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# A Content Analysis and Study of the Influence of the New York Times and Los Angeles Times on Public Opinion

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Dr. Harold Shaver, Advisor  
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Major William Darley, of the Office of the Chief of Staff for Public Affairs, Department of the Army, conceived the general idea for this research in December 1990, and worked to gain its acceptance as an approved topic for research with OCPA.

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Finally, we acknowledge a debt of gratitude to our faculty advisor, Dr. Harold C. Shaver, director of the W. Page Pitt School of Journalism, Marshall University. His patience and eye for detail through our many discussions was invaluable as we refined our method, conducted the study, reported the findings, and justified the conclusions.

As critical as each man's contributions were to this research, we alone conducted the study, and are solely responsible for any errors of fact, omission, and commission contained herein.

CPT E.S. Loomis

CPT P.S. Phillips

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## Introduction

The relationship between the United States military and the American news media was fundamentally altered during the course of the Vietnam War. The mutual distrust, suspicion, and in some cases outright hatred have almost become institutionalized in the nearly two decades since the conflict ended.

The conflict in the Persian Gulf once again raised the spectre of controversy regarding military-media relations. Many of the techniques employed and issues raised by each side in 1991 had their foundation in 'lessons learned' during the Vietnam War.

Two of the more contentious topics during each war were the amount and type of coverage given United States combat forces and military policy, and the effects of that coverage on subsequent American public opinion concerning the employment of military firepower.

Following the cessation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there was great debate regarding the level of objectivity and the effect on public opinion of media reports coming out of Vietnam, and whether either of these factors was critical in undermining American resolve to continue the war effort.

Some scholars, such as noted media critics Peter Braestrup and Ernest Lefever, performed content analyses and concluded that elements of the media were biased against U.S. policy and forces and thus contributed to an erosion of national will, thereby helping to 'lose' the war.<sup>1</sup> However, many researchers

and media experts insisted this position was a myth or outrageous distortion, and pointed to a lack of empirical evidence linking coverage by one or more media outlets to public opinion.<sup>2</sup>

Not surprisingly, given the wide recognition of Vietnam as the nation's first 'televised war,' the vast majority of research into the effects of media on public opinion of the war was dedicated to the study of television. In fact, a search of the literature uncovered only one study, Peter Braestrup's Big Story, that examined newspaper coverage of the war and how it may have influenced public opinion.

Currently there are researchers conducting studies intended to examine televised coverage of the Persian Gulf War.<sup>3</sup> Again, there appears to be a relative lack of interest in the newspaper coverage of the conflict.

## **Purpose**

The purpose of this research was to track coverage of Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm in selected national print media to determine the amount and tone of coverage given various aspects of the conflict; and further, to determine what, if any, effect media coverage had on popular support for U.S. military intervention and conflict in the Persian Gulf.

## Research Questions

In an attempt to eliminate any presupposition or bias, questions, rather than hypotheses, that addressed specific issues regarding military-media relationships were developed. The researchers felt that answers to the following questions would lead to better judgements concerning the amount, tone and effects of coverage of the war.

1. In selected newspapers, what was the relative amount of coverage of certain aspects, elements or variables of the war in the Persian Gulf?
2. Was there a discernible tone to the coverage? What percentage of stories were favorable, unfavorable or neutral in the way in which they reflected upon Presidential policy and/or military intervention in the region?
3. Was there a relationship between the amount and/or tone of the coverage of the operation and the level of popular support as reflected in various opinion polls?
4. What variables, aspects or events receiving coverage by the media appeared to influence public opinion of U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf (if any)?

5. How did the amount and tone of coverage differ between the selected newspapers?

### **Literature Search**

#### **PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY**

Many studies dealing with media influence on public opinion have been conducted; however, most of those have dealt with media influence on voters during political campaigns. In the past few years, an increasing number of studies have sought to determine the relationships and impacts between public opinion and national security policy.

Russet and Graham have proposed four possible relationships between public opinion and national security policy. The first is that public opinion is **controlling**; that is, that policy makers follow the dictates of public opinion as reflected in polls. The second interpretation says that it is **controlled**, and policy makers manipulate public opinion. Third, opinion may be deemed **irrelevant** in that leaders nearly obey nor dictate public opinion. Finally, public opinion and policy may **interact** with each other.<sup>4</sup>

Intuitively it would seem that the first three relationships would be rather extreme if taken universally, and researchers have generally been able to refute each in specific cases.<sup>5</sup>

Russett and Graham argue that

...leaders in a real sense interact



with public opinion, both responding to it and manipulating it...they respond by doing what will be popular in the short run (using or threatening to use military force internationally) when domestic, economic, and political conditions encourage short term vote maximization. They manipulate it in the sense that they increase their popularity without correcting the underlying causes of mass discontent that endangered their popularity in the first place.<sup>6</sup>

This somewhat cynical view of the decision makers' process would mandate intense interest in both media coverage of crises and poll results regarding the public's perception of the same events. The media, as both the reporters of events and of poll results, would therefore be critical players in the process.

#### MEDIA IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION

The American Institute for Political Communication released a report in 1969 that attempted to quantify to some degree the dynamics of public opinion. The study concluded that about two-thirds of the general public felt that their voting behavior was influenced to some degree by the media. The media, as institutions, were found to be among the most influential of organizations in the formulation of voting decisions. However, the degree of influence felt by the individual was based on a number of factors, including the extent of an individual's dependence on the media (the level of obtrusiveness), the medium's importance as a news source and its credibility as a news source.<sup>7</sup>

In 1969, newspapers consistently ranked higher than television

with the public in terms of individuals' dependence upon them and for their perceived credibility.<sup>8</sup> In many instances, this confidence has continued; however, there have been exceptions.

In 1983, a poll conducted by Gallup indicated that newspapers ranked sixth among ten institutions in terms of public confidence, behind organized religion, military, banks, the U.S. Supreme Court, and public schools. Television ranked last. The same poll found that 38 percent of respondents had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in newspapers, while only 25 percent said that about television.<sup>9</sup>

However, in 1984, Roper found that if given differing reports by the two mediums, 51 percent of adults would believe television, compared to 22 percent who would believe newspapers.<sup>10</sup>

#### MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE MILITARY

Although no one has been able to quantify the exact effects of media coverage on issues of national defense policy, for there are simply too many variables, several studies have indicated that generally, media can shape the form and magnitude of opinion change on matters of national defense policy to a small degree, but cannot themselves initiate significant opinion change.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, it is clear that both the media and the military presume that media coverage can indeed have an effect on public opinion.

The actions of the military and the media since the end of the Vietnam era are indicative of their respective belief in the power of media as a force on public opinion. The military has made efforts to create a core of trained public affairs officers (PAOs) whose purpose is to perform functions similar to those of corporate public relations practitioners. Among these efforts have been programs where officers spend a year training with public relations or media firms, as well as degree programs wherein the military sends its officers to obtain advanced degrees in a journalism or public relations field. The media have consistently fought to gain access to military operations, ostensibly to increase public understanding of the issues involved, and thereby assist the public in the development of informed opinions. Lawsuits filed during military operations in Grenada and Saudi Arabia attest to the desire among journalists to broaden media access.

While the researchers found a number of studies that discussed the impact of media coverage on public opinion of national defense policy, few studies seeking to quantify the relationship were located. The two most widely cited works in this field appear to be Braestrup's Big Story, and Lefever's TV and National Defense. Both of these studies assumes that media coverage does indeed have an influence on public opinion, and each deals with aspects of coverage of the Vietnam War.

Braestrup charged that the 1968 Tet Offensive conducted by the North Vietnamese--an abject failure by the North Vietnamese

militarily--was misrepresented by the American media as a debacle for United States and South Vietnamese forces due to "...a rare combination of circumstances on the various habits, incentives, economic constraints, and managerial and manpower limitations peculiar to each of the major U.S. news organizations."<sup>12</sup>

He cited the New York Times' coverage of the Battle of Khe Sahn as an example of newspaper misrepresentation of the larger Tet Offensive. Khe Sahn began when the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) surrounded the U.S. Marine Base at Khe Sahn--a seige that would continue for 77 days. Military historians have since discounted this as a victory for the NVA since the number of U.S. casualties was low, the NVA sustained high losses, and the base was ultimately held.

Significantly, U.S. forces were systematically repelling NVA forces in numerous, simultaneous battles elsewhere, but these received scant coverage. Khe Sahn, while relatively unimportant, became a story probably due to the defensive nature of U.S. efforts there. Coverage of Khe Sahn was dominated by what Braestrup termed a "...suggestion of impending disaster."<sup>13</sup>

Braestrup's content analysis showed that during February and March of 1968, the Battle of Khe Sahn received intense coverage despite its relative unimportance in the context of the Tet Offensive and the entire war. During that period, 73 stories regarding Khe Sahn were published in the Times. Of those, 31 appeared on the front page--a number far outweighing the story's military merit.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, photographs published

by the Times likely misled the public as well:

Ten of the 25 Times Khe Sahn photographs showed U.S. troops wounded, dead, ducking fire, or surveying enemy-inflicted damage; four showed them in noncombat poses; and only one picture showed Marines firing back.<sup>15</sup>

Braestrup concluded that:

...there is no evidence of a direct relationship between the dominant media themes in early 1968 and changes in American mass public opinion vis-a-vis the Vietnam War itself...But we can observe unmistakable reflections of strong media themes (notably concerning Khe Sahn and the South Vietnamese) in the Congressional rhetoric and in the discussion by the politically active and media sensitive elites outside Washington.<sup>16</sup>

It is clear that Braestrup presumed some relationship between what was covered and what was later discussed and opined upon.

Lefever, in TV and National Defense, found that during 1972-1973, over 66% of the stories dealing with military issues appearing on the "CBS Evening News" were unfavorable in their characterization of the military. In contrast, only 13% of stories aired on the show during the same time period reflected positively on the military.<sup>17</sup>

Additionally, he found that nearly 50% of the stories selected by "CBS Evening News" dealt with what he categorized as "problems in the military." Lefever acknowledged that the impact of that coverage would be difficult to quantify, and would depend in large part on the perspective of the viewer.<sup>18</sup>

By questioning the network's fairness and service to the viewer, however, he appeared to link what was seen during evening

television news programs with potential public opinion.

#### PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Many researchers have attempted to draw correlations between media coverage and public opinion, but have not been able to establish cause-and-effect relationships.<sup>19</sup> This is likely due to the inherent complexities in the term 'influence,' and the relatively unstable nature of public opinion. Public opinion has been described as a concept made up of several variables, including depth, frequency, consistency and intensity.<sup>20</sup> Each of these variables is assumed to have a significant impact on the opinions held by individuals, and thus will impact on any polls taken.

Depth refers to the level of political attentiveness. This has been measured by polling on such questions as, "Who is the state senator from your district?" Some studies have found that only about 28% of respondents in 1967 could answer this question correctly.<sup>21</sup> This apparent lack of depth poses obvious problems for researchers attempting to analyze the findings from opinion polls.

Frequency is defined as the relative rate of opinion holding on a particular issue. This is usually measured by poll questions that ask, "Have you read, seen on TV, or heard about...?" Generally, people tend to hold opinions on issues of broad interest (such as wars or civil rights) most frequently, and less frequently hold opinions on issues more narrow or focused

in scope.<sup>22</sup>

Consistency measures respondents' opinions from one polls to the following poll(s). Ideally, individuals would give the same answer or hold the same opinion each time, but this is rarely so. For example, in 1968, opinions concerning America's options in Vietnam (withdraw, escalate, etc.) were solicited prior to and following the Presidential election. One study found that slightly less than fifty percent of the respondents gave the same response each time.<sup>23</sup> This indicated a somewhat ambivalent or confused view of the war, and would be a confounding variable to any researcher attempting to correlate public opinion and media studies.

Intensity measures respondents' level of belief in their responses. It is frequently determined by questions using a Likert-type scale such as "How important to you is/are...?" Obviously, the level of opinion intensity can have great ramifications upon the other variables, and make the researcher's job difficult.

It is critical to note that for years scholars and decision makers believed that public opinion on defense matters was too volatile to provide a stable platform upon which to base policy. More recently, however, a number of studies, including one by Shapiro and Page, have concluded that stability, not volatility, is the rule in public opinion on national defense matters, and that the public "...change their policy preferences in a rational fashion--in a manner worthy of serious consideration in

deliberation about the direction and content of U.S. foreign policy."<sup>24</sup>

Even in an age of increasingly sophisticated survey techniques it is difficult to obtain accurate, verifiable measures of public opinion, and only in relatively recent times has serious thought gone into the potential for using opinion findings as a tool in determining policy.

