabited island off the coast, or to negotiate the placement of a post with the local chieftain. Force and colonization were rarely used by the Portuguese as methods to further these goals.<sup>53</sup>

Having neutralized through the Treaty of Tordesillas the threat represented by Alexander VI's meddling, Portugal now undertook the long overdue voyage to India--ten years after Dias' return. By this time John II was dead and his cousin Manuel I (1495-1521) was king. The task fell to twenty-eight year old Vasco da Gama. His fleet sailed out of Lisbon with three vessels and a supply ship in July, 1497.<sup>54</sup> He sailed due south from Cape Verde until he reached the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope and then swung east around the cape, reached Mossel Bay, the limit of Dias' exploration, and continued north along the Mozambique coast.<sup>55</sup> Da Gama continued along the east African coast, stopping briefly at Mombasa, and then continuing to Malindi (Kenya) which he reached on May 18, 1498. There the Moslem ruler, unlike the others encountered, was friendly and cooperative and provided da Gama's fleet

fresh provisions and an expert Arab pilot named Ahmad Ibn Madjid (at an exorbitant fee in the opinion of the Portuguese) who conducted them across the Indian Ocean to Calicut.<sup>56</sup>

The Hindu ruler of Calicut gave da Gama and his fleet a cold reception, considering the Portuguese crude, backward, and no better than pirates. When asked by the Moslem traders, the traditional enemies of the Portuguese, what they were doing there the now famous reply was "In search of Christians and spices." Da Gama kept his head, however, at his cold reception and, in typical Portuguese style, deftly negotiated for three months from his ship until he obtained a load of spices and headed home on August 29, 1498.<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, having secured what he came for and frustrated by Moslem intrigues against him, he bombarded Calicut upon his departure, leaving the area as an enemy.<sup>58</sup> He returned in July 1499 to Lisbon after suffering terrible hardships on the voyage back, including the loss of one ship. But the long sought ocean route to India had been achieved.<sup>59</sup> Portugal followed up da Gama's expedition with another one under the command of Pedro Alvares Cabral. His expedition had two significant results. First, it led to accidental discovery of South America. Secondly, and of more immediate importance, Cabral returned to Portugal in June or July 1501 loaded with spices, the profits from which greatly exceeding anyone's expectations.<sup>60</sup>

Having arrived first in the East, Portugal immediately laid plans for the establishment of a vast Asian commercial empire. The immediate obstacle to these plans was the monopoly on the spice trade held by the Moslem city-states and traders. Portugal placed the task of

breaking this monopoly into the hands of two men--Francisco de Almeida and Affonso de Albuquerque. Between the years 1505 and 1511 these two commanders broke the back of the Moslem spice-trade monopoly and reduced by deft application of both force and peaceful treaties the major trading city-states of the Indian Ocean. These efforts culminated in the successful conquest of Malacca by Albuquerque in July 1511.<sup>61</sup>

Under the command of both Almeida and Albuquerque were several individuals who would play a direct role in the transfer of the impetus for further discoveries to Spain and in the discovery and subsequent pacification of the Philippines. Foremost among these was Ferdinand Magellan. Born in 1480 in either the province of Tras-os-Montes or Entre-Douro-e-Minho in northern Portugal, his family was part of the fourth grade of nobility known as *fidalgos de cota de armas*. As a boy he was apprenticed as a page in the court of Leonora, wife of John II, and was an attendant in the household of Manuel I. He was joined at Court by his cousin Francisco Serrano, the two boys placed under the tutelage of Ferdinand's brother Diogo de Sousa. Upon reaching the age of 25, Magellan decided to use the Indian service as a means of advancement and signed on, along with his brother Diogo and cousin Serrano, for Almeida's expedition.<sup>62</sup> While in the Indian service Magellan and his relatives distinguished themselves for their bravery and were rewarded with commissions. However, they soon became involved in the infighting then current in the Portuguese Indian service and found their loyalties questioned by both the king and Albuquerque.

While at Cochin Magellan befriended many people of the merchant class, including an individual by the name of Diego Barbosa, a close

friend of his cousin John Serrano (Francisco's brother), and later to become the author of a significant geography of Asia. Dissatisfied with the India service and realizing that his fortune could not be made in his current condition, Magellan allied himself with the Fugger and Welser banking families in Cochin. These families distrusted the intentions of Albuquerque because of his stated intention of seizing Goa and moving the operations of the Asian administration, and thereby the control of Asian trade, to that city under his personal control. To neutralize these plans the bankers intended to move their trade operations to Lisbon where direct political influence could be brought to bear on the king. The bankers also intended to control trade directly from Portugal, thereby bypassing Goa and Albuquerque.<sup>63</sup>

In allying himself with the banking interests, Magellan fell further out of favor with Albuquerque. The situation became acute when he opposed the governor's desire to commandeer four spice ships in the planned invasion of Goa. As a result of this opposition, Albuquerque, in a letter to the king, accused Magellan of being a spy in the service of Castile--an accusation, in light of later events, that the king took seriously.<sup>64</sup>

While Malacca was being pacified, Albuquerque planned for the outfitting of a fleet to sail to the Moluccas. They departed Malacca in December, 1511, and consisted of three caravels and one junk under the command of Antonio d'Abreu. Francisco Serrano and Simon Affonso captained the other caravels while the command of the junk was entrusted to a Hindu pilot named Nakoda Ismael who had made the trip to the famous



spice islands on numerous occasions. All of the vessels were manned by a mixed crew of Portuguese, Malays, and other seamen.<sup>65</sup>

The ships sailed along the Sumatra-Java-Lesser Sunda chain but were soon reduced by one vessel, when the caravel of Simon Affonso was lost in a storm off of Java.<sup>66</sup> Two versions exist regarding Serrano at this point. One states that he proceeded with Abreu to the island of Banda. There they found that Serrano's ship was rotten and so a native prau was purchased to carry the load of nutmeg and cloves, which were abundant, back to Malacca. On the return trip the prau ran aground on a reef off a group of islands known by the Portuguese as the Luvipino (Kepulauan Penju) directly south of the island of Amboina. The second version states that Serrano became separated from the fleet during the same storm that resulted in the loss of Affonso, perhaps purposely, but after several days journey one night found his ship on fire and was wrecked on Luvipino; Abreu being the only one to arrive at Banda finding the value of nutmeg and clove so lucrative that he abandoned plans to continue to Ternate and, instead, returned to Malacca.<sup>67</sup>

In any event Serrano found himself shipwrecked. The Malays told Serrano that the waters were frequented by pirates and before long a vessel did turn up. However, these people weren't pirates but Badjao; traders who lived permanently on their boats and wandered from place to place. Serrano had his men hide while the Badjao investigated the wreck near the rocks and seized their vessel. Finding the craft filled with trade goods, Serrano decided to cruise among the islands and make a profit along the way to the Moluccas. Upon reaching Amboina in the Moluccas group a civil war was in progress and Serrano decided to aid

the reigning chief. The well organized and armored Portuguese easily brought victory to the chieftain in a small skirmish and news of their presence spread. Soon boats were sent by the competing datus of both Ternate and Tidore, two islands of the Moluccas, to invite the Europeans to their kingdoms and gain them as allies against the other, particularly after word of the Portuguese victory at Malacca reached the islands. Serrano reconciled the differences of the two competing Moslem monarchs and soon had himself installed on the throne of Ternate, complete with harem, and appointed his Portuguese companions to various positions of authority over the Moluccas.<sup>68</sup>

He sent several letters to Albuquerque assuring him of his loyalty, asking for the assistance of a caravel, and to be recognized as governor of the islands. No ships could be spared from Malacca and many of Albuquerque's aids, jealous of Serrano, did all they could to deny his recognition as governor.<sup>69</sup> During this same period Serrano wrote to his friend Magellan telling him of the beauty of the islands and urging him to join him where their fortune would be made. Serrano gave Magellan the directions and information on the location of the islands, as best he could, the distance from Malacca, their relation to the Line of Demarcation, talked of the possibility of holding them with just one hundred Portuguese soldiers against all comers, and outlined a private venture the two could undertake to fulfill their dreams of wealth.<sup>70</sup>

It is not certain if Magellan was in Malacca or Lisbon when he received the letters but what is certain is that he learned of the Moluccas from Serrano. Two early stories concerning a Ferdinand Magellan in the India service during this period do appear. In the

first it seems that after his disagreement with the Viceroy he was assigned to patrol duty in the Straits of Malacca. John da Empoli, the commander of the merchant fleet forced to participate in the sack of Goa, also served Albuquerque during the invasion of Malacca. Before order was restored there, Albuquerque received a report that Goa was under siege from both the land and the sea. He left da Empoli in charge of Malacca as King's Factor and sailed back to Goa only to be shipwrecked when his vessel struck a reef in a storm.<sup>71</sup>

In the Viceroy's absence, Magellan embarked on an expedition, possibly through the instigation of da Empoli, taking him to the east about 600 leagues, or 2,000 miles, the area we now know to be the Philippines. Upon his return, Magellan was the target of much official criticism. He delivered a private report to da Empoli but officially said very little of his discoveries. According to this version he suggested in the official report submitted to Goa that the Moluccas lay on the Spanish side of the Line of Demarcation exposing himself to criticism in both Goa and Lisbon. The second chronicle states that Albuquerque sent Magellan to join Francisco Serrano but that the former disobeyed his orders and proceeded on a voyage of discovery to a number of islands about 600 leagues past the Moluccas. Both stories indicate that Magellan was quietly relieved of his command in 1513 and returned to either Cochin or Lisbon.<sup>72</sup>

The accuracy of these accounts cannot be determined. Since they were written after Magellan's defection to Spain they may have been concocted by early Portuguese chroniclers to prescribe base motives for his actions in Lisbon, or to prove an antecedent discovery of the

Philippines by Magellan under the Portuguese flag should Lisbon have desired to submit a counter claim to the archipelago. In addition, the period that this voyage is said to have occurred conflicts with other circumstantial evidence that Magellan was back in Portugal in 1512. In any event, we do know that by 1512 or 1513 Magellan was back in Lisbon as his name appears on a receipt for his stipend paid from the royal treasury as a result of his rank, and among a list of officers returning from India receiving a promotion as *fidalgo escudiero* for his service in the east.<sup>73</sup>

After a short period in Portugal, Magellan served as a soldier in Morocco where he once again distinguished himself for bravery and received a wound in the leg that left him with a permanent limp. As a result, he was awarded the position of *quadriheiro Mor*--a position that combined the duties of Provost Marshall, Captain of the Guard, and Master of the Horse. One of the responsibilities of this position was over Moorish prisoners of war and war booty. The position was a lucrative one, usually reserved for soldiers of the upper nobility who used it for personal profit to favor friends and family. The award to Magellan, a man of inferior social rank, was unusual and created jealousies among members of the upper nobility. Upon the death of his mentor, Count John de Meneses, on May 15, 1514, Magellan's opponents took the opportunity to accuse him of allowing the Moors to recapture several hundred horses--a charge akin to treason. He personally appealed to the king, but it appears that the forces arrayed against him were greater than he realized. He went before a court martial where he was able only to secure a verdict of "not proved."<sup>74</sup>

He returned to Lisbon and requested an another audience to press the king to approve a planned voyage to the Moluccas to join his cousin Serrano. Months passed and no word of the date for his audience was forthcoming. Finally, in desperation, Magellan untactfully decided to use the forum of the public audience at the steps of the throne to gain the king's attention. Manuel, obviously influenced by the accusations of disloyalty against Magellan, and given the opportunity by Magellan himself, decided to humiliate his subject before the entire court. Upon leaving Magellan asked permission to enter the service of another lord to which the king replied that he did not care where Magellan went.<sup>75</sup>

Many historians have suggested that the animosity between Manuel I and Magellan predated the criticisms levelled by Albuquerque and Pedro de Sousa, probably going back to the days when they were at the court of John II.<sup>76</sup> That may be the case but the behavior of the king, who suspected Castilian spies everywhere and jealously withheld royal recognition, lest a competing power to the throne be created, treated other discoverers in his service in similar fashion. The crisis of loyalties of the Indian service obviously played a role in this. John Serrano, returning in 1513, also received a hostile reception from the king because of his associations with the Fugger banking interests who were out of favor because of their financing of Spanish expeditions. As a result, he fled to Spain and signed on as a pilot.<sup>77</sup> Vasco da Gama echoed the general criticism of Magellan then current in the circles of the Portuguese court but, after waiting 19 years for the honors due him for his voyage to India, in 1518 repeated Magellan's threat to transfer

to the service of Spain and only then received royal honors. By that time Magellan had been in Spain one year.<sup>78</sup>

It appears that immediately after his humiliation before the king, Magellan began to formulate a plan to reach the islands by a western route. Embittered he wrote to Serrano that he would be coming to the Moluccas "by Spain if not from Portugal."<sup>79</sup> As mentioned earlier it was about this time the concept that the bull of Alexander VI and the Treaty of Tordesillas had split the world in two became fashionable--the Line of Demarcation running around the globe to Asia. John Dias de Solis, a Portuguese expatriate living in Spain, had become the *piloto mayor* for Spain in 1512 and convinced the Spanish monarch, Ferdinand II of Aragon, that the Moluccas lay on the Spanish side of the Line. Word reached Europe in 1514 that Vasco Nunez de Balboa had seen another ocean on the other side of Panama and this prompted Ferdinand to action. On October 8, 1515, Solis departed with three caravels to find a strait to the ocean discovered by Balboa. Magellan, were he looking to his future prospects in Spain, would be able to take advantage no matter the outcome of Solis' expedition: should Solis fail, the strait would still need to be discovered; should he succeed, the Spaniards would be in need of experienced pilots.<sup>80</sup>

During the three to four year period he remained in Portugal after his break with the king, Magellan was assisted by Ruy and Francisco Faleiro, two scholars of navigation and cosmography who also had a falling out with the king.<sup>81</sup> With the help of other veteran pilots secretly in sympathy with him, Magellan gained access to the royal chartroom containing the combined navigational knowledge of

Portugal. He came upon the globe of Martin Behaim, royal cartographer in Lisbon from 1492 to 1506, and it may have been Behaim's globe that Magellan brought to Spain to convince the Spanish of a strait in the southern hemisphere. There is also some evidence to suggest that he also received assistance from John of Lisbon, the man who recommended his services to the commander in Morocco in 1513.<sup>82</sup>

John of Lisbon had secretly commanded a caravel for Cristobal de Haro, the Fugger agent in Portugal, to determine the location of the strait across the American continent. He managed to sail down to the River Plate, though this was in the Spanish zone of discovery and he sailed under a Portuguese flag, believing this to be the entrance to the strait. Evidently he shared his log books, rutters, and charts with Magellan. In mid-February 1516, John de Solis also reached the River Plate and, upon landing at the sight of some natives, was killed by them. The remnants of his expedition returned to Seville in September, 1516 with the news of Solis' demise.<sup>83</sup> Upon this news Magellan made his preparations to defect to Spain. Contacts were made with the Spanish government through Duarte Barbosa, formerly the Portuguese scrivener in India, who had also fallen into disfavor in the eyes of Manuel I. Convincing other veteran pilots of the Indian service to accompany him Magellan surreptitiously reached Seville in a single boat on October 20, 1517.<sup>84</sup>

Magellan joined and would be joined by other Portuguese expatriates in Spain who had left because of disagreements with Manuel I. Among these included the Faleiro brothers; Christopher and Diego de Haro, originally the Fugger agents of Lisbon; and the Barbosa family,

significant because Diogo Barbosa had captained a ship in Cabral's expedition and would play an important role in gaining an audience for Magellan with the Spanish Crown.<sup>85</sup>

As a result, all of the secrets of exploration that Portugal had attempted to protect through the policy of secrecy was now in Spanish hands. Magellan's defection, and that of his friends was not the first or most significant. Diogo Barbosa, the man who would be Magellan's benefactor in Spain, had been closely allied with the Brangansa family in Portugal, one of that country's primary feudal lords. John II embarked on the suppression of the lords because of their frequent intrigues with Castile and many members of the Bragansas allied themselves with these factions. As a result, many of the feudal lords were killed or became refugees in Spain. Upon his return from Cabral's expedition in 1502 Diogo Barbosa, as did many others, decided to join his benefactor in Seville. Bringing with him his fortune from his trade profits, his knowledge of navigation, seamanship and the Indian trade, he settled in Spain, married the heiress of one of the aristocratic families of Andalusia, and became Governor of the Castle of Seville and maritime advisor to Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca--the Bishop of Burgos and the most influential man in Spain.<sup>86</sup>

Despite the loss of this valuable manpower, Portugal continued to extend its rule in Asia. Lopo Soares de Albergaria, Albuquerque's successor in the period 1515 to 1518 completed the subjugation of Malabar and Ceylon. In 1516 Rafael Perestrello reached China from Malacca and the following year Ferdinand de Andrade arrived in Canton with Tome' Pires, the latter the first ambassador to China. Eventually



trading posts were erected in Ningpo in 1522, Amoy in 1544, and Macao in 1557. In 1542 the Portuguese landed in Japan and by 1549 had established a foothold there.<sup>87</sup> Despite these advances, however, the impetus for discovery was now firmly in the more capable and determined hands of Spain.

### The Roots of Spanish Culture

The land that Magellan and the other expatriates travelled to, as sociologists and psychologists are wont to tell us apply to most nations and individuals, was one that constituted the sum total of its cultural history to that time. Portugal and Spain shared a common history and, as a result, conflicted over common and competing goals. What follows is a survey of the societal forces that created 16th century Spanish culture and the political and social events that influenced its decisions in the discovery and colonization of the New World and the Philippines.

The first prehistoric people inhabited the Iberian peninsula about 11,000 B.C. and their presence is preserved in paintings left on the ceiling of a cave in the Spanish town of Altamira. However, the first important race of people to inhabit the peninsula were the Iberians, who arrived sometime between 3000 and the 6th century B.C., probably from Mesopotamia via northern Africa. They settled mainly in the southern two-thirds of the peninsula, primarily along the Ebro River. The name Ebro stems from the word Iber meaning "river" hence the name "Iberian." The Iberians established a thriving culture, building

walled cities of great megalithic stones. Their social organization, based upon the horse, was clannish and tribal in character. Their art was influenced by the Greeks and has come down to us in bronze figures representing bulls, flowers, and other animals.<sup>88</sup>

The Phoenicians arrived about the 12th century B.C. and later conducted a significant amount of trade with the Iberians. They are credited with founding the southern cities of Cadiz and Malaga, the latter about 1100 B.C.. The Celts, a Nordic race, arrived from the north in two invasions; the first in 900 B.C. and the second in 600 B.C.. They settled in the northern part of the country above the Ebro River and intermarriage among these races gave rise to the people called the Celtiberians--combining the dark features of the African and Mediterranean peoples with the light features of the Celts, still seen today.<sup>89</sup>

The Spain of this period appears throughout early Greek literature. The most famous of these, the legend of Heracles in Greek mythology, states that the gods assigned him the task of travelling to the west and capturing the oxen of Geryon. Present authorities believe this land to be Spain. After crossing many lands, Heracles reached the western extremity of the Mediterranean and raised two pillars to mark his progress called the Pillars of Heracles. These legendary pillars are the peaks of present day Gibraltar and Ceuta, which brace north and south of the straits to the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>90</sup>

The non-legendary Greeks, however, arrived in Spain about 600 B.C.. As the Phoenicians before them, they first came as seafaring traders but later established permanent trading posts and settlements

along the Mediterranean alongside the Phoenician settlements. As a consequence, they introduced the Hellenic culture to the African culture of the Iberians.<sup>91</sup>

The major direct traceable contributions to the Celtiberians by the Greeks and the Phoenicians were the arts of civilization, written language, farming, dyeing cloth, the use of metals, as well as the arts of painting, ceramics, and sculpture.<sup>92</sup> Fusions of Iberian and Greek art have come down to us in archaeological remains, the most significant of these is the stone bust called the *Dama de Elche* ("Lady of Elche"). The face of the statue reveals an oriental quality considered characteristic of Hellenic art combined with an Iberian headdress and jewelry.<sup>93</sup>

A disparity exists, however, between the relative impact of the Phoenician and Greek civilizations. The interest of the Phoenicians in the peninsula, as a people constantly in touch with the home country, was focused upon the creation of coastal trading posts. Consequently, most of the Phoenician colonists remained apart from the indigenous populations, making mainly material contributions to Celtiberian culture. In contrast, the Greeks were cut off many times from their home country because of political instability. They found themselves compelled to establish friendly relations with the Celtiberian towns to aid in their survival, thereby more strongly influencing Celtiberian cultural development by introducing the Greek philosophical and mythological tradition.<sup>94</sup>

In the 6th century B.C. the Phoenicians of the coast settlement of Cadiz began moving inland and unintentionally came into conflict with

the interior Celtiberian tribes there. Having learned the advantages of federation from the Greeks, many of the Celtiberian tribes united and attacked almost all of the Phoenician cities of the coast. Tyre, the homeland of the Phoenicians, was far away and besieged by the Assyrians, so the Phoenicians asked the assistance of the rising colonial city of Carthage in northern Africa. The Carthaginians responded to the call for help and decided to assume control of the lucrative trade emanating from the settlements for themselves.<sup>95</sup>

By the 3rd century B.C., however, Carthage and Rome were in the midst of the Punic Wars--each attempting to gain control of the Mediterranean basin. Iberia, where Carthage established a foothold, was situated on Rome's most vulnerable flank. In addition, the Celtiberians and Carthaginians established friendly relations through trade. Celtiberians serving in the Carthaginian armies and were known for their fearlessness and bravery. As a result, the Carthaginian ruler Hamilcar Barca decided to concentrate his forces in Iberia and so brought most of the tribes of the Celtiberians under his control. He founded the cities of Hamilcar Boca (Barcelona), and New Carthage (Cartagena), the second with the intention of moving the center of Carthaginian government to Iberia. Hamilcar, and his son Hasdrubal after him, assembled a large army of Iberian infantry and Nubian horseman and laid plans for the conquest of Italy. It was left for Hamilcar's other son, Hannibal, to implement these plans beginning in 218 B.C.. For fourteen years Hannibal ranged up and down Italy against the Roman armies but eventually his forces were exhausted, forcing him to return to Carthage. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Publius Cornelius Scipio, the legions

of Rome began the conquest of the Iberian peninsula. By 205 B.C. the Carthaginians were driven from the peninsula which became the Roman province of Hispania.<sup>96</sup>

The expulsion of the Carthaginians from the Iberian peninsula did not provide an easy Roman occupation. Like the Phoenicians before them, the contribution to Celtiberian society by the Carthaginians was material rather than social in nature. They strengthened the tribal and military affinities of the indigenous peoples without directly intervening in their social institutions.<sup>97</sup> In the "Geography" written by the Greek writer Strabo (63? B.C.-24? A.D.) there were fourteen indigenous Iberian tribes, each diverse and separated from the other. As a result, the period of Roman rule was marked by extended periods of rebellion by one or the other of the various tribes. No doubt many of these rebellions were instigated by the remnants of the Carthaginians and represent, therefore, an extension of the Punic Wars.<sup>98</sup> The Romans deftly used one tribe against another in temporary alliances, and by the slow process of Romanization, brought most of the peninsula under their rule.

The second process, Romanization, was the most effective means of bringing the peoples of the peninsula under control and brought about through three methods. The first of these was through the appropriation of the existing rudimentary Celtiberian system of towns and settlements, and placing them under the framework of Roman administration and allowing the indigenous tribes to continue to be ruled by their own laws and political traditions.<sup>99</sup> Roman traditions were conferred through the vehicles of a religion and a priesthood.<sup>100</sup> The second of these

methods was the resettling the various tribes of the interior regions into towns and cities, similar in character to the Greek and Phoenician settlements, where Roman schools and other social institutions could have their effects.<sup>101</sup> The last method derived from the fact that, unlike most of the empire, the rebelliousness and internecine tribal warfare of the Celtiberians made it necessary to maintain a force of 40,000 Roman garrison troops in Hispania to keep the peace. Most of these troops intermarried with the Celtiberians and established towns called "colonies." The colonies were different from the wholly indigenous settlements because they were given full Roman citizenship and governed under Roman law.<sup>102</sup> Thus the Roman solution to governing Spain was to combine the characteristics of a strong central government with a great measure of local autonomy.

Rome ruled Hispania for six hundred years. It became both the granary for the empire and the wealthiest of the provinces. Agriculture and the raising of livestock was vigorously promoted. Spanish horses were prized throughout the empire for their speed and courage in the Roman circuses. Olive oil, wine, and fruits were exported in great abundance. The tradition of Roman law and custom was introduced throughout the province. The engineering ability of the Romans was applied in the building of cities, aqueducts, bridges, circuses, amphitheaters, temples, and roads. The main highway, the Via Augusta, stretched from the city of Rome to Cadiz, connecting all of the major cities of Hispania. Hispania also became famous for its gold and silver mines. According to Gibbon over 20,000 pounds of gold was exported each year from three Hispanic provinces. In a pattern to be repeated by the

Spaniards in Mexico and Peru, the Romans used forced native labor for the mining; maintaining control through local rulers who profited from the trade.<sup>103</sup>

At the end of the Roman era several traits of Hispanic society that were to carry into the 16th century were present. The concept of written Roman law and administration, which was later to manifest itself in the Spanish desire to document all official actions, was already deeply ingrained. The Latin-based Spanish language was a direct contribution of the Romans to linguistic unification of the peninsula. The Christian religion, which was to be the cornerstone of Spanish society, was largely the religion of the region. The traits of tribalism derived from the North African peoples was combined in an uneasy truce with the Roman concept of centralized power and governance.<sup>104</sup> The indigenous tribal traditions were replaced with Roman forms at the lowest cultural level--the concepts of family, property, inheritance, etc. were all Romanized.<sup>105</sup> Added to this, Spain found itself an uneasy melting pot of diversity that conflicted with both the tendency to tribalism and exclusion, and the desire for repressive, centralized control.

In addition, two important socio-economic traditions were introduced during this period. Manual laborers and tradesmen organized themselves into guilds called "colleges." The guilds were first voluntary organizations but in the 4th century A.D. made obligatory by law. From that point professions became hereditary--a son required to follow the trade of his father. With economic and social mobility no longer possible the poor and middle classes were forced to work under

the protection of one of the rich or powerful members of the community, or to work on his land. A seignorial system of land use arose in which people were compelled to work on the cultivated lands of an overlord without the opportunity of leaving it and this obligation was conferred on the children of the peasant.<sup>106</sup>

Christianity reached Hispania sometime during the 1st Century A.D.. The period of the Christian conversion of Hispania, like other parts of the Roman Empire, is marked by the stories of the sacrifices and travails of the martyrs, giving impetus to the spread of the new religion. Despite these powerful symbols, it was not until 325, upon the accession of Constantine as Roman emperor, that the Hispanic Roman officials accepted Christianity and ended its suppression. Hispania, like the rest of the empire, had finally become predominantly Christian.<sup>107</sup>

Judaism entered Hispania during the reign of Hadrian (117-138). Their immigration increased during the reign of the Antonines (Antonius Pius and Marcus Aurelius) who restored the Jews' privileges of travelling freely about the empire and holding municipal offices. Finding the Mediterranean climate and dry mountain terrain similar to the one they left in the Middle East, the Jews settled throughout the principal cities of the province, building synagogues, publicly celebrating their religious feasts, and contributing their cultural traits to Hispanic society.<sup>108</sup>

During the first four hundred years of the modern era Hispania enjoyed a period of peace and security. However, the Roman Empire soon began to weaken and in 409 the peninsula was invaded by three Germanic



tribes: the Suevi, the Vandals, and the Alani. All three tribes ravaged the countryside but the Vandals were particularly brutal (hence the term "vandalism"). This last tribe mainly settled in southern Hispania until a fourth Germanic tribe, the Visigoths, partially Romanized and Christian, invaded the peninsula and drove the Vandals into northern Africa.<sup>109</sup>

The Visigoths, who struck a bargain to regain control of Hispania with the Roman emperor, did not get firm control of the peninsula until the 7th Century A.D..<sup>110</sup> They established a landed aristocracy that split the peninsula into several individual petty kingdoms, these constantly warring among themselves. Being Arian Christians--not accepting the Roman Catholic concept of the Holy Trinity--they vigorously persecuted the Hispanic Roman Catholics. They plundered churches, extorted money from the rich, and sent many others to be executed. Eventually, a civil war between a Visigothic king and his converted Roman Catholic son led to the defeat of the Arian sect and the establishment of the Roman Catholicism as the state religion. Thus the religious element of Visigothic rule was one based upon political expediency.<sup>111</sup>

The unity of the Christians accomplished, the Visigothic kings soon began the first suppression of the Jews in the history of the peninsula. They were a lucrative minority who were easy prey for the avarice of the ruling Christian nobles and kings. Royal edicts compelled them to be baptized or face death or torture--one report states that 80,000 Jews submitted to conversion rather than face the alternative. The suppression was a popular measure among the more

extreme elements of the Roman church and so used by the Visigothic ruling class to politically pacify them. So powerful was this faction that one Visigothic king decreed to expel all Jews from his dominions. Despite these measures, the Jews remained on the peninsula, though in a diminished status of oppression and servitude, and would play a significant role in the development of Spanish culture and civilization.<sup>112</sup> Not insignificant to their survival on the peninsula was the timely arrival of the Moors.

The Visigoths saw themselves not as the destroyers of Rome and the Roman traditions but their natural heirs. They were a people, however, of different traditions and left their own indelible Germanic mark on the indigenous and Latinate institutions of Hispania. They institutionalized the Roman legal tradition by establishing the formal written laws called the *Statuti legum*, which applied solely to Visigoths, and the Roman Law of the Visigoths, which applied to the Gallo-Roman and Hispano-Roman populations. Both documents, concerned themselves with the laws of government, family and property, and while respecting traditional Roman and indigenous social traditions, gave a unique Visigothic interpretation to matters of everyday concern to the citizens of Hispania.<sup>113</sup>

The establishment of a landed aristocracy combined with the Roman seignorial laws imposed a type of feudalism upon the once independent Celtiberian and Roman towns.<sup>114</sup> The most significant characteristic of the new noble class was its hereditary nature--noble status under the Romans conferred solely for the life of the individual.<sup>115</sup> Having no other centers of power to neutralize their

own, the noble class established a system in which the selection of a sovereign depended upon election of the majority of nobles. Disagreements over the selection, and competition for alliances led to instability and frequent assassinations and warfare--a trait of Spanish governments until the end of the 15th century.<sup>116</sup>

The end for the Visigoths, as noted earlier, came when the Moors arrived in the year 711. The king of the Visigoths at the time of the Moorish invasion was named King Roderick. One of his primary generals commanded Ceuta on the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar named Count Julian. Apparently, in one of the frequent internecine squabbles over succession, Julian had sided with a losing faction and invited the Moors to invade the kingdom of Roderick. The Visigothic king was unaware of this bargain when, upon hearing of the Moorish invasion, he fielded an army of 100,000 men on the plains of Jerez to oppose the invader. After several hours of fierce deadlocked fighting Julian turned his troops against Roderick and the Moors carried the day. Having won with apparent ease, the invaders decided to stay and swept on to the Visigothic capital of Toledo and within months were in control of all of the peninsula except the region of the Cantabrian mountains--it was from these mountains that Christian kingdoms would rise to begin the reconquest of the peninsula against the Moors. The swiftness of their victory was due in large part to the willingness of the Visigothic nobles to accept Moorish political control in exchange for a large degree of autonomy within their own kingdoms. The invaders continued on into France across the Pyrenees where the enemy was not so willing to negotiate and received a decisive defeat at the hands of Charles Martel

at Poitiers in 732. From that point their control of the peninsula, under pressure from the Christian armies of the mountain regions, slowly receded to the south.<sup>117</sup>

The Moslem rule of the Iberian peninsula lacked the character of a strong central government known under the Romans. At first ruled nominally from Damascus, in 929 the peninsula became an independent kingdom with the establishment of Cordoba by Abderrahman III.<sup>118</sup> They practiced a religious toleration unknown elsewhere in Europe. The choice was not Islam or death, but Islam and full rights, or Christianity and Judaism with lower status and taxation.<sup>119</sup>

Despite attempts at unity through reconciliation, the Iberian and Visigothic cultural legacy of instability and factionalism continued. The Moors themselves were a heterogenous group composed of Berbers, Yemenites, Syrians, Copts, and Arabs.<sup>120</sup> The various groups within the Moorish kingdom, religious and otherwise, constantly warred among themselves, weakening its ability to resist pressure from the Christian kingdoms. Civil order and defense of the peninsula could only be maintained with the assistance of Berber and Slav mercenaries. Finally, in 1085, the Christians captured the important city of Toledo and this caused the Arab rulers to make an urgent call for help from the Berber tribes of Morocco, known as Almoravides. Recent converts to Islam, the Almoravides ("those vowed to God") crossed the strait in 1086 and, like the Carthaginians when their aid was sought, decided to remain, bringing order and a strict Moslem practice to the kingdom. In 1146 an even more primitive group of Berbers, the Almohades (unitarians), invaded the country and seized control of the government.

These tribes at first reversed the policy of religious tolerance practiced in the kingdom and, as a result, drove thousands of Jews and *Mozarabes* (Christians in Arab territory) into the northern Christian kingdoms. After a time, each new Moorish tribe that arrived in al-Andalus--as Hispania now came to be called--would further split the land into petty kingdoms to reward members of their own tribe, repeating the indigenous pattern of competition and warfare. As a result, instead of bringing political stability to the kingdom, the arrival of these tribes eventually added to the internal instability of al-Andalus.<sup>121</sup>

Despite this instability, the cultural achievements of the Moorish kingdoms were exceptional, particularly compared to the developments elsewhere in Europe. Cordoba was the early center of the first period of Moorish civilization (756-1086) on the peninsula and consisted of 250,000 inhabitants--making it the largest city in Europe. It was heralded for its artistic splendor, which combined European and Moorish elements and for its great mansions and several libraries. It was recognized throughout Europe as the scientific center of the continent. Christian kings and nobles travelled to Cordoba for serious medical ailments because of their knowledge of anesthetics, and other medical procedures. Medicine, botany, chemistry, physics, mathematics, astronomy, geography, and Greek philosophy were some of the fields the scholars in Cordoba practiced. Compared to their harsh treatment under the Visigoths, the Jews enjoyed a great deal of freedom of movement under the Moors and so played a large role in the cultural flowering of al-Andalus. The Moors established a university and under the leadership of Abderrahman III (912-961) Jewish, Arab, and Christian scholars were

gathered together to study. The city boasted over seventy libraries and many bookshops. Contributions to European civilization springing from this fertile intellectual ground were the concepts of algebra and spherical trigonometry. Arabic numbers replaced the cumbersome Roman numerals and, as a consequence, allowed the introduction of decimal notation, the value of position, and the concept of zero.<sup>122</sup>

As under the Romans, agriculture was extensively promoted throughout the kingdom. Cotton, sugarcane, rice, the palm and mulberry trees, and new types of fruits and flowers were introduced. Complex systems of aqueducts, waterwheels, and irrigation ditches were built. Al-Andalus literally bloomed and became renowned for its gardens and extensive agricultural resources.<sup>123</sup>

Several factors soon worked to modify the intolerant nature of the Almoravide (1086-1146), and later, Almohade (1146-1248) periods of rule. Generally the Moorish soldiers entered the Iberian peninsula without women. Consequently, they took Hispanic wives and by the third generation the progeny of these unions combined Moorish and Hispanic racial, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. Northern Iberian women were particularly valued by the Moorish noble classes for their light features and occupied important places in the royal harems. Reciprocally, many of the Christian kings from the north took Moorish wives and temporary alliances were created as a result of these marriages.<sup>124</sup> In addition, the Almohades practiced a unique type of Islam that encompassed a philosophical breadth that approached the concept of pantheism and, in practice, provided for the acceptance of other cosmological beliefs. Finally, many Hispanic Christians and Jews

converted to Islam in order to counteract the effects of the oppression.<sup>125</sup>

As a result, the period of Almohade rule is considered the height of Moorish Spain's cultural flowering. Under them Seville surpassed Cordoba in importance and soon became a center for scholars and artists. Jews were allowed once again to practice their religion and move freely about the kingdom. Four scholars who studied at Seville during this period and who were to deeply influence the development of European thought in its course toward Renaissance philosophy were the Jew Maimonides (Moses Ben Maimūn), and the Moslems Ibn Tufail, Avempace (Ibn Bājjā), and Averroës. Averroës in particular advocated the supremacy of the human intellect, seeing no contradiction between science and religion. It was these four men who interpreted Greek thought, particularly Aristotle, and reintroduced Greek philosophy to Medieval Europe. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274) was influenced by their works and wrote his *Summa Contra Gentiles* as a refutation of the Spanish philosophers, though he took much from their writings.<sup>126</sup>

The final period of Moorish rule and influence became confined to the kingdom of Granada (1248-1492) when Seville fell to the Christian kingdoms in 1248. The sovereigns of this tiny kingdom dexterously played one Christian kingdom against the other--supporting Castile and Aragon at various times.<sup>127</sup> For a period of several years they paid tribute to Castile. Soon, however, internal squabbles and civil wars over succession within the royal harem, and the unification of Castile and Aragon presaged the end of the Moors on the Iberian peninsula. The end came when in 1476 the Moorish king Abul-Hassan refused to pay the

annual tribute, retorting: "The mints of Granada no longer coin gold, but steel!"<sup>128</sup>

So as Moorish rule rolled south the conquering Christians found that the land of al-Andalus was composed of four peoples: Moslems of eastern origin, many of whom intermarried with Christians; Moslems of Spanish origin, numerically superior to the first group, also often married to Christians; a considerable Christian population allowed to practice their own religion--that differed considerably from the standard Roman Catholic liturgy--and governed under the old Visigothic written laws, often ruled by Christian bishops and nobles; and isolated Christian nobles who retained a measure of autonomy under Moorish rule. The country was a bilingual one but not along religious lines as one might suppose. Instead, Arabic was spoken by the upper classes and *Romance castellano* (to become Castilian) by the lower classes.<sup>129</sup> In fact, despite prohibitive edicts to the contrary, Arabic continued to be spoken in some circles until the final expulsion of the Spanish Moslems in 1614.<sup>130</sup>

This period of receding Moorish and expanding Christian control, extending over 700 years, was known to the Spaniards as *La Reconquista*, the Reconquest. No other nation of Europe went through a similar period of struggle covering so long a time. There were short periods of peace but rarely for more than a decade or two; there were wars among Moorish Spanish kingdoms, wars among Christian Spanish kingdoms, and, as noted in regard to Granada, Moorish-Christian alliances against other Christians and Moors. Generally, however, the character of the *Reconquista* was Christian Spaniard against Moorish Spaniard. As a



consequence, the period of the *Reconquista* represents the crucible in which was molded 16th century Spanish values and culture<sup>131</sup>, and these would shape the pattern of colonization in America and the Philippines.

As noted earlier, however, the only activity during the *Reconquista*, was not war and killing; there was a cross-pollination of Christian and Moorish cultures. John Crow, the historian of Spain: The Root and the Flower, puts it succinctly:

Christians and Moors lived together in the same land engaged successfully in the two greatest actions of human life: war and lovemaking, two forms of conquest, two forms of intimacy. . . . perhaps the making of love, and all that this implies, was of equal importance to the slaying of the enemy in the formation of Spain.<sup>132</sup>

The most important cultural lesson learned by the Spaniards during the *Reconquista* was the power derived by the adoption of a dynamic and revolutionary religious cosmology. The Moors maintained their cohesion and were able to construct a vast Mediterranean empire, despite their heterogeneity, through the unifying force of Islam-- combining belief with imperial goals. The Jews, who also settled in the Moorish states, brought with them their own holistic religious beliefs that underlie Christian teaching, contributing to their ability to survive as an intact people despite repeated attempts by various nations throughout history to repress and exterminate them.<sup>133</sup>

The Visigoths, whose religious conversion derived from political motives, did not possess a similar rallying point in their defense against the Moors. In response, the remnant Christian kingdoms of the north developed a religious faith merged with nationalism: uniting the state, the people, and the church under a common goal. Consequently,

religion became a powerful and absolutist weapon in the struggle of the *Reconquista*.<sup>134</sup> However, this development was not one, initially at least, consciously developed as a strategy. With the destruction of the Visigothic kingdom and the instability wrought by the Moorish invasion, the only institution left for the Christians of the peninsula to take comfort from was that of the church. In rebuilding their lives the northern Christian societies used this one surviving institution upon which to base the reconstruction of the others.<sup>135</sup>

Symbolism also played a powerful role in rallying the soldiers in the wars of the Moorish invasion and this lesson was also learned by the Christians by the time of the *Reconquista*. The Moorish army of the initial conquest kept what was said to be the arm of the prophet Mohammed locked in a vault in the great mosque of Cordoba. Throughout their battles against the Christians in the 8th century the Moorish generals invoked the powers of divine intervention from the arm--inspiring their armies and terrifying their Christian enemies. As a result, the Spanish Christians developed a need for a unifying symbol that would counterbalance the symbolism of the arm.<sup>136</sup>

This need manifested itself in the development of several cults, the most significant being the cult of St. James. The symbology of this cult was carefully nurtured and intensely believed, contributing significantly to the cohesion and legitimacy of the *Reconquista*.<sup>137</sup> The factual nature of the cult is unimportant. What is important is the legendary nature of the story that gave rise to the cult and the effect it had on the Spaniards and other European Christians.

According to the legend, based upon the Christian New Testament, the brothers James and John were the sons of the Galilee fisherman Zebedee and his wife Salome, sister of the Virgin Mary, and were two early disciples of Jesus. They were present at the Last Supper and the Crucifixion (29 A.D.) and so fervent in their preaching of the new religion that Jesus, while alive, gave them the surname *Boanerges*--the Sons of Thunder. The Book of Acts suggests that the apostles scattered to the four corners of the world after the Crucifixion to spread the new faith. According to the tradition that follows the Book of Acts, Matthew went to Ethiopia, Thomas to India, Jude to Persia, Simon to India, Bartholomew to Armenia, and James to Iberia. After converting nine disciples to Christianity, the first Christians of Europe, he was visited at Zaragoza by the Virgin Mary and returned to the Holy Land where he was beheaded by order of King Herod Agrippa in 44 A.D.. Following his martyrdom in Jerusalem and burial at Caesarea, James' body was disinterred and the corpse was found to have its head mysteriously reattached. A stone ship manned by knights appeared at Jaffa, the seaport of Jerusalem, and they rescued the body of James bringing it to the seacoast town of Iria Flavia (Padron) on the west coast of Iberia. A pagan queen refused to allow burial of the cargo of the ship until she was visited by various miracles that convinced her to convert to Christianity and so allowed the body to be buried inland at the site of an old Roman cemetery. This was about 44 A.D.. The site was forgotten by Roman Christians because of their persecution. Sometime around 812-814 a hermit happened to see a bright star hovering over a field for several nights accompanied by celestial music. The hermit notified the

local bishop and the grave was excavated revealing the uncorrupted body of Saint James. His remains were interred in a coffin at the site that became famous as Santiago de Compostela.<sup>138</sup>

Being a saint of the Christian faith, stories were soon spread that he had taken personal leadership over the Christian armies at the Battle of Clavijo in 844 against the Moors of Cordoba. The legend follows that the saint led the army on a white charger, carrying a white banner with a red cross and, during the battle, unsheathed a great sword killing Moors by the thousands--later earning him the name Santiago, Matamores (St. James, Slayer of Moors). The Christians, inspired by this sight, upon the battle being joined cried out: "Santiago! Cierra Espana!" ("Saint James! Close in, Spain!") and routed the Moors. Soon Saint James began to appear at the head of armies throughout the *Reconquista* against the Moors, in the suppression of the Jews, and at the head of the conquistadores in the Americas. As a result of this cult, he is, to this day, the patron saint of Spain.<sup>139</sup>

Soon Santiago de Compostela became a place of pilgrimage for all of Europe. To the devout of the Middle Ages there were three physical places on earth that signified the faith of the Catholic Church: Jerusalem, where Jesus was Crucified; Rome, where Peter founded the Church; and Compostela, the point from which Europe was evangelized. An individual travelling to one of these special places would earn extraordinary blessings. Those who travelled to Jerusalem were called palmers, because they usually returned with palm leaves; those who travelled to Rome were called romers; but those who travelled to Compostela were the only ones entitled to be called pilgrims because of

the hazardous nature of the 900 mile trip out of Paris and across the Pyrenees and northern Spain. Soon over half a million pilgrims travelled over the road known as the Way of St. James. When they returned to their homes elsewhere in Europe they brought with them Spanish-Moorish culture and the knowledge of the intellectual achievements of the Moors. In addition, they helped to focus attention on the wars of the *Reconquista* which resulted in European aid to the Christian kingdoms of the peninsula both in terms of manpower and money.<sup>140</sup>

Because of the large numbers of pilgrims that travelled on the Way of St. James, robbers and bandits roamed along the area of the road, contributing to the natural hazards of the journey. As a consequence, various military-religious orders of knights formed to provide protection to the devout and to prosecute the fight against the Moors. The first of these orders, the Knights Templar, were organized about 1128. The Knights of Santiago, consisting mainly of Spaniards, were mainly responsible for ensuring the safety of the pilgrims on the Way of St. James. Other orders were the Knights of Calatrava, Alcántara, and the Hospitalers. The church at first did not favor the creation of private armies in its name, but in 1086 when the Almoravides invaded the Iberian peninsula, the Catholic hierarchy became convinced of the necessity to blend the aims of warfare with those of religion. The manpower from these orders would eventually serve as the core of the armies of the Crusades and in the *Reconquista* on the Iberian peninsula.<sup>141</sup>

Of the principle peninsular Christian kingdoms of Portugal, Navarre, Aragon, León, and Castile, the last one came to be the most dynamic and preeminent of the lot by the year 1248. A comparison of the characteristics of the last two kingdoms during the Middle Ages epitomizes the reason for Castilian ascendancy. Though eventually united under a common monarch through marriage León and Castile came to be based upon different traditions. León represented the conservative side of Hispanic culture, maintaining the Visigothic monarchical structure and law. This structure was based upon the concept of a strong monarchy supported by a network of nobles and the codification of law. León's conservatism, therefore, was to limit its actions internally and externally. Castile, on the other hand, represented a break with the past. The Castilians were an independent people, resentful of authority. They detested the Visigothic code of laws and tradition states that all known copies of it were burned in a huge bonfire in the town of Burgos. Consequently, the law of Castile came to be based upon the concept of common law. The monarchy was not considered to be above this law and so was a limited one. This egalitarian approach to governance created a dynamism in thought and action that was to lead to Castilian dominance against the Moors and over the other Christian kingdoms.<sup>142</sup>

Castilian dynamism combined with religious zeal gave the kingdom the strength to carry the bulk of the battle against the Moors. The victories that led to the fall of the major Moorish capitals on the peninsula--Cordoba, Seville, and Granada--were Castilian victories. The epitome of the Castilian came to be expressed in the epic "Poem of

El Cid" written about 1140. Based upon the life of a soldier named Ruy Diaz de Bivar, the legend tells the story of a self-made man who achieves success against all of the forces pitted against him--monarch and Moor. According to the poem, El Cid is a soldier who has been sent by the king of Castile to collect the tribute from the Moorish kingdoms of Cordoba and Seville. He finds that these kingdoms are being attacked by the forces of Granada with the help of one of the favorites of the Castilian king. After warning the trespassers against their attacks, he challenges them on the field of battle and inflicts upon them a crushing defeat. He returns to Alfonso VI, the king of Castile, who dubs him El Cid Campeador, from the Arabic language meaning "The Lord, Winner of Battles." Soon, however, the king becomes suspicious of El Cid's motives and banishes him from the kingdom with the proviso that any Castilian subject giving him aid and comfort will be put to death. As a result, El Cid offers his services to the Moorish king of Saragossa and wins several victories against the Christian kingdom of Barcelona and then against the Moorish kingdom of Valencia, which he rules for the last five years of his life. His conquest of Valencia has the effect of rolling back the Almoravides, a task Alfonso VI was unable to perform, thus he shames the monarch who banished him and simultaneously serves the cause of Christianity. The character of El Cid idealized all that was valued by the Castilian of the Middle Ages--his sense of self, his assuredness against great odds, his fierce independence, his courage and dignity, his familial loyalty, and his unending faith. El Cid was the common man who could bring about extraordinary results through the force of his will and the content of his character. It was this model that

was to inspire the Castilian during the *Reconquista*. Later it inspired the conquistadores to leave their homeland and venture forth to make their fortunes in the New World.<sup>143</sup>

As the Castilians seized the central peninsula from the Moors, problems of consolidation of the new territory began to overshadow those of the *Reconquista*. Much of the land conquered was uninhabited, particularly along the border territories that had suffered from centuries of conflict. According to the *Siete Partidas*, a codified Castilian system of law informally introduced in the 14th century, all conquered territory belonged to the Crown. Ungranted lands were known as *tierras realengas* (crown lands), later to be called *tierras baldías* or simply *baldíos*.<sup>144</sup> Consequently, the central government encouraged settlers to go into these areas and build homes and establish towns. To encourage settlement special rights and privileges were granted, called *cartas pueblas* and *fueros*, to individuals willing to settle the land.<sup>145</sup> Jews and Moslems as well as Christians were granted *fueros* during this period; it was not yet necessary to be Christian to be a Castilian. The *fueros* provided the Castilian Crown with a new source of political legitimacy. As noted earlier, under Roman and Visigothic rule a powerful noble class had arisen to continually challenge the power of the king. These noble classes, who frequently controlled large territories in their own right, would ally themselves with the church, large landholders, and the military-religious orders to enforce their will on the Crown.<sup>146</sup>

To counterbalance this power, and to enlist the support of the citizenry in the war against the Moor <sup>147</sup>, the Castilian monarchs, and



those of the other kingdoms who followed the Castilian model, closely tied themselves to the townships. From this a form of nascent democracy grew in which parliaments called Cortes ("courts") sprouted up across the peninsula. The first Cortes was established in Aragon in 1162, in León in 1188, and in Castile in 1250. Democratically elected town councils came into being in both León and Castile about 1220.<sup>148</sup> In addition, the power of the nobles was further reduced by the establishment of the monarchy by hereditary succession, replacing the previous system of election instituted under the Visigoths.<sup>149</sup>

The division of land among the *fueros*, nobles, and military-religious orders is an important aspect of Medieval Castilian social organization in understanding the pattern of Spanish colonial administration during the 16th century. The society of the Castilians during the *Reconquista* was one in constant transition, seeking new conquests, retrenchment, and consolidation. Throughout the history of modern Spain wealth, power, and status came to be associated with holdings in land, and this pattern of social organization was to be reflected in their colonial enterprises. Therefore, a brief survey of Castilian land use will provide important insights into the nature of colonial pacification.

