


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order to produce a best guess as to the shape of the emerging global power system. A short discussion of historical world power leaders and the sources of their power demonstrate how the three elements of power helped these nations to the forefront of world power. A discussion of the three elements of power, as they relate to the emerging countries of the Pacific Rim and the European Community (EC), followed by a brief discussion of international geopolitic systems helps determine which countries, if any, can either replace the United States as the unipolar power leader or share the world power in a multipolar world.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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A UNIPOLAR OR MULTIPOLAR WORLD?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The United States of America was thrust into a world leadership role in the closing years of World War II. It became a superpower along with its rival, the Soviet Union. The world became bipolar with these two superpowers structuring and controlling the "system" of world power. Over the past year, the world again witnessed changes unprecedented in history. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of the USSR marks a dramatic change in the future of world politics. For the first time since Great Britain became the hegemonic leader of the world in the eighteenth century, no single power can come close to the United States in its role as a unipolar world leader.

The central question in the world power circles is whether or not the United States can or will retain this unipolar leadership, subjugate its role to the developing power countries of the Pacific Rim or Europe (EC), decline altogether as a world power, or share its power status on an equal, cooperative basis. This study briefly integrates the elements of power--military, economic, and political--and the systems of international politics in order to produce a best guess as to the shape of the emerging global power system. A short discussion of historical world power leaders and the sources of their power demonstrate how the three elements of power helped these nations to the forefront of world power. A discussion of the three elements of power, as they relate to the emerging countries of the Pacific Rim and the European Community (EC), followed by a brief discussion of international geopolitic systems helps determine which countries, if any, can either replace the United States as the unipolar power leader or share the world power in a multipolar world.

The world has seen truly remarkable changes since 1945--the approximate year that the United States was thrust into a world leadership role. It remains debatable whether or not the United States was ready to assume a role in shaping the events of the world; nevertheless, most agree that the United States and the Soviet Union was each drawn--either willingly or unwillingly--into power vacua created by the downfall of Western Europe, the weakness of China, and the defeat of the Japanese Empire.

For more than forty years, world politics has been bipolar, with chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union structuring and controlling the "system." During 1989-91, the world again witnessed changes rare in history. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union marks a dramatic change in the future of world politics and power. As Edward N. Luttwak put it:

With the Soviet-Western antagonism now rapidly waning, the web of intersecting relations that we call "world politics" is therefore in a fluid state for the first time in two generations.

For the first time since the establishment of the Axis Powers over fifty years ago, no single power or coalition of powers, can come close to the United States as a superpower. The world political system, backed by economic, military, and political power, for the first time since England's hegemony in the eighteenth century has a clear leader. "The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar," argues Charles Krauthammer. "It is unipolar. The center of world power is the

unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies."² This point is not without challenge. Many authors believe that the old bipolar world of the United States and the Soviet Union will become multipolar with power being distributed throughout regional power centers in the Far East and Europe.

The central question is whether or not the United States can retain leadership in a unipolar world or subordinate its role to other power sources as the world political climate rapidly changes. Most political scientists agree that the world political system is changing, but there is disagreement as to whether power will be distributed on a multipolar basis or on a unipolar one. This disagreement goes further, as to whether the United States will remain the sole superpower, be replaced by one of the new powers emerging, or share the world power on an equal, cooperative basis. This study will briefly integrate the elements of power--military, economic, and political--to produce a best guess as to the shape of the emerging global power system.

Many learned people believe that the United States is in a period of decline as a world power. Many of these same professionals believe that the Pacific Rim countries such as Japan, China, and Korea will either replace the United States as the world power leader or be one of the multipolar centers of power. Many others believe that united Germany or the potentially more powerful European Community (EC) will be a part of this multipolar power base. In an effort to determine if the

world will become unipolar, multipolar, or something entirely different, a historical look at the past and present centers of power in the world and the sources of their power is an excellent place to start.

WORLD POWERS PAST AND PRESENT

Authors such as Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Donald M. Snow believe that "historically, the primary measure of a nation's power has been its military capability,"³ be they Roman legions or Spanish tercios. Donald M. Snow notes that it was common for royal families to marry across national boundaries, and both royal civil servants and mercenary armies were generally composed of nationals from other countries. "Most members of ruling families, in fact, had more in common with their counterparts in other countries than with the lower classes in their own countries."⁴ Sixteenth-century Spain boasted of its trade with the Indies, the Far East, and especially with the colonies of the new world. A steady supply of raw materials, finished products and gold and silver from countries all over the world made it possible for Spain to control the wealth, industry, and political aspects of the world. As economic power was to sixteenth century Spain's source of wealth, it also contributed to its downfall as a world power.

Throughout the centuries, statesmen and other observers have made mistakes in perceiving the true measurement of economic power: for example, in the 17th century mercantilist theorists who focused on Spain's reserve of

gold bullion would not have understood Holland's or France's rise through conditions favorable to political stability and commerce.⁵

The defeat of the Spanish Armada allowed the Netherlands to open trade and capital markets which provided the impetus to become the world power leader in the seventeenth century. Its navy was strong enough to keep the sea lanes open for the traders to capitalize on the new world markets in South, Central, and North America as well as Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. During this time period, the Netherlands became the top trader of the world through their open trade and more importantly the establishment of capital markets, trade agreements and treaties. Trade continued to bring wealth and power to the Netherlands throughout this period which was unencumbered by few devastating wars and strengthened by continued exploration. "This comparatively tranquil situation ended with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire."⁶

Besides its great army led by Napoleon, France is credited with several factors that made it a world leader. In population, France dominated Western Europe. According to the British historian A.J.P. Taylor, "traditionally the test of a great power was its strength for war."⁷ Population, during this time, was a critical asset for taxation and the enrollment of members of an armed force. Along this same line, the French Revolution, coupled with the large French Army, sense of national pride and political ideology made the populace enthusiastic for the first time in the history of a world power.

Domestically, the Revolution democratized politics, creating a sense of citizen involvement previously missing in the masses of the population. The fervent cries of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!" activated common French people and made them willing both to serve in the military and be taxed to support France.⁸

In order to deal with this vast population and keep the masses satisfied, the French government established a public administration system unequalled throughout the world. According to Joseph S. Nye Jr., a leading analyst of power and security, France rose to world leadership and power primarily through control of its population, a substantial growth in industry (especially in the rural areas), a vast public administration system of government, and of course its great army.⁹

Next up to bat as the world power leader was Great Britain. "During the seventeenth century, England was a second-rate power. By the eighteenth century it was challenging richer, more populous France for superiority in Europe."¹⁰ Toward the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, England made its move to global leadership and power through an explosion in the industrial revolution and, of course, the building of a strong navy. Traditionally, historians such as John Brewer have attributed England's rise to its political and economic freedoms, its strong mercantile economy and the extraordinarily efficient finance and credit system.¹¹ Professor Nye, when discussing the evolution of power, seems to generally support these elements of Great Britain's power during the 19th

century but adds that nation's ability to impose a global free-trade system coupled with economic stability.¹² Yale historian Paul Kennedy in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers argues that England's roots of decline, like other global leaders, began with overextension of its military and economic might.¹³ Others argue that the two world wars robbed England of its hegemony. Whatever the case England was replaced as a world power during or immediately after World War II.