#### MEDIA AND INFLUENCE ON THE INDIVIDUAL

Public opinion, of course, is a function of not only what the public observes, but also is a function of how events are interpreted for it by the media.

There are certainly distinctions to be drawn between the extent to which an individual or individuals are dependent upon the media in general for knowledge of a particular issue and the degree to which those same individuals use the media and view them as a credible source in the formulation of opinion.<sup>25</sup>

These distinctions, while not quantifiable, have spawned the concept of "Obtrusiveness." Obtrusiveness is defined as "the amount of personal experience people have with issues."<sup>26</sup> Researchers have hypothesized that as the amount of obtrusiveness increases, the level of efficacy by media in influencing opinion decreases, and vice-versa.<sup>27</sup> Studies in the obtrusive contingency theory have demonstrated that it is supported in some instances, but that some issues (such as inflation) seem to be unaffected.<sup>28</sup> In other words, some issues seem to be so



personal as to be almost immune from influence due to media coverage.

Support for the obtrusive contingency theory is due in part to acceptance by many opinion researchers of the media system dependency theory, which holds in part "...that the less personal experience or contact people have with a social system as a whole, the greater is their dependency upon mass media messages."<sup>29</sup>

While only a handful of studies have specifically examined the obtrusive contingency theory,<sup>30</sup> it would appear to be a valid consideration in any study of the function of the media and their effects on public opinion held toward military policy.

Since the abolishment of conscription, an ever-decreasing number of Americans have military experience. Only a relative few had family members directly involved with the military operations in the Persian Gulf with whom they corresponded. Therefore, the picture presented by media of the operation was the only connection the majority of Americans had with events in the Gulf. It can be presumed that the media played a key role in helping individuals to form their opinions concerning U.S. military policy.

Given the afore-mentioned tendency toward stability in public opinion of national defense matters, the media would necessarily play a key role in effecting any opinion change, since only media are able to indicate to the public that a general climate of change has occurred, and thus enable individuals to voice

their opinion without suffering the effects of what Noelle-Neumann has termed the "spiral of silence."

#### AGENDA SETTING

While the purpose of this study is not to prove or disprove an agenda-setting hypothesis, a discussion of this theory is relevant in that one of the puposes of the study was to determine if a correlation existed between coverage of events in the Persian Gulf and poll results.

Agenda-setting hypotheses assume a correlation between presentation of information in the media through selective emphasis, and corresponding beliefs in the **importance** of issues (as opposed to the adoption of a **relative position**, i.e., for-or-against) by the audience.

As defined by Graber, "According to these theories, media audiences accept guidance from the media of their choice in determining what information is most important and therefore worthy of their attention."<sup>31</sup>

Agenda-setting is a relatively new idea. While the roles and importance of the media in a free society have been recognized for perhaps 250 years or more, it was only in the first quarter of this century that Walter Lippman and others in the field of public opinion began to note the limited opportunity of the common man to actually observe events, thereby making the press critical in presenting the "outside world" so people could make judgements concerning events.<sup>32</sup>

Many scholars credit Bernard Cohen with bringing into focus the influence that media might have on the public. In 1963 he made the observation that "The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."<sup>33</sup>

Scholars since have set about attempting to show a relationship between what was depicted in media and subsequent public opinion in a manner not intended to depict causality, but rather, to determine if a correlation existed that could be discounted due to chance.

While the researchers were unable to locate any agenda-setting studies specifically aimed at national defense policy, several studies using secondary analysis of print or broadcast media products and public opinion polls have been conducted. Funkhouser in 1973 used Gallup poll results and a content analysis of newsmagazines to determine the level of correspondence between public opinion and news coverage of several issues in the 1960s.<sup>29</sup>

In 1990, Brosius and Kepplinger performed a similar study by comparing a content analysis of West German Television news programs with weekly public opinion polls on issues of concern to Germans.<sup>35</sup>

Hence, while these researchers do not hold that the amount or tone of coverage of various aspects or events of the war prove causality, it might be shown that the amount or tone of media coverage of aspects or elements of the conflict influenced

public opinion.

Given some researchers' belief that newspapers have stronger agenda-setting effects than television,<sup>36</sup> the comparison between the content analysis of the selected newspapers and the results of public opinion polls was deemed applicable.

## Method

The research design was a two-step process beginning with a traditional content analysis design for survey research. Following the completion of the content analysis, an effort was made to determine if any relationship existed between the content and tone of the stories in the newspapers and subsequent public opinion poll results on related topics.

### Part I-Content Analysis

Much of the design for this portion of the research has been adapted from Content Analysis of Communications, by Richard W. Budd et. al.; Mass Media Research, by Roger D. Wimmer and Joseph R. Dominick; TV and National Defense, by Lefever; and Big Story, by Braestrup. Each of these scholars is well recognized for proficiency in the area of content analysis.

While there are thousands of newspapers in the United States, resource constraints made examination of more than two impractical. The newspapers analyzed were The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times. The papers were selected in part because they have large readerships and are recognized by some scholars as agenda-setting newspapers,<sup>37</sup> in part because they consistently provided the researchers with raw data from surveys conducted during the time frame under study, and in part because they gave the study a geographical diversity.

Press coverage of the war in the Gulf was examined from the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait through March 7, 1991--one week following President George Bush's declaration that the military objectives he ordered had, in fact, been realized.

Events identified as potentially the most illuminating were selected to best provide representative press coverage, i.e., events that received widespread media coverage would provide the focus for the research as representative samples.

The key dates and events selected (adopted using Eastern Standard Time) for research were as follows:

- |                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| --August 2, 1990 | Iraq invaded Kuwait   |
| --August 7, 1990 | Bush ordered U.S. soldiers to Saudi Arabia                          |
| --Nov 7, 1990    | Bush ordered increased build-up of U.S. forces                      |
| --Jan 7, 1991    | Final attempt at peace between Baker and Aziz failed                |
| --Jan 13, 1991   | Congress authorized use of military force by Bush if necessary      |
| --Jan 16, 1991   | (Air) war began with Iraq   |
| --Feb 23, 1991   | Bush committed ground forces in final effort to remove Iraqi forces |
| --Feb 28, 1991   | Iraq agreed to meet U.N. demands                                    |

A two-week 'window' surrounding each of these events was created by analyzing the issues of each publication for one

week prior to and following occurrences that were identified as key events.

The exception to this was the first 'window,' since there was negligible coverage prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This 'window' was structured round the August 7, 1990 decision by President Bush to commit American forces to the area.

Due to event 'window' overlap, the sampling selection resulted in four research periods: 2-14 Aug., 1-14 Nov., 1-23 Jan., and 15 Feb.-7 Mar. Researchers were thus required to perform content analysis on 70 editions of each newspaper, or one-third of the 210 total possible editions for the time period. Analysis of the two publications required study of a total of 140 papers.

Content analysis was conducted only on stories appearing on the first page of the newspapers. This was due primarily to resource considerations.

Stories on the front page of subject papers were categorized by placing them into one of 18 subject areas appearing on a coding sheet developed to track data for the purpose of this research. These categories were developed prior to the study by the authors. Categories were:

**-Purpose of U.S. involvement:** Stories that covered and analyzed U.S. policy toward Iraq and reasons for a U.S. presence.

**-Iraqi Commentary:** Coverage of the Iraqi government's side of the story. Consisted of announcements by Saddam Hussein,

the Ministry of Information, diplomats and military commanders.

**-Congressional debate:** Debate by Congress in the House or Senate or in committee.

**-Congressional commentary:** Comments by legislators in forums other than the House or Senate.

**-United Nations participation:** Stories addressing debate over resolutions dictating actions required of Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait, and the assembly and actions of its enforcement arm--the multi-national coalition.

**-Allied casualties:** Stories describing casualties (or lack thereof) among the forces of the coalition, including the U.S.

**-Opposition casualties:** Stories discussing Iraqi military casualties.

**-Civilian casualties:** Stories discussing verified or believed Iraqi civilian casualties.

**-Duration of conflict:** Stories estimating the duration of the war prior to its commencement, as well as those emphasizing potential length following the start of the war.

**-Level of minority/female involvement or casualties:** Stories emphasizing contributions and casualties among two groups media described as potentially or actually over- or under-represented.

**-Military readiness:** Stories addressing the ability of



coalition forces to conduct offensive and/or defensive operations.

**-Personality profile:** Stories profiling individuals directly involved in the conflict.

**-Performance of U.S. and allied units, soldiers and equipment:** Assessments of the performance of units, soldiers and equipment. How well or poorly they performed.

**-Economic factors:** Stories emphasizing the impact of the build-up and war on the U.S. economy, including recessionary trends, budget deficits and monetary contributions of countries potentially benefitting from military action against Iraq.

**-Demonstrations in favor of U.S. involvement:** Stories covering such demonstrations.

**-Demonstrations against U.S. involvement:** Stories covering such demonstrations.

**-Terrorism:** Stories emphasizing potential or actual acts of terrorism related to U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf.

**-Other:** Anything not covered by one of the above categories.

While many stories included elements of more than one category, each story was categorized and evaluated based upon a dominant theme or subject, a method frequently used by scholars in the conduct of content analyses.<sup>38</sup> Following this, a measurement of the content and tone of each story was

accomplished.

Story content was analyzed based upon quantifiable measurement of the following factors:

--Column Inches

--Presence and size of Photos and/or Graphics

In collecting newspaper data three to six months following the conclusion of hostilities, the researchers had to rely on microfilm records of the two newspapers. These microfilm records uniformly showed the newspapers at 90% of their actual size. The microfilm lengths and sizes were thus multiplied by a factor of 1.1 to give measurements in actual sizes.

Since the column widths of the two newspapers were different, it was necessary to adopt a standard column width so that measurements would be equal. This equality was critical to the credibility of story measurements, since without a common column width, the narrower, more numerous Los Angeles Times articles would have been given more significance than they merited.

The researchers used the New York Times' 2-1/8 inch column as the standard. Thus, for each paper the conversions were different. For the New York Times, standard stories on microfilm merely had to be converted from microfilm size to actual.

On occasion, the New York Times used non-standard column widths. In those cases, the width was multiplied by a factor to make it equivalent to the 2-1/8 inch column. For example, the length of an article with a column with of 1-7/8 inches

was multiplied by a factor of .88 to reflect its shorter, actual length in standard column width inches.

For Los Angeles Times stories, stories had to be converted from microfilm size to actual size, and then from the actual column width to the standard column width of the New York Times. This was accomplished by multiplying the 1-15/16 inch standard Los Angeles Times column by a factor of .91. In this way, the researchers attained measurement consistency. Non-standard Los Angeles Times column widths were handled in the same manner as those from the New York Times.

These nominal factors were then weighted to account for the likelihood that readers would read and process information. Because several studies in the use of headlines, photos and graphics indicated that readers will read and process some articles more than others, the researchers developed a system of weighting that provided an overall score for each story.

Accompanying front-page information graphics and/or photographs were given a weighting factor to account for the increased likelihood that readers would read and process the story. Based on Poynter Institute research,<sup>39</sup> stories with accompanying information graphics were given a weight of two (2). Those with photographs 1-2 columns wide were given a weight of one and one-half (1.5). Those with photographs 3 or more columns wide were given a weight of one and three-quarters (1.75). In cases of multiple photographs, or where photographs and information graphics were both present, only the higher

weighting was used. Only photographs or graphics appearing on the front page were weighted.

Based upon the institute's finding that readers' eyes move to the most prominent object on a page, then generally move to the next most dominant elements in "following the trail" laid for them by editors,<sup>40</sup> it was determined that the relative position of the story on the page was inconsequential. As the Poynter study found no real significance in the size and font of headline sizes, they were excluded from consideration.

In addition to nominal factors, press coverage of events was evaluated as "favorable," "neutral," or "unfavorable." A story was defined as "favorable," if on balance there were more assertions, opinions, or ideas reflecting favorably upon the National Command Authority (NCA), that is, the President, his administration, and the leaders of the armed forces. Stories were rated "unfavorable" if on balance, the reflection tended to be negative toward the NCA. Stories were given a "neutral" evaluation if there appeared to be a relative balance in the number of assertions, opinions, and ideas rated "favorable" and "unfavorable."

Balance and fairness, not objectivity, were the key elements in neutrality as defined in the study.

Prior to the actual research, five independent coders were utilized to conduct a pilot study. These coders examined 14 Gulf War-related newspaper stories previously coded by the researchers. Intracoder (between the present researchers and

the subjects of the pilot study) reliability was relatively low--about 60 percent. However, reliability among the pilot study coders was even less. This was attributed to the number of subjects in the pilot study (five) and to difficulty in consistently applying the definitions given to the categories for purposes of coding.