Among the *fueros*, after the construction of the town and its division into districts or quarters, a system of community ownership of certain resources and lands was established. The communitarian tradition was one of the cornerstones of the Castilian town.<sup>150</sup> One of the communitarian institutions to arise was the system whereby the monarch allowed the *baldíos* to be used by the public and municipalities,

normally for grazing.<sup>151</sup> The importance of these lands to the economic well being of the townships soon became paramount. According to the Cortes of 1586-88 the public lands and *baldíos* used as grazing lands were considered the "principal source of livelihood" of the various villages and towns of the countryside. As a consequence, the planting of crops on these lands was greatly restricted and required the permission of the Crown.<sup>152</sup>

A second institution of communitarianism was the practice known as *presura* (squatter's rights), a tradition that encouraged the maximal exploitation of arable land. The history of this tradition predates the Christian kingdoms which recognized its legality in the law of the *fueros* of the 11th to 14th centuries.<sup>153</sup> Laws respecting *presura* are also noted under the rule of the Caliphate of Cordoba.<sup>154</sup> Under *presura* a squatter could claim the right to the use of land even though another individual may hold possession of the land through occupation. Thus, under this tradition, the rights of possession of land were determined through use as opposed to occupation. Sometimes *presura* led to proprietorship but, more often, did not; the squatter having to surrender his rights to the land to the original owner at the end of the harvest. Because of the extensive nature of Crown holdings, the *baldíos* were frequently used under the concept of *presura* and in this way the communitarian nature of many of the *fueros* reinforced.<sup>155</sup>

The final completely communal institution of the Castilian towns was called the *derrota de mieses* or simply *derrota*. Under this system grazing animals were allowed to winter pasture on the cultivated lands for stubble and fallow grazing, thus limiting the rights of farmers to

the land between the time of the planting and the harvest.<sup>156</sup> So strongly infused in Castilian life was this practice that it also became part of the Castilian law of the *fueros*.<sup>157</sup>

The various communitarian traditions developed by the Castilian towns reflects the nature of the Spanish environment. Because of the arid nature of this environment, an intensive type of cultivation and irrigation was necessary in order to produce the food necessary to support the various settlements of the *Reconquista*. Consequently, the various communitarian traditions represented a compromise among the various competing uses for the land. To the Spaniard of the 16th century it would have been unthinkable to allow land to go unexploited.

In addition to communitarian practices and institutions, most Castilian towns had a system of municipal property. The most common method to obtain municipal property was for the community to expropriate the *tierras baldías* on their own authority, though in most cases this was done with the tacit approval of the Crown. These lands were called *tierras concegiles* (lands of the town council).<sup>158</sup> There were two categories of municipal lands: the *proprios*, which was property that the town government rented out to private individuals to defray the tax burden of the municipality, and lands held in common. The structure of common property in Castile was regulated by a number of traditions and laws.<sup>159</sup> One of these was the *ejido*, an institution meaning "village commons," but derived from the latin word *exitus*, meaning "on the way out," since the *ejido* consisted of lands on the outskirts of town used for the village pound, the public threshing and winnowing floor, the community rubbish heap, and the slaughter pen.<sup>160</sup> The *fueros* also

owned in common certain woodlands, steams and lakes, pasture lands and fields.<sup>161</sup> All of these institutions reinforced the communal nature of in the townships. Consequently, the communitarian system appears as an essential aspect of Hispanic society and it was to find its way to the Americas.<sup>162</sup>

Reflecting the growing prestige and power of the *fueros*, which consisted predominantly of farmers, artisans, craftsmen, and merchants, was the high esteem held for manual labor between the 10th and 14th centuries. Some individuals were elevated to knighthood for their outstanding talent. The townspeople, especially on the border towns, doubled as soldiers. Many took from the enemy in battle enough booty to purchase a horse and arms and become a *caballero* (mounted soldier) and thus enter the nobility. Most of these eventually became *caballeros villanos* ("petty village noblemen") because of their merit as *caballeros*, though they did not own great landed estates, wealth, or power. The *fueros* presented an opportunity for the people to throw off the yolk of determinism imposed by the Medieval caste system inherited from the Visigoths. Thus they afforded a freedom to the common people unlike any other in Europe at the time, save England.<sup>163</sup>

Juxtaposed with the communitarian nature of life in the townships, the nobles, military-religious orders, and Spanish church owned and ruled great territories outright. This was the seignorial system inherited from the Roman and Visigothic periods called *latifundio*. Unlike feudalism, in which the relationship between lord and inhabitant was reciprocal, under the system of *latifundio* this relationship was unilateral; the land and its inhabitants were ruled by

the noble. On these estates only two classes existed--landlords and peasants--and the day-to-day existence of the latter was usually miserable, possessing only those rights granted at the whim of the landlord.<sup>164</sup>

The system of *latifundio* was given further support through the system of subdividing reconquered land, by monarchs more sympathetic to the nobles, in reward of services they performed in the *Reconquista*. Simultaneously, the strictly seignorial nature of these estates in many regions became diluted both from pressures from the indigenous peasantry and from competition with the *fueros*. Beginning in the 12th century the peasants in some regions revolted, gaining for themselves political and social rights that defined and limited the work that had to be performed for the noble, abolishing the seignorial system in favor of a feudal one, and allowing peasants to marry without the consent of their lords. Pope Adrian IV (1154-1159) aided in bringing about these changes by the issuance of a bull supporting the rights of the peasants.<sup>165</sup> In addition, by the time of Charles V (1521-1556) privileges of nobility could be openly purchased rather than based upon the Visigothic racial theory of "special qualities" and thus the commercial nature of *latifundio* exploited. Finally, as noted earlier, many of the lands granted by the Castilian monarchs was uninhabited as a result of centuries of warfare and incentives had to be developed to encourage resettlement.<sup>166</sup>

Needless to say, once the peasant was settled on the land the nobles used their superior position to break the reciprocal nature of the noble-peasant relationship. Even in areas of organized peasant

revolt the gains derived from the nobles were only transitory. The most common feature under all of these arrangements was that a system of land rent or tribute, sometimes involving personal services, would be paid to the noble in exchange for certain privileges to the land.<sup>167</sup> As the royal treasury became further in need of funds as a result of its colonial enterprises in America, and embroiled in wars throughout Europe, this system spread throughout Castile as the Crown sold its *baldíos* and other land holdings, sometimes containing towns and cities, to the various monied noble families.<sup>168</sup>

Similar in structure to the noble estates were those held by the Spanish Catholic Church. Since land in Castile meant power, the church possessed a great deal of power as a result of its extensive land holdings.<sup>169</sup> During the *Reconquista* the Crown expanded these holdings. Even after the fall of Granada the ecclesiastical estates continued to expand as nobles transferred title to their estates to the church through bequests.<sup>170</sup> As a result, the church played a direct role in the shaping of Spanish political and social institutions in the reconquered territories.<sup>171</sup> The power derived from these holdings also determined its influential role in shaping these institutions elsewhere.

The last group of large estate holders were the military-religious orders. Among the strictly Hispanic orders that benefitted from the Castilian system were the Knights of Calatrava, Alcántara, and Santiago. As noted earlier in this chapter, they played a key role in expanding and defending the frontier during the *Reconquista*. In return for their services, as in the case of the nobles, the kings of Castile

and León rewarded them with land grants in former Moslem territories.<sup>172</sup> The land was assigned through the institution known as the *encomienda* (literally meaning territories entrusted to one's care). Each *encomienda* was administered by a *comendador* appointed by the Grand Master of the order. The position included control over specified lands, privileges, and revenues. The mission of the *encomienda* was to support the building of towns, the building of local churches, the protection of the clergy, and to defray military expenses. Since the *comendadores* could pocket the difference between the amount raised and expenses, these positions became very lucrative and coveted. The *encomienda* had its roots in the time of the *Reconquista* but the number of *encomiendas* assigned by the Crown continued to grow well into the 16th century to encourage settlement of empty spaces.<sup>173</sup> The *encomiendas* repopulated the pre-*Reconquista* settlements and began new ones, supporting the indigenous system of communal property and custom, but retaining large amounts of these lands for themselves thereby combining seignorial practices with the communitarian ones of the townships.<sup>174</sup>

In addition to the communal *fueros* and seignorial estates, the Castilians practiced one other type of land division--that of private property by individual peasants. Though the Castilian monarchs could assume title to all reconquered territory, they initially tended to respect the Mozarabic concept of private property rights--a system of small holdings owned outright by farmers combined with the system of squatter's rights already discussed. The establishment of the *fueros* on uninhabited lands in proximity to these areas tended to reinforce this

socioeconomic pattern. Later, the Castilian monarchs ruled that Moslem cities that resisted the *Reconquista* would lose their property rights while those that settled on peaceful terms would be allowed to retain theirs; the monarchs in the latter case were content to receive the same tribute previously received by the Moslem rulers. The most important of the reconquered cities came under the direct jurisdiction of the Crown and Christian colonists were encouraged to settle in these places through the system called *repartimiento* (meaning division).<sup>175</sup> Under this system the expropriated lands of resisting towns and the uninhabited lands (the *baldíos*) of peacefully pacified towns were broken into small holdings and distributed according to social class to deserving citizens.<sup>176</sup> However, the Christian rulers soon found pretexts to confiscate the Moslem lands--using the occasions of uprisings or juridical proofs--and this led eventually to the expropriation of these holdings by the *repartimientos*.<sup>177</sup> In these cases the Spaniards would superimpose the system of *repartimiento* upon the Mozarabic and Moslem system of land use, dividing the peasants among the various landholders, thus the seignorial characteristics of Spanish society were internally absorbed by a system originally designed to support smaller landholdings.<sup>178</sup>

Because of the great freedom and upward social mobility they afforded the people, the nobles saw the *fueros* and *repartimientos* as a direct threat to their position and authority.<sup>179</sup> In response the nobles introduced the tradition of *mayorazgo*, or entailed estate, formalized in Spanish law in 1505 and adopted by the rest of Europe. *Mayorazgo* provided that the eldest son would inherit the entire holdings



of his father's estate rather than be divided among his children. This paternalistic system of inheritance had the effect of further centralizing land ownership in the areas practicing *latifundia*.<sup>180</sup>

In addition, internal strife and anarchy still was the natural order of things in Castile in the 14th and 15th centuries. Soldiers of fortune and bandits roamed the countryside under the hire of the nobility to weaken the *fueros* because of their organized nature. These bands invaded the farmlands to demand tribute and pillaged the caravans that carried trade from one town to another.<sup>181</sup> In response the *fueros* banded together creating *Hermandades*, or confederations of towns, to enforce the peace. The *Hermandades* organized police forces, and granted them the power to apprehend law breakers and to hold summary trials and sentences. At various times in Castilian history the *Hermandad* police force was used as an army to wage war against both neighboring nobles and Moorish kingdoms.<sup>182</sup> The *repartimientos*, who did not have the benefit of protection of a powerful lord or the *Hermandad*, usually were easy prey and succumbed to these attacks.<sup>183</sup>

As noted, the Castilian kings granted Jews and Moslems *fueros*. The reasons for this acceptance stems from the abortive attempt made by Fernando III (1199-1252) after the capture of Seville and Cordoba to expel them. The measure resulted in the ruin of the local economy and the decline of agriculture and had to be reversed. The Castilians found that they had conquered the lands of a culture that was superior to their own in most ways. They had overcome it through the force of their zeal and the unity of their effort. This zeal, however, did not blind them from recognizing the error of Fernando's policy of expulsion and

led them to the adoption an extended period of religious tolerance that was to last to the dawn of the 15th century.<sup>184</sup> In addition, while useful in recapturing land from the Moors and in rallying support on the field of battle, Christianity did not yet have the dogmatic quality that would lead to the absolute domination of all aspects of Spanish life.<sup>185</sup>

Consequently, the flower of a Spanish culture, as opposed to a Roman, Visigothic, or Castilian one, began to grow during this period. Whereas thousands of Christians had lived in a Moorish land, now thousands of Moors lived in a Christian one, and, as a result, the influence of the Moorish culture in Castile and elsewhere in Europe began to be felt more than ever before. After the capture of Toledo, Alfonso X (1252-1282) gathered the Moorish and Jewish scholars of the city, which he made his capital, to his court. The scholars of this court translated the Greek classics, which had been in Arabic, into Latin for the use of European scholars who visited Toledo.<sup>186</sup> Universities were built in Palencia (c.1212) and Salamanca (c.1243), the first lasting only a few years, but the second becoming one of the most significant places of learning in the Middle Ages<sup>187</sup>--Bologna, Paris, and Oxford being the only other contemporary universities that could compete with it.<sup>188</sup> The sons of kings, and nobles sat on the same hard benches and walked down the same cold halls of Salamanca as the other students. Cardinals and kings throughout Europe submitted disputes for adjudication to its faculty, and theories of theology, philosophy, and science developed there became the basis of government policy.<sup>189</sup>

During this period of cultural flowering and enlightened tolerance significant societal fissures began to develop. Forces of insularity struggled against those desiring to join the mainstream of European culture. While a time of cultural growth, many of the more significant works of the time were little known outside the peninsula because they were published in Castilian, now the official language of the kingdom, rather than in the universal Latin.<sup>190</sup>

The numerous Jews in the kingdom, in the pattern of a people working desperately to make themselves too valuable to discard, dedicated themselves to scholarship, the trades, finance, civil administration and medicine. The Arabs, while also producing scholars, physicians, tradesmen, and musicians, mainly confined themselves to tilling the soil. By 1300, however, the more numerous Castilian Christians, who had captured the land but had very little in the way of material possessions--their combativeness and religious asceticism carrying them to their victory--began to take refuge in racial and religious stereotyping to explain their secondary material status in a country they had shed blood to win. They looked down on the Moors, who worked with their hands but who owned their land, and with hatred on the Jew, who, in their eyes, was always counting money and accumulating material possessions.<sup>191</sup> As a result, manual labor came to be associated with one of these minorities and, consequently, considered a mark of lower caste.<sup>192</sup> This developing fissure in racial and religious tolerance manifested itself, at first, in an inward looking period among the Christian Castilians. The Medieval period is known as a time of great church and cathedral building. These edifices, which

came to rise throughout the countryside, represented the unity that was developing among the Christian nation that was eventually to form its social and political shape.<sup>193</sup>

The political instability characteristic under the Visigoths and Moors, was also inherited by the Medieval Castilians and was to last into the 15th century. By late 13th century the king could no longer offer *fueros* to counterbalance the power of the nobles. In an attempt to strengthen royal power, Alfonso X created a royal court separate from the Council of Castile that consisted of the king and several judges. This royal court of appeals travelled from kingdom to kingdom until 1485, when it was permanently established at Valladolid. By the second decade of the 16th century these inferior regional appellate courts (called *audiencias*) were established in Galicia, Granada, and Navarre, and did provide a measure of royal control over local jurisprudence.<sup>194</sup>

Alfonso X also supervised the publication of the *Siete Partidas*, the seven branches of law, based partly upon the codified Roman law, outlining the rights and duties of citizens in an obvious attempt to strengthen his base of legitimacy. Despite this move the nobles continued their intrigues against the power of the king and wrested several concessions from him, reversing many of the rights obtained by the peasants on the *latifundia* estates.<sup>195</sup> In 1282 Alfonso X was removed in a rebellion that became one of a series of successions to the throne brought about through repeated bloody rebellions. Secure from the threat of the Moors, Castile turned its aggressive spirit against

itself and cast aside the ideal of peaceful and lawful succession to the throne.<sup>196</sup>

A series of kings succeeded to the throne by this method. Peter I (1350-1369) deepened the fissures developing in the young Spanish culture. Given the surname "the Cruel," Peter became king at the age of fifteen and began an immediate campaign to eliminate his five illegitimate brothers who also pretended to the throne. He and the nobles who opposed him drenched the countryside in blood in these wars. Peter is personally credited with killing twelve men including an archbishop, several cousins, friends, half-brothers, and allegedly his own French queen. He is accused of taking a harem in the Moorish tradition and flaunting his favorite mistress, Maria Padilla, at the court. Not trusting anyone from among his own people, he assigned Jews to the highest positions of government including tax collectors, adding to the enmity growing against them. He had the Moorish palace in Seville, the Alcazar, renovated and held court there in the manner of the former Moorish rulers. Perhaps most telling in assessing the accuracy of these stories, he attempted to bring the nobles to heel by calling the Cortes (1351) and passing legislation restricting their rights to the benefit of the lower classes, though these laws were more honored in their breach than observance.<sup>197</sup> His death came at the hands of his illegitimate brother Henry of Trastamare, supported by a rival faction of nobles, who buried a dagger in his chest and succeeded to the throne (1369-1379).<sup>198</sup>

To add to the hardships of the time the Black Death epidemic reached Castile in 1348 and lasted for several years, imposing a

biological holocaust that caused the death of about one-third of the population. Throughout the rest of Europe the Jews and other outsiders were blamed for the epidemic and, as a result, were the object of great bloody massacres and expulsions. For a while in Spain, however, no similar outrages were committed, particularly because of Peter's dependence upon the Jews of his court. Upon the accession of Henry, however, the monarch decided to punish the Jews for their support of his half-brother and so taxed them heavily and sold into slavery those unable to pay. After a time Henry began reappointing Jews to civil office but the nobles and clergy, no doubt seeing an opportunity to divide the people, were able to pass restrictive laws against them. These laws made it mandatory for Jews to wear a distinctive badge on their outer garments so they could be identified, and forbade them from taking Christian names. Combined with the other elements among the Castilian Christians that contributed to the widespread antipathy against them, the Jews now became associated with the excesses and cruelty of Peter. Being doctors and pharmacists, the Christians saw them as continuing to profit at the expense of others during the time of the Black Death. In 1391, on Ash Wednesday an anti-Jewish riot--no doubt instigated by the clergy--erupted in Seville, and the Jewish quarter burned to the ground. The riots spread across Spain to Cordoba and Castile and through other smaller cities and towns. Thousands were murdered in this human holocaust, the dead piled in heaps in the streets of Cordoba.<sup>199</sup>

With nowhere else to go, considering the oppression against them being undertaken elsewhere in Europe, tens of thousands of the Spanish

Jews converted to Christianity both by compulsion and in an attempt to escape persecution. Many of them rose to positions of authority in the Roman Catholic Church. These converts were called *marranos* and gained acceptance in almost every area of Spanish society. They intermarried with the older Christian families, entered the universities and the professions and trades, and rose, through intermarriage, to the nobility.<sup>200</sup>

After Henry a succession of weak and ineffective monarchs, vulnerable to the conflicting power of both the nobles and the townships, ruled Castile until 1474 when Isabela the Catholic took the throne. As noted earlier, the king of Portugal intervened in the Castilian succession favoring Juana who was half Portuguese. Isabela was Henry's sister but entirely Castilian. As a consequence the battle lines were drawn among the nobles of the kingdom starting a civil war that would last until 1479 when Isabela's forces won the throne. That same year the 83 year old John II of Aragon and Navarre, father of Isabela's husband Ferdinand of Aragon, died. The conjunction of these events resulted in the unity of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon and the beginning of modern Spain in the political sense.<sup>201</sup>

The rule of the Catholic sovereigns, as they are called, was to significantly affect Spanish society. Having won the throne Isabela first sought to stabilize her own rule. There was widespread support in Aragon and elsewhere, upon the death of Ferdinand's father, that Isabela should cede the Crown in favor of her husband as the male in the royal line. A marital agreement had already been signed that upon her succession to the throne of Castile Ferdinand would not intervene in the

internal affairs of the country. But the problem of who would have the primary power was not resolved. The solution to this conflict, after months of negotiation, was the Diarchy. By this agreement both husband and wife would rule jointly. Justice would be dispensed jointly if at the same place at the same time, and individually if at different places. Royal ordinances had to be signed by both, money to be stamped with the busts or figures of both, and the royal seals to contain the arms of both Aragon and Castile. The administrative affairs of Castile remained solely, however, in the hands of Isabela.<sup>202</sup>

Having taken care of personal domestic affairs the sovereigns then moved to consolidate power elsewhere in Spanish society and politics. Various heretical groups such as the *Mozarabes*, as well as the Jews and Moslems represented obstacles to religious unity. In addition, the competing power of the nobles and townships prevented political unity. To bring these groups under the control of the monarchy the Catholic sovereigns initiated various measures. Between 1480 and 1483 the Catholic sovereigns established the Holy Inquisition under the rubric of examining the sincerity of the Jewish converts and to enforce religious orthodoxy.<sup>203</sup> The *Hermandades* of the *fueros* were molded into a federal police force called the "Holy Brotherhood" to bring further control to the countryside and to reduce the power of the nobles.<sup>204</sup> Ferdinand assumed the grand masterships of the three military-religious orders, Santiago, Alcántara, and Calatrava when they became vacant, co-opting the power of these societies. At the Cortes that assembled in Toledo that year the faction for the nobles was ejected and their places taken by town lawyers, called *letrados*,



educated in the Roman and Visigothic legal tradition of the *Siete Partidas* of Alfonso X, the lawyers being more favorable to the interests of the Crown.<sup>205</sup>

The Inquisition was first established in Italy by Pope Honorius III in 1231, in France by St. Louis in 1233 and into Spain by Gregory IX in 1235 against the various "heresies" then developing among the infant Catholic churches. The Pope gave the Dominican order of priests responsibility for the Inquisition, in certain countries the order receiving up to one-third of the wealth of the person condemned.<sup>206</sup> By the Middle Ages it began to be used to repress the various Protestant sects sweeping across Europe. Brutal methods were used against these people and the methods employed by the Spaniards were not unique. However, the peculiarities of Spanish culture absorbed the philosophy and methods of the Inquisition and transformed them into a uniquely Spanish institution.

The primary purpose of the Inquisition was as a political instrument of Isabela and Ferdinand, but one imbued with religious fervor. The distinctions between the spiritual and the temporal were blurred thereby making it a necessity that Spain become one in spirit as well as in purpose and rule. The Crown secured many concessions from Rome and in the process created a separate Spanish church--one that combined national political and religious interests.<sup>207</sup> This last point is not insignificant for this separation of the Spanish from the Roman church allowed the sovereigns to assume control of the ecclesiastical power of the nation. They placed the friars in control

of the Inquisition and these brought down many of the bishops whose loyalties the Crown suspected.<sup>208</sup>

The ferocity and zealousness of Spanish society that had served so well against the Moors, and that had caused its political instability, was now turned against itself and was to affect the very fabric of society. In the words of the Spanish historian Salvador de Madariaga, "Under their (the Catholic sovereign's) common rule the Spanish anarchy became a state and the Spanish state became a church."<sup>209</sup>

As has been demonstrated, there was widespread anti-Jewish sentiment among a large portion of the Christian majority in Spain that caused the passing of laws by the Cortes during the 15th century severely restricting their rights and movements. The proportion of the Jewish population that converted to Christianity blurred the physical and religious distinctions erected by the anti-semitic laws. Soon interests within the Catholic Church and elsewhere questioned the sincerity and "purity" of the conversion of the *marranos*.

Unlike the European Protestants who openly defied Papal influence, the paranoia generated by the Inquisition in Spain was particularly insidious because all were suspects no matter their Christian devoutness, loyalty or the benevolent intent of their actions or opinions. Family genealogies were studied to determine if any Jewish blood had contaminated the lineage and, if determined to be so, their property and position were taken from them.<sup>210</sup>

The Rules and Regulations for the Inquisition, which were written to determine if someone was a "Judaizer", effectively illustrate

the level at which the Inquisition intruded. If an individual wore better clothes or spread clean table-linen on the Jewish sabbath; if he had no fire in his house the day before the sabbath; if he ate a meal with a Jew, ate animals slaughtered by one, or observed any of the Jewish fasts; if he washed a corpse in warm water, or turned his face toward the wall when dying; if he recited one of the Psalms of David without the addition of the Doxology; and if he gave his children Hebrew names he was convicted of apostasy.<sup>211</sup> Other serious charges included the avoidance of the use of fat or lard in cooking; preparing amive, a broth popular among Jews; eating "Passover bread"; reading or possessing a Hebrew bible; ignorance of the Pater noster and Creed; or in defending a Jew.<sup>212</sup>

These measures were first used against the nobility to further weaken their power, keeping the aristocracy in a constant state of terror. They also proved to be exceedingly popular, feeding on the general animosity held for both the nobles and Jews.<sup>213</sup> Consequently, the Inquisition provided an opportunity for enterprising souls to become informers and thus appropriate jobs, titles, and money. Black lists proliferated, the most famous of which was entitled "The Green Book of Aragon," which caused the downfall of hundreds of families. So effective was this tool that another list entitled "Blot on the Nobility of Spain," written by a Cardinal in 1560 embittered by the rejection for admittance of two relatives to a military order, accused several hundred individuals with having impure blood, thereby producing the same result as the earlier blacklist.<sup>214</sup>

When applying for a job a man had to provide a genealogy going back several generations proving the purity of his blood, and the compilation of such records provided a lucrative market for forgery, bribery, and blackmail.<sup>215</sup> Most sinister and tragic was the self-consuming aspect of the repression in which high level *marranos*, which included Isabela's private confessor, Talavera, and the Grand Inquisitor himself, Torquemada, zealously executed the repression as proof of their own spiritual purity. Not accidentally, the confiscation of wealth and property wrought by the Inquisition also enriched the royal coffers, solving the perennial monetary shortages and allowing for greater monarchical freedom.<sup>216</sup>

This concept of racial purity infiltrated all aspects of Spanish society and was eventually to affect its intellectual development by reinforcing the insular aspects of Spanish culture. Later, when they were confronted with the Indians of the Americas and Asia, it would manifest itself in an extreme form of cultural chauvinism that tended to think of itself as the embodiment of human achievement, conferring upon the Spaniards the responsibility for imposing upon these primitive peoples the gift of Spanish culture and institutions to the exclusion of all non-Hispanic considerations. When combined with the unity of the political and spiritual organisms, it also endowed Spanish society with a peculiarly legalistic characteristic, finding juridical proofs that served to justify otherwise indefensible actions.

While the Inquisition pressed against the *marranos* and nobles, the Catholic sovereigns launched an invasion in 1481 of Granada under the pretext of a Moorish attack upon Spanish territory.<sup>217</sup> The

Spanish monarchs were compelled to eradicate Moorish influence from the peninsula not just from racial and religious prejudice, but also as a result of the threat posed by the rise of the Ottoman Turks. The Turkish empire had only a short time before conquered Constantinople and continued pressing the European countries in the eastern Mediterranean as well as spreading their control across North Africa--even attempting an invasion of Italy. The Spaniards felt that they could little afford to allow the existence of a sympathetic presence to the Turks on the Iberian peninsula.<sup>218</sup>

Though small in size compared to the united kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, the Moslem kingdom was well protected with ramparts and a large army. Eleven years expired before Granada, weakened by famine and exhaustion, conditionally surrendered on January 2, 1492. Under the terms of the treaty Isabela and Ferdinand guaranteed the Moslems religious freedom; the retention of their own laws, homes, and possessions; and that they were to pay no additional taxes.<sup>219</sup> The terms of this treaty, however, would not be respected for long.

The *marranos* and nobles repressed and the Moors defeated, the Jews now became the target of the monarchy. From the time of the first Inquisitional Tribunal in 1480, Torquemada had espoused the expulsion of the Jews who did not convert, but Ferdinand rejected his recommendation because of the negative economic effects that such a move was expected to cause. However, the confessions coerced and property confiscated over the twelve years of the Inquisition had demonstrated to the monarchy that the *marranos*, and by extension the Jews, were insincere

and could not be trusted, and that a tremendous amount of wealth was there for the taking.<sup>220</sup>

Anti-semitic fanaticism among the Christians seems to have reached a fever pitch by this time and led to the prosecution of a case before the Inquisition that was to become a cause celebre of the 15th century--one repeated to this day by anti-semitic Spanish historians.<sup>221</sup> In June, 1490, a *marrano* by the name of Benito Garcia, on his way back from his pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela was robbed by some of the Christian inhabitants of the town of Astorga. A Jew, converted or not, was fair game for plunder among many of the Christian communities. Garcia, who was under suspicion from the start because of his possession of a consecrated wafer, was arrested instead of the robbers. The local authorities tortured and interrogated him and then turned him over to the Inquisition. Eighteen months after torture and confinement, first at Segovia then at Avila, Garcia confessed to the story the Inquisitors sought: that he and other Jews crucified a Christian child and performed an obscene ritual involving the child's heart and the consecrated wafer. Of course, no body had been found in the area and no child was missing from the vicinity of Astorga. As a result, Garcia was executed in an *Auto de Fe* held at Avila on November 16, 1491. Using the Garcia trial as an example of the vileness of the Jews within the kingdom, Torquemada had the story of the *Niño de La Guardia*, as the imaginary child came to be known, broadcast throughout the kingdom from the altar. The *Niño de La Guardia* soon became a folk hero and a popular saint and his canonization demanded at Rome--miracles were said to occur on the fictitious spot where his body was said to

have been found. As a result, a popular call arose among the people for the expulsion of the Jews.<sup>222</sup>

Three months after the fall of Granada the axe fell and the Catholic sovereigns decreed the expulsion of all Jews from Spain. The decree ordered them, upon pain of death, to convert to Christianity or leave the country within four months. The decree allowed them to dispose of their property, but they could not receive gold, silver, or precious stones in payment. Abranel, a Jew attached to the royal household, obtained an audience with the king at his quarters at Santa Fe and offered 30,000 ducats--a large sum of money--in return for the rescission of the decree. Ferdinand was on the verge of relenting to Abranel's plea when Torquemada stormed into the room holding aloft a crucifix, and shouted, "Judas Iscariot sold his master for thirty pieces of silver; Your Highness would sell him anew for thirty thousand; here he is, take him and barter him away." The decree stood and Abranel was forced to join his brethren in exile. Approximately half of the total Jewish population of 300,000 left the country, migrating to northern Africa, Constantinople, the Near East, Albania, and Greece. The Spanish Jews, however, had never lived elsewhere. Their Spanish identity, despite the repressive laws and riots, was as ingrained as that of the Christian Spaniards. Consequently, the remainder of the Jewish population remained in Spain and accepted baptism, only to become further grist for the Inquisitorial mill.<sup>223</sup>

For a period of six to seven years after the treaty the Moors of Granada were left in peace. Then Archbishop Jimenez de Cisneros began attempts to convert the Islamic populace to Christianity by distributing

gifts to the Moslem leaders. Since conversion seemed to be profitable many of the common people followed the lead of these rulers. On one occasion hundreds of people assembled to be baptized so a large mop of Holy Water was twirled over the heads of the crowd to consummate the ceremony. When these efforts at conversion stalled, Cisneros in 1499 had all of the Arabic religious books that he could find thrown into a huge bonfire in the public plaza of Granada. The archbishop also used threats and arrests to compel the more intransigent portions of the populace to convert. In 1502, the Christian sovereigns issued a royal decree requiring conversion or expulsion and, as the Jews before them, most of the remaining Islamic population remained and converted.<sup>224</sup>

Moriscos, as converted Moors were called, still did not enjoy equality with other Spaniards. Laws forbade them to wear their traditional clothing and from bathing, the latter considered to be the mark of apostasy. Soon the demon of racial purity set its sights upon the Moors, and as in the case of the *marranos*, under the Inquisition they were repressed, slaughtered and finally, under the reign of Philip III between the years 1609 and 1611, expelled from the kingdom. Since the Moors had mainly confined their activities to farming they took their agricultural knowledge with them and Spain lost the backbone of its agricultural economy. As a consequence, farm productivity declined and the land that had been the breadbasket of Rome and famed for the flowering gardens of Cordoba lost its fertility and abundance--a condition from which Spain has still not recovered.<sup>225</sup>

The Catholic sovereigns had combined the political, religious, and social organisms of Spain together and subordinated them to their



will. But one last center of power existed outside the monarchy--that of the townships--and these they soon brought under their power through several measures. The Cortes did not meet between the periods of 1482 and 1498, and only after then to rubber stamp appropriations decisions already decided by the Crown. The sovereigns' chief justices, called *corregidores*, convened and presided over municipal meetings, thereby neutralizing the power of elected municipal officials, and acted as "inquiries in residence"--open to investigate any suspected illegal acts by elected municipal authorities. As mentioned, the *Hermandades* were co-opted by the Crown and turned into a national police force. Special examiners, judges, and auditors also enforced royal control, and the number of people who could be elected *caballeros* severely restricted. Though not entirely destroyed, the sovereigns clearly made the townships and the Cortes subordinate to their authority.<sup>226</sup>

Two other significant events occurred in 1492 in Spain. One was Columbus' discovery of America already noted in the first section of this chapter. The other was the publication of the first Castilian book of grammar by Antonio de Nebrija--the first of any modern European tongue. When presented to the queen at court she is supposed to have asked, "What is it for?" In reply Nebrija answered, "Language, your majesty, is the ideal weapon of empire."<sup>227</sup> No greater example can be given to illustrate the cultural insularity that had overtaken the kingdom and in anticipating the use that language was to have in the pacification of the New World.

Under Isabela and Ferdinand Spain had become an absolutist state. This occurred because the divisiveness between the various

elements of Spanish society created the conditions where a strong leader (or, as in this case, leaders) could play one faction off against the other and in so doing destroy independent and competing bases of power. The key to all of this was the unifying force of religion. The suspicion engendered by the Inquisition of possible enemies hiding everywhere, particularly enemies having traits that could be tagged, in the context of the time, as reprehensible, had the effect of uniting various factions against the most powerful one. Vulnerable when isolated, each faction was eliminated in turn until only the power of the Crown, legitimized by a union with the persuasive power of an evangelical Christianity, remained.

The extent of 16th century Spanish monarchical absolutism has been a topic of lively debate among historians. In the 18th and 19th centuries British historians, in particular, tended to use the Spanish system as the monarchical model to avoid, especially when compared to British constitutional monarchy, pointing to the rapid decline of Spanish power and tracing this decline to the a system that placed the destiny of an entire nation in the hands of one individual. While the absolute nature of the monarchy certainly contributed to the decline of the Spanish empire, the debate begs the question regarding the extent of absolutism. Political analysis of totalitarian governments in our own time (the 20th century) reveal that absolute governments rule absolutely only within certain confines. Identifying these confines and understanding their significance is important in understanding the nature of 16th century Spanish civilization and the manner in which that

nation tended to interact with its colonial possessions and the nature of the institutions established in those possessions.

On the surface, the rule of Isabela and Ferdinand appears to be a break with many of the traditional Spanish socio-political structures and there is no doubt that their policies destroyed the source of much of the societal vitality of the Spanish. However, on a different level, their policies were a successful application of the imposition of centralized rule attempted throughout the history of the peninsula. Instead of selecting the *fueros* to counterbalance the nobles and thereby further dispersing power, which was the solution of previous monarchs, the Catholic sovereigns established the monarchy as the sole locus of power and legitimacy. The friars were placed in charge of the Inquisition, and being ambitious men, many times used this power to replace bishops with themselves. Similarly, the *letrados* replaced the nobles in the Cortes and the lower noble classes replaced the oldest noble families by denouncing them as having impure blood. Thus, when placed in positions of authority, these emerging groups owed their survival and allegiance to one source--the monarch.

The extent of this power, however, when compared to the whole of Spanish society was quite small. Approximately 80% of the Spanish population practiced subsistence agriculture either as freemen or on the great landed ecclesiastical and noble estates. The overwhelming majority of this population was illiterate<sup>728</sup> and control maintained through the power of a mystical religion. The movement known as the Cult of the Virgin was particularly prevalent in Medieval and Renaissance Spain. Throughout the countryside statues of the Virgin

were buried in fields during the more intolerant periods of Moorish rule. Later, when peasants brought new fields into cultivation these statues began to be dug up. In these cases legends would arise describing, as in the case of Campostela, that a star appeared in the sky marking the spot of the statue or that a peasant was visited by the Virgin in a dream and implored that her image be liberated from the earth. So common were the supply of statues and so resilient the imaginations and faith of the people that to this day one cannot go into a sizable Spanish town without a local variant of this story complete with relic.

The concern of the Crown in the 16th century was in controlling the social institutions created by the literate and socially mobile upper 20% of the society--the nobles and rising middle class. No doubt the recorded impact of the Inquisition and other aspects of Isabela and Ferdinand's rule is skewed to this class since the poor and illiterate people who made up the bulk of Spanish society, as poor and illiterate people elsewhere, left no written record behind. However, even within the limited grouping of the nobles and middle class the monarch ruled absolutely only in certain matters.

In conducting research for this manuscript one is overwhelmed by the amount of correspondence written to the Spanish monarchs concerning the most mundane matters of Spanish life, particularly in the case of the colonies. Several historians have referred to the amazing amount of freedom of expression revealed in this correspondence though there were obviously forbidden subjects.<sup>229</sup> No doubt this correspondence was used by the monarchs as a sort of intelligence service regarding matters

in their dominions.<sup>230</sup> However, there is a consistency in this policy of free expression in line with Castilian tradition. As illustrated earlier, the Inquisition intervened at the lowest levels of society and derived its power and legitimacy from the Crown. In addition, since the period of the Visigothic kingdom, the sovereign was considered to be subject to the same laws as every other subject. The Catholic sovereigns reconciled this apparent contradiction in the union of temporal and spiritual authority by making the monarch obligated to respond to the needs of the people under Spiritual authority--the same authority that in their conception ruled every man. The monarch evaluated the acceptability of what was written and the governed evaluated the fairness of the royal decisions through the unwritten system of justice and values that operates in every society--the *gemeinschaft*--and this heavily influenced by Christian doctrine.

Power had been consolidated within the confines of Spain. After Isabela's death in 1504, Ferdinand (d. 1516) continued the work of consolidating power in the monarchy. In 1505 the Laws of Toro were promulgated. These laws established the concept that the power to make, interpret, and annul laws lay in the king. According to the concept, equity, or a beneficial interpretation, was the ultimate aim of law. The *letrados* as the representatives of the monarch were responsible for the vitality of this "living law" as personified in the monarch.<sup>231</sup> The influence of the Laws of Toro had a significant effect upon Spanish society. The functioning of local administration and jurisprudence depended upon the *letrados* and led Spanish society to focus upon the

desire to find juridical proofs to define almost every aspect of society.

Internationally, Spanish expansionism had only begun. Ferdinand added the kingdom of Navarre in 1513.<sup>232</sup> This man, who Machiavelli used as his archetype in developing the model of the ideal manipulative ruler in The Prince, also defeated the French in Italy and added the kingdom of Naples to his dominions.<sup>233</sup> Most significantly, however, the colonies of the New World held center stage in the development of Spanish law, politics, and culture. The language of empire and Spanish social institutions were transplanted throughout these new lands.

Historians have labelled this period the Spanish Golden Age. The monarchs that were to follow the Catholic sovereigns, Charles I (Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, 1516-1556) and Philip II (1556-1598) span the period upon which the coming chapters will focus. The monarch to which Magellan and his fellow pilots fled was Charles.

Charles was educated in Flanders and when, in 1516, he succeeded to the Spanish throne he did not speak a word of Spanish. The nobles of Spain saw this as an opportunity to win back the power they lost under the Catholic sovereigns but, when they approached Cardinal Cisneros who now controlled the regency, he pointed to his cannon when questioned about his authority. As a result, Charles successfully assumed the throne at the age of seventeen without opposition from this group.<sup>234</sup>

The grandson of Ferdinand, he was generally disliked by the Spanish people and distrusted them in return. He appointed Flemings to many high positions in government further undercutting his legitimacy. Fifteen towns sent a legation to the king to complain about his attitude

and actions and made several formal demands but Charles refused to compromise. Finally, in 1520, rebellion broke out among the townships. Several local heroes rose to positions of leadership but no one person united their cause. The nobles, now seeing a chance to regain power at the expense of the townships, backed the king and the combined forces of the Crown and nobles crushed the rebellion and the absolutist monarchy established by Isabela and Ferdinand was reaffirmed. Charles had the leaders of the rebellion executed and 4,000 German troops quartered in the rebellious towns. Later, after conditions settled, he pardoned the remainder of those who had been part of the rebellion.<sup>235</sup>

Charles placed Spain in the middle of European events. Through his mother, Juana of Castile, and his grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon, he inherited Castile, Aragon, Navarre, Sardinia, Sicily, the Kingdom of Naples, the Roussillon, and the Spanish colonies in Africa and the New World; from his father, Philip the Handsome of the Hapsburgs, he inherited territories in northern and eastern France, the Low Countries, and Luxembourg; and from his grandfather, Maximilian I, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, he inherited dominions in Austria and Bohemia. Though the largest empire since Charlemagne, it was loosely confederated, having no common political identity or legitimacy except for the biological accident of Charles V. He aggressively attempted to maintain this empire, using the methods of absolute rule that had worked so well in Spain, and to crush the Reformation movement then sweeping across Europe, but to no avail.<sup>236</sup>

For all of its power, Spain at the beginning of the 16th century was a nation that had cashed in its cultural wealth and lived well for

the short period its capital lasted. Historians recently have looked upon the Golden Age of Spain more uncritically than in the past, blaming its decline on external reasons such as colonial overextension, economic debt, military decline, and the failure to industrialize. These reasons, however, are deceptive in nature and represent only the symptoms of the general sickness that had overcome Spanish society. Spain during its Golden Age was a nation with its substance already carved out, the momentum of its cultural achievements during the 13th and 14th centuries carrying it through the politically ascendant period of the 16th and 17th centuries.

At the root of this cultural bankruptcy is the Inquisition and the peculiar sort of racial prejudice that it spawned. Aside from the material and intellectual contributions made by the Jews and Arabs that were eliminated from Spanish society by this measure, all non-Hispanic influences were made suspect. Thus the University of Salamanca, the center of learning in all of Europe during the Middle Ages, began to decline and provides a convenient bellwether of Spanish intellectual freedom. First, in reflection of the Inquisition, those of impure racial origins were excluded. Then the boys of untitled families could no longer attend the university--the nature of the curriculum changed to that of a finishing school for the nobility. By the end of the 16th century mathematics were no longer taught and by 1750 medicine dropped from the curriculum.<sup>237</sup> Charles V stated that Salamanca was "the treasury from which I furnish justice and government to my people of Spain,"<sup>238</sup> and he was right--the decline of Spain coincided, not accidentally, with the decline of Spanish intellectual freedom. In



addition, the Spanish prejudice against manual labor--having been associated with the traits of the Moors and Jews--instilled a unique desire among the upper classes to make their fortunes by other means, thereby resulting in the neglect of Spanish industry. Thus, Spain was a bipolar world consisting of numerous poor illiterate laborers and a few relatively rich, well-educated overlords.

The combined force of the diseases of reaction, intolerance, insularity, cultural chauvinism, racial purity, and absolutist rule eventually doomed Spain to failure. Combined with these destructive tendencies is the political genius displayed by Isabela and Ferdinand in manipulating political forces in Spain and Europe to their advantage. Unfortunately, their successors were not as talented or successful. The New World and the Philippines were discovered coincident with these events and they were to shape the nature of the conquest and colonization of those lands. They also determined the cultural traits that were to be transplanted there and bequeathed to their progeny.

#### The Legacy of Spanish American Colonial Rule

Spain at the dawn of the 16th century had united the Iberian peninsula and was well underway in establishing a vast overseas colonial empire in a new world. Columbus, after his voyage of 1492 in which he discovered the islands of San Salvador<sup>239</sup>, Cuba and Hispaniola, made several additional expeditions. In September 1493, he left Spain with seventeen ships and fifteen hundred men to colonize his discoveries. He discovered the island of Dominica in November 1493, and explored and

began the settlement of the islands of Cuba and Hispaniola. He also discovered Puerto Rico and Jamaica on this trip, returning to Spain in 1496 with a supply of Indian slaves.

The story of the conquest of the island of Hispaniola (named La Isla Española by Columbus<sup>240</sup>) and the atrocities and depredations committed upon the natives of that island by the first Spanish settlers have been well documented throughout history and do not need to be repeated here. However, the weaponry used by the Spaniards in the conquest of the Arawaks (as the natives were called) provides an idea of the military methods employed at the time. The Spaniards used the arquebus, crossbow, sword, cavalry, and hounds to great effect against the primitive native weaponry of spear and blowgun. Of the last two Spanish weapons, the first was effective because of the fear the horse created among the natives, and the second because of their effectiveness in literally tearing a native to pieces. In this manner were the Arawaks warred upon until they submitted to forced labor in the gold mines or landed estates.<sup>241</sup>

Columbus made a third voyage with eight ships in January 1498. Splitting his fleet in two, he sent one group to Hispaniola to colonize that island and led the second south to Cape Verde and from there travelled to the coast of present day Venezuela, which he believed to be the mainland of Asia. He arrived at Hispaniola after several weeks of exploration and found a rebellion among the colonists in progress. While this rebellion fomented, a royal investigator sent by Isabela and Ferdinand to check on Columbus' administration of the islands arrived in Cuba in 1500<sup>242</sup> and, exceeding his authority, promptly clamped

Christopher, his brother, and son in chains<sup>243</sup> and sent them back to Spain. The Spanish sovereigns disapproved of this move by their investigator and released them.<sup>244</sup>

It became apparent in Spain during this time that the lands of the New World discovered by Columbus were much more extensive than originally thought and many more expeditions of discovery were authorized by the Spanish monarchs to the great consternation of Columbus who, in the contract signed with Spain, had been made viceroy and governor of all the lands he discovered and given ten percent of the proceeds from those lands tax-free.<sup>245</sup> This was done because Isabela and Ferdinand began to believe that it had been a mistake to grant to Columbus complete proprietorship of the new lands--particularly on his actions regarding enslaving the natives.<sup>246</sup>

Though Columbus requested and received approval for a fourth, and last, voyage, his full monopoly rights to the new lands were never reinstated and he was never again entrusted with political administration.<sup>247</sup> On his last voyage Columbus sailed from Cadiz in May 1502 and explored the eastern coast of Central America from Honduras to Panama, and after finding some deposits of gold, was shipwrecked on Jamaica. The purpose of this final voyage was to find a strait past the mainland beyond the newly discovered islands and into the Indian Ocean.<sup>248</sup> He returned to Spain in November 1504 and died two years later still believing that he had explored the east coast of Asia.<sup>249</sup>

Even before Columbus' troubles in Hispaniola erupted the Spanish Crown obviously had doubts about the administration of these new lands. Between the years 1495 and 1497 the government published a general

concession to all those wishing to explore them. The rich merchants of Seville and Cadiz, hearing stories of gold and pearls in America, outfitted ships manned by ruthless fortune-seekers. So great were the abuses committed by these men that the general license was revoked.<sup>250</sup> Thus the colonization and administration of the New World colonies was to be a centrally controlled enterprise following the pattern established by the *Reconquista* and by the Catholic monarchs in all of their other relations.