America assumed an internationalist role only reluctantly after economic predominance had been established for half a century, after a crushing military assault on a U.S. territory in 1941 catalyzed the nation out of its isolationist torpor, and after the globalization of the Cold War kept America engaged.¹⁴

The United States, from the Declaration of Independence, to World War II, was a largely isolationist nation state. Washington's injunction against "permanent" and entangling alliances had such a far-reaching legacy that America fought World War I as an "associate power," ostensibly unencumbered by the sordid obligations of multilateral coalitions.¹⁵

Many consider that the Soviet Union became at the same time in history a true world power leader. Author William Pfaff believes that the Soviet Union, although risen to superpower status, was never in the same league as the United States.

The Soviet Union never possessed industrial power remotely comparable to that of the United States, although for an unconscionably long time American and other Western analysts accepted Soviet claims to industrial and

technical parity, and even imminent superiority: that the USSR really would "overtake and surpass" the United States. The USSR's nuclear status, ideological claims and political influence and its domination of eastern Europe, all made it appear logical to assume equivalent economic and industrial power, or at least the potentiality. There was, as well, an evident political, bureaucratic and, in the defense industries, commercial motive to make the most of the Soviet threat.¹⁶

Politically, the United States and the USSR were at odds. The free nation's leadership responded with harsh words and actively spoke out against communism. Prime Minister Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech of 1946 began this communism-bashing followed by every U.S. President. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 pitted good against evil. President Eisenhower portrayed "forces of good and evil, freedom pitted against slavery, and lightness against dark".¹⁷ The Cold War had begun and was to continue for the next forty to fifty years.

Since 1940, the United States has been a leading power. The economic boom brought about by World War II, the vast resources of the North American continent, its universal culture, its technological base and strong, modern military forces were contributing factors in making the United States a superpower. A quick look at articles and books published by many of the leading analysts of power shows that most of these same factors are what brought the USSR into being as a superpower. In fact, this study has shown that many of these same elements of power have been associated with hegemonic status throughout history.

Although most of the preceeding examples of world powers operated in balance-of-power systems, they do illustrate how the elements of power help elevate nation states into world leadership--important considerations when deciding what world system (to be discussed later) is developing in today's rapidly changing geopolitics. Simply stated, a nation state must possess the elements of power to a fairly great degree to be a world leader. It must be a world leader in order to control the system of world politics. From the above discussion on the past and present world leaders, three elements of power stand out as contributing factors that made these nations world leaders.

THE ELEMENTS OF POWER

The elements of power, as has been shown, are varied and changes as history changes; however, there are three (four, as portrayed by some authors) that are always analyzed in order to determine global leadership. Military, economic and political instruments of power dictate whether or not a nation will become a world leader. David Jablonsky, in his article "Elements of Power," suggests that "in addition to the three elements of power there are sociopsychological factors."¹⁸ Other authors agree on this point. Although important, sociopsychological factors will not be considered as a separate element of power in this study. "The three-part designation will, however, serve for analytical purposes. In practice, the three forms of power are related, and applications are rarely discrete."¹⁹ A short discussion of the

three elements of power will show this point.

The military element of power has proven time and time again to be an important measure of a nation's power. Throughout recorded history, a nation-state with a powerful military could force its will on less powerful nations either through the actual use of its military or the mere threat of its use. It is not merely sufficient to have a large military force. Many nations have a large military force but are unable to threaten or coerce its neighbors or world region. Similarly, a nation with a relatively small military force can be more of a military threat to its neighbors or even to the world as a whole. In order for a nation's military to be a determining factor of world leadership several factors must be present.

First and foremost, a nation's military power must be projectable. That is, forces must either be stationed near possible areas of conflict or national interest or they must be able to move quickly and efficiently to the area. Except for internal security, it does not do much good to have an excellent military force and no assets with which to move it to an area of conflict.

Just as the populace of France was important during the eighteenth century, the mobilization of large segments of the population into an armed force is important in today's world. A nation must have the capacity and potential to mobilize its reserve forces, its population and its industrial base in order to wage war.²⁰

Once a nation has mobilized its populace and reserves, the organization and equipment of the force must be modern and efficient to carry war to its foe. Such things as science and technology, transportation, logistics, and sources of actual equipment itself play a role in military power. Jablonsky also points out that a nation's "philosophy of employment" of its military is important to the element of military power. In other words, what is the history of the state in relation to its use of forces?²¹ No discussion of military power since 1945 can be complete without a brief review of nuclear weapons.

With the use of the atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, the United States ushered the world into the Nuclear Age. This weapon of mass destruction brought both peace to the world and pushed the world to the nuclear threshold. With long-range bombers and missiles it was possible to destroy an enemy from many thousands of miles away. The mere threat of the use of nuclear weapons would suffice to keep an enemy at bay. Nuclear weapons were, and still are, an important part of the military element of power. But the power derived from nuclear weapons has proven to be so awesome and destructive that its actual application is virtually foreclosed. Nuclear war is simply too costly.²² Most authors now agree that the definition of power is moving away from the emphasis on nuclear weapons and military force to a greater dependence on another aspect of power--the economic element of power.

"The economic instrument of power refers to the use of

economic rewards or penalties to get people or states to comply with policies."²³ In reality, economic power is very difficult to measure. "First, like other forms of power, economic power cannot be measured simply in terms of tangible resources."²⁴ Professor Kennedy reasons that the task of exacting comparative economic statistics is almost impossible due to the reluctance of "closed" societies to publish their figures, differentiated national ways of measuring income and product, and fluctuating exchange rates. ²⁵ Economic power can run the gamut from resources such as raw materials, global markets, production of goods, and sources of capital to behavioral definitions in which a nation by its past experiences, military and political elements of power, and will of the population is able to set and enforce the rules and agreements for the global economy. In any case, a nation's economic power can generally be measured by the percentage of World Gross National Product (GNP). The ability of a nation to sell its goods (both manufactured and raw materials) is paramount to a growing GNP. Directly affecting the GNP is how a nation spends its money as reflected in a percentage of the GNP. Does it have financial and trade surpluses or one or more deficits? A nation must have an appropriate share of the world's manufacturing output in order to help control its trade deficits. In order to strictly measure the economic strength of a nation, several criteria should be taken into consideration. Besides world manufacturing production, "total industrial potential" must be taken into account. Total industrial

potential includes measures of population and education, basic infrastructure of cities, ports, railways and other shipping methods, industry capacity, capital, reinvestment of profits for the long term, and regional stability to name the most important. Closely aligned to the economic element of power and greatly integrated into it is the last important measurement of a nation's power--the political element of power.

