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THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES GRAND STRATEGY

BY

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For the more than 40 years of the Cold War, United States grand strategy for national security primarily employed the political and military elements of national power to attain the ultimate objective of the strategy; prevention of Soviet hegemony in Eurasia and eventual defeat of communism. The two fundamental components of the strategy were containment and deterrence. By the end of 1990 the strategy had been successful and, by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union itself had ceased to exist. This study examines the new European environment influencing formulation of an evolving national security strategy. Impacts and implications of a changed Europe are explored by investigating American interests in Europe today, the changing relationship between economics and national security, and threats to U.S. interests in Europe. Recommendations for U.S. National Security Strategy are posited in view of political, economic and military developments in Europe. The United States has significant interests in sustaining peace and stability in
19. Continued:
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THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES GRAND STRATEGY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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For the more than 40 years of the Cold War, United States grand strategy for national security primarily employed the political and military elements of national power to attain the ultimate objective of the strategy; prevention of Soviet hegemony in Eurasia and eventual defeat of communism. The two fundamental components of the strategy were containment and deterrence. By the end of 1990 the strategy had been successful and, by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union itself had ceased to exist. This study examines the new European environment influencing formulation of an evolving national security strategy. Impacts and implications of a changed Europe are explored by investigating American interests in Europe today, the changing relationship between economics and national security, and threats to U.S. interests in Europe. Recommendations for U.S. National Security Strategy are posited in view of political, economic and military developments in Europe. The United States has significant interests in sustaining peace and stability in a changing and uncertain Europe. Mutual economic security and prosperity have become as important as military collective security alliances and have emerged as a new rationale for continued US commitment to engagement in European affairs.
PART I

INTRODUCTION

In 1989 and 1990 American policies of containment and deterrence achieved their objectives. The Cold War ended and 1990 joined 1815, 1898 and 1945 as a symbolic year of change in the international system and the American role in it. Like them, 1990 signalled the beginning of debates about the nature of the new system, American interests in this new environment, and the policies which the United States should pursue to advance its interests.¹

The end of the bipolar world which grew out of the aftermath of World War II finds an emerging Europe where countervailing forces are operating against a backdrop of multi-polarity, complexity and reappearing themes. At the same time states of the European Community (EC) are moving dramatically toward unprecedented integration, the newly surfaced Central and Eastern European states are struggling to achieve democratic, market-oriented societies and avoid disintegration and relapse. As an anxious Europe advances toward new arrangements for security, trade and political relations on the continent, nationalism is reemerging, suppressed ethnic schisms and historic border disputes are resurfacing and economic and social conditions are again stirring dormant, potentially destabilizing tendencies. Europeans are searching for and debating new security architectures while simultaneously progressing toward the creation of a single, integrated pan-European economy by the end of this century. Rapid and evolving political, economic, social, and security changes, uncertainty and a possibility for great achievement all
characterize the continent as it approaches the millennium. With the termination of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fledgling Central and Eastern European democratic states, the United States and Western Europe are presented with an opportunity for historic change.

The more than four decades of the Cold War were distinguished by relative stability and predictability as a classical balance of power was established on the continent and states were sorted into the respective camps of the superpower antagonists. Under the shield of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nationalism was restrained in the face of a unifying threat. In the democratic west, economic prosperity and growth provided time for political institutions to develop and mature. Such stability and unity are, in fact, an aberration from the norm for Europe. Instability, friction, competition and change, often violent, are far more typical of Europe's heritage.

The dynamics of European history over the past 400 years, the rapid pace of change in Europe, the destabilizing effect of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from Eastern Europe all threaten to create the power imbalances and vacua that have historically frustrated efforts to achieve genuine peace in Europe.1

The emerging realities in Europe impact the most fundamental considerations for shaping United States national security strategy. The thesis of this paper is that both the relationship between economics and national security as well as the basic ways and means for achieving the security interests of the United States in Europe are changing in profound ways. The prospects and
implications which these changes pose for national security strategy are explored in this paper by posing and investigating the following questions, the answers to which lie at the core of our attitudes toward, interests surrounding and involvement in continental affairs: What constitutes American interests in Europe today? What challenges to U.S. interests in Europe can be perceived? How has the relationship between economics and national security changed? What are U.S. interests and NATO's role in a changing Europe? And finally, should the United States adopt an economic national security strategy, and, if so, how should such a strategy be employed in Europe?