Inter-coder reliability (that between the two researchers) on a twelve story pilot study was 91.6 percent. Interestingly, the researchers, who designed the pilot study on the basis of an assumption that they would be more likely to find the press "unfavorable" in its treatment of the National Command Authority, found that they were in fact far more inclined to evaluate a story as neutral than were the pilot study coders. As a result of the pilot studies, the definitions for both the categories and the tone of the articles were re-written as they appear at the present time.

Due to the high level of inter-coder reliability and limited resources available, each story was coded by a single researcher, except for particularly problematic articles, when the decision as to content or tone was made jointly.

A thematic or assertion approach (as opposed to the use of 'key' words or phrases) was used in determining whether a story reflected negatively, positively or in a neutral manner upon the NCA.

When the content analysis had been completed, each story had a numerical score relating to its quantifiable

characteristics and a symbolic characterization of tone. By way of example, a story ten inches in length with no accompanying graphics that was rated "neutral," was represented as "10N". A story ten inches in length with an accompanying front page informational graphic (weighted as 2) and rated "favorable" was represented as "20+".

The results of the content analysis of the papers was shown by compilation of the scores for each story, each category, each newspaper, and overall. Results obtained were based on descriptive statistics that measure central tendency. Results determined topical frequency, amount of coverage for each category or variable and overall tone. Measurements were completed to highlight differences between the two newspapers as well. Thus, for each newspaper, results were obtained that showed what subjects were covered, how frequently they were covered, what the tone of the coverage was, and results of weighting.

Nonparametric statistics (Chi square and correlation matrices) as well as multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) were used to determine the differences between the newspapers.

This concluded the content analysis portion of the study.

## Part II--Determination of Correlation

Following the content analysis, the authors sought to determine if any relationship existed between the newspapers,

the date of publication, the ratings stories received (in the aggregate), or the type and amount of coverage of aspects of the conflict and subsequent shifts in the results attained on public opinion polls.

The researchers used poll results corresponding with dates immediately prior to, during (if available) and immediately following the study periods in correlating polls with the items listed above.

Questions asked on polls from a variety of sources (including those from the papers under study) were combined to create a longitudinal trend of public opinion. It was necessary to use a variety of sources because not every poll asked the same question each week. Therefore, poll results had to be combined to provide a trend of opinion. There were, of course, minor differences in the wording of the questions.

This process tracked the results of specific questions that related to the categories of stories analyzed earlier for content. The four questions tracked were:

- 1) "Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?" (NYT poll question) On two occasions (beginning 22 January and 26 February), results from the Los Angeles Times were used. The question in the LAT poll was phrased in a manner identical to that of the New York Times, except it was prefaced by the words "Generally speaking..."

2) "Do you think the United States did the right thing in sending troops to Saudi Arabia, or do you think we should have stayed out?" (NYT poll question) The question was phrased in a different manner on the LAT polls but was judged to have the same meaning because at the time of the poll the only action that had been taken was an initial deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf region. The question read as follows in the Los Angeles Times poll: "Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling the Iraq situation in the Middle East?" This question was used on two occasions (beginning on 17 January and 16 February) to form the opinion trend.

3) "Do you think George Bush has explained the situation in the Middle East well enough so that you feel you understand why the United States is sending troops to Saudi Arabia, or hasn't he?" (NYT poll questions throughout)

4) This question read as follows in the New York Times poll: "How long do you expect a large number of U.S. troops will remain in the Persian Gulf area -- less than three months, between three and six months, between six months and one year, between one and five years, or more than five years?" This poll was used for the poll results from 1-14 November 1990.

The Los Angeles Times question read: "How long do you expect American troops to stay in the Middle East: less than one month,



one to three months, between four and six months, up to one year, more than one year?" This question was used for poll results from 2-13 August 1990 and from 26-27 February 1991.

The NBC poll read: "How much longer do you expect the U.S. troops to be in Saudi Arabia?" This poll was used to construct the timeline from 1 November 1990 to 26 February 1991 and from 27 February to 7 March 1991.

This method provided the researchers with a trend of opinion using secondary analysis on subjects of interest. The computer statistical program SAS was used to create a correlation matrix using Pearson R correlations to identify statistically significant relationships. Results are included in the results portion of the text, as well as in Chart 31.

In addition to the newspaper, date, rating, and overall coverage, the researchers sought to determine if the coverage of specific subject areas had any effect on subsequent public opinion in similar areas. By way of example, did newspaper coverage of economic events have any effect whatsoever on the public's perception of the economy as reported in polls?

Again, a matrix was created using SAS that correlated the four questions above with coverage of the following story categories in the newspapers: U.S./Allied Diplomacy; Economic Factors; Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment; Purpose of U.S. Involvement; and Military Readiness. Results are discussed in the text and also at Table 32.

## RESULTS

### QUANTITATIVE RESULTS--CUMULATIVE (2 AUG 1990--7 MAR 1991)

#### Both Newspapers:

For the entire period of study, 487 articles relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf appeared on the front pages of the newspapers. The Los Angeles Times accounted for 296 of the articles, or 60.78% of the total. The New York Times had 191 stories, or 39.22% of the stories.

Of the 487 total stories, 316, or 64.88% were placed into one of the seventeen categories originally developed by the researchers. The remaining 171, or 35.12%, were categorized as "Other," and further grouped according to subject. This method resulted in the use of 50 categories (the 17 original plus 33 sub-categories developed by the researchers--some of which had only one occurrence).

This was necessary because many stories on the front pages of each newspaper dealt with subjects that did not fit well in the original seventeen categories. For example, stories based on diplomatic events, those dealing with military-media relationships, and those concerning the reactions of Americans of Arab or Israeli descent were not viewed as clearly within the definitions of any of the seventeen categories originally developed.

The ten categories appearing most frequently were as follows:

Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (N=71 stories, or 14.57% of all front page stories relating to the gulf situation); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=50, 10.26%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (N=45, 9.24%); Military Readiness (N=32, 6.57%); Iraqi Commentary (N=28, 5.75%); Economic Impact (N=25, 5.13%); U.S. Military Strategy (N=25, 5.13%); United Nations Participation (N=19, 3.90%); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (N=19, 3.90%); and Allied Casualties (N=17, 3.49%). These ten categories accounted for 67.94% of the total appearances in both newspapers for the entire study. (Table 1)

Three of the ten most frequently appearing subjects were categories derived from the "Other" category: U.S./Allied Diplomacy, Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy, and U.S. Military Strategy.

Story length plus the presence of any photographs or graphics was used to determine weighted coverage. Results were as follows: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (2802.85 weighted points, or 15.69% of all points awarded); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (2195.71, 12.29%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (1372.65, 7.69%); Military Readiness (1100.55, 6.16%); U.S. Military Strategy (932.78, 5.22%); Iraqi Commentary (890.92, 4.99%); Allied Casualties (789.09, 4.42%); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (759.27, 4.25%); Economic Impact (689.66, 3.86%); and United Nations Participation (658.29, 3.69%). Taken together, these ten categories received 68.26% of all points awarded during the period. (Table 2)

Thus, the ten items appearing most frequently also gathered

the most weighted coverage, although the relative order changed in places four through ten.

New York Times:

During the study, 191 stories relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf appeared on page 1. While the subjects varied widely, 130, or 68.06% of the stories were placed in one of the categories created by the researchers. Sixty-one stories, or 31.94%, were placed into the "Other" category and further grouped according to subject matter. This resulted in a total of 34 categories or subjects of stories appearing on the front page.

Three of the original categories developed by the researchers had no stories appearing. Those categories were: Demonstrations in Favor of U.S. Involvement, Terrorism, and Duration of Conflict. Thus, 31 subjects were represented by stories on the front page.

For quantitative purposes, stories were analyzed both by the number of appearances (topical frequency) and by the total number of points awarded based on the research methodology discussed previously (total coverage).

The five categories with the highest cumulative topical frequency were: Performance of Units, Soldiers and Equipment (N=28, 14.66% of the total stories); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=24, 12.57%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (created from the "Other" category, N=22, 11.52%); Military Readiness (N=14, 7.32%); and

Iraqi Commentary (N=14, 7.32%). The remaining 26 categories or subject areas appeared from 1 to 9 times and accounted for from .52% to 4.71% of the total stories appearing. Stories placed in the five most frequent categories accounted for 53.40% of all stories appearing on the front page during the study. (Table 3).

In terms of weighted emphasis, the five categories receiving the most coverage were: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (1115.20 points, or 16.67% of the total points awarded stories relating to the Persian Gulf); Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (1096.56, 16.39%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (648.28, 9.69%); Military Readiness (484.69, 7.24%); and Iraqi Commentary (403.03, 6.03%). Thus, the five most heavily weighted subjects received 56.02% of all points awarded during the time period. (Table 4).

For the entire period of the study, the five categories appearing most frequently garnered the most coverage, although the relative rankings of each category differed in the top two places.

#### Los Angeles Times:

For the entire study, 296 articles relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf appeared on the front pages of the Los Angeles Times. Of those, 180, or 60.60% were placed in one of the categories originally developed by the researchers. The other 116, or 39.40%, were placed in the "Other" category and

further grouped according to subject. This resulted in the use of 47 categories overall.

The five categories having the most appearances were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (N=43 stories, or 14.53% of front page stories relating to gulf events); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=26, 8.78%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (N=23, 7.78%); U.S. Military Strategy (N=20, 6.76%); and Military Readiness (N=18, 6.08%). Together, the five categories accounted for 43.93% of front page appearances. (Table 5)

The top five subjects in terms of weighted coverage were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (1706.29 points, or 15.28% of all points awarded); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (1080.51, 9.67%); U.S. Military Strategy (759.75, 6.80%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (724.37, 6.49%); and Allied Casualties (686.56, 6.15%). These five categories accounted for 44.39% of all points awarded front page stories in the Los Angeles Times. (Table 6)

#### Comparison:

For the entire period of the study, coverage by the two newspapers was similar. Of the ten most frequently appearing topics in the New York Times, eight were among the ten most frequently covered by the Los Angeles Times as well. Differences among the top ten were that the New York Times had Congressional Commentary tied for the eighth most frequent topic and Civilian Casualties tenth. Neither made the Los Angeles Times' top ten.

The Los Angeles Times devoted heavy coverage to U.S. Military Strategy (fourth) and Allied Casualties (tied, seventh), categories that did not rate in the New York Times' top ten.

The results of the weighted coverage showed identical differences between the coverage in the two newspapers.

Generally, the coverage in the Los Angeles Times was more abundant and more narrowly focused--more issue specific--than that of the New York Times. By way of example, the researchers used 47 categories to place all Los Angeles Times articles, compared to only 31 for the New York Times.

Three categories developed by the researchers initially for the study never had a story primarily concerned with that subject appear on the front page of the New York Times. Those variables were Demonstrations in Favor of U.S. Policy, Terrorism, and Duration of Conflict. In contrast, the Los Angeles Times had two, six and one stories respectively for those categories.

#### QUANTITATIVE RESULTS--STUDY PERIOD I (2-14 AUG 1990)

##### Both Newspapers:

During the first study period, 91 articles dealing with events in the Persian Gulf appeared on page one of the selected newspapers. Of these, 73, or 80.22%, were placed in categories designed by the researchers. The remaining 18 (19.78%) were categorized as "Other" and further grouped by topic. This resulted in a total of 16 categories for stories appearing in

the newspapers during the timeframe.

The six most frequently appearing subjects were: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (22 stories, or 24.18% of all stories); Economic Factors (16, 17.58%); United Nations Participation (10, 10.99%); Iraqi Commentary (9, 9.89%); Military Readiness (8, 8.79%); and Arab League Matters (8, 8.79%). The remaining articles were grouped in ten categories and appeared from one to five times, receiving from 1.10% to 5.49% of the total coverage. During this period, stories dealing with these six subjects accounted for 63% of the The New York Times' front page coverage. (Table 7).

The stories appearing most frequently also received the most coverage for this period. Factoring in the presence of informational graphics or photographs yielded the following results in terms of weighted coverage: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (1058.17 points, or 33.42% of all points awarded); Economic Factors (419.44, 13.25%); United Nations Participation (354.09, 11.18%); Iraqi Commentary (344.98, 10.90%); Military Readiness (241.06, 7.61%); and Arab League Matters (240.73, 7.60%). Although stories in these six categories were only 63% of the coverage, they were given 83.96% of all weighted points. (Table 8).

#### New York Times:

During the study period, 39 stories aligning in ten categories appeared on the front page. Thirty of these stories, or 76.92%,



were placed in one of the categories developed by the researchers. The remaining nine stories (23.08%), were placed in the "Other" category and further grouped by subject.