Used in its pure sense, the political element of power is "the manner in which the state organizes its resources. The political structure in being determines how vital decisions are made and who makes them. Ultimately this action may assist the nation or preclude it from making the optimum use of its resources."²⁶ In the context of superpower status or world leadership, the political element of power can simply be stated as getting other nations to do what is deemed necessary or correct by means other than those that apply the other elements of power. Professor Nye describes this type of power as co-optive or "soft" in contrast to the "hard or command power of ordering others to do what you want."²⁷ The intangible power sources associated with the political element of a nation's power include culture, ideology, political cohesion, and trust in the international arena. All this adds up to the amount of influence one nation has over others. In order to influence other nations, a nation must employ a strong, sustained foreign policy, possess diplomatic skill, have both economic and military might and develop rigid alliance structures. As with the other elements of

power, political power is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a nation's goal solely on its own merit. All elements of power are inter-related and are normally used by a nation in combination.

The three elements of a nation's power are, in essence, what makes a nation a world leader. In most cases one element of power is directly dependent upon another. For example, one country trying to convince another to agree to a particular option would have added weight if the first nation possessed greater economic and/or military power. " Similarly, the state of health of a nation's military forces depends heavily on the health of its economic structure."²⁸ Economic power may very well depend on a nation's ability to sell military hardware or negotiate suitable trade treaties.

Coordinating the instruments of power and deciding which is appropriate in any given situation is, of course, at the heart of conducting a nation's foreign policy. To some extent, the nature of the situation will dictate which instrument or combination of instruments is employed. At the same time the choice depends on the availability of various instruments of power, and on national predilections to use one form or another.²⁹

This point from professor Snow can be further examined. In order for a nation to use a particular element of power, that element, first of all, must be available. A nation without a military or a very weak one could not use the military element of power against a militarily strong nation. Secondly, it must be a credible element of power. If a nation is to use its economic

element of power against another, the first nation must have a strong economy. Thirdly, a nation, through its foreign policy and its political make-up normally have preconceived notions about the use of the different elements of power. Most nations, for example, will negotiate first, use economic sanctions secondly and resort to war only as a last resort. This is assuming, of course, that a nation possess all of the elements of power, has the capability to use any and all of them, has the credibility to use whatever element of power deemed necessary and finally has the predisposition on the use of the elements of power. "Countries dependent upon a single source of power," says Samuel P. Huntington," are highly vulnerable to degradation of the particular type of power in which they specialize."³⁰

As previously mentioned, most analysts and political scientists agree that the power of a nation in the world today is measured by its military might, its political strength and its economic status. As 1992 unfolds, many nations and groups of nations have the three elements of power to some degree. Most agree that the world from the latter stages of World War II through the tumultuous year of 1990 was bipolar-one that was controlled exclusively by the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. Author and syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer believes that the world today is unipolar with the United States being the center of world power.³¹ Others, like Hoffmann and Kennedy believe that the United States is and has been for some time in a period of decline as the world

leader. New power centers are rapidly developing. Countries like Japan, the Pacific Rim countries of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and China, Germany (and/or Europe) are set to become the pillars of the new multipolar world. Whether or not this multipolarity will come about over the next few decades is anyone's guess. There is also emerging another system of world politics--that which Dr. Michael Roskin, visiting professor at the United States War College, refers to as a "stratified" system. "This stratified system has at least three levels: The top one is that of the remaining superpower; the second is that of the major economic powers; and the third is that of the many poorer and weaker nations."³²

The elements of power, as has been shown, are important in the determination of which nation or coalition of nations will stay or become the major world powers. It has also been shown that these elements of power are interrelated to such a point as to become embeded into one another. It would be almost impossible to determine what international system the world would accept by using solely the elements of power as the measure. Throughout history there has been a succession of different international systems with which man has had to deal.

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF WORLD POLITICS

The dictionary defines the word "system" as an organized set of doctrines, ideas, or principles usually intended to explain the arrangement or working of a systematic whole. It further

defines a system as a form of social, economic, or political organization or practice. Morton A. Kaplan, professor of political science and a trailblazer on the study of political systems, classified several models of international systems, and provided key variables that can be used to determine the nature of the international system in being at any given moment in time. In his article, "Variants on Six Models of the International System," professor Kaplan argues that definite sets of essential rules constitute the characteristic behavior of the different systems. Since most authors agree that the world political system is moving away from a bipolar system to either a multipolar system, a unipolar system, or some sort of stratified system, only these three will be discussed.³³ As the Soviet Union faded into history and American economic decline continued, multipolarity was the political system favored by most political scientists as the likely replacement for the bipolar system. "According to this thinking, the world was dividing into trading blocs who would be constantly tempted to hide behind protective barriers to keep out foreign products. No one or even two powers would dominate; it would be a sort of economic free-for-all."³⁴ Under this system, most of the decisions in the political world would involve economic considerations. Those world players that cannot compete in the economic arena, i.e., the third world countries or the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), would get the leftovers or be left out altogether. Many argue, especially Roskin, that a multipolar world system lacks the

"ferocious, zero-sum competition of the bipolar model."³⁵ In other words, under the bipolar system, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, each with its own blocs, would either win or lose any given world decision. Their particular side would either gain or lose in their bipolar world. Everything that went on within the world was designed to get or keep other governments on their particular side. The world was balanced and, for a period of thirty to forty years, stable in that no major wars occurred.

The ferociousness of the economic battles that would occur in a multipolar world, the seemingly non-caring attitude of the major players toward the lesser players, and the absence of the zero-sum game, all lead to the probability that a multipolar world system cannot preserve world order. Historically, American foreign policy has sought open markets and free trade since the intervening war years. Portions of Europe and practically all of the major players of the Pacific Rim have practiced trade protectionism to a great degree for as long as can be remembered. If multipolarity actually comes into being, and the U.S. attempts to break down the protectionist barriers, either through the use of one or more of the elements of power or by practicing isolationism itself, it is no telling what could happen to the international system. It would indeed become a nasty arena capable of political and economic instability, discontinuance of all international treaties, and possibly even war itself.

Krauthammer believes that while multipolarity "will come in time," the world today is unipolar. "Which leaves us with the

true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world, brought sharply into focus by the gulf crisis: a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial West."³⁶ Under the unipolar system the single world leader would preserve world order by making other nation states follow the rules. It would attempt to stabilize the world by seeking and obtaining security, a concert of world community actions and, to a certain extent, alignment of the major world player's foreign policies to that of the leader. The unipolar world came into being after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States-led United Nations' coalition defeat of Iraq and for now is the most-likely successor to the old bipolar system. This new world order looks something like this: "The U.S. leads the U.N. and the middle-sized powers to stop an aggressor. Most of the world supports the U.S. position, at least with words."³⁷ Wars would tend to be small, regional affairs characterized by quick defeat of the aggressor, rapid redeployment of U.N. troops and a stabilized, to some extent, region. The aggressor will have to follow U.N. mandates in order to survive as a nation state.

The unipolar world is also chaotic. Nations may not want to follow a unipolar leader. They may perceive that the unipolar leader is only in this for its own good--especially in the economic arena. The leader may not be able to convince other nations that an action is a joint venture rather than a unilateral one. The leader may not be able to defray the costs

associated with unipolar status without other nations "chipping in" costs associated with multilateral actions. To say the least, a unipolar world is an unstable one.

The third and final international system to be discussed in this paper is a model that has been developed by Roskin, who refers to his model as a "stratified" one which essentially combines both the multipolar one and the unipolar one.