The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States describes America's aspiration for a new world order, an opportunity, "... to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals..." The text of the document continues by addressing the shaping of a security strategy which will require fresh approaches to lingering problems. Europe is recognized as the region which, "... more than any other area... has held the key to the global balance in this century, and it is this continent more than any other that is experiencing fundamental change." The difficulty for the United States now is to remain constructively engaged in the ongoing emergence of a different Europe that, by virtue of choice, circumstance and enormous American effort over decades, in many ways is transforming into as much of a competing as an allied bloc.
Nevertheless, however much the acuity of the threat to Europe may subside in coming years, the primacy of U.S. commitment to the security of that theater is unlikely to change. U.S. political, economic and cultural interests in Europe are unparalleled outside the 50 states of the union.

While the military dimension of American commitment to Europe may diminish, it is unlikely that American interests in Europe will be eclipsed in the view of the United States by concerns elsewhere in the world throughout the remainder of this decade, if not beyond.

Any exploration or assessment of national security strategies with regard to any of the elements of national power must begin by establishing what constitutes a nation's interests in the region under consideration. America's enduring interests in Europe are:

* The preservation of peace through the maintenance of regional stability.
* The promotion of liberal, fair trading, market-based economies with strong private sectors.
* Democratic, pluralistic societies based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and individual liberties.
* Prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons and the technologies associated with production and delivery.
Incorporating the singular intent of these primary interests is a fifth, increasingly compelling American interest in the nations of Europe devising a regional security arrangement that seriously contemplates the possibility of U.S. military and/or political disengagement from its former level of involvement in continental affairs. Such a system would preclude a return to some form of a regional balance of power scheme, would arrest the resurgence of latent nationalism, and would promote and extend the stabilization that derives from shared economic prosperity.

Since the end of World War II the nature of American interests in Europe has experienced a profound transformation. In an article appearing in the Fall 1990 Brookings Review, C. M. Kelleher describes three distinct post-World War II American images of Europe which provide an excellent starting point for a consideration of changing U.S. interests in Europe today.

The perception of Europe and Europeans that emerged in the early postwar period perhaps said more about American goals and motives than it did about reality, much less about European perceptions about the same cluster of international factors. But it also presented to the American public both good and real reasons for Europe to be the central focus of postwar American foreign policy.

Kelleher cites as both the first and dominant perception, a view ". . . of Europe as both the prize and the price of the postwar political and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union." The development of a Europe fundamentally similar to the United States was viewed as an essential precondition to the construction
of an international order, \ldots conducive to American political and economic interests. In the language of Bretton Woods, democratic, capitalistic European systems, tied inextricably to an international economic order led by the United States, were ultimately in America's best interests.\textsuperscript{1}

The second significant U.S. attitude regarding postwar Europe can be termed the "necessity of doing it right." Two world wars in less than 34 years, both of which had drawn in a reluctant America, made ensuring Europe remained at peace an absolute necessity. Europe would be rebuilt on a stable democratic basis and the regional security of the area would be underwritten by a collective defensive arrangement led by the United States. NATO became the framework for the coordination of Western interests, \ldots the symbol for Americans of the continued maintenance of the new Europe they had helped to construct and were now destined to lead.\textsuperscript{1}

Kelleher's third American perspective on postwar Europe has to do with the role played by particular European states in global politics. She postulates that, over time, Americans have grown critical of European states, individually, if not as a group. Increasingly, especially as the reconstructed continent grew more competitive and economically challenging vis-a-vis the United States, Americans saw the Europeans, \ldots as insular, recalcitrant, or soft, and always in the rear \ldots Europeans gave paramount weight to narrow, short-term political gains and to national economic interests.\textsuperscript{1}
Initially, the United States commitment to a broken Europe was aimed at thwarting Soviet hegemony in Eurasia. The Marshall Plan, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the forward deployment of substantial amounts of U.S. military power on the continent were all components of a geopolitical rationale for an American European commitment which is now obsolete. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact combined with the ultimate defensive potential of nuclear weapons has made classical, pre-nuclear conquest and domination nearly unthinkable.