The most frequently appearing subjects for the first study period were: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=12, 30.77%); Economic Factors (N=8, 20.51%); United Nations Participation (N=4, 10.25%); Arab League Issues (developed from the "Other" category, N=4, 10.25%); and Military Readiness (N=3, 7.69%). Articles centering on these five subjects accounted for 79.47% of the Times' front page stories during the first study period.

Stories placed in the remaining five categories appeared once or twice and accounted for the remaining 20.53% percent of page one appearances. (Table 9).

Weighted coverage for the period was as follows: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (642.74 points, or 43.51% of total coverage received); Economic Factors (198.50, 13.43%); United Nations Participation (154.50, 10.45%); Arab League Issues (140.63, 9.52%); and Military Readiness (84.75, 5.73%). During this period, stories in these categories accounted for 82.64% of front page coverage of the Persian Gulf situation. (Table 10).

For the first study period, the relative rankings of the top five subjects both in terms of topical frequency and weighted coverage were identical.

#### Los Angeles Times:

During the first study period, 52 stories on the situation

in the Persian Gulf appeared on the front page. Stories were placed into 14 categories. Forty-one of the stories, or 78.85%, were placed into one of the original categories. The remaining 11 (21.15%) were placed in the "Other" category and further grouped according to topic.

The most frequently covered subjects were: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=10, 19.23%); Economic Factors (N=8, 15.38%); Iraqi Commentary (N=7, 13.46%); United Nations Participation (N=6, 11.54%); and Military Readiness (N=5, 9.62%). For this period, nearly seventy percent (69.23%) of the stories relating to the Persian Gulf situation appearing on the front page dealt with one of the subjects above.

Stories placed in the remaining categories appeared from one to four times and accounted for 30.77% of the front page appearances of stories dealing with the Gulf situation. (Table 11).

Weighted coverage for the period was as follows: Purpose of U.S. Involvement (415.43 points, or 24.60% of the total coverage for the period); Iraqi Commentary (299.48, 17.73%); Economic Factors (220.94, 13.08%); United Nations Participation (199.59, 11.82%); and Military Readiness (156.31, 9.26%). Of coverage given the Persian Gulf situation on the front page, 76.49% dealt with the topics above. (Table 12).

For the period, the five factors appearing most frequently garnered the most coverage, although Economic Factors fell below Iraqi Commentary in terms of overall coverage despite appearing

more often.

Comparison:

During the period the five subjects covered most frequently by the newspapers were similar. Purpose of U.S. Involvement made the most front page appearances for each newspaper, followed by Economic Factors. The New York Times rounded out its top five with United Nations Participation, Arab League Matters, and Military Readiness. The Los Angeles Times place Iraqi Commentary ahead of United Nations Participation and Military Readiness.

An examination of the weighted coverage given the variables showed similar results, although the Los Angeles Times' results had Iraqi Commentary, rather than Economic Factors as the second most heavily-weighted category.

During the August 2-14, 1990 period, coverage in the Los Angeles Times tended to be less general than that in the New York Times. The researchers used 14 categories to place the Los Angeles Times' articles, compared to only 10 for those of the New York Times.

**QUANTITATIVE RESULTS--STUDY PERIOD II (1-14 NOV 1990)**

Both Newspapers:

During this period, 45 articles appeared on the front page of the two selected newspapers. Of these, 33, or 80% of all

14

stories were categorized in one of the 18 subject areas developed by the researchers. The remaining 12 articles (20%) were categorized as "Other" and further grouped according to topic. This resulted in the use of 13 categories, 9 of which were those originally developed.

The four most frequently appearing subject areas were: Military Readiness (13 stories, or 28.89% of all stories); Congressional Commentary (7, 15.55%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (6, 13.33%); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (5, 11.11%). The remaining subjects appeared from one to three times and represented from 2.22% to 6.66% of the topics covered. Thus, of the Persian Gulf related stories appearing on page one of the newspapers during the study period, 68.88% dealt primarily with one of the four subjects above. (Table 13).

As in the first study period, these subjects earned the most weighted points, although there was a slight change in the order. Results of weighted coverage were as follows: Military Readiness (493.22 total points, or 31.61% of the points awarded); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (194.32, 12.47%); Congressional Commentary (194.12, 12.44%); and U.S. Allied Diplomacy (141.70, 9.07%). Overall coverage given these topics was 65.58% of the total points awarded. (Table 14).

#### New York Times:

During the second study period 18 stories relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf appeared on the front page.

Fourteen of these stories, or 77.77%, were placed in categories developed by the researchers. The remaining four stories (22.23%) were placed in the "Other" category. In this case, all stories were placed in one of five categories.

The topical frequency of the categories was as follows: Military Readiness (N=7, 38.89% of total stories during the period); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (N=4, 22.22%); Congressional Commentary (N=4, 22.22%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=2, 11.11%); and Personality Profile (N=1, 5.56%). These stories constituted all the front page subjects covered by the newspaper during the period.(Table 15).

The weighted ranking of the amount of coverage in each of the categories was as follows: Military Readiness (260.85 points, or 44.10% of the total coverage for the period); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (118.52, 20.04%); Congressional Commentary (92.92, 15.71%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (61.05, 10.32%); and Personality Profile (58.16, 9.83%). Again, these rankings represent the entirety of front page coverage for the period. (Table 16).

#### Los Angeles Times:

During the second study period, 27 stories relating to the Persian Gulf appeared on page 1 and were placed in 10 topical categories. Twenty-one stories, or 77.78%, were placed into the original categories while the remaining six (22.22%) were placed in the "Other" category and further grouped.

The topical frequency during this period for the five most frequently appearing subjects was as follows: Military Readiness (N=6, 22.22% of all stories); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=4, 14.81%); Congressional Commentary (N=3, 11.11%); Demonstrations Against U.S. Involvement (N=3, 11.11%); and Secretary Baker's MidEast Visit (N=3, 11.11%). For the period, 70.36% of front page stories dealing with the Persian Gulf situation dealt with one of the above five topics. (Table 17).

Weighted representation by points awarded for the study period was as follows: Military Readiness (232.37 points, or 24% of the total points awarded); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (133.27, 13.75%); Demonstrations Against U.S. Involvement (125.08, 12.91%); Congressional Commentary (101.20, 10.45%); and Baker's MidEast Visit (91.00, 9.39%). In this period, 70.34% of front page coverage of events in the Persian Gulf region could be categorized in one of the categories above. (Table 18).

#### Comparison:

During the 1-14 November 1990 period, there was a slightly greater disparity in what was covered than was the case during the August 2-14 1990 study period. The eighteen front page articles from the New York Times relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf during the study period were placed into just five categories: Military Readiness, U.S./Allied Diplomacy, Congressional Commentary, Purpose of U.S. Involvement, and Personality Profile.

The Los Angeles Times, in its 27 front page articles, saw events during the period differently. While it gave the largest number of appearances to Military Readiness, this was followed by Purpose of U.S. Involvement, Congressional Commentary, Demonstrations Against U.S. Involvement in the Region, and Secretary of State James Baker's visit to the front. A total of 12 categories were used in placing articles from the Los Angeles Times during the period.

Weighted coverage results from the New York Times matched those of topical frequency. In the Los Angeles Times, an examination of weighted coverage showed that Demonstrations Against U.S. Involvement moved ahead of Congressional Commentary into third place in that newspaper's rankings.

#### QUANTITATIVE RESULTS--STUDY PERIOD III (1-23 JAN 1991)

##### Both Newspapers:

During the January 1-23, 1991 study period, 171 stories concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf appeared on the front pages of the two newspapers. Of the total stories, 116, or 67.83% were placed in categories developed by the researchers. The remaining 55 stories, or 32.17% were placed in the "Other" category and further grouped by subject. This resulted in the use of 30 categories, 17 of which were originally developed by the researchers.

The five most frequently appearing subjects were: U.S./Allied

Diplomacy (N=30 stories, or 17.50% of all gulf-related stories appearing on the front pages); Unit, Soldier, and Equipment Performance (N=30, 17.50%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=15, 8.78%); Civilian Casualties (N=10, 5.84%); and Congressional Debate (N=9, 5.26%). These five categories totalled 54.97% of front page coverage during the period. Other subjects appeared from one to eight times, and accounted for the remaining 45.03% of appearances. (Table 19)

The relative rankings using weighted coverage given the topics closely resembled those found in topical frequency. The five most weighted topics were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (1075.67 points, or 17.98% of all points awarded); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (965.10, 16.14%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (661.03, 11.05%); Civilian Casualties (373.03, 6.24%); and Allied Casualties (339.76, 5.68%). Total points awarded these subjects were 57.09% of all points awarded. (Table 20)

#### New York Times:

During the third study period, 63 stories relating to events in the Persian Gulf appeared on page 1. Of these, 41, or 59.42% were placed in the original categories developed by the researchers. The remaining 40.58% were categorized as "Other" and further sub-grouped.

The six most frequent topics were: U.S./Allied Diplomacy (N=16 stories, or 25.39% of the total stories); Performance of Units,



Soldiers, and Equipment (N=12, 19.04%); and Civilian Casualties (N=5, 7.93%). Purpose of U.S. Involvement, Iraqi Commentary, and Congressional Debate each had 4 stories comprising 6.34% of the total. These six categories accounted for 70.84% of front page stories relating to the Gulf situation. (Table 21).

Weighted coverage for the period emphasized the following five topics: U.S./Allied Diplomacy (469.81 points, or 22.46% of the total points awarded); Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (468.32, 22.38%); Civilian Casualties (157.30, 7.52%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (152.90, 7.30%); and Congressional Debate (140.34, 6.70%). In this case, 66.36% of Gulf-related front page coverage dealt with one of the above topics. (Table 22).

During this period, the relative rankings for topical frequency and weighted coverage were identical except Congressional Debate which, despite having an identical number of stories, received more coverage due to the presence of visual aids and/or more lengthy stories.

#### Los Angeles Times:

During the study period, 108 stories relating to the Persian Gulf situation appeared on the front page. Of these, 75, or 69.44%, were fit into variable categories originally developed by the researchers. The remaining 33 stories were placed in the "Other" category and further sub-grouped by topic.

Three topics dominated during this period in terms of topical

frequency. They were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (N=18 stories, or 16.67% of all gulf related stories appearing on the front page); U.S./Allied Diplomacy (N=14, 12.96%); and Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=11, 10.91%). These three topics accounted for 40.54% of front page stories. The remaining 26 subject areas appeared from one to six times and accounted for 59.46% of appearances. (Table 23)

The same three topics dominated weighted coverage rankings. They received points as follows: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (607.35 points, or 15.62% of all points awarded); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (508.13, 13.07%); and U.S./Allied Diplomacy (495.29, 12.74%). Thus, these three topics received 41.43% of all weighted points awarded during the period. (Table 24)

#### Comparison:

The two papers showed marked differences in their news judgment during this period. Only six categories were among each newspaper's ten most frequently appearing subjects. This was the only period where the two newspapers showed a difference in their top story. The New York Times gave over 25 percent of its Gulf-related front page coverage to the subject of U.S./Allied Diplomacy, while the Los Angeles Times led with articles concerning the Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment.

Once again, the number of categories into which stories were

placed varied greatly. The New York Times' 69 stories fit into 18 categories, whereas the Los Angeles Times, which covered things such as the war's effects on military families on the front page, had stories placed in 29 categories.

Differences in the results of weighted coverage between the two newspapers were similarly vast.

#### QUANTITATIVE RESULTS--STUDY PERIOD IV (16 FEB--7 MAR 1991)

##### Both Newspapers:

During the final period of study, 16 Feb.-7 March 1991, 180 articles relating to the war in the Persian Gulf appeared on page one of the two newspapers. Of these, 96, or 53.33% were placed into categories originally designed by the researchers. The remaining stories were placed in the "Other" category and further grouped according to subject. This resulted in the use of 38 categories.

The five most frequently appearing subject areas for the period were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (N=40 stories, or 22.22% of all stories); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (N=19, 10.56%); U.S. Military Strategy (N=17, 9.44%); Iraqi Commentary (N=11, 6.11%); and Allied Casualties (N=11, 6.11%). Together, these five categories accounted for 54.44% of the total coverage. (Table 25)

Using weighted coverage, the following categories were the five highest: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment

(1667.68 points, or 23.31% of all points awarded); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (759.27, 10.61%); U.S. Military Strategy (666.36, 9.31%); Allied Casualties (489.06, 6.83%); and Ceasefire Talks (446.06, 6.23%). (Table 26)

New York Times:

During the final study period, 71 stories relating to the war in the Persian Gulf appeared on the front page of the newspaper. Of these, 45, or 63.38% fit into categories originally developed by the authors. The remaining 26 stories--36.32% of the total, were placed in the "other" category and further grouped by subject.