A stratified world would have at least three levels: a superpower at the top, major players one level down, and a series of weaker countries ranging from robust NICs (newly industrializing countries) to pathetic basket cases. The second tier could be further divided into two: the "money bag" powers of Germany and Japan, and countries such as Britain and France that have moderate ability to project power overseas.³⁸

Roskin further argues that the United States, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, is the only remaining military superpower; however, several economic major powers are emerging. They sometimes follow the lead of the United States and sometimes directly compete with it. One can conclude that while the United States remains the sole unipolar military power, there are several multipolar economic superpowers, namely the Pacific Rim countries and Western Europe.

While the stratified system could contribute to a new world order and promote peace, it would likely be unstable in that "the bitterness and economic dislocation of bloc competition" could resemble "the increasing disorder of the decaying balance-of-power system in the late nineteenth century or the interwar system that led straight to World War II."³⁹ It would

definitely need the cooperation of the two top levels of nations in order to keep the world stable.

All three of the world systems briefly described above require nations that are world power leaders to orchestrate other nations in order for the world to move towards peace and prosperity. Whether or not one of these systems will come about over the next few decades is anyone's guess; however, a quick look at the nations thought to be present and future power leaders and their strength as it relates to the elements of power--economic, military, and political--will provide an insight to the future system.

THE UNITED STATES

The power of the United States has its roots in World War II. It was the only nation, within the power circles, to escape the ravage of the great war. America's economic, military, and political elements of power became the strongest in the world. Under Stalin, the USSR was to challenge the United States and did so up until its demise in 1991. The Pacific Rim countries including Japan were devastated and only through the goodwill of America did they become the "lands of the trinket makers." Europe and England were similarly destroyed, with their economy and military weakened or devastated to a point that they were minor players. This left only the United States, and to some extent the USSR, with a growing economy, political stability, and military strength to have its way in world affairs.

The economic strength of the United States has surely

declined since the immediate post-war years.

The United States produced 40 to 45 percent of the gross world product in the late 1940s and early 1950s. That share declined rapidly, reaching the vicinity of 20 to 25 percent of gross world product of the late 1960s. That is roughly where it has remained.⁴⁰

Professor Nye explains that this decline was only natural since other nations regained their economic strength after World War II. "What is more," as he points out, "the recovery of Europe and Japan was a major goal of the American policy of containing Soviet expansion."⁴¹ If one looks at pre-war figures for the U.S., already the leader of global economics, its share of the world product is about the same as it is today--averaging from 20 to 25 percent. Declinists argue that the decline has occurred much "more quickly than it should have over the last few years" and the decline has become "precipitous".⁴² Depending upon which author one references, this is either acceptable or else spells doom for the American economy. Economist Paul Krugman in The Age of Diminished Expectations believes that "our economic performance today is broadly considered a success," despite our productivity creeping up barely 1 percent a year through the 1980s and into the 1990s.⁴³

While the economy is generally considered a success, problems still exist--problems that quite possibly will diminish American strength in the future. America's prolonged period of recovery under President Reagan surpassed all expectations; however, this same period showed an increase in federal spending

and trade deficits, thus making the United States the world's largest debtor nation instead of the creditor nation of the past. These current twin deficits (trade and federal budget) will continue to erode America's economic policy options until our government and the population decide to seriously do something about it.

By most economists' figures, the United States is clearly in third place economically behind Japan and Europe when measuring the world's GNP in terms of yearly output. At the same time, when measuring the percentage of the world's gross product, the United States ranks as having approximately one-fifth of the global economic product. As Samuel P. Huntington observes:

In short, if "hegemony" means having 40 percent or more of world economic activity (a percentage Britain never remotely approximated during its hegemonic years), American hegemony disappeared long ago. If hegemony means producing 20 to 25 percent of the world product and twice as much as any other individual country, American hegemony looks quite secure.⁴⁴

Militarily, the United States is, and will continue to be, the strongest nation on the face of the earth. Each and every author studied for this work agrees that no other nation even remotely matches America's military strength since the decline of the Soviet Union. Most authors also agree that the military element of power is a declining measurement of world power and more and more emphasis is placed on the economic and political elements of power. Such authors as Nye readily point out,

however, that military force "can never be ruled out in an anarchic system of states where there is no higher government to settle conflicts and where the ultimate recourse is self-help."⁴⁵ Most agree that the possession of a strong military force is still essential in today's world and will still play important political roles in the years to come. Even Clausewitz pointed out that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means."⁴⁶ War, or the threat of it, will be with the world as long as nations exist on the planet. Although the military is one of the most expensive outlays to the U.S. budget, it is a necessary one that must continue for the foreseeable future.

The world's most powerful military machine, that of the United States, is currently decreasing in size--both in budget and in manpower. Even so, when considering the factors that contribute to military power, the United States will continue to have the strongest and most technologically advanced military in the world.

Politically, the United States remains the world leader. Since the United States stepped into the world leadership role, either through other nations not willing to assume the role or through its combined military and economic power at the end of World War II, it has not been challenged with the possible exception of the Soviet Union. Through its military strength, its willingness to step into forays of other nations, its superior diplomatic corps and overall influence in the world arena the United States has continued to lead the world. "A

country may get the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such affects".⁴⁷ The political stability of the United States in conjunction with its culture, values, ideology, and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules in the international arena make its voice considerably greater than other nations. This trend will likely continue because of the universalistic popular culture of the United States, the spread of democracy versus the downfall of communism, and the political make-up and cohesion so apparent in the United States.

THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES)

No discussion of world power would be complete without a discussion of what used to be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Throughout the period from about 1950 until its demise in 1991, the Soviet Union was one of the bipolar superpowers of the world. Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists, although its successor states possess large militaries armed with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union underwent what Kennedy describes as "imperial overstretch"--that is, its military and economic overextension has led to its downfall. Russia is in economic and political decomposition with only some of its military left. It would appear that, with the absence of competent leadership associated with the struggle between the ex-Soviet republics and different nationalities, even the military element of power is ineffectual, although it remains

one of the largest in the world. All that remains of a once great power is its vast array of nuclear weapons, controlled by largely unknown leaders. This aspect alone makes what used to be called the Soviet Union even more dangerous.

The Russian revolution to an open market system has just begun. "Once the old system has been undermined and the process of revolutionary change begun, it usually proves uncontrollable. This clearly is what is happening in the Soviet Union."⁴⁸ As it presently stands, no one controls the economy or the military which puts Russia out of the picture of world leadership in any aspect for some time.

PACIFIC RIM COUNTRIES

Although Japan is considered a Pacific Rim country, a separate section of this paper will be used for its discussion. Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers includes in his discussion of the composition of the Pacific Rim countries not only the economic powerhouse of Japan, but also the People's Republic of China, Australia, New Zealand, and the NICs of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Also included in his discussion is the larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) lands of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.⁴⁹

On the economic side, the Pacific Rim countries, as a whole, account for approximately 43 percent of the world's GNP. Many economists believe that this percent will rise to at least 50

percent by the year 2000, thereby shifting the economic gravity away from America and Europe and to the Pacific Rim. Taken as a whole, this is quite impressive, but if a researcher looks at each individual country involved, only Japan, Korea and China have any impact on the world economy.