Additionally, and possibly as important, the logic of old geopolitics has been undermined by the emergence of technical, information-based economies in the western democracies. The industrial, smokestack economies which fought World War II could conceivably be captured and utilized by a conquering nation. The knowledge-based post-industrial economies which replaced them cannot. America retains vital national interests in Europe and must remain constructively engaged in continental affairs. However, such a commitment requires new rationale and revised objectives to reflect changes in both the United States and Europe.
PART III
CHALLENGES TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE

Europe faces a wide range of imposing new challenges. While the drive for greater economic and political integration so characteristic of the last decade reaches culmination, prospective unity symbolized by "Europe 92" clashes vividly with the divisive forces that resurgent nationalism has unleashed in eastern and southeastern Europe. A federated Europe protecting its markets by exclusive trade barriers will only exacerbate problems in other, more fractious regions of the continent.11

Change in Europe continues to proceed at a pace that poses significant challenges to the abilities of governments, the private sector and societies to adapt to new and, to some, unsettling developments. Change, in and of itself, tends to be inherently threatening to many, especially rapid and/or radical change. Such change is exactly what is transpiring in Europe.

Challenges to U.S. national security interests in Europe are addressed from four primary aspects: potential American neo-isolationism, the means by which the United States may remain constructively engaged and influential in European concerns, the pivotal issue of the survival of the newly emerged, formerly totalitarian Central and Eastern European states and arms control, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and overall regional stability on the continent.

Perhaps the most often overlooked challenge to United States interests in Europe exists not in Europe at all but within the American myopia that has historically characterized U.S. attitudes...
toward "foreign involvement." The United States has always displayed a natural tension in national security affairs between foreign and domestic focus and policy. Ironically, at precisely the time America is in a position to exert sizeable influence and leverage in international relations and developments, the nation is seriously preoccupied with domestic concerns over recession, unemployment, budget debates, the deficits and where to place blame as well as the politics generally inherent to presidential election years.

In the wake of victories in the Cold War and Desert Shield/Storm and lingering domestic economic difficulties the nation seems to be searching for a rationale to remain engaged in European affairs. Isolationism runs throughout American history and the leadership mantle of the democratic west assumed by the United States after World War II was taken somewhat reluctantly. As the nation debates whether or not to remain substantially involved in European affairs or to deliberately retrench and, in so doing, relinquish an ability to influence European developments impacting on American national security much hangs in the balance. "At stake is the middle ground between isolationism and global activism."11

If the extent to which the United States will remain engaged in European matters is questionable, no less resolved is the manner or mechanism for exercising such engagement. At the heart of this issue is the ongoing controversy over continuing U.S. presence, militarily, on the continent. Relatedly, the utility of maintaining NATO or how to change the alliance and the nature and
future of the "transatlantic link" which served the mutual security interests of both sides of the Atlantic during the Cold War, is under active debate and represents a vital interest for the U.S.

The possibility of the failure of post-communist Europe to successfully transition to multiparty democracies and market-based economies poses a serious challenge for both Europeans and Americans. Unless the West is willing to provide meaningful assistance to the post-Cold War economies of nations like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary their delicate, newly emerged democracies' survival is at risk. These fledgling governments face problems of economic and political reform, ethnic hostility, and impatient populations. Establishing democratic governments and capitalistic economies will involve a difficult struggle between national self-determination and economic viability. Reintegration of these nations into the economic and political fabric of the West and the development of a workable security architecture is of obvious significance to Europeans and Americans alike. Much will depend on how quickly action is taken to permit the necessary political and economic reforms an opportunity to create the conditions under which market-oriented democracies can survive.

Finally, serious attention is required to preclude any revision toward the concept of military power as the principal guarantor of intra-continental security. The European order currently materializing is making a major break from history in that the main guarantees of security and pluralistic order among nations are evolving economic and political cooperation, dialogue
and exchange. The challenge to U.S. national security interests in this regard is that the unfolding of a new European security system, for once not based on individual, nationalistic military power, requires, ", . . . a fundamentally different set of assumptions about the sources of political stability and peaceful international change."13 In order that the former paradigm for regional security, i.e., military parity with one's neighboring states sufficient to maintain balances of power, not resurface in a changing Europe, the United States' goal must be to emplace policies which deter potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated technologies and to, ", . . . relate arms control as an instrument of state compromise to the assurance of peaceful European political change, progressive stability, and beyond."14