The six most frequently appearing subjects were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (N=15 total stories, or 21.12% of the stories covered); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (N=8, 11.26%); Iraqi Commentary (N=8, 11.26%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (N=6, 8.45%); Ceasefire Talks (N=4, 5.63%); and Internal Iraqi Unrest (N=4, 5.63%). These six categories accounted for 63.35% of the front page coverage given the war in the Middle East. (Table 27).

In terms of weighted coverage, the following items received the most attention: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (568.74 points, or 22.47% of the total points awarded); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (295.37, 11.67%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (258.51, 10.21%); Iraqi Commentary (233.84, 9.24%); and Ceasefire Talks (207.04, 8.18%). These five topics received

61.77% of the front page coverage analyzed. (Table 28).

In the final period, the major stories were the same, although the degree of coverage differed substantially.

Los Angeles Times:

During the final period, 109 stories relating to the situation in the Gulf appeared on the front page of the Los Angeles Times. Of these, 48, or 44.04% were placed in a category originally developed by the researchers. The remainder were graded as "Other," and further categorized according to topic.

The five most frequently appearing subjects were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (N=25 stories, or 22.94% of all appearances); U.S. Military Strategy (N=14, 12.84%); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (N=11, 10.09%); Allied Casualties (N=8, 7.34%); and Post-War Kuwait (N=6, 5.50%). Together, these categories accounted for 58.71% of the stories appearing on the front page. (Table 29.)

The weighted subjects were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (1098.94 weighted points, or 23.77% of all points awarded); U.S. Military Strategy (580.49, 12.55%); Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (463.90, 10.03%); Allied Casualties (386.53, 8.36%); and Post-War Kuwait (276.15, 5.97%). These subjects received 60.68% of the coverage given front page stories during the period. (Table 30)

### Comparison:

As the war progressed through the air phase, into the ground phase, and on into eventual Iraqi surrender, the newspapers continued to differ in their news judgment. Although both gave the most appearances to stories concerning the Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment, thereafter, consensus was lost. The New York Times rounded out its top five with articles pertaining to Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy (primarily, the Soviet peace initiative), Iraqi Commentary, Purpose of U.S. Involvement, and the Ceasefire Talks.

The Los Angeles Times, on the other hand, followed with coverage of U.S. Military Strategy, Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy, Allied Casualties, and gave heavy coverage to events in Post-war Kuwait.

Once again, examination of weighted coverage results yielded similar differences.

In this period, the New York Times had an uncharacteristically narrow focus in some of its articles, as evidenced by the 22 categories required for classification of its stories. As usual, the Los Angeles Times, with 29 categories, was even more narrowly focused in its coverage.

## **TONE OF COVERAGE--CUMULATIVE**

### Both Newspapers:

Coverage of events in and around the Persian Gulf for the entire study was almost evenly balanced. Of the 487 articles evaluated by the researchers for the tone of coverage, 306, or 62.83%, were deemed "neutral" in terms of the manner in which the story reflected upon the National Command Authority. Ninety-one articles, or 18.69%, were seen as reflecting upon the NCA in an "unfavorable" manner, while 90 stories, or 18.48% were analyzed as being "favorable." (Chart 1 and 1A)

### New York Times:

For the entire period of study, the newspaper showed a tendency toward neutrality in its coverage of events relating to the Persian Gulf. Of the 191 stories analyzed, 123, or 64.40%, were rated as "neutral"; 37, or 19.37%, were rated "unfavorable"; and 31, or 16.23%, were judged to be "favorable" in the manner in which they reflected on the policies and actions of the National Command Authority. (Chart 2).

### Los Angeles Times:

This newspaper too showed a tendency toward neutrality in its coverage of events in and relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf. Of 296 articles evaluated, 183, or 61.82% received

a rating of "neutral." Fifty-nine articles, or 19.93% of the total, were rated "favorable," while 54 articles, or 18.25%, were seen as "unfavorable." (Chart 3)

#### Comparison:

Comparative examination of the newspapers demonstrated similarities and differences in the tone of coverage given events relating to the situation in the gulf. (Chart 16)

The vast majority of articles in each paper received "neutral" ratings from the researchers. The New York Times, with 64.40% of its 191 front page articles rated "neutral," (n=123), had a slightly higher cumulative percentage than did The Los Angeles Times, which had 183 of 296 articles (61.82%) graded "neutral" by the evaluators. Thus, the Los Angeles Times was somewhat more likely to be opinionated on certain subjects.

The Los Angeles Times had a higher percentage of stories deemed "favorable" than did the New York Times. For the entire study, the Los Angeles Times had 19.93% of its front page articles rated "favorable", while the New York Times articles were evaluated as "favorable" only 16.23% of the time.

The New York Times, on the other hand, was more likely to be critical of the National Command Authority, as 19.37% of its articles were deemed "unfavorable," compared to 18.24% of those appearing on the front page of the Los Angeles Times.

Computations of sample means showed the newspapers to be dissimilar in the manner in which they gave tone to the stories.



The mean "favorable," "unfavorable," and "neutral" percentages for the New York Times in any period were 13.45%, 21.34%, and 65.46% respectively. The means for the Los Angeles Times were 20.03%, 22.38%, and 57.59%. (Chart 3A)

However dissimilar the results appeared, they were not determined to be statistically dissimilar by either 2 by 3 Chi Square analysis or by MANOVA at a p .05 level of significance. (Chart 3B and 3C)

#### **TONE OF COVERAGE--STUDY PERIOD I**

##### Both Newspapers:

Evaluated together, the two newspapers demonstrated an almost remarkable level of neutrality during the first study period. Of the 91 front page stories evaluated by the researchers, 47, or 51.66%, were rated as "neutral." Twenty-two stories, or 24.17%, were rated "favorable." Those numbers were duplicated for stories rated "unfavorable." (Chart 4).

##### New York Times:

The first study period produced results highly similar to those of The New York Times for the cumulative period. Of 39 stories evaluated, 24, or 61.54%, were rated "neutral." Eight of the articles, or 20.51%, were rated "unfavorable," and the remaining seven articles, 17.95%, were found to be "favorable." (Chart 5).

### Los Angeles Times:

The first study period yielded results highly dissimilar to those of The New York Times during the same period. Of the 52 stories analyzed, only 23, or 44.23% were rated "neutral." Fifteen stories, or 28.85%, were seen as "favorable," while 14 stories, or 26.92%, were rated "unfavorable." (Chart 6)

### Comparison:

During the first study period, the cumulative comparison held true as the Los Angeles Times demonstrated a greater tendency to take a position in stories on its front page.

In this period, the New York Times remained far more "neutral," with 61.54% of its articles so evaluated, compared to only 44.23% for the Los Angeles Times.

The Los Angeles Times was both more "favorable" and "unfavorable" during this period, with ratings of 28.85% and 26.92% respectively, compared to the New York Times' ratings of 17.95% and 20.51%. (Chart 7)

## **TONE OF COVERAGE--STUDY PERIOD II**

### Both Newspapers:

The tone of coverage during this period was different from that of the first study period. Of 45 articles evaluated, 27, or 60.00%, were rated "neutral." Fourteen articles (31.11%) were found to be "unfavorable," while only four articles, or

8.89%, were deemed to place the National Command Authority in a "favorable" light. (Chart 8).

#### New York Times:

The Times' coverage of events in the Persian Gulf during this period differed significantly from the coverage of the first period and for the entire study. Of the 18 stories rated during this period, 13, or 72.22% of the total, were evaluated as "neutral." The remaining five stories, or 27.78%, were rated "unfavorable," meaning there were no "favorable" articles during this period. (Chart 9).

#### Los Angeles Times:

Coverage in the Los Angeles Times during the second study period changed markedly from that of the first. During this period, 14 (51.85%) of the 27 stories appearing were rated "neutral." Nine (33.33%) were rated "unfavorable," while only four (14.82%) were found to be "favorable." (Chart 10)

#### Comparison:

The New York Times again remained neutral in the vast majority of cases, with 72.22% of its articles rated "neutral," compared to only 51.85% in the Los Angeles Times.

Once again, the Los Angeles Times had a higher percentage of articles deemed "favorable" and "unfavorable," with results of 14.81% and 33.33% respectively. The New York Times during

this period had no articles rated "favorable" and 27.78% rated "unfavorable." (Chart 11)

### **'TONE OF COVERAGE--STUDY PERIOD III**

#### Both Newspapers:

The third period of study yielded results tending to be either "neutral" or "unfavorable." Of 171 articles evaluated, 112, or 65.49% were rated "neutral." Forty-three stories, or 25.15%, were seen as "unfavorable," while the remaining 16 articles (9.36%) were rated "favorable." (Chart 12)

#### New York Times:

The third period of study, like the preceding period, was dominated by coverage rated either "neutral" or "unfavorable." In this case, of the 63 stories, 39, or 61.91% of the stories, were rated "neutral," and 18, or 28.57% were found to be "unfavorable." Thus, only six stories, or 9.52%, were found to be "favorable." (Chart 13)

#### Los Angeles Times:

The period of study yielded results similar to those of the New York Times. Of 108 articles analyzed, 73, or 67.59%, were evaluated as "neutral." Twenty-five articles (23.15%) were seen as "unfavorable," while the remaining 10 (9.26%) were found to be "favorable." (Chart 14)

### Comparison:

Both papers were dominated during the period by ratings of "neutral" or "unfavorable." During this period, however, the Los Angeles Times showed a higher tendency toward neutrality as 67.60% of its front page articles were so rated, compared to 61.90% for the New York Times.

This was due to a large degree to the critical nature of the New York Times' articles for the period, as 28.57% of stories in the paper were seen as "unfavorable," compared to 23.14% for the Los Angeles Times.

Neither the New York Times nor the Los Angeles Times was especially "favorable" in its coverage during the period, as demonstrated by their ratings of 10.50% and 9.26% respectively. (Chart 15)

### **TONE OF COVERAGE--STUDY PERIOD IV**

#### Both Newspapers:

The fourth period of study was marked by a reversal of the apparent trend of unfavorable coverage during the previous three periods. Of 180 articles studied, 120, or 66.66%, were graded "neutral." Forty-eight stories, or 26.67%, were found to be "favorable," leaving only 12 articles, or 6.67% that were graded "unfavorable." (Chart 16)

#### New York Times:

The final period of the study served to reverse an apparent trend developing during the second and third periods. Of the 71 articles evaluated, 47, or 66.20% of the articles were rated "neutral," thereby continuing the dominance of that rating. In this period, however, 18 articles, or 25.35%, were rated "favorable," leaving only six articles, or 8.45%, rated as "unfavorable." (Chart 17)

#### Los Angeles Times:

Coverage during this period was dominated by articles deemed "neutral" or "favorable." Of 109 articles analyzed, 73, or 66.97% received a "neutral" evaluation. Thirty articles, or 27.52% of the articles, were deemed "favorable." The remaining six articles, 5.51%, were seen as "unfavorable." (Chart 18)

#### Comparison:

The final period of study was the most "favorable" of the four study periods. Coverage in each newspaper was highly likely to be "neutral" or "favorable," thus reversing an apparent trend that had been developing during the preceding two periods.

Each paper exhibited a high degree of neutrality as seen in ratings of 66.19% for the New York Times and 66.97% for the Los Angeles Times.

The Los Angeles Times was slightly more "favorable" in its coverage, with 27.52% of its coverage so evaluated, compared

to 25.35% for the New York Times.

Given the results on the battlefield, neither paper had many "unfavorable" stories. For the period, 8.45% of the coverage in the New York Times was rated "unfavorable," while only 5.50% of the Los Angeles Times' stories were so rated. (Chart 19)

#### **CORRELATION ANALYSIS RESULTS--NEWSPAPER, DATE, AND TONE**

##### General:

Using results for each edition of the newspapers studied, a matrix was created using the statistical program SAS that contained codified information regarding the newspaper, the date of publication, the evaluation of the article's tone, and the presence of graphics (if applicable). Those factors were then correlated with poll results corresponding to dates immediately prior to and after each study period in an effort to determine if a relationship existed between the amount or tone of coverage and public opinion as revealed in selected poll questions. Poll results were taken from the answers to the questions outlined in the methods portion of the study.

As one of the researchers' purposes in Part II of the study was to determine if coverage in the aggregate had any effect on poll results, the newspaper, the date, and the nature of coverage were correlated with the polls. Results of correlations are shown in Table 31.