Korea is a country divided and presently the more advanced South Korea has grown to possess over twice the population and four times the GNP of North Korea. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe shocked the hardline North Korean government, which, with its economic aid cut off, finds itself alone with China, Cuba and North Vietnam in the communist world. Many economists expect to see North Korea in the next few years go the way of Russia. With only a few industrialized cities, most of its GNP is devoted to its military, and very little world trade, North Korea's economy simply cannot continue without massive assistance or trade. The South, on the other hand, is one of the economic dynamos of the Pacific Rim. While South Korea has a lot going for it in the economic arena, it did suffer setbacks during 1990. The Korean stock market suffered large downturns. The rising oil prices, related to the Gulf War, squeezed profits and generated inflation and labor problems. This, associated with maldistribution of income, rising expectations of general populace (especially students) and environmental issues all added up to obstruction for future economic growth. Like the rest of the Pacific Rim countries, South Korea is heavily dependent upon imports for almost all its raw materials to feed its industry.

From wood, oil, and electronics to the very food for its population, South Korea must rely on the world to keep its economic growth at a respectable rate. Any economic sanction or deprivation of raw materials would surely bring South Korea to its knees. To help cover its dependence on foreign imports, South Korea has established trade agreements with China--the one great land mass of natural resources on the Pacific Rim.

Like most other Asian countries, China continues to feel the impact of the breakup of the Communist system in Europe. As a partially closed society, China's economic figures are, at best, suspect; most economists believe that China's economic growth maintained a high annual rate of nearly 9 percent for much of the 1980s. "But the PRC remains a country whose human and technological infrastructure is developed to an extent far below that of the United States or even the Soviet Union."⁵⁰ Nevertheless, China's much vaunted and increasingly older "four modernizations" (defense, agriculture, industry, and science) was a commitment to all-out economic growth. The only events likely to stop China's economic growth would be the outbreak of war with the former Soviet Union, which seems unlikely at this time, or a political and social revolution such as that going on in the CIS today. "But the general point remains: China will have a very large GNP within a relatively short space of time, barring some major catastrophe; and while it will still be relatively poor in per capita terms, it will be decidedly richer than it is today."⁵¹ China, in the last few years has opened trade

agreements with both Korea and Japan and has entered the U.S. market. The Chinese have opened several southern "special economic zones" to increased trade and capitalist investment. These have enjoyed spectacular growth, but the rest of China's industry is still trapped in standard communist inefficiency.

As previously mentioned, the majority of the remaining Pacific Rim countries has enjoyed unique and dramatic economic success.

Economic growth in this vast area has been stimulated by a happy combination of factors: a spectacular rise in industrial productivity by export-oriented societies, in turn leading to great increases in foreign trade, shipping, and financial services; a marked move into the newer technologies as well as into cheaper, labor-intensive manufactures; and an immensely successful effort to increase agricultural output faster than population growth.⁵²

As a result, the combined economies of the Pacific Rim (including Japan) are roughly equal in size to that of the United States. Simply stated, this entire area is where much of the economic activity in the world is happening. Barely twenty years ago, the Pacific Rim was engulfed in a war, power confrontations, poverty, insurgencies, and a move towards comunistic ideologies. Today, this entire area is one of the most important trading centers of the world--especially with the United States where trade has grown from insignificant figures to an estimated 300 billion dollars in annual two-way trade; nearly one-third larger than with Europe. This trend will likely continue well into the next century as the economic center of gravity continues its shift

from Europe and America and becomes entrenched into the Asia/Pacific region. While it can be said that the entire Pacific Rim enjoys economic growth not existing in Europe or the United States, the other elements of power leave a lot to be desired.

Politically, the Pacific Rim countries carry very little weight within the global community. First, there is not one single country within the Pacific Rim that is willing or capable of bringing the others into concert politically. Most of the nations within this vast area are inward-looking, secular societies afraid of outside influence. Secondly, there remains a great mistrust of Japan throughout the region and the world. The entire Pacific Rim especially China, Korea, and the Philippines has not forgiven Japanese wartime aggression. Thirdly, the entire Pacific Rim lacks a culture and a set of values with broad international appeal. Professor Nye, when discussing co-optive or soft power, concludes that in order for a country to have a voice in international institutions, it must have a universalistic popular culture.⁵³ In order for the Pacific Rim countries to become political powerhouses, fundamental changes in their cultures and societies would have to occur.

Militarily, the majority of the Pacific Rim countries rely heavily on the West for security. China, and, of course, North Korea are not dependent upon the United States for their security, but, according to Professor Nye, they, and the rest of the region, are happy with the stabilization the West brings to

this region of the world.⁵⁴ The fear of a remilitarized Japan is still quite apparent even after some 45 years. Another factor that deeply concerns the military element of power in the Pacific Rim is that as long as the West continues its policy of military stabilization and security of the region, the governments there are not required to budget large portions of their GNP towards their own military or become involved in an arms race. Currently, the highly industrialized countries within the Pacific Rim, with the exception of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, spend approximately 1 to 2 percent of their GNP on their own defense forces. This further allows these countries to reinvest these "unused" funds back into their economy. The military element of power in the Pacific Rim is severely lacking in all countries except China, North and South Korea, and Japan and even they are not considered "world class" armies.

China's military forces show much greater regional than global military power. Technology is a primary contributor to its absence as a world power.

The PRC's technical military problem goes beyond the question of numbers. At the end of the Korean War the PLA was a reasonably modern force in terms of equipment, almost all of which came from the Soviet Union or had been made in China to Russian specifications. After the split in the early 1960s the Chinese were faced with the problem of manufacturing an increasingly obsolescent force.⁵⁵

Recently, the four modernization programs instituted by the Chinese government has had as one of its objectives to develop a

more modern military force but this will take many more years to materialize. Meanwhile the Chinese have continued building a credible nuclear force for "finite nuclear deterrence to prevent strategic attack".⁵⁶ The export of military equipment to less-developed countries (primarily the Middle East and South America) has also shown a dramatic increase in recent years and by the mid-to-late 1980s China was shown to be the fifth largest exporter of weapons.

The PLA is a military power to be reckoned with; however, China's inability to use this important element of power globally greatly hinders its government from becoming a true world power.

North Korea is another country which does not rely on American security. The North Korean Army is a large one but is poorly armed and equipped. Support from China is waning since the Chinese government began holding trade talks with the West and South Korea. Improved relations between North and South Korea signal a positive step towards reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. North Korea even recently agreed to stop development of nuclear weapons.

The North Korean navy is primarily coastal in nature; its air force is becoming outdated as repair parts and other critical technologies from the Soviet Union began to trickle; and its technological base is not sufficient to enter the global power race. Best guess is that North Korea is a potent adversary on the Korean Peninsula, maybe even a regional power, but surely does not measure up to a global military power.

South Korea, on the other hand, with technological advances on the military and economic scene and under the security umbrella of the United States, enjoys a strong, modern military capable of its own defense. Whether or not the South Korean government wishes to spend more for its own defense remains to be seen. It appears that they are quite satisfied with their home defense and have no ambitions about becoming a regional nor global military power.