Other major voyages after Columbus expanded the knowledge concerning the extent of the new lands. Most noteworthy was that of Alonso de Hojeda who left with four vessels in May 1499 and followed the route of Columbus' third voyage. He reached South America near present day Paramaribo and coasted northwest along the regions now known as Guiana and Venezuela. He then proceeded to Hispaniola for a rest and on his return to Spain raided two small islands. He arrived back in Spain with 220 native slaves, and some pearls and gold.<sup>251</sup> One other voyage was significant during this time. Not long after Hojeda left Cadiz, Alonso Nuño, an expert pilot, set sail with one fifty ton caravel and thirty-three men for the pearl coast of South America. Nuño so successfully obtained pearls and other precious metals on this trip that it became the most profitable expedition to the New World undertaken to that time.<sup>252</sup> The promising nature of both of these trips had the effect of encouraging further explorations to the American mainland beyond the islands found by Columbus.

Soon the Spaniards explored the entire coast of South America, though much of it was on the Portuguese side of the Line of Demarcation.

Still, while of great interest to Europe as a whole, the New World provided little wealth to Spain; records from the time (c. 1508) indicate that a small amount of gold amounting to 400,000 pesos arrived in the home country each year.<sup>253</sup> It was not until the explorations of the interior of the American mainland that the potential wealth of the new lands were realized. These expeditions were to culminate in the conquest of the Aztecs in Mexico by Hernán Cortés (1518-1520)<sup>254</sup> and of the Incas in Peru by Francisco Pizarro (1531-1535).<sup>255</sup>

The methods of conquest of these more organized civilizations reveals that the Spaniards brought much with them from the *Reconquista*. The 16th century was a time a great change in terms of military weaponry and organization. The Spanish methods in America had an old-fashioned and haphazard quality that recalled earlier periods. The armies of conquest consisted of mercenaries, each arming himself as best he could. Many of these mercenaries were not professional soldiers but social outcasts of the Inquisition, men hoping to escape the seignorial obligations of the common man, and men from the poorer districts in Spain.<sup>256</sup> Both Cortés and Pizarro themselves came from the poor desert-like district of Extremadura, a district that stands foremost in producing *conquistadores*.<sup>257</sup>

Methods of strategy and tactics were improvisational in nature-- the situations encountered would have made any European drill-book of the time obsolete anyway. The weaponry carried on these expeditions were the same ones mentioned in regard to Hispaniola--arquebuses, pikes, swords, cavalry, crossbows, and hounds. While firearms were significant in the conquests, they are not considered by historians to have been

decisive. Artillery pieces could not be brought along because of the mountainous terrain and thick undergrowth of the areas of the conquest.<sup>258</sup> Once again, cavalry seems to have been one of the decisive weapons in the initial victories, but Cortés brought only sixteen horses with him and most of these were killed in the various battles against the Aztecs leaving his men to fight on foot. They had the advantage of steel over stone, but the native weaponry, consisting of battle-axes, slings, spears, and long-bows<sup>259</sup>, was just as capable of inflicting a mortal wound to any of the handful of heavily outnumbered Spaniards.<sup>260</sup>

The decisive nature of the invasion seems to lie in the same methods that were used to good effect in the *Reconquista*. The native opposition was not united and the Spaniards were able to gain these competing tribes as allies. In addition, the majority of the Indian population, which had been organized into a system of communal labor, was docile and largely indifferent to who held power. Without the assistance of the natives Cortés could not have had the buildings of Tenochtitlán pulled down.<sup>261</sup> Consequently, since the political legitimacy of the Indian empires was narrowly based it was necessary only to defeat a small cadre of political leaders in order to assume power. Finally, the spirit of the aggressive type of Christianity practiced by the Spaniards carried them through to victory even when one would suppose that the numerical odds were clearly against them. The Amerindian faith professed that an individual was required to fight and, if need be, die bravely. In contrast, the Spanish faith was one that professed survival and victory.<sup>262</sup>

The places that the Spaniards did have problems were with the less settled and civilized tribes of the interior. The Araucanians of southern Chile, the Chichimecas of northern Mexico, and the Karibs of the lesser Antilles all inflicted defeats upon the Spaniards and could not be pacified. Without a system of social organization that could be readily identified by the Spaniards, these tribes were able to successfully resist subjugation.<sup>263</sup> Their defeat was brought about by a combination of brutal military methods applied over a period of several decades and, as elsewhere in the New World, attrition brought about by diseases unintentionally introduced by the Spaniards. In Mexico the effect of these diseases caused the reduction of the indigenous population from over 11,000,000 in 1519 to less than 2,500,000 by the end of the 16th century.<sup>264</sup>

Clearly the Spaniards never really understood why they succeeded in America. No great plan had been developed by any of the *conquistadores* and this is why this is still a point at issue among historians today. The Spaniards obviously entered upon an unknown world armed only with their material weapons and the baggage of their culture and experience. By knowingly or unknowingly applying the methods used during the *Reconquista* they were able to conquer highly organized civilizations with but a few hundred men. Two cultures met on the field of battle and the one that valued victory achieved victory and the one that valued heroic death achieved heroic death.

The Spaniards imported several institutions into the islands during the initial period of discovery and conquest and these were to become models for later colonial enterprises. The rebellion in

Hispaniola led Columbus to bring about the importation of the *repartimiento* system of Indian labor in order to appease the rebels. Unlike the division of former Moslem lands in Spain, the *repartimiento* in the New World followed the model developed in the Canaries in which certain numbers of natives were assigned to landed estates as enforced labor or servants.<sup>265</sup> This model was used in the Canaries and the islands of America because of the non-pastoral characteristics of the indigenous population. However, when the Spaniards moved into the more densely populated portions of the mainland the institution of the *encomienda* came to be used instead.<sup>266</sup>

Following the example of the military-religious orders, the *encomiendas* were grants of land and people entrusted to the care of an *encomendero*. As in Spain these estates did not follow the seignorial character of those owned by the nobles, but instead gave the *encomendero* the right to exact tribute and personal services from time to time to defray the expenses of pacification.<sup>267</sup> In return the *encomendero* provided protection for the Indians, appointed and paid the parish priests, and constructed churches and settlements.<sup>268</sup> Usually the tribute was collected through the indigenous chieftains, the system of the *encomiendas* superimposed over the indigenous population.<sup>269</sup> This institution was given legislative approval by Isabela in 1503<sup>270</sup>, which provided that with each new conquest the *adelantado* or governor could divide up the natives of the area among the conquerors.<sup>271</sup>

As noted, the interior lands that were opened up by the *conquistadores* were well beyond the expectations of the Crown. An efficient system of administering these great lands had to be found.



Unlike the pattern of colonization later practiced in English America, the transmission of culture in Spanish America was through imperial domain--not by the growth of individual settlements of immigrants acting on their own impulse.<sup>272</sup> This pattern was immediately established during the time of Columbus, for aside from the *repartimiento*, he also provided that the Spanish settlements in the New World be based upon the Castilian model and this system was later transferred to the remainder of the colonies.<sup>273</sup> At first the main source of Spanish emigration to the New World was from among individuals convicted of crimes and exiled by the courts and the Inquisition<sup>274</sup>, but this policy was soon revoked.

Combined with the commercial nature of the colonial enterprise was the concern for the welfare for the Indians held by the Spanish monarchs. In 1502 Isabela and Ferdinand assigned Nicolás Ovando as governor of Hispaniola and in his instructions appear the first of many edicts regarding the treatment of the Amerindian population. They decreed that he was to provide for the kindly treatment of the Indians and maintain peaceful relations between them and the settlers; that the Indians were to pay tribute and help in the prospecting for gold, but shall receive fair wages for their labor; that emigration was now restricted to Spaniards, excluding Jews, Moros, or Moriscos--to prevent them from endangering the souls of the Indians; that African slaves born in Christian lands could be taken to the colony but no others; and that the Governor was to be careful not to alienate the Indians against Christianity.<sup>275</sup>

By the time Ovando arrived, however, the Indians had already been alienated by the brutal methods of the colonists. To meet the new conditions the sovereigns instructed him in March 1503 to establish the Indians in villages; to give them lands they could not abandon; to place them under a protector; to provide a school house in each village to teach them reading, writing, and Christian doctrine; to prevent their further oppression by the indigenous chieftains; to suppress the native heathen ceremonies; to have them marry their wives in the Christian form; and to encourage their intermarriage with the Spanish Christians.<sup>276</sup> Later that same year, in December 1503, the sovereigns addressed the problem of labor: the Indians should work on public works, in gold prospecting, and in farming but their labor was to be paid for through wages to be determined by the governor <sup>277</sup> but "as free men . . . and not as servants."<sup>278</sup>

The sovereigns also moved to settle the administrative control of the new lands. Unlike other colonizing nations, the lands of the Indies, as they were called, were considered by the Crown to be co-equal kingdoms with the other Spanish kingdoms on the Iberian peninsula. Consequently, the administrative office created to govern the New World lands was through a royal Council of the Indies.<sup>279</sup> The basis of this administrative system evolved naturally when, in May 1493, Isabela and Ferdinand appointed Juan de Fonseca, the archbishop of Burgos, to act as admiral in making preparations for Columbus' second voyage. For the next ten years, until the establishment of an official administrative agency, he acted as the sovereigns' colonial minister.<sup>280</sup>

The first administrative agency established by the sovereigns in 1503 to assume most of these duties was the *Casa de Contratacion de Las Indias*--the House of Trade of the Indies--established in Seville<sup>281</sup> under the guidance of Fonseca.<sup>282</sup> The Casa in its earliest stage consisted of a treasurer, an auditor, and a factor or manager. Its initial duties dealt mainly with shipping and trade--maintaining of ample stores of the commodities to be shipped to the Indies, for its officials to exercise supervision over all commerce with the Indies, to select proper captains for ships, and to keep themselves informed regarding conditions in the colonies and in order to encourage trade.<sup>283</sup> It also required that a public notary be present on every ship to record all on-board activities.<sup>284</sup> Later in 1524, an edict of Charles I created the *Real y Supremo Consejo de las Indias*--the Council of the Indies--that allowed the Casa, as a subordinate agency of the Council, to deal with every aspect of relations with the newly discovered lands including administration, commerce, and law.<sup>285</sup> The Casa also established itself as a school for the academic and practical study of the sciences involved with navigation--astronomy, cosmography, map and instrument making, and, by 1552, the training of pilots.<sup>286</sup>

Initially the Casa was situated at the docks in the Alcazar but, as time went on the size of the Casa's staff grew with the extent of the New World holdings and its responsibilities<sup>287</sup>, and its location was moved to the cathedral--using part of the building as lecture rooms.<sup>288</sup> No one could sail from Spain to a colonial possession without a permit and government registration. No one could send out goods or import them except through the Casa and upon payment of

extraordinary duties. By the Casa's rules, trade was forbidden to any except Spaniards.<sup>289</sup>

The political questions presented by the New World led to the creation of a Council of the Indies.<sup>290</sup> The purpose of the Council was to bring the political arm of the colonies under the direct control of the monarchy in the same way the Cortes had been--through the placement of professional lawyers and judges schooled in the *Siete Partidas* over the colonial administration.<sup>291</sup> The Council emerged between 1511 and 1519 as a standing committee of the Council of Castile and recognized as a separate organ of the government in 1524.<sup>292</sup> The initial composition of the Council was variable in nature, composed informally of Fonseca and Lopé de Conchillos, the king's secretary of Indian affairs.<sup>293</sup> In 1524 the composition was formalized and consisted of a president, a high chancellor, eight *tetrados*, a *fiscal* (treasurer), two secretaries, and a lieutenant chancellor. It was the high court of appeals and a directive ministry over the colonial *audiencias*.<sup>294</sup>

The most significant act of the Council during its formative years was the assignment by Domingo de Mendoza, Cardinal Archbishop of Seville, and president of the Council, of a mission of Dominican priests under a Pedro de Córdoba to investigate the charges of native exploitation in the New World by the Spanish colonists. So shocked by the conditions they faced in the colonies, the Dominicans began to attack the abuses directly. The colonists, realizing the significance of this threat to their interests, sent an emissary to the king to defend themselves from the priests' charges. In reply, the priests sent

their own representative. As a result of this confrontation at Court, Fonseca called a *junta* of learned men to recommend measures to remedy the situation. The result was the Laws of Burgos, promulgated on December 27, 1512, with a supplement added seven months later.<sup>295</sup>

The Laws of Burgos consisted of thirty-two articles that became the fundamental laws governing the Indies for the next generation. Under these laws the Indians were to be brought together in towns by the *encomenderos* to learn Hispanic ways; that a church was to be built in all of the Indian towns and they were to be taught the Pater Noster, the Credo, and the Salve Regina; that sick Indians were to be compelled to attend confession; that Indian children were to be baptized within eight days of their birth; that the children of caciques were to be taught reading, religion, and writing; and that the Indians were to be treated well. Other provisions concerned the proper use of Indian labor and had the effect of institutionalizing the system of compulsory labor imposed by the colonists.<sup>296</sup>

Pedro de Córdova, correctly sensing that the *encomenderos* had more influence among the members of the *junta* returned to Castile. He pleaded with the king to reconsider many of the laws and to this request Ferdinand relented by creating another *junta*. These revisions placed additional restrictions on the labor of married and pregnant women; on child labor; specified the clothing of the Indians; and emphasized the religious instruction of children and unmarried girls. Córdova did not get the reforms he was seeking--a battle that would once again be taken up by the priests in the New World under a different leader. The

revisions to the Laws of Burgos were approved by the king and incorporated into the Laws on July 28, 1513.<sup>297</sup>

From the discussions that led to the Laws of Burgos the Crown assigned to Juan López de Palacios Rubios draft what was called the *requerimiento* (the Requirement) and no better example of the juridical nature of Spanish society as it applied to the New World can be found. Instituted in 1514, the *requerimiento* was a document that outlined the history of Christianity, the supremacy of the pope, and the obligation of Indians to submit to Spanish authority. The *requerimiento* was to be read by the *conquistadores* to the Indians prior to the initiation of any action against them. The Indians were obliged to sign the document and, if they refused, Spain would not be responsible for their conquest.<sup>298</sup> In execution, the reading of the *requerimiento* provided a legal pretext for the unrestrained slaughter and conquest of the Indians in the New World. The *conquistadores*, accompanied by a notary, would read the *requerimiento* in Spanish to the uncomprehending Indians just prior to taking military action against them. Contemporary Spaniards, when describing the *requerimiento*, often shared the opinion of Bartolomé de Las Casas, the Dominican friar who championed the cause of Indian rights, when he confessed that upon reading it he did not know whether to laugh or weep.<sup>299</sup> With the introduction of reforms by the Council in 1542, the practice of the reading of the *requerimiento* ended.

By 1542 the composition of the Council was specified in detail under what were called the New Laws. To this body was entrusted the supreme legislative and judicial control, under the king, of Spanish America. It was to meet twice daily. While business might be delegated

to committees, legislation of general importance was required to be acted upon by the full Council and required a two-thirds vote for passage.<sup>300</sup> Later, under the leadership of Juan de Ovando, the Council issued orders to the various colonial administrative bodies to give detailed reports on the history, geography, flora, fauna, and population of the various colonies and its permanent staff increased to compensate for the enlargements of the Council's mission. These *relaciones*, as they were called, provide the bulk of information we have concerning the indigenous customs of the New World and the Philippines during the 16th century.<sup>301</sup>

Beside legislative and judicial responsibilities, the Council served as advisory board for all civil and ecclesiastical offices in the Indies. The role of the Council in the government of the Indies was not that of a commanding body, instead the purpose of the Council was to act as a brake upon the decisions of the various colonial administrators to ensure that the interests of the king were represented. Their opinions, as is to be expected of professional judges, were balanced, closely reasoned, and based clearly upon law and precedent--by necessity conservative. After publishing their opinions the king was the deciding voice in all deliberations.<sup>302</sup>

While these administrative bodies within the home country attempted to maintain control of the distant colonies through the power of appointment and review, the obvious difficulties in administration engendered by the distances of months between the colonies and Spain presented many unique problems. All too often the decisions of the home country would be implemented after great delay, and if unpopular, not at

all. Also the Crown found itself presented in many cases with a fait accompli regarding questions of great colonial importance. As the population and importance of the New World colonies grew the monarchy naturally sought further means of bringing the far off dominions under its rule. In 1510 the king established an independent court to hear appeals from the decisions of the colonial governors' justices<sup>303</sup>, and during the earliest period established the appointive position of viceroy to represent his interests<sup>304</sup>, thereby replacing the initial system of individual rule established by *conquistadores*. By 1574 the New World consisted of two kingdoms: New Spain, extending from Venezuela and above the isthmus of Panama northward into North America; and Peru, consisting of the isthmus and South America except Brazil, which was a Portuguese possession, and Venezuela.<sup>305</sup>

By this time the pattern of Spanish and Indian colonization had been well established. According to Juan Lopez de Velasco, historian and cosmographer to the Council of the Indies, there were in the New World two hundred Spanish cities and towns with some mining settlements consisting of 160,000 Spaniards. Of this about four thousand were *encomenderos*. He lists eight to nine thousand Indian villages containing 1,500,000 tributes (men of 15-60 years old) out of a total Indian population of about 5,000,000 not counting those who had escaped into the interior or those tribes that could not be pacified.<sup>306</sup> He notes that the population of the islands had dropped significantly in favor of the more lucrative enticements of the mainland.<sup>307</sup>

Velasco lists Mexico City as having 15,000 Spaniards and 150,000 Indians. Typical population distribution of the New World is



illustrated by the figures given for the northern Indian province of Teotlalpa. This province of 600 miles lists no Spanish towns save two small mining settlements containing 130 Spaniards. There were twenty-six Indian villages with 114,000 Indians paying tribute to either the Crown or the *encomenderos*, and fifteen monasteries averaging three to four friars each.<sup>308</sup> In the bishopric of Tlaxcala to the east were two Spanish towns and two hundred Indian villages consisting of 215,000 tributaries. These were divided into 127 *repartimientos*, sixty-one of these belonged to the Crown and sixty-six to private persons.<sup>309</sup> In Yucatan, not counting the district of Tabasco, there were four Spanish towns with 300 householders. One hundred-thirty of these were *encomenderos*, the remainder being planters that lived on the plantations, traders, and officials. In South America there were one-hundred settlements containing 13,500 households. Two thousand Spaniards were *encomenderos*, the rest farmers and traders. The Indians had not been brought into villages as in the north but the number of tributaries is listed as 880,000.<sup>310</sup> In the city of Quito there were 400 Spanish families. In Lima there were 2,000 Spanish families, thirty of these were *encomenderos*, the rest traders and officials. The Indian population in these areas numbered 25-26,000 and were divided among 136 *repartimientos* of which six belonged to the Crown.<sup>311</sup>

On paper the position of viceroy was a powerful one. He directed the colonial bureaucracy, supervised the Indian policy, administered the treasury and collection of colonial revenues, served as commander of the military forces, presided over Church affairs through the *Patronato Real*--the control of appointment to Church offices--and as

the president of the *audiencia* or chancery.<sup>312</sup> The normal term of office, as in most Spanish colonial executive positions, was three years but it could be extended or shortened by the king.<sup>313</sup> In reality, however, the power of the viceroy was limited in many ways. The area of the viceroyalties were too large and contained poor roads thereby limiting direct control. In addition, the multitude of local officials and other councils tended to limit the actual power exercised by the individuals in this position.<sup>314</sup>

One of the institutions created to check the power exercised by this and other administrative offices was the *residencia*. The *residencia* was an inquest into the conduct of the individual while in office. The successor of the individual or their superior would convene a court consisting of two commissioners and all petitions would be entertained by any citizens that wished to present grievances about the individual's conduct or decisions.<sup>315</sup> For the viceroy the *residencia* lasted six months and normally a report was sent to the Council of the Indies for adjudication.<sup>316</sup> In the more distant colonies the initial imprisonment of the individual in cases of gross malfeasance in office sometimes resulted, though this rarely occurred.

The other significant institution in the colonies that acted as a check on the arbitrary powers of the viceroy and colonial administrators was the *audiencia*, introduced into Santo Domingo in 1511 and then into Mexico after the conquest of the Aztec empire.<sup>317</sup> This institution combined the functions of the chanceries of the different Spanish kingdoms. The *audiencia* was, therefore, the viceroy's or governor's council and colonial court of appeals. Each viceroy had an

*audiencia* and, when the viceroyalties were further subdivided into lesser administrative units, each of these units had an *audiencia*. The governor and captains-general of the various subdivisions acted as ex-officio president of the councils as did the viceroy at the highest level.<sup>318</sup>

The composition of the *audiencia* depended upon its relative importance in the viceroyalty. In the subordinate *audiencias* they doubled as criminal judges. As a council the *audiencia* deliberated with its president in meetings called an *acuerdos*. The executive had no vote in matters of justice but could determine if an item was judicial or political in nature. Persons could appeal any act or decision of the viceroy to the *audiencia* and decisions of the *audiencia* could be brought before the Council of the Indies.<sup>319</sup> The subordinate *audiencias* could communicate independent of the viceroy to the royal audiences of the king in Spain. If a vacancy occurred in the viceroyalty or government, the *audiencia* assumed the executive powers of the colonial administration until a new executive was appointed.<sup>320</sup> Whether the *audiencia* or the viceroy dominated in the affairs of government depended upon the personalities of the individuals involved.<sup>321</sup>

The powers of the colonial *audiencias* tended to be more extensive than those in Spain; acting as executive organizations equal to the Council of Castile. Among these extensive powers was jurisdiction over the *residencia* of inferior administrative officials; the collection of tithes; the right to commission special investigations; supervision over inferior judges; and the assumption of the royal patronage. In addition, they were tasked with guarding the

royal prerogative in the colonies and authorized to try all persons accused of usurping it; to ensure that ecclesiastical and civil officials did not charge excessive fees; to supervise the properties of deceased prelates; and to restrain ecclesiastical judges and dignitaries through the *recurso de fuerza*--a power that Hispanic jurists derived from the Alexandrian donation to keep ecclesiastical authorities from interfering in civil affairs.<sup>322</sup>

Every three years the president tasked one of the auditors of the *audiencia* to tour the countryside and inform the viceroy or governor of the economic conditions, the number of churches and monasteries, the conduct of the town officials, the religious condition of the Indians, and any other matters of interest.<sup>323</sup> These surveys of the countryside provided a measure of central control over local conditions and provide the historian with a valuable written record of conditions during that time.

The administrative subdivisions of the *audiencia* were the *corregimientos*, the *alcaldias mayores*, and the *alcaldias ordinarios*.<sup>324</sup> The executives for these subdivisions were appointed by the Crown but interim appointments could be made by the viceroy<sup>325</sup> and the practice developed of locally designating these officials and obtaining confirmation from Spain.<sup>326</sup> The duties of each of these subdivisions concerned the administration of local conditions over the various townships. These institutions generally followed the pattern they were used for in Spain: the *corregimientos* with jurisdiction over larger districts, the *alcaldias mayores* over smaller districts and

towns, and the *alcaldias ordinarios* over the municipalities as judges.<sup>327</sup>

The distance of the colonies from Spain, however, allowed for their development in some unique ways. While *alcaldes* in Spain were generally city judges subject to the *corregimientos*, in the colonies there was no difference between these two positions. Each *corregidor* and *alcalde mayor* resided at the primary settlement of the province and combined the functions of judge, inspector of the *encomiendas*, administrator of the financial committee (the *real hacienda*) and police, collector of tribute, vicepatron and local military functionary.<sup>328</sup>

There were two distinct types of *corregidor*. The *corregidor* of the Spanish towns, following the model of the home country, was a trained lawyer and therefore a representative of the Crown. The *corregidor* of the Indian settlements, however, was an amateur selected from among the settlers having no *encomienda* or landed estates, these qualifications seen by the Spaniards as a check on any possible conflicts of interest. However, these qualifications also established the individual as being one having no independent means of support except for the small salary provided by the state. As a result, the institution of the *corregimientos*, as well as the remainder of the colonial administration, provided ample opportunities for abuse, which were exploited. The majority of disputes that are recorded in the records of the colonial summary court concern *corregidores* who extorted labor and tribute for their personal gain, and of local chieftains who bribed the *corregidores* to keep quiet concerning the extortion of tribute from the Indians.<sup>329</sup>

The development of the Spanish townships in the colonies took on two distinct patterns. The first one to develop derived from the military aspect of the conquest. Through this method the leading officers and soldiers of the army of the *conquistadores* became *vecinos*, or legally enrolled householders, and thus were given special rights and privileges. In many cases these individuals were also *encomenderos*. From among his officers the commander would nominate the first city government--the *cabildo* (town council) consisting of twelve *regidores* or councillors. In some cases *regidores* would be appointed for life. From among the *vecinos* the *cabildo* elected the two *alcaldes* subject to the approval of the commander or other district executive authority.<sup>330</sup>

The second pattern to arise was the more traditional one based upon the Spanish township. In 1507 the towns of Hispaniola sent a delegation to the Crown to receive the same status of Spanish towns and this the king granted with specific instructions. As had developed during the period of the *Reconquista*, the colonial townships organized themselves into conventions similar to the Spanish Cortes. However, just as in the case of the Cortes, the sovereign decreed that these bodies were forbidden to meet except with his permission. Thus, the absolute nature of monarchical rule was reaffirmed in the New World.<sup>331</sup> In 1523 Philip II granted the townships the right to elect the *regidores* unless the right to nominate them had been accorded to the commander of the color. . However, just as the king had put an end to those nascent attempts at democracy through the conventions, so too did the Crown organize the internal structure of the colonial townships.<sup>332</sup> The Crown directly intervened in these cases by

allowing certain positions to be purchased or obtained through political appointment. This practice of the purchase eventually became a major source of colonial income to the Crown and usually included the offices of the sheriff, city and county clerks, notaries, proctors, depositories, ensigns, *regidores*, treasurers, sealers of weights and measures, and assayers.<sup>333</sup> This system afforded a successful merchant the opportunity to become a member of the official class which was seen as an improvement in social caste.<sup>334</sup> Not surprisingly, the commercial nature of this system also encouraged individuals to obtain a satisfactory rate of return on their initial investment and reinforced practices that in their execution were to the detriment of the indigenous population.<sup>335</sup>

The economic incentives to the home country in maintaining colonies can be seen by the main sources of revenue generated by these holdings. Mining royalties; the tribute--paid by the male Indians of working age; the *alcabala*, or excise tax, levied on goods sold; the *almojarifazgo*, or export and import duties; the *averia*, or convoy tax, on the value of cargoes; receipts from the sales of offices; receipts from the sale of indulgences; government monopolies on gunpowder, salt, tobacco, and quicksilver; and a portion of church income all provided revenue for the royal treasury.<sup>336</sup> As noted earlier, among the colonies the most profitable enterprises resided in New Spain and Peru, the island colonies being somewhat of a drain on government resources.<sup>337</sup> So pronounced was this difference that by 1574 the island colonies of the West Indies had been almost completely abandoned

by the Spanish colonial populations and several government edicts and incentives were instituted to stem this tide.<sup>338</sup>

As noted earlier, the nature of Spanish emigration to the New World was strictly controlled by the monarchy. The rules established by Isabela and Ferdinand, restricting emigration to the old Christian families, continued in force until 1526 when Charles V issued an ordinance giving full liberty to all subjects of his kingdoms to travel to the New World. He also granted Venezuela to the Augsburg banking houses of the Welsers and the coast of Chile to the Fuggers but, despite these measures, no German settlements resulted.<sup>339</sup> Because of reversals by the Spanish in Europe that resulted in an attitude of jealousy guarding their assets, Philip II reversed the liberal emigration policy of his father and issued regulations designed to maintain the Spanish nature of the New World *criollo* (colonial) population. As a result, no one could travel to the Indies without the permission of the Crown under penalty of complete forfeiture of property.<sup>340</sup>

Concurrently, the Crown attempted to entice greater settlement in the West Indies by farmers and artisans. In 1519 colonists that travelled to these lands were guaranteed exemption from taxation for twenty years<sup>341</sup> and in 1529 feudal lordships were offered to any willing to establish communities there.<sup>342</sup> Despite these incentives, the bulk of colonization centered in the lucrative kingdoms of New Spain and Peru.<sup>343</sup> Despite incentives and the lucrativeness for Spaniards emigrating to the New World, by later standards the number of people emigrating from Spain was never large--between 1,000 and 1,500 people



each year travelled to the Americas.<sup>344</sup> A large part of the reason probably lies within the structure of Spanish society itself. The controlled nature of emigration made emigration an alternative for a very small proportion of the population--merchants, members of the upper classes, and traders. This was especially true once the armies of Spain were turned toward maintaining the Spanish empire on the European mainland as opposed to further exploits and conquests in the Americas, thereby eliminating a ready source of colonists in any occupation. Finally, the very lucrateness of the New World provided an incentive for those colonists already in the Americas, and in control of much of the apparatus of colonial administration, to severely restrict any new arrivals.

The Spanish attitude toward the indigenous population is one that evolved over time and had a great effect upon government policy. That the pattern of slavery that arose in Africa under the Portuguese did not arise in South and Central America stems from the opposition to slavery by both the Crown and the influential Spanish population. During the early years of the conquest of the Amerindians the Crown received many petitions from these subjects to abolish the institution of slavery and to set the Indians free.<sup>345</sup>

Instead of the application of a policy of inferiority or slavery the policy of the Spanish government was to convert the Indians to Christianity and to reduce them to civilized (i.e. Hispanic) life and regular industry. The process was a compulsory one and brutally applied in its execution.<sup>346</sup> The main method of pacifying the Indians was the *encomienda* system described earlier. The *encomiendas*, like the

*repartimiento* system, quickly degenerated into a type of slavery. The abuses of this system found opponents among the Spaniards. The most significant individual to speak out about this system was Bartolomé de Las Casas. Arriving in the New World as a soldier during the conquest of Cuba, he was so horrified by the abuses he saw that he renounced his wealth and took Dominican vows. In 1522 he wrote A Very Brief Recital of the Destruction of the Indies. The work described in detail the abuses committed by the Spaniards in the New World and established him as the foremost spokesman of Indian rights.<sup>347</sup>

Contemporaneous with the efforts of Las Casas were the philosophical and juridical writings of Francisco de Vitoria, prima professor of theology at the University of Salamanca, who focused upon the question over the legitimacy of the conquest of the Indians by the Spaniards. According to Vitoria, any one of only seven principles, rooted in the concept of international law, might provide Charles V with a clear and just title to exercising political jurisdiction in the New World. These were: 1) the right to travel and to trade anywhere in the world without harming the Indians, 2) the right of Christians to preach the Gospel in pagan lands, 3) intimidation on the part of pagan rulers to compel native Christians to return to idolatry, 4) the right of the pope to depose a native ruler most of whose subjects are converts and to give them a Christian prince, 5) the personal despotism of native rulers or the prevalence of tyrannical laws, 6) free and voluntary election of the Spanish monarch by the Indians themselves, and 7) native states requesting the military assistance of the Spaniards.<sup>348</sup> While on the surface it would appear that Vitoria's thesis was an attempt to justify

the Spanish conquest, the principles he enumerated tended to establish a reciprocal and limited relationship between the Indians and the king. Issues surrounding Vitoria's principles would arise again many times concerning Spanish rights in the New World and the Philippines.

The work of Las Casas and others led to the passage of sweeping reforms, directed mainly against the *encomiendas*, called the New Laws of 1542. According to these laws the future enslavement of the Indians was prohibited; all slaves whose masters could not prove just title were to be liberated; *encomiendas* belonging to officials of the government, churchmen, and charitable institutions were to be given up; *encomenderos* who abused the rights of the Indians were to forfeit their holdings; and no new *encomiendas* were to be granted and existing ones were to lapse upon the death of the holder.<sup>349</sup> Opposition to the New Laws was widespread among the colonists, including ecclesiastical authorities, and the influence these people possessed was soon brought to bear at Court.<sup>350</sup> As a result, the laws were amended to allow the continuation of the *encomienda* system for four generations, after which the lands would revert to the Crown. Spanish kings granted subsequent extensions that resulted in the survival of the institution until well into the 18th century.<sup>351</sup>

As specified under the Laws of Burgos, under the *encomienda* system the Indians were gathered together in their own villages in the policy of *congregación* or *reducción* (reduction). They were governed by their own magistrates and, unlike the practice of the Spanish towns, elected their officials--the purchase of office illegal in the Indian settlements. Each village contained a church and a village priest, the

expenses borne by the *encomenderos* out of the tribute payment.<sup>352</sup>

According to the law regulating the *encomendero*, those individuals that did not meet their obligation to provide for the religious conversion of the Indians forfeited his holdings.<sup>353</sup> No Indian could live outside his village and no Spaniard could live in an Indian village. Spaniards travelling through the Indian settlements could not stay in any one village more than one night, except merchants who were permitted to stay two.<sup>354</sup>

The Spaniards introduced the institutions of agrarian communitarianism that coincided with indigenous forms that closely resembled Hispanic ones. The Aztec populations were divided into *capulli* (clans) that combined kinship and landowning characteristics. Under this system the arable lands of Mexico were divided among family heads in hereditary units. In Inca Peru, the *ayllu*, similar to the *capulli*, annually allotted each family enough arable land necessary for its survival. While pre-Hispanic Mexico had no indigenous system of common pasture lands because of the lack of domesticated grazing animals, in Peru the *ayllu* also held grazing land in common. In the pre-Hispanic American societies, as in many of the Hispanic arrangements among the *fueros*, the peasant held land only as long as they kept it in use while ownership rested in the community. The introduction of the *capulli* and *ayllu* institutionalized these practices.<sup>355</sup>

The Indians had to pay tribute in kind to the *encomendero* or the Crown as applicable. Protectors of the Indians were appointed by the colonial executive administration to look after their interests. Slavery of the Indians was prohibited. In granting *encomiendas* the

descendants of the conquerors, discoverers, and first settlers were given priority. *Encomenderos* could not be absentee landlords but had to live in the district containing their holding.<sup>356</sup> In addition, the *encomendero* could not live in the Indian villages; nor build a house, introduce black slaves, or maintain stock-farms in the vicinity of their villages. They were also required to marry within three years of receipt of their holding and could not leave the province without a license or go to Spain except in extraordinary circumstance.<sup>357</sup>

In addition to the tribute the Indians were subject to a system of compulsory labor. This system did not apply to the individual Indian but applied to the village. The use of Indian labor became commonplace in the construction of public works and used by the *encomenderos* to compel Indians to work in the mines. As a result of abuses of this system several laws were established by the Crown to protect the rights of the Indians but many of these were ignored by the local colonial officials--many of whom profited from the compulsory system of labor. This system also dictated the pattern of colonization in the New World.

The Spaniards tended to confine themselves to the large cities and in the professions, as traders, colonial officials, or to the management of the *encomiendas* and the mines. The system of abundant and cheap Indian labor discouraged the development of a Spanish artisan class.<sup>358</sup> Contributing to this condition was the power of the Seville merchants to restrict the nature of trade with the New World through the Casa de Contratacion. These restrictions did not allow for any sizable export trade in agricultural products from the Indies. In 1529 Charles V issued a decree providing for freer trade with the colonies but,

because of the power of the monopoly at Seville, historians doubt whether the decrees were ever implemented.<sup>359</sup>

The work of Hispanization in the New World was accomplished through two methods. The first was through the process of Hispanic intermarriage and miscegenation with the indigenous population that, when combined with the environmental holocaust wrought by the introduction of the European diseases, resulted in the creation of a large and highly influential *mestizo* (mixed blood) class. Considered, because of their blood ties, to be of a higher caste than the indigenous peoples, the *mestizos* directly aided the processes of pacification and Hispanization by bridging the two worlds.<sup>360</sup>

The other method of Hispanization fell to the members of the various religious monastic orders--the Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, Mercenarians, and Jesuits.<sup>361</sup> The work of these orders in the New World were controlled, not from Rome, but from the Spanish Crown. Pope Julius II in 1508 granted to Ferdinand the right of patronage (the *Patronato Real*) in the New World--a concession of little significance at the time when confined to Hispaniola but of great importance when the mainland conquests were completed during later periods. The Spanish monarchs broadly interpreted the concession and under it the king of Spain nominated to the Pope all high church dignitaries, prohibited the implementation of Papal bulls in America without the king's consent, and required all priests and friars travelling to the New World to obtain a royal license.<sup>362</sup>

Of all of the administrative institutions of pacification and governance created by the Crown, the monarchical introduction of the

friars in the New World was the most effective in acting as a check on the power of the local colonial officials. The friars established themselves in every Spanish and Indian town and settlement and held many official positions. Though some of these friars became subject to the same corruption that tempted other officials, the work of the religious orders was generally constructive. Schools were built along with churches in the various towns and villages, teaching both reading and writing to Spaniards and Indians alike. The first university in the New World was founded in 1535--the college of Santa Cruz in Tlaltelolco, New Spain--and beside teaching the elementary subjects also taught Latin, philosophy, music, Mexican medicine, and native languages.<sup>363</sup> Several other universities followed and made significant contributions in the subjects beyond the purview of the Inquisition--linguistics, history, anthropology, medicine, and surgery.<sup>364</sup>

In summary, the Spanish colonization of the New World reflected the contradictions of 16th century Spanish society--the desire for autonomy and for wealth opposed by the imposition of absolutist rule and the concern for the rights and welfare of the Indians. The experience of the Spanish in the New World shaped their perceptions and philosophies, and these were to be applied in the pacification of the Philippines. In 1521, Magellan discovered the archipelago and failed to establish a base there. Several expeditions followed and these failed also. It was not until 1565 that the Spanish were able to successfully establish a foothold on the islands--this a colonial enterprise originating from New Spain. The following chapter will outline the reasons for the failure of the first expeditions and the methods of

success used in the successful one that eventually led to the  
pacification of the islands.



## NOTES

1. Much controversy has surrounded the characterization of this period. Non-Europeans, in particular, have challenged the sobriquet given it, arguing that neighboring kingdoms were already aware of each other in the places of the globe later visited by the Europeans; because Europeans were ignorant of these lands does not make them "discovered" upon the arrival of a European. I have decided to continue use of this name because of the reason most clearly expressed by Martin J. Noone in his book, The Islands Saw It (Republic of Ireland: Helicon Press, 1980, p. 2), he states that Europeans "were the first to undertake voyages from their homeland to all parts of the world, thereby breaking down the isolation that had existed from the beginning of time between the various races of the human family" thus, he reasons and I agree, the expression "Age of Discovery" is valid.

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10. Boorstin, The Discoverers, 128-129.

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12. Boorstin, The Discoverers, 139.

13. Zaide, The Philippines Since Pre-Spanish Times, 103.

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31. Noone, The Islands Saw It, 10.
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35. Noone, The Islands Saw It, 11; Penrose, Travel and Discovery, 46-47; Marques, History of Portugal, 220; and Boorstin, The Discoverers, 172-173.
36. Boorstin, The Discoverers, 170-171.
37. Noone, The Islands Saw It, 11 and note; Boorstin, The Discoverers, 171-172; and Penrose, Travel and Discovery, 48-50.
38. Boorstin, The Discoverers, 227; and de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, 221.
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45. Boorstin, The Discoverers, 248.
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## CHAPTER IV

### THE SPANISH AND THE PHILIPPINES

#### Magellan and the Failed Expeditions

Under the conditions of the competition for the spice trade between Portugal and Spain, the event in history that made inevitable the discovery of the Philippines was the issuance of the *Inter Caetera* and the establishment of the Line of Demarcation. The event that completed the action was the voyage of Magellan. This voyage, while significant to European history for proving that the American continent could be rounded and the world circumnavigated, is significant in Philippine history for three reasons: first, because it is the voyage that brought about the European discovery of the islands, secondly, because it explains the proximate motivations that led to the discovery and eventual pacification of the islands, and finally, because the reasons surrounding its failure in bringing about the pacification of the islands provide some clue to the later, successful pacification.

As noted in the previous chapter, Magellan, joined by the other Portuguese expatriates, upon reaching Seville was welcomed by Diogo Barbosa--a Portuguese expatriate who in Spain became influential at the Spanish Court. He soon solidified this relationship upon marrying Barbosa's daughter, Beatriz, after a romance of two months.<sup>1</sup> As a result of the influence of his father-in-law, Magellan succeeded in

approaching the *Casa de Contratación* with his plans for a voyage. Initially, however, he was put off by the Casa officials because he refused to be specific. By this time the Casa was flooded on a daily basis by individuals requesting royal sponsorship for voyages of discovery and, no doubt, they eyed Magellan's reticence suspiciously. He would only say that he knew where the Moluccas were and how to get there within the Spanish side of the Line if they would give him the ships. He did not want others to profit from anything he may say to his own exclusion and had promised Faleiro that he would not reveal details of the proposed voyage until the latter arrived in Spain, which he had not yet done.<sup>2</sup>

However a member of the Casa, Juan de Aranda, was impressed by Magellan, and after making inquiries about him, arranged to have a private meeting with the Portuguese expatriate. He told Magellan he could get him in touch with the right people in the court if Magellan agreed to share with him eight percent of the profits of the proposed voyage and to this Magellan assented.<sup>3</sup> True to his word, near the end of January 1518 Aranda paid the expenses of Magellan and Ruy Faleiro, who now reached Spain, to Valladolid, the capital of Castile, where prince Charles of Burgundy had just arrived for his coronation. Charles was barely eighteen, was brought up in the Dutch possessions, unfamiliar with Spain, and did not speak the language. His principle advisors, then, seem to have made most of the important decisions of state. These advisers were the Chancellor Sauvage, his tutor; Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, later known as Pope Adrian VI; and Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca,

archbishop of Burgos, chief minister of the kingdom of Castile and chairman of the Council of the Indies.<sup>4</sup>

In Spanish matters Fonseca had the most influence and it was with him that Aranda put Magellan in touch. Magellan outlined the details of the expedition to him emphasizing his belief that the Moluccas were on the Spanish side of the Line and that there was a strait at the tip of South America which would allow access to the other ocean seen by Balboa. The bishop, who had recommended not financing Columbus twenty-five years earlier, learned his lesson and recommended Magellan to Chancellor Sauvage who then brought the matter to the attention of the king.<sup>5</sup>

At this audience, held in January 1518, Magellan explained that he had a plan to reach the Moluccas, which he believed to be on the Spanish side of the Line of Demarcation, from the west by means of a passage around South America. To arouse interest in the project he read an excerpt from one of the letters he received from Serrano.<sup>6</sup> In these letters Serrano purposely exaggerated the distance from Malacca to the Moluccas in order to place them on the Spanish side of the Line and this estimate seems to have been influential in convincing Magellan and, more importantly, Charles V to launch an expedition to the islands from the west.

Maximilianis Transylvanus, a visitor to the Court at the time and son-in-law to Diego de Haro, the Fugger agent<sup>7</sup>, later wrote a contemporary account of Magellan's audiences and voyage, based upon primary documents and interviews, and confirms the emphasis placed upon

this point by Magellan and Christopher de Haro<sup>8</sup>, the latter joining Magellan in February.<sup>9</sup> He states:

. . . they both showed Caesar (Charles V) that though it was not yet quite sure whether Malacca was within the confines of the Spaniards or the Portuguese, because, as yet, nothing of the longitude had been clearly proved . . . (it) was held to be most certain, that the islands which they call the Moluccas . . . lay within the Spanish western division.<sup>10</sup>

Magellan also traced the route he would take on a painted globe, possibly the globe of Behaim from the Portuguese royal chartroom, and astonished the court by introducing his Malay slave Enrique and a woman slave from Sumatra, making them speak in their native languages.<sup>11</sup>

Bartolomé de Las Casas was at the Court when Magellan presented his case to the king and provides a colorful description of the scene:

Magellan had a well painted globe in which the whole world was depicted, and on it he indicated the route he proposed to take, saving that the strait was left purposely blank so that no one should anticipate him. And on that day and at that hour I was in the office of the High Chancellor when the Bishop (of Burgos, Fonseca) brought it (the globe) and showed the High Chancellor the voyage which was proposed; and, speaking with Magellan, I asked him what way he planned to take, and he answered that he intended to go by Cape Saint Mary, which we call the Rio de la Plata and from thence to follow the coast up until he hit upon the strait. But suppose you do not find any strait by which you can go into the other sea? He replied that if he did not find any strait that he would go the way the Portuguese took.--This Fernando de Magalhaens must have been a man of courage and valiant in his thoughts and for undertaking great things, although he was not of imposing presence because he was small in stature and did not appear in himself to be much.<sup>12</sup>

After the audiences of January and February, events moved quickly, resulting in Magellan and de Haro being called together the following month to work out the final details of a voyage to the Moluccas. During these proceedings the two men disagreed with each other over the proper financing of the expedition--Magellan preferred to have the ships given by the king while de Haro pushed to use his own

ships under the flag of Spain. This was a frequent issue in the financing of expeditions of the time because of the obvious questions regarding risk, control, and the distribution of profits. In this case Charles decided in favor of having Spain finance the whole expedition and a charter was signed on March 12, 1518, in Zaragosa--to where the court had moved for Charles' coronation as the monarch of the kingdom of Aragon--for the expedition.<sup>13</sup>

By the terms of the contract the king agreed to outfit five ships and send no other expeditions for ten years by the same route and to provide food supplies, artillery, small arms, and ammunition sufficient for a voyage of two years.<sup>14</sup> For their part of the bargain, Magellan and Ruy de Faleiro agreed to find the Spice Islands and other lands on the Spanish side of the Line. If they did not succeed in the venture within ten years from the date of the sailing they would be permitted to trade and navigate without further royal assent, reserving one twentieth of their net gains for the Crown.<sup>15</sup> They were to be given one-twentieth of all income derived from their discoveries, the titles of *adelantados* and governors of the lands they would discover, the exclusive rights to one-fifteenth of the revenue of two islands, in perpetuity, if they should discover more than six, and their heirs would inherit both their titles and money upon their deaths.<sup>16</sup> The King of Castile would be the supreme sovereign over such islands and was to be paid one fifth of the total cargo sent in the first return expedition.<sup>17</sup> Both were also appointed Captains-General of the expedition with plenary powers<sup>18</sup> and dubbed into the order of the Knights of Santiago.<sup>19</sup>

After the signing of the contract Magellan supervised the preparations for the expedition and it appears that the Portuguese were quite alarmed at the news of Magellan's expedition. The Portuguese ambassador, Alvaro da Costa, was in Zaragoza in July 1518, and got wind of the expedition. He immediately notified Lisbon, adding that in his opinion, Cardinal Adrian was against the expedition because of more pressing needs in Europe and could be influenced to place pressure on Charles to have it scrapped. He also believed that Magellan could be brought to a sensible position and brought back home. He obtained an audience with Charles and demanded that his harboring traitorous Portuguese subjects would threaten the marriage between his sister and Manuel. Unmoved by the threat, Charles continued preparations for the expedition.<sup>20</sup>

Magellan was soon the object of intrigues by Portuguese spies. The Portuguese consul in Seville, Sebastian Alvarez, instigated riots against Magellan at the waterfront and engineered attempts to burn his ships and supplies.<sup>21</sup> On this occasion, while supervising the work of overhauling the vessels and outfitting them, Magellan had his personal banner hoisted onto the main mast of his flagship, the Trinidad. He failed to raise the royal standard of Castile alongside and, because his personal banner was similar in appearance to the Portuguese flag, the Portuguese consul was able to use the animosity held by the Castilians against Portugal to provoke a riot. Before the situation could get completely out of control, a member of the Casa came on the scene and convinced Magellan to take down the provocative colors. Later Alvarez saw Magellan in private with promises of rewards and amnesty if he would

return to Portugal. Magellan, not trusting Manuel, refused and Alvarez resorted to threats.<sup>22</sup> That these threats were taken seriously is evidenced by Charles sending an urgent letter to the Casa ordering that the gold recently brought from Hispaniola be used for expeditiously outfitting the expedition. Bishop Fonseca also provided Magellan with a bodyguard for the rest of the time he was in Spain.<sup>23</sup>

In exasperation the Portuguese sent two expeditions to intercept Magellan. One of these was sent to the Plate River in South America and another to the Moluccas.<sup>24</sup> The Portuguese also bribed the Spaniards, Mendoza and Cartagena, both nominated for command in the expedition, to see that it was sabotaged.<sup>25</sup> Charles V, however, only suspected that Portugal would act on its threats and to ease the strain in relations between the two kingdoms created by Magellan's expedition penned a letter dated February 28, 1519, to his uncle Manuel that:

. . . our first charge and order to the said commanders is to respect the line of demarcation and not to touch . . . any regions of either lands or seas which were assigned to and belong to you.<sup>26</sup>

Magellan's fleet consisted of five ships and a crew of between 265 and 268 men. As most voyages of that time, the crew consisted of vagabonds, rogues, knights, adventurers, and jobless mariners from many nations and races. Of the number thirty-seven were Portuguese, thirty Italians, nineteen Frenchmen, one German, one English, and most of the remainder Spanish.<sup>27</sup> The ships were outfitted with vast stores of foodstuffs, trade clothes, medicines, arms, and other supplies. Perpetually short of money, the royal treasury ran short of funds and Christopher de Haro, ready to profit by the expedition, defrayed the remainder of the expenses.<sup>28</sup> In return, de Haro was granted the right



to have an equal share with the Crown in subsequent expeditions to the Moluccas.<sup>29</sup>

The *Casa de Contratación* issued a stream of directives to Magellan touching on all points of the expedition and the detail these instructions entail provides an example of the extent of control the Casa attempted to exert on such voyages. The directives outlined the duties of officers; the instructions pilots should get on the course to be followed; the system of signalling; and the conduct towards peoples of overseas countries--that they are to be treated with friendship and justice, even Moslems, and on no account were any to be taken against their will; that officers ensure their crews ashore do not molest native women; that the king's business takes first priority and that private trading done in defined circumstances and according to rank; that no weapons be sold to people overseas; that they were not to be intimidated by firearms or the noise of the ships' guns; and that gambling, blasphemy, and unnatural vice during the cruise was strictly prohibited.<sup>30</sup>

To provide for the spiritual aspect of the expedition, seven priests were assigned: Fathers Pedro de Valderrama, Bernardo Calmeta, Sanchez de Reyna, Morales, Rodrigues, Hartiga, and Diugurria.<sup>31</sup> Cosmographers for the expedition reads like a who's who from the period--Duarte Barbosa, Antonio de Pigafetta, Sebastian del Cano, Francisco Albo, and Andres de San Martin.<sup>32</sup>

The most interesting individual among the latter group was Antonio de Pigafetta--a Venetian knight and Roman ambassador to Spain. He offered his services to Magellan without pay and was admitted as a

member of the expedition. He knew something of navigation and was a good fighter. Little is known about Pigafetta's early life. His family was of Tuscan origin and eventually settled in Venice where Antonio was born in 1480 or 1491. He was trained as a soldier and became a knight of the Military Order of St. John (Rhodes). In 1519 he was in Spain with the Roman embassy and volunteered to join the expedition. He recorded a history of Magellan's expedition which first appeared in 1525 and which is the only complete first-hand account of the entire voyage. His work forms the basis for the majority of the historical knowledge concerning the events of Magellan's voyage.<sup>33</sup>

At dawn of August 10, 1519, the expedition departed Seville. Faleiro, co-commander of the fleet, was left behind. Some controversy exists as to why this occurred. Officials of the House of Trade showed Magellan an order from the king dated at Barcelona, July 26, 1519, which ordered that Ruy Faleiro was to remain behind, and in his place Juan de Cartagena, cousin of Fonseca, was chosen as Magellan's second in command.<sup>34</sup> Martin J. Noone, an historian of the Filipino discovery and conquest, states that after the initial excitement about the expedition wore off it became apparent to the Crown that Faleiro, who was a man of various eccentricities, was not one to command men and ships on the high seas.<sup>35</sup> Considering the later behavior of Cartagena in supporting a mutiny against Magellan, it is reasonable to assume that some sort of intrigue to bring about the sabotage the expedition was afoot--two officers in Magellan's command were definitely in the pay of the Portuguese to bring about that very end. In addition, the racial differences that engendered suspicions and antagonisms should not be

discounted--Magellan and most of his captains were Portuguese while the junior officers Spanish.

