


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PAN-TURKISM, TURKEY, AND THE MUSLIM PEOPLES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: - A MODERN PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph W. Feneis
United States Army


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
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INTRODUCTION

Now that the Soviet Union has self destructed, the Muslim republics and peoples of the former Soviet Union are of great interest and concern to nations and leaders throughout the world. The Western world hopes to see the nations become democracies supportive of Western ideals of freedom and human rights. The Islamic world rejoices in the freedom of their co-religionists and seeks to guide them to return to the world of Islam. Surrounding nations, including China, India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, seek to gain new markets, insure security and stability in the region, and, in many cases, protection of or association with ethnic relatives.

It is the growing competition of Turkey, Iran and Russia for influence in the region, however, that has drawn the most speculation and interest. At the extremes, pundits forecast the rise of a new Turkish empire or the spread of rabid, Iranian style fundamentalist Islam resulting in a new anti-Western, Iranian led Muslim bloc or the resurgence of an authoritarian, expansionist Russia.¹

A recurring theme in all this speculation is the resurgence of pan-Turkism. In the most extreme form writers envision a new Turkish empire spreading over the lands of the former Soviet Union where peoples of Turkic origin live. Others see a unified Turkestan, corresponding roughly to the territory of the old Turkestan ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) of the formative years of the Soviet Union.

Still others see a Muslim nation, composed of the Muslim peoples of Turkic and Iranian origin, based on a new version of the pan-Islamic dream. There are historical roots for all of these visions. The pan-Turkish movement in particular was a significant obstacle to the Soviet Union's assimilation of czarist territories following the 1917 revolution.

Turkey is a long time friend and ally of the United States. Furthermore, she is a secular, democratic, Islamic nation which has enjoyed great success in Western style development and economic expansion. Since ninety percent of the former Soviet Muslims are of Turkish origin and more than ninety percent of the former Soviet Turkic peoples are Muslim,² Turkey has major interests and influence with the Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union. She can clearly fill a role as a bridge to the newly emerging Muslim nations.

While the newly independent Muslim nations of the former Soviet Union are indeed looking to Turkey for examples of political, economic and cultural development, there is no credible evidence that the Muslim republics are ready to join a new Turkish hegemony. There are far more obstacles to any form of unification than there are bases for a pan-Turkic empire. In the historical context, the last attempt at pan-Turkish activism in Russia failed completely during the days prior to and following the Revolution of 1917, for many of the same reasons that exist today. Any

attempt to build a new Turkish empire, whether economic, cultural, or otherwise, carries inherent great risk for Turkey and possibly for the stability of the region.

This paper will look at pan-Turkism in its historical context in order to gain a better understanding of its applicability and appeal in today's world. We will start with a review of the origins and history of the Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union. We will look in detail at the development of pan-Turkism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its flowering and its ultimate failure. After a brief review of the development of the Muslim republics in the modern era, we will look in further detail at the current state of affairs in the newly independent Muslim nations, and highlight those issues which favor, but primarily mitigate against the realization of the pan-Turkic dream.

GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS

The Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union consist of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In addition, there are Autonomous Republics (ASSRs), Autonomous Provinces (APs), and National Regions (NRs) within the many of the republics of the former Soviet Union which have Muslim populations. The most populous of these are the Tatar ASSR and Bashkir ASSR within the Russian Republic. A list of the Muslim peoples of the

former Soviet Union is at Appendix 1.

In all, there are approximately 54 million Muslim people in former Soviet Union (19.2 per cent of the Soviet population), with 14.39 percent, or 40 million of them located in the six new Muslim nations. 4.8 percent of the Soviet population, or approximately 13.7 million Muslims remain in Russia proper. There are also sizeable Muslim minorities in Georgia and Armenia. In addition, there were 49.5 million Turkic speaking people in the territory of the former Soviet Union in 1989 (91 percent of the Muslim population).³ Turkish Muslim peoples also constitute significant minorities in Iran (8 million), Afghanistan (1.8 million), and China (14 million). The Tajikis are of Iranian descent, and speak a language closely related to the Persian of Iran. There are significant Tajik minorities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. The Muslims of Azerbaijan are Shia, while the vast majority of other Muslims in the former Soviet Union are Sunni.

There are distinct differences in the languages of these peoples. The Tajiks speak Iranian. The Turkic languages fall into three distinct language groupings: "Turki", which includes new and ancient Uyghur, middle Turkic, Chaghatay, vernacular Kyrgyz, and sedentary Uzbek; "Oghuz", which includes Osman or Anatolian Turkish, Azeri Turkish, Turkmen, Gagauz, and Crimean Turkish; and "Kipchak", which includes Kazakh, Karakalpak, Nogay, literary Kyrgyz, nomadic

Uzbek, and Tatar.⁴ Language differences have developed over the centuries to the point where one variation of Turkish is not distinguishable to the speaker of another Turkish variant. A Turkish political leader after a recent visit to Central Asia expressed his disappointment that he needed an interpreter to conduct his business.⁵

The republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan constitute the area known as Central Asia. Many scholars will also include all or part of Kazakhstan in discussions of Central Asia, since the Kazakh people are also Turkish Muslim and the southern part of Kazakhstan was a part of the old Russian colonial administrative district (*guberniia*) of Turkestan. The entire region has also been known historically, even before Russian times, as Turkestan, and can be further divided into West Turkestan, which includes the area we described as Central Asia above, and East Turkestan, which includes the area in China beyond the Tien Shan mountains populated by the Turkic Muslim Uyghurs. Northern Afghanistan has also been included in the descriptions of Turkestan, particularly in the pre-Russian and pre-British era.

Major terrain features include the Caspian Sea, the Aral Sea, the Amu Darya river (Oxus of ancient times), the Syr Darya river (Jaxartes of ancient times), the Qara Qum and Qizil Qum desert regions of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respectively, the Betpak Dala (Plain of Misfortune) clay and salt marsh desert of Kazakhstan, and the

Tien Shan and Altai mountain ranges. The Ferghana valley follows the upper Syr Darya river and cuts across the territory of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The Caucasus mountains are important terrain features in Azerbaijan.⁶

PRE RUSSIAN HISTORY

Turkish tribes are known to have migrated westward as far as the Volga and eastern Europe as early as 451 A.D. One tribe, the Bulgars, roamed the Volga steppes and later moved to the Balkan peninsula, where they gave their name to present day Bulgaria.⁷ Other Turkic tribes roamed the area from Mongolia westward, north of the Syr Darya river and along the plains of the Aral sea. The area from the banks of the Syr Darya river westward to the borders of Iran was primarily occupied by nomadic relatives of the sedentary Persians up to the eighth century, when Iran came under attack by Arabs from the west and the Turkish tribes from the east. Eventually the Turks and the Arabs clashed throughout Turkestan. The Arab migration finally stopped in 751 A.D. at the Talas river, where they defeated a Chinese army and then withdrew to western Turkestan.⁸ By the tenth century the Persians had regained control of Arab occupied lands, to include western Turkestan, only to be driven out by Turkish tribes in 999 A.D. Turkish tribes continued to grow in strength and eventually one tribe, the Seljuks, defeated Persians and pushed through northern Iran and into Anatolia. These were the founders of the Seljuk empire, later

succeeded by one of their subject Turkic tribes, the Ottomans.⁹

In the thirteenth century the great Mongol warlord Ghengiz Khan conquered and recruited large numbers of Turkic tribes and began his conquest of an empire that extended from China to the banks of the Volga. Upon Ghengiz' death, his lands were split between his grandson Batu, and his three remaining sons. Batu inherited the lands west of the Syr Darya river, across the Urals and beyond the Volga. His people came to be called the Golden Horde, and Batu eventually extended his dominion all the way to the Crimean peninsula. Chaghatai inherited the lands of Transoxiana (the area between the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers and also known as Mawarannahr) and lands southeastward to include the territories of the Ferghana valley, Semirechie and Singkang. Ugedei inherited the original lands of the Mongols and Tului received territories in China.¹⁰

The Golden Horde would eventually split into the Golden and White Hordes. The White Horde formed the basis of the Kazakh peoples, later splitting into the Nogai and Uzbek Hordes. Chaghatay's peoples split into the khanates of Mawarannahr and the newly formed Mughulistan (the regions of Ili, Semirechie, and eastern Turkestan).¹¹

In 1369, Timur (Tamarlane), a Chaghatai descended district governor in

Mawarannahar, seized power and went on to conquer a great empire that included the southern Kazakh steppe up to the Volga river and Mughulistan (1370), Persia and the Caucasus (1390), northern India (1398), and Syria and eastern Anatolia, where he defeated the Ottomans in 1402.¹² Timur's descendants did not retain his vast empire, but they did remain in power in Samarkand and ruled large parts of Turkestan until the beginning of the sixteenth century.¹³

Timur's defeat of Tokhtamish at Berke in 1395 marked the end of Mongol rule in Central Asia and caused the breakup of the Golden and White Hordes.¹⁴ By this time, however, most of the Mongol leaders, including Timur, had been assimilated into the Turkish tribes they ruled, so that their Mongol lineage was only a matter of proud family heritage.¹⁵ The breakup of the Golden and White Hordes spawned the creation of the Nogai and Uzbek khanates in Central Asia.