Currently there is but one power within the Pacific Rim countries that has the capacity to become a world leader: Japan. This country, as can be seen from the discussion below, contains, to some extent, all three elements of power.

JAPAN

Dr. Eugene Brown, professor of political science at Lebanon Valley College and visiting professor at the United States Army War College, in 1991 summed up Japan's rise as an economic giant:

For the past four decades the mutually beneficial U.S.-Japan partnership has served a crucial link in America's global strategy of containing the Soviets and for the Japanese, permitted them to focus their prodigious energies on a single-minded drive for economic growth while shielded behind the American security guarantee.⁵⁷

Japan's economic performance over the past four decades is unquestionably impressive. With a slow start, after being destroyed by the war, Japan's GNP grew about 10 percent a year during the mid-60s through the mid-70s--unheard of in any other

economy. "In 1950, Japan's economy was one-twentieth the size of the American economy; three decades later it had grown to more than half the size of the U.S. economy."⁵⁸ Today Japan is the globe's largest creditor nation, has the second largest economy, and is the second largest exporter of manufactured goods. Whatever is happening in the world of economics, is happening in Japan. As previously noted, many economists believe that the measurement of world power is moving away from the traditional military element of power to the economic one.

If so, states professor Nye, we are in a "Japanese period" in world politics, but cautions that "one should not leap too quickly to the conclusion that all trends favor economic power or countries like Japan."⁵⁹ Japan is vulnerable to change in the international trading economy, as well as to trade discrimination or trade war. Japan remains heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and exports to more populous markets. Any closure of foreign markets and/or a disruption of vital oil supplies would effectually close down Japan's economic well-being. Also, as one looks back at 1990 and 1991, Japan's economic powerhouse displayed a few cracks. The stock market took a nose dive, anger grew over the U.S./Japan balance of trade, and the temporary slowdown of oil imports due to the Persian Gulf War greatly affected Japan's economic showing. "Moreover, it dawned on many people that Japan had become a capital-rich, labor-poor country whose vast wealth is dedicated to making Japanese cooperatives competitive in the world rather than improving the

Japanese standard of living."⁶⁰

Intangible resources also affect economic power. Interdependence is such an intangible resource. Japan is dependent upon the United States for the large American marketplace. On the other hand, the United States is less dependent upon Japan. This creates a situation that favors the United States in bargaining power in the economic arena. Simply stated, Japan has to "go along" with the United States in most economic matters such as financing the American debt and free trade agreements.

Today there is increasingly hostile American and European reaction to the seemingly unstoppable Japanese economy. Year after year, the Japanese provide more and more products on the open market and trading surpluses have widened. While the United States, due to its beliefs in open trade, has done little to curb imports, the Europeans have established import quotas and economic obstructions on Japanese products. This trend will likely continue in the years ahead and if Japan doesn't do something other than "voluntary" export limits and obstructions of imports towards the United States, there will surely be action by the American government. Already there is pressure on Washington for import limits, a call for substantial increase in American imports into Japan, and even an encouragement to raise the exchange rate of the yen. "As the western world drifts toward quasi-protectionism, moreover, its tendency to put limits upon the total amount of textiles or televisions imported implies

that Japan will have to divide that shrunken market with its Asian rivals."⁶¹ As we have already seen, the entire Pacific Rim is an economic dynamo. The sharing of the market with these rivals plus the fact that Japan's economy is "maturing" is a definite disadvantage for them.

We have also seen that things like population is important to a nation's power. In fact, Japan has experienced a birth-rate decline in recent years--more so than any of the advanced economies. This fact, coupled with the fact that, like America, Japan is experiencing a "graying" of its work force. "By 2010 it will have the lowest ratio of working age people (those 15 to 64 years old) among the leading industrial nations, which will require high social security outlays and could lead to a loss of dynamism."⁶²

Many feel that the key to Japan's future economy is whether it will elect to move away from its neo-mercantilist strategy and towards a more import-dependent society. If not, Japan is ready for significant retaliation due to the growing isolationism and protectionism evident in Europe and America. "Japan has become too large a player to have a free ride in the international trading system any longer."⁶³ While some political scientists like Richard Rosecrance and Joseph S. Nye Jr. raise questions about Japan's economic future, it appears that Japan will remain strong for some time.

While the measurement of power is moving towards a strong economic criterion, the military element of power remains

important. It may surprise some to learn that even though Japan spends only 1 to 2 percent of its GNP on its military, the Japanese military is not at all lightweight. "Spending 1 percent of its GNP on defense has allowed Japan to develop a military capability on the scale of the major West European countries."⁶⁴ The size of Japan's military includes some 150,000 self-defense forces and approximately 90,000 sailors and airmen. By some accounts, Japan's defense budget is the third largest in the world, contributing greatly to its modern navy consisting of some 60 warships (including 14 submarines), 33 destroyers, 16 frigates, 67 smaller craft and 180 aircraft and its air force with 315 combat aircraft. Its army is organized into 13 divisions (in NATO terms, they are really brigades), equally distributed between Infantry, Armor and Artillery. Its Army Aviation consist of 33 squadrons with 400 light aircraft and helicopters.⁶⁵

Still, according to several authors the weakest element of Japan's power is its military weakness. Almost all agree that there are two basic reasons for this. First, the United States wrote the Japanese constitution which proclaims that the Japanese people would forever renounce war and a strong military capable of war outside its boundaries. Instead, Japan was to rely on the American security umbrella. Each and every government since the implementation of their constitution has reinforced this strategy. The people of Japan do not want a large military force--especially capable of operations outside their borders--

do not want possession nor basing of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil and will not support a higher budget for military expenditures. These facts were again proven by Japan's military absence in the Persian Gulf War.

Secondly, further Japanese rearmament would greatly upset its neighbors within the Pacific Rim. They have yet to forget the Japan of the 1930s and 1940s. Surely there would be countermeasures by them and thus greatly limit the gains of Japan's rearmament. Since Japan is totally consumed by its exporting economy, greater external problems would occur during and after rearmament. It would be easier for Japan to convert its economic power to political power rather than to military power and get roughly the same results.

"To date, Japan has yet to make a serious and determined effort to convert its economic and financial power into substantial political influence."⁶⁶ Simply stated, Japan lacks the ambition to play in global politics. This lack of ambition can be diagnosed into two separate causes. The uniqueness and historical isolation of the Japanese civilization prohibits Japan from seeking world political power. Secondly, new hostilities, not only from its Asian neighbors, but also world-wide, provoked by Japanese commercial and trading policies are obstacles to its rise in political power. On the other hand, the recent behavior of Japan which has "generally hidden under the table since the first shots rang out in Kuwait" further erodes Japanese political standing in the world.⁶⁷

Japan has had an immense growth rate since the end of World War II and enjoys a very favorable global economic situation. From the Japanese viewpoint, it would not be a wise move to change what got them there in the first place--something Professor Kennedy calls Japan's (self-proclaimed) "omidirectional peaceful diplomacy"--or what might be more cynically described as "being all things to all men."⁶⁸ It has had the protection of the U.S. military, kept the yen exchange rate low, implemented restrictions on non-vital raw material imports, and was all things to all men. In essence, Japan has been able to increase its economic power with few political responsibilities.