As did most ships originating from Seville at the time, Magellan stopped at San Lucar de Barrameda, a port at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River. While Seville was a maritime center, the Guadalquivir River was so shallow that a deep water port was needed. San Lucar de Barrameda, twenty-five miles downstream served this purpose and it was there that the remaining onload of stores took place by barge for another forty days.<sup>36</sup> On September 20, 1519, the flotilla hoisted sails and sailed for the Canaries.<sup>37</sup>

The voyage of Magellan across the Atlantic and down the South American coast was fraught with hazards. Alerted by his father-in-law before making the crossing, he successfully overcame a mutiny staged by Cartagena and the other disloyal officers. After losing a ship to a storm and running dangerously low on provisions, he successfully found the strait that bears his name on October 21, 1520. Passing through the strait another ship, captained by a disgruntled rival, deserted to Spain and represented Magellan's command and those of his Portuguese associates to the Spanish Crown as one riddled with abuses.<sup>38</sup>

Having survived hardships that would have doomed most others, Magellan successfully transited the strait and began crossing the new ocean. The voyage across the Pacific lasted three months and twenty days which was over twice the time normally taken to cross the Atlantic. As a result, food and water ran low and so the men were reduced to drinking putrid water and eating rats, biscuits with worms, sawdust, leather from armor, boots, and rigging. During this period nineteen men

died and thirty became too weak to work.<sup>39</sup> Land was sighted on January 24, 1521 and again on February 4, 1521 but both of the islands were found to have been uninhabited and without fresh water.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, on March 6, 1521, Magellan and his fleet landed in what is now known as Umatac Bay, Guam. There the natives, called Chamurros, were friendly and supplied them with fresh water and provisions. However, during their stay some natives stole a small boat from the flagship and Magellan went ashore with an expedition of men recovering the boat, burning forty or fifty houses and killing seven natives. He named the islands as a result of this incident the Islas de Ladrones--Islands of Thieves--a name they retained until the 19th century.<sup>41</sup> Trouble had broken out immediately upon entering the bay as the ships were met by natives eager to trade. The ships were overwhelmed by them and soon their decks were swarming with traders. An altercation between the flagship's boatswain and a native took place and soon fighting between the Spaniards and the natives commenced with the latter firing crossbows and the latter jumping back to their canoes and throwing spears. While this fighting was going on, other natives came to the ships and traded goods before taking up the fighting with their comrades. Magellan, seeing that the natives trading were outnumbering the ones fighting, ordered his men to stop firing and, as a consequence, the Guamanians also stopped fighting.<sup>42</sup> During the punitive expedition ashore a group of Guamanians on forty or fifty canoes came out alongside the ships to trade oblivious to the fate of their neighbors.<sup>43</sup>

On March 9 Magellan left Guam and continued his voyage westward and seven days later, on March 16, 1521, spotted the mountains of the

island of Samar and entered what is presently known as Leyte Gulf. The following day he made landfall at Homonhon, a small islet south of Samar.<sup>44</sup> There he set up two big tents of sail cloth to treat the members of his crew who fell weak or were dying of scurvy, laying them out in the fresh air and giving them fresh food and drink. Magellan ordered that a sow be slaughtered for these men, fed them the coconuts that grew plentifully, and provided them with fresh water from two springs found on the island.<sup>45</sup> This is the first known landfall of any European in the Philippines and constitutes the beginning of the Spanish period in the islands.

A day or two after the arrival of the Spaniards on Homonhon, a boat from the neighboring island of Saluan arrived with nine natives. They were the first Filipinos the Spanish saw. Magellan offered them gifts in order to establish amicable relations, these being red caps, mirrors, combs, bells, and ivory trinkets and they gave the Spaniards fish, palm wine, bananas, and coconuts in return. Upon leaving they promised the Spaniards they would return.<sup>46</sup> Once word spread that traders were in the vicinity, the Spaniards were visited on several occasions by other groups of Filipinos eager to trade fresh provisions for the items brought for barter. Magellan showed these visitors his ships and brought out samples of cloves, cinnamon, pepper, and other spices to test their knowledge--knowing that their recognition would indicate that the spices were available locally and that he was in close proximity to the Moluccas, but their reaction was negative.<sup>47</sup>

Consequently, on March 25, 1521, Magellan, knowing he was in the vicinity of the Moluccas, left Homonhon and sailed southwestward. On

March 28 he reached the island of Limasawa, south of Leyte, and there found the kingdom of the *datu* Kolambu.<sup>48</sup> At first the rajah refused to meet the ships, but instead sent others out to converse with the Spaniards. Enrique, a personal Malay slave of Magellan obtained while in the Portuguese service, conversed with the natives indicating that some form of the Malay dialect was spoken in this part of the archipelago<sup>49</sup> and probably convincing Magellan that he was close to the Malay peninsula.<sup>50</sup> After the disposition of the Spaniards had been established as friendly by the exchange of presents, Kolambu sent out three porcelain jars each filled with rice, oranges, and bananas and came out to be received by Magellan, bringing with him many expensive gifts. Magellan showed Kolambu the sea chart and explained the voyage he had made and presented greetings from Charles V. Magellan then had his soldiers perform a mock battle on the deck of the ship to demonstrate the effectiveness of European arms. The *datu* was obviously impressed and intimidated by this display and accepted the offer of friendship offered by the Spaniards by performing the ritual of blood brotherhood.<sup>51</sup>

In consummation of the alliance, Kolambu invited Magellan to have two men eat dinner at his own dwelling and among these was Pigafetta would give a colorful and complete account of all that he saw and experienced, including an evening of much food and drink.<sup>52</sup> The next morning Magellan, concerned about the safety of his shore party, sent some men to fetch Pigafetta and his companion back to the ship. All day the Spaniards busied themselves in preparations for Easter Sunday Mass.<sup>53</sup> At this time Kolambu's brother, Awi or Rajah Siagu, king of

Butuan was visiting, and is noted by Pigafetta as owning several gold mines.<sup>54</sup> On Easter Sunday, March 31, 1521, mass was held on Limasawa and the two Filipino kings respectfully attended this service. He had guns fired at the conclusion of the Mass, held a fencing tournament, and planted a huge cross on the summit of a hill overlooking the sea.<sup>55</sup> Magellan claimed the islands for Spain and named them the "Archipelago of St. Lazarus" because he had reached them on March 16, 1521, the day of the Catholic saint.<sup>56</sup>

The erection of the cross had two symbolic purposes: one spiritual and one temporal. One of Magellan's first questions had been if the islanders were Moslem. They answered no and turned their faces and hands to the sky and, according to Pigafetta called out "Abba."<sup>57</sup> Magellan showed great joy at this news and so it would seem that Pigafetta got it wrong. Instead of "Aba," which would resemble Allah a bit too closely, the natives had probably invoked the more common name *Bathala* instead. The fact that they were innocent heathens in the Spanish-Portuguese frame of reference and not from among the traditional Asian religious adversaries of the Europeans gave Magellan some comfort. First, because they would be more amenable to accepting the Catholic faith, and secondly, because they would not be subject to outside assistance should they attempt to resist Spanish rule. Under the second condition, the act of putting up the cross conformed to the convention of claiming territory--one accomplished without making the chiefs of the island any the wiser.<sup>58</sup>

The main concern of the expedition, and a concern that would be shared by future ones, was in securing a source of provisions. The

Portuguese had solved this problem by accompanying the longest voyages with a stores ship but this was not normally the procedure on Spanish expeditions for two reasons. First, the crossing to the Americas was of relatively short duration and required no special provisioning and, secondly, the extent of the Pacific Ocean was not anticipated. The nature of Magellan's voyage, and subsequent ones sent to the Philippines from Spain, was more in line with the earlier voyages of Dias and Da Gama--a problem with which the Spaniards had no experience.

After having crossed two oceans, Magellan's expedition was completely reliant on its ability to forage among the lands discovered. Consequently, on the way down the hill Magellan saw small plots of cultivated fields and realized that the subsistence nature of the agriculture practiced in the island would not be able to sustain his fleet. He asked Kolambu where the best place was to get food and the *datu* answered that Seilani (southern Leyte), Calaghan in Mindanao, and Cebu were the most productive settlements that offered produce for trade. Kolambu then added that of these places Cebu was the largest.<sup>59</sup>

This exchange gave Kolambu the opening he was looking for in obtaining some services from the Spaniards and offers one of the more amusing incidents of the expedition. He volunteered to guide Magellan and his fleet to Cebu but added that he could not do so until the rice harvest had been completed. If the Spaniards assisted in collecting the harvest the waiting period would be significantly reduced. The next day Magellan sent a team of men to harvest the rice, but the native chiefs were suffering from a hangover from having feasted all night and so no



work was accomplished. Work, however, did take place over the next two days and the fleet sailed.<sup>60</sup>

After passing several islands, on April 7, 1521, Magellan and his fleet came upon the port of Cebu and upon entering the harbor, in contravention of the instructions from the Casa, raised his ships' banners, went to battle stations, reefed his sails, and fired his artillery causing some panic among the people of the settlement.<sup>61</sup> The story of Magellan and his conduct at Cebu, which has been enumerated by many historians is important for the subtle but significant actions that eventually led to the Captain-General's downfall and death in the islands and so some of the main events are worthy of enumeration and analysis.

Magellan sent a negotiating party ashore consisting of his foster-son de Sousa (of which little is known), his slave Enrique and, according to the curious renaissance Spanish practice, the expedition's lawyer whose job was to formalize and witness the proceedings in accordance with Spanish law.<sup>62</sup> The *datu* of Cebu, named Humabon, after having heard Magellan introduced as "captain of the greatest king and prince in the world," replied that Magellan was welcome but must pay what the Spaniards interpreted as tribute but what in actuality was a customary exchange of gifts. As proof of the custom, Humabon stated that just four days before a Siamese trader laden with gold and slaves had presented the gift and as proof introduced a Siamese trader from the vessel who had decided to stay behind. Contrary to the local custom, Magellan refused to provide the gift and demanded that exclusive trading privileges be extended instead. The Siamese trader warned Humabon about

the might of European weaponry displayed at Malacca while Kolambu simultaneously assured him of the Spaniards' good will.<sup>63</sup>

As a result of the warnings and assurances given by the various parties at the negotiations, Humabon relented and agreed to a blood compact to seal vows of friendship<sup>64</sup>, though in this case it seems to have been for the purpose of confirming the trading relationship agreed to by both parties and perhaps to buy time. Humabon then explained to the Spanish delegation, obviously to clarify his earlier request, that it was tradition for visiting ships' captains to exchange gifts with him upon their arrival. He asked the Spanish delegation whether if in this case he should give a gift first or should he wait for Magellan to make the first move. Enrique, continuing the belligerent attitude, replied that since the chief wanted to maintain the custom he should be the first to present a gift.<sup>65</sup>

On the morning of April 9 Kolambu and the Siamese merchant came on board the flagship with a message from Humabon to inform Magellan that he and his people were gathering food to be brought on board to establish friendly relations. Once again, as had been done at Limasawa, Magellan staged a mock battle of his men as a military demonstration of his power. Later that afternoon, a nephew of Humabon accompanied by ten of the most prominent men of the *barangay* delivered several baskets of rice, pigs, goats, and chickens to the ship.<sup>66</sup>

Obviously believing these men to be nobles in the European mold, Magellan, obviously shocked, asked if they usually held such meetings in public, and when they answered positively, if they had the authority to make a peaceful alliance, which they answered in the same way, though

whether they understood this question in the same way it was asked is questionable. Magellan then launched into a long harangue about the creation of man and the need of the natives to convert to Christianity. The Cebuans replied that the Spaniards could leave a man behind to teach them his faith. Magellan countered that instead of leaving someone behind he could have his priest baptize them now and later bring men to teach them the faith--another violation of the Casa's instructions. If Pigafetta is to be believed, they answered that they would talk to their chief and then contradictorily stated that they wished to become Christians. Magellan, and others of his crew present, accepted this news in an emotional outburst, the Captain-General embracing both Humabon's nephew and Kolambu. He then loaded them down with presents and sent Pigafetta to deliver the most valuable ones to Humabon himself.<sup>67</sup>

On the flagship there was a man onboard who was incurably ill of scurvy. The man succumbed to his disease and Pigafetta was sent once again to Humabon for permission to bury the man. The *datu* diplomatically replied, "If I and my vassals all belong to your sovereign, how much more ought the land."<sup>68</sup> The funeral was arranged with great pomp to make an impression and, as at Limasawa, a wooden cross was erected as the conventional sign of discovery and possession.<sup>69</sup>

Having successfully brought off a show of force on shore, and claimed, surreptitiously, Cebu for Spain the Spaniards decided it time to set up a store, or factory, for trading goods was set up on the shore on Friday, April 12, at which the Cebuans traded gold for the common

goods displayed. Magellan, intending to stay to rule the islands, noticed that the Cebuans were experienced traders and immediately put a stop to the practice--having the sailors accept only foodstuffs in trade.<sup>70</sup>

Magellan had still not met Humabon and the expedition was not in Cebu one full week when, on Saturday, April 13, arrangements were made for the baptism of Humabon and his people. A platform decorated with drapes and palm branches was set up in the open space where the burial had been made. On April 14 Magellan went ashore with forty of his men and met Humabon for the first time. After a quick exchange of pleasantries he had Humabon and his chiefs baptized.<sup>71</sup> That Magellan intended to stay and Hispanize the natives is clearly indicated by this action. He gave Humabon the name Carlos after the king of Spain; renamed Humabon's son Fernando after Charles' brother; Rajah Kolambu, the name of Juan; and the Siamese trader the name Cristobal.<sup>72</sup>

Perhaps relieved to have finished with the ceremonial formalities of welcoming who to them were simply another group of traders, the *datu* and his chiefs declined Magellan's invitation to dinner aboard his ship. Father Valderrama continued the work of baptism and after dinner Humabon's wife came with forty women attendants to undergo the ritual. Someone among Magellan's crew brought along a statue of the Virgin with the Child Jesus. The *datu's* wife was impressed by the beauty of the statue and asked to be baptized and was with the wives of the other prominent families of Cebu. In the pattern of the earlier baptisms, Humabon's wife was given the name Juana in honor of Charles' mother; her daughter, renamed Catalina; and Kolumbu's wife was christened Isabel.<sup>73</sup>

Magellan seems to have been a religiously devout man and attended Mass every day. Knowing that he had violated the Church doctrine that baptism was to follow religious instruction, he attempted to make up for this lack with Humabon. On one occasion Humabon's wife, who was young and beautiful, attended Mass and Magellan, obviously taken by her beauty, remembered her joy at the sight of the image of the Virgin and Child and presented it to her.<sup>74</sup> Whether Humabon approved of this transaction is not recorded.

Many people from surrounding districts were baptized during the following week. Estimates as to the numbers are guesswork but Transylvanus, from survivors' figures, gives 2200.<sup>75</sup> According to contemporary accounts, Cebu extended four to five statute miles along the seashore. It was a town of considerably larger size than any in the surrounding islands and therefore probably possessed a correspondingly greater influence through familial alliances. Magellan, probably interpreted the size of the *barangay* to be the determining factor in influence and so decided that establishing a strong Christian base in Cebu would allow for the establishment of preeminence over the surrounding islands and provide an effective defense against the Portuguese. He assumed, as did later voyagers, that the social hierarchy of the Cebuans also followed the European model and could use this as an effective means of control. That this is the case is indicated by Magellan, shortly after the baptism, attiring Humabon in a yellow and violet silk robe signifying royalty, compelling the neighboring chiefs at a formal ceremony to swear allegiance to the Cebuan *datu*, and compelling Humabon, in turn, to swear allegiance to the

king of Spain. The most incongruous action in furtherance of this strategy occurred when Magellan presented Humabon with a red velvet chair and gave him instructions to have it carried before him at all public ceremonies.<sup>76</sup>

Having achieved the wholesale baptism of the Filipinos, Magellan then insisted that they burn their old religious idols. The natives replied that they could not because they were offering sacrifices for the datu's brother, a man very well respected, who was seriously ill.<sup>77</sup> That they were keeping their old idols because of the sick man was probably a polite excuse to an impolite demand. The flexible, almost pantheistic, nature of Filipino culture noted in chapter one of this paper would not have abided the destruction of their idols--particularly those containing the *anitos* of their ancestors. Prohibitions against destroying idols had been recognized in the written Filipino codes that have come down to us and the punishment for such offenses was death.

Magellan continued to insist that the Christian God would cure the sick man if only he were baptized and the pagan idols burned. In dramatic fashion, Magellan organized a procession to the house of the sick man, who was in a coma. After baptizing the man, his wives, and his children, a mattress, sheets, pillow, and coverlet were provided for the man to rest on, as were sweet preserves to eat and perfume. The man recovered and Pigafetta states the natives themselves destroyed their holy places. Noone, however, doubts the veracity of this statement and poses an alternative hypothesis. Pigafetta states that the natives destroyed their own temples in a state of religious ecstasy crying out "Castiglia, Castiglia"<sup>78</sup> but it is likely that Pigafetta was being

purposely disingenuous. Noone proposes that, instead, the natives may have been shrieking "Pastilan, Pastilan"--a term expressing great horror or sorrow--as they saw their idols destroyed before their eyes by the religiously enraptured Europeans.<sup>79</sup>

Combined with the Spanish actions regarding the idols another source of friction with the Filipinos may have been sexual in nature. While making no specific mention of such excesses Pigafetta does talk about the mutilation of the male sexual organs practiced by the natives and the preference for the Europeans which the native women had.<sup>80</sup> He states:

The males, large and small, have their penis pierced from one side to the other near the head, with a gold or tin bolt as large as a goose quill. In both ends of the same bolt, some have what resembles a spur, with points upon the ends; others are like the head of a cart nail. . . . When the men wish to have communication with their women, the latter take the penis not in the regular way and commence very gently to introduce it (into the vagina), with the spur on top first, and then the other part...Whenever any of our men went ashore, both by day and by night, every one invited him to eat and to drink. . . . The women loved us very much more than their own men. All the women from the age of six years and upward, have their vaginas (*natura*) gradually opened because of the men's penises.<sup>81</sup>

Encouraged by what he saw as success at Cebu, Magellan next ordered all of the other *datus* of Cebu and surrounding islands to recognize Humabon as their king and pay homage.<sup>82</sup> All eyewitnesses agree with Pigafetta that not all of the other *datus* in the area would cooperate with this plan or even to welcome the Spaniards.<sup>83</sup> Magellan was told by the Cebuans of a Lapu-Lapu, a *datu* from Mactan Island, who refused to pay homage to Humabon.<sup>84</sup>

Mactan Island is barely ten miles in diameter, swampy along the edges; the interior shallow infertile soil over a hard coral base,

capable of supporting only a small population. Despite these geographical limitations, the story is told that there were two chiefs on the island--Sula, who submitted and paid the petty tribute of two goats, and Lapu-Lapu, supposedly the enemy of Sula who refused to pay the tribute. On Friday, April 26, 1521, Sula requested assistance from the Spaniards in the form of soldiers to participate in an attack that was planned against Lapu-Lapu for the following night.<sup>85</sup>

Magellan decided to go personally to Sula's aid. Later accounts state that his closest friends tried to dissuade him from entering into a local dispute. John Serrano at least did object vigorously to the plan and so demanded to be left behind to guard the ships. Despite this opposition, Magellan and sixty picked men that same night loaded onto three boats bound for Mactan. The Spaniards took muskets, crossbows, helmets, and corselets but no leg armor.<sup>86</sup> With them was Humabon, his nephew, several of his principle men and five to six hundred warriors on twenty to thirty native *balanguays*.<sup>87</sup>

Apparently the natives were aware of Magellan's landing in advance for they met him at the beach.<sup>88</sup> The islanders were obviously hoping that the Spaniards would attack before the sun was up because they had dug pits to trap them--an indication that preparations had been going on for some time.<sup>89</sup> Magellan told Humabon to keep his men out of the fight and he would demonstrate how Europeans fight.<sup>90</sup> He first sent the Siamese trader to Lapu-Lapu to tell him that an amicable relationship could still be worked out provided he would agree to recognize Humabon as overlord and Spain's dominion. Otherwise they



would taste Spanish steel. Lapu-Lapu rejected the offer and replied that they too had good lances which were hardened by fire.<sup>91</sup>

Magellan charged the shore with forty-nine of his men, eleven being left behind to guard the boats, wading through the reef and the shallow water. When they reached the beach Lapu-Lapu arrayed his forces into three battle columns.<sup>92</sup> The tide was so low that the boats, which were armed with culverins, could be brought no nearer than two to three hundred yards from the beach and so these weapons could not be used in the battle. The number of 1500 warriors comes from Pigafetta and is probably exaggerated at that but other sources are no more reliable-- Transylvanus gives three thousand<sup>93</sup>, Albo six thousand.<sup>94</sup>

In the face of these numbers Magellan arrayed his force back to back with the musketeers and crossbow men firing into the Mactanese for half an hour or more with little effect. He shouted orders to cease fire but his men, frightened by the size of the force amassed against them, paid no attention. He dispatched some to burn some houses and flush out the enemy hiding behind them but this move only infuriated the Mactanese. Soon many of the men from the small Spanish force were wounded by the shower of spears and arrows, especially in the legs which were without armor. Magellan himself was struck in the leg by a poison arrow. He exhorted his men not to be frightened by the superiority of the enemy because he heard that "two hundred Spaniards in the island of Yucatan put sometimes two or three hundred thousand men to flight"<sup>95</sup> but it soon became apparent that the experience of Yucatan would not be repeated that day. He ordered his men into a retreat that soon deteriorated into headlong flight. Consequently, Magellan found himself

left on the beach with only eight other men, including Pigafetta, fighting off the enemy as best they could in water up their knees as the tide came in. These nine men kept their ground for over an hour until Magellan ordered the others to return to the boats while he covered their retreat. Pigafetta chronicles in detail how one warrior attempted to run Magellan through with his bamboo spear and was instead impaled upon Magellan's lance. Unable to withdraw the lance from the dead man Magellan attempted to draw his sword and realized that he could not because his arm was partially paralyzed by a shoulder wound. As he tugged at his sword he was soon set upon from all sides. He fell forward from a blow in the leg from a native bolo, and then hacked by the Mactan warriors until dead.<sup>96</sup>

In the battle, beside Magellan, eight Spaniards died and four Cebuans who had been part of a group who had come to Magellan's aid. Fifteen Mactan warriors were killed and many others wounded.<sup>97</sup> Many of the Spaniards scrambling on the boats panic stricken demonstrated disloyalty and cowardice--weaknesses noted by the Cebuans. When they reached the ships in Cebu with the news of the defeat all men and merchandise were called back to the ships.<sup>98</sup> That afternoon Humabon sent a delegation to Lapu-Lapu asking for the body of Magellan and the other dead at the insistence of the Spanish officers, most prominently Barbosa, but he refused to release the corpses.<sup>99</sup>

After they had returned from Mactan, Magellan's men chose two new commanders--Duarte Barbosa and Juan Serrano--thus the Portuguese nature of the command structure was maintained.<sup>100</sup> Barbosa and Serrano decided to reaffirm all of Magellan's agreements with Humabon. To do

this they needed Enrique, slightly wounded at Mactan, to interpret but he refused to take orders and took to his bed in mourning.<sup>101</sup> Magellan had provided in his will that upon his death Enrique was to be set free and it appears that he was aware of this obligation. Despite this fact, Barbosa refused to honor the promise of freedom and threatened to have Enrique flogged for disobeying orders<sup>102</sup>, though Transylvanus suggests that Serrano made the threat<sup>103</sup>, and so he carried out his orders. At this point, Pigafetta and other Spanish authors have conjectured that Enrique, determined to get revenge on his tormentors, wove a tale of treachery to arouse the suspicions of Humabon against the Europeans.<sup>104</sup>

On Wednesday morning, May 1, 1521, Humabon sent word to Barbosa and Serrano that the jewels he had promised to be given to the king of Spain were ready and would be delivered during a banquet to which the Spaniards were invited.<sup>105</sup> Serrano objected to leaving the ships unprotected and undermanned but Barbosa retorted that he could stay onboard if he were afraid. Consequently, Serrano was the first to jump onto a small boat and precede everyone to the banquet place.<sup>106</sup>

Twenty-four men<sup>107</sup> from the fleet went ashore including Barbosa, Serrano, Father Valderrama, and Enrique. As the banquet began Humabon's warriors set upon the Spaniards and killed them.<sup>108</sup> The din and cries from the massacre soon reached the Spanish fleet. Serrano, bleeding from his wounds and with his arms tied behind him, was dragged to the beach by the Cebuans. He begged his friend Juan Carballo to come to his aid but Carballo turned a deaf ear and commanded the ships to sail away.<sup>109</sup>

Many theories have been put forth concerning the reason for the ruse and subsequent slaughter. As noted earlier, Pigafetta attributed it to the mistreatment and resulting machinations of Enrique. Another theory put forth by one of Pigafetta's contemporaries posits that four other *datus* of Cebu had threatened Humabon with death if he did not drive out the Spaniards and so he relented to their demands. Most significantly, however, an investigation conducted by the king's court in 1522, after the arrival of the survivors, determined that the massacre was due to the disreputable conduct of the men, in particular Magellan, in Cebu--especially noting the mass conversions before religious instruction, and the cases of sexual relations with and rape of the Cebuan women.<sup>110</sup>

The Philippine chapter of Magellan's expedition ends at this point, though its importance to future voyages does not. The fleet continued to drift among the islands in search of the Moluccas, almost suffering a similar fate in Borneo as at Cebu, foraging for provisions and conducting themselves as pirates. Finally, on November 8, 1521, twenty-six months after leaving Spain, the remains of the fleet arrived at the island of Tidore of the Spice Islands.<sup>111</sup> There they learned that Francisco Serrano had been poisoned by the sultan of Tidore who was waging war against the Portuguese in the islands. The Spaniards allied themselves with this native chieftain and were able to repair their two remaining ships and load them with provisions and spice for the return voyage to Spain. It was agreed among them that the Victoria, commanded by Sebastian del Cano, would return by the surer way of the Cape of Good Hope in violation of the Treaty of Tordesillas, while the flagship

Trinidad, commanded by Gomez de Espinosa, would sail across the Pacific to Panama.<sup>112</sup>

After overcoming many more hardships, on Saturday, September 6, 1522, the Victoria, with tattered riggings and eighteen survivors, entered the port of San Lucar de Barrameda.<sup>113</sup> Two days later they anchored in Seville and discharged their artillery in salute.<sup>114</sup> The fate of the Trinidad, however, turned out differently. Departing Tidore for Panama on April 6, 1522, with a cargo of spices and a crew of fifty-four, the ill-fated ship attempted a crossing of the Pacific against the prevailing winds and currents. After seven months at sea her leaking hull forced the Spaniards to sail back to the Moluccas and the surviving crew placed themselves under Portuguese custody.<sup>115</sup>

All of the survivors of the Victoria received honors and rewards, Charles receiving them with great fanfare.<sup>116</sup> The cargo of the Victoria consisted of thirty tons of cloves, and a quantity of cinnamon, sandalwood, nutmeg, and other spices. Among the natives from Tidore who were presented to the King, one was not allowed to return to his homeland because he inquired about the value of the spices at the Spanish bazaars and with good reason for the profit from this one ship paid for all of the expenses of the expedition and showed a hefty profit.<sup>117</sup>

Needless to say a euphoric mood overtook the Spanish Court and de Haro as principle investor. Anticipating even greater profits from the arrival of the larger Trinidad, Charles V authorized the creation of a *Casa de la Contratación de la Especería*<sup>118</sup>--a House of Spice Trade-- with Christopher de Haro as its first manager independent from the Casa

to be established at the port of Coruña.<sup>119</sup> Thus, the control over the spice trade sought by the Fugger agents under the Portuguese was obtained under the flag of Spain. Alas, the fate of the Trinidad and subsequent expeditions rendered these hopes stillborn.

During the intervening years from the departure of Magellan, Portugal and Spain continued to wrangle over their conflicting claims to the Moluccas. Each maintained that the islands fell on their own side of the Line. In 1521, King Manuel of Portugal died and was succeeded by his son John III. Having a more moderate disposition to Spain than his father, relations between the two nations improved<sup>120</sup> until, when in 1522, the return of the Victoria posed a tangible threat to Portugal's claim to the Moluccas. According to de Gomera, a sixteenth century historian, John was "snorting with indignation at the thought that he was about to lose the valuable spice trade. . . . And he, and the whole country behind him, were ready to tear down the sky."<sup>121</sup>

John, invoking the Treaty of Tordesillas, demanded that the Spaniards cease sending ships to the Moluccas and that both nations undertake the promised expedition of cosmographers and other experts to determine the exact location of the Line.<sup>122</sup> Spain rejected these claims--the latter specifically because it was obvious to the technical advisors at Court that a definite means of determining longitude had not be established.

Charges and countercharges passed between the two nations as Spain continued preparations for another expedition to the Moluccas. Finally, Charles V sent Dr. Juan Cabrero of the Council of Castile as his personal envoy to John to carry a letter outlining the Spanish

position. This position was that any discussions regarding the interpretation of what were viewed as settled matters in the Treaty of Tordesillas would not be entertained. However, any question of fact was open to negotiation. He specifically noted that the treaty stated that if one of the nations accidentally occupied the territory of the other, they should vacate it when the error was found. Since even Portuguese experts could not be certain that Malacca was on the Portuguese side of the Line, how could John demand that the Spaniards cease sending voyages to the Moluccas when the legality of the Portuguese voyages sent further east was in question. Charles then appeals to John to settle the issue peacefully and as a family matter, especially considering the forces arrayed against Spain (i.e. the Protestants, Turks, and French) waiting to take advantage of any split between the two nations.<sup>123</sup>

Soon a Portuguese delegation arrived at Court in Pamplona and requested that a meeting with Spanish legal and cosmological experts be held to interpret the ambiguous portions of the Treaty of Tordesillas. To this Charles assented. After inconclusive debate the ambassadors gained an audience with Charles and requested that he cease sending expeditions to the Moluccas, invoking the right of prior discovery and raising the veil from their policy of secrecy. Charles proposed that the two nations suspend further voyages to the contested islands until a settlement was reached and to this the Portuguese agreed.<sup>124</sup>

The Portuguese believed that Charles stood little chance of surviving the war with France, not to mention the other commitments he had made throughout Europe. Consequently, since they in fact physically held the Moluccas; were the only country with a credible naval force in

the region; and knew about the fate of the Trinidad, information not yet known in Spain, they decided that delay would gain them an advantage. The two countries signed an agreement called the Treaty of Vitoria on February 19, 1524 in which the border towns of Badajoz, on the Spanish side, and Elvas on the Portuguese side were designated as the place to hold talks concerning the Moluccas.<sup>125</sup> From April 11 to May 31, 1524, the two sides met and could not agree,<sup>126</sup> the Portuguese basing their claim on the right of prior discovery and the Spanish countering that discovery without occupation granted no rights and pointing to the oaths of sovereignty given by Humabon, Kolambu, and other natives on the Magellan expedition. Finally the Spaniards ended the conference by presenting the Portuguese with a globe showing the Line of Demarcation cutting through Rio de Janeiro in the Atlantic and Malacca in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese in reply reasserted their priority of discovery and threatened death to any Spaniard found in the Moluccas.<sup>127</sup>

Charles now decided to dispatch another expedition to seize the Moluccas as quickly as possible. Since de Haro and the Fugger bankers, under the agreement signed over the Magellan expedition, had control of expeditions to the Moluccas through the House of Spice Trade, all preparations for the expedition were made out of Coruña.<sup>128</sup> Charles gave command of this expedition to Garcia Jofre de Loaisa, Knight of the Order of St. John (Rhodes), son of a noble Castilian family of Ciudad Real, and brother or near relative of his namesake on Charles' Court, the bishop of Osma, later to become president of the Council of the Indies.<sup>129</sup> Also accompanying Loaisa was Sebastian del Cano, who had



piloted the Victoria back from the Moluccas and led the mutiny against Magellan in South America, and Andrés de Urdaneta.<sup>130</sup>

Since he figures so prominently in Filipino history a brief outline of Urdaneta's background is useful. He was born of noble family in Villafranca de Oria, in the province of Guipuzcoa, Spain in 1508.<sup>131</sup> His father was a government official in Villafranca and saw to it that he be well educated until their untimely death of the plague. Later in life he was regarded to be the foremost expert of navigation in Asia and the Pacific. In 1525, however, when he joined the Loaisa expedition, he was seventeen or eighteen years old and setting off on the first of many expeditions that he was to undertake under the foremost navigators and cosmographers of the day.<sup>132</sup>

The Loaisa expedition is only of passing interest because it represents a continuation of the sequence of events that eventually led to the Spanish pacification of the Philippines and, therefore, will only be outlined. Of most interest are the instructions to Loaisa. They stated that the expedition was to proceed directly to the Moluccas, refraining from diversionary trips in search of other discoveries. Sailing orders were as specified for Magellan. Once in the Moluccas the commander was to assume the office of governor and make arrangements for the loading of spices on the largest ships of the fleet for the trip back to Spain while the smallest ships would be used for defense. A fort was to be built on the Moluccas, or if not practicable, in the islands north of them, i.e. the Philippines. Friendly relations were to be established with the native chieftains contacted during Magellan's expedition and attempts were to be made to rescue survivors from that

voyage. The officers were to take particular care to prevent the members of the crew from sexually abusing the women. Finally, the instructions specified a priority of succession among the officers in the event of death of Loaisa and his lieutenants. Prophetically, the instructions specified that should all of the officers should die, the men are to elect a captain-general and other officials when necessary.<sup>133</sup>

The Second Armada de Molucca, as the expedition was called, was composed of seven ships and 450 men, most of the latter Basques, left Coruña, Spain on July 24, 1525<sup>134</sup>, following the route used by Magellan.<sup>135</sup> He stopped in the Canaries and from there coasted south along Africa, crossed the Atlantic, and skirted the South American coast. Loaisa, who was not a trained mariner, lost all but the flagship to shipwreck, separation, and desertion during the Atlantic crossing and transit of the straits.<sup>136</sup>

Already having suffered great hardships, overcrowded with survivors, and dangerously short of provisions, the Victoria, flagship of Loaisa's fleet began the Pacific crossing alone. Soon, however, a wave of sickness and death spread among the crew beginning with the death of the ship's pilot on June 24, 1526. In late July, barely 400 leagues from the Strait and four degrees north of the Equator, Loaisa succumbed to the sickness. He was succeeded by Juan Sebastian del Cano of the Magellan expedition but, also suffering from the same illness that struck Loaisa, died on August 6. The crew elected Alonso de Salazar, a minor official on one of the wrecked ships, captain-general to replace del Cano.<sup>137</sup>

The Victoria arrived at Guam on the morning of September 4. There they rescued Gonzalo de Vigo, a Galician deserter from the ill-fated Trinidad of Magellan's expedition. After provisioning--avoiding any of the conflicts with the native Chamorros encountered in the Magellan expedition--and resting the crew, the Victoria continued on its voyage south on September 10.<sup>138</sup> Of the crew, the rest at Guam did Salazar no obvious good and he died of the same illness that had taken the other crew members on September 15. With no officers or officials of any sort left, Martin Carquizano, an *alguacil* in Spain assumed the position, confirming his dubious authority in a rigged poll of the crew.<sup>139</sup>

At sundown on October 2 they came in sight of Mindanao. At first the people encountered were friendly and traded provisions freely with the Spaniards, but the next day relations changed suddenly and inexplicably. They soon learned that a Bornean trading party was in the islands were convinced that the Spaniards were Portuguese. The Bornean Moslems were vying for control of the region, especially of the Moluccas, at the time and so the mistaken identity was logical. After several more attempts at negotiations in which the Spaniards seem to have displayed bad faith--they lacked an interpreter for the voyage and saw all of the actions of the natives as hostile--and running short of provisions they decided to try their hand at Cebu and see if any survivors of Magellan's expedition were there in accordance with the Instructions of the voyage.<sup>140</sup>

The expedition failed to make it to Cebu because of the contrary winds of the season.<sup>141</sup> Finally, on November 3, 1526, they arrived at

the town of Zamafo, a dependency of the sultanate of Tidore, in the Spice Islands. Tidore was still in the midst of a war with the Portuguese for control of the islands. As a result, seeking to use the opponents of the Portuguese to their advantage, the Spaniards, now consisting of only 120 men under the leadership of a new commander-- Hernando de la Torre--threw up a fort on Tidore and conducted a small war upon the Portuguese contingent in the islands while awaiting further assistance from Spain.<sup>142</sup>

Though de Haro and the Fuggers were to control the voyages following Loaisa, a group of merchants and investors from Seville managed to win royal approval of another expedition to the Moluccas under the leadership of Sebastian Cabot, son of the famous explorer John Cabot.<sup>143</sup> In mid 1526, a seaman from the Trinidad managed to elude capture and, stowing away on a ship bound for India, successfully made his way to Spain. He brought the news of the fate of the ship and crew and the building of the fort on Tidore by the Loaisa expedition directly to Charles V.<sup>144</sup> Charles ordered that the Cabot expedition be fitted out without delay to reinforce the men on Tidore and on April 13, 1526 Cabot, with four ships and 250 men, sailed out of San Lucar de Barrameda bound for the Moluccas and other islands of the Far East including the exploration of the lands of Tarsis, Ophir, Catayo, and Cipangu.<sup>145</sup>

Similar to the racial disharmony suffered during Magellan's voyage, dissension arose between the Italian Cabot and his Spanish captains and men. Problems concerning insufficient provisions, an issue that plagued all of the expeditions up to this point, exasperated the situation. Off the Brazilian coast mutiny broke out and there the

ring-leaders beached.<sup>146</sup> Cabot, hoping to find another strait and riches on his own, and obviously abandoning the mission of aiding the Loaisa garrison in the Moluccas, sailed up the Plate River and for the next three years became bogged down in exploring up river channels, fighting off hostile Indians, and searching for gold. In December 1526, an expedition sent by de Haro under the auspices of the House of Spices, arrived at the River Plate for the specific purpose of exploring the region and found out from Cabot's men posted at a fort at the mouth of the river of the change in the expedition's mission. They returned to Spain and reported on the situation, though Cabot remained in the good graces of the king until his return in failure. Finally, after losing over half his men, Cabot hesitantly returned to Spain in August 1530.<sup>147</sup>

The problems of outfitting an expedition to the Moluccas from Spain had become obvious to the Crown and it seems that the king began to become suspicious of Fugger influence. In June 1526, Charles V wrote a letter to Hernan Cortés in New Spain instructing him to organize a voyage to determine conditions in the Moluccas<sup>148</sup> and determine the fate of the Loaisa and Cabot expeditions.<sup>149</sup> In August 1526, a member of the crew of one of the separated ships of the Loaisa expedition, having sailed up the Pacific coast of South and Central America, arrived in Mexico City<sup>150</sup> and this prompted Cortés, who was losing favor in the Spanish Court, to vigorously lobby the king to allow him to send an expedition to the Moluccas.<sup>151</sup> By the end of the same year, the authorization that Cortés had been hoping for arrived to "see to it that two caravels, or possibly a caravel and a brigantine, are sent to

Moluccas in search of our men there . . ."<sup>152</sup> Thus, the impetus for exploration to Asia shifted to the New World from Spain.