Newspaper:

Pearson R correlation showed that the particular newspaper (i.e., Los Angeles Times or New York Times) had no statistically significant relationship with any of the variables chosen for study.

Date:

The date of a newspaper was shown to have a statistically significant relationship with a number of variables. A positive relationship existed between the date of a story and the likelihood that the story would be evaluated as "favorable." This indicated that, as the conflict progressed, the newspapers were more likely to print articles reflecting favorably upon the NCA. Given the results of the U.S.--led allied war effort, this was not a suprising finding.

Date also had a significant positive correlation with the results of public opinion polls regarding Presidential approval ratings. As the date increased, the level of Presidential approval ratings as reflected in polls--both before and after the period of study--increased as well. Interestingly, the level of correlation for Presidential approval prior to the period of study (.68115), was slightly higher than that following the study period (.62532), although both were significant at  $p < .001$ .

This would seem to indicate that the amount and tone of coverage of events in any one period had a slightly dampening effect on Presidential approval ratings.



Approval of United States Middle East policy before and after the study periods had statistically significant positive correlations with the date variable as well. As with the presidential approval variable, the relationship was slightly higher prior to study periods (.76015) than after (.75547). Again, the probability of error was  $p < .001$ . This probably reflected the relatively "unfavorable" view of U.S. involvement in the region for the first three periods of study.

The date had a significant positive correlation with public opinion poll results regarding the level of approval of the use of the armed forces in the region. Thus, as Desert Shield/Desert Storm wore on, the likelihood that those polled would approve of the use of armed forces in the region increased. In this instance neither the correlation coefficient (.25568), nor the probability of error ( $p < .05$ ) was as strong. No significant correlation was observed between the date of the newspaper and poll results following a period of study.

The date also had mixed results when correlated with the poll results regarding clarity of policy for U.S. involvement in the region. No significant correlation between date and poll results prior to a period of study was found. However, a statistically significant, moderately negative correlation (-.38404) was observed between date and poll results subsequent to a study period. The probability for error in this observation was  $p < .001$ .

The correlation between the date and poll results indicating

an anticipated military commitment duration of more than six months was the strongest observed in the study. The correlation between poll results prior to any period of study and the date was (-.82087). That between poll results following a period of study and date was (-.90800). Probability of error in each correlation was  $p < .001$ . Thus, as the date increased, there was a strong inverse relationship with poll results indicating the conflict would last in excess of six months. Again, given battlefield reports, this is not surprising, and is borne out by the higher post study period correlation.

Tone:

The rating of tone a story received--either "favorable," "neutral," or "unfavorable,"--showed a statistically significant correlation to several variables, although where correlation by both date and rating with poll results was observed, the correlation with date was invariably higher.

In addition to the correlation with date previously discussed, the rating showed a significantly positive correlation with the presence of informational graphics and/or photographs as well.

As with date, there was a significant correlation between presidential approval ratings both prior and subsequent to a study period. Again, the correlation with results prior (.23303,  $p < .001$ ) was higher than that after a period of study (.14495,  $p < .01$ ).

The results showed a significant correlation between rating

and poll results regarding overall United States Middle East policy. As with the date correlation, correlations were higher for the polls prior to a period of study (.28721) than for those following study periods (.21440). Both correlations showed an error probability of  $p < .001$ .

The rating a story received had a positive, significant relationship to poll results prior to a period of study determining approval of the use of the armed forces in the Middle East (.15260,  $p < .05$ ). No significant correlation was observed between rating and post study period poll results on the same subject.

No significant correlation was observed between rating and poll results regarding clarity of United States policy in the Middle East, either before or after a period of study.

Statistically significant inverse correlations were observed between rating and poll results indicating the percentage believing the duration of the military's duration of commitment to be in excess of six months.

Once again, results showed the correlation to be stronger for polls conducted before a period of study (-.30305,  $p < .001$ ) than for those done subsequent to a study period (-.11342,  $p < .05$ ).

## **CORRELATION ANALYSIS RESULTS--SELECTED ARTICLE SUBJECTS AND POLL RESULTS**

### General:

The research also was intended to determine if any of the subject categories receiving coverage by the media appeared to influence public opinion concerning United States involvement and activity in the Persian Gulf, or if it appeared that coverage followed public opinion, or if coverage and public opinion were statistically irrelevant.

Once again, a matrix was created using the statistitcal program SAS that correlated the selected story subjects with poll results corresponding to dates immediately prior to and after each study period.

The poll results were the same ones used in the correlations with newspaper, date and rating. The story subject categories selected were: U.S./Allied Diplomacy, Economic Factors, Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment, Purpose of U.S. Involvement, and Military Readiness.

Results of the significant correlations are explained here by category, and are shown at Table 32.

### U.S./Allied Diplomacy:

Pearson R correlation showed that stories about U.S. and allied diplomatic efforts had a statistically significant positive correlation ( $p < .0001$ ) with poll results regarding

Presidential approval ratings and approval of the use of force. In other words, as the number of "favorable" stories increased, the level of Presidential approval and the percent approving the use of force to resolve the conflict increased as well.

In each case, the correlation was significant with poll results recorded before and after periods of study.

The correlation between stories concerning U.S. diplomatic efforts and Presidential approval ratings was higher before any study period (.45281) than after (.29308). The same was true of the correlation between stories about U.S. diplomatic efforts and poll results regarding the use of force, although to a lesser degree (.39894 for correlation prior to a period of study, .30317 for the correlation following a period of study).

The fact that Presidential approval ratings following study periods did not have higher correlations than those prior to study periods (some of which were almost wholly cented diplomatic events) seems to indicate that the public in effect "had its mind made up" to support the President.

On the other hand, the higher prior correlation between diplomatic actions and the percentage favoring the use of military force would seem to indicate that a "softening" of opinion occurred during the study periods, when intensive diplomatic activity was apparent.

These results, while certainly not conclusive, seem intuitively plausible and fairly support the "rally 'round the

flag" phenomenon reported by Mueller and others. This concept generally states that a President, by threatening to use force, or in a short duration using it, is able to generate initially intense, favorable opinion toward himself and the potential use of force.<sup>41</sup>

#### Economic Factors:

Coverage of economic factors correlated with poll results of Presidential approval ratings and the percent approving the use of military force in exactly the same manner as did stories of U.S. and allied diplomatic efforts; that is, the results were highly significant ( $p < .0001$ ) and in each case the correlation with results prior to a study period was higher than that observed subsequent to a study period.

In this case, however, the differences between before- and after- correlations was greater. The Presidential approval correlation with economic factor stories was .60298 before a period of study and .32720 following a period of study, meaning the correlation was about one-half as strong.

This probably indicates a public intent to support the President in the first place (the "rally 'round the flag phenomenon"), and that the relative importance of economic concerns was somewhat lessened in the face of imminent or on-going conflict.

The higher level of correlation between the coverage of economic factors and the use of force before a study period

(.62814) than after (.34000) probably indicates as well a relative lack of interest, or placing of importance upon, economic factors by a public when faced with war.

The most interesting correlation regarding the Economic Factors category was one that did not appear; that is, the relationship between coverage of the economy and the public's opinion of the economy as reported in the polls. No significant relationship was found. As both poll data and economic stories were readily available, this would seem to indicate that either newspapers had an inconsequential effect on opinion or that the public's attention was elsewhere.

#### Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment:

Articles concerning the performance of the military had statistically significant correlations with three poll results: Presidential approval ratings ( $p < .0001$  prior to study periods,  $p = .0007$  afterward), the use of force ( $p < .0001$  for both before and after results), and the duration of the conflict ( $p < .0001$  for both before and after results).

Once again, in all cases, the correlations were stronger for the poll results taken prior to periods of study than for those taken following study periods.

The correlation between the coverage of military performance and Presidential approval ratings was moderate (.34877,  $p < .0001$  before, .28185,  $p < .001$  after). This would seem to indicate that the public, while to some degree basing their opinion on the

performance of the military, was more likely "holding the course."

Performance correlated in a slightly stronger manner with the percentage of the public reporting to favor the use of force in the region (.45153 before and .43416 after a period of study). The moderate correlation, combined with only a slight drop in the the results following a period of study, would appear to indicate a marginal influence of coverage on results in this instance.

The correlation between military performance stories and the percentage of the population believing military commitment in the region would last in excess of six months was negative in both cases, meaning that as the number of "favorable" stories regarding military performance increased, the number of people believing the commitment would be of a six-month duration or longer decreased.

The correlations were significant at  $p .0001$ , and as usual, the correlation following a period of study was less than that prior to a period of study ( $-.57231$  before,  $-.36322$  after a period of study). This would seem to indicate the public had confidence that military involvement would last a short period of time, but that as stories were published, confidence was somewhat diminished.

#### Purpose of U.S. Involvement:

Coverage of the purpose of American involvement in the region



correlated with the polls in problematic fashion. None of the correlations produced before- and after- results that had identical levels of significance.

Stories of purpose of involvement correlated with the results of Presidential approval polls prior to periods of study at a  $p < .0001$  level of significance, but did not correlate with the same poll subject following periods of study.

Purpose of involvement stories correlated with results of polls taken prior to periods of study regarding the use of force and duration of conflict at a high level of significance ( $p < .0001$ ), but correlated less strongly and with less significance following periods of study. Again, the correlation with duration of commitment was negative.

#### Military Readiness:

Stories about military readiness showed lesser correlation with poll results than did any other category. Only one of the correlations were significant at more than the  $p < .05$  level, and all of those were at rather low levels of correlation.

Military readiness had a statistically significant, negative correlation with the expected duration of the conflict as shown in the polls. Thus, as the number of "favorable" stories about military readiness increased, the number of people reporting that they believed the commitment would exceed six months decreased.

In this case, the level of correlation following a period

of study was higher than that shown before the study (-.25189 before at  $p < .0290$ , -.27989 at  $p < .0014$  after a period of study). This would seem to indicate that "favorable" coverage of military readiness did have some influence on the public's perception of the probable duration of the military commitment in the region.

This was the only instance in the study where it appeared that media coverage of a particular subject seemed to lead public opinion.

Military readiness also had statistically significant correlations with poll results regarding Presidential approval ratings and opinions on the economy, though in each case only with the polls following a period of study, to a level of  $p < .05$ , and with a relatively weak correlation.

## CONCLUSIONS

The study, briefly stated, dealt largely with three major questions: What subjects or variables were given significant coverage during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield? What was the nature of that coverage? What effect, if any, did the choice of subject matter and nature of coverage appear to have on public opinion polls? As the researchers saw it, the remaining questions were tertiary or dealt with the finer points of these.

Empirical answers to these and less obvious questions have been presented in great detail in the "Results" portion of the study. Conclusions presented here are intended to expand upon, and, in some cases, explain the results obtained.

### What was Covered:

Many of the conclusions obtained were probably to be expected. Generally speaking, there was little that could be termed surprising in the findings regarding what subjects the newspapers covered most frequently.

Newspaper coverage of the events in the Persian Gulf increased as time passed. Whereas early in Operation Desert Storm the newspapers may have had one or two front-page stories each issue, by mid-January the number was four to five.

While the newspapers' coverage was necessarily tied to the "events of the day," there was an obvious focus on coverage of diplomatic efforts and the purpose of United States

involvement in the region throughout Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Some issues, such as the economy, demonstrations for or against involvement, and military readiness were covered in varying degrees during the four periods.. Coverage of diplomacy and purpose, however, remained a constant topic on the pages of these newspapers.

Coverage for the overall study was dominated by the following subjects (in rank order): Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment; Purpose of U.S. Involvement; U.S./Allied Diplomacy; Military Readiness; U.S. Military Strategy; Iraqi Commentary; Allied Casualties; Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy; Economic Impact; and United Nations Participation.

During the developmental stages of the research, the authors did not include diplomacy as a major variable in military operations, thinking it to be the extension of domestic politics as interaction with other countries. However, in keeping with the writings of military theorists such as Karl von Clausewitz and Niccolo Machiavelli, the political could not be separated from the military aspects of Desert Shield/Storm. Diplomatic efforts continued through the start of the air and ground phases of military combat operations, and began anew following the Iraqi capitulation to the United Nations mandates.

During computation of results, diplomatic efforts were placed in two sub-categories, U.S./Allied and Soviet/Iraqi. These sub-categories placed third and eighth respectively both terms of frequency of appearance and weighted coverage.

United States military strategy was the third topic not specifically designated during method development and was also drawn from the "Other" category. However, the category's presence in third place when combining results is due primarily to its prominence on the front page of the Los Angeles Times. The paper had 20 stories exploring U.S. strategy options, while the New York Times devoted only five stories to the subject. The Los Angeles Times drew many of its stories from contributing military analysts who presented "what if" analyses of potential military operations. Other stories were distilled from the comments of unnamed military sources. The New York Times dealt less with those kinds of sources and spent less time on "what if" scenarios.