The Nogai horde consisted of the tribes in the Ural/Volga area. They and other descendants of the Golden Horde in the Volga region would come to be known as Tatars. The Nogai Horde eventually split into the Kazan, Astrakhan, Nogai and Crimean khanates.¹⁶ The Uzbeks eventually occupied the area from the headwaters of the Syr Darya to the Aral Sea (displacing the Timurid dynasty) and north to the Irtysh river. The name Uzbek came to be applied to all of the tribes who roamed present day Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.¹⁷ Timur's descendent Babur, the last ruler

of the Chaghatai realm, fought the onslaught of the Uzbeks, but eventually left the area to conquer northern India and found the Moghul empire which lasted until British times.¹⁸

Within the Uzbek khanate, however, rivalries continued between descendants and supporters of the Timurids and the Uzbeks. The tribes who ruled in the Syr Darya basin and Mawarannahr came to be known as the Uzbeks, and their northern rivals formed the Kazakh khanate. By 1513, the Kazakhs had been formed as a people under the Kazakh khanate of Qasim Khan, and they became a people distinct from the Uzbeks, even though they shared a common language and heritage.¹⁹

The Tajiks, who are most common to Tajikistan, are most probably descendants of the Persians who displaced the Soghdians during the Arab conquest of Persia in the seventh and eighth centuries. The Soghdians were traders who handled the silk trade along a long, narrow belt of Asia that carried the silk trade from China to Rome. When the Persian/Tajiks displaced the Soghdians, they settled in their present area and in many of the cities of southern Central Asia. Although much of this territory was conquered by Turkish tribes, the comparatively nomadic Turks did not displace the Tajiks.²⁰

Central Asia remained under the control of various Turkish rulers, most notably

the Seljuks and later the Khorezm Shahs, until the arrival of the Mongol/Turkish conquerors of Ghengiz Khan in the thirteenth century. The influence of Iranian culture remained strong, particularly in the cities. Although the Uzbeks conquered and drove out the ruling descendants of Chaghatay and Timur, the peoples merged and the language and culture of the area remained that of Chaghatay and his descendants, a blend of Turkish, Iranian, and Arabic cultures. The great cities of Central Asia (Samarkand, Bukhara, Kokand, Tashkent, Khiva) became centers of learning, culture, trade and religion.²¹ The scholar Avicenna of Bukhara wrote a medical textbook in the 10th century that was still in use centuries later. Al-Khorezmi is reputed to be the inventor of algebra in the ninth century.²² The atmosphere of the cities was cosmopolitan; the intellectuals and many of the rulers spoke and wrote in either Persian or Arabic, yet the majority of the peoples of the region were Turkish and the Chaghatai dialect of Turkish was the most common spoken language. This cosmopolitan atmosphere survived the conquests of the Mongols under Ghengiz Khan and the later conquests of Timur. Indeed, the reign of Timur is known for the flowering of Islamic culture and art.²³

By the end of the fifteenth century the great migrations of the Turkic and Iranian peoples in Central Asia, Anatolia, the Caucasus, and the Volga/Ural regions had largely ceased. There would still be much fighting and territorial incursions, both by the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks, as well as invasions of Mongol tribes, but the disposition

of these peoples today closely matches what it was then. The Kyrghyz took slightly longer to settle, not reaching their present location until the end of the sixteenth century, with some tribes coming in as late as the early seventeenth century.²⁴

By the end of the seventeenth century, the great Khanates of Mawannawahar and Mugulistan had disintegrated and the area divided into the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Kokand and Khiva (Khorezem). To the west of the Amu Darya river, the Turkmen tribes, descendants of the Oghuz family of tribes that spawned the Seljuks and Ottomans, continued their nomadic existence in a largely unstructured and ungoverned manner.²⁵

Central Asia's early development and civilization was strongly related to its role in the trade of spices and exotic materials between eastern and western worlds. The area was criss-crossed by great caravan routes running east-west and north-south. By the sixteenth century, however, the Western world had discovered maritime routes to bypass the slow and expensive caravan routes, and Central Asia entered a period of economic and cultural stagnation which lasted into this century. This stagnation was further accentuated by the conversion of the Persians to Shia Islam under the Saffavid rulers of the sixteenth century, in effect cutting Central Asia off from the rest of the Islamic world. Bukhara and other Central Asian cities continued to be renowned in the Islamic world for their centers of Islamic learning, but this was now a very

conservative and unprogressive Islam, frozen in the past.²⁶

RUSSIAN CONTACT

Russian relations with the Muslim peoples of her territory were heavily influenced by the experience with the Tatars. At one time the descendants of the Golden Horde ruled large parts of what is today Slavic Russia. The Tatars and the Slavic tribes fought each other regularly, made slaves of each other, and tried to convert the peoples they subjugated to Islam or Christianity.²⁷ Eventually, the Russians gained the upper hand. Bennigsen refers to the theory of "the Tatar yoke" which credits the Tatar-Russian relationship with the Russian predilection for cultural backwardness, despotism, and servility. In any event, Russians had a great respect for the military and political superiority of the Tatars, and an abiding sense of inferiority in relation to the them.²⁸

In 1552, Russians conquered the Tatar khanate of Kazan and began 360 years of expansion and conquest of empire. By 1556 they had conquered the Astrakhan khanate and the remainder of the Tatar territory in the Volga region, to include the relatively weak remnants of the Nogai khanate.²⁹

Although the Russians conquered the Tatars, relations between the two peoples remained strained, and often violent, into this century. Russian pressure on the culture and religion went through several periods of lesser and greater persecution over the centuries. There were periods of relaxation in the late seventeenth century and again in the late 1730's. Under Peter the Great and his successors, attempts at Christianization and Russification intensified, resulting in the Tatars rebelling in 1755 as part of the Pugachev rebellion. By 1766 Catherine II began a series of actions to relax pressure on Tatar religion and culture, and to include them in the administrative and military efforts of her empire. Catherine's liberalization lasted until the late nineteenth century, by which time Tatar merchants, officials, soldiers and administrators rose to success and prominence throughout the empire. This led further to the Tatar "renaissance" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³⁰

While the Russians were engaging the Tatars and colonizing their lands, the Kazakhs were coalescing as a people and the Kazakh khanate was formed. Sometime during the early sixteenth century, the Kazakhs split administratively into three hordes, the Great, Middle, and Small Hordes. As nomads, the Kazakhs constantly roamed and acquired new territory. By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, they occupied most of present day Kazakhstan. The division of the people into Hordes probably related to the land they occupied, with the Small Horde in the west, the Middle Horde in central Kazakhstan, and the Great Horde in the east, including the

rich Semirechie region.³¹ During the seventeenth and eighteenth century the Russians expanded eastward into the great Siberian steppe and did not attempt to conquer the territory of the Kazakhs. Contact was limited to the edges of the steppe, frequent trade missions, and emissaries exchanged between the various khans and the Russian court.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Kazakhs faced invasion by the Mongol Kalmyks from Mongolia and China. The Kalmyks made major conquests of Kazakh territory, causing many of the Kazakh khans to seek help from Russia. The Russians, however, maintained neutrality until 1731, when the Kalmyks began to threaten Russian interests and territory. The Russians made treaties with the leaders of the Kazakh Small and Middle Hordes, extending protection and essentially bringing them into the Russian empire. They did not initially try to occupy, administer, or tax the territory, however. They maintained their rule through the Kazakh khans, who frequently turned on their Russian protectors to raid trade caravans or use Russian pasture land for their herds. In the mid-eighteenth century the rise of the Ching dynasty caused most of the Kalymks to abandon their conquered lands in Kazakhstan and return to their homelands in western China. The Great Horde for a time came under Kalymk rule, later under Chinese rule, and later still regained independence.³²