The need for basic security drives the behavior of states even under the best of conditions. The European Community (EC), if it is to serve as a new basis for transnational security on the continent, will have to rely on member nations accepting and having trust in a philosophy of no "relative gains" among EC members. The disappearance of the unifying threat from the East could, if not forestalled, result in relative gains thinking and, in turn, competition. In short, useful arms control and non-proliferation of WMD requires the EC be successful. Anything less than unqualified success could result in a tendency for old antagonists to revert to former ways of providing for their national security.
NATO is the only organization associated with defense that has a proven military command structure capable of overseeing change, managing crisis, and of making decisions. NATO has a vital role to play in the difficult transitional period ahead of us as arms control measures and the CFE Treaty are implemented against the background of a turbulent scene in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and beyond.15

Following the unsuccessful Moscow coup of August 1991, barely months after the article containing the above quotation was written, the debate concerning NATO’s validity and relevance for the new Europe has intensified. Today, while the underlying reason for the creation of a North Atlantic alliance in the first place continues to evolve in unpredictable directions, the need for a mutual defense organization to defend against a superpower aggressor appears to be yet another relic of the Cold War. Critical uncertainties continue to exist in Europe that, if anything, make NATO and, as important, a continuing and active role for the United States in the Alliance, of serious concern.

First, the factors which have made Europe an almost perpetual source of conflict for centuries have not necessarily been eliminated from the continent. There is ample reason to suspect that those factors may have only been contained or restrained by the artificial security condition which resulted from the superpower confrontation of the Cold War. Second, in view of
European history, it is altogether still problematic that a military withdrawal of United States forces would be followed by continuing peace and stability on the continent. Not only have Europeans not yet demonstrated, "... the ability to achieve consensus in executing a common European defense policy," but, 

... the combination of growing domestic turmoil and the colossal military arsenal that still exists in the (former) Soviet Union, entails great risks."

Ironically, even the former Soviet Director of Military and Political Studies in the Academy of Science of the USSR has held that,

... the dismantling of NATO could lead to instability and a return to old rivalries, that would not be in the best interests of the (then) Soviet Union."14

What is needed now is a future vision and renewed appreciation of the roles NATO can play in promoting United States National Security interests in a changing Europe.

Simply stated, the United States should maintain a credible military presence in Western Europe. A continued strong U.S. military presence in Europe is as vital to safeguarding peace and regional stability in the post-Cold War as it was to preventing conflict during the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War in Europe has disrupted the balance of power and created a power vacuum in Eastern Europe. It has bestowed a political setting that is risk-filled, uncertain, and rife with the potential for civil disorders and ethnonationalistic conflicts.15

The U.S. forces which will remain after the current drawdown has been completed should be on a scale which is small enough to quell American political and fiscal concerns yet is sufficiently
robust to realistically symbolize America's faithfulness to the alliance and to sustain a pivotal role in the European military balance as well as the influence in continental affairs which accompanies it. "Thus, the fundamental question may not be whether we can afford or want to maintain a military presence in Europe but, rather, whether we can afford not to."\(^{11}\)

A forward deployed U.S. force would require an institutional framework within which to operate and viable missions to support its presence. The current NATO organization must be updated to better serve these needs. The process to transform the alliance, .. began in earnest with the July 1990 London Declaration where the NATO Heads of State and Government set a new course for the Alliance. This Declaration placed the Alliance on a course to adapt rapidly to the changing security environment in Europe and encourage the positive developments underway in the Central and Eastern Europe countries.\(^{11}\)

In May 1991, following a meeting of NATO's Defense Planning Committee, the Alliance announced its new strategic concept which provides for a substantial transformation of the organization in light of recent changes on the continent. Decisions were taken to recast the Alliance from, ".. an organization which was primarily military oriented to one more focused on the political dimensions of defense and security."\(^{11}\) The new concept serves to revitalize NATO's utility and relevance to both Europeans and Americans. It supports the security interests of all member states by, among other things, acknowledging that the security challenges and risks to the Alliance are, ".. multi-faceted, multi-directional and unpredictable."\(^{11}\) It comprehends that the security
interests of alliance members might be affected by risks of differing and wider natures than before, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, out-of-area threats and heretofore unrecognized threats of terrorism. Additionally, the concept acknowledges the contribution,

...to security provided by the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC) and the United Nations (UN). But, it emphasizes the primacy of NATO concerning the security and defense of its members. 