The expression "money talks" certainly applies to world political power. Invariably, Japan, the world's greatest creditor, will take a more active role in world politics in the years to come, but not yet. Japan has established businesses, invested heavily in the stock markets of the major powers, continues to finance (to a great extent) the American national debt, and has created lobbies in most of the free world governmental capitols. It is only a matter of time until Japan becomes a political power comparable to that of the United States.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC)

Many analysts agree that of the economic, military and political power centers in existence today, none will be more capable of assuming hegemonic control of the world better than

the European Community (EC). Samuel P. Huntington argues that if the European Community became politically cohesive, it "would have the population resources, economic wealth, technology, and actual and potential military strength to be the predominant power of the 21st century."⁶⁹

Politically, the European Community currently lacks the cohesion to become a world power. Historically, Europe has never acted in concert on international issues which, as some believe, has been the root cause of numerous wars dating back to the Middle Ages. The European Community is nothing more politically than a confederation of twelve nations with strongly divergent policies. The ever-present ideas of national sovereignty and the erosion of a nation's capacity to rule inside its own borders, constantly interfere with political consensus.

Most of the members of the EC are prosperous, democratic welfare states with an ideological appeal comparable to that of the United States. The culture of these countries also has a basic appeal to the entire globe. Economic decisions and support to international organizations and institutions are hallmarks of the European countries as well as solid educational programs, social programs and an increasingly common foreign policy.

If the eventual goal of the EC is the creation of a European Union, something resembling the United States of America, then all of the potential political factors are already present. Most authors agree, however, that there will not be a United Federal Europe. For the present, and likely well into the future, the

Council of Ministers will be the only political body and the center of decisionmaking. As Professor Nye puts it: "if the past is any indicator, a federal Europe is a long way off. Even if 1992 lives up to expectations, major political questions remain."⁷⁰

Militarily, West Europe could become quite powerful. But if it cannot unify politically, neither can it act in concert militarily. The size of the armed forces of the twelve European Community nations combined are about the size of those of the United States before the reduction. Although faced with standardization problems in equipment and, more importantly, in languages, one is still faced with sheer size and high technology. Military spending averages around 4 percent of the GNP in most countries of the EC. "Were those countries, or, more significant still, the entire EEC, spending around 7 percent of total GNP on defense, as the United States is today, the sums allocated would be equal to hundreds of billions of dollars--that is roughly the same amount as the two military superpowers spend."⁷¹

The West European Union (WEU), the unused military arm of the EC, has recently given signs of awakening. In 1990, Germany and France established a small combined military force headquartered near the German/French border. Many analysts think that this is the first step in fleshing out the WEU, although Germany and France deny such allegations. Others, such as John Train, believe that "the Western European Union conception is

wishful thinking for now. First it's a not even paper tiger, but a paper butterfly".⁷² Nevertheless, the WEU debate came alive during the early months of Operation Desert Shield as a possible solution to the defense of European Community objectives within Europe and joint operations outside Europe. With the uncertain need for NATO now that the Soviet Union is no longer, the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and the growing economic consensus within the alliance, the WEU, in some form, will become much more than an office in London.

One element of power appears to be on track for the European Community.

On the other hand, in the economic sphere, the program for the post-1992 Single Market is proceeding, and while this certainly will not reach all of its targets in detail by the end of 1992, it has already accomplished a fundamental change in how European businessmen,⁷³ industrialists and bankers see the future.

During the period 1960-1988 the European Community's share of the world's product ranged from approximately 23 to 25 percent compared to the United States' 26 to 30 percent and Japan's 5 to 10 percent. Altogether Europe's resources are impressive, as can be seen from the figures above. "Its economy is larger than Japan's and only slightly smaller than the United States."⁷⁴ Also, recently the twelve member alliance and the European Free Trade Association agreed to form a free trade zone extending from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean consisting of nineteen nations. This agreement, to be implemented in January 1993 will

create a market about 50 percent larger than that of the United States in terms of population (some 380 million people). Many newspapers and news broadcasts are currently stating that this new market, to be called the "European Economic Area", will be the largest, most integrated economic area in the world. According to one news source, the nineteen nations (twelve of the EC and seven of the European Free Trade Association) already account for more than 40 percent of world trade.

Particularly crucial to the overall economic growth in the EC is what happens as Germany continues to pour vast sums of its money into the former East Germany. The EC, led by Germany's impressive economic growth, is somewhat leery towards Germany in that Germany is thought by many to be trying to reestablish its past position of economic dominance in Europe by annexing the former East Germany. This will take some time, however. "It now seems that eastern Germany's industrial reconstruction and environmental cleanup will alone absorb more than a decade of western Germany's investment surplus."⁷⁵ Whatever happens to the German economy due to its unification could spill over into the entire EC; however, with a single market system it is likely that the EC will greatly benefit in the years to come. For now, most Europeans are enjoying increased wealth due to a vigorous economy. There are still major decisions that must be negotiated between members of the alliance before real economic power in a consolidated sense can be brought to bear on the rest of the world.

CONCLUSIONS

How does all of this fit into a world system? It appears that the United States will remain a world leader for quite some time. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the world system of politics has moved away from a bipolar system and to what Charles Krauthammer refers to as a unipolar moment in time, with the United States in control of this system. The central question is whether the United States, either willing or completely out of necessity, will remain the unipolar leader. Or will it be replaced by one of the Pacific Rim countries or the European Community? Or will the system of world interactions change once more and head towards a multipolar system?

There is little doubt that the United States can lead a unipolar world. It has the economic, political and military elements of power to do so. The more problematic question at this point in time is whether or not Americans will support such a unipolar status. The threat has gone away. Our former enemy under the bipolar world has disappeared. More and more articles, books, and newscasts are going into great detail about those foreign entanglements George Washington warned us about so many years ago. It would, however, be a grave mistake to view these entanglements as a drain on the American economy. Since before World War II, and proven time and time again, American involvement overseas has remained good for the economy. There is a wave of isolationism that is spreading throughout America that

has both popular and natural appeal: a movement that can be compared to the pre-Pearl Harbor one. It is also one that our government cannot afford to let happen. America cannot lead in a unipolar system if the isolationists win out.

Questions also arise about America's economy. Can the United States afford to be a unipolar leader? Each year the U.S. depends heavily upon our European and Pacific partners to finance our debts--hence lending even more to the argument that America cannot afford to abolish its involvement abroad. Growing concerns about the domestic issues could very well stem the flow of foreign investments and loans that keep America strong. Many argue whether or not the United States could have unilaterally gone to war with Iraq and still be solvent in terms of finances. In order for the United States to maintain control of this unipolar world, its domestic program must get on track, its twin deficits under control, and it must develop and maintain involvement abroad.

One of the biggest concerns for the United States in its role as the unipolar leader is the problem of keeping the international marketplace as open as possible to American goods. Our foreign policy for many years has been based on open markets. At the same time the U.S. has allowed Europe, the Pacific Rim, and even countries within the western hemisphere, to practice trade protectionism. With the economic power of the U.S. declining year after year, many of these same countries are standing up to America and not changing their ideas on

protectionism. Excuses such as hormone-fed beef or inferior manufactured goods are common. The United States must overcome these obstacles if it is to remain the unipolar leader.