The Russians, meanwhile, had extended a string of fortifications to defend the trade routes and extend their influence in the lands of the Small and Middle Hordes. This string of fortifications is often referred to as the Orenberg line, and extended from Uralsk on the Ural river in the west to Semipalatinsk on the Irtysh river in the east.³³ From this line they defended their territory against the forays of the Kazakhs of the Great Horde and raids by tribes from China and Central Asia. Eventually, the Russians extended their control to a second line of fortifications, which marked their conquest of the Great Horde, and set a new frontier with Central Asia. This line extended from the north of the Aral Sea in the west to Verny (Alma Ata) in the east. The stage was set for the final conquest of Central Asia.

CENTRAL ASIAN CONQUEST

Central Asian contact with the growing Russian empire was mostly limited to diplomatic and trade activities until the eighteenth century. Central Asians and Russians traded everything from textiles to slaves. Until the late nineteenth century, the balance of trade was in favor of the Central Asians. Both the Russians and Central Asians raided each other's territories frequently, but these were not serious military actions. Cossack invaders were initially successful in 1603, but later were annihilated by the Khivan khan. In 1717 Peter the Great sent a 3,500 man force to establish a fort on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea in Khivan territory, but this

force too was soundly defeated. As the Russians conquered the Kazakhs and extended their line of fortifications, contact and conflict with the Central Asian Khanates became more frequent, and Russian encroachment more successful.

The Central Asian Khans supported the Kazakhs in their fight against the Russian expansion, which only caused the Russians to become more determined to control the Central Asians. In 1830-40, another Russian invasion force met disaster in Khiva. The Russians completed their second line of fortifications across the southern plains by 1847, and prepared to take on the Central Asian Khanates directly. During this period, the khanate of Khiva was declining in power, while the khanate of Kokand was expanding. Beginning in 1850, Russia and Kokand began a series of direct conflicts. In 1865 the Russian conquest of Tashkent effectively marked the defeat of Kokand, although a series of military and diplomatic actions would go on until 1876. The Russians also turned against the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva, defeating them and bringing them under Russian control. In 1876, the Russians abolished the khanate of Kokand and incorporated its territory. Bukhara and Khiva were allowed to stand as autonomous entities which would survive into the Soviet era, but they had effectively become vassal states of the Russian empire by 1876. On the western side, Russian military expeditions against the Turkmens moved ever southward, culminating in the battle of Gok Tepe in 1881, and the final submission of the Mari Turkmen chieftains in 1884.

The British, expanding their own empire during this same time frame, were not happy with the Russian successes. In 1887 the two empires agreed on a border that extended westward from the headwaters of the Amu Darya river to Persian Khorosan on the Caspian Sea. In 1895, the two empires further agreed on a line of delimitation across the Pamirs eastward to China. This agreement marked the end of Russian expansion in Central Asia and the acquisition of a vast new empire.³⁴

CRIMEAN AND AZERBAIJANI CONQUESTS

On the other side of the Caspian Sea, the Russian drive across the Caucasus to the Crimean peninsula again put them in conflict with Turkish Muslim peoples. The Crimea, after being conquered by the Batu Khan and the Golden Horde in the thirteenth century, became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire in 1478. In 1774 the Russians separated the Crimea from Ottoman control and in 1783 the Crimea was officially attached to the Russian empire. The Crimea was subsequently the scene two bloody wars between Russia and the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century. As a result, the Russians, from the beginning of their control of the peninsula, persecuted the Crimean Tatars, resettling many of them from the coastal areas and causing hundreds of thousands to emigrate. Nevertheless, the Crimea produced many of the great leaders and ideas of the Tatar renaissance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³⁵

In the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, Russian expansion began with Ivan the Terrible's contacts with the Karabindians in the sixteenth century. The Georgian and Armenian peoples have had kingdoms which date back many centuries. The mountain people have aggressively maintained their independence or at least autonomy from all aggressors. The region has alternately been ruled by the Persians, Russians, Turks, and Arabs. Azerbaijan had been under Persian influence for centuries. Peter the Great conquered Baku and Derbent in Azerbaijan in 1723, but the area was soon lost again to the Persians.³⁶ It was not until 1813 that Russia regained control of Azerbaijan, and 1826 she conquered western Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan.³⁷

RUSSIAN RULE AND ASSIMILATION

The Russians governed and treated their Muslim subjects differently depending on their location. The Tatars were located within the boundaries of Russia itself, so a much greater effort was made to assimilate them. The Kazakhs were split between the *guberniia* of the Steppe in the north and Turkestan in the south. The Kazakhs were not required to serve in the Russian military, and the Russian attitude toward them was to rule, but not assimilate. They did, however, create a class of sultan-administrators which caused severe disruption to the Kazakh way of life and eventually led to rebellions and reforms in the late 1850s. Russians were also less tolerant of Islam in Kazakhstan than southern Central Asia, despite the fact that

Catherine II had once sent Tatar missionaries to convert the Kazakhs to Islam. The rich lands of northern Kazakhstan quickly became subjected to large scale in migration of European settlers who displaced and disrupted the Kazakh nomadic lifestyle.³⁸

In southern Central Asia, the Russians were content to allow the local governing and religious structures to continue. No attempts to convert the natives were made. Administratively, Central Asia came under the Turkestan *guberniia*. The emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva remained as separate entities, although they had very little freedom of action beyond what the Russian administrators allowed. Officially, they were protectorates of the Russian empire. Like the Kazakhs, Central Asians were not required to serve in the military.³⁹

In Azerbaijan, the discovery of oil quickly led to expansion of Russian influence. Baku became a very cosmopolitan city, and it was not until 1960 that Azeris would again be the majority people in their own capital city. The oil industry was dominated by Russians and Armenians, causing further strains in relations with the local population. Azerbaijan had been dominated by the Persians for centuries. Persian remained the language of government, even under Russian control, until 1840. As a means of lessening Persian influence, the Russians encouraged the development of local Turkish culture and language. Persian remained the language of the courts and the upper classes until the 1870's and beyond. The Azeri reaction to the Persian

influence did lead, however, to Azeri participation in the Tatar and pan-Turkic renaissance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many of the leaders of that movement came from Azerbaijan.⁴⁰

PAN-TURKISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM

Several pan-ism movements developed in the late 19th century, including pan-Slavism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. In the mid-nineteenth century, Jemal al din Afghani created the intellectual climate for the foundation of the pan-Islamic movement, which would in turn lead to the development of pan-Turkism and the *Jadid* movement in Russia. Afghani preached a return to the basics of Islam free from superstition and vulgar popular beliefs. He called for a unity of spirit of Muslims throughout the world, and educational reforms which would allow Muslims to enter the modern age without losing the basic precepts of Islam⁴¹. Afghani's teachings became popular with the modernist movement in Turkey and Tatar intellectuals in Russia. In Ottoman Turkey, the call for Islamic unity was especially appealing to Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who saw it as a means of extending and justifying his empire.⁴²

At about the same time in Russia, the foundation for reform of the Islamic school system and modernization of Islamic thought was laid by Shihabeddin Merjani,

a Volga Tatar theologian. At that time, all Muslim schools were based on the Bukharan model, a very formal system dating to medieval times, which was very conservative and very limiting. Merjani believed that every Muslim should be able to interpret the Koran for himself, and he also wanted to include modern and secular subjects in the curriculum so that Muslims could take part in the intellectual and cultural life around them, including Russian language and Western culture. Merjani founded a school to teach according to his beliefs and gave birth to the Tatar involvement in the political, cultural and economic affairs in modern Russia.⁴³