The expedition was prepared in New Spain and financed by Cortés. It consisted of three ships and 110 men commanded by Alvaro de Saavedra Cerón, a cousin of Cortés who had a distinguished career as governor of Vera Cruz and had served him well in the conquest of the Yucatan.<sup>153</sup> According to the instructions of the king, the aims of the expedition were: to find out what happened to Serrano and other survivors of the Magellan expedition left in Cebu in 1521, to look for the ship Trinidad, to ascertain what had happened to the Cabot expedition, to determine the fate of the Loaisa expedition, and to return with this information promptly.<sup>154</sup>

In addition to the instructions of the king, Saavedra received a sealed letter from Cortes, dated May 28, 1527, and addressed to the king of Cebu apologizing for the conduct of Magellan.<sup>155</sup> Cortés also instructed his cousin to use all means to spy on the Portuguese operations in the area, to fortify the Spanish foothold in the Moluccas, to ensure he does not infringe on the prior rights of Loaisa or Cabot if they are alive, to bring back seedlings of the spice plants with natives familiar with their culture, and, finally, to bring the cargo only to one of two Pacific ports--Aguatlán in Colima or in Tehuantepec--securely under his personal control.<sup>156</sup>

Aside from the personal instructions of the king and Cortés, the expedition of Saavedra was more ad hoc in character than those originating from Spain under the watchful eyes of the Casa. The ships were built at the mouth of the Río de Balsas and the quality of the

workmanship is betrayed by the fact that the flagship Florida began leaking badly just a few days out of port. However, never before had an expedition bound for Asia been fitted out in the New World, but it was a mission which Cortés and his successors would assume with vigor.<sup>157</sup>

On October 31, 1527, Saavedra's fleet of three vessels left the port of Zihuantanejo, Mexico. Shortly after leaving port the leaking of the flagship referred to earlier made its appearance and, instead of returning to port for repairs, Saavedra decided to have the crew man the pumps twenty-four hours a day and foolishly jettisoned the equivalent of fifty days provisions.<sup>158</sup> On December 14, while crossing the Pacific, two of the ships were blown off course in a storm and never seen again.<sup>159</sup> As the Victoria before them, the crew of the Florida had to continue the crossing alone. They travelled through the Carolines and claimed the islands of Ulie and Yap for Spain<sup>160</sup>, which they incorrectly identified as the Ladrões.<sup>161</sup>

After a brief stay loading firewood and fresh water, the expedition pushed on and on the evening of February, 1, 1528, saw the island of Mindanao and other islands of the Philippine archipelago along the horizon.<sup>162</sup> As in the Loaisa expedition, no interpreter had been taken along so in coming upon some native on shore they could only communicate through non-verbal gestures--a dangerous method of communication among differing cultures. The mutual suspicion between the Spaniards and the inhabitants of Mindanao soon ended in hostility between the two parties. As the Spaniards made ready to get underway they saw what appeared to be a European on the shore waving to them. They sent a boat for him and found that he was named Sebastian de Puerta,

a Portuguese crewman of the Loaisa expedition from one of the ships lost off the South American coast--the Parra.<sup>163</sup>

He explained that the Parra had made the Pacific crossing alone, had landed at Mindanao in August 1526 (two months ahead of the Victoria) and was attacked by the Moslem inhabitants, and that in the attack the natives captured him and others and made them slaves. As a slave he had learned the native language, had heard from his captors that the Parra had run aground and was lost<sup>164</sup>, that eight Spaniards survived the massacre at Cebu in 1521 and had been sold by the Cebuans as slaves to Chinese traders<sup>165</sup>, and that the Victoria had come by and continued southward.<sup>166</sup>

Knowing the fate of Magellan's men--making a trip to Cebu unnecessary--and that the Victoria had travelled south, Saavedra decided to coast south along Mindanao to the Moluccas. A storm forced him to seek shelter in a protected natural harbor. There they went ashore in search of food and the value of an interpreter became apparent as de Puerta communicated with the initially hostile natives and managed the situation to the point of the local *datu* coming out to meet the Spaniards, offering to undergo the ritual of blood brotherhood for trade. Before these friendly relations could be enlarged upon, however, another storm forced the ships out of the harbor and into the open sea where they continued their journey.<sup>167</sup>

The expedition came upon the small islands of Candigar and Sarangani and there a native prau came alongside to display two captured Spaniards that they were offering to sell by barter. Saavedra, through de Puerta acting as interpreter, obtained the freedom of the two



Spaniards as well as successfully trading Spanish cloth, glass beads, and other items brought as barter for rice, pigs, poultry, vegetables, tuba, cloves, and cinnamon. These two captives were also from the Parral but, it was learned later, had led a mutiny against the ship's captain and, untrained in piloting, ran the ship aground.<sup>168</sup>

Finally, on March 25, 1528 the Florida arrived in the Moluccas where they found the garrison of the Loaisa expedition conducting a war of attrition against the Portuguese, which surprised Saavedra "in view of the great friendship between the emperor (Charles V) and the king of Portugal."<sup>169</sup> Following his instructions, Saavedra loaded the Florida with provisions and enough cloves to pay for the costs of the expedition and set off for Mexico on June 14, 1528. As in the case of the Trinidad, the course taken by Saavedra put him against the prevailing winds and currents. Running short of supplies he turned around and put in at Mindanao but found that the Moslem kingdom in Borneo had imposed a trade embargo on all Europeans in the Moluccas and so they could obtain no provisions there. As a result, the Florida found itself back at the fortress at Tidore on October 19.<sup>170</sup>

After repairing the badly leaking Florida, Saavedra decided to make another attempt across the Pacific. With thirty men he departed Tidore on May 3, 1529. As on his previous attempt he came upon opposing winds and currents and could do no better than to hop from one Pacific island to another. Finally, ailing from disease he died at sea on October 9, 1529. His final instructions were to travel as far north as 30 degrees and, if the winds were still unfavorable, to return to the Moluccas. Macias del Puyo, who succeeded Saavedra, followed these

instructions and found that, indeed, conditions were no better. He turned the Florida around and arrived in the Moluccas on December 8, 1529, finding that the fortress at Tidore had fallen, that the Sultan of Tidore was dead and succeeded by a hostile Moslem ruler, and that the garrison was now maintaining a tenuous existence at Zamafo.<sup>171</sup>

The remnants of the Saavedra expedition joined the garrison with those of Loaisa's men and held out against the Portuguese for four more years. The end, however, was in sight. The Portuguese brought with them word that Charles V had sold his rights to the islands to the king of Portugal. At first the Spaniards refused to believe this was the case, but as it became apparent that no reinforcements were coming to their aid--their numbers reduced from disease, malnutrition, war, and desertions--they came to believe the rumors. Official confirmation came in 1533 when two Portuguese ships arrived with a new Portuguese governor and word of guaranteed passage back to Spain for the remaining Spanish garrison.<sup>172</sup> Only seventeen Spaniards, including Urdaneta, remained at Tidore from the original numbers of the Loaisa and Saavedra expeditions. Under Portuguese protection they left the Moluccas in 1534 and 1535 and, after travelling through Malacca, Ceylon, and other places reached Lisbon in 1536.<sup>173</sup>

The agreement that ceded Spain's rights to the Moluccas was called the Treaty of Zaragoza and signed April 22, 1529. From the time of the failure at Badajoz the two nations had continued to hold meetings regarding the location of the Line. In 1525 at Segovia, the two nations held talks and in the following year Charles' advisors from the Casa and the Council of the Indies met with the Portuguese ambassador over the

issue.<sup>174</sup> Finally, feeling pressured over financing his armies against the combined forces of England, France, Venice, and the Pope<sup>175</sup>, and obviously not realizing that the spice trade alone could finance his entire government, he decided to mortgage his claim to the islands to Portugal for 350,000 ducats. The Line of Demarcation was moved to 296 1/2 leagues east of the Moluccas with all lands east of the Line belonging to Portugal and all lands west to Spain.<sup>176</sup> One interesting stipulation of the agreement states that the Treaty of Tordesillas would be restored if the Spanish king decided to redeem the Mortgage, as it was called.<sup>177</sup>

The reaction to the treaty of Spain was one of shock. Pedro de Villegas, one of the cosmographers of the Casa, strongly advised Charles against the treaty and the Cortés of Castile, though with Fugger inveigling behind the scenes, requested they be given the spice trade, repay the 150,000 ducats received from Portugal as down payment, and return the spice trade to Charles after six years.<sup>178</sup> De Haro, of course, felt the largest shock as it became clear that his *Casa de Especería* at Coruña would live a short, and unprofitable, life. He had already started outfitting another expedition under the command of another experienced Portuguese expatriate, Simon de Alcazava, consisting of eight ships and one thousand men. In recompense, Charles granted the Alcazava expedition a charter to explore and colonize the region of southern Chile--an enterprise that ended in failure.<sup>179</sup>

Having effectively killed any incentive to continue explorations to Asia from Spain, Charles V accidentally planted the seed for exploring the islands and lands to the western extremities of Spain's

dominions in the New World by the Saavedra expedition. In the mind of the Spaniards these dominions ended at Cebu. Although the archipelago of St. Lazarus, as the Philippines were then called, was not mentioned in the Treaty of Zaragoza, Charles apparently abandoned his claim to the islands since they are west of the Moluccas<sup>180</sup>, though later actions indicate that they did not know this to be the case. Even after their location became known, the Spanish always considered the Philippines to be part of the Western Hemisphere and it was not until 1844 that they transferred the islands to the Eastern Hemisphere and dropped a day from the calendar at Manila.<sup>181</sup>

Cortés, as has been seen, had financed the Saavedra expedition, but by 1529 had completely lost favor with the king. The *Audiencia* ruled in his place and, only after personally appealing to the king, did he receive the title "Governor of the islands of the South Sea"--one he had sought for quite some time. Believing that further fame and fortune lay in further explorations in the Pacific, he spent the next ten years financing unsuccessful Pacific expeditions up the California coast.<sup>182</sup>

In competition with Cortés was Pedro de Alvarado. Alvarado had served as one of Cortés' most trusted lieutenants. During the conquest of the Aztecs Cortés sent him south to Guatemala and there he successfully defeated the Mayas, establishing himself as the *conquistador* governor of that province. More politically astute than Cortés, he allied himself through marriage with the powerful duke of Albuquerque and greased many palms at the Council of the Indies with the gold and silver mined by the Indian slaves in Guatemala; survived charges of malfeasance by the *Audiencia*, Las Casas, and the colonists;

had his position of governor of Guatemala officially confirmed in Spain; and given, seemingly in conflict with Cortés' rights, authority to explore the Pacific.<sup>183</sup> On one of his trips back from Spain he met the survivors of the Loaisa expedition, most significantly Andres de Urdaneta. Convinced that further fortune could be gained by the exploration of the Pacific, in 1539 he started the building and outfitting at the town of Iztapa thirteen ships for that purpose. However, as governor of a province he needed official approval for the voyage from the man who held the new position, created in April 1535, of Viceroy of New Spain--Don Antonio de Mendoza.<sup>184</sup>

Mendoza, as head of New Spain, had also been granted authority by Charles V to explore in any direction he saw fit. As the preeminent government official in New Spain, he assumed the role of local sovereign so all extraordinary actions had to be approved by him. In June 1540, Alvarado and Medoza met and decided to pool their resources in two joint ventures--one to the north and the other across the Pacific. According to the agreement, Alvarado would provide shipwrights, timber, and other supplies necessary to build the ships at Iztapa, while Mendoza would obtain all hardware that could only be obtained from Spain--anchors, sails, and artillery. Profits between the two men would be split evenly. Cortés, disillusioned by the failure of his expeditions, returned to Spain and was now no longer a factor.<sup>185</sup>

The first expedition, under the command of the Portuguese commander Juan Cabrillo, left Navidad on June 27, 1542 and explored the California coast as far north as San Francisco Bay. The other expedition, under the command of Ruy Lopez de Villalobos,

barrister-navigator and brother-in-law of the viceroy<sup>186</sup>, was given the task of exploring and subjugating the "Western Islands."<sup>187</sup> Thus, the Villalobos expedition is the first sent expressly for the purpose of colonizing the Philippines, though the opportunities possible in maintaining a base close to the Moluccas was also an incentive.

On November 1, 1542, Villalobos sailed from the port of Navidad on the same route used by Saavedra and Magellan before him. The expedition consisted of six ships and 200 men. Among the crew were Juan de Gaetano, Portuguese pilot who had sailed with Grijalva (1537) and D'Olloa (1539) in the coast explorations of California and Mexico; Guido de Lavezaris, fleet accountant; and four Augustinian missionaries--Geronimo de San Estaban, Nicolas de Perea, Alonzo de Alvarado, and Sebastian de Trasierra.<sup>188</sup> Villalobos' instructions stated that he was to colonize the "Western Islands," establish trade relations with the people, preach the Christian religion, and avoid the Moluccas, respecting the Treaty of Zaragoza.<sup>189</sup>

After a relatively calm voyage--encountering only one storm along the way--the expedition reached Mindanao on February 2, 1543, which Villalobos named after King Charles. The prevailing southerly monsoon winds drove them further and further south along the Mindanao coast. Soon, as in previous voyages, the expedition began to run low on provisions. They continued to coast along Mindanao, looking for a settlement with which to trade, and on April 1 came upon the island of Sarangani where they met opposition by the natives.<sup>190</sup> The Portuguese out of the Moluccas, in trading for food, had also taken many of the islanders of Sarangani as slaves. Consequently, any European was eyed

with suspicion.<sup>191</sup> Dangerously short of provisions, unable to travel north against the prevailing northeast monsoon, and with many men suffering from scurvy, Villalobos decided to attack the islanders and take their food. Once the successful skirmish ended, Villalobos learned that there was little food to be found--obviously the normal state of things during the dry season. Low on food, Villalobos ordered his men to plant corn and they reluctantly obeyed him.<sup>192</sup> The Spaniards were forced to eat anything they could find--coconut buds, cats, dogs, crabs, rats, snails, and jungle roots.<sup>193</sup> Internal dissention broke out among the Spaniards and a faction developed among the officers to travel further south to the Moluccas. It appears that this latter faction convinced Villalobos to establish a permanent settlement on the island, though its southernmost location placed it outside of the normal routes travelled within the islands.<sup>194</sup>

In July 1543 the galliot San Cristobal, which had been separated from the fleet during the storm in the Pacific, arrived at Sarangani. They had travelled through the central part of the islands as had Magellan and had been welcomed by the native populations and received ample provisions. Instead of moving the settlement to one of these northern locations, he sent his ships south to forage for provisions and these encounters, originating in the hostility held for the Portuguese among the islanders, ended in bloodshed and very little food.<sup>195</sup>

Finally, while deciding to remain in Sarangani, Villalobos called a meeting of his officers and decided to send the most seaworthy of his ships, the San Juan, to attempt the voyage back to New Spain. The

galliot was to accompany the San Juan along its way to Leyte and to bring back to the settlement provisions obtained there. Arriving at Leyte in August, they followed Villalobos' lead in naming Mindanao after Charles V by naming these central islands the *Islas Filipinas* and unintentionally provided the most significant contribution of the Villalobos expedition to Filipino history--the name Philippines.<sup>196</sup>

While awaiting the return of the galliot, Villalobos continued to obtain provisions through the cultivation of his own crops and by raiding the neighboring *barangays*. A delegation from the Portuguese fortress in the Moluccas arrived, accused the Spaniards of trespassing and violating the Treaty of Zaragoza, and demanded that they depart. To this Villalobos replied that the Mortgage applied solely to the Moluccas and not the "western islands." Not content with this reply, they sent agents around Mindanao and the other islands to urge the natives not to trade with the Spaniards, promising them weapons and payment in return--an unnecessary move considering Villalobos' experience and odd considering that all the evidence suggests that Portuguese were the cause of native hostility.<sup>197</sup> In October the galliot arrived back in Sarangani with ample provisions and reported that the San Juan was well on its way to New Spain. Villalobos, seeing that the local native hostility combined with that posed by the Portuguese would make his position untenable, finally decided to transfer the colony to the friendlier environs of Leyte. However, he had waited too long and the northeast monsoon had again arrived. They had travelled no more than forty leagues when a gale forced them south. Obviously yielding to the faction among his officers who favored challenging Portuguese hegemony



over the Moluccas, Villalobos turned his remaining ships around and, in January 1544, against his instructions, arrived at Ternate.<sup>198</sup>

There he allied himself with the sultan who opposed the Portuguese and waged a bitter and protracted fight against them. The San Juan, sent on to New Spain, encountered the same difficulties as the Saavedra expedition and returned to the fleet at Tidore in May 1544.<sup>199</sup> A second attempt was made a year later by the southern route, coasting along the island of New Guinea, but once again contrary winds and currents brought them back to Tidore on October 3, 1545.<sup>200</sup> At that point Villalobos knew he was beaten. Upon the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements from Malacca, he surrendered his men and ships in January 1546. Villalobos, suffering from symptoms that appear similar to polio, died at Amboina on April 4, 1546. The survivors of the expedition dispersed--some stayed in the Moluccas and others returned to Spain by way of Malacca, Goa, Cochin China, and India, arriving in Lisbon in 1549.<sup>201</sup>

The news of Villalobos' trespass infuriated Charles V. Unable to afford to make another enemy in Europe, he reprimanded his viceroy for the trespass.<sup>202</sup> Occurring at the height of the royal investigations into the conduct of the New Spain officials as a result of the complaints published by Las Casas, the immediate effect of both of these actions was to put a temporary halt to all voyages to Asia.

This situation no doubt widened the gulf between Charles V and the Spaniards. His son, Philip, had been acting as regent of Spain since 1543 and it was to the prince that the officials and people of Spain looked to represent their interests--he spoke Castilian and did

not practice what seemed to the Spaniards to be rude Germanic customs.<sup>203</sup> Voluntarily relinquishing Spain's rights to the Moluccas was as unpopular a move as the suppression of the townships, which the Flemish monarch undertook shortly after assuming office. The faction among Villalobos' officers who led their commander into the Moluccas were probably representative of most Spaniards at the time who had an opinion about the issue, particularly among men of the New World who frequently acted in defiance of royal edicts anyway.

Pressure for further Spanish voyages to the east continued to build. The Portuguese extended their overseas empire by adding Macao in China and trading rights in Japan to their holdings. Fearing that they would be faced with the same *fait accompli* elsewhere in Asia as they faced in the Moluccas, the Council of the Indies, through the intercession of Philip, continued to press the king for further expeditions, urging him to begin another voyage out of New Spain in 1552 and again in 1554.<sup>204</sup> To both of these requests Charles replied in the negative. However, tiring of the wars against France, the Lutherans, and the Ottomans he abdicated the throne in favor of Philip II in 1556. He bequeathed to his son the Kingdom of Naples, the Duchy of Milan, Flanders, the Franche Comté, and Luxembourg.<sup>205</sup> He also bequeathed the baggage of empire as he faced the forces of Protestant Europe and Moorish Turkey arrayed against him. But for those wishing to launch further voyages to the Far East and the Philippines the succession of Philip represented the event they sorely needed.

### The Legazpi Expedition: The Initial Pacification

The actual administration of Spain fell on Juana, aunt of Philip, until his return from the Netherlands in 1559.<sup>206</sup> On September 21, 1557 she authorized the new viceroy of New Spain, Don Luis de Velasco, to undertake any overseas explorations he saw fit<sup>207</sup> and this was reaffirmed by the king in 1559.<sup>208</sup> Velasco immediately began planning for expeditions to take possession of Florida and to travel to Asia. In preparation for the latter expedition, he consulted with Andres de Urdaneta, Juan Pablo de Carreon, and Guido de Lavezaris, all veterans of the Moluccas voyages--the first under Loaisa and the other two under Villalobos.<sup>209</sup>

After determining the feasibility and difficulties of such a voyage, Velasco sent Correon to Spain to present the plan for the expedition personally to the Council of the Indies and the king. After returning to Spain and hearing Correon's plan for the voyage, Philip wrote to the viceroy on September 24, 1559, authorizing him to outfit the expedition outlined by Correon for the conquest and colonization of the Philippines.<sup>210</sup> The letter established that the financing for the expedition would be borne by the state and that the ships were not to enter into Portuguese territory but they may go "to other nearby islands, such as the Phelipinas and other, which lie outside the above agreement and within our demarcation, and are said likewise to contain spice."<sup>211</sup>

Accompanying the letter to the Viceroy Velasco was another letter to Andres de Urdaneta who, after returning from the Loaisa expedition,

fought in the Mixton War in New Spain in 1541, joined the Augustinian religious order at Mexico City in 1552, and became a priest in 1557.<sup>212</sup> In this letter Philip urged Velasco to use his influence to convince Urdaneta to accompany and act as navigational advisor of the expedition.<sup>213</sup> Both Urdaneta and Velasco replied on May 28, 1560, probably in consultation with one another. In his reply to the king, Urdaneta accepted the task requested of him by the king and then gives the opinion that the Philippines were on the Portuguese side of the Line according to the Treaty of Zaragoza. Viceroy Velasco, in his separate reply, sustained Urdaneta's stand on the matter.<sup>214</sup> Both men, however, provide the king with an important exception: to go to the Philippines to rescue the Spaniards stranded from previous expeditions and to take along expert pilots to determine the definite location of the Line.<sup>215</sup> To all of this Philip assented, in a letter to Urdaneta dated March 4, 1561 sent from Aranjuez, the king expressed great pleasure at his acceptance and indicated that he already contacted the viceroy authorizing him to send "to the Western Islands" the expedition<sup>216</sup>, thus the prohibition on further Asian voyages instituted under Charles was put aside.

Velasco energetically and enthusiastically made preparations for the voyage. However, these traits seem to have caused the viceroy to be overly optimistic concerning the progress over the building of the ships. He left this task to Carreon at Navidad<sup>217</sup> and in his correspondence of May 1560 that the ships "will be ready by the spring of sixty-one."<sup>218</sup> However, the size of the task soon became apparent to Velasco. The conditions at Navidad were ad hoc at best. The delay

in authorizing further voyages of discovery from the New World obviously took its toll as the expertise involved in shipbuilding had to be built from the ground up.<sup>219</sup> In addition, there is ample evidence to suggest that Carreon used his position for his personal profit. Velasco appointed an investigator to look into these matters and this resulted in monetary matters being taken out of Carreon's hands, though he retained responsibility for supervising the shipbuilding.<sup>220</sup>

One of the reasons of the delay, and indicative that the Spaniards had learned the lessons of the previous expeditions, concerned the provisioning of the ships. The grain harvest delayed the making the required amount of biscuit as did the other provisions being hauled overland to Navidad, "to ensure they would be fit for consumption over the two years projected for the voyage."<sup>221</sup>

Despite the difficulties encountered, Velasco wrote to the king on February 9, 1561, revising his optimistic forecast and states that the ships would be ready by the end of the year. That this date was also optimistic shall be explored further on. However, also in this letter the viceroy identifies the man that will command the expedition-- Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "a more suitable man, and one more satisfactory to Fray Andres Urdaneta, who is to direct and guide the expedition, could not have been chosen. . ."<sup>222</sup> Legazpi was born of a noble family in Zumarraga (Zubarraja), Guipuzcoa, Spain. His birthdate and facts about his early life are unknown. He studied law before arriving in New Spain in 1531. He became a member of the Mexico City *cabildo* on April 4, 1531. He was serving as *cabildo* secretary when Velasco chose him to lead the expedition.<sup>223</sup>

Further delays in outfitting the expedition plagued the viceroy. In 1561, in a memorial to the king, Urdaneta, obviously frustrated by the obstacles encountered, recommends that Acapulco be established as a port instead of Navidad because of its more "healthful location" and because of Navidad's remoteness. Personally aware of the consequences of being stranded at some distant location, Urdaneta envisages a self-sufficient base of operations in New Spain to undertake the colonization of the entire Pacific region through the use of island way stations.<sup>224</sup> Further communications between Velasco, Urdaneta, and the king concerning the delays in the expedition over the next three years are unknown. In May 1563, Legazpi writes to the king accepting the viceroy's appointment as commander of the fleet.<sup>225</sup> It is not until February 25, 1564, and again on June 15, that the viceroy writes to Philip apologizing for the delay in outfitting the voyage, particularly referring the delay in assembling the necessary provisions referred to earlier. However, he projects, accurately this time, that the expedition will be ready to sail about October.<sup>226</sup>

Velasco during this period began to fear for his health and, the day after his June communication with the king, made out his last will and testament. In this document he provided for the Inspector General and *audiencia* to see that the voyage to the Philippines be carried out in accordance with the king's instructions.<sup>227</sup> A month later, on July 31, 1564, Luis Velasco died in the home of a friend in Mexico City.<sup>228</sup> The Inspector General referred to in Velasco's will was Jeronimo Valderrama. It appears that as early as 1562 Velasco was concerned about his health and requested that the Council of the Indies send an

Inspector to ensure a smooth transition of government in the event of his retirement or death. The Council respected his request and sent Valderrama the next year<sup>229</sup>--a move that would have significant consequences for the mission of the voyage.

Valderrama was a typical inspector of the Spanish administration--suspicious, aggressive, and straight-forward. He referred to Velasco as "unfitted for his job here in regards to either judicial, executive, or military affairs . . . he has his relatives installed everywhere . . . half the audiencia are related to him by marriage."<sup>230</sup> On Legazpi he stated, "a good sort and they tell me a devout Christian, but not worth a damn. For he's been all his life a secretary . . . pretty paltry background for a military command."<sup>231</sup> It should not have been surprising when, upon reading the orders given to Legazpi by Velasco--instructing him to go to the Philippines only to rescue survivors and establish settlements elsewhere--that Valderrama interpreted the king's instructions to go to the Philippines literally and changed Legazpi's instructions. On August 18, 1564, he wrote the king:

I got round to reading the instructions intended by the late viceroy for the commander of the expedition, and discovered he had given orders to go to an entirely different destination from what your Majesty had originally specified. . . . He gave orders to go to New Guinea, which is a very different matter . . . During our discussions on this point, the friar Urdaneta gave us notice that if the expedition was to be sent to the Filipinas, he would refuse to go . . . So in view of all the previous delays and the fact that this friar is very necessary towards the success of the venture, it was decided to keep the change of orders secret for the time being, publicly giving the commander the original orders of the viceroy but making sure to slip the secret orders of the audiencia to him just before sailing, with a forewarning to keep them secret until the fleet reached the point where they would have to change course for Felipinas . . .<sup>232</sup>

Thus, the purpose of the expedition was changed by the untimely death of Velasco. The *audiencia* met with Legazpi in secret session and gave him the secret orders changing the instructions of the deceased viceroy. These instructions, as in those issued by Council of the Indies in Spain, are noteworthy for their detail. Legazpi was to take command of four ships and 350 men. He had authority to assign pilots, ship's masters, mates, and other positions to individual ships but royal officials, captains, and troop commanders were assigned by the viceroy or *audiencia*. An inventory of all items on board was to be made and a general roll call of the crew accomplished before sailing. To prevent the overloading of the vessels, no adventurers or unnecessary slaves and servants could accompany the expedition. The route taken by Villalobos was to be followed directly to the Philippines, the instructions even specifying the islands to stop at and the items to be procured. The oath of loyalty to the king shall be taken by all and the morals of the men guarded. Most importantly, once in the Philippines "if, in your judgement, the land is so rich and of such quality that you should colonize therein, you shall establish a colony in that part and district that appears suitable to you."<sup>233</sup> A return route is to be found back to New Spain, and this voyage is to be specifically commanded by Urdaneta.<sup>234</sup> Other aspects of the instructions concern the gentle treatment of the Indians, to avoid the Moluccas and crossing the Portuguese anywhere in the general area, and to be on guard against native treachery--the last item an obvious reference to the experience of the Magellan expedition at Cebu.<sup>235</sup>



In the end the expedition consisted of four ships and about 380 men. The flagship, the San Pedro, carried a brigantine on its poop-deck and was 500 tons. The other ships were the San Pablo, 400 tons, the San Lucas, forty tons, and the San Juan de Letran, eighty tons. Having learned the lesson of the Saavedra expedition, the first two ships were the largest and sturdiest built in the New World to that time. Of the crew, 200 were soldiers, 150 seamen, six Augustinian missionaries-- Fathers Andres de Urdaneta, Martin de Rada, Diego de Herrera, Andres de Aguirre, Pedro Gamboa, and Lorenzo Ximenes--though the last died at Navidad before the fleet's departure, and the remainder cabin boys, cooks, and servants. Other important men of the expedition were Guido de Lavazares, fleet treasurer and survivor of the Villalobos expedition; Melchor de Legazpi, fleet accountant and son of the commander; and Captain Felipe de Salcedo, Legazpi's grandson.<sup>236</sup>

On November 21, 1564, the Legazpi expedition sailed out of Navidad for the Felipinas.<sup>237</sup> It is one of the best documented voyages on record thanks to the efforts of Urdaneta who, as chief navigator, insisted that all of the ships maintain precise logs for the obvious purpose of determining the dividing point for the line.<sup>238</sup> For five days the fleet maintained a south-west course to give the impression that they were headed for New Guinea--far enough away from New Spain to prevent desertions--then Legazpi called a meeting of all captains, pilots, officers, and priests and read the secret orders of the *audiencia*.<sup>239</sup> Urdaneta and the other friars objected strongly to the mission of the expedition, stating they had been deceived by the king, but since the expedition could not be abandoned at this stage,

consented to guide the fleet to the Philippines by the most expeditious route.<sup>240</sup>

Despite the attention to detail in selecting officers, individual ambitions still affected the progress of the expedition. While crossing the Pacific the San Lucas, captained by Alfonso de Arellano and piloted by a mulatto named Lope Martin, deserted the expedition and dashed ahead to the Philippines, reaching Mindanao on January 29, 1565. After obtaining a small cargo of spices from the natives, the deserters recrossed the Pacific and returned safely to Navidad on August 9, 1565-- being the first successful eastward crossing of the Pacific by any European expedition. Arellano claimed rewards for reaching the Philippines ahead of Legazpi and for having discovered the return route to Mexico. He was later tried in Spain for deserting the expedition and was found guilty but was not punished owing to his influence at the Spanish court.<sup>241</sup>

Meanwhile Legazpi pressed on and reached Guam on January 22, 1565 where they remained until February 3. The experience of the Legazpi expedition in Guam stands in stark contrast to the earlier expeditions and is the first case in which the level-headedness of Legazpi is demonstrated. The fleet entered the harbor and was met by 300 native praus filled with Chamurros eager to barter. The Spaniards greeted the natives calmly, with the men staying on their ships. Legazpi had given the order that only Urdaneta was to contact the natives and a disciplined quiet was to be maintained so as to avoid misunderstandings or frightening the natives. Urdaneta, however, could only remember the numbers of the Chamurro language up to ten, which he proceeded to recite

and met with a roar of laughter, thereby relieving the tension of this first encounter.<sup>242</sup>

Because they had been taken and impressed as laborers by previous expeditions, the natives distrusted the Spaniards and would not come aboard their ships to trade. When the Spaniards landed on shore for fresh water, the native people pelted them with rocks and when completing trading transactions over the side of the ships with the Chamurros, who valued iron of any sort especially nails, the Spaniards frequently found that the natives had got the better of them in the deal. The entire situation was one inviting confrontation and conflict but Legazpi, to his great credit (considering the composition of crews in his time), maintained discipline. He only allowed his men ashore in small groups and under the supervision of an officer, and forbade any type of aggression except the most minimal measures required for self-defense.<sup>243</sup>

In the meantime Father Urdaneta made a complete reconnaissance of the bays and islands surrounding Guam and charted them. Feeling that the island would provide a perfect base of operations for further discoveries in Asia, he proposed establishing a permanent settlement on the island and all at a meeting of officers agreed but Legazpi, who rejected the suggestion sternly, stating it was contrary to the instructions of the *audiencia*. He then ordered the officers to make ready to get underway for the Felipinas.<sup>244</sup> When the roll call was completed the Spaniards found that a cabin boy was missing. Legazpi sent a search-party ashore and there a group of Chamurros held the hacked-up portions of the boy in derision. In retaliation, the

Spaniards sent a party of a hundred and fifty men ashore where they burned several houses and captured and hung several men from the vicinity where the boy had been murdered. Consequently, the Legazpi expedition left Guam as avengers despite the best of intentions.<sup>245</sup>

On the morning of February 13, 1565, after only ten days sailing, the lead ship of the fleet reported seeing land. Soon they were in the shadow of the twin land mass of mountain and jungle known as the islands of Leyte and Samar. Their first night in the Philippines was spent anchored in the protection of a small islet northeast of Samar.<sup>246</sup> Legazpi sent a landing party ashore to a village that seemed to be deserted. After landing the Spaniards were met by a group of fifty men, and when it appeared that the Spaniards had no outward belligerent intentions, the remainder of the villagers, called Warays, emerged out of the jungle and sailed out to the Spanish ships in impressive longboats to welcome them. Legazpi and the *datu* of the village exchanged presents and this solidified friendly relations.<sup>247</sup>

Despite the preparations made in New Spain, Legazpi soon found himself badly in need of provisions. Much of the meat had gone bad on the crossing, a small quantity of flour remained, as well as a good quantity of biscuit, but the latter was being held for the return voyage. Legazpi urged the *datu*s to bring food in exchange for trade goods, but the subsistence nature of the native agriculture yielded meager results. He questioned the natives as best he could, for despite their difficulties on previous voyages concerning misunderstandings the Spaniards did not bring an interpreter, and the *datu*s replied that the larger trading villages were further to the west. Based upon this

information, Legazpi dispatched two groups in small boats--one north and one south--to find the village of Tandaya that had provided provisions to the ship San Juan of the Villalobos expedition. Both of these groups returned empty handed, encountering both distrust and hostility among many of the islanders they came upon. Legazpi weighed anchor on February 20 and continued south until they rounded headland of south Samar and anchored in Leyte Gulf.<sup>248</sup>

Anchoring in the lee of another islet, this one called Manicani, a longboat containing a Waray *datu* met the ships and told them he would lead them to Tandaya. One member of his party surprised Legazpi and his crew when he parroted many Castilian phrases--possibly a survivor or descendent from one of the earlier Spanish expeditions--and this man also promised to lead them to Tandaya on the following day. The time came and went but the *datu* and the Spanish-speaking Waray were nowhere to be seen. Legazpi sent a party of fifty men led by the officer Martin de Goiti and the pilots Rodriguez, Espinosa, and Astigarribia to reconnoiter down the coast in search of Tandaya or some other large settlement. In the meantime Legazpi decided to go ashore to the village of the Waray *datu* that had visited the day before. He was met on the shore by a large crowd of warriors shouting aggressively at the Spaniards and showering them with stones. After ten days the small party under de Goiti returned and reported a fairly sizeable settlement containing about two hundred houses, rice fields, and three large native praus with bags of rice and camotes (sweet potatoes) on board.<sup>249</sup>

This was the town of Cabalian. On the morning of March 6 the ships of the Spaniards appeared in the bay. Jieronimo de Pacheco, a Malay member

of the crew, had by this time been selected ad hoc interpreter for the fleet, and was sent ashore to reassure the natives that the Spaniards' intentions were friendly. He invited the *datu* and other elders of the village aboard the flagship and offered to undergo the ritual of blood-brotherhood as a pact of friendship. A man who represented himself as the son of the *datu* named Camatuan came aboard the ship and Legazpi, receiving the man respectfully, gave him several presents. When asked why the *datu* had not come in person, he replied that his father was too old and feeble. The blood-brotherhood ceremony was performed between Camatuan and Martin de Ibarra, the master of the flagship and a relative of Legazpi, and sent back with a message of good will and a request to trade for foodstuffs. Camatuan returned on board and informed the Spaniards that the people had rejected their overtures. They listened as the islanders gathered together their property and made preparations to repel their arrival. The next morning Legazpi disembarked de Goiti to the village and he was met at the beach by a group of armed and belligerent warriors. Legazpi, unable to comprehend the defensive attitude of the natives, held a meeting of his officers and priests and asked them, if under the circumstances and in their opinion, would force be permissible to obtain the needed provisions. Urdaneta answered for the priests that yes, force could be justified on several theological grounds. Though Urdaneta's reply was surely based upon the necessity of the situation--desperate men short of food in a strange land, unsure if they can return home, not understanding the primitive people obstinately refusing to grant them the food they so sorely need, infuriated by being turned away from an obviously inferior race--all of these factors

playing a role in his reply but instead of giving voice to these frustrations, justifies the action on theological grounds. Legazpi then asked Camatuan to make one more appeal to his people, which he did and which was rejected. In reply to this answer, a force of one hundred armed Spaniards stormed the deserted village and seized all of the remaining food left behind--forty or fifty pigs, some rice, chickens, and camote.<sup>250</sup>

After this action the scope of the Spaniards' folly began to become clear. Through Pacheco acting as interpreter and a rudimentary dictionary of Waray that someone began to compile, they learned from Camatuan and his men companions that Tandaya, Butuan, Camiguin, Limasawa, Bohol, and Cebu--all large trading villages--were nearby.<sup>251</sup> They proceeded first to Limasawa but found that the place had become uninhabited since Magellan's visit and then turned to the island of Camiguin to determine if cinnamon could really be obtained there as claimed by Camatuan. Before setting out Legazpi allowed the Warayans to depart on their *bangka* (a Visayan boat), giving them additional gifts and provisions, and pledging friendship to the people of Cabalian.<sup>252</sup>

They anchored off the northeast coast of the Camiguin on March 11 and disembarked small boats to reconnoitre along the coast of the island. As at Limasawa no one was to be found. A few deserted huts had been left behind and the Spaniards picked up some rice and deserted pigs. To the men familiar with the experience of the Villalobos expedition things looked very bleak. At this point Father Urdaneta seems to have provided the leadership necessary to maintain the morale of the fleet. They decided to set sail for Butuan, the next settlement

on the list, and there obtain the item the expedition needed most next to provisions--an interpreter. However, the contrary winds of the northeast monsoon that had plagued the Villalobos expedition blew them to the barren island of Bohol. They found a safe anchorage along the coast and decided at a general meeting of the officers and priests held on March 15 to send the lighter, more maneuverable pinnace San Juan to Butuan, keeping the other ships at anchor at Bohol, to ready the flagship for a return voyage to New Spain, and to make a determination whether to send the remaining ships to Butuan, perhaps to establish a base of operations, based upon the outcome of the San Juan's voyage. On March 18--the day before this plan was to be put into effect--a large sailing vessel was spotted in the Mindanao Sea.<sup>253</sup>

Legazpi disembarked two boats of men to overtake the prau. If they were foreigners they were to be invited to the flagship, if natives left to go on their way. When the Spaniards approached and invited the men aboard the prau to anchor near the flagship, they were greeted by jeers and insults, one man waving a plucked chicken overhead and yelling in Spanish, "Come aboard if you dare."<sup>254</sup> When the Spaniards closed in, the men on the prau fired upon them with a culverin, muskets, and arrows, resulting in the death of one man and the wounding of several others. Finally, the Spaniards overtook the prau, forcibly boarded it, and overcame their tormentors. When the prisoners from this skirmish were taken back to the flagship, eight in all including the pilot, it was learned that they were a Bornean trading vessel out of Brunei. The Moslem pilot spoke the language of the Moluccas understood by Urdaneta, as well as the Visayan language of the central Philippines, and so, for



the first time since they arrived in the islands, the Spanish were able to converse freely with someone from the region. Legazpi apologized for the misunderstanding that led to bloodshed and asked the pilot why they had acted belligerently. The pilot replied that they expected the Spaniards to be belligerent themselves. Legazpi then apologized again and returned the contents of the prau to the Moslems, which included Chinese porcelains, damask, silks, tapestries, bells, pots of caste iron, incense, and brass pans.<sup>255</sup>

Having earned the friendship of the pilot through his fairness, Legazpi was able to learn a great deal about the islands and the entire Asian region since the pilot travelled regularly to the Moluccas, Borneo, Java, Malacca, India, and China.<sup>256</sup> The conversation finally got around to the hostility that the Spaniards encountered in the islands and the Moslem pilot told Legazpi of how a great Portuguese fleet two years previously had travelled about the islands in and around Mindanao and had taken by force anything they desired, in the process killing and enslaving thousands of people. The pilot stated that it was estimated that a thousand people were killed at Bohol and almost the entire population of Limasawa, as the Spanish could attest, destroyed. Legazpi apologized for this behavior and explained to the pilot that the Spaniards were different people than the Portuguese. In reply, the pilot, perhaps out of discretion, stated that while he understood the difference, the other islanders could not tell one European from another.<sup>257</sup>

The Moslem pilot evidently assisted the Spaniards in reaching Bohol while the San Juan was dispatched as planned to Butuan. At Bohol

the Spaniards were met with expected hostility. Legazpi obtained the aid of the pilot to explain to the *datus* of two of the primary *barangays* of Bohol, named Katuna (or Si katuna) and Higala (or Si higala) that the Spaniards were not the Portuguese and they had come to peacefully trade in the islands. The Bohol *datus*, after several tentative moves to test the Spaniards' veracity, accepted the explanation and welcomed them, explaining that their hostility was based upon the depredations committed by white men from the Moluccas who they resembled.<sup>258</sup> On March 16, 1565, a day still of great importance in the Philippines, Legazpi and Katuna sealed their friendship through a blood compact. A few days later a similar compact was concluded with Higala.<sup>259</sup>

Legazpi did all he could to enforce discipline among his men in keeping friendly relations with the Boholans, especially in light of the actions of the Portuguese. On one occasion a party of Spaniards came upon a *bangka* filled with rice and vegetables. The frightened natives abandoned their cargo, which the Spaniards delightedly expropriated. Seeing the *bangka* towed alongside the flagship, Legazpi enquired into its possession and became furious. He sent a messenger to Katuna who, arriving on the beach with a crowd of people, explained that the boat belonged to one of his people and that the food had been purchased to relieve the shortage of food experienced during the dry season. Legazpi pointed to the *bangka*, demonstrating that not a grain of rice had been taken, and thereby earned the trust of the natives. As a result, though they had arrived in Bohol during the time of the year referred to by Katuna, in which there was a shortage of food, people came from around Bohol and the surrounding islands to trade with the Spaniards.<sup>260</sup>

Hoping to use the good will at Bohol to his advantage, Legazpi sent the flagship's *frigata* (a small boat) with ten soldiers commanded by Juan Aguirre, and accompanied by Francisco de Astigarribia, Rodriguez the pilot, the Bornean pilot, and an interpreter to Cebu. This expedition left on March 30 and was expected to return in seven days.

In the meantime, the San Juan had been in Butuan and come upon some Malay speaking Moslems from the island of Luzon.<sup>261</sup> There they traded silver coin for gold and wax with the traders. They also met the *datu* of Butuan, giving him presents and sending greetings in the name of Legazpi, though the *datu's* greeting seems to have been cautious. Having taken care of formalities with the *datu*, the Spaniards continued to deal with the Luzon traders and found that much of the merchandise was tainted, in one case the traders placing clay and wood inside of wax blocks. This discovery almost caused a clash of arms between the Spanish and the traders that was avoided only with the intercession of the royal officials and one of the Augustinian friars. The San Juan reached the anchorage at Bohol on April 4 and de la Isla, the captain of the ship, reported to Legazpi what he found.<sup>262</sup>

Preparations had continued to be made on the flagship for the return voyage to New Spain. On April 12, Legazpi assembled his officers and priests at a general meeting to determine if a permanent settlement should be made in the islands, and if so, where. Urdaneta and the other Augustinians were opposed to the idea. First, the Treaty of Zaragoza placed the islands on the Portuguese side of the Line, and secondly, the king possessed no sovereignty over the Filipinos since none of the conditions outlined by Vitoria that would authorize conquest existed in

the islands, though they were not unanimous on that point. Respecting the reasoning of the Augustinians, Legazpi then asked the hypothetical question: if the king did have authority to settle in the islands where would it be? The overwhelming response was Cabalian.<sup>263</sup>

The fleet made ready to establish a settlement at Cabalian and to send the flagship, the San Pedro, back to New Spain. However, the *frigata* had not returned from Cebu on time and it contained Rodriguez, the chief pilot of the expedition. Legazpi went to the *datus* of Bohol and requested assistance from them in locating their boat. The *datus* immediately outfitted a large outrigger, manned by thirty rowers and, accompanied by two Spanish musketeers, proceeded to Cebu personally to locate the Spaniards.<sup>264</sup> On April 20, the Bohol *datus* returned and reported that the Cebuans reported no sign of the Spaniards and spirits among the fleet fell. Not only had they lost their chief pilot but also the Moslem pilot who had been so helpful. The next day, Easter Sunday of 1565, the *frigata* appeared at Bohol with all men safe except for the Moslem pilot who had been killed in a skirmish with hostile natives. The men on the *frigata* had failed to carry out their orders and had travelled around and inland on the island of Negros where they came upon hostile village after hostile village. They did pass by Cebu and noted its large settlements. Despite this, Legazpi and the fleet was so overjoyed at the apparently providential return of the *frigata* that the folly of the men was ignored.<sup>265</sup>

As a result of the information brought back by the *frigata* and the two musketeers who accompanied the *datus*, Legazpi once again assembled his officers and the friars to determine the best place to

establish a permanent base of operations. The majority determined that Cebu was the place.<sup>266</sup> On Easter Monday, April 22, 1565, the fleet left Bohol and anchored off of Cebu five days later. Word of the expedition travelled quickly among the islanders so that the fleet was met by a crowd of Cebuans watching from the beach, some packing their things in order to flee into the jungle. Legazpi sent Pacheco ashore to tell the people that the Spanish had arrived to come to a peaceful settlement with the chief of Cebu for the purpose of peaceful trade. No sooner had Pacheco returned to the ships, an emissary arrived at the beach stating that the *datu* of Cebu, named Tupas, welcomed the Spaniards and that he would be out to greet them shortly. Two hours passed and an elderly man came out to the flagship and stated that he was a Moslem Bornean and spoke both Malay and Visayan and would be of great service to them and that perhaps Tupas would arrive later that same day.<sup>267</sup>

While waiting for Tupas to make his appearance the fleet observed the natives continuing to pack up their belongings and flee into the jungle. Several of Legazpi's officers urged him to seize the town immediately. Legazpi gave the Moslem interpreter gifts and asked him to impress upon Tupas that no harm was meant. Finally, Father Urdaneta, Mateo de Saz, captain of the San Pablo and Master-of-Camp, and the expedition lawyer, Hernando de Riquel were sent ashore to read the Requirement or proclamation to the Cebuans informing them that Tupas had broken his solemn word and that if they did not lay aside their weapons and appear before the king's representative within two hours, the Spanish would wage war upon them. Tupas finally appeared but indicated that he was afraid of being ambushed. Urdaneta reassured him that this

was not the case and returned to the flagship. Hearing of Tupas' appearance, Legazpi sent Urdaneta and the negotiating party back to the beach with an offer to exchange hostages but this too was rejected by the *datu*.<sup>268</sup>

Another emissary of Tupas appeared and offered to negotiate in the place of the *datu* since Tupas was ill. De Saz rejected the offer out of hand and returned to the flagship. Legazpi then ordered Urdaneta and de Saz to give one last warning to the Cebuans. Having removed the women, children, and possessions to the safety of the interior of the jungle, the Spanish emissaries were met by armed men warning them away from the beach. As this occurred, the already sizeable native force was being reinforced by men arriving by praus from the other *barangays* from the northern coast of island. Legazpi called a war council of the officers and friars in which they decided that everything had been done to maintain the peace. Almost two hundred sailors and soldiers were crowded into boats and made a forced landing under cover of artillery. Frightened by the sound of the artillery and musketry, by the time the Spaniards arrived on the beach the *barangay* was deserted. A minor controversy among historians exists concerning whether the Cebuans attempted to torch a storehouse causing the destruction of several houses, which were made of nipa, or if the Spaniards started the fire as a punitive measure. Either explanation is plausible, in any case the Spaniards swept through the town vainly in search of provisions.<sup>269</sup>

At this point an event that was to hold a great deal of significance to the Spanish occurred. One of Legazpi's soldiers named Juan de Camuz, in the process of looting among the native houses, found

the statue of the Child Jesus left from the Magellan expedition. Legazpi and the other Spaniards were elated at the discovery and, in the spirit of the cult of St. James, saw it as an optimistic sign of divine intervention.<sup>270</sup> The discovery of the statue, as the date celebrating the ritual of blood-brotherhood between Legazpi and Katuna, is held to be of great significance in the Philippines to this day and the statue is still preserved in the Augustinian church in Cebu.<sup>271</sup>

Despite the spiritual ecstasy brought on by the discovery of the statue, the Spaniards were still short of provisions. They expanded their foraging patrols to include the settlements to the north of the main part of Cebu. At this point discipline momentarily broke down as the soldiers took just enough of the rice and farm animals to provide for themselves individually instead of for the entire garrison. Legazpi, outraged at this apparent error by his officers, sent the men out again but, when they arrived at the villages previously pillaged, found that the food and animals that had been previously left behind were now gone.<sup>272</sup>

The fragmented nature of Filipino society outlined in the second chapter of this thesis now began to work in Legazpi's favor. As early as the initial looting of Cebu, some of the natives approached the camp in curiosity. The Spaniards motioned to them to come nearer and be friends but the intimidated natives fled into the jungle.<sup>273</sup> Soon, however, the numbers of Cebuans who returned to the *barangay* grew from day to day. Legazpi, understanding that the survival of his settlement depended upon friendly relationships with the natives and perhaps influenced by the concept of native rights--the Augustinians providing

the necessary reminders--treated the returning Cebuans with friendship and ordered his men to do the same. Interspersed with these friendly encounters were occasional night-time hit-and-run attacks upon the Spanish sentries.<sup>274</sup>

As a result of these attacks, Legazpi began the construction of a fort on May 8. It was constructed in the form of a triangle, one side facing the sea and two fronted the land, enclosing a fresh water spring in the case of siege, and guarded by a strong palisade.<sup>275</sup> With preparations being made to ready the flagship for the return voyage to New Spain, the foraging expeditions, and other business in the protection of the garrison, little progress was made on the fort. During a concentrated night attack the Cebuans almost successfully destroyed the fort along with the Spaniards' provisions, ammunition, weapons, and trade goods.<sup>276</sup>

Eventually Legazpi's policy of conciliation began to win the day. A man who identified himself as Tupas' brother arrived first and he performed the ritual of blood-brotherhood with Legazpi's second in command, Mateo de Saz. Soon the fisherman returned to the village and found that they could sail close to the Spanish ships without dire consequences. Finally, Tupas himself turned up in Cebu in May during a religious procession in which the statue of the Child Jesus was being carried to take its place in the church constructed within the confines of the fort. The miracle prone Spaniards interpreted this as a sign of further divine intervention and welcomed the Cebuan *datu* enthusiastically.<sup>277</sup>



Whether everything that was said at the meeting between Legazpi and Tupas, or for that matter interpreted properly by the Spaniards, is open to question. Two Moslem Malays interpreted Malay into Visayan, and vice versa, for Tupas, and Pacheco performed the same service between Malay and Spanish for Legazpi. Another *datu*, named Tamuñan accompanied Tupas and he was possibly from the northern settlement that sent reinforcements during the brief confrontation with the Spaniards. He and Tupas stated that they were willing to become friends with the Spaniards and requested that the ceremony of blood-brotherhood be performed to solidify the relationship. It is here that Legazpi demonstrated the same Spanish juridical tendency that led him to send the fleet's lawyer to witness the reading of the Requirement. Instead of the native ritual, Legazpi insisted that a written document be executed to formalize the relationship. The discussions remained at an impasse over this issue until, in exasperation, Legazpi relented to the native ritual but stipulated that in three days the *datu*s were to honor the Spanish requirement for a written document.<sup>278</sup>

After the ritual of blood-brotherhood was completed, Legazpi launched into a long harangue about the benefits of being subjects under the benign rule of Spain and how they had been pardoned for the malice they had shown to both Magellan and to Legazpi. In return for paying a yearly tribute, Legazpi would provide them protection from their enemies and beneficial trade.<sup>279</sup> The ceremony obviously held a great deal of importance in the eyes of the Cebuans for there were no further attacks upon the Spanish sentries.