The top story varied by period. In August 1990, the purpose of U.S. involvement was the top subject in both newspapers. This appears logical, as the first study period was constructed around President Bush's decision to deploy elements of the United States Army's XVIII Airborne Corps to the region. Any decision to commit U.S. military forces in an other than self-defense role is expected to engender great discussion, and that decision was no exception

During the two weeks surrounding President Bush's announcement of a continuation of the military build-up in November, the top story became the coalition's military readiness. This primacy was offset by the fact that this period had the smallest amount of coverage in general and of military readiness in particular,

however.

The continued deployment of forces during this period faced competition for coverage from local and national elections, and the number of newspaper articles regarding Desert Shield dropped drastically. The New York Times had two days when no stories appeared on the front page, and the Los Angeles Times' coverage dropped to as few as three articles on the days of and following elections.

Throughout Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Iraqi commentary was extensively covered by both newspapers, and was the fifth most topically frequent subject and sixth in weighted coverage for the entire study. Commentary from Saddam Hussein, his Ministry of Information, and military leaders received more coverage than did the impact of operations on the U.S. economy, comment and debate by U.S. congressional leaders, and the environmental damage caused by the war. The viewpoints of Iraq's leadership thus received considerable space and prominence in the newspapers studied.

Because of last-minute diplomatic activity surrounding Congress' decision to endorse actions by the administration and preceding the beginning of the war, U.S./Allied Diplomacy tied with Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment in the third (January 1-23, 1991) period of study. This period saw the heaviest coverage of the entire study. The Los Angeles Times frequently had six stories per day on its front page, and the New York Times had as many as five.

Air operations continued and ground operations began in the February-March 1991, period, resulting in Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment becoming the most topically frequent and heavily weighted story in the period. This was reasonable, as this category contained the stories that had combat operations as their theme.

The most surprising result was the relative paucity of stories about the potential and actual impact of military operations on the environment of Southwest Asia. Scenes of wildlife struggling in the oil-covered Persian Gulf and burning oil wells blackening the skies of Kuwait were daily--if not hourly--fare on network and cable television. Of 487 front page stories, only four stories on the environment appeared. This was especially interesting considering many environmental groups, including the Sierra Club (San Francisco), and Earth First! (Arizona) are located in the geographic region the Los Angeles Times calls its own.

Thus, for the most part, the newspapers' front page coverage increased as combat drew nearer and was largely tied to the events in the region.

#### Tone:

In this area too there were few findings the researchers considered surprising. Stories evaluated as "neutral" by the researchers dominated in each newspaper for all four periods. Since each of these newspapers is regarded as a mainstream

publication, it would seem appropriate for coverage to be dominated by "neutral" writing.

While there were some discrepancies, coverage from the time of President Bush's decision to commit military forces to the region through the commencement of hostilities grew increasingly "unfavorable." Once hostilities began, coverage became more "favorable." Given the definitions of tone used and the battlefield results, this too is not surprising.

The tone of coverage of Operation Desert Shield/Storm in the two newspapers, when combined, was remarkably balanced for the period of the entire study. Of 487 articles evaluated, 306 were rated "neutral," 90 were rated "favorable," and 91 received "unfavorable" ratings.

This overall balance was a product of the differences in coverage during the four distinct study periods. The first study period, 2-14 August 1990, centered around President Bush's initial decision to commit troops to the region, was perfectly balanced, with 47 articles rated "neutral," 22 rated "favorable," and 22 rated "unfavorable."

The second study period, 1-14 November 1990, centered around Bush's Nov. 7 decision to expand the number of forces in the region. This period, due at least in part to news competition from election coverage, received the least coverage of any of the four periods. The overall "unfavorable" nature of the coverage (14 articles were rated "unfavorable," compared to only four rated "favorable") began what appeared to be an



"unfavorable" trend in coverage that continued through the commencement of hostilities.

The third study period, 1-23 January 1991, which was constructed around Congress' decision to authorize the President's use of military force, if necessary, reflected a growing sense of unease among both newspapers and the public at large. The nature of coverage during the period in the two newspapers combined remained predominantly "neutral," but the number of "unfavorable," stories was nearly three times as large (43) as those rated "favorable," (16). Poll results during this period were likely to show declining approval ratings for the President's handling of the situation, his overall approval rating, and the like. These reflected a trend that began with the November 1990 study period.

The final study period, 16 February-7 March 1991, was constructed around two events--the start of the ground phase of military operations on 23 February and the agreement of Iraq to meet United Nations resolutions on 27 February. Not surprisingly, given the outcome of the war, this was the only period that was covered in a "favorable" manner by the two newspapers. In fact, the number of "favorable" stories outstripped those rated "unfavorable" by a four-to-one margin, 48 to 12. While this period reversed what had been a developing trend in the nature of coverage, the huge margin of "favorable" articles, combined with the large number of stories overall--180 in the period, also was critical in the overall, balanced nature

of coverage by the two newspapers.

Results of examination of coverage of individual categories are shown in Chart 20. The chart shows which of the ten most frequently appearing categories were given the most "favorable" and most "unfavorable" coverage by percentage. The percentage was figured by dividing the number of articles rated "favorable" or "unfavorable" by the total number of articles in the category. Using this method, it was possible for a category to appear in the top five on each side.

Those subjects receiving the highest percentage of "favorable" coverage in the two newspapers were: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment (38.03%); United Nations Participation (36.84%); Military Readiness (15.63%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (14.00%); and Economic Impact and U.S. Military Strategy (each with 12.00%).

The performance of allied forces and President Bush's ability to mold and maintain the allied coalition arrayed against Iraq appear to have had some influence in the manner in which coverage of stories in the categories above was given. However, this influence was not unidirectional, as three of the six categories above also appeared in the five most "unfavorably" covered variables.

Only the appearance of Economic Impact in the top six above surprised the researchers. This was due in part to stories on the economy late in the operation that disclosed the probable absence of dire economic effects predicted by many economists

early in the build-up, and in part because of the relatively few stories placed in that category.

The most "unfavorably" covered categories were: Economic Impact (44.00%); Allied Casualties (35.29%); Purpose of U.S. Involvement (32.00); Military Readiness (21.87%); and U.S./Allied Diplomacy (11.11).

The only real surprise here was the presence of Military Readiness. The researchers, somewhat parochially perhaps, felt that the military was ready, and that it was reflected in public confidence levels. But early, "unfavorable" stories in each newspaper detailing equipment problems, real or perceived, contributed to put the category in the top five.

The only category in the ten most topically frequent overall to have more than 50 percent of its articles not rated "neutral" was Economic Impact. This was due in large part to the number of stories predicting economic disaster early in the Desert Shield portion of the operation.

#### How the Newspapers Differed:

The research showed that there were more similarities than differences between the two selected newspapers in the way in which they covered Desert Shield/Storm. In some cases, these similarities and differences had influence upon the results obtained.

### Coverage:

Different editorial policy on the newspapers resulted in the Los Angeles Times having approximately 60 percent of the stories in the sample evaluated by the researchers. The Los Angeles Times habitually started more stories relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf on the front page than did the New York Times, and jumped them more frequently to inside pages. The New York Times had as many as five Desert Shield/Storm related stories on the front page of a single issue, and in some instances had none at all, while the Los Angeles Times never had fewer than three and at times had as many as seven Desert Shield/Storm stories on its front page.

Generally, the New York Times examined topics from a broader perspective than did the Los Angeles Times. Placing the Los Angeles Times' stories in the 17 original categories was more difficult, necessitating placement in the "Other" category followed by further grouping according to theme. This was reflected in the number of categories necessary to classify all editions of each paper--37 for the New York Times and 50 for the Los Angeles Times.

The New York paper, in keeping with the original intent of founder Henry Jarvis Raymond, dealt with stories from a more impersonal, neutral angle. The Los Angeles paper, on the other hand, personalized stories more often, using a narrower focus to examine the impact of news on individuals--sometimes in stories beginning on the front page. The following examples

serve to illustrate.

Only the Los Angeles Times ran public reaction stories at the start of major phases of the operation on the front page. It also had front-page stories covering the perceived impact of the conflict on ethnic, religious and other demographic groups (Arabs, Jews and the families of service members) in America.

Despite geographic separation, the different editorial staffs, and the differences highlighted above, the ten topics with the highest frequency and weighted coverage were nearly the same in each newspaper. Eight of the topics were exactly the same, though their relative ranking often differed. The Los Angeles Times placed U.S. Military Strategy and Allied Casualties in the top ten, while the New York Times substituted Congressional Commentary and Civilian Casualties in their place in its top ten. These differences serve to highlight the disparate editorial policies for each paper.

Seven of the Los Angeles Times' and eight of the New York Times' categories were those originally developed by the researchers.

The Los Angeles Times focused more of its stories on the war's impact on the U.S. domestic economy than did the New York Times. The New York Times had nine stories about economic impact, eight of them during the August, 1990, period. The Los Angeles Times devoted 19 stories to the subject, eight in the August period, with the remainder almost evenly split between the November and January periods. This result is ironic given the

New York Times' proximity to and historically close monitoring of Wall Street.

Stories detailing potential and actual casualties suffered by allied forces were also covered more often by the Los Angeles Times. Fourteen of their stories dealt with allied casualties, compared with only three New York Times front page stories on the subject.

Coverage of civilian and opposition (Iraqi) casualties was nearly identical in the two newspapers. The New York Times had seven articles about the former and two concerning the latter. The Los Angeles Times' coverage included seven civilian casualty stories and three opposition casualty stories. Considering the war's eventual outcome, the disproportionate number of stories covering allied and opposition casualties may have been due to either the apparently pessimistic early estimates of potential casualties by military planners and analysts, or by the Iraqi denial of access to Western reporters to their portion of the Kuwaiti theater of operations.

#### **Tone:**

As detailed in the "Results" portion of the study, differences in the nature of coverage between the two newspapers were not found to be statistically significant. Given the quantitative differences between the two newspapers, however, the differences certainly had some degree of influence on the overall results obtained, and therefore merit discussion.

The Los Angeles Times, which produced approximately 60 percent of all stories evaluated, was more likely to present stories lacking balance than was the New York Times. This was especially the case when considering those stories evaluated as "favorable," where the mean percentage of stories so evaluated for a period was 20.03% in the Los Angeles Times, compared to 13.45% for the New York Times. For stories rated "unfavorable," the difference was far less, 22.38% and 21.34% respectively. Nearly identical results were obtained when median percentages were used for each newspaper. (Chart 3A). Clearly, the large number of "favorable" articles in the Los Angeles Times had some effect on the overall results.

Differences in the manner in which each newspaper covered the ten most frequently appearing subjects were apparent as well. The Los Angeles Times, consistent with its tendency to be more "favorable" in its coverage, exceeded the percentage of "favorable" coverage by the New York Times in four of the eight common categories: Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment, U.S. Allied Diplomacy, Military Readiness, and United Nations Participation. It had the same percentage of "favorable" stories in two others--Iraqi Commentary and Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy.

Only in the areas of Purpose of U.S. Involvement and Economic Impact did the New York Times print a higher percentage of "favorable" stories than the Los Angeles Times.

The New York Times and Los Angeles Times split in their

tendency to publish articles rated "unfavorable" in the eight common categories. The New York Times had a higher percentage of "unfavorable" articles in four categories: Purpose of U.S. Involvement, U.S./Allied Diplomacy, Iraqi Commentary, and United Nations Participation.

The Los Angeles Times was more likely to print articles reflecting in an "unfavorable" manner on the National Command Authority when the subject was Performance of Units, Soldiers, and Equipment, Military Readiness, Economic Impact, or Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy.

Again, the differences reflect each newspaper's primary focus and news judgment. The New York Times devoted much of its space to the international arena, while the Los Angeles Times' editorial staff seemed more inclined to focus on the domestic impact of the conflict.

#### Correlation Analysis Conclusions:

##### **General:**

Correlation analysis using Pearson R matrices showed that coverage in the newspapers was identical as it related to the polls; that as time passed, tone was likely to become more "favorable;" that information graphics and/or photographs were more likely to accompany articles evaluated as "favorable;" and that significant correlations existed between the dates of publication and the tone of stories and the results on public



opinion polls.

#### **Newspaper--Poll Correlation:**

No correlation was found to exist between either newspaper and any of the questions selected from the polls. This was expected to some degree, as the results of multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) analysis showed the newspapers not to be significantly different.