Afghani's Pan-Islamism and the liberalization of the Tatar intellectual circles caused by Merjani's teachings inspired the great Tatar proponent of Islamic/Turkish unity, Ismael Bey Gasprinski. Gasprinski had earlier been exposed to pan-Slavic ideas in Moscow and the Young Ottoman movement in Turkey. He developed his own philosophy of unity of mind, language and action of all of the Muslim Turkic peoples of Russia. Although his philosophy was rooted in the unity of Muslim people his emphasis on unity of language in effect created the basis for the pan-Turkic movement. He spread his ideas through his very influential newspaper, *Terjuman*, which was written in Ottoman Turkish. Although the language was understandable only to the Crimean Tatars, Azerbaijanis, and some intellectuals in the remaining parts of Turkic Russia, the newspaper had tremendous influence. Its word was spread widely by the Tatars who were the merchants and travellers of Central Asia and the Kazakh steppe. Gasprinsky believed in education as the main weapon of preservation

of Muslim society, national rebirth and Turkish-Muslim unification. He founded a reformed school to teach according to the "new methods" (*usul jadid*) where he introduced secular subjects and a reformed Arabic alphabet. His methods became widely copied throughout Muslim Russia and even reached India, Persia and China. *Jadid* became a term used to describe the reforms and the reformers themselves. *Jadids* would have a tremendous influence on Russian Muslim participation in the political and cultural upheavals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴⁴

The first call for political unification of the Turkish peoples of Russia and the Ottoman empire came in 1904 from a Yusuf Akchurin, a Tatar journalist. Akchurin thought that the pan-Islamic ideals of Afghani and Gasprinski had become outmoded in an era of secularization of Muslim lands. This new doctrine, which came to be called Turkism, or pan-Turkism, was clearly dangerous to the continued existence of the Russian empire, and it placed its adherents directly in opposition to the Russian political system. Akchurin believed, however, that such unification could be achieved as a result of a coalition of powers hostile to the czarist empire.⁴⁵ As a direct challenge to Russian rule, the doctrine of pan-Turkism was to have deep and lasting effect not only on the Turkic peoples it appealed to, but also on the czarist and Soviet attitudes toward the pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements of the early twentieth century. Russian and Soviet rulers saw the movement as hostile to their continued power, and necessarily did all they could to stamp out its influence.

In Russia and Central Asia, however, pan-Turkism was less important than the identification with Islam by the Turkic peoples. At that time, ninety percent of the Turkic peoples in Russia/Central Asia were Muslim and ninety per cent of the Muslim peoples were Turkic. Turkic peoples were more apt to identify themselves first as Muslim than as Turkish or Uzbek etc. While the vast majority of the peoples were Turkish, by that time the languages of the region devolved to the point where a native of eastern Turkestan could not understand the Turkish of a Crimean Tatar or an Ottoman Turk. As a result, the pan-Turkish movement in the new Soviet Union was much more identifiable as a Muslim movement, and the organizations of Muslim Turks in 1905 and in 1917 were called All Muslim conferences as opposed to all Turkish congresses.

In Central Asia, the conservative Islamic tradition caused further conflict in the pan-Turkic movement. The *Jadid* movement had no appeal for the very conservative rulers and religious leaders of the region. The presence of Tatar businessmen and administrators did cause intellectual stirring, and the adoption of *Jadidism* by many of the young peoples of the area, but the Central Asians were not major players in the intellectual and cultural developments that spawned the *Jadid* and pan-Turkic movements. These opponents came to be known as the Kadimists, supporters of the "old methods" (Usul Kadim). Nevertheless, *Jadids* would play a role in the overthrow of the khans of Khiva and Bukhara during the revolution of 1917-1918.⁴⁶

The Tatar and Azeri led *Jadids* were enthusiastic participants in the political struggles of the early twentieth century in Russia. Indeed, many of the *Jadids* felt a stronger pull to the Social Revolutionaries and Kadets than they did to the pan-Turkic movement. Between 1905 and 1907, three all Muslim conferences were held, although the attendance was dominated by the Tatars and Azerbaijanis. Muslim leaders also served as members of the central committee of the Kadets, and Muslims were represented in the Duma. Czarist reactions later caused Muslim representation to decrease significantly so that by the fourth Duma in only six Muslim delegates were allowed, and none from Central Asia.⁴⁷

As the Russian government clamped down on the activities of the Turkish nationalists and the pan-Turkists, and limited their access to the Duma, many of the more radical leaders of the movement emigrated to Ottoman Turkey to continue their activities. In 1908, the Young Turks' coup placed them in power in Constantinople. These new leaders rejected the pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and instead adopted an ideology which called for the unification of all the empire's nationalities under the Ottoman dynasty. The Young Turks were much more receptive to the pan-Turkish ideals of the Russian emigres, and many of them came to accept the pan-Turkish philosophy. Officially, however, their doctrine was still that all of the peoples and nationalities were equal, a doctrine sometimes called Ottomanism and anathema to conservative Muslims. Zia Gek Alp, an ardent Turkish nationalist, took

up the cause of pan-Turkism and became a very influential voice of the movement.⁴⁸

Back in Russia, meanwhile, many of the Turkish leaders, particularly the Tatars and Azerbaijanis continued to work within the Russian system. Although they supported many of the ideas of the pan-Turkists, they maintained that their first national loyalty lay with Russia. This allowed the gradual development of mutual understanding. In the last decade of imperial Russian rule, civil rights of Muslim Tatars were nearly equal to those of Slavic Russians, Muslim schools were growing and prospering under the *Jadid* modernization movement, and Tatar relations with Russians were marked by an absence of racial prejudice. A Muslim Azeri general commanded the elite Guard Cavalry Corps of Nicholas II and a Tatar commanded the Second West Siberian Corps during the Russo-Japanese war.⁴⁹

This felicitous relationship did not extend to the Kazakhs or the Central Asians, however. There Russians continued to immigrate, taking over Kazakh lands and spreading the cotton monoculture in Central Asia. There was a clear social divide between the governing Russians and the local population.

WAR AND REVOLUTION

Russia's entry into World War I caused some moral dilemmas for the Muslims of Russia, particularly when Turkey entered the war against Russia. Most Tatars and Azerbaijanis strongly supported their Russian homeland, and even many Kazakhs and Central Asians initially supported the Russian effort. Their way was made easier by Muslim leaders who ruled that the Turkey's actions were being driven by a handful of leaders under the influence of Germany, and that Muslims were required to defend their co-religionists only in matters of faith, not politics. Therefore, the Turkish Muslims of Russia were under no obligation to defend their brother Turks or the Sultan Caliph.⁵⁰

In Constantinople, meanwhile, the emigre Russian pan-Turkists were making common cause with the Ottoman empire. Through their Committee for the Defense of Muslim Rights, they agitated for Turkish declaration of war against Russia, supported the war effort, and carried their political and propaganda campaign to central Europe. During the war, they recruited an anti-Russian military unit from the Tatar prisoners of war in Austria and Germany, although with limited success. Their attempts to foment Muslim rebellion in Russia were generally unsuccessful, and sharply rebuffed by the Muslim representatives in the Duma.⁵¹

In Kazakhstan and Turkestan (Central Asia) the reaction to the war was largely one of indifference. Although bothered by the regime's opposition to the Turkish

caliph, the Muslim peoples did not directly oppose the war. The costs of supporting the war, however, quickly caused increases in dissatisfaction. The Russians continued to appropriate the land of the nomads in north Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Natives and settlers continued to clash. In Kazakhstan, the Russians cleared whole areas of natives, turning over the fertile lands to Russian settlers to farm, while the Kazakhs were banished to the more barren regions to tend their flocks. The demands of the war effort also caused a significant increase in taxes and depletion of herds.⁵²