The three days stipulated by Legazpi for the signing of the documents came and passed and both *datus* were nowhere to be found. Legazpi sent several messages for the *datus* to finalize the treaty but, despite assurances from their intermediaries, they not only did not return to sign the treaty but avoided the Spaniards completely.<sup>280</sup> Perhaps at this point the entire gist of what they had agreed to became apparent. As has been discussed, the powers of the *datus* were limited. The entire concept of ceding sovereignty to an unseen foreign "king" would certainly have been beyond their authority and perhaps their comprehension. The entire situation came to a head on May 23. Pedro de Arana, one of Legazpi's squires, was attacked by several Cebuans, killed, and beheaded. Immediately, the frustrated Legazpi ordered de Saz and a hundred men to pursue the perpetrators into the jungle in retaliation. The Spanish force came upon a village in the interior and, we are told, found one of the guilty men with Arana's blood still on his hands. Among the prisoners taken in the village were the wife and two daughters of Tupas' brother. Seeing that he had the handle he was looking for, Legazpi allowed a woman of the dependent class belonging to the wife's household free to tell Tupas about the hostages he held and that the next move was his.<sup>281</sup>

While facing these difficulties from the Cebuans, Legazpi soon became plagued by internal dissention that would arise throughout his stay at Cebu. In preparing his reports for the *audiencia* that would be taken back to New Spain by the flagship, he ordered a census of all personnel taken on May 27. While the men stood in parade to be counted, the squires of the expedition approached Legazpi and complained that,

during de Saz' absence, they had been guard duty at night--a duty unbecoming their social status. Legazpi accepted this criticism in silence, but when de Saz, as commander of troops, returned he assigned the insubordinate individuals permanent guard duty or face hanging. In retaliation, the squires secretly set fire to the stores house of the fortress next to Legazpi's quarters. Only through valiant effort was the fire put out, preventing the destruction of the entire Spanish garrison. During the investigation that followed an unburnt fuse was found that indicated arson. Soon two of the ringleaders were identified and one of them hanged. In writing his report to the *audiencia*, Legazpi pleaded for further assistance from New Spain to confront the internal as well as external enemies that surrounded him.<sup>282</sup>

The most important task of the expedition was in finding an easterly route back to New Spain for without one the colony would be lost. On June 1, 1565, the ship San Pedro left Cebu for New Spain. Expecting a long, arduous journey the ship was outfitted with enough supplies for eight months.<sup>283</sup> Two hundred persons were assigned to the San Pedro, all of them sailors, except for Captain Felipe de Salcedo, commander of the expedition; Father Urdaneta; Fr. Andres de Aguirre; Martin de Ibarra, ship's master; Francisco de Astigarribia, bosun; Esteban Rodriguez, chief pilot; Rodrigo de Espinoza, assistant pilot and the former pilot of the San Juan; three Cebuans, and one Guamanian.<sup>284</sup> Sailing with the monsoon past Leyte and between Masbate and Samar they ran the stormy San Bernardino Strait and by July 1 were at 24 degrees north, above the Ladrones and, under the guidance of Urdaneta, continued northeast until reaching the westerly winds between

37 and 39 degrees. They then turned west, sighted the California coast on September 18, and reached Acapulco on October 8, 1565, with only sixteen of the crew able to man the ship--the rest being sick; sixteen men had died on the return trip including Ibarra and Rodriguez.<sup>285</sup> The choice of Acapulco was not accidental. Prior to departing, Urdaneta had established a beacon there<sup>286</sup> and, as noted, preferred its facilities and climate to Navidad.

The travels of Urdaneta and Aguirre were not quite over. In January 1566 they departed New Spain for the home country to report on the expedition directly to *Casa de Contratación*, arriving in Seville in April.<sup>287</sup> By July, the Council recommended that Philip authorize reinforcement of the Legazpi settlement in Cebu and to which he approved. However, Philip, in authorizing the reinforcement, was still obviously concerned about the issues of the Line and the Mortgage. On October 8, 1566, Urdaneta and several of the king's cosmographers were called to Court to answer two questions: were the Philippines on the Spanish side of the Line? and, if so, were they part of the Mortgage ceded to the Portuguese?<sup>288</sup> The reply of the experts was that, in the first case, as supported by the newly available evidence from Urdaneta's observations (which were incorrect), the islands were on the Spanish side of the Line; and that in the second case, the islands were part of the Mortgage ceded to the Portuguese.<sup>289</sup> Philip, however, seeking to justify the authorization he had already granted for the reinforcement of the islands, and not wishing to cede the territory that by right of prior discovery was Spain's, decided that the Treaty of Zaragoza would be interpreted in the strictest sense. Only the Moluccas were named so

only the Moluccas were mortgaged. Seeking the proper basis for this opinion, Philip then had his two Court cosmographers retract their previous opinion, which they did on July 16, 1567, resting their revisions on the grounds that they were unqualified to interpret treaties--a matter reserved for the sovereign.<sup>290</sup> By this time Urdaneta was back in New Spain. There he declined the offer of the *audiencia* to return to the Philippines, instead returning to his monastery in Mexico City where he remained until the day of his death, June 3, 1568.<sup>291</sup>

Meanwhile, Legazpi continued to do all he could to ensure the colony's survival. On June 2, 1565, the day after the departure of the San Pedro from Cebu, a man carrying a white flag entered the Spanish camp and, after identifying himself as Ahmed, indicated that he was an emissary sent by the Cebuan *datu*s.<sup>292</sup> He asked Legazpi about the prisoners, particularly the wife and daughters of Tupas' brother, and asked what the price of the ransom was to gain their release. Legazpi replied that peaceful relations, meaning Spanish sovereignty, was the price to release the prisoners and that Tupas and his people must return to their homes. The emissary asked to speak to the wife and girls, which Legazpi assented to, and when he saw they were unharmed asked if the girls' father could come to visit them. Legazpi replied that he would be free to visit them anytime. That same evening two members of Tupas' family, Simakyaw and Sicatipan, arrived. The former man was Tupas' brother. He requested that Legazpi take him as captive instead of his family. Impressed by this show of bravery, Legazpi showed Simakyaw that his family was safe and replied that they would be

released if the Cebuans returned to the village. Impressed that his family had been kept safe, Simakyaw stated that he would submit to any conditions Legazpi decided to impose upon him and swore to return with the villagers and Tupas.<sup>293</sup>

The next day, Simakyaw appeared with a group of followers that including the twenty or twenty-one year old son of Tupas, both of whom stated that the *datu* would not be able to arrive until the next day since he was an old man. According to the Spanish chronicler, Legazpi kept the young man close to him as if he were his own son--more likely as a potential hostage. Legazpi gave his guests European clothes as gifts and these they wore while waiting for Tupas to arrive. On the morning of June 4, 1565, messengers arrived stating that Legazpi could expect Tupas to arrive by midday. They asked to have a word with the party sent ahead the previous day, obviously to see that they were unharmed and surprised to see them dressed in European garb.<sup>294</sup>

Finally, Tupas arrived attended by six or seven elders and fifty attendants of the dependent class. Legazpi welcomed him with great ceremony and made a conciliatory speech to the *datu* and his party. Tupas reciprocated and agreed to a peace treaty in writing. In the one sided negotiations that followed, the Filipinos agreed to recognize Spanish rule and to pay tribute, and, in return, the Spaniards agreed to protect the Cebuans from their enemies and to trade with them on a fair basis.<sup>295</sup> As had Magellan before him, Legazpi presented the Cebuan *datu* with "robes of Rouen linen, a doublet of purple velvet, and a hat of blue silk, and a silver belt."<sup>296</sup> Soon other *datus* from

surrounding *barangays* began to arrive in Cebu, in submission according to the Spaniards, but probably to welcome them as friends.<sup>297</sup>

The resignation to Spanish rule by Tupas represents the beginning of the pacification of the islands. During this initial period four issues arose that tend to reveal the differences and conflicts among the two cultures. The first concerned the drinking of *tuba*. After friendly relations had been established the people of Cebu began bringing various goods to the Spanish encampment, among these the drink *tuba*. Legazpi at ostensibly banned the trade in *tuba* because he stated that it was slightly alcoholic and encouraged people to go around drunk. However, the *tuba* vendors tended to be young women of the dependent class who had different attitudes regarding sex, noted in chapter two, than the staid and moralistic Legazpi. He forbade the women to enter the Spanish camp or to stay overnight, and admonished Tupas and the other elders for the practice but they made light of the situation. As a result of the prohibition, a lively market in *tuba* bars sprung up in the village.<sup>298</sup>

Two further issues that probably caused some friction were the Spanish prohibition against the funereal custom of killing members of the dependent class and burying them with their dead patron and in disarming the Cebuans. Yet according to the chroniclers, the only problems that arose came, as during Magellan's occupation, from Mactan. Tupas told Legazpi that the Mactan *datu*, named Dagami, upon their arrival had advised him to war on the Spaniards. In all likelihood Dagami was the head of one of powerful families of Cebu and decided to leave the *barangay* for Mactan. However, instead of personally intervening against Dagami, as had Magellan before him, Legazpi wisely

sent Tupas to talk to the intransigent individual. Three days later, Tupas arrived back in Cebu, though the transit time between the islands is a few minutes, and stated that Dagami and his followers had fled to Leyte.<sup>299</sup>

The final incident represents one of those events recorded in history that takes seems amusing given the passage of time. Having completed the building of the fortress, it became apparent to Tupas and the other Cebuans that the Spaniards really did intend to become permanent residents. As a result, Tupas informed Legazpi that his wife and daughters would like to meet him. Legazpi replied that he would be delighted and so a day was arranged. Tupas' wife appeared preceded by sixty singing woman and attended by two servants. Obviously these were the opening ceremonies to the traditional indigenous marriage arrangement and an offer to establish a familial alliance. Thinking that he was being officially honored, Legazpi returned the favor by giving a banquet and lavishing gifts on the women, especially Tupas' wife and two nieces. Obviously Legazpi had lavished a bit too much attention on one of the young women for a few days later Tupas sent a young woman, a "niece" according to the chronicler, to Legazpi's home to serve him in any way he saw fit. Obviously embarrassed by this overt offer Legazpi gave the young woman several gifts and put her in the charge of the friars who, after instructing her in the Christian religion, baptized her under the name of Isabela, and married her off to Andrés the Greek, a shipwright in Legazpi's service. This action was seen as a personal insult by Tupas and he vowed never to convert to



Christianity or to believe that the Spaniards' intentions were to become part of the community.<sup>300</sup>

These incidents taken together, while raising potential problems, were insignificant next to the real threats to the survival of the Spanish colony--food and the Portuguese. It is perhaps fortunate for the Spanish that the friars decided to avoid the wholesale conversions undertaken during Magellan's visit. Various reasons have been put forth for this: that the permanent nature of the settlement was in doubt since instructions had not yet been received from the king, that the experience of the Americas had enforced a doctrine that converts were to had voluntarily and only after education in the Christian religion, and that the absence of an interpreter prevented proper instruction.<sup>301</sup> Whatever the reason, the potential conflicts that could have been arisen between the weak Spanish garrison and the Cebuans over long standing indigenous traditions would have eclipsed these small insults.

The most serious problem continued to be food and Legazpi sent ships to out to the other islands to trade or forage but this strategy met with little success.<sup>302</sup> One day, however, seven or eight Bornean Moslems from Manila in the island of Luzon camp alongside the fort in a small boat and requested permission to trade. Legazpi granted the request. The two sides displayed their trade goods but the Borneans insisted that they were interested only in silver. They indicated that some of their countrymen had obtained silver from Spaniards at Butuan at the rate of exchange of one weight of gold for six of silver. The Spaniards insisted on five to one and soon the negotiations reached an impasse. The Borneans, however, soon sized up the Spaniards'

predicament and offered to obtain rice at Panay and use it to trade. Legazpi immediately agreed to this and the Borneans departed.<sup>303</sup>

After the departure of the Borneans, about September 1565, the food ration had been reduced to its lowest level. Legazpi once again authorized a foraging expedition but word had now gotten around about the Spaniards and so most of the villages they came upon were deserted. Finally, the Borneans arrived back in Cebu with the promised rice and were paid in the silver they valued so highly. Half of the rice went to the Spanish garrison and half to the people of Cebu who were suffering as much from the shortage of food because of the presence of the Spaniards. The Borneans promised to return on a regular basis with additional shipments of food and to this they kept their word. Though they experienced additional seasonal difficulties, never again was the existence of the Spanish colony to be threatened by the shortage of provisions.<sup>304</sup>

Internal threats continued to plague the infant colony. In November 1565, obviously frustrated by the meager spoils and downright privations the islands presented thus far, a conspiracy among several men of the Spanish garrison was organized to seize the ship San Juan and sail to Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Spain or France. The leader of the revolt was Pablo Hernandez, a Venetian, but before the plot could be executed he was betrayed to Legazpi by Juan Maria, one of the co-conspirators either out of jealousy or fear. Benefiting from the disloyalty among the conspirators, Legazpi had Hernandez hanged as a result.<sup>305</sup> Later the Spaniards learned that the plot originated in

Navidad as part of the plot that resulted in the desertion of the San Lucas.<sup>306</sup>

Luckily for Legazpi, he had two talented officers in his service--De Saz and De Goiti--who continually came through during the toughest of times in finding foodstuffs and other materials needed by the Spanish garrison while they awaited word from New Spain.<sup>307</sup> Finally, on October 15, 1566, the galleon San Geronimo out of Acapulco entered Cebu channel to the great relief of the Spaniards. Their relief, however was to be short lived. The galleon had been found foundering off of Leyte by Juan de la Isla aboard a small frigate that was patrolling the area in search of De Saz, who had been sent there to search for a survivor from a previous expedition. When the San Geronimo anchored, the Spaniards learned that she was without instructions, supplies, or captain. Lope Martin, the same pilot who had conspired in the desertion of the San Lucas, had survived the investigation into that incident and managed to be appointed pilot of the San Geronimo where he organized a successful mutiny only to be overthrown by the loyal members of the crew who steered the ship to Cebu.<sup>308</sup>

Desperate to receive some definite instructions from New Spain, Legazpi decided to send another ship to New Spain and, in order to encourage a prompt reply, he decided to load it with cinnamon. He sent a force of one hundred men on a frigate and the San Juan to Kawit in Zamboanga under the command of de Saz to trade for the cinnamon. They left on November 1, 1566, but were back within a few days to report that they had come upon a Portuguese fleet in the Mindanao Sea.<sup>309</sup> The next day two Portuguese *fustas* (light vessels) appeared before the

harbor of Cebu but sailed away without giving the customary port courtesies to the authorities on the land--obviously sent to do a reconnaissance of the Spanish settlement. The Spaniards became alarmed at the appearance of the two vessels and expected to shortly see the remainder of the Portuguese fleet. Three days passed and during that time Legazpi made preparations for a siege, supervising the construction of breastworks and trenches. Finally the two of the Portuguese *fustas* entered the harbor and Legazpi received the voyagers hospitably. The Portuguese explained that they had been separated from the main fleet which was en route "to the Moluccas and from thence to Amboina to punish the natives for various depredations and for killing some Portuguese."<sup>310</sup> Legazpi offered them provisions including marmalade and, to give them the impression that regular trade was conducted, indicated that the fruit had come over on the last voyage from New Spain. The Portuguese noted this information and departed.<sup>311</sup>

With the threat from the Portuguese gone at least temporarily, Legazpi decided to make another attempt to send the San Juan to New Spain after obtaining cinnamon from Zamboanga. The same vessels set out of Cebu as before in February 1567. While setting out the terms of trade some misunderstanding seems to have occurred and the Spaniards soon found themselves under attack. Having learned from Legazpi that restraint paid larger dividends, de Saz pulled out of the anchorage without retaliating and, in fact, sent a message back apologizing for the incident and offering to begin again despite the fact that he was probably hit by a poisoned arrow in the skirmish. This time the transfer of goods was completed without incident as a large load of

cinnamon was loaded aboard the two vessels. Some of the men began trading for personal stores of cinnamon--a practice that de Saz immediately prohibited. However, the prohibition ran against the tradition among voyagers of those days, who usually received no or little pay for their services.<sup>312</sup> Martin Hernandez, a Portuguese mariner, other members of the crew were outraged by the prohibition and conspired to assassinate de Saz and escape to the Moluccas, who by then was seriously ill. De Saz, however, suspected that some treachery was brewing and assigned Juan de Morones, the captain of the frigate, to take command of the San Juan and to post an armed guard. Morones and his men soon uncovered the plot organized by Hernandez and, at the orders of De Saz, was summarily hanged. A few days later de Saz, the most experienced and professional of Legazpi's soldiers, died on the way back to Cebu.<sup>313</sup>

Upon hearing the news of de Saz' demise, Legazpi appointed de Goiti as Master-of-Camp in charge of ground troops and made preparations to get the San Juan ready for her voyage across the Pacific. On July 10, 1567, loaded with provisions for a voyage of several months, the San Juan left the channel of Cebu for New Spain under the command of Juan de la Isla.<sup>314</sup> That same day, two Portuguese ships from the Moluccas arrived at Cebu carrying dispatches addressed to Legazpi from General Gonzalo de Pereira, the Portuguese governor-general of the Moluccas. Pereira stated that the Spaniards were trespassing on the Portuguese side of the Mortgage and that they should depart or be forcibly expelled from the colony.<sup>315</sup> In reply, Legazpi stated only that he was awaiting instructions from Philip II to determine what to do.<sup>316</sup>

The documentary evidence on relations with the Cebuans during this period is mute. Tupas continued to insist that the absence of Spanish women was indicative that the Spaniards did not intend to stay. The day-to-day concerns surrounding the securing of provisions and other supplies, in which the majority of the garrison found itself deployed to other islands, and the occasional threats from the Portuguese probably tended to isolate the Spaniards from the Cebuans thereby minimizing any effects they would otherwise have made on the indigenous society. Before the end of 1566, they were able to secure the conversion of the Moslem Camotuan who acted as the primary interpreter and intermediary between the Spaniards and Tupas. This conversion tended to encourage further conversions, though the friars still demonstrated restraint in this area.<sup>317</sup>

The fleet the Spaniards had been hoping for finally arrived on August 20, 1567 while they were in the midst of reinforcing their positions in anticipation of a Portuguese assault. Two ships, the San Pedro and San Lucas, under the command of Felipe Salcedo arrived with two hundred men to augment the 150 men left from the original expedition, forty pieces of artillery, and Juan de Salcedo, eighteen year old brother of Felipe. The sole disappointment for Legazpi, especially in deciding how to deal with the Portuguese, concerned the lack of any sort of instructions from the king who, as noted earlier, still was in the midst of deliberations over the Mortgage when the fleet departed New Spain in April 1567.<sup>318</sup>

The arrival of the fleet must have finally convinced Tupas that the Spaniards were in the islands to stay. On March 21, 1568, he was

baptized by Father Herrera, with Legazpi acting as godfather, and named Felipe after the king. His son was also baptized with Juan de Salcedo serving as godfather and named Carlos after Charles I.<sup>319</sup> From that point the speed of conversions and baptisms among the Cebuans increased, especially as the Augustinian friars became familiar with the Visayan language.<sup>320</sup>

The absence of the instructions from the king troubled Legazpi. He decided to send the San Pablo back to New Spain, still under the command of Felipe Salcedo, to secure additional soldiers, supplies, and the sorely desired instructions.<sup>321</sup> Legazpi's apparent fixation on receiving instructions from the *audiencia* or the king may appear odd given the distances involved and the tentative nature of communications across the oceans. Having served as an official in New Spain he was trained in the juridical tradition of representing the interests of the Crown. That Philip decided personally at Court the questions concerning the Line of Demarcation and the Mortgage is indicative of the pitfalls of absolute monarchy--the best way to determine whether one is representing the Crown's interests is to have a ruling in advance from the sovereign.

The San Pablo departed Cebu on July 1, 1568, but while anchored at the Ladrones was run aground by a sudden storm. As the crew abandoned ship for the safety of the beach, the Guamanians attacked them relentlessly. Later, the natives tired of attacking the Spaniards and treated them hospitably. All members of the crew survived the shipwreck and, before long, under Salcedo's leadership, built a frigate from the

wreckage upon the hull of a native prau and returned to Cebu where they found the colony under siege by the Portuguese.<sup>322</sup>

On September 18, 1568, a small Portuguese vessel arrived at Cebu with letters from the Moluccan governor-general announcing his imminent arrival. Ten days later, a strong Portuguese armada of nine ships and about thirty Moluccan praus appeared at the entrance of the channel. Under a flag of truce he ordered the Legazpi to abandon the settlement but he refused. A brief engagement occurred between the fortress and two Portuguese galliots that had crept in close to the colony but mostly the confrontation was a war of diplomatic charges and counter-charges between Pereira and Legazpi. The last communication between them is dated October 31, Pereira then decided to blockade the harbor. The Spaniards once again had to withstand hunger as the blockade extended into November and December. Suddenly on January 1, 1569, the Portuguese fleet, suffering from a typhoid epidemic, lifted the blockade and sailed back to the Moluccas.<sup>323</sup>

The clash with the Portuguese fleet affected Legazpi and the colonists deeply. No doubt they would have quit the colony had they been able to and the history of the Spanish in the Philippines would have ended here. Legazpi called a general meeting of the officers and priests and, after consultation, decided to immediately move the headquarters for the colony to the friendly settlement of Panay with its abundant supply of rice and multiple outlets to the sea.<sup>324</sup>

As the colony held on against hunger and the Portuguese, Juan de la Isla, who had departed for New Spain on the San Juan in July 1567, arrived in Spain in April 1568 to plead for assistance before the



king.<sup>325</sup> The colony in the Philippines was a minor affair when compared to other projects and events in the Spanish empire. Foremost in importance, no doubt, were the operations against the Ottomans in North Africa and the Mediterranean that eventually led to the Spanish victory at Lepanto.<sup>326</sup> Impressed by the urgency expressed by de la Isla, Philip II immediately packed him off on a Viscayan *zabra* (a small two masted fishing vessel) to Vera Cruz loaded with the needed supplies. He sent with him instructions to the new viceroy of New Spain, Martin Enriquez, to assist de la Isla in the outfitting of a fleet as quickly as possible.<sup>327</sup>

De las Isla arrived in New Spain in November 1569 and set about immediately to carry out the king's orders. Included on the list of passengers were several married couples and the Spanish families that Tupas had been looking for as a positive sign of permanence, including de la Isla's wife and children.<sup>328</sup> During this period the San Juan, which had been turned around from Acapulco with additional reinforcements and supplies for the colony after disembarking de la Isla, arrived in Cebu in July 1569. A few days later the San Lucas, commanded by Felipe Salcedo, departed for New Spain. Accompanying Salcedo was Fr. Diego de Herrera who had been selected among the Augustinians to see the king at Court and express reservations about the legality of the occupation and the mistreatment of the natives by the Spanish soldiers. The exact nature of the mistreatment is not known but this mission represents the first of a long series of conflicts between the ecclesiastic and civil authorities that was to shape the nature of the Philippine pacification. The San Lucas arrived in New Spain in

November, shortly after de la Isla's arrival. The viceroy, believing that all questions regarding the colonization of the islands had been settled by de la Isla's audience with the king, declined Herrera's request to proceed to Spain concerning these matters and assigned him to return to Cebu with de la Isla.<sup>329</sup>

Shortly after the departure of the San Lucas, Legazpi executed the move to Panay. The intervening years from the time of the Portuguese blockade are shrouded in mystery. During the move to Panay the ship containing the papers of Legazpi covering this period was shipwrecked in a storm.<sup>330</sup> It appears, however, that the Spaniards had entered a new, more aggressive stage in the colonization. The soldiers were spread throughout the islands to forage for food and pacify the natives. We know that small garrisons were kept in Masbate, Ticao, and Burias.<sup>331</sup>

Relations with the local Panayans is not known. The official chronicle states that the Spaniards were gratefully received because they had defeated their traditional enemies. The most serious threat, once again, came from an external source. Shortly after moving to Panay a rumor spread that the Portuguese had returned to Cebu and destroyed the fortress. Legazpi sent de Goiti in command of a force immediately to assist the colony but when they arrived they found the rumor to be untrue. Instead they learned that a Moro force of twenty large *balanguays* had raided a town outside of Cebu and had taken their *datu* and several other people prisoner. De Goiti sailed in pursuit of the pirates and captured four of their vessels. The Moros captured indicated that they had been given orders from the sultan of Borneo to

destroy the Spanish outposts, kill the Spanish governor, and imprison the remainder.<sup>332</sup>

Legazpi's policy of dispersal allowed the Spaniards to gain further knowledge about the islands. One of the main protagonists, however, in the spread of Spanish rule was his grandson, Juan de Salcedo. While establishing the headquarters in Panay he roamed the area of the Sibuyan Sea and travelled as far north as the islands bordering Luzon and Mindoro. During his travels he continually heard stories about the size, importance, and wealth of Manila.<sup>333</sup>

In January 1570, two *datus* of northwest Panay requested assistance against people they described as Moslem pirates operating out of the town of Mamburao on the island of Mindoro. No doubt this town was one of a number of fortified outposts in the Philippines under the Bornean sultanate. With a force of forty Spanish soldiers and about two hundred Visayans, Salcedo sailed to Mamburao and found it to be defended by a stockade, which he easily stormed. Two actions of Salcedo during this battle denote a break with the policy of restraint practiced by Legazpi and de Saz. The first occurred when the majority of the defenders of Mamburao escaped to the small island of Lubang and he allowed his men to loot the town. The second action was perhaps the more reprehensible one from the European perspective: after having captured a number of prisoners, he then ransomed them for gold, splitting the proceeds between himself and his men. Legazpi would not have tolerated these actions by any other officer under his command than his grandson.<sup>334</sup>

Salcedo pursued the islanders to Lubang. Here he found two strong fortified towns with walls and ramparts twelve feet high on which were mounted small brass cannon and surrounded by moats. Salcedo came upon the first fortification and called for the islanders to their surrender--an offer that they rejected. His men then stormed the walls and the disorganized defenders fled from the fortress in panic. He then sent a Moslem prisoner to the second fortification to advise them to surrender and, as before, they rejected the demand. The Spanish force attempted to storm the walls of this town but were driven back and almost defeated. Seeing that he could not afford another frontal attack, Salcedo then brought his ships close to the fort and bombarded it, thereby causing the defenders to sue for peace and pay ransom in gold. Interestingly, once defeated the people of Lubang became the allies of the Spanish in all future battles. Aside from extending Spanish rule in the archipelago, the conquest of Lubang also brought the Spaniards to the entrance to Manila Bay--the rich and powerful city that Salcedo and others had heard about throughout the islands.<sup>335</sup>

The pace and pattern of conquest changed with the activities of Salcedo. Upon his return, a general meeting of officers and priests convened. At this meeting the Spaniards decided to send a stronger force north under the command of de Goiti, with Salcedo as second in command, to find the town of Manila on the island of Luzon and bring it under Spanish rule. On May 3, 1570, two small frigates and about fifteen *praus* containing ninety Spanish arquebusiers and sailors<sup>336</sup> and 200 to 300 Visayan and Panay allies departed the settlement at Panay. They sailed northwest by the Sibuyan Sea, touching at Sibuyan

and Banton islands. While anchored at the southern end of Mindoro, de Goiti learned that the forward part of his fleet had spotted two Chinese trading junks anchored in a river. Unable to sail the larger frigates to meet the junks, de Goiti dispatched a smaller force of *praus* under Salcedo to contact the junks and establish friendly relations. This force became scattered by a gale and only a portion of it reached the junks. Believing themselves under attack, the Chinese fired rockets and warned off the *praus*, but the Spaniards in these boats believed the Chinese action to be a challenge to battle. The *praus* managed to grapple the larger junks, reduced the defenders with fire from the arquebuses, and boarded and plundered them. When Salcedo and de Goiti arrived, according to the chronicler, they expressed their displeasure at the "havoc made among the Chinese."<sup>337</sup> However, de Goiti's next action is to reprimand the Chinese for their warlike behavior and allow them to depart for their home on one of the junks with just enough provisions and equipment necessary for the voyage after taking from them the trade goods the two junks contained: "silk, both woven and in skeins; gold thread, musk, gilded porcelain bowls, pieces of cotton cloth, gilded waterjugs . . . earthen jars and crockery; large porcelain vases . . . iron, copper, steel, and . . . wax . . ."<sup>338</sup> If he is to be believed, the chronicler states that the Chinese were pleased with this arrangement, and also the one in which one of the junks was sent back to Panay with four Chinese volunteers to pilot it.<sup>339</sup>

As they coasted north along the island of Mindoro, the Spaniards stopped at the more populous Moslem *barangays* of the island and, after initially encountering hostility, subdued each of them peacefully,

extracting tribute or partial payment of tribute wherever they went. While at the *barangay* of Balayan the Spaniards heard of the great strength of Manila. De Goiti sent the *praus* ahead into the bay under the command of Salcedo. There they came upon a place, which is the region surrounding what is presently called Lake Taal, where there were "many people and much cultivated land."<sup>340</sup> Here Salcedo and his small fleet came upon a fortified town and, when they approached it, soon found themselves in ambush under a shower of arrows. They fired their arquebuses, thereby frightening the natives, and were able to make their retreat. Salcedo sustained a leg wound from one of these poisoned arrows and the chronicler states that he took a medicinal herb as a antidote to the poison.<sup>341</sup> In retaliation for this attack, the Spaniards found a landing site near the town and attacked the natives, frightening them once again with their arquebuses and killing forty. After this brief but bloody skirmish, the Spaniards and their native allies entered the town and found inside two Chinese traders that had been taken prisoner by the villagers. They learned from the Chinese that they were the lone survivors of two trading junks that were at the town when word of the Spaniards' activities on Mindoro had reached Luzon--an indication of the efficient intelligence system that worked in the islands. They desired to leave before the arrival of the Spaniards but the natives of the town would not allow them to depart. After a brief skirmish in which the town *datu* had been killed with a culverin, the Chinese grounded their vessels while attempting to leave the harbor and there succumbed to the native attack. Salcedo set the Chinese free and returned to de Goiti to report on events within the bay.<sup>342</sup>

In contrast to Salcedo's experience, de Goiti conducted friendly relations with the natives at the bay's entrance. There the Spaniards came upon the natives of the *barangay* of Tulay who provided the fleet with provisions and paid tribute. It was at this meeting that the Spanish chroniclers take note for the first time of the internal dissention among the various *barangays*. De Goiti allowed the Balayans to accompany his fleet to the entrance of the bay. When the Tulayans approached the fleet and offered friendship the Balayans protested, stating that when one of their trading vessels had been wrecked on their coast "they stole their goods . . . and killed two of them, setting their heads on stakes."<sup>343</sup> In reply de Goiti stated that he had come to establish peaceful relations with both *barangays* and that any disputes between them would be settled by the Spanish. He stated that if either party broke with the decision settled upon, the Spaniards would make war upon them and to this the natives agreed.<sup>344</sup>

With the fleet reunited the Spaniards decided to enter the bay in force. While coasted the interior of Manila Bay, de Goiti's men in the *praus* raided the fishermen and other small craft of the coastal *barangays*, actions that he reprimanded them for when word reached him<sup>345</sup>, and indicative of the difficulty in maintaining discipline among the Spanish soldiery. De Goiti brought along as interpreters and guides a resident of Manila and his brother, both of whom traded regularly with the Spaniards at their settlement in Cebu, and who converted to Christianity. It is not known if these natives accompanied the fleet voluntarily, but the chronicler does make a point in mentioning that the wife and son of one of the men were left in

Panay.<sup>346</sup> Considering the deft use made of hostages by Legazpi in Cebu, the families of these men were probably held in Panay as insurance of their loyalty. From these men de Goiti learned that the *datu* of Manila was named Soliman and of the location of the settlement.<sup>347</sup>

After a short voyage, the fleet arrived at a cove now known as Cavite.<sup>348</sup> Here, two hours before sunrise, the two residents of Manila and a "Cafre" (either a black African or a non-Christian from India) disembarked from the frigate onto *praus* to reconnoitre the port and the river and send offers of friendship (under Spanish hegemony) to Soliman. The men arrived back to the fleet three days later with an uncle of the converted Manilans who claimed to be an ambassador of Soliman.<sup>349</sup> After preliminary statements about the greatness of Soliman, the uncle stated that the Manilan *datu* desired to establish friendly relations with the Spaniards and welcomed them to establish settlements as they had done in Panay and Cebu--an indication that the Spanish presence had been known for some time.<sup>350</sup> De Goiti responded positively to Soliman's offer and stated that in order to conclude peaceful arrangements that they must meet each other face to face. The uncle requested that he convey this message to Soliman before the Spaniards arrived, which de Goiti granted, though the Spanish fleet proceeded behind the *prau* after giving it a head start of a mile or two.<sup>351</sup>

According to the chronicler, on the way to Manila the fleet came upon natives from neighboring *barangays* who complained of abuses committed by Soliman, as well as by Chinese traders from four junks who complained about unfair trading practices committed by their Manilan



hosts.<sup>352</sup> Whether these descriptions were written as justifications for Spanish action under Vitoria's preconditions or accurate reflections of social fragmentation to the point of hostility among the various communities of the region cannot be determined. The chronicler states that de Goiti only took note of these complaints and continued in the wake of the *prau* until coming in sight of Manila--a thriving *barangay* under Rajah Soliman who was a son-in-law of the Bornean sultan. It was situated on the south side of the mouth of the Pasig River and was defended by a wooden fort and palisade both mounted with bronze cannon. On the other side of the river was the *barangay* of Tondo ruled by the Rajah Lakan-Dula, the uncle of Soliman.<sup>353</sup>

After anchoring, de Goiti sent one of his interpreters to the shore to tell Soliman that he had arrived and to request a meeting. The man quickly returned to say that the requested meeting would take place on the beach. The first man to meet the Spaniards at this place was Matanda (meaning Old Chief), who greeted them in a friendly manner. Not long after, Soliman himself appeared with "an air of importance and haughtiness."<sup>354</sup> Obviously, the self-assurance with which Soliman handled himself seems to have disturbed the Spaniards. Soliman stated that he welcomed the Spanish as friends but, he added, the Moslems of Manila were not the same people as the painted savages of the southern islands they had encountered previously and that he would repay any abuse of their rights with death. After laying these ground rules Soliman returned to the fortress.<sup>355</sup>

The initial meeting having ended, both sides waited tensely for the other to make a move--Soliman in his fortress with his guns and

weapons ready, de Goiti on the frigate with his gunners and soldiers alerted. One of the Manilan interpreters asked de Goiti to spend the night with his relatives in Manila and to this de Goiti granted permission. During the night the Spanish soldiers on the beach and some of the Manilans taunted each other but both sides maintained discipline and avoided conflict. The next morning the interpreter arrived again with his uncle to state that Soliman had heard that the Spaniards intended to demand tribute from him and to this he would not acquiesce-- obviously he was aware of the actions of the Spaniards elsewhere in the islands. To this news de Goiti debarked from his vessel, and with only the two interpreters, walked into the fortress to speak personally with Soliman. The Manilan *datu* was obviously impressed with this display of courage and concluded the ritual of blood-brotherhood with him. De Goiti in his negotiations with Soliman exempted Manila from payment of the tribute and promised the protection of Spanish arms. In return, de Goiti obtained from him the names of forty other settlements in close proximity to the town.<sup>356</sup>

Despite this peaceful settlement, the chronicle states that the two sides did not drop their guard and that tensions remained high. He makes special mention of the experience of the chief notary of the Spaniards who went ashore to trade silver for gold and insisted on a rate of three measures to one against the Manilans' position of five to one, though all previous chronicles concerning trade seem to support the latter price as the one in common practice throughout the islands. This disagreement confirmed in the mind of the Spaniards that Soliman was not negotiating in good faith. On the way back to the ship, Soliman told

the notary that in the morning his people would pass in review to celebrate the new peace with the Spaniards and that they were not to be alarmed since this would entail the firing of cannon. At the same time, the frigates were visited by many native *praus* from neighboring *barangays* who, through the interpreters on board, told the Spaniards that Soliman was planning a ruse and would attack them at the first possible moment.<sup>357</sup> It is possible that the local villagers, who had already expressed hostility against the Manilans, wished to turn the Spanish against them or, considering the experiences at Malacca and Cebu, that Soliman really intended to do away with the Spaniards. Whatever the case, the chronicler states that a message was then received by de Goiti from Soliman warning him that the *datu* of Tondo was planning an attack by sea for the next morning and that Soliman would ally himself on the side of the Spanish.<sup>358</sup>

This confused story of planned treachery is, in all likelihood, a fabrication composed after the events of the next morning. Tensions were certainly high in the Spanish camp as de Goiti ordered his soldiers in the *praus* to sleep fully armed on the beach that night. In dramatic, prophetic fashion the chronicler states how "that day the sunset was so blood-red that the sun was blood-stained."<sup>359</sup> The next morning the fleet spotted some small vessels on the horizon entering the anchorage area and de Goiti, thinking that they were some of the boats sent against him from Soliman, sent a *prau* to do a reconnaissance of the approaching vessels. When these craft approached closer, it became apparent that they were fishing boats and de Goiti, thinking that the

men on the *prau* would attack them, fired the small boat culverin to call them back.<sup>360</sup>

Hearing the cannon, the Manilans thought they were under attack and returned fire. The Spaniards on the beach, obviously prepared for this contingency beforehand, stormed the stockade, overpowering the few defenders standing watch, and rushed into the town. The Manilans were obviously unprepared and fled in panic before the ordered battle of the Spanish arquebusiers, despite the inaccuracy of these weapons. The villagers fled across the Pasig River and into the interior jungle. De Goiti, then afraid that his men would begin plundering and become vulnerable to a counterattack, ordered that the town be burned. About one hundred Manilans were killed in the engagement including a Portuguese artilleryist who was believed to have been a deserter from the Portuguese garrison in the Moluccas. De Goiti took eighty prisoners, including Chinese and Japanese settlers, and a rich war booty, notably Soliman's gold and artillery pieces.<sup>361</sup>

The Spaniards remained in the town for two days for a final surrender by Soliman but he and his people remained in the interior. Fearing that he was too outnumbered to pursue the Manilans into the interior and that the arrival of the southwest monsoon, expected shortly, would prevent his return to Panay, de Goiti left Manila and sailed back to the Spanish headquarters at Panay to report on his actions.<sup>362</sup> Salcedo, still suffering from the leg wound, was sent ahead to Panay while de Goiti coasted along Mindoro to collect the remainder of the tribute promised by the villagers. While completing this task a messenger arrived from Legazpi informing him to return

immediately to Panay because of the arrival from New Spain of Juan de la Isla.<sup>363</sup>

The arrival of the voyage of Juan de la Isla in June 1570 marked a turning point in the pacification of the Philippines for on board were the specific instructions from Philip II outlining the actions to be taken by Legazpi. These documents represent the basic blueprint that the Spaniards followed for the next thirty years in bringing about the final reduction of the islands to Spanish rule. In these documents the king appointed Legazpi governor and captain-general of Cebu and instructed him to undertake the conversion of the Indians to Christianity through peaceful means; the assignment of *encomiendas* to bring about their pacification; to enslave only those Moslems sent as missionaries from the Ottoman Empire or who attempt to prevent the peaceful preaching of Christianity in the islands, and allowing for the purchase of slaves in the custom of the indigenous population; and to send back to New Spain all non-Spaniards, particularly Portuguese, in light of the intrigues the expedition had already endured.<sup>364</sup>

The immediate effect of the communications from the king was to reconcile the Spaniards to the permanent intent of their occupation in the islands and this seems to have disappointed Legazpi, who perhaps was expecting further instructions to explore and settle the other, richer portions of Asia that he and his men had heard of in their frequent encounters with Moslem and Chinese traders. Among the instructions the king granted Legazpi the title of governor and captain-general of the Ladrones (Guam) with instructions for their pacification and colonization--an impractical task--and a salary of two thousand ducats a

year for each of his titles to Cebu and the Ladrones, but payable out of the proceeds of the tribute from those lands.<sup>365</sup>

On July 27, after the day of only a month, Legazpi sent de la Isla back to New Spain with two communications--one from the governor and one from Father Herrera. In his own letter, Legazpi indicates that, because of the vulnerability of the Spanish settlements in Cebu and Panay, he intends to explore and pacify the large island of Luzon, and expresses alarm over the news that an expedition out of Peru was granted overlapping concessions with the lands he has already explored and claimed for the king. He closes his letter by asking that his son Melchior, who had been representing Legazpi's interests at Court, and his grandson Felipo Salcedo be allowed to return to him, and indicates that two of the culverins captured at Manila were accompanying de la Isla for the king's inspection.<sup>366</sup> Herrera, for his part, outlined in his communication for the king the reasons for his trip of the previous year to New Spain. In this letter he indicates that the official reports describe many of the natives as Moslems as a pretext for the violence committed against them in which their property is taken and their houses burned, and he asserts that the reason for the difficulties of the Spanish in obtaining provisions in trade is because of their war-like actions against the islanders.<sup>367</sup>

Both of the letters that accompanied de la Isla epitomized the tension that was to mark the entire period of the Spanish pacification of the islands--the desire among the military and civil officials for the establishment of a profitable colony and the desire among the religious authorities to protect the rights of the natives. Certainly

the lack of distinction between civil and ecclesiastical authority that characterized Spanish society contributed to this conflict. However, two important differences already become apparent between Spanish administration in the New World and in the Philippines. First, the king's instructions concentrated all executive power in the position of the governor. Theoretically this position was subordinate to and controlled by the bureaucratic structure of the viceroy in New Spain, but the distance and time that separated them diminished this check on power to the point of being ineffective. Secondly, the monumental task of converting the natives to Christianity was left to the six friars that were in the islands when the royal instructions were received. This task was to remain undermanned during the entire period of the Spanish pacification, leaving it largely to the *encomenderos* to accomplish, thereby increasing the hostility between the church and the institution of the *encomienda* that began in the New World.

With the instructions of the king making the occupation of the islands permanent, Legazpi began the construction of a Spanish town at Cebu. While there, on October 19, 1570, Pereira, the Portuguese governor of the Moluccas, and his fleet returned to Cebu with a stronger force and bombarded the Spanish fortification. Legazpi, as on previous occasions, demonstrated restraint in his dealings with Pereira, and with his new found title to the islands established by the king of Spain, the Portuguese fleet returned to the Moluccas. Never again were the Portuguese to attempt to challenge Spanish title to the islands.<sup>368</sup>

Having settled matters with the Portuguese, Legazpi got down to the task of settling the islands in the manner of the American colonial possessions. He apportioned the natives in the area into *encomiendas* and, on January 1, 1571, appointed the first town officials of the City del Santissimo Nombre de Jesus--two *alcaldes*, six *regidores*, a notary, and two *alguacils*--the town named in honor of the statue of the child Jesus found there.<sup>369</sup> Having laid the groundwork for Cebu, and leaving Lavezaris as administrator of the colony<sup>370</sup>, Legazpi then returned to Panay where he arranged for the garrisoning of Spanish outposts elsewhere in the Visayas, and to plan the establishment of his capital in the islands--Manila.

Legazpi's exact reasons for moving on Manila at this time are not known. Certainly, the importance of the settlement as a terminus for trade with China and Borneo helped to convince him that it would serve as the perfect capital for a vast oriental trading empire--centrally located and possessing the agricultural resources that he struggled to obtain every year. In any event, on April 15, 1571, Legazpi left Panay with the pinnace San Lucas, a frigate, a *bangka*, and twenty-three native *praus*, manned by 210 Spaniards, and several hundred Visayan auxiliaries.<sup>371</sup>

As the fleet coasted along Mindoro, the Spanish collected the tribute still due from many of the *barangays*.<sup>372</sup> At one of these villages Legazpi ransomed thirty Chinese traders whose vessel had been shipwrecked and were taken as slaves by the local people. Using the same diplomacy that had worked for him so well up to this point, Legazpi set the Chinese free and provided them with a boat for their safe return



home.<sup>373</sup> This small act of kindness would determine much of the character of the Spanish development of the islands all out of proportion to its apparent importance.

As had de Goiti before him, Legazpi anchored near Cavite in Manila Bay. While waiting for the slower *praus* to catch up with the larger ships, a Moslem trader named Dimandul, an agent of the Bornean sultan sent to watch the movement of the Spanish in the Philippines and who Legazpi had met in Panay, boarded the captain-general's ship and told Legazpi that there were three rajahs in the area of Manila and that two wanted peace but that Soliman, because of the actions of de Goiti on his previous visit, was preparing once more for war.<sup>374</sup> Legazpi asked Dimandul to assure the chiefs that he had not come as an invader but to assist them.<sup>375</sup>

With his fleet together, the next day Legazpi proceeded to Manila. Soliman, who had rebuilt his kingdom upon the departure of the Spaniards, spotted the approach of the Spanish armada, burned his village, and retreated across the Pasig River to Tondo. Seeing this, Legazpi dispatched de Goiti with an interpreter who explained that the Spaniards had come in peace, not in retaliation for the previous conflict. Lakandula, the chief of Tondo, came out to Legazpi's vessel and told the Spanish captain-general that all three *datus* desired peace. Legazpi requested that all three meet to discuss the misunderstanding the next day and to this Lakandula agreed. On May 17, 1571, Legazpi disembarked and met with Rajahs Matanda and Lakandula and assured them of the Spaniard's peaceful intentions as long as they recognized Spanish hegemony over their villages. To this both agreed. Finally, the next

day Soliman came into the camp and affirmed the agreement of the other *datus*, explaining that on the previous visit of the Spaniards he could not submit because he did not possess absolute power and others in the *barangay* had opposed Spanish rule. In typical Spanish fashion, an agreement between the *datus* and Legazpi was drawn up and dutifully witnessed by a notary. Thus, on May 19, 1571, in a religious ceremony held in a makeshift church constructed for the occasion, Legazpi took formal possession of Manila in the name of the king of Spain.<sup>376</sup>

Why the *datus* of Manila and Tondo submitted peacefully to Spanish rule has been a point of much conjecture among historians of the Philippine Islands. The lethality of European weapons, witnessed by traders in Malacca and other Portuguese possessions and experienced first hand during de Goiti's visit, no doubt played a part. In addition, the pattern of settlement in the islands had been for each new invader either to force its predecessor into the interior or to become absorbed by the larger Filipino culture. Perhaps the *datus* believed that in granting Legazpi the concession to settle with their people they would be able to conduct their lives in the same way they had in the past.

As had been done in Cebu, Legazpi then requested that the *datus* use their influence to convince the surrounding *barangays* to submit to Spanish rule. The *datus* from the *barangays* of Macabibi and Hagonoy refused to submit and arrived at Tondo to jeer at Lakandula for submitting to the Spaniards, and arriving at the Spanish camp in Manila, challenged Legazpi and his men to do battle. Legazpi, clearly insulted by the display and desperate that the act of defiance not go unpunished,

despatched de Goiti and eighty men to pursue the defiant *datu* and his followers. The two forces met at Bankusay Channel on June 3, 1571. The natives opposed the Spanish force with about thirty *praus*, each containing one or two culverins. However, the ordered formation of the Spanish arquebusiers soon scattered the defenders and, when they reached landfall in retreat, were cut off by the Visayan allies of the Spanish. This display of power obviously had its desired effect for within a few days of the battle most of the *datu*s of the surrounding *barangays* came to Manila to submit to Spanish rule.<sup>377</sup>

On June 24, 1571, Legazpi officially established Manila as a city (*ciudad*) and formed its government by appointing local officials as he had done in Cebu; proclaiming it the capital of the Philippines.<sup>378</sup> He sited the town on the location of the torched *barangay* and outlined it in the characteristic pattern of a Spanish-American seaport town-- complete with central square and fortress. Having established a base of operations containing adequate provisions, Legazpi then moved to bring the interior *barangays*, some of these formed by refugees from other *barangays* wishing to escape the Spanish, under his rule.<sup>379</sup>

Many of the *datu*s of Pampanga, a province containing many *barangays* practicing wet-rice agriculture, refused to submit to Spanish rule. As a result, Legazpi dispatched de Goiti with a force of one hundred soldiers, unwillingly guided by Soliman and Lakandula, to bring the recalcitrant villages under Spanish control.<sup>380</sup> During this trip Lakandula deserted from the Spanish force, and upon his return to Manila, was placed in irons by Legazpi. Only upon the return of de Goiti was he released in a mock show of leniency.<sup>381</sup> While in

Pampanga de Goiti continued the conquest of each of the *barangays*, some of them protected by small fortresses, winning their surrender both by military demonstrations and by storm.<sup>382</sup>

During de Goiti's subjugation of Pampanga, Rajah Matanda fell ill and died. According to the Augustinian historian Joaquin Martinez de Zuñiga, author of a history of the islands published in 1803, Matanda voluntarily requested baptism after a brief instruction in the Christian religion but the accuracy of this is open to question.<sup>383</sup> The Spaniards used the occasion as a demonstration of their solidarity with the old *datu*, observing his funeral with much pomp and circumstance and appointing Soliman as the supreme monarch of Manila with the *datus* of the surrounding *barangays* witnessing.<sup>384</sup> Upon hearing, in August 1571, of the arrival at Panay of two more ships from New Spain with supplies and one hundred more soldiers, de Goiti returned to Manila and was assigned by Legazpi to guide the ships to Manila and to resettle his family, who were in Cebu, in Manila.<sup>385</sup>

While de Goiti was accomplishing his mission in Panay and Cebu, Juan de Salcedo took command of the Spanish force, and accompanied by Fr. Alonso Alvarado, a veteran of the Villalobos expedition, sailed up the Pasig River toward the area known as Laguna de Bay. According to the anonymous author of "The Conquest of Luzon," the *datus* of the *barangays* of Cainta and Taytay had on previous visits to Manila challenged Spanish rule.<sup>386</sup> Salcedo first came to the fortified *barangay* of Cainta and, after waiting three days for the inhabitants to submit, stormed the fortress. The Spaniards lost three men in the engagement while slaughtering four hundred Filipino men and women.<sup>387</sup>

When the villagers of Taytay heard of the ruthlessness exhibited by the Spaniards at Cainta, they voluntarily submitted to Spanish rule.<sup>388</sup>

Salcedo continued his campaign around Laguna de Bay subduing more kingdoms, some by force and others peacefully with the intercession of Alvarado, bringing about 25,000 more subjects under Spanish rule.<sup>389</sup> From Laguna Salcedo heard of gold mines in a *barangay* named Paracale in present day Camarines Norte province. With sixty of his men he crossed the rugged mountains to the south that separates the two coasts of the island, suffering the loss four soldiers from disease due to their travelling during the rainy season, and arrived at a deserted settlement. There they found the heralded gold mines, finding that some of them were of impressive depth.<sup>390</sup> The Spaniards remained in Paracale, attempting to entice the natives back to their settlement, but to no avail. When Salcedo failed to return to Manila at the stipulated time, Legazpi sent a rescue party of twenty men to find him. After suffering similar privations as Salcedo's party before them, the rescuers arrived at Paracale to find Salcedo and his men ill with fever and emaciated from hunger. They escorted them safely back to Manila where Salcedo became a sort of celebrity among the other Spaniards.<sup>391</sup>

After arriving back in Manila from Cebu, de Goiti continued the conquest of Pampanga with a force of one hundred fifty soldiers, peacefully capturing the last unpacified major fortified *barangay*.<sup>392</sup> During this period Legazpi continued to assign *encomiendas* in Panay and Luzon. He reported to the Viceroy of New Spain that the colonists were unhappy with the assignments because of the apparent lack of anything of value except rice.<sup>393</sup> To appease them, Legazpi established the amount

of the tribute to be paid to the colonists, ostensibly to reimburse their expenses in pacifying the natives and in salaries. Soon, however, conflict between the Spaniards and the Filipinos arose as the former attempted to compel the extraction of as much wealth as possible from the natives. Rebellions against the Spaniards arose in Bohol, Panay, and Marinduque bringing bloodshed to both sides. Legazpi ruthlessly put down these revolts, assigning Captain Luis de la Haya to reconquer the rebellious *barangays*.<sup>394</sup>

At the beginning of 1572 an event that would shape the future character of Philippine pacification occurred as ten Chinese junks appeared in Manila Bay. The junks arrived as a gesture of good will as a result of the ransoming of the thirty Chinese in Mindoro the year before by the Spaniards. These ships were filled with trade goods-- silk, iron, flour, sugar, porcelain, tin, brass, copper, lead--and the merchants insisted that these were just samples and that they would return on a regular basis. Thus began the regular trade with China and the establishment of a Chinese community at Manila that eventually would lead to the famous Manila galleon.<sup>395</sup> However, greater ambitions possessed Legazpi and the Viceroy of New Spain than a trading agreement with China. Later that year the viceroy wrote to Legazpi authorizing him to assign an expedition for the exploration and conquest of China.<sup>396</sup> In the mind of the Legazpi and other Spaniards the settlements in the Philippines once again became a temporary base of operations for a greater goal--this time for a larger, more lucrative Hispanic Asian empire.