Finally, in order for the United States to remain the unipolar leader, other countries must accept its leadership. More and more countries like Japan, France and the European Community in general are less willing to follow the United States in geopolitics. Of course, all of these countries, to varying degrees, helped the United States defeat Iraq during the Gulf War. No wonder, it was for their own good--some to their very survival due to the oil market. What happens when the United States, in conjunction with the United Nations, tries to build another coalition--one that is not in the best interests of the countries of the EC or the Pacific Rim? Suppose the United States had to go it alone in the Persian Gulf. Could it have survived politically and economically? In order for the United States to lead a unipolar world, its foreign policy must align as closely as possible to as many nations as our national interests allow. It must be understanding, multilateral in nature, and take into account the desires of other nations.

The world is definitely within a unipolar system as it stands now. There are many variables that may, and probably will, interact on this unipolar world, causing it to change once more. From the evidence presented and the corresponding rules laid out by Kaplan, the world will not revert to a balance-of-power system or to one of the bipolar systems he

describes. When, and if, this change to a new system occurs, the result will surely be multipolar in nature.

The more isolationism spreads through America, the more the United States will be forced to accept a multipolar status. The evidence shows that the United States cannot become truly isolated. The world is in an information period in which corporations can and do establish branches and subsidiaries all over the world. Even today, it is very difficult to determine which automobile is truly American made. This trend will continue as international companies look for cheap labor and developing trade arrangements. Whenever the multipolar world comes about it will look something like this: the United States, Europe, and Japan will be the economic powers; politically, the United States and the EC will dominate; the United States will retain its military superiority. The multipolar world will be unstable as the superpowers vie for trade markets. Disagreements in the political arena will pit two superpowers against the third. Cooperation among nations, when they do, will tend to forget countries of the Third World. The multipolar world will witness many small regional wars, economic development and a corresponding balance and imbalance as nations compete, alliances will form and dissolve very frequently, followed by renewed arms races, and finally a proliferation of different leaders--each wanting peace and harmony that will elude them time and time again.

No one knows when, or if, this multipolarity will come

about. There is a list of authors that believe the United States will loose its grip on the unipolar world currently in existence in a relatively short period of time due to its economic status and large deficits. Others believe that the United States is merely in a period of renewal and that the American spirit, along with difficult domestic, foreign policy, and budgetary decisions, will lead the world into whatever system that will emerge.

It would be great to have a world system--a new world order--in which nations get along and make decisions that are best for all. Perhaps Roskin's stratified system fullfills this desire, but unfortunately, it will be a long way off. For now, the world will remain unipolar.

The basic premise of this paper has been to show that, in order for a nation to be a world leader, it must possess the elements of power. Only then can a nation control, or be a partner in, the world political system. The United States is the only nation on the face of the earth that possesses all three elements of power to such a degree as to control the system of world politics. While other nations possess the political, economic, and military elements of power in varying degrees, they are not yet capable of controlling the world system.

ENDNOTES

¹Edward N. Luttwak, "The Shape of Things to Come," Commentary 89 (June 1990): 17.

²Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs America and the World 1990/91, (1991): 23.

³Donald M. Snow, National Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 14.

⁴*Ibid.*, 15.

⁵Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Still in the Game," World Monitor 3 (March 1990): 43.

⁶Snow, 16.

⁷Nye, 44.

⁸Snow, 16.

⁹Nye, 43.

¹⁰John Brewer, "What Made England Great," The Wilson Quarterly Volume XIII, 1 (New Years 1989): 15.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Joseph S. Nye., "The Changing Nature of World Power," Political Science Quarterly 105 (Summer 1990): 190.

¹³Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 444.

¹⁴Patrick M. Cronin, "American Global Leadership After the Cold War: From Pax Americana to Pax Consortis," Strategic Review (Summer 1991): 9.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power," Foreign Affairs America and the World 1990/91, (1991): 35.

¹⁷Kennedy, 372.

¹⁸David Jablonsky, "Elements of Power," War, National Policy, and Strategy Course 2, Volume 1, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (Summer 1991): 34.

¹⁹Snow, 17.

²⁰Jablonsky, 33.

²¹Ibid.

²²Nye, "Still in the Game," 45.

²³Snow, 17.

²⁴Nye, "Still in the Game," 46.

²⁵Kennedy, 415.

²⁶Jablonsky, 30.

²⁷Nye, "Still in the Game," 47.

²⁸Snow, 18.

²⁹Ibid., 19.

³⁰Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.--Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs 67 (Winter 1988/89): 90.

³¹Krauthammer, 23.

³²Michael Roskin, Ch. 1, "Strange New World," IR: The New World of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993 expected).

³³Morton A. Kaplan, "Variants on Six Models of the International System," In International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 291.

³⁴Roskin, 9.

³⁵Ibid., 16.

³⁶Krauthammer, 24.

³⁷Roskin, 10.

³⁸Ibid., 12.

³⁹Ibid., 15.

⁴⁰Huntington, 81.

⁴¹Nye, "Still in the Game," 43.

⁴²Kennedy, 525.

⁴³Paul Krugman, The Age of Diminished Expectations (Washington, DC: The Washington Post Co., 1990), 5.

⁴⁴Huntington, 84.

⁴⁵Nye, "Still in the Game," 45.

⁴⁶Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl Von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 87.

⁴⁷Nye, "Still in the Game," 46.

⁴⁸Pfaff, 40.

⁴⁹Kennedy, 44.

⁵⁰Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Understating U.S. Strength," Foreign Policy 72 (Fall 1988): 118.

⁵¹Kennedy, 455.

⁵²Ibid., 441.

⁵³Nye, "The Changing Nature of World Power," 183.

⁵⁴Ibid., 185.

⁵⁵T.N. Dupuy and John A.C. Andrews, The Almanac of World Military Power (4th ed.; San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1980), 104.

⁵⁶Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead-The changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990), 136.

⁵⁷Eugene Brown, "Japan Achieves Recovery, Little Respect," Sunday Patriot News, (Harrisburg, PA), December 8, 1991, Sec. B, p.11.

⁵⁸Nye, Bound to Lead, 156.

⁵⁹Nye, "Still in the Game," 45.

⁶⁰A.U.S.A., Beyond the Cold War: A Global Assessment 1990 (Washington, DC: Institute of Land Warfare, January 1991), 38.

⁶¹Kennedy, 461.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Nye, Bound to Lead, 158.

⁶⁴Nye, "Understating U.S. Strength," 119.

⁶⁵John Keegan, World Armies, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983), 324.

⁶⁶Robert Tucker, "1989 and all That," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1990): 102.

⁶⁷Krauthammer, 24.

⁶⁸Kennedy, 458.

⁶⁹Huntington, 93.

⁷⁰Nye, Bound to Lead, 154.

⁷¹Kennedy, 472.

⁷²John Train, "The Gulf War and the Future of NATO," Armed Forces Journal International (July 1991): 24.

⁷³Pfaff, 42.

⁷⁴Nye, Bound to Lead, 143.

⁷⁵Pfaff, 41.

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