When the czar changed previous policy in 1916 and authorized the conscription of Kazakh and Central Asian peoples into the military, they revolted. Organized resistance initially began in Samarkand and Tashkent, but quickly spread to Kazakhstan, where the revolt became large scale. At one point more than 30,000 rebels actively fought against the czarist forces attempting to enforce the conscription laws. The revolt was eventually put down by czarist troops, but not before there had been large scale attacks on Russian settlers. As many as 500,000 Kazakhs and Kyrgyz trekked eastward to China to avoid conscription and the aftermath of the revolt. Many of these migrants died enroute, and even more died when, after the inhospitable reception by the Chinese, they headed back. When they did get back, they found that even more of their lands had been confiscated by the Russians. Thereafter, Kazakhs and Central Asian conscripts served in czarist labor battalions, but local rebellions and active resistance continued throughout the region.⁵³

"The February Revolution reached Turkestan by cable,"⁵⁴ is a view expressed by many of the historians of the revolution in Central Asia, and it applies to the revolution in Azerbaijan as well. Although the Tatars had a very active representation in the revolutionary movement of the times, the Muslims of Central Asia were indifferent to the administration in Russia, since all Russians were seen as conquerors and colonialists. The revolution only reinforced this view, as the first seeds of revolution and overthrow of the existing governmental structures came from Russian workers along the rail line and Russian enclaves in the cities. The Russian governor of the Turkestan guberniia, General Kuropatkin, simply declared himself a representative of the new Provisional government, and made an agreement with the Russian led Tashkent soviet to form an alliance against native uprisings. It was not until May, 1917 that the majority of the old colonial administrators had been replaced by the representatives of the revolutionary groups, and even these were predominantly Russian.⁵⁵

Bolsheviks took power in Tashkent in October, 1917, one week before the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd. The new Soviet's treatment of its native Muslim population, however, was no better than that of its Social Revolutionary or Czarist predecessors. The Soviet passed a resolution which banned Muslims from governmental posts.⁵⁶ Muslim leaders of the region reacted by calling a number of all Muslim congresses. At the fourth Congress, meeting in Kokand in late November

and early December 1917, the delegates proclaimed the autonomy of southern Central Asia, elected a council (two-thirds Muslim, one-third Russian), and formed the Government of Autonomous Turkestan.⁵⁷ The Muslim Congress appealed to the Bolshevik government in Moscow for help in controlling the excesses of the Tashkent soviet, but received a reply, drafted by Stalin, which in effect said that if the local population did not like the actions of the local soviet, they should themselves overthrow it rather than appealing to the central government for help.⁵⁸ The Kokand government had no troops and very little money. It did succeed in making contact with the Alash Orda government in Kazakhstan, and intermittently conducted negotiations with the rebel Cossack leader Ataman Dutov.⁵⁹ The Tashkent Soviet, reacting slowly at first, later sent military forces to sack Kokand in February, 1918. The destruction of the city marked the end of the Kokand Autonomous Government of Turkestan, but it also sparked the beginning of the popular revolt which came to be known as the Basmachi movement.⁶⁰

In Kazakhstan, the support of the natives for the provisional government was initially much stronger. Local leaders established a national party, the Alash Orda, which then sent representatives to the Provisional Government. Alash Orda gradually moved from support of the Provisional Government to a position of independence for Kazakhstan, and when the October revolution came, the Alash Orda formed an autonomous government which sided with the Whites in fighting against the

Bolsheviks and remained viable governing body until its military defeat in November, 1919.⁶¹ The battle for independence was hampered by the widespread famine and devastation of the countryside as well as strained relations with the White Russian leaders. Indeed, just before the final defeat of the Whites and the Alash Orda, the White leader, Admiral Kolchak, had demanded that the Kazakh autonomous government be abolished and the Kazakh leaders submit to Russian leadership. These demands made it easier for the defeated leaders of the Alash Orda to make peace with the Bolsheviks and try to gain some influence for their peoples in the new Soviet government.⁶²

Events in Central Asia during this period were essentially happening independent of control by Lenin, Stalin and the Bolshevik government in Moscow because Central Asia had been split off from the rest of the revolution by the civil war. The Cossack and White Russian opponents to the new Bolshevik government essentially fought many of their battles between Central Asia and Russia proper. The passage of the Czecho-Slovak legions through the area and the formation of Admiral Kolchak's armies in the east further accentuated the isolation of Central Asia. Thus the Tashkent soviet, and its later version, the Turkestan Soviet Federal Republic, were able to act in ways that conflicted with the Leninist principles of inclusion of national peoples in the government, and with a greater degree of autonomy from the central government than the Bolsheviks had envisioned. It was not until the fall of 1919 that

the Red Army was able to overcome the rebellious forces and reestablish contact with Central Asia.⁶³

The greatest challenge to the power and legitimacy of the Tashkent government after the defeat of the Kokand rebels came in the Transcaspian district. Here a combination of local Muslims and Russian workers rebelled against Bolshevik control, killed the Tashkent special envoy, and established a rival government. The Transcaspian government appealed to the British forces located in Persia for help, who sent a small detachment of Indian troops into the region. The British withdrew in February 1919, however, and the combined effects of famine and lawlessness in the countryside led to anarchy and loss of control by the Transcaspian government. The Red Army returned in July, 1919 and by February, 1920 the Reds were once again in control of the region.⁶⁴

The emirate of Bukhara was split between the influence of the conservatives who supported the emir and the young intelligentsia, strongly influenced by the *Jadids*, who favored the revolution of the Soviets. Known as the Young Bukharans, they appealed to the Tashkent Soviet for help in January 1918. The Soviet sent an expedition to help, but it was defeated and the Turkestan government was forced to sign a treaty which recognized the independence of Bukhara, gave back some disputed

territories and provided arms to the emir.⁶⁵ It was not until August, 1920 that the Red Army was able to return to Bukhara, depose the emir, and impose a Soviet style government on the area. Even then the Bukharans were organized as an Autonomous republic which enjoyed nominal independent status until the further national delimitations of 1924.⁶⁶

In Khiva, battles between the Uzbeks and the Turkmen tribal leaders made intervention easier. Again, a party of young, *Jadid* inspired intelligentsia and merchant leaders called for Russian assistance in overthrowing the ruling Turkmen khan. In January, 1920, a Red Army force was sent to assist, and by June had defeated the khan and installed the Khorezmian People's Soviet Republic (Khorezm being the ancient name for Khiva).⁶⁷

In March 1918, a group of predominantly Russian Bolsheviks seized power in Baku and formed the Baku Commune. The remainder of Azerbaijan, represented primarily by the Musavat party, joined with the Georgian and Armenians in forming the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia in February 1918. In May 1918, the Federation broke up and the independence of Azerbaijan was declared.⁶⁸ With Ottoman help, the Azeris attacked Baku in July 1918 and defeated its British and Russian defenders by September. The Ottomans were forced to withdraw following their defeat along with the other Central Powers in November. They were replaced

for a short while by British troops, who subsequently withdrew in November, 1919. Protected from the Bolsheviks by the White armies of General Deniken fighting the Civil War, Azerbaijan remained independent until April, 1920. ⁶⁹

The last task remaining for the Soviets was the defeat of the Basmachi rebellion. The Basmachis, centered in the Ferghana valley region, initially started as bandits forced into violence by the widespread famine and disruption caused by the war and revolution. With the defeat of the Kokand government and the establishment of Soviet control throughout Central Asia, the bandits and rebels were joined by the disaffected and displaced nationalists, intelligentsia and Muslim leaders who could not accept continued Russian rule. The movement became truly revolutionary, expanding from its base of peasant revolt and guerrilla tactics against the Russians to the point where a Ferghana Provisional Government was formed.⁷⁰

After the overthrow of Khiva and Bukhara, the Basmachi movement expanded into the defeated khanates and acquired new support from the displaced leaders of Khiva and Bukhara. This infusion, however, caused splits in the movement along tribal and ideological lines. The liberal nationalists, many of whom were *Jadidists*, who had initially provided the intellectual leadership of the movement, were not able to generate the appeal to the peasants that the conservative religious and tribal leaders could command. In addition, the widespread famine and disorder caused many of the

intellectuals to be seen as useless parasites by the common people who were struggling daily to survive. Basmachi slogans became more oriented toward Islam and conservative, as well as anti *Jadid*.⁷¹