By the middle of that same year the majority of the archipelago was tentatively under Spanish rule by the combined efforts of the military expeditions of de Goiti and Salcedo, and the *encomenderos*. Only the northern part of Luzon had still not been visited by the Spaniards and Salcedo volunteered for this task. He sailed from Manila on May 20, 1572, with forty-five Spanish soldiers. At the cape of Bolinao he came upon some Chinese in a slaving junk who had captured a *datu* and other natives from one of the local *barangays*. He and his men captured the junk and gave the Filipinos their freedom, earning their friendship and loyalty.<sup>397</sup>

Salcedo continued coasting along the Pangasinan and Ilocos provinces, finding a friendly reception by the coastal peoples but resistance from those of the interior, until he reached a place he named Cape Bojeador. There his men resisted continuing the expedition and to these demands he relented. He retraced his way south until reaching the town of Vigan which he decided to make into a Spanish town as a base of operations, renaming it Fernandina, and where he built a small fortress. Leaving his second in command, Captain Antonio Hurtado, and twenty-five soldiers at the new settlement, he took seventeen of the remaining men and started off to continue his explorations to the north. He continued along the entire west coast of Luzon, reaching the Cagayan River valley, taking note from his boat of the richly cultivated lands and dense population, and continued south down the Pacific coast of Luzon until landing at a place he thought to be Paracale. He crossed Luzon and made it to Laguna de Bay where he found a small boat to take him across the lake. During the crossing a gale battered the small outrigger, causing

the rowers to swim for shore. After several hours abandoned in the middle of the lake, a native *prau* happened by and brought the waterlogged Salcedo to their village on the other side of the lake. There some *encomenderos* passed through and learning of Salcedo's arrival, sent messengers back to Manila to report on his whereabouts. Upon their return he learned that his grandfather, Legazpi, had died.<sup>398</sup>

Legazpi had died on August 20, 1572, of what was probably a heart attack at the age of sixty-seven.<sup>399</sup> Many of his contemporaries, bitter about his inability to stop the abuses of the soldiers and early *encomenderos* and thinking him in league with them, accused him of profiting greatly from the expedition. This is an idea popular in some of the recent Filipino historical literature. However, on the day his possessions were inventoried, the officials found only two small purses containing 460 pesos he had borrowed just a few days previously, a silver service, and a large gold chain.<sup>400</sup> Legazpi represented the other type of conquistador that was as common during the period of Spanish overseas expansion as the gold seeking Pizarros and Alvarados--men moved by a combination of religious zeal and loyalty to the king. In this way the actions of Legazpi represent a continuation of the most idealistic purposes of the *Reconquista*.

When word reached the Spanish officials of Legazpi's death they assembled in his house and took out the strong box containing the nomination for his successor.<sup>401</sup> The long deceased de Saz was listed as the first choice in the documents and so Legazpi was succeeded by his stipulated second choice--the treasurer Guido de Lavezaris.<sup>402</sup> The



interim administration of Lavezaris represents a transitional period in the Spanish period of pacification. He did not have the same concern for the welfare of the Filipinos expressed by Legazpi, nor did he hesitate, after the brief interruption of a typhoon<sup>403</sup>, to exercise the full powers of his office.

He organized an expedition under de Goiti and other commanders to Pangasinan and Ilocos consisting of a strong Spanish force of twenty-three ships, including armed galleys, to extort as much gold as possible from the people. This action brought the Augustinians, who denounced the action, into direct conflict with the governor's power and administration.<sup>404</sup> The seeds of this conflict, planted during the apportioning of *encomiendas* by Legazpi but sprouting under the official actions of Lavezaris, would grow into a sizeable power struggle between the office of the governor and the *encomiendas* on one hand and that of the Catholic priests on the other.

Lavezaris also brought about controversy in the small colony by his snubbing of Salcedo--keeping him unused in Manila and assigning *encomiendas* to other officers. Finally in July, 1573, perhaps thinking that he had established his authority with Salcedo, Lavezaris assigned him the mission of pacifying southern Luzon. Salcedo left Manila with 120 soldiers and a number of native allies--the exact number is not known--and began the pacification of the provinces of Bicol, Albay, and Camarines. Crossing the mountains using the same route he used to reach Paracale, he came to the Bicol River and established the town of Santiago de Libon, garrisoning it with 80 soldiers under Captain Pedro de Chavez. This outpost became the nucleus of Spanish power in

Bicolandia.<sup>405</sup> Over the next five months Salcedo managed to establish a form of control over the southern island by the familiar methods of peaceful negotiation and small, but ruthless, armed engagements.<sup>406</sup> During this period Lavesares took an inspection tour of the Visayas and, according to his own version, attempted to stop some of the abuses of the *encomenderos*, though there is no indication that he took any decisive action. Upon returning to Manila in 1574, he recalled Salcedo and granted him the half of Ilocos containing the town of Fernandina--founded during his exploration of that region the previous year--as an *encomienda*, the other half going to de Goiti.<sup>407</sup>

That same year the most serious threat to the survival of the Spanish colony of the Philippines since the difficulties with the Portuguese visited itself in the form of the Chinese Pirate Limahong. He was born of a middle-class Chinese family in the seacoast town of Tiu-Chiu, in the province of Cui-tam, China. At the age of 19 he gathered many boys of his own disposition together and joined the service of Chinese buccaneer Tia-La-Ong. He soon won the attention of the pirate chieftain because of his cunning and martial prowess. Later, when Tia-La-Ong died, Lim-Ah-Hong took control. He established his stronghold at the island of Pe-hou. He became the most feared pirate in China--other challengers were bloodily repulsed and the emperor of China proclaimed him an outlaw and ordered his capture dead or alive and sent three fleets to destroy his forces. Realizing that he was in peril he and his followers fled their stronghold and sailed to the Philippines to install themselves there in place of the Spaniards.<sup>408</sup> Compared to the few hundred Spaniards in the island, Limahong's force was a

formidable force to be reckoned with, consisting of sixty-two war junks, 2,000 soldiers, 2,000 seamen, 1,500 women, many agriculturists and artisans, shiploads of household furniture, farm tools, seeds, domestic animals, and other supplies needed in kingdom-building.<sup>409</sup>

The large Chinese fleet, unknown to either the Spaniards or the Filipinos, sailed directly for Manila. While laying out the plan for Fernandina, Salcedo saw the large fleet coasting down the island and heard that twenty of his men who had been sent out in a small craft to search for provisions had been captured by the strangers and eighteen of them put to death. Thinking his town under attack, he gathered a force of soldiers from the outlying settlements and began to set up defensive positions. However, seeing the squadron of ships proceeding to the south he rightly concluded that they were heading for Manila and so he and his small force of fifty men marched to aid in the capital's defense.<sup>410</sup>

Limahong arrived at the island of Corregidor at the mouth of Manila Bay on November 29 and learned from the captured Spaniards through Portuguese interpreters that the defenses of the town were down because forces had been scattered throughout the islands. At midnight Limahong confidently landed 600 men at Parañaque, mistakenly thinking it Manila, under a Japanese commander by the name of Sioco. Realizing their mistake the invaders marched overland along the bay toward Manila reaching its outskirts early the next morning. As they passed through the coastal *barangays* the Filipinos became alarmed, fleeing to Manila and reporting the arrival of hundreds of Bornean troops. De Goiti, at his residence at Bagumbayan, outside of Manila, was the first to hear

the cries and din of the neighboring *barangays* and met the Chinese columns with a few of his soldiers, battling them until slain.<sup>411</sup> The Chinese burned his house to the ground, and obviously took their pleasure on his wife and other members of his household. This delayed the invaders long enough for the two Spanish companies in the fortress to organize the defenses and for other reinforcements close by to reach the town. Thinking that they had arrived unexpectedly, Sioco and his men stormed the city fortifications but were repulsed by the defenders.<sup>412</sup> Fresh troops arrived on the scene and engaged the Chinese on their flanks. Seeing that the invaders' flanks had been turned by the attacking reinforcements, the Spanish forces that now were organized in the fort came out to engage the Chinese center. Having already suffered a great number of casualties from the effective firing of the Spanish culverins and the arquebusiers, Sioco ordered the retreat and rejoined Limahong's reserve force near Cavite where they rested for two days.<sup>413</sup>

That night Salcedo and his fifty men on small craft arrived at the coast of Bataan. Warned by friendly Chinese traders that Limahong was already at the gates of Manila, Salcedo debarked marched overland, reaching Manila the next day, December 1. Upon his arrival Salcedo was appointed Master-of-Camp in place of the dead de Goiti.<sup>414</sup> Throughout that night he prepared the Spanish defenses and by the use of troop movements, fires, and continual cannon fire, deceived the Chinese into believing his forces were larger than their actual size.<sup>415</sup> On the morning of December 2, Limahong personally directed the second attack upon Manila. He landed 1500 men under the command of Sioco who would

storm the town while Limahong's fleet bombarded it from the sea. On this occasion Limahong removed the boats of his force from the beach to ensure that they would fight to the death and obtained a pledge from Sioco that he would either deliver Manila to him or die in the attempt. Sioco split his force into three divisions--two to attack the fort from the north and the other frontally. The division responsible for the frontal assault burned the houses of the Spaniards outside of the fort in order to lure them into the open but Salcedo was able to maintain the discipline of his troops and reduced the numbers of the invaders by artillery fire. Seeing that the Spaniards could not be lured from the fort, Sioco ordered his men to storm the palisades. The division attacking frontally successfully breached the walls and fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Salcedo led a group of pikemen to the breach who successfully counterattacked and drove the Chinese forces back to the beaches.<sup>416</sup> The Spaniards pursued the Chinese force killing Sioco in the process, but immediately returned to the fort when the Chinese landed their reserve force of four hundred men. This force was also repulsed by the Spanish cannon fire and the ordered fire of the arquebusiers.<sup>417</sup>

On December 3, defeated and furious, Limahong left Manila and returned to Panañaque, decimating the Filipino population there in retaliation, and sailed northward to Pangasinan.<sup>418</sup> On an islet in Lingayen Bay at the mouth of the Agno River he came to an amicable arrangement with a local *datu* and established a fortified settlement.<sup>419</sup> He informed the neighboring Filipino communities that all of the Manila Spaniards had been killed and that he was the sole

ruler of Luzon and that they would pay tribute to him under penalty of death or slavery.<sup>420</sup>

With the immediate threat to Spanish rule in Manila overcome, further problems arose that reveal the true depth of Spanish pacification. During the siege of Manila many of the natives in Tondo killed the Christian converts among them. On Mindoro the natives abducted the priests that were left behind on the island and waited for the outcome of the battle then in progress in Manila Bay to determine their fate. However, probably the most serious threat came from Lakandula and Soliman. They established a war camp at Navotas where they gathered together their warriors and allies from other regions. Alarmed at this internal threat to their rule, Father Geronimo Marin, a priest popular with the Filipinos, and Captain Juan de Salcedo went to Navotas and conferred with the *datus*. They promised the *datus* better treatment for their people, and restoration of the special privileges granted by Legazpi, and revoked by Lavezaris, to their families if they would prevent any armed insurrection and aided the Spanish in their battle against Limahong. Lakandula agreed to these terms and arrived back in Manila where Governor Lavezaris pardoned him and gave him a gold chain and silk garment as gifts. Four days later the recalcitrant Soliman also relented as did the rebellious *datus* on Mindoro.<sup>421</sup>

The Spaniards were now ready to oust Limahong from Philippine soil. Salcedo gathered an expedition at Manila consisting of 250 Spaniards, 1500 Filipinos (including Lakandula, his sons and relatives), and a friendly Chinese named Sinsay to act as interpreter.<sup>422</sup> On March 22, 1575, he left Manila and sailed to Lingayen Gulf where he

destroyed the Chinese fleet. He attacked the Chinese kingdom on several occasion but his losses were so great that he decided to fall back on the medieval method of siege by starvation.<sup>423</sup> The siege lasted several months and many letters were exchanged between Salcedo and Limahong during it in which both sides refused to relent. The effectiveness of the siege was greatly reduced by the use of exploding shells during Chinese bombardments against the siege lines.<sup>424</sup>

Deciding that the Philippines made an unsatisfactory sanctuary, Limahong had his people construct small craft from the remains of their junks and dig a canal to the sea. On August 3, 1575, using the feint of a frontal attack, Limahong and the bulk of his surviving followers made their escape to the sea.<sup>425</sup> The troops participating in the feint were left behind to be killed, captured, or escape into the mountains. These fugitives are believed to be the descendants of the people in that province known as Igorot-Chinese.<sup>426</sup>

Having defeated the threat posed by Limahong, Salcedo returned to Fernandina to prepare for a voyage to New Spain to fetch his widowed mother and sisters. However, he soon became ill with fever and died at his home on March 11, 1576, at the age of 27.<sup>427</sup> The death of Salcedo represents the end of the initial period of the Spanish conquest of the Philippines as new officials, familiar with the bureaucratic procedures of Hispanic government, were appointed to govern the country. This had happened previously in Hispaniola and New Spain with the replacement of both Columbus and Cortes--the imposition of royal control over the loosely governed territories of the conquistadores.

The extent of Spanish control in the islands, however, was more tentative than in the Americas at the end of the period of military conquest. Perceiving the Filipino social structure through European eyes, a perception that had served them well in the Americas for the wrong reasons, they incorrectly tried to maintain political control through the *datus*; attempting to establish them as inter-barangic monarchs. This absence of inter-barangic cooperation, however, worked more in their favor than against them. During the siege of Limahong the potential for widespread rebellion was reduced by the limited nature of the *datu's* power--it was safer for Lakandula and the other chiefs to accept Spanish largesse than to attempt to cut across the web of inter- and intra-barangic familial politics. As a result, eleven years since the arrival of Legazpi, the Spanish system of rule had been superficially superimposed over the indigenous Filipino social structure, which operated largely undisturbed.

Contrary to the early Spanish histories that claim conquest and pacification through the military actions of de Goiti and Salcedo, and the evangelical work of the friars--a claim that has largely gone unchallenged to this time--it is apparent that the work of pacification--that is, the reduction to a submissive state--could only be accomplished by the imposition of an Hispanic social structure. Military victories over small autonomous communities, pledges of fealty only vaguely understood if at all, and superficial conversions to a religion that was more structured and limited in scope than the indigenous cosmography certainly did not constitute pacification. The



next section will explore some of the political and social institutions that brought about that submission.

### Establishment of Spanish Colonial Rule:

#### The War of the Cultures

The administrations of Legazpi and Lavesaris (1572-1575) established the institutions and issues that would dominate the islands for the remainder of the 16th and during the first half of the 17th century. At the center of these issues were the power and effectiveness of an absolutist governor, the actions of the *encomenderos*, the granting of landed estates, the importance of the Sino-Hispanic trade, and the influence of the Catholic church. The manner in which the Spaniards dealt with each of these issues determined the pace and character of Filipino pacification.

As was noted in the last section, the first governor, Miguel de Legazpi, was conferred the title *adelantado*; a title conferred on all of those who discovered lands and brought sufficient people to colonize them. The king also conferred upon Legazpi the right to govern the islands in his name and other laws established by the Council of the Indies.<sup>428</sup> During these first years, the governor in the Philippines was administratively subordinate to the viceroy and *audiencia* of New Spain similar to the arrangement established with the other islands of the West Indies<sup>429</sup>, however, the distance separating the Philippines from New Spain made this system impractical and by default gave the governor of this distant colony a great deal of latitude.

As head of the colonial government, the governor and captain-general's authority was regarded as final except in certain matters of litigation that could be appealed to the *audiencia* in Mexico.<sup>430</sup> This created situations in which the administration of justice could be delayed for over a year as the individual appealing the decision of the governor would have to travel to New Spain to appeal before the *audiencia* and then return to the Philippines with the sealed decision of the *audiencia's* review to be interpreted and executed by the very same governor.

Several factors militated against the seemingly absolute powers of the governor. The most obvious and least of these was the *residencia*--the investigation into a governor's term of office by his successor.<sup>431</sup> Theoretically anyone under Hispanic rule during the term of the governor could bring forth complaints concerning the conduct of his office. However, the extent to which the Filipinos were encouraged to participate in the process is open to question in light of the litany of abuses recorded by the friars that were committed by the soldiers and *encomenderos*. Even a governor as obviously corrupt as Lavesaris was found innocent of any malfeasance in office by his successor Francisco de Sande (1575-1580) in 1575.<sup>432</sup>

However, the most powerful informal influence that limited the power of the governor developed from the pattern of Spanish colonization of the islands brought about by the Sino-Hispanic trade and the speculation in the selling of those goods in Acapulco. So lucrative was the galleon trade that many colonists that had settled in Cebu and other Hispanicized towns moved to Manila to participate in this trade.<sup>433</sup>

The Spanish population of Manila rose from the 230 Spaniards that accompanied Legazpi in 1571 to about 1,200 by the next decade,<sup>434</sup> and reached a peak of 2,400 in about 1620.<sup>435</sup> This growth in the population and importance of Manila stood in contrast to the decline of the other major Spanish towns. Cebu lost its traditional commercial relations with other Chinese and Southeast Asian traders as noted by Miguel Loarca in his "Relacion de las Islas Filipinas" written in June 1582.<sup>436</sup> In addition, according to Domingo de Salazar, the first archbishop of the islands writing between 1586 and 1588, Cebu's population had declined to about thirty Spaniards on his visit there.<sup>437</sup>

The lucrative nature of the Manila *naos* stemmed from the method of distributing shares. Every Spaniard in the colony was entitled to a share of the profits from the galley according to his investment and standing in the community. The capacity of the vessel was measured by taking a bale of about two and one-half feet long, by sixteen inches broad, and two feet high. If the vessel could carry four thousand bales, then these were distributed among the colonists. The right to ship items in a bale was called a *boleta* or ticket. The distribution of the *boletas* was determined at the town hall by a board consisting of the governor, attorney-general, one *alcalde*, one *regidore*, and eight citizens. The dean of the *audiencia* was also a member of this board when the institution was introduced into the islands in 1583. To facilitate the allotment and sale of *boletas*, they were divided into sixths. Each official of the islands received a certain number of *boletas* as a perquisite of office. The *regidores* and *alcaldes* had

eight. The small holders who did not wish to participate in the venture could sell their *boletas* to merchants and speculators. The command of the *nao* was the most lucrative position the governor could bestow upon any individual, the commission from which was worth a small fortune in itself. This commission was raised through the profits of the trip, the passage-money of passengers, the sale of freight tickets, and from the gifts of merchants. Not only the captain of the galleon, but the pilot, mates, and crew all profited.<sup>438</sup>

The impact this trade had on the New World was immediate. The survival of the port of Acapulco came to depend upon the arrival of the Manila *nao*.<sup>439</sup> The Seville merchants, who already had managed to restrict the internal commercial development of New Spain and Peru, looked askance at the importation of Chinese goods into the New World and the consequent payment of those goods with Mexican silver. The result were a series of laws intended to restrict the impact of the trade. In 1587 shipment of Chinese cloths from Mexico to Peru was prohibited. In 1591 all direct trade between Peru and other parts of South America and the Philippines was prohibited. In 1593 a decree, not actively enforced until 1604 and then ineffectively, limited the value of the cargo that could be carried on the *naos*.<sup>440</sup> The unintended effect of these laws was to make the lucrative nature of the trade all that more lucrative since monopoly profits, encouraged by a black market in Chinese goods between New Spain and Peru, were obtained.<sup>441</sup> This effect was reinforced by another portion of the decree that restricted trade with the Philippines to Mexico.<sup>442</sup>

The effect of this concentration of population, power, and wealth in the city of Manila tended to limit the governor's power by skewing his perception based upon the events in the capital and the friction he experienced in attempting to encourage development elsewhere in the islands. Pedro de Rojas, *oidor* of the *audiencia* of Manila, writing to the king on June 30, 1586, laments:

Carrying on commerce as they do, all the Spaniards are absorbed in it, to such a degree that there are not even enough to aid in the expeditions and military operations. . . . This country is not growing, but rather falling into appalling decay and weakness.<sup>443</sup>

These concerns were echoed by Antonio de Morga, *alcalde* of the *audiencia* in New Spain, in 1609 when he wrote:

The trade and merchandise is so considerable and profitable, and easy to administrate (because it lasts only three months of the year . . . ) that the Spaniards have not applied themselves to nor undertake anything else.<sup>444</sup>

The problem of uneven development of the islands was recognized at the time, however, the measures taken to correct the imbalance were half-hearted and directed from the Council in Spain. One of these measures was the granting in 1594 of the request of the citizens of Cebu to send a galleon outfitted at their own expense to New Spain. The decree temporarily stimulated economic activity in the port and several galleons travelled between the years 1596 and 1604. However, the decree limited the items that could be exported to beeswax, cotton tablecloths, bananas, and other fruits from the area. As the profits from this trade failed to cover the cost of the venture, especially with the loss at sea of one galleon in 1597, interest in continuing the Cebu *naos* evaporated.<sup>445</sup>

The Sino-Hispanic trade also had an effect on the indigenous population and on immigration by Chinese and Japanese traders. The *barangay* of 2,000 indigenous people found by Legazpi in 1571 became transformed. By 1620, in addition to the Spaniards already noted, Manila and its environs embraced 3,000 Japanese, 16,000 Chinese, and 20,000 Filipinos.<sup>446</sup> The majority of the last group were those who remained from the estimated 35,000 Filipinos from surrounding islands and *barangays* that had been brought in the 1590s as forced labor to work on the building of permanent stone and brick edifices and the walls of the *Intramuros* (Inner City).<sup>447</sup> This system of labor was called *polo* (forced) labor. It applied to all male Filipinos from 16 to 60 years of age and required them to render labor for 40 days a year on public works. Any *polista* (one who rendered the obligatory labor) could be exempted by payment of one and a half reales for every day of the 40 days he was to be at work. This sum of money called *fala*, tended to exempt the members of the *datu* families who were granted Spanish favors and privileges and given municipal positions.<sup>448</sup> According to the royal regulations concerning *polo*, the *polistas* were to be paid one-fourth real a day and supplied with free rice. Usually, however, the *encomenderos* and other officials who were responsible to providing this payment kept the money and rice ration for themselves.<sup>449</sup> The very process of uprooting these individuals from their physically autonomous and socially independent *barangays* and congregating them at Manila must have had a transforming and devastating effect upon the very fabric of Filipino society.

Increasing numbers of people in the outlying Filipino suburban communities (*arrabales*) found themselves disenfranchised as many of the *datu* families (known as *principales* to the Spanish), in the confusion of the initial period of pacification, were able to represent the communal lands of the *barangay* as their own and sell them to the Spaniards. As a result, finding themselves set adrift from their traditional livelihood, considerable numbers of Filipinos began to offer their services for hire as laborers and domestics within the Manila *Intramuros*. The *arrabales* also developed reputations among the Spanish communities as havens for the vices of usury, gambling, and thievery.<sup>450</sup>

Also contributing to societal transformation of the indigenous population in the vicinity of Manila were the segregated *Extramuros* (Outer City) communities of Dilao, consisting of Japanese emigrants, and Parián and Binondo, consisting of Chinese emigrants. The main impetus for the emigration of Japanese to the islands was the continued suppression of the Christian converts in Japan, especially during the reign of Hideyoshi. Prior to 1585 the Japanese had lived with the Spanish population in the *Intramuros*, but soon the substantial nature of this population growth brought about the designation of Dilao as a Japanese ethnic ghetto as a means of political and social control. From about 1,000 residents in 1595, continued persecutions led to the steady growth of Dilao, reaching about 3,000 individuals by 1624. With the closing of Japan to the outside world by the Tokugawa shogunate in 1639, emigration to the Philippines from Japan ceased.<sup>451</sup>

The Chinese began arriving into the Manila area coincident with arrival of the trading junks. Yearly about 14,000 merchants assembled

at a trade fair when the large junks arrived during the time of the spring monsoons. Silks, nankeens, porcelain, copper, iron, and other products were exchanged for Mexican silver. In 1581, Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa allowed the Chinese to settle outside the *Intramuros* on marshy ground on the south bank of the Pasig River, this area came to be called the Parián.<sup>452</sup> About the same time the *Extramuros* quarter known as Binondo was created when the governor allowed some Chinese, including Christians who had married Filipinas and their *mestizo* descendants, to move north of the Pasig River.<sup>453</sup> Relations between the Spaniards and the Chinese of the Parián was always strained, mainly because of the resistance of the Chinese to Christian conversion and Hispanization. However, the Parián and Binondo represented the commercial lifeblood of Manila. During the daylight hours the gates of the *Intramuros* would be opened and the people would stream out to do their shopping.<sup>454</sup> In describing the Parián's importance to the city, the Bishop Domingo de Salazar wrote the king in 1590:

This Parián has so adorned the city that I do not hesitate to affirm to your Majesty that no other known city in España or in these regions possesses anything so well worth seeing as this; for in it can be found the whole trade of China. . . . In this Parian can be found workmen of all trades and handicrafts . . . doctors and apothecaries . . . also many eating-houses where the Sangleys (Chinese) and the natives take their meals; and I have been told that these are frequented even by Spaniards.<sup>455</sup>

Despite the dependence of the Spaniards upon the Chinese population, suspicion over a general uprising persisted and resulted in bloody persecutions. In 1593, the Parian was burned to the ground and moved further from the walls of the *Intramuros* under the Spanish guns because of a mutiny among fifty Chinese rowers impressed into labor for an attempted invasion of the Moluccas by Governor Dasmariñas that



resulted in his death.<sup>456</sup> In 1603, mistakenly believing that the arrival of an official Chinese embassy was a ruse for an invasion and uprising, the Spanish, aided by Filipino and Japanese allies, prosecuted a pogrom of the Chinese population in the Parian resulting in almost every one of the 23,000 to 25,000 inhabitants being murdered.<sup>457</sup> Similar massacres occurred in 1639, 1662, 1686, and 1762. In each case the economy of the colony stagnated and did not recover until the Spaniards took the contradictory action of encouraging further Chinese emigration.<sup>458</sup>

The presence of such large foreign communities affected the indigenous population of Manila and environs through day-to-day contacts, intermarriage, and informal miscegenation. As in the Americas, the Spanish tended to encourage intermarriage with native women. While Hispanic *mestizos* were considered to be socially inferior to *peninsulares* (people born in Spain) and *criollos* (originally called *Filipinos*)<sup>459</sup>, they were considered superior to native Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, and the *mestizos* of these other groups.<sup>460</sup> In this way, the Spaniards also continued the methods of the *Reconquista* and the *conquista* in the New World. However, because of the small numbers of Spaniards in the colony, and the immunity of the indigenous population to European diseases thereby preventing a decline in population similar to what occurred in the New World, the Eurasians never attained a significant measure of economic or political control or influence.<sup>461</sup> More effective, however, were the relations actively encouraged between the Chinese and the Filipinos. Since the majority of Chinese immigrants were male traders, they tended to have both formal and informal

relations with Filipinas. Because the Spaniards believed that the converted Filipinas would tend to raise the offspring from these unions as Catholics and the fathers would inculcate Chinese values of industry, the Spanish saw Sino-Filipino intermarriage as a means of the eventual assimilation and Hispanization of the otherwise insular Chinese community.<sup>462</sup>

With the informal friction created by the importance of Manila limiting the absolute nature of the office of governor, the job of pacification in the countryside was left mainly to the appointed officials of the Spanish administration. The Philippines were broken into provinces and districts according to the dialects spoken by the inhabitants. Unlike the pattern in the New World, there was a significant difference between the types of officials that administered the districts. The pacified provinces were placed under an *alcalde mayor* while unpacified regions were placed under the control of a *corregidor*.<sup>463</sup> In the Philippines, where the office of captain-general and governor took the place of the viceroy, *alcaldes mayores* and *corregidores* acted as lieutenants, combining the civil and military authority. In addition to the powers they normally exercised in Spain and the New World, in the islands they were required to defend their provinces and districts against invasions, insurrection, Indian recidivism, and any other civil disturbances.<sup>464</sup> As in the New World, these positions tended to be low paying but were greatly sought after because the *alcaldes mayores* were given the authority to control trade in their provinces and the laws forbidding them from engaging in trade

could be set aside by the purchase of a license called an *indulto de comercio*.<sup>465</sup>

During the first three decades of the Spanish colony, when foodstuffs and other commodities were scarce, the *alcaldes mayores* were responsible for the collection of the tribute in kind that took the form of a rice quota (through a *repartimiento de géneros*). These officials were usually able to collect more of a scarce commodity than specified in the *repartimiento* and sell the excess at a substantial profit on the black market.<sup>466</sup>

As the work of pacifying the archipelago proceeded, the number of *alcaldias* grew. As noted in the last section of this chapter, however, the status of pacification tended to be loosely applied. Before 1580 there were four *alcaldias* comprising the provinces of Manila, Ilocos, Camarines, and Cagayan.<sup>467</sup> This number increased to sixteen under the term of Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa (1580-83).<sup>468</sup>

The Spaniards attempted to use the same method of urban resettlement of the natives as was used in Spain during the *Reconquista* and in the New World during the *Conquista*. To this end the Spaniards launched a program of *reducción* (resettlement) where religious officials could achieve their conversion and colonial officials supervise the processes of change.<sup>469</sup> As noted in Chapter Three, the process in the New World consisted of the establishment of Spanish cities (*ciudades de españoles*) and secondary settlements (*villas de españoles*) to act as centers of control in the countryside. By 1590, this process resulted in the establishment of three primary *ciudades* (Cebu, Naga, and La-lo) and two *villas* (Vigan and Arévalo). However, the concentration of the

Hispanic population in Manila soon reduced the effectiveness of these regional urban centers in the process of pacification.<sup>470</sup>

The subdivision of the *alcaldias* was into *pueblos* (towns) each placed under a *gobernadorcillo* (petty governor), ordinarily called *capitan* (captain). He was assisted by other town officials such as the chiefs of police, cattle, fields, the *tenientes* (deputies), and the *alguaciles* (subordinate functionaries).<sup>471</sup> Antonio de Morga, writing in 1609, states that the *gobernadorcillo* was elected annually by the married natives of the town with the confirmation of the royal governor.<sup>472</sup> The *pueblos* were further subdivided into groups of from forty to fifty tributaries called *barangays* (villages), each under a chief called a *cabeza de barangay*. Originally the office of *cabeza* was hereditary and represented a survival of the kinship organization of the earlier native *barangays*. *Cabezas* paid no tribute and were part of the class of *principales*. The *cabeza's* chief duty was to collect taxes in the *barangay*.<sup>473</sup> In this manner the Spaniards attempted to use what they saw as the indigenous social hierarchy of the Filipinos as agents of pacification.

The *reducción* of the natives into *cabeceras* (mission communities) and *poblaciones* (towns) proceeded slowly. The primary agent of the process of urbanization and pacification, as it was in Spain and the New World, was chosen by the Spaniards to be the *encomienda*. Based upon their experiences in the New World--where many of the lieutenants of the *conquistadores* became rich men overnight from the workings of the Inca and Aztec silver and gold mines--the Spaniards considered the apportioning of the natives into *encomiendas* and the granting of landed

estates to be two of the most important powers of the governor. The latter, however, overtook the assignment of *encomiendas* in importance as the Spaniards living in the *Intramuros* of Manila gained wealth from the galleon trade and desired a tangible symbol of their new found status. This created a situation that encouraged individuals to attempt to become overly zealous in attempting to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the governor in order to be favored by his largesse.<sup>474</sup>

During the short, two year period that he was able to assign *encomiendas*, Legazpi designated 143 individuals as *encomenderos*, assigning them a holding containing between 1,500 and 6,000 Filipinos--far larger than the prescribed *repartimientos* of the New World. The number of *encomiendas* were expanded greatly during the subsequent administrations of Governors Lavezaris and de Sande.<sup>475</sup> Loarca, in his "Relation of the Filipinas Islands," written on June 12, 1582, also verifies the size of these holdings. He describes thirty *encomiendas* near Manila, ten near Cebu, and fifteen near Arévalo.<sup>476</sup> In the last case the number of Filipinos assigned to *encomiendas* varied between 250 and 1,500 individuals, though the average numbered 500. Though contrary to previous *cédulas* limiting the size of the New World *encomienda* to yield no more than 2,000 pesos in tribute, the larger size of the *encomienda* was supported by the churchmen of the archipelago because of the small number of friars in the islands. This reality eventually became recognized by the royal *cédula* of August 9, 1589, that allowed the sizes of *encomiendas* in the Philippines to increase to 1,000 persons if necessary to more equitably spread the cost of conversion and defense, though this figure was still below the actual size of many of

the *encomiendas*.<sup>477</sup> In all cases the assignments were made in both pacified and unpacified lands. In this sense the institution of the *encomienda* represents one of the main conduits used in opening up the interior regions and peripheral islands of the archipelago.

The governors favored the use of the *encomienda* as a reward to relatives, friends, and associates. The first census taken in the islands occurred as a result of accounting for tributaries in the year 1591 prepared by Governor Gomez Perez Dasmariñas (1590-93) and demonstrates the rapidity with which the institution spread throughout the islands. According to the census, known as the "Account of the Encomiendas in the Philippine Islands," the region from the Cagayan Valley in northern Luzon to the north coast of Mindanao had been pacified. The census counted 166,903 tributes, estimating that this number of tributaries would equate to 667,612 Filipinos. Overseeing the natives were thirty-one royal *encomiendas*; 236 individual *encomiendas*; 140 friars; and twelve *alcaldes mayores*.<sup>478</sup> The numbers of Filipinos reported in the census did not include the unpacified regions of the Igorots, Moros, or Negritos. In addition, the number of *encomiendas* described as having "justice, but no instruction"<sup>479</sup> highlights the shortage of priests tasked with the *reducción* of the natives. According to the census, 161 additional priests were required to accomplish this task<sup>480</sup>--a number eventually provided. Most importantly, the small numbers of *alcaldes mayores* meant that the *encomenderos* would be infrequently inspected, if at all, and operated independent of the rule of the governor.

As in the New World the *encomenderos* were to collect the tribute, supervise labor in public works, maintain peace and order, protect and educate the Filipinos under their charge, and to aid the missionaries in the propagation of Christianity.<sup>481</sup> However, the lack of exploitable natural resources in the islands similar to those found in the New World made this an impossible task. Certainly a good many of the men who accompanied Legazpi dreamed of acquiring riches in the Philippines similar to those expropriated from the Indians of the Americas. But many of the men who were and accompanied the *conquistadores*, as in the case of Legazpi, participated in the explorations of new lands, not for material gain, but inspired by the same sense of destiny and religious zeal that accomplished the *Reconquista*. That good intentions originating from zeal can have effects as devastating as if they were malevolently intended is the subject of much of this paper.

As noted in the previous section of this chapter, the Spaniards in their colonies at Cebu, Panay, and during the early years in Manila experienced continual shortages of foodstuffs. The native practice of subsistence agriculture did not possess the required flexibility to absorb a sizeable non-productive population. The absence of any indigenous governmental or bureaucratic organization is indicative of this fact. Consequently, the plight of the majority of *encomenderos* was desperate. In a memorial sent to the king in 1581, the colonists allude to this fact and the effects it had on their actions in regard to the natives:

We have seen service in the conquest and pacification of these islands and their settlement, some of us 10 years, others 12, others 15, with only the original grant-in-aid which the officials of Your Majesty's treasury of New Spain released to us in Mexico

on our way hither. It was soon spent by reason of necessities we encountered in pacification of these natives; and so we have been forced to rob them and impose upon them in other ways, burdening our consciences in this fashion merely in order to subsist. We thus have a heavy load on our souls which we are unable to shake off by reason of our great poverty.<sup>482</sup>

Bishop Salazar, upon his arrival in the islands in 1581, offers a vivid picture of the soldiers in the colony--penniless, going without pay, continuously hungry. He describes cases when soldiers in this condition:

. . . will break in on a native who has just cooked himself a meal and take it away from him, ill treating and beating him in the bargain. And if I should restrain and reprimand them, they say, 'What do you expect us to do? Lie down and die!'<sup>483</sup>

Compared with the lucrative nature of the growing Sino-Hispanic trade, the *encomienda* in the Philippines became a questionable enterprise. As a result, the majority of Spanish *encomenderos* tended to congregate in Manila to participate in the Chinese trade and performed only those duties absolutely necessary to retain either their position as *encomendero* or that would directly benefit themselves. Usually this constituted simply collecting the tribute. Bishop Salazar in his "Affairs in the Philipinas" written in 1583 states:

Although the decree (of the king) relating to encomiendas says, 'Provided that you instruct them in the matters of our most holy faith,' the only care that they have for that is, that the *encomendero* takes with him eight or ten soldiers with their arquebuses and weapons, orders the chiefs to be called, and demands that they give him the tributes for all the Indians of their village. . . . What the *encomendero* does, after having collected his tributes . . . is to return home; and for another year he neither sees nor hears of them. He takes no more account of them than if they were deer, until the next year, when the same thing is repeated.<sup>484</sup>

Other complaints before the writing of Salazar's report of 1583 confirm the belligerent nature the *encomienda* had taken. The



Augustinian Memorandum of 1573 delivered to the king by Father Diego de Herrera describes similar methods by the *encomenderos*<sup>485</sup>, as does the Friar Martin de Rada's opinion on the tribute submitted in 1574.<sup>486</sup>

An example of the impotence of the governor in regard to the control of the *encomenderos* concerns the administration of the third governor of the islands, Dr. Francisco de Sande. Upon his appointment in 1575, Philip II set forth instructions concerning the humane treatment of the Filipinos and the punishment to be carried out against the guilty *encomenderos* who had committed abuses as reported by the Augustinians in their memorials to the Crown.<sup>487</sup> As a result, de Sande disestablished many of the *encomiendas* that had been distributed by Legazpi and Lavezaris and transferred others to the Crown.<sup>488</sup> In vigorously carrying out these instructions, on May 26, 1576, de Sande forbade the holding of *encomiendas* by royal officials and redistributed three *encomiendas* falling into this category to the Crown.<sup>489</sup> Despite these measures, by the end of his administration additional abuses were noted by the Augustinians that he seemed unable to prevent.<sup>490</sup> He was driven from his post by the enemies he made by implementing measures against these new abuses.<sup>491</sup>

The effect of the *encomienda* during the first decades after the introduction of the Spaniards concerned mainly the response of the indigenous societies to the demand for tribute and the effects engendered by the enforcement of *polo* labor. The tribute (*tributo*), a kind of head-tax, was established by Legazpi as eight *reales* per family payable in money or in kind.<sup>492</sup> In 1602 it was raised to ten reales. Every married man over 20 years old or every unmarried woman over 25

years of age living with the parents was considered "half-tribute." *Principales* and widows of Spaniards were exempted from paying it.<sup>493</sup>

The *encomenderos* collected the tribute and, by determining the method of payment, usually profited from it. This was especially the case during the period of the *repartimiento de géneros*. The *encomenderos* compelled the Filipinos to pay in rice, clothes, fowl, or produce and other scarce commodities. In one specific case, the *encomendero* of Dagami in Leyte required the payment of the annual tribute to be in wax and used a tampered balance in weighing it so that the people paid twice the amount required. Other *encomenderos* tortured and killed people, plundered their homes and fields, and confiscated their property in collecting the tribute.<sup>494</sup>

In the case of cyclical commodities, the *encomendero* would delay the collection of the tribute to the time when the items were most plentiful and at the low end of the demand curve. They would then hoard the item until a period of scarcity in the cycle and then sell it at a substantial profit.<sup>495</sup> Since *encomenderos* and *alcaldes mayores* controlled commerce in their districts, there was no danger of competition in pricing these commodities once released on the market. The collection of the tribute usually contributed to the size and extent of the scarcity of the item and many Filipinos were forced into debt peonage arrangements in order to survive.<sup>496</sup> The result was the strengthening of the power that the *datus* and *principales* held over other members of the community since the *cabezas de barangay* and *gobernadorcillos* were the only members of the community possessing specie.

It was not until the end of the 16th century that the abuse concerning the expropriation of scarce commodities through the tribute was corrected. The rate was revised to ten *reales* in what was called a *tasación*. This amounted to an increase of two *reales*. One-half *reale* went to the bishop for the salaries of the cathedral chapter. One and one-half were allotted for support of the military garrison. Of the remaining eight, six went to the *encomenderos* and two to the friars as a stipend.<sup>497</sup> Reforms instituted in 1604 established the tribute to be collected as four *reales* in kind, one fowl, and the remaining six *reales* in specie. The products in kind were to be drawn from commodities that were plentiful in that province.<sup>498</sup> However, instead of the response to the calls by the Augustinians for the correction of abuses, the institution of the *tasación* is indicative of the successful introduction by the end of the 16th century of a specie-based economy, the successful expansion and intensification of the indigenous agricultural systems in the production of food and other commodities far in excess of local needs<sup>499</sup>, and the need to make up for large deficits in the colonial treasuries. During this period the Royal Subsidy or *El Situado* was to be raised within the islands though later, in 1606, Mexico began providing a subsidy to help alleviate these deficits.<sup>500</sup> A large part of the *situado* would normally derive from the *almajarifazgo* tax imposed on the galleon trade upon their arrival in Acapulco.<sup>501</sup> The *tasación* also came at a time when debt peonage among the Filipinos had been greatly expanded, acting to institutionalize those changes.

The dynamics of debt peonage affected the manner in which *polo* was enforced and tended to exacerbate the food shortages experienced

during the first two decades of the Spanish colonization. The extensive amount of land under cultivation seen by Legazpi and Salcedo in the central plains of Luzon in 1571 quickly fell into disuse as thousands of *polistas* were drawn from the surrounding communities to work on the building of the *Intramuros*, the gold mines of eastern Luzon, the cutting down of forests for the building of galleys, and as oarsmen on the galleys.<sup>502</sup> As noted earlier, the payment of the wage mandated by law to the *polistas* rarely, if ever, were made. Aside from the obvious desire of the Spanish officials to enrich themselves, much of this attitude relates to the manner in which the Spaniards saw the indigenous *aliping* class. In his reply to the charges of abuses in the system of *polo* made by the friars, Governor Gomez Perez Dasmariñas wrote to the king in 1592 that:

They (the friars) have urged the same obstacle against me in equipping the galleys with seamen from among the Indians; and say that, in good conscience, this cannot be done; that although such natives otherwise may be the perpetual slaves of their chiefs, while here they are seamen for but three years, at the end of which they are freed . . .<sup>503</sup>

During the first decades of the pacification, the Spanish colonists actively encouraged and participated in the buying and selling of members of the *aliping* class. As noted in the previous section, the colonists at Cebu and Panay petitioned the king for permission to enslave Moors found in the islands. The instructions brought by de la Isla in 1570 prohibited this trade except in cases of Moslems sent from the Ottoman Empire as missionaries. This stipulation led the Spaniards to find Moors everywhere in the islands--a fact pointed out by Father Herrera that same year. The lessons learned from Mexico<sup>504</sup> and the

efforts of the Augustinians against this practice led Philip II to issue the royal *cédula* of November 7, 1573, prohibiting Spanish residents from retaining slaves in any manner. Another *cédula* assigned responsibility for eliminating the practice to the priests in the archipelago. Lavesaris protested these rulings on behalf of the colonists, insisting that the natives had been enslaved in a just war.<sup>505</sup> Despite the *cédulas*, the practice persisted in the islands leading the king to instruct Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa in 1582 to enforce the *cédula* of 1573. In his reply to the king dated June 16, 1582, Ronquillo demonstrates the delays that governors of the islands could create even in the face of direct royal instructions. He states:

This kingdom was thrown into great confusion by a decree in which your Majesty ordered the liberation of all Indian slaves held by Spaniards. This affair has caused me much anxiety, for if it should be . . . put into execution . . . this kingdom would be placed in a sad state for many good and very forcible reasons. . . . I . . . beseech your Majesty that the decree be greatly amended, since this is a very important matter.<sup>506</sup>

Ronquillo decided to delay the execution of the *cédula* until the receipt of a reply to the petition of the colonists requesting the king reconsider the decision.<sup>507</sup> In apparent exasperation, Philip II issued another *cédula* dated August 9, 1589, ordering the emancipation of all slaves in the Philippines. The decree was strengthened by a bull issued by Pope Gregory XIV dated April 18, 1591, which threatened excommunication of those persons refusing to free their slaves.<sup>508</sup> These measures seem to have been successful in eradicating the practice among the Spaniards by the time de Morga wrote his "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas" in 1609.<sup>509</sup>

In contrast, the early attempts among the clergy to abolish the practices of debt peonage among the Filipinos were largely unsuccessful. The complicated nature of kinship ties with the *aliping* class and the desire among the Spaniards to maintain the *principales*, who based status on the number of dependents held, as the conduit of social control over the indigenous populations conspired against its abolition. The policy of the clergy in requiring emancipation of the *aliping* class began to stall evangelical efforts. By 1586, Bishop Salazar wrote to the king admitting defeat on the subject of native servitude.<sup>510</sup> For the next one hundred years the Spaniards would attempt to phase out the institution of debt peonage without undermining the foundations of the native society. Aspects of the practice survived the Spanish colonial period and still exist in many of the islands to this day.<sup>511</sup>

Unrecognized by Salazar and his contemporaries, the institutions introduced by the Spaniards not only conspired against their efforts in opposition to native servitude, but tended to reinforce and encourage the practice. As the institution under which the collection of tribute and the assignment of *polo* was accomplished, the *encomienda* was one of the primary vehicles for bringing about this transformation of Filipino society. Combined with the extortionary nature of collecting the tribute, the *polo* tended to institutionalize and reinforce the system of debt peonage already existing in the indigenous culture. Many members of the *maharlika* class lost status and became *aliping*, creating a native society consisting of rich *principales* and dependent laborers and share-croppers. These dynamics would interact with other significant trends as well--those concerning the growth of the landed estates.