NATO serves multiple national security interests of the United States. The Alliance is a proven security structure that can guarantee stability while Europeans continue to progress toward integration amid uncertain, potentially unstable circumstances. Managing arms control issues and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear arms, will require a continuing American military presence in Europe. Such a military commitment would place the U.S. in a position to constrain proliferation by enabling security guarantees to be extended to European states that might otherwise feel compelled to seek such weapons because of perceived threats to their own security. It would also provide the United States an ability to better react to any proliferation that might occur. Further, a military presence would provide the U.S. a voice in influencing the political, military and, of increasing importance, economic developments that will determine Europe’s future stability. Until other institutions or arrangements based on influences other than military power are
available to secure U.S. interests in Europe, NATO still gives America a voice and an indispensable "seat at the table."
Since ancient Athens taxed its empire to raise a fleet against Sparta, there has always been a strong connection between wealth and military power and, therefore, in the most simple and direct way, between economics and national security.\textsuperscript{13}

Commenting on the role of economics in the evolving post-Cold War international security environment, S. P. Huntington finds three groups of changing conditions which he describes as, (1) systemic changes, (2) changes in the distribution of power in the international system, and (3) changes in the relations among countries. All groups have direct impact on U.S. interests in Europe and our national attitude and approach to dealing with the changing relationship between economics and national security.

Systemic changes are adjustments in the structures of domestic and international politics which are characterized, among other things, by "... the emergence of a truly global economy and of powerful transnational economic organizations and the global movement towards democratic political systems and market economies."\textsuperscript{14} Huntington also remarks that,

Perhaps the most important consequence of these systemic changes is the seeming shift in the relevance and usefulness of different power resources, with military power declining and economic power increasing in importance.\textsuperscript{15}

Supporting this position, Jordan and Taylor in \textit{American National Security} discuss the dynamic period of world economic
growth after the Second World War which was, "... driven in part by dramatic increases in economic interaction among nations... which have also become increasingly interdependent." The authors continue by linking this growth and interdependence to significant effects on the current economic position and relative fiscal health of the United States. "The rapid growth of industrial might in Europe (and Japan) began to shift the economic power balance away from the U.S. preeminence." One of their more salient conclusions is that, "... increasing international security involves more than safety from military attack."

There are many who would endorse the argument that military prowess no longer is the most appropriate or even adequate measure of superpower status. Indeed, as the global distribution of wealth is altered, migration of political power soon follows. This, in turn, confers influence increasingly tantamount to that of military power. Writing in the Military Review, D. M. Glantz notes a changing world condition that may be particularly applicable to the United States in this regard. Observing accelerated, evolutionarily changing world conditions he notes, "Most prominent among these... were changing global economic relationships, a virtual redistribution of economic power that has, until recently, been masked by the trappings of military strength."

Huntington's second grouping of changes relates to the shifting distribution of power in the international system. Included in this categorization is the gradual, relative decline in the economic dominance enjoyed by the United States since the end
of World War II; a corresponding escalation in the economic power of both the Japanese and the nations of Western Europe; the collapse of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Eastern Europe; and perhaps by the end of the decade, "... the coming together of ... Europe and the emergence of the European Community as a powerful actor on the world's political as well as economic scene."

Changes in the relations among countries goes directly to the removal of conditions of bipolar stability and predictability which characterized the Cold War period and is the third group of changes. Nations have been rather simplistically seen as either ally, neutral or antagonist. The post-Cold War world, on the contrary, is seen as diffusing into a spectrum of less defined, more obscure relationships between nations that will be based upon a combination of ethnic, religious, national, economic and socio-political factors. Relations are more likely to be marked by an opportunistic mix of cooperation and competition and the potential for volatility will increase. Huntington concludes that, "All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities."