In 1921, Enver Pasha, the Young Turk who had been a key leader of the Ottoman Empire and overthrown by Kemal Ataturk, arrived in the Ferghana region and took over leadership of the Basmachi revolt. Under the banner of pan-Islam, he began a campaign to throw the Russians out of Turkestan. He issued an ultimatum to the Russians, telling them to get out of Turkestan, and he scored a significant military victory at Dushanbe in early 1922. However, Enver's message was heavily influenced by the pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic ideals. He became caught up in the conflict between the conservatives and the *Jadids*, and lost the support of the exiled Emir of Bukhara.⁷²

The Russians responded both militarily and politically. By granting concessions to local leaders, allowing more religious, economic and political freedoms for local people, implementing the New Economic Policy which helped to alleviate the famine, and using Muslim military units, the Soviet government was able to reduce popular support for the Basmachis. They also conducted extensive military offensives against the rebels. Enver Pasha was decisively defeated at Kafrun on June 15, 1922 and was later killed in battle in August, 1922; by 1924 the Basmachi rebellion was essentially

over and Soviet control of the region assured.⁷³

THE SOVIET ERA

Soviet treatment of the Muslim peoples and republics went through several phases after the revolution. Initially, the indigenous peoples were promised freedom to form their own governments with their own peoples, to include the right to secede from the Union. Lenin's government issued a decree in October 1917 giving four principles concerning the rights, equality, freedom from restrictions and free development of the nationalities of the Peoples of Russia.⁷⁴ Central Asia in particular was to be an area of experimentation and rectification of imperial Russian mistreatment. Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders had written extensively about the injustices of the czarist regime's colonization of Central Asia. A full body of theories had been established by the time of the revolution concerning the measures needed to bring these supposedly backward peoples into full and equal participation in the socialist future. In the debate over how to implement local rule, Stalin's concepts of union and autonomous republics, both as major partners within the Union and as subordinate parts of member republics won out over the objections of Trotsky.⁷⁵

In Russia proper, the Tatars gave great support to the Reds, in part because of ideological agreement but primarily in hopes of gaining national autonomy under the

plans put forth by Lenin and Stalin. Large numbers of Tatars served in the Red Army, in the eastern front fighting against Admiral Kolchak, in Frunze's Fifth Army fighting to retake Central Asia and defeat the Basmachi, and the Volga and Transcaucasus regions. Others were prominent in the political structure of the new Bolshevik government, most notably Sultan Galiev, who would go on to become both the leader of the Tatar government and later the symbol of Stalin's shift from supporting indigenous leaders to one of central power and Russian leadership of the new Union. Stalin's plan for autonomous republics won out over Trotsky and other Bolshevik objections, and in May, 1920 the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was officially created. This Republic, however did not have the national autonomy envisioned by Tatar nationalists, who hoped to have a base for further creation of a pan-Turkic union of the Muslim peoples of the old Russian empire.⁷⁶

In lower Central Asia, the Young Bukharans and the Young Khivans at first actively supported the Soviets who had helped bring them to power. When they began to support the pan-Islamic movement toward a united Turkestan, the Soviets moved against them, and had effectively expelled them from power by 1922. Many of the young Bukharans went over to the Basmachi, further complicating the Soviet mission of recruiting local leaders to govern Central Asia.⁷⁷

In response to complaints of Great Russian domination of local governments,

the administration in Tashkent went through a series of purges and restructuring to rid the regime of the vestiges of Russian colonialism. Local leaders were recruited, but the party and administration continued to be dominated by Russians. A Turkestan Commission was dispatched by Moscow to resolve the problems of the region. It provided for more participation by local leaders and led to the era of "national communism", which proved to be necessary for the successful implementation of the New Economic Program and the recovery of the region from famine.⁷⁸

By 1924, Soviet power had sufficiently consolidated that the Soviet leaders were able to further divide Central Asia. Under the national delimitation plan the territory of the Turkestan SSR and the Bukhara and Khiva SSRs were divided up and reformed into the Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs. Also formed were the Tajik ASSR as a part of Uzbek SSR and the Karakirgiz Autonomous Oblast (today's Kyrgyzstan) under the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Tajikistan would not become an SSR in its own right until 1929, Kyrgyzstan not until 1936.⁷⁹ Kazakhstan was also initially a part of the RSFSR; it did not become an SSR in its own right until 1936.

The national delimitation accomplished several things for the Soviet government: it ended any national association with Khiva and Bukhara; it dispelled any notion of a united Turkestan; and it built upon and exploited the differences within

the Central Asian intelligentsia, between the tribal units of the area, and between the different languages and cultures of the peoples of the region. The national delimitations, though artificial in their creation, did provide the bases for the Soviet experiments in new political structures, economic structures and language and cultural policies.⁸⁰

Indeed, some authors credit the Soviets with genuine intent of promoting modernization and improving the lot of the Central Asians by providing rational economic, political and linguistic divisions of territories that were comprised of hundreds of backward tribes speaking radically different dialects and having no viable economic structure. The pre-existing governmental organizations of Khiva, Bukhara, Turkestan, Transcaspia and Kazakhstan were themselves heavily mixed with languages, nomads, herders and sedentary peoples. The Soviets also saw their effort as an attempt to provide for the self determination of nationalities (as opposed to nationalism) and to build the necessary conditions for the proper development of socialism.⁸¹

In any event, the delimitation did succeed in creating national identities in a region where they had not really existed before, and did provide a structure upon which the Soviets could implement their cultural, linguistic, economic and political experiments.⁸² In addition, the delimitations created the political structures which took on sufficient national identity that when the Soviet Union did disintegrate, the

republics created by the delimitation of 1924 in fact became nations in their own right.

Following the delimitation, the Soviets engaged in a policy of *korenizatsiia* (nativization). The drive was complicated by the purge of pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic nationalists and the elimination of the Basmachi which occurred simultaneously. Sultan-Galiev, a former member of Stalin's nationalities commission, and a resurgent pan-Turanian nationalist was accused of conspiring with pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic counterparts in Persia, Turkey, and the Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs with a goal of creating an Islamic or Turkish state within the old Russian empire. His conspiracy was discovered in 1923 and he was executed in 1929.⁸³ The *Jadids* and intellectuals who had flocked to the revolution at its beginning were now being purged as deviant national communists. As a result, the pool of locals the communists had to draw from was limited. Forced to choose between competent but independent minded intellectuals and the politically reliable but less educated and generally incompetent remainder, the Soviets opted for political reliability.⁸⁴

With the defeat of the Basmachis, the purging of the "national communists" who included so many of the pre-war intellectuals and *Jadids* who had espoused the pan-Turkish cause, and the arrest of Sultan-Galiev, the pan-Turkish movement in Russia effectively came to an end. While the rhetoric would continue on both sides

for many years, there was never again a serious threat to Soviet rule of its Muslim peoples from pan-Turkish nationalists.