The granting of landed estates proceeded more slowly than the assignment of *encomiendas*. Central to the slow pace of this progress was the way in which the Spaniards viewed the indigenous Filipino social system. The communal type of land ownership practiced by the Filipinos in the *barangays* was not as structured as that in the *fueros* of Spain or the townships of the New World. The Spaniards, however, believing Filipino values to be in agreement with their own, or at least similar to those encountered among the Incas and Aztecs, saw the *datus* as owning outright large tracts of land. This at first prevented the granting of lands to favored Spaniards because of the laws prohibiting the expropriation of native lands. However, as in Spain, lands not obviously owned by the natives or by private individuals belonged to the Crown (*tierras realengas* or *baldíos*). Eventually, the Spaniards, through the introduction a specie based economic system, purchased the land from the *datus* and the class of *principales*.<sup>512</sup> From these two sources the governors were able to make about two hundred small grants of land between the years 1571 and 1626.<sup>513</sup>

There were three types of ordinary grant: *estancias para ganado mayor* (for horned cattle), *estancias para ganado menor* (for sheep), and *caballerías* (as farmland).<sup>514</sup> These grants were made to soldiers, colonial officials, and the religious orders. The full effect of these grants upon the indigenous population was limited to the area immediately surrounding Manila, particularly in the province of Tondo.<sup>515</sup> The acquisition of the landed estates by the religious orders, some by gubernatorial grants and others by donation by other grantees (following the pattern of the home country), increased the

effect on pacification by the friars. The original purpose of these grants was not to pacify the natives but instead to solve the perpetual shortage of provisions experienced by the Spanish population of the *Intramuros* in Manila.<sup>516</sup>

The effect of the 16th century Spanish desire for land as a sign of status created a situation where land speculation in the area around Manila flourished, particularly as the city dwellers of the *Intramuros* accumulated wealth from the Sino-Hispanic trade. Records from the period of the late 16th and early 17th centuries reveal cases where Chinese and Tagalog traders of Manila purchased small and large holdings from *principales* and, in turn, sold them to wealthy Spaniards and the religious orders. The immediate effect upon Tagalog society was drastic. The *datus* and *principales* joined the speculators in the buying and selling of land and many became colonial administrators. As the size of the landed estates grew, displacing the communal barangic lands, the lesser *maharlika* families, already hard pressed by the collection of the tribute by the *encomenderos* and *alcaldes mayores*, as well as the growing *aliping* class were demoted in status and became sharecroppers, unsalaried and salaried farm workers, or wandering laborers called *vagamundos*. This last class became so large that a special category for the payment of tribute had to be established to take them into account in the 17th century.<sup>517</sup>

The transformation engendered by the landed estates must have been subtle for few records of Tagalog protests against conditions on the estates exist. This fact is somewhat mitigated by the obvious lack of understanding of Hispanic legal institutions and procedure by the



Tagalogs, who had no similar institutions. The earliest known case brought against the estates occurred in 1603 when Archbishop Miguel Benevides accused the Jesuits of exploiting the Chinese and Tagalog laborers at their estate at Quiapo. According to the complaint, the farmers had to pay four *reales* and one chicken monthly and to contribute to the Jesuits' duck and chicken eggs weekly. He also asserted that the Tagalogs of Quiapo claimed that the lands had originally been the communal lands of their *barangay* and had been taken from them illegally. In joining the defense, Governor Pedro de Acuña asserted that the estate had been originally granted to several Spaniards by Governor de Sande. They sold the land in 1583 to Diego Vásquez de Mercado who, in turn, donated the land to the Jesuits. The outcome of this case is not known and it could simply represent an internal squabble over native spoils-- the archbishop wanted the natives of Quiapo to work on his cathedral in Manila instead of on the Jesuit lands.<sup>518</sup> However, it does provide an example of the manner in which the indigenous agrarian system was subtly transformed.

As larger and larger numbers of *maharlikas* were reduced to *aliping* status as a result of indebtedness incurred from abuses concerning the tribute and the sale by *principales* of the communal barangic lands, the growth of the landed estates created a demand for labor that found a ready source. When the *principale* sold title to the communal lands of the *barangay* the traditional ties of the individuals to the land were frequently maintained; the Filipinos only vaguely aware of their change in status.<sup>519</sup>

As larger numbers of Filipinos found themselves alienated from the communal lands, the monastic estates promoted a system of labor called *servicios personales particulares* that could be substituted for the *servicios personales reales* or *polo*. Since it denied a portion of the work force to public works, the governors and other royal officials initially opposed the substitution of personal services for the *polo*. However, since work on monasteries and the estates fell into the category of personal services, these institutions could not function without a ready supply of labor. As a result, this concept prevailed. Individuals who provided personal labor to the estates were called *casa de reserva* or *reserva de polo*. The arduous nature of the work on the galleys, in the shipyards, and in log-hauling made the work of a *reserva*, where at least a facade of the traditional lifestyle could be maintained, preferable to that of a *polista*. *Reserva* labor became so desirable that Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, the representative of the Philippines in Madrid, reported that in 1608 entire towns of *reservas* had formed around the estates.<sup>520</sup>

The labor of the *reservas* was organized in a fashion similar to the labor arrangements between the *alipin* and their superiors. In Pampanga and Ilocos the *reservas* were obliged to work four days a week, the other three set aside for rest and working on their own fields. They were also paid half a *reale* each day. The use of *reservas* provided ample opportunity for profiteering by the *cabezas de barangay* and the *gobernadorcillo*, who would sell exemptions to *polo* by placing the names of individuals on the rolls of *reservados*. This created a situation in which only those unable to meet the price of the *gobernadorcillo*, either

from their poverty or refusal to enter into debt peonage, provided *polo*.<sup>521</sup> Undoubtedly, the majority of the wages paid to the *reservas* wound up back in the pockets of the estate owners less a portion retained by the *gobernadorcillos* who used the roll of the *reservados* as a means of exchange.

The growing monastic landed estates represented one aspect of the ecclesiastical administration that operated alongside the civil administration of the islands. As already noted, the traditional conflict between the civil and ecclesiastical officials that began in the New World continued in the Philippines. These conflicts arose over the actions of the *encomenderos* in the collection of the tribute, the treatment of the *polistas*, the expropriation of native food and gold by the soldiers, and the issue of slavery. However, at the heart of the conflict was the inability or unwillingness of the governors to respond to these abuses. The Augustinian Memorandum of 1573 was the first of many documents sent to the king regarding these offenses and sums up this apparent gubernatorial indifference:

Many injuries have been and are still practiced on the Indians by the Spaniards or by the *encomenderos* themselves. . . . Even murders have been committed; and since they live in remote regions and since the aggrieved parties cannot go to plead for justice, or have no one to plead it for them, if it even comes to the ears of the governor, it is not corrected.<sup>522</sup>

The governors and *encomenderos* resented the Augustinian reports and regarded them as an encroachment on their exclusive political authority.

One example of this continual conflict occurred in the year 1574 when Father Martin de Rada, Provincial of the Augustinian Order, in reply to Governor Lavezaris' request for an opinion on the tribute

questioned the belligerent actions of the Spaniards in the islands.<sup>523</sup> In reply to Father Rada's letter, Governor Lavezaris and other officials at Manila wrote a letter to Philip II of Spain in June, 1574, defending themselves. They stated that the conquest of the land could not be unlawful since it was carried out under the king's orders, that the wars and raids against the Filipinos were committed in self-defense, that the tributes were small considering the wealth of the people, and that the collection of tribute was conducted by force only in cases where it was necessary.<sup>524</sup>

Since the church was organized during the first three decades of the colony's existence as a diocese under New Spain, the impact of the religious officials on the governing of the archipelago was limited. This condition changed significantly, however, with the appointment of Monsignor Domingo de Salazar, Dominican prelate, as the first Bishop of Manila in 1579.<sup>525</sup> Salazar had evangelized for forty years in Venezuela, New Spain, and Florida and was a follower of the philosophy of Francisco de Vitoria. Leaving Spain in 1579 and arriving in the Philippines in March 1581, Salazar immediately indicated that he intended to be an activist in the government of the island. He began the building of the Cathedral of Manila and promulgated the rules of discipline to be followed by the religious orders, the secular clergy, and the ecclesiastical chapter.<sup>526</sup> He also called together the prelates from the various orders for the purposes of holding diocesan synods to discuss issues concerning the organization of the Catholic Church in the islands. Four councils were held between 1581 and 1586.<sup>527</sup> The first of these portended the friction that would mark

his term as bishop until his death in 1594. On October 17, 1581, he called the synod to discuss the liberation of Filipino slaves held by the Spaniards.<sup>528</sup>

As Herrera and de Rada before him, Salazar sought through a number of methods to influence the conduct of civil administration in the islands--especially in regard to the *encomienda*--which he saw, quite rightly from a juridical standpoint, as an institution established for the purpose of religious conversion and not economic exploitation. His frequent opposition to the abuses of the *encomenderos* has earned him the title "Las Casas of the Philippines" by many historians of general Philippine history and of the histories of the individual religious orders. However, it should be kept in mind that the bishop also resided in Manila, as did the governor, and that the effect of the confrontations between the Salazar and the governor usually did not extend beyond the walls of the *Intramuros*. That Salazar was an activist who took direct action in protecting the rights of the Filipinos is only now being discovered and the actual impact of these actions on conditions in the countryside worthy of further research.

The tangible results of Salazar's and his predecessors' efforts in the Philippines that can currently be traced were the disestablishment of the proprietary governorship and the imposition of limitations upon the powers of the governor; the establishment, disestablishment, and reestablishment of the *audiencia*; the widespread successful conversion of the Filipinos to Catholicism; and the establishment for the Spaniards of a philosophical justification for the pacification of the islands. These achievements were to influence the

shape of Filipino pacification and development for the remainder of the Hispanic occupation.

The proprietary governorship was introduced into the Philippines with the *asiento* created with the expedition of Legazpi. In light of other agreements made with *conquistadores*, the agreement with Legazpi represented the traditional method the Crown used in sponsoring voyages of exploration and conquest. The typical pattern that followed was the replacement of the *conquistador* with a bureaucratic official trained in the *Siete Partidas* and tasked with representing the interests of the king. With the unpopularity of de Sande brought about by the actions he took against the *encomenderos*, the perfect compromise seemed to have been struck with the offer of Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa, an *alguacil mayor* of New Spain, to undertake the outfitting, at his own expense, of an expedition of 600 colonists to the Philippines. The remoteness of the Philippines in relation to Spain, and its attendant costs, obviously swayed the king to assent to the offer. As a result, an *asiento* was drawn up in 1578 in which the king agreed to make Ronquillo governor for life, the granting of an *encomienda* in each of the principle towns of the colony, the privilege of designating his successor, and the granting of broad latitude in the appointment of colonial officials in exchange for his financing of the expedition.<sup>529</sup>

The nature of the agreement with Ronquillo, while appearing beneficial, especially by saving the royal treasury the expense of sending priests and colonists, had a devastating effect upon the political and social development of the nascent colony. Ronquillo obviously intended to recoup the expenses from his investment. Such

agreements were typical of the ones made with *conquistadores*, however, Spanish military power had already had a foothold on the islands and the Philippines offered little in the way of plunder that would normally be expected to be gained in a *conquista*.<sup>530</sup> The actions taken during Ronquillo's term of office, which lasted until his death in 1583, and that of his nephew Diego (1583-84) exacerbated the already sensitive relationship between the civil and ecclesiastical officials. Many of the most reprehensible abuses recorded by the friars in regard to the colonial officials and the *encomenderos* occur during the administration of Ronquillo, and it is these conditions that Salazar first noted and recorded in great detail for the king upon his arrival.<sup>531</sup> So widespread were the abuses of Ronquillo's administration, that several members of Legazpi's original expedition requested his recall and the establishment of an *audiencia*.<sup>532</sup>

The members of this group dispatched a member from among them, Captain Gabriel de Rivera, to present their complaints directly to the Council and the king in Spain via the Viceroy of New Spain.<sup>533</sup> The proposal for an independent *audiencia* in the Philippines was opposed by the viceroy in New Spain. He replied to Rivera's request in a tribunal to the Council of the Indies that the Philippines should be ruled out of Guadalajara in the same manner as the other islands of the West Indies. Upon his arrival in Spain, Rivera answered the objection of the viceroy by stating that the isolation of the islands alone justified the establishment of a separate *audiencia*. He also pointed out the nearness of the colony to China and Japan and asserted that the colony could profit best in these contacts by dealing directly with the Council of

the Indies rather than through the meddling officials in Mexico that were not educated or knowledgeable about local conditions.<sup>534</sup>

As a result of Rivera's efforts in Spain, and the litany of evidence against Ronquillo received by the Council from the friars, Philip II created the *audiencia* of Manila in May 1583. The tribunal was to be composed of three *oidores* and Santiago de Vera, formerly *alcalde* of Mexico, who was to succeed Ronquillo as governor *ex officio*. De Vera and two members of the *audiencia* reached Manila on May 25, 1584, to the great relief of many of the colonists, not the least of which included Salazar and the other friars.<sup>535</sup> Rivera, as de Sande before him, took immediate action to correct the abuses of the *encomenderos*, dispossessing the worst offenders of their *encomiendas*.<sup>536</sup>

If these measures heartened Bishop Salazar, his joy was short-lived. Since his arrival in the islands, the bishop had stretched his ecclesiastical authority to impose his influence upon the organs of government in Manila. In many cases he directly intervened into the abuses of the *encomenderos*, hauling them into the ecclesiastical court. During the synod of 1581, several *encomenderos* were adjudged guilty of abuses against the Indians during the initial military actions of the pacification and ordered to pay 50,000 pesos in restitution for damages under penalty of not receiving sacramental absolution. The *audiencia* moved against these actions of the bishop, asserting that he had usurped civil prerogatives in the process. In response, Salazar referred such cases to the Inquisition for adjudication. The Inquisition was a powerful weapon, of course, and out of the reach of the *audiencia*.<sup>537</sup>



Contrary to the expectations of its advocates, the *audiencia* engendered strife and contention between the various public officials of the colony who allied themselves with various factions, substituting confusion and infighting for the absolutist rule of the governor.<sup>538</sup> By 1586 the various factions had come to an impasse. De Vera convoked a *junta*, an assembly of all estates, to discuss the measures to be taken concerning the island. The *junta* met on April 20, 1586<sup>539</sup>, and consisted of the *audiencia*, the bishop, the cathedral chapter, the city corporation, representatives from the religious orders, the military, the merchants, and citizens from a number of the provincial towns.<sup>540</sup> Despite the potential hostility among some members of the colony for his opposition to the acts of the *encomenderos*, Bishop Salazar dominated the proceedings and managed to insert several recommendations concerning the reform of the *encomienda*, the payment of tribute, and the treatment of the Filipinos.<sup>541</sup> One of the principle changes recommended in all of the memorials, however, was the disestablishment of the *audiencia*. The memorials were consolidated by the *junta* and Alonso Sánchez, a Jesuit priest, chosen to act as the envoy of the colony to present them to the king.<sup>542</sup>

After considering the memorial of the *junta*, Philip II approved of most of the recommendations. So impressed was the king with Sanchez that he allowed the Jesuit to recommend someone to replace De Vera as governor of the Philippines to carry out the reforms. Sanchez recommended Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas.<sup>543</sup>

The king concurred with the choice of Dasmariñas and issued instructions to the prospective governor that would have a significant

impact on the shape of the colonial administration in the islands. In this document, dated August 9, 1589, the king set the amount of tribute and the apportionment among the Church, treasury and army; the amount of customs duties to be charged; the number of troops to be maintained in the islands; made provision for the payment of salaries, the payment of the debt incurred from the original discovery and conquest of the islands, and for the construction of penitentiaries and hospitals for the Spaniards and natives; recommended the governor and bishop consider establishing refuges for young women and dowries for native women who married Spaniards; ruled that the offices of secretary and notary could no longer be sold; restricted the governor to make land grants only to those who lived in the islands at least three years and would actually make improvements upon the lands granted; cancelled all grants made by previous governors and magistrates to their relatives; made provision for sending additional missionaries, the expenses of the out-going friars to be shared equally by the king and the clergy, the latter providing the funds from their share of the tribute; ruled that slaves held by Spaniards were to be set free, that all natives thereafter born were by right free, and made provision for the freedom of all natives in bondage by non-Spaniards; and abolished the *audiencia* that had been established in 1583, and which had been seen as an ineffective check on the governor, and replaced it with an advisory council.<sup>544</sup>

With the abolition of the *audiencia*, the traditional infighting between the governor and bishop reappeared. Unlike previous conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical authorities, the disagreement between Salazar and Dasmariñas concerned the nature of the relationship between

the civil and the ecclesiastical and the philosophical basis of Spanish sovereignty in the islands.

The disagreement centered on two specific issues. The first about the amount of control over church matters the governor exercised through the *patronato real*. Salazar asserted that the *patronato* was simply a privilege granted to the Spanish Crown by the Pope to aid and protect the Church in its evangelical mission. It conferred upon the state no right to interfere in the appointment, removal, or assignment of diocesan personnel. As an official well versed in Spanish law, Dasmariñas knew this was contrary to the position established during the reign of the Catholic sovereigns. He countered that appointments to vacant benefices and removal from those benefices required the approval of the viceregal patron. Salazar responded to this challenge by making his appointments temporary thereby bypassing the requirements of the *patronato real*.<sup>545</sup> Dasmariñas reported to the king concerning this challenge to the royal authority and the response was swift. In a letter to Dasmariñas dated January 17, 1593, the king instructs the governor no so subtly that the control of the stipend belongs to the civil administration. If the governor does not like the appointments of the bishop, do not pay the them their stipends.<sup>546</sup>

The other controversy concerned the rights of the Filipinos in regard to the payment of tribute. The conquest of the Philippines was influenced by the juridical writings of Francisco de Vitoria, prima professor of theology at the University of Salamanca at the time of his death in 1546. As noted in the last chapter, Vitoria suggested that any one of seven principles might provide Charles V with a clear and just

title to exercising political jurisdiction in the Indies. Bishop Salazar was a student of Vitoria and greatly influenced by his writings. In challenging the nature of Spanish sovereignty in the islands, Salazar attempted to define the conditions under which tribute could be collected. According to Bishop Salazar there are two types of sovereignty--natural and supernatural. The purpose of natural sovereignty--as characterized by Philip II in Spain--is for the king to administer justice and defend subjects. The purpose of supernatural sovereignty is for the Pope to lead men to eternal salvation. Natural sovereignty is acquired as a result of free and voluntary elections on the part of the natives or as a result of a just war. In the Philippines neither condition was met. The supernatural sovereignty of the Pope, however, was conferred by Jesus through St. Peter and his successors. Although the Pope had no secular authority over the infidels he could take secular actions to achieve the spiritual ends of the papacy's supernatural sovereignty. The Alexandrian donation of the New World to the Castilian kings was an act of supernatural sovereignty as long as those monarchs continued the propagation of the Christian faith in those lands. The papal grant did not invalidate the natives' personal, property, and political rights but complemented them.<sup>547</sup>

Bishop Salazar had sent a letter with Sanchez in 1586 for the king. He sharply criticized the laxity of the *encomenderos* in discharging their quasi-missionary responsibilities. He charged them with failing to build chapels, neglecting to instruct their wards in the Christian faith, and withholding the friars' stipend.<sup>548</sup>

One section of the royal instructions of Dasmariñas stated that the new governor was to resolve the tribute controversy "in consultation with the bishop." Salazar interpreted the instructions as meaning the two would jointly solve the issue. Dasmariñas argued that the king had only instructed him to seek the advice of the bishop.<sup>549</sup> The bishop presented Dasmariñas with a memorial in which *encomenderos* were divided into three categories: those in which religious instruction was given; those that had no religious instruction but had peace and justice; and those that lacked religious instruction and peace and justice. *Encomiendas* belonging to the first category could collect tribute, but only from Christian Filipinos<sup>550</sup>; those in the second category should only pay one-half the tribute in small *encomiendas* (less than 300 tributaries) and one-third in large ones<sup>551</sup>; and those in the last category, none at all. If anything in excess of that specified in the memorial was collected, full restitution had to be made to the natives.<sup>552</sup>

To ensure that the memorial was acted upon, the bishop summarized the memorial into twenty-five conclusions<sup>553</sup> and had them read from the cathedral pulpit. Many of the members of the priesthood interpreted the conclusions as a directive and refused the sacrament of penance to anyone who did not obey all of its provisions.<sup>554</sup> Upon hearing about the memorial of the bishop, the *encomenderos* notified the Governor that if the bishop's views prevailed they would as a group return to New Spain. The governor urged the bishop to accept the evils of the *encomienda* system or risk losing the missionary enterprise. The governor and *encomenderos* also pointed out that the converted may resent

paying more than the pagan natives. Salazar replied that the once the people understood the meaning of their conversion they would surrender their goods for baptism. The result of this controversy were the ordinances of 1591.<sup>555</sup>

Dasmariñas sent copies of the conclusions to all of the religious orders in the islands requesting their opinion on them. The Dominicans upheld the bishop, the Franciscans proposed a separate theory, and the Jesuits and Augustinians proposed a compromise that the governor adopted.<sup>556</sup> On February 28, 1591, Governor Dasmariñas issued an ordinance ordering all natives in *encomiendas* where religious instruction was given and Spanish authority established, to pay the full tribute of one peso of ten *reales* whether Christian or non-Christian; that natives in *encomiendas* pacified but lacking religious instruction, to pay the full tribute minus the portion for religious instruction; that natives in unpacified *encomiendas* are to pay no tribute; and that natives assigned to *encomiendas* in a state of revolt were to be compelled to pay whatever token tribute could be collected in order to establish Spanish authority.<sup>557</sup> The *encomenderos* were obliged to deposit two reales per tributary to the treasury. This special fund, the "fourths," was administered by the treasury to finance charitable projects for the natives.<sup>558</sup>

Bishop Salazar refused to accept the revisions of his conclusions. Other conflicts also arose between him and the governor. He now held that armed force could not be used by the Spanish to reduce new territory or to put down rebellion. He refused to grant concessions to the *conquistadores* who had still not made restitution to the

Filipinos. He opposed compulsory native labor, even for wages, and the system of forcing the Filipinos to sell their produce at a fixed price. Finally, he continued to refuse to recognize the *patronato* of the royal officials.<sup>559</sup> He left for Spain in June 1591 to present his case personally to the king accompanied by a Dominican companion, Fray Miguel de Benavides. Despite Salazar's personal pleas to at Court, the king mostly sided with the governor as spelled out in his instructions to Governor Francisco Tello on May 25, 1596. The king rebuked the friars for using their sacramental powers to enforce their views on the tribute and were admonished to refrain from using the pulpit as a place to discuss controversial secular issues.<sup>560</sup>

While in Spain, Salazar rejected the acceptance of the need to collect tribute in order to prepare the natives for conversion. He asserted that Castilian sovereignty must be based upon the supernatural foundations of that sovereignty. Tribute could not be imposed until the Spaniards first provided the natives with religious instruction. After Salazar's death on December 4, 1594, Benavides remained at the Spanish court and persuaded Philip II that one of the principles of Vitoria provided a way out of the impasse; if the natives voluntarily elected the Spanish sovereign as their own he would be their natural sovereign as well as supernatural one and there would be no question concerning the right to levy tribute.<sup>561</sup>

Upon his arrival back in the Philippines as the bishop of the newly created diocese of Nueva Segovia (Cagayan), Benavides handed the governor the *cédula* of February 8, 1597, ordering him to induce the Filipinos in all provinces under Spanish control to render voluntary

submission to Castilian sovereignty. In the Manila provinces, Ilocos, Laguna de Bay, and Pangasinan the *cabezas de barangay* and *principales* were assembled in the presence of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities and elected the Spanish king as their lord and master. This voluntary election was based upon the promise of the Spaniards to render certain services. In these documents the invasion was termed as a liberation. The king promised to render religious instruction, the administration of justice, and protection from enemies (Japanese, Chinese, Moros, and hostile infidels). In the village of Magaldan, on March 21, 1599, the leaders of the province gathered together and swore allegiance to Bishop Benavides as the representative of the Spanish monarch. They also forgave the illicit exactions of tribute in the past. The *datus* of Laguna de Bay asked for a year's delay to think things over but whether they ever did commit themselves is not known. The significance of these election ceremonies were not as farces to ease the conscience of the king but a formula for legitimizing the conquest and for reconciling the Filipinos to the new order of things.<sup>562</sup>

Two other recommendations of Salazar were also adopted by the king that would shape the development of the islands for the next 250 years. The first, executed in 1598, restored the *audiencia* in order to establish balance between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities and the second increased the single Philippine bishopric to four. Manila was established as the archiepiscopal see and Nueva Segovia (Cagayan), Nueva Cáceres (Naga), and Cebu as suffragan dioceses. The petition to accomplish the latter change was submitted to the Pope in June 1595 and approved in August of that same year.<sup>563</sup> The first of these measures,



the reinstatement of the *audiencia*, led to the promulgation of regulations in 1599 concerning civil cases. The *audiencia* ruled that in civil cases involving Filipinos the customary Tagalog laws would apply instead of Roman or canonical law.<sup>564</sup> The last measure represented a recognition that one of the principal Hispanic methods of Hispanization was the spread of Christianity.

The process of conversion of the Filipinos was largely determined by the experiences of the friars and priests in the New World. By the time of the Legazpi expedition to the Philippines, most of the debates regarding the proper procedures for dealing with indigenous religious practices, native rights, and societies had been resolved by the debates of Sepulveda and Las Casas, and the influence of Vitoria. Consequently, the main method established of converting the natives to Christianity was through use of the indigenous language.<sup>565</sup> Combined with the institutionalization of barangic civil law, the Hispanization of the islands took a unique course that combined indigenous elements with the superficial imposition of Hispanic social institutions.

The conditions in the Philippines differed from those found in the New World by the numerous dialects, some similar in only the most rudimentary manner, that existed in the islands. This difference stemmed from the autonomous nature of the barangic social organization and the fact that the Philippines was a political concept imposed by the Spaniards upon a region of 7,000 separate islands. The absence of a lingua franca that could be used to bridge the various dialects together provided the first path of resistance to the conversion of the Filipinos.

During the initial period of pacification the small numbers of friars also militated against the use of Christian conversion as a means of pacification. In 1576 there were only thirteen Augustinian friars in all of the islands. The baptisms they did accomplish normally involved children.<sup>566</sup> The decisive period in conversions occurred between the period 1576 and 1594. During this period the number of missionaries rose from thirteen to 267. The number of conversions also rose during this time, reaching approximately 286,000 by 1594.<sup>567</sup> This number represents approximately 40 percent of the pacified population listed in the census of 1591.

The work of the religious conversion of the Filipinos was through the various religious orders. As noted earlier, the first group of friars were the Augustinians who came with Legazpi and Urdaneta in 1565.<sup>568</sup> The second order to arrive in the islands were the Franciscans.<sup>569</sup> Under the leadership of Fray Pedro de Alfaro, they arrived at Manila on June 24, 1577.<sup>570</sup> The third missionary order to arrive were the Jesuits. They arrived in Manila in September 1581 represented by Frays Antonio Sedeno, Alonso Sanchez, and Brother Nicolas Gallardo.<sup>571</sup> When Don Antonio de Morga arrived in the Philippines in June 1595, he brought with him several Jesuits and an order granting them the exclusive privilege of conducting missions in China and Japan. All other orders were forbidden to pass outside of the islands.<sup>572</sup> The first Dominicans to reach the Philippines, Bishop Domingo de Salazar and a companion, arrived with the Jesuits in March 1581. The first regular Dominican mission of fifteen members, however, did not arrive

until July 1587.<sup>573</sup> The last order, the Augustinian Recollects, did not arrive in the islands until 1606.<sup>574</sup>

To facilitate the conversion of the Philippines the islands were partitioned by the Spanish government among the several orders in 1595.<sup>575</sup> The Augustinians confined themselves to the Ilocos, Pangasinan, Pampanga, and some islands of the Visayas; the Franciscans were confined to the Bicol Peninsula and the regions around Laguna de Bay, such as Laguna, Rizal, Batangas, and Tayabas; the Dominicans to the Cagayan Valley and part of Pangasinan; the Jesuits to Cebu, Leyte, Samar, Bohol, and later Mindanao; and the Recollects to Bataan, Zambales, Mindoro, Madbate, Ticao, Burias, Romblon, Cuyo, Palawan, Negros, and part of Mindanao.<sup>576</sup>

The strategy of the missionaries was to gather the Filipinos together through the process of *reducción* into various *cabaceras* and *poblaciones*. As noted earlier in this section, the *encomienda* was chosen as the main instrument of achieving this goal. However, the concentration of the Hispanic population in the vicinity of Manila eliminated the New World strategy of positioning the native towns around a provincial Spanish settlement that acts as an agent of political control. The missionaries usually found themselves as the only Spaniards in regions encompassing hundreds of square miles. As a result of the disruption to the indigenous barangic relationship to the land that caused many Filipinos to be set adrift, the work of the missionaries in conversion through a system of mission stations became the pattern of religious pacification in the islands.<sup>577</sup>

The narrative describing the work of the Recollect missions to the year 1624 provides an example of the methods used by the priests:

They first reduced those people to a social life and united them, settling quarrels among the families, and forming a goodly village; and, urging their obligation, they built a church and house. They continued to gently insinuate themselves in the natives' hearts and succeeded in reducing them to the bosom of the Catholic church.<sup>578</sup>

The Augustinians founded 385 towns in this manner, the Franciscans 233, the Jesuits ninety-three towns, and the Dominicans ninety towns.<sup>579</sup> The towns (called *pueblos*) were founded on the typical Spanish colonial plan with a church and convent and usually around these were the plaza, government building, and houses of the more prominent residents.<sup>580</sup> However, the process of religious conversion proceeded slowly and was not at the forefront of the transformation of native society. Well into the 18th century, large portions of the islands of Luzon and Cebu had still not been completely pacified.<sup>581</sup>

Instead, the work of the missionaries was one of Hispanic consolidation long after the social and economic effects of the Spanish introduction into the islands had taken place. Three hospitals existed by the time of de Morga--two for Spaniards and one for the natives.<sup>582</sup> Two orphanages were established (of San Andres and Santa Potenciana) in Manila for the shelter of needy women and girls of the city.<sup>583</sup> Most significant was their educational work. The first schools were parochial in nature. These schools taught reading, writing, and music. The missionaries taught trades to the natives and introduced improvements in rice culture, brought maize and cacao from America, developed the cultivation of indigo, coffee, and sugar cane. Tobacco was the only one of the economic plants introduced into the colony

through government policy. The missionaries also introduced the printing press which was first used at Manila in 1593 for the printing of first Tagalog catechism. Soon presses were installed in monasteries by all the orders throughout the islands. As a result engraving was taught to the natives. With the construction of churches and other religious buildings sculpting, silversmithing, and other trades were taught. Musicians, both instrumental and vocal, were needed for the choirs. Women became proficient in embroidery on domestic cloth as well as the cloths brought in from China, such as silk and velvet. Manila during this period was being built of stone buildings and the trades for stone masons were taught.<sup>584</sup>

In 1582, Bishop Salazar promulgated rules for education in the islands: (a) Every city, district, and outlying *barrio* shall have two primary schools--one for boys and one for girls; (b) All children regardless of social or economic standing must attend school; (c) class attendance must be maintained by the schools; (d) in addition to the curate or parish-religious, the learned people of the town will elect those to be instructors and teachers; (e) the salary shall be paid by the relatives of the pupils; (f) poor families shall not be compelled to pay the expenses of the schools but their children must still attend school; (g) the equipment and expenses of instruction shall also be paid by the families of the pupils; (h) the minimum curriculum shall be Christian Doctrine, Reading, Writing of the dialect, Rudiments of Arithmetic, and Good Manners and Right Conduct.<sup>585</sup>

The process of pacification for many parts of the Philippines was an incomplete one. The initial military expeditions served to provide a

foothold for the small Hispanic population against the less technologically advanced cultures of the *barangays*. The agents of pacification were the introduction of an Hispanic system of land use, a specie based economy, and the destructive effects of the tribute collection by the *alcaldes* and *encomenderos*. The Spanish strategy for using the indigenous hierarchy, though ineffective in bringing about the submission of neighboring communities, was effective in bringing about social control within the *barangay* society, particularly as the ranks of the *aliping* class grew. The pattern had been set for the future development of the archipelago.

## NOTES

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243. "Resume of Documents," in Blair & Robertson, The Philippine Islands, Vol. II, 110-111; and Noone, The Islands Saw It, 297-298.

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356. Ibid., 96-97.
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359. Ibid.
360. Ibid.
361. The artillery was manufactured in the Philippines by a Pampangan cannon-maker by the name of Panday Pira. So impressed were the Spaniards by the quality of the cannon manufacture that the Spaniards, after their subsequent successful invasion of Manila and Luzon, made Panday Pira Spain's cannon-manufacturer in the colony. Pira's foundry was moved to Manila in 1590 and remained in the service of Spain until 1805. From Zaide, The Philippines Since Pre-Spanish Times, 180 and note.
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363. Ibid., 104; and Noone, The Islands Saw It, 398.



364. "Royal Communications To and Concerning Legazpi," in Blair & Robertson, The Philippine Islands, Vol. XXXIV, 235-240.
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574. Reed, Colonial Manila, 60.

575. Miguel A. Bernad S.J., The Christianization of the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives (Manila: The Filipiniana Book Guild, 1972), 224.

576. Zaide, The Philippines Since Pre-Spanish Times, 225.

577. Bernad, The Christianization of the Philippines, 224-228.

578. "Early Recollect Missions," in Blair & Robertson, The Philippine Islands, Vol. XXI, 315.

579. Zaide, The Philippines Since Pre-Spanish Times, 228-229.

580. Ibid., 229.

581. For further information on the Igarots see Scott, The Discovery of the Igarots; also Fenner, Cebu Under the Spanish Flag, 61.

582. Benitez, History of the Philippines, 141-142; and Bazaco, The Church in the Philippines, 229.

583. Benitez, History of the Philippines, 142-143.

584. Ibid., 148-152.

585. Bazaco, The Church in the Philippines, 275.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECONSIDERATIONS

Dr. Antonio de Morga, auditor of the *audiencia* of Manila, writing in the year 1609 recounts an incident concerning the galleon San Felipe during a visit of Japan in 1596. An individual by the name of Nagamori Masuda, a member of the Court of the Japanese ruler Hideyoshi, was on board the galleon as it stopped off to deliver missionaries. Curious about the distances the Spaniards had travelled, Masuda asked the pilot of the galleon how Spain had become so powerful. The pilot replied, "first the monks had entered and preached their religion, and the military forces following after them had subjected those countries."<sup>1</sup>

The immediate result of the imprudent remarks of the pilot of the San Felipe were the suppression of the Christian converts in Japan and the eventual loss of trade with that nation. The long-term result of his remarks, however, has been to invite an incorrect interpretation of the processes that worked to bring about pacification among the natives of the New World and Asia. The views of the pilot were certainly representative of the perceptions held by his contemporaries. But the student of history must not forget that the remarks are recorded thirty years after the most recent *conquista* of any considerable scope. It becomes clear that the pilot's remark was simply a vernacular interpretation of recent history. The significance in the remark lies

not in the merits of the assertion, which may be found correct after testing against the available historical evidence, but that the Spaniards believed it to be so and that it was recorded in one of the most important 17th century chronicles about the development of the archipelago.

The idea that the missionaries were the vanguard in the process of pacification, as a prelude to military conquest, is a reoccurring theme in histories of the Americas and the Philippines. However, to persist in this view is to invite a simplistic and incorrect interpretation of the processes that worked to bring about native pacification. One of the conclusions of this study is that neither military action nor evangelical conversion alone were the primary agents responsible for bringing about the reduction of the majority of Filipinos. Instead, this study has demonstrated that the Hispanic process of pacification was an incomplete one and brought about by many subtle processes originating in the interaction of Hispanic and Filipino actions and responses.

To the student of military history, the study of the process that brought about Philippine pacification reveals the cultural conflict that underlies all war. Unencumbered by the minutiae of military battles and campaigns, the study of the societal effects engendered when an action emanating from an alien set of values is unleashed upon a vulnerable society demonstrates in stark terms the psychic undercurrent of physical actions. The selection of the agents of pacification was a synthetic process--emanating from the interaction of Hispanic and Filipino cultures--as opposed to a conscious one. The intermediate effects

resulting from that interaction were unintended and the final state, while achieving Filipino subservience, was not in a form anticipated nor, in some cases, desired. The military practitioners of low intensity conflict in our own time should be aware of the chaotic nature of these forces when prescribing policies that will have an invasive effect upon indigenous values and societal processes.

This study has presented the history of the Filipino pacification using an ethno-historic approach. This approach required the integration of information from political, sociological, historical, economic, philosophical, theological, and other social disciplines. Through this process, it is apparent that societal and cultural institutions and customs within Filipino society contributed to their pacification. In the case of Hispanic society and culture, internal developments combined with external events led them to the New World. The process of the *conquista* in the New World, in turn, transformed Hispanic society and culture, modifying it in subtle ways that determined the form it was to take when introduced into the Philippines. Finally, local conditions in the islands further modified the manner in which Hispanic society and culture functioned in that most distant colony.

The pre-Hispanic Filipino societies were generally kinship-based and bilaterally structured. The method of settlement, the *barangay*, reflected the individualized and subsistence-based agricultural nature of societal relationships. Status was based upon performance in the frequent inter-*barangay* wars, in the number of *aliping* dependents held through the system of debt peonage, and status within the kinship group

based upon generational respect. The religious beliefs in the islands generally possessed animistic-pantheistic characteristics and reflected the complex societal norms that had developed to reduce the incidence of intra-barangic kinship disputes. Ancestor worship, as part of the religious cosmography, reinforced the kinship-based nature of the society. Situated on the periphery of the Eurasian trade routes, small continuous migrations of people from invading cultures and religions allowed the Filipino societies to use the strategy of superficial acceptance and eventual absorption in dealing with external stress.

In contrast, Hispanic society developed in the crucible of the Iberian peninsula. The strategic geographical importance of the peninsula engendered by the Straits of Gibraltar made it a gateway for African or Western European invasion. In its early history the individualism of the Celiberian tribes combined with the statutory and absolutist traditions of Rome. From the period of Romanization, and later under the Goths, social control was maintained through the method of land distribution and the process of urbanization. Internal political and societal fragmentation led to the peninsula's invasion by the Moslems of North Africa and the cultural and agricultural flowering of al-Andalus. The Moslem occupation of the peninsula preserved the competing societal forces of fragmentation and absolutism, and magnified their effects through alternating periods of religious tolerance and intolerance. This internal weakness, as in the case of the Goths before them, would eventually lead to the fall of the Hispanic Moslem kingdom.

In response to the power of al-Andalus, the competing Christian kingdoms of the peninsula developed a militant and evangelical

Catholicism as a counterweight to Islam and combined it with the political objectives of the *Reconquista*. The methods of the *Reconquista* were direct military action, miscegenation and intermarriage with Moslems and Jews, the Roman strategy of urbanization, and the introduction of the *repartimiento* and *encomienda* over the Moslem towns and peasants. The kingdom of Castile became dominant over the other kingdoms of the peninsula during the *Reconquista*. Eventually, the internal fragmentation of Hispanic society led, through the medium of the Inquisition, to the imposition of absolutist monarchical rule that combined the political authority with the militant nature of Hispanic Catholicism. Society became insular and juridical in nature, though fragmentation and individualism continued to flourish on the lowest societal levels.

Though Hispanic artistic and cultural growth became ossified by the combined effects of the Inquisition and the absolutist nature of Castilian politics, the messianic nature of the *Reconquista* and the competition with Portugal for the spice trade led to the accidental discovery of the New World. Psychologically, Hispanic society responded to these discoveries by the construction of juridical and theological proofs. These proofs reconciled Hispanic society to the new concept of the world engendered by the discoveries and provided a justification for its continued existence and expansion in the light of the existence of indigenous native populations that developed independent of Eurasian society and the Judeo-Christian tradition.

On the level of cultural myth, the *conquistador* continued the Hispanic individualist ideal embodied in the tradition of El Cid. The



expeditions that brought about the *conquista* of the New World represented wars of liberation in continuation of the spirit of the *Reconquista* as expressed in the philosophy of Vitoria. On the level of societal necessity, the New World represented an opportunity for individuals to escape the absolutist and determinist nature of Hispanic society on the Iberian peninsula. For the religiously devoted it provided an opportunity to bring about the propagation of Catholicism among the natives of the New World. Throughout the period of Hispanic overseas expansion these two motivations would work in conflict with one another.

In conducting the *conquista* of the New World, the Spaniards applied the methods learned during the *Reconquista*. They also viewed indigenous native societies and political structures within the limits of their own experience among the Moslem territories of Iberia and Northern Africa and the Christian kingdoms of Europe. Consequently, the *conquistadores* tended to seek out fragmentation within native society or ally themselves with competing native tribes. Exploiting the centralized character of Aztec and Inca society, they established a foothold in the Americas by military actions directed against the power elite of the supratribal empires.

After the initial period of military action, political control was maintained through the ruling classes of the indigenous American societies. Social control was brought about, as in the *Reconquista*, by the process of urbanization and the application of the *repartimiento* and *encomienda* systems. These last two systems soon degenerated into systems of slavery as natives were compelled to work on the mines and on

large landed estates, created by the expropriation of native lands, called *latifundio*. Miscegenation and intermarriage was encouraged and a sizeable *mestizo* population developed. The influence of this population in the Hispanization of society became greater as the environmental holocaust wrought by communicable disease and forced labor destroyed some indigenous societies and reduced the indigenous population on the mainland by two-thirds. The Church administration, which operated coincident and in concert with the civil administration, contributed to the process of Hispanization by Christian conversion and urbanization. The exploitation of the New World brought about serious questions regarding Church-State relationships and the treatment of natives. The conflict between the desire for profit on the part of the *conquistadores* and royal officials and for evangelization among the natives by the ecclesiastical officials erupted into opposition and brought about the reform and modification of the worst abuses of the Hispanic colonial societies.

The voyage of Magellan to the Philippines represented the basic flaw in the manner in which Hispanic society approached the indigenous social organization of the Filipinos. The attempt by Magellan to use the *datus* of the *barangays* as the agents of political control led to the failure of his expedition. As a Portuguese soldier of significant experience among the Moslem kingdoms of Asia, he was unable to understand the limited nature of the *datu's* power. Legazpi repeated this mistake but native opposition was not sufficient to cause the failure of his expedition. He also proved to be more circumspect and level-headed than Magellan.

While the emphasis upon the *datus* worked against the Spaniards during the first years of their arrival in the islands, the autonomous nature of the barangic communities worked in their favor. The absorptive nature of Filipino society gave Legazpi and the Spaniards time to establish a foothold in the islands. In addition, the absence of intra-*barangay* cooperation prevented any sort of organized opposition to Hispanic occupation.

The Spaniards attempted to apply the same methods learned in the New World to bring about the pacification and Hispanization of the Philippines. Initial military operations were conducted throughout the islands to bring about their pacification. However, the autonomous nature of the *barangays*, as already noted, worked against the actual reduction of the natives to a subservient state in the true meaning of the word. The Filipinos would allow the superficial imposition of Spanish rule until the time when the soldiers would depart the area and return to Manila to receive royal honors.

The beginnings of pacification can be traced to the extraction of the tribute and the *repartimiento* in commodities. The subsistence agriculture practiced by the natives could not immediately respond to the demands from the Spaniards and dislocations within the barangic communities occurred that resulted in increased debt peonage to the detriment of the *maharlika* class. The unintended consequence of this dislocation was the eventual empowerment of the *datus* and *principales*, who soon increased the numbers of *aliping* under their control. After the Spanish move to Manila, the land sales by the *datus* and *principales* in the region surrounding the *Intramuros* alienated the Tagalog societies

from the traditional barangic communal lands and further swelled the ranks of those reduced to debt peonage.

The imposition of the system of *encomienda* reinforced these changes in Filipino society. Its enforcement of *polo* labor created further dislocations as individuals torn from their *barangays* could no longer devote their labor to the growing of food and contributed to the further spread of debt peonage. The control of trade by the *encomenderos* and *alcaldes mayores*, who purchased limited commodities at low prices and resold them during periods of severe shortage at high prices, also tended to empower the *principales* at the expense of the *maharlikas*. The lack of readily exploitable resources in the islands supported the extortionist nature of the *encomienda*, and the concentration of the Hispanic population within the walls of the *Intramuros* at Manila. Apart from the dislocation on the pattern of land use already noted, the Sino-Hispanic trade centered in Manila destroyed the pre-Hispanic trading relationships between the Chinese and Moslems and the surrounding islands, contributing to their economic stagnation.

Unlike the New World, intermarriage and miscegenation with Filipinas did not produce an influential Hispanicized *mestizo* population in the islands. The small size of the Spanish population and the resistance of the natives to communicable diseases as a result of their continual contact with Eurasian peoples restricted the size of this population. Additionally, the Hispanic strategy of social control through urbanization did not occur because of the related phenomena of the concentration of the Spanish population at Manila and the lack of interest in the development of the *encomiendas*.

The work of the religious in the islands took two forms. The first concerned the traditional antagonism between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities that led to the eventual election of the king as the sovereign of the islands--an act of vassalage that had a significant psychological impact upon the Spanish community in Manila, the officials in Spain, and among the *principales* of Luzon. The second was the evangelical work of the friars in the countryside. The period of the 1580s, a time of great changes in the structure of Filipino society, provided the friars with a fertile environment for Christian conversion. In this way the work of the friars during the first years of the occupation was one that contributed to the consolidation of Hispanic rule and furthered the process of Hispanization.

Significantly, however, a large proportion of the Filipinos had yet to be pacified by the dawn of the 17th century. The abandonment of the countryside by the *encomenderos* left this work to be accomplished solely by the friars over the next 250 years. The system of mission centers resulted in the establishment of towns spatially similar to those created in Spain and in the Americas. The significant difference, however, between these towns from those in Spain and the New World is that the friar acted as both religious and civil official. The concentration of the Spanish population at Manila was soon institutionalized in law and Spaniards were forbidden to travel in the countryside without the permission of the parish priest. In addition, Spaniards could not stay in the districts for more than one night and other restrictions were placed on their movements. As a result, for much of the archipelago, the pacification of the population occurred

slowly and without the disruptive dislocations experienced by the Tagalog and Visayan societies during the 16th and early 17th centuries. No doubt, many disgruntled individuals from the pacified regions of the islands escaped into the interior and joined some of these communities.

In conclusion, the pacification of the islands during the period covered by this thesis was only partially completed. The fragmented nature of the barangic societies presented a situation wholly different from that encountered by the Spaniards in the New World. As a result, the complete pacification of the archipelago was never actually accomplished.

This being said there are many questions that still remain regarding the pacification and subsequent Hispanization of the islands. The absence of widespread revolt during the period of the 1580s is most curious. I have not attempted to cover the Tondo Conspiracy of 1587--an attempt by the *datus* and *principales* of Luzon to overthrow Spanish rule--for various reasons. First, it was confined to those who had benefited most from Spanish occupation. Secondly, once the conspiracy was uncovered it crumbled without conflict of any sort. Finally, there is inadequate information on the nature of the potential rebellion. This is a subject worthy of further investigation.

Questions also exist regarding the actual conditions on the *encomiendas*. Few actual records of management of the *encomiendas* have been brought to light. The actual effect of the friars' efforts to ease the burden of the Filipinos under the *encomiendas* also cannot be determined. Finally, little evidence exists regarding the reaction of the Filipinos to what was happening to them. Physical and spatial

effects can be reconstructed but those concerning the fabric of Filipino society cannot.

Finally, the resistance of Moro society to pacification and Hispanization deserves further study. The answer may simply lie in their spatial separation from Manila. However, the fact that the Spaniards had decided not to pursue a crusade against an intransigent and hostile Moslem population in one of their own colonies is significant and may reveal much about the very nature of the Spanish occupation of the islands.

NOTES

1. de Morga, The Philippine Islands, 79.



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