Huntington's prediction is echoed by Aaron Friedberg who anticipates, "... the end of the Cold War will crack the crust that has been holding existing alignments in place and hasten a fundamental restructuring of the international political system."
If the essential relationship between national security and economics has undergone a pivotal, potentially irreversible change, and I maintain that it has, then a redefining of world power and the contribution of economics to a nation's security posture is overdue. The world's economy is becoming inextricably more interdependent. Individual nations rely, for their own prosperity and growth, upon the prosperity of others to a much larger extent than has ever been the case in the past. Today, "No nation is invulnerable; none are autonomous. No nation dominates in the way individual nations have dominated in the past." Military power did not defeat communism or ruin the Soviet Union. Rather, it served to buy sufficient time for the Soviet's system to suffer an implosion precipitated by its own economic and ideological failures. Understanding U.S. national security issues in Europe and contemplating suitable strategies must embrace the increasing prominence and criticality of our economic relationship with the Europeans.
The traditional separation of economic policy and security strategy in our formulation and pursuit of national strategy is no longer appropriate. "Economic Strategy" is increasing in importance and changing in composition. As the international security regime becomes more multipolar and less confrontational, we must reconsider our goals and the means to achieve them."37

James R. Golden, author of the above quotation, writes that America is searching for a new vision. This search has been necessitated by a number of factors, of which some have been in motion for decades and some of which are relatively recent developments. Certainly, the utter collapse of communism's command economies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe stands out as the signal event which seems to have initiated the "search." However, "The broadening and deepening of the European Community (EC), . . . the changing pattern of international economic activity . . . the decline in direct military threats to our vital security interests, . . . (growing) economic parity among the United States, Japan, and the European Community . . . have all refocused attention on the interrelationship of economic policy and security strategy."37 Hence the search for a vision to satisfy a national security agenda reacting to a fundamentally different global security environment. Simply, the Cold War is history and it is no longer "business as usual."
Approaching the 21st Century, the United States' new global vision is articulated and described in the component goals and objectives of President Bush's "New World Order." Succinctly stated, our national interests are, "... the survival of the United States, a healthy and growing U.S. economy ... healthy, cooperative relations with allies and friendly nations ... and a stable and secure world." The President's 1990 landmark Aspen speech depicted a new U.S. strategy for national security which was cognizant of a changing world. The President spoke of seizing the historic opportunity to create lasting world peace. He advocated transforming the nation's security environment. As we enter a new era, "... the Defense Strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can - and must - be different." He could have easily substituted Economic for Defense and financial for military and would have made just as important a point.

The United States requires a new national instrument to forward its fresh vision as well as the goals and interests which are derived from the National Security Strategy crafted in support of the vision. The recently published National Military Strategy of the United States recognizes, "... a number of departures from principles that have shaped the American defense posture since the Second World War." Describing the changing realities of the global strategic landscape, the strategy acknowledges, "... a momentum toward increased political, economic, and military cooperation in Europe ... and other regions." The military component of National Security Strategy has been well conceived and
articulated. What the United States requires now is a National Economic Strategy which complements the military and spells out realistic ends, ways and means as it sets an azimuth for the nation into an uncertain and changing future. Such an economic security strategy is especially important as America reacts to a changing Europe.

United States Joint Chief of Staff Publication 1 defines the term Strategy as, "The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." Although the heritage of the definition is clearly martial in nature, the transference and applicability for a national economic strategy is easily seen. Given the recognition that the structure of, "... the international economy is changing in ways that will have important consequences for the interaction of economics and national strategy," it is apparent that new approaches are needed for pursuit of U.S. goals in relation to the world and Europe in particular.

In an evolving Europe where, "Economic status and competitiveness will be the measure of day-to-day ... power," the lack of a coherent and coordinated U.S. national economic strategy becomes more apparent as the European Community (EC) moves toward increasing political and economic integration. The EC, which until relatively recently, impacted on U.S. concerns mainly because it
played a role in transatlantic trade relations, has become a much more significant factor and is now a reality to which the U.S. must respond in a more cogent manner. Retaining the transatlantic link, influence and vote that accompanies NATO membership (and for the present, leadership) is part of the answer. A forward-looking examination of U.S. economic policy and the strategy for achieving the goals which flow from that strategy is a major portion of the remainder of the answer. The basic relationship between U.S. economic and security interests mandates a more engaging, cooperative relationship with the EC. Such an approach would serve to advance the security interests of both the U.S. and EC by promoting regional stability and economic growth and prosperity. At the same time American commercial interests would be advanced in an increasingly competitive world market.