Language reform was high on the Soviet agenda from the earliest days of the revolution. Language policy was designed to accomplish several things, most of which were contradictory. On the one hand, the Soviets were publicly committed to the equality of nationalities and the right of self determination. On the other hand, Soviet policy called for a convergence of the cultures and purging of national differences, especially language differences. Soviets had the task of creating written languages where none had existed before. In the Muslim republics, languages were to be developed along the lines of the national delimitation. The Latin alphabet (as opposed to the Cyrillic, which smacked too much of Great Russian imperialism) was adopted as the replacement for Arabic script and the vehicle for preserving and developing the languages of the newly identified nationality groupings. Notably, the Soviets chose to preserve the differences between the Turkic languages rather than using the opportunity of implementing the new language policy and the introduction of the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic to unify the Turkic languages. Such a policy would have aided the Soviet goal of convergence of culture and language of the new Soviet peoples; on the other hand it would have greatly enhanced the reasoning of the pan-Turkists who called for the formation of a single Turkish or Islamic nation in Turkestan.⁸⁵ While many authors will argue that the language policy, along with

national delimitation discussed above, was designed to "divide and conquer" the homogenous Turkic peoples of the region, others note that the Soviets were remarkably sensitive to cultural boundaries in Central Asia.⁸⁶

Latinization of the alphabets began in Azerbaijan in 1922; by 1930 all the Muslim republics and nationalities had switched. Beginning in 1936, however, these languages were switched to the Cyrillic alphabet. The change to Cyrillic coincided with the Stalin terrors and the resurgence of Great Russian nationalism. One of the goals was to provide an easier means of adopting Russian words to local languages, moving towards the goal of minimizing the linguistic and cultural differences of the Soviet people.⁸⁷ "Russification" of local languages and an emphasis on learning Russian as a second language became official goals of the language program, a trend which continued through the Brezhnev era and did much to inflame the anti-Soviet feelings of the peoples of the various republics.⁸⁸

By the 1930s Stalin dropped the pretense of equality of nationalities and allowed *korenizatsiia* to die. The lack of competent cadres had caused severe problems in meeting the first Five Year Plan. Russians, European Soviets, or those few Central Asians who could operate in the Soviet environment were the only ones to benefit from rapid upward mobility. A resurgence of Great Russian nationalism accompanied by the purges of the 1930s virtually eliminated another generation of

local leaders. Locals were still employed in administration and party positions but they were much more dependent on Moscow and local Russians for getting and keeping their jobs. During and after World War II, Stalin began to soften his position; some local leaders began to reemerge, but they usually had a Russian or European as their "deputy."⁸⁹

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev allowed greater local ethnic participation in elite positions, calling for the rapprochement (*sbliizhenie*) and biological merger (*sliianie*) of all Soviet nations into a higher community, a policy not popular with Russians or Muslims.⁹⁰ Its net effect was to begin to put local elites back into positions of real power, but based on the assumption that they would try to emulate their Russian "elder brother." One result of this shift was the coming to power of local leaders who became patriarchs - they were able to stay in power for more than twenty years and transform the governing of their republics by the appointment of local elites loyal to them throughout the ruling structure.⁹¹ By the early 1970's it was apparent that *sliianie* was not working. Brezhnev instituted policies of affirmative action to further recruit local elites and tolerate the concentration of local elites in republic governments and party structures, which in turn further strengthened the power base of the patriarchal leaders of the republics. Roeder describes this process as "ethnofederalism," and notes that it further weakened the control of the center over the republic leadership, just the opposite effect of what was intended to happen.⁹²

When Gorbachev came to power (the only general secretary of the Communist party who had not served in an ethnic republic outside the Russian republic or in an area in Russia where ethnic minorities were predominant)⁹³ the situation was ripe for the republic leadership to openly pursue the interests of their republican constituents more than the interests of the center. Given glasnost and perestroika, it is little wonder that the republics were ready to declare sovereignty.

ISLAM

Islam came to the plains of Central Asia with the Arab invasion of the eighth century. It spread slowly at first, then accelerated as the Mongol conquerors were converted and carried Islam along on their conquests. It did not spread completely, however, and it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the last of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz were converted. Furthermore, the depth of belief varies, dependent on the lifestyles and location of its adherents. The Crimean Tatars were not known to be deeply religious, despite the Crimea being one of the homes of the pan-Islamic and Jadid movements.⁹⁴ The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, converted to Islam late, held their beliefs lightly, but not so lightly that Soviet efforts to separate them from their co-religionists to the south were successful. Russian Muslims also gave birth to one of the great reform movements of Islam, the Jadid movement described above.

Bukhara was the pillar of Islam, a city so holy that Muslims unable to travel to Mecca could become hajjis after seven visits to Bukhara instead. It was also a center of learning and the locus of the conservative opposition to the reforms of the *Jadids*. Today, there are again *madrasahs* open, with students anxious to reassert Bukhara's reputation for leadership in Islamic learning. These same students reflect an awakening of the pan-Islamic ideal, talking of the formation of an Islamic republic embracing all of the Muslims of the former Soviet Union.⁹⁵

Soviet response to Islam has been varied over the years, dependent on the needs of the regime. From 1917 to 1928, religious toleration was practiced to varying degrees, especially in the first three years as the Soviets fought to survive in the civil war. In 1928 the religious schools were closed and a period of antireligious activity began which lasted through the purges of the 1930s. In 1938, antireligious activity relaxed somewhat and the tolerance lasted through the war years.⁹⁶

In 1943 the Muslim Religious Boards for Central Asia, the Caucasus, European Russian, and Siberia were formed. These boards governed official Islam in the Soviet Union, which provided for registering mosques, mullahs and religious communities. There has also been a large underground or unofficial observance of Islam in the Soviet Union, primarily through the Sufi Brotherhoods and self appointed or itinerant mullahs. There has always been a fairly widespread observance of the public rituals

of Islam (the circumcisions, weddings and burial ceremonies), even during the times of religious intolerance. ⁹⁷

Despite the official sanctioning of Islam through the Muslim spiritual directorates, and the Soviet propaganda use of its appointed muftis of the religious boards, official disapproval of religious practice continued through the Gorbachev years. As late as 1987 party members were expelled for taking part in religious rituals and Muslims jailed for conducting religious activities. ⁹⁸

Today, the struggle for the revival of Islam throughout the Muslim republics is open. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and several other countries are sending money and people to preach their particular brands of Islam and to help in opening new mosques and *madrasahs* (religious schools). Leaders of the new nations, meanwhile, are still reluctant to fully embrace the marriage of Islam and government seen in many other countries. The leader of Uzbekistan, like several of his counterparts, is seeking to follow Turkey's example of a secular Islamic state. ⁹⁹

The modernizing principles of the *Jadid* movement are also enjoying a resurgence, particularly in the sermons of the officially appointed mullahs and leaders of Islam in the old Soviet structure. The Grand Mufti of the Tashkent Ecclesiastical Administration, Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf, began in 1989 to publish a

series of khutbas (sermons) in the official communist media which are seen as advocating the modernization of Islam along the lines of the *Jadid* tradition.¹⁰⁰ In the new era of religious toleration which began in 1989, Yusuf and other official mullahs like him have been accepted by the secular leaders and allowed to voice their opinions on social and political problems. Yusuf was even appointed to the USSR's Supreme Soviet, and has become an important player in the efforts of the secular leaders to channel and control the public resentment of social and economic conditions.¹⁰¹

Another important development in Central Asian Islamic affairs is the rising popularity of "Wahhabism". The Wahhabites trace their heritage to the conservative Sunni sect based in Saudi Arabia and their heritage of resistance to the official Islamic clergy of the Ottomans. Wahhabism has great appeal to the youth of Central Asia, as it represents an ideologically acceptable vehicle for resistance to the carryover civil authorities still in power in the new nations and their officially appointed and approved Islamic clergy. Interestingly, this also puts the youth of the region on the side of reactionary thought, while the older but official clergy and proponents of Islam represent the modernizing tradition of the *Jadids* which espouses the participation of Islam in the governmental and social affairs of the modern world.¹⁰²

PAN-TURKISM IN THE NEW ERA

When considering the prospects for a revival of pan-Turkism in the modern era, one must look to its roots. It is helpful also to remember that pan-Turkism is linked in its history and in the minds of many Turkic peoples to pan-Islamism. The pan-Islamic movement, while it did not originate in Russia, enjoyed great popularity among both conservatives and liberal *Jadids*. Ultimately, the two movements proved to be incompatible, as pan-Islamism was far more conservative than pan-Turkism and the authority of the old rulers was challenged by the modern thought and methods associated with pan-Turkism. Nevertheless, the pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were firmly linked in the minds of many Central Asians when Enver Pasha sought to combine the forces of the two movements during his leadership of the Basmachi rebellion of the early 1920s.