Europe's vision of itself as seen in EC92, a "borderless Europe without frontiers," envisions the almost total removal of physical, fiscal, and technical barriers to trade. Equally ambitious plans for increased political and even military integration through a spectrum of institutions is also contemplated. These developments demonstrate that the economic and political climate is deviating from the Cold War model in ways which will result in a far larger role for a national economic strategy . . . a device for gaining national security objectives which the United States does not currently possess.

The basic implication of post-Cold War reality for United States interests in Europe is that NATO was the security instrument
of choice when Europe was polarized by a readily discernable, tangible threat. Today, the EC, surrounded by a cluster of other evolving institutions (e.g., Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), Council of Europe (COE), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), The Western European Union (WEU) and others) has become too strong economically to be subject to American influences as was the case during most of the time following the end of World War II.

It remains unquestionably in the national security interests of the United States to retain the ability to influence affairs in Europe. The military element of national power is no longer adequate or sufficiently useful to be employed alone as a means of influence except under the most radical and, therefore, unlikely circumstances. National influence is increasingly a function of combined political, military and economic leverage. The foreign policy and military strategies for achieving U.S. National Security interests are congruous and working with reasonable success in an uncertain global environment. The missing component of a coordinated and balanced approach toward securing the nation's economic goals which contribute to America's secure position in the world is an economic strategy.
PART VII

CONCLUSION

Glaciers, when they invade a continent, not only obscure its topography but, through the weight of the accumulated ice, literally press its surface down into the earth's mantle. Retreats of glaciers cause old features of the landscape slowly to rise up again, sometimes altered, sometimes not. The expansion of Soviet and American influence over Europe at the end of World War II had something of the effect of such a glacier. It froze things in place, thereby obscuring old rivalries and bringing peace -- even if a "cold" peace -- to a continent that had known little of it throughout its history.5

The Cold War glaciers in Europe are gone. The possibility of moving toward a new European order supported by integrating continent of nations is as real today as the aspiration has ever been at any time. Extraordinary potentialities exist to build new arrangements for regional security and stability which serve the peaceful interests of all nations. No less remarkable are the daunting challenges, uncertainties and mechanisms of change which must be resolved and created in order to take advantage of the historic opportunities existing today. Building on our core of national values and enduring interests, our national security strategy should seek to shape an approach which thinks about achieving U.S. national security objectives in new ways. Our strategy must comprehend the trends confronting us today, appreciate the need for fresh approaches to old problems and, above all, recognize the transitory nature of the opportunities now extant. The strategy should be constructed on the premise that an
expanded combination of increasingly important economic and political elements is now as important as have been military objectives, if not more so. A coherent and coordinated economic strategy for national security is called for to complement our political and defense agendas. Militarily, the nation's strategy should sustain objectives which underpin the fundamental national interests even as the resources to support those objectives are diminishing and the friction inherent in balancing foreign and domestic concerns is causing the nation to act increasingly preoccupied with internal affairs. At the same time the strategy must reaffirm the political priority for maintaining stability and managing continental change peacefully through a variety of institutions.

For the fourth time since Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo the dominant powers of the west, led by the United States, confront the responsibility of formulating a new political order following a decisive victory in a prodigious and prolonged conflict. . . . the Cold War. The decisions arrived at will match the significance of those that cast the shape of the peace settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945. If well conceived and suitably pursued these decisions can establish the foundation for a durable peace, shared prosperity and stability on the continent. If not so conceived and pursued they may very well set conditions which could foment friction and instability just as the errors of 1919 set in motion events ultimately resulting in World War II. The decisions and policies which will be arrived at and adopted in pursuit of United States
National Security interests in Europe must invest the intellectual, military, and economic resources necessary to retain multiple channels of influence. "The United States faces a decade of great challenge and of great opportunity to cooperate in, not create, a new Europe . . . It will mean adjusting to the new economic competition with Europe with greater equanimity than till now, and downgrading the significance of military power in our foreign policy generally and with regard to Europe in particular."
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 6.


7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. Ibid., p. 5.

9. Ibid., p. 6.

10. Ibid., p. 7.


17. Ibid., p. 38.

18. Ibid., p. 37

20. Ibid., p. 8.


22. Ibid., p. 1.

23. Ibid., p. 13.


27. Ibid., p. 17.


29. Ibid., p. 295.

30. Ibid., p. 295.


33. Ibid., p. 19.


37. Ibid., p. 2.


41. Ibid., p. 1.

42. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, 1 June 1987, p. 350.


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