Pan-Islam has great appeal to Central Asians in particular, as many of them do not have a strong sense of nationhood. To them, the membership in the great Muslim community (umma) has as much meaning as the rather artificial construct of nationality. Alexandre Bennigsen's classification of three alliances of the Central Asian is the most widely known and accepted. These are: the subnational or tribal, including the extended family; the national, based on the 1924 delimitation of territory; and the supranational, part of the Islamic community as a whole, or at least of the Central Asian Islamic community as a whole.¹⁰³ One should note, however, that for the Azerbaijanis this does not always prove true. While Islamic symbolism

has been a part of the nationalist movement in Azerbaijan, the movement is focused most powerfully on Azerbaijan as an ethnic territorial nation, not as part of the universal Muslim community.¹⁰⁴

Kemal Ataturk, the great leader of the Turkish revolution and founder of modern Turkey, distanced himself from pan-Turkism while he was concentrating on building the modern Turkish nation. But he did espouse pride in Turkishness and Turkish nationhood; his philosophy also strongly reflected the pan-Turkish antipathy towards pan-Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁰⁵ Turkish leaders ever since have eschewed visions of empire and concentrated on Ataturk's dictum of "peace at home, peace abroad." When Turgut Ozal, Turkey's current president, stretched this principle to its limit in supporting the US war effort against Iraq in 1990-1991, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, the Defense Minister, and the foreign minister resigned in protest.¹⁰⁶

Despite the appeal of pan-Turkish peons to the citizens of modern Turkey and the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union, there are far too many obstacles for such a dream to be a practical reality. Turkey has many problems to solve within its current sphere of nationhood. These include resolution of the Cyprus dispute, a Kurdish insurgency movement that is increasing in intensity, and a continuing campaign to gain acceptance into the European Community. Any attempt to reach

unification or rapprochement with Azerbaijan, the closest Turkic republic, would bring instant conflict with Armenia, an ancient enemy, and could seriously strain relations with Iran and its sizable Azeri minority.

With the exception of the Nakhichevan ASSR sub-unit of Azerbaijan, Turkey lacks a common land border with any of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. The Caspian Sea to the east and the Transcaucasus nations to the north will forever effectively block Turkey from any contiguous land contact with her erstwhile empire.

Nor are the republics themselves likely to favor unification with Turkey. If history is a guide, the reaction would be just the opposite. When Ottoman troops reached Azerbaijan and helped throw out the Russians in 1918, there was initially great rejoicing by the Azeri people and officials. An important center of the pan-Turkish movement, the Azeris saw the coming of the Turkish troops as the first step in the long desired unification of Turkish peoples. Within two months, however, dissatisfaction with Ottoman meddling in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan had caused widespread disillusionment with the potential union with the Ottoman empire.¹⁰⁷ Today, the sense of Azeri nationalism is stronger than ever. While the Azeris show more interest in associating with their ethnic brethren in Turkey than in Shiite Iran, the overriding character of Azeri politics today is nationalism. A pan-Turkic union

with Turkey is likely to be just as unpopular as any union with Iran and its sizeable Azeri minority.¹⁰⁸

The prospects for a unified Turkestan or Turkish state based on pan-Turkish principles are equally unlikely. The elimination of the Crimean Turkish republic and scattering of its people by Stalin in 1946¹⁰⁹ virtually wiped out one of the great intellectual sources of the pan-Turkish movement. The Volga Tatars are involved in a new attempt at autonomy in Russia, but as yet those efforts are focused on the Tatar ASSR itself and do not appear to contain the seeds of a pan-Turkic revival. In any event, the Tatars and the *Jadids* and pan-Turkish intellectuals they produced have been tainted by their early collaboration with the nascent Soviet state.

The Central Asian republics are ripe for further turmoil. Their environment has been devastated by the cotton monoculture whose huge demands for irrigation water has cause the drying of the Aral Sea and the climatic changes that are now increasing desertification of the lands around it.¹¹⁰ The Soviet central planning system did not put any industry besides basic cotton agriculture in the region; consequently the new nations are still heavily dependent on Russia and the Ukraine for the essentials of modern life, to include subsistence agriculture. In addition, the exploding population has no industrial jobs for its increasingly well educated and therefore disaffected youth. The leadership of the republics is largely a carryover

from the communist days; even where new national leaders have been elected, the bulk of the administrators still come from the old communist structure. Under the patriarchal system developed after the 1960s, these leaders do genuinely strive to meet the needs of their titular nationality constituents, but the leaders learned their craft and got their rewards acting as intermediaries between their republics and the old Union center.¹¹¹ They are not well equipped to deal with the demands of democracy, nationhood, capitalism and economic self-sufficiency, and therefore continue to govern in much the same way as they did before the collapse of their Soviet parent. Ultimately, the current elites will be caught up in a power struggle among themselves, secular modernists, and Islamic activists.¹¹²

In Central Asia, the majority of the population is indeed Turkish, but the Iranian descended Tajik minority is sizable and is well represented in each of the republics besides their own, particularly Uzbekistan. With the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism represented by the Wahhabi movement, the appeal of pan-Islam is stronger than any pan-Turkish agenda. Ethnic rivalries between Tajiks and Turkish tribes will almost certainly prevent any unification based on pan-Turkish principles. The Tajik-Uzbek enmity in Uzbekistan has been described as a "bomb waiting to be detonated,"¹¹³ hardly a situation favorable to any type of unification effort.

There are both new and old conflicts among the Turkish peoples themselves

which will also mitigate against any type of unification. The riots in the Ferghana valley in 1989 pitted Uzbek Turks against Meshketian Turks. Turkmen nomads have long been in conflict with the more sedentary Uzbeks and are unlikely to share their natural resources with them.

Given all these problems it is certain that there are far more obstacles to the formation of any type of unified nation in Central Asia than there are circumstances favoring it. What is likely to happen is unpredictable but the achievement of a unified Turkestan under a pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic banner appears to be least likely outcome.

What, then, will Turkey's role be in the future of the Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union? Turkey has already formed cultural, economic, educational, and diplomatic ties with all of the new Muslim nations. To date, she has not made any approaches to the budding nationalist movement in Tatarstan or the other Muslim republics within the Russian federation. Indeed, Turkey's relations with Russia are better than ever, and she stands likely to form a bridge to the Muslim republics not only for the West, but also for Russia herself. At least one Russian commentator has hailed Turkey as the ideal role model and go between for the new Muslim nations.¹¹⁴

Turkey has also formed economic unions with the new nations both bilaterally and in conjunction with Iran and Pakistan through the Economic Cooperation Organization.¹¹⁵ At the same time she has played a major role in the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council. Turkey has not yet made the full transition from a statist economy, and has severe inflation and unemployment problems, but her success to date is clear evidence that a secular Muslim nation can succeed in the modern world. As a capitalist nation successfully making her way into the developed world, Turkey is a shining role model for the new nations.

Similarly, Turkey's increasingly strong democracy provides a political example for the new Muslim nations. Although beset by military coups in her past, Turkey has always returned to a democratic form of government. She has recently successfully changed governments and appears to be fully on the road to a stable democratic future.

It appears, therefore, that Turkey's best contribution to the development of the new Muslim nations is just the course she has been pursuing: economic leadership, political role model, cultural and educational assistance. Additionally, she will be the ideal intermediary for the West, and perhaps Russia and many other nations, in relations with those new nations. Any attempt to resurrect pan-Turkish dreams would be counter productive to those roles. Turkey is well advised to eschew any

association with pan-Turkish clamor and continue on the course she has set.

Appendix 1
 Muslim Peoples of the Former USSR by Nationality and Language
 Group¹¹⁶

<u>TURKIC</u>	<u>IRANIAN</u>	<u>CAUCASIAN</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Uzbek	Tajik	Chechen	Dungan
Kazakh	Osset	Avar (D)	(Sino- Tibetan)
Tatar	Kurds	Lezgin (D)	Arab
Azeri	Persian	Kabardian	(Semetic)
Turkmen	(Iranian)	Dargin (D)	
Kyrgyz	Tat	Ingush	
Bashkir	Baluchi	Adygian	
Karakalpak	Afghan	Lak (D)	
Kumyk		Abkhazian	
Uygur		Tabasaran (D)	
Karachai		Circassian	
Turks		Abazinian	
Balkat		Rutul (D)	
Nogai		Tsakhar (D)	
		Agul (D)	

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2. This figure was used in several publications to describe the situation in Russia at the time of the 1917 revolution, and still holds true today. See the figures at page four below.
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43. Hostler, 120-121.
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68. Nahaylo and Swoboda, 45.
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