#### **Date of Publication--Tone Correlation:**

A significant correlation was found to exist between the date of the edition of a newspaper and the rating given the stories in that edition. The correlation was positive, meaning that as time progressed, the likelihood that an article from the selected newspapers would be rated "favorable" increased. This result would seem to be intuitively reasonable, given the outcome of the war from the United States' vantage point.

#### **Presence of Information Graphics--Tone Correlation:**

The rating that an article received was found to have a significant positive correlation with the presence of information graphics and/or photographs. Thus, as the rating of any article increased, the likely presence of art increased as well.

#### **Date/Tone and Poll Results Correlations:**

Significant correlations were found between both date of newspapers and the tone of articles and the results of polls conducted subsequent to study periods for the following poll areas of interest: The level of Presidential approval; the level of approval of U.S. policy in the Middle East; and the belief

that the duration of military commitment in the region would exceed six months.

Correlations between the date of publication and poll results were consistently higher than the correlations between tone and poll results. This finding would seem to indicate a limited role for the media in influencing public opinion on these issues.

In addition, the correlations for both tone and date of publication with poll results conducted prior to a period of study consistently exceeded the correlations between tone and date of publication and poll results attained following a period of study. In other words, the "before" results were stronger than the "after" results. This too would seem to indicate a limited role for the newspapers in influencing public opinion.

Had the tone correlations exceeded those of the date of publication, or had the "after" correlations exceeded the "before" correlations, a strong case could have been made for newspapers influencing public opinion.

In only one area did one of these situations occur. The correlation between the date of the publication and the estimated duration of conflict as reflected in polls showed the strongest "before" and "after" correlations observed ( $-.82807$  and  $-.90800$  respectively, with  $p .001$ ). The stronger "after" correlation may indicate that, in this case, media may have had an effect on public opinion.

Thus, in the aggregate it would appear the newspapers and their tone of coverage had very little influence on the results

seen in public opinion polls.

The Relationship between Coverage of Individual Categories and Public Opinion Polls:

Pearson R correlation showed fairly consistent results in correlating coverage of specific categories and public opinion poll results.

One notable finding was that in all cases except the Military Readiness--Duration of Commitment correlation, the correlation prior to any period of study was higher than that following a period of study. This would seem to indicate either that the public had its collective "mind made up" concerning the issues, or that media had a "softening effect" on the public's outlook.

In general, no identifiable pattern of media influence upon public opinion of individual subjects was discerned. Presidential approval ratings, for example, correlated to some degree with newspaper coverage of nearly every subject area. However, it is not clear from the data gathered that the coverage itself, and not the President's prominent position, contributed to changes in his approval ratings. In addition, the lesser correlation following periods of study than that seen prior to periods of study would seem to indicate only the aforementioned "softening" of opinion rather than any real influence tied to the type or amount of coverage.

The line charts at the end of the study depict the general trend of a public opinion--tone of coverage correlation for

individual issues, but it must be restated that public opinion almost invariably changed or evolved prior to changes in the manner in which the stories were reported in the newspapers. (See the section containing line charts).

Generally, the correlations between poll results and specific issue coverage were of moderate intensity (usually, about .20 to .50) with extremely high levels of significance.

One surprising finding was the lack of correlation between coverage of economic factors and public opinion results regarding the economy. This is probably best explained using the obtrusive contingency theory, that the greater the amount of personal experience with an idea, the less reliant one becomes on the media for information. Since virtually all adults are affected by the nation's economic status, it could be inferred that their level of familiarity was high, thus lessening the influence of the media in this area.

The mixed results obtained on this portion of the study call for additional research into the coverage--public opinion question. (Table 32)

#### General Conclusions:

In summation, the coverage of Operation Desert Shield/Storm was highly consistent with what the researchers intuitively believed it should have been. The major topics for discussion were extensively covered on the front pages of the two selected newspapers.

Coverage in the aggregate was almost remarkably balanced, although the newspapers indicated differing levels of bias when studied individually. The treatment of specific topics was consistent with each newspaper's historical editorial stance and was again characterized by overall balance.

This finding differed greatly from the content analyses conducted by Braestrup and Lefever during Vietnam. This could be for a variety of reasons, such as an increased level of "professionalism" on the part of journalists covering Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the method by which stories were categorized and tone was determined, or the results seen on the battlefield. In any case, the results obtained represented a significant departure from those obtained in studies of television coverage of the Vietnam War.

This study concludes that the newspapers studied were highly balanced and fair in the coverage given the Persian Gulf War, that the coverage for the most part tended to reflect events rather than tertiary issues, and that media had a limited role in directly influencing public opinion.

A final conclusion would have to be "Results count." That is, that in the face of an overwhelmingly professional, successful operation like the recently concluded war in the Persian Gulf, little of consequence could be said to seriously detract from the National Command Authority. On the other hand, it must be understood that a "results count" approach would mandate a ready acceptance of valid criticism when results are

not what was reasonably expected.

**Cumulative Nature of Coverage - LAT and NYT**  
**Desert Shield-Desert Storm**  
**Topical Frequency**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Fav</b>	<b>Neu</b>	<b>Unfav</b>	<b>Tot</b>	<b>% Tot</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	27	39	5	71	14.57	1
Purpose of US Involvement	7	27	16	50	10.26	2
US/Allied Diplomacy	1	29	5	45	9.24	3
Military Readiness	5	20	7	32	6.57	4
Iraqi Commentary	2	25	1	28	5.75	5
Economic Impact	3	11	11	25	5.13	6.5
US/Military Strategy	3	22	-	25	5.13	6.5
UN Participation	7	10	2	19	3.90	8.5
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	18	1	19	3.90	8.5
Allied Casualties	1	10	6	17	3.49	10
Congressional Commentary	1	8	5	14	2.85	11
Civilian Casualties	-	10	3	13	2.67	12
Personality Profiles	5	5	1	11	2.26	13
Congressional Debate	1	5	4	10	2.05	14
Arab League Matters	2	7	-	9	1.85	16
Post-war Iraq	-	8	1	9	1.85	16
Terrorism	1	5	3	9	1.85	16
Ceasefire Talks	5	3	-	8	1.64	18
Public Reaction Stories	2	3	2	7	1.44	19.5
Demonstrations Against	-	2	5	7	1.44	19.5
Post-war Kuwait	1	5	-	6	1.23	21
Opposition Casualties	-	5	-	5	1.03	22
Environmental Damage	-	1	3	4	.82	23.5
Media Issues	-	3	1	4	.82	23.5
Baker Visit	2	-	1	3	.62	25.5
Iraqi Motives	-	3	-	3	.62	25.5
Arab-American Concerns	-	-	2	2	.41	31
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	-	1	1	2	.41	31
Minority/Female Involvement	-	2	-	2	.41	31
Jordanian Issues	-	2	-	2	.41	31
US/USSR Relations	1	-	1	2	.41	31
Demonstrations For	1	1	-	2	.41	31
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	-	2	-	2	.41	31
Impact on Military Families	-	1	1	2	.41	31
Iraqi Military Strategy	-	2	-	2	.41	31
War Announcement	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Israeli Retaliation Plan	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5

Table 1 - Cumulative Topical Frequency

Duration of Conflict	-	-	1	1	.20	42.5
Weapon Technology	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Summary Story	-	-	1	1	.20	42.5
European Arms Suppliers	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Kuwait Economy	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Iraqi Exiles	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Chinese Public's Support	1	-	-	1	.20	42.5
Iraqi Readiness	1	-	-	1	.20	42.5
US Jewish Reaction	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Hussein Assessment	-	-	1	1	.20	42.5
Iraqi Invasion	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Internal Saudi Problems	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5
Occupied Kuwait	-	1	-	1	.20	42.5

Total	90	306	91	487	100%	-
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**Table 1 - Cumulative Topical Frequency**



# **Cumulative Weighted Coverage Desert Shield-Desert Storm**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	2802.85	1	15.69
Purpose of US Involvement	2195.71	2	12.29
US/Allied Diplomacy	1372.65	3	7.69
Military Readiness	1100.55	4	6.16
US/Military Strategy	932.78	5	5.22
Iraqi Commentary	890.92	6	4.99
Allied Casualties	789.09	7	4.42
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	759.27	8	4.25
Economic Impact	689.66	9	3.86
UN Participation	658.29	10	3.69
Personality Profiles	474.56	11	2.66
Ceasefire Talks	446.48	12	2.50
Civilian Casualties	437.90	13	2.45
Congressional Commentary	409.47	14	2.29
Post-war Iraq	367.88	15	2.06
Congressional Debate	338.44	16	1.89
Terrorism/Hostages	287.47	17	1.61
Public Reaction Stories	285.11	18	1.60
Post-war Kuwait	276.15	19	1.55
Arab League Matters	261.79	20	1.47
Demonstrations Against	258.14	21	1.45
Media Issues	164.30	22	.92
Opposition Casualties	139.30	23	.78
Iraqi Motives	112.39	24	.63
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	111.96	25	.63
Environmental Damage	105.09	26	.59
Iraqi Military Strategy	93.11	27	.52
Baker Visit	91.00	28	.51
Weapon Technology	86.08	29	.48
Arab-American Concerns	77.32	30	.43
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	73.81	31	.41
Minority/Female Involvement	72.17	32	.40
Summary Story	66.71	33	.37
Impact on Military Families	66.26	34	.37
Iraqi Exiles	62.59	35	.35
US Jewish Reaction	62.18	36	.35
Demonstrations For	61.89	37	.35
Jordanian issues	54.33	38	.30
Kuwaiti Economy	47.76	39	.27
Hussein Assessment	33.35	40	.19
US/USSR Relations	32.13	41	.18
Iraqi Invasion	31.16	42	.17
Chinese Public's Support	28.62	43	.16

Table 2 - Cumulative Weighted Coverage

War Announcement	26.50	44	.15
Israeli Retaliation Plan	23.38	45	.13
Internal Saudi Problems	20.60	46	.12
Occupied Kuwait	20.10	47	.11
Attack Announcement	19.11	48	.11
Iraqi Readiness	13.65	49	.08
Duration of Conflict	5.67	50	.03

Total	17,860.83	-	100%
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**Table 2 - Cumulative Weighted Coverage (Continued)**

# **Cumulative Topical Frequency - NYT** **Desert Shield-Desert Storm**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Fav</b>	<b>Neu</b>	<b>Unfav</b>	<b>Tot</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	9	18	1	28	14.66	1
Purpose of US Involvement	4	11	9	24	12.57	2
US/Allied Diplomacy	3	14	5	22	11.52	3
Military Readiness	2	10	2	14	7.32	4.5
Iraqi Commentary	1	12	1	14	7.32	4.5
Economic Impact	2	5	2	9	4.71	6
UN Participation	2	5	1	8	4.19	8
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	8	-	8	4.19	8
Congressional Commentary	1	4	3	8	4.19	8
Civilian Casualties	0	5	2	7	3.66	10
Congressional Debate	1	2	2	5	2.61	13
Personality Profiles	2	2	1	5	2.61	13
US/Military Strategy	0	5	0	5	2.61	13
Ceasefire Talks	1	3	-	4	2.10	15
Arab League Matters	1	3	0	4	2.10	15
Post-war Iraq	0	4	0	4	2.10	15
Allied Casualties	1	1	1	3	1.57	17.5
Hostages/POW's	0	1	2	3	1.57	17.5
Iraqi Motives	0	2	0	2	1.05	20
Demonstrations Against	0	0	2	2	1.05	20
Opposition Casualties	0	2	0	2	1.05	20
Public Reaction To Start Of War	0	1	0	1	.52	26
Arab-American Fears	0	0	1	1	.52	26
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	0	0	1	1	.52	26
US/USSR Relations	1	0	0	1	.52	26
War Initiation Announcement	0	1	0	1	.52	26
Minority/Female Involvement	0	1	0	1	.52	26
Jordanian Issues	0	1	0	1	.52	26
Israeli Retaliation Plan	0	1	0	1	.52	26
Attack Announcement	0	1	0	1	.52	26
Environmental Damage	0	0	1	1	.52	26
Demonstrations For	0	0	0	0	-	-
Terrorism	0	0	0	0	-	-
Duration of Conflict	0	0	0	0	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>100</b>	

**Table 3 - Cumulative Topical Frequency - NYT**

**Weighted Coverage-NYT  
Desert Shield-Desert Storm**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Purpose of US Involvement	1115.20	1	16.67
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	1096.56	2	16.39
US/Allied Diplomacy	648.28	3	9.69
Military Readiness	484.69	4	7.24
Iraqi Commentary	403.03	5	6.03
UN Participation	300.93	6	4.50
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	295.37	7	4.41
Congressional Commentary	233.60	8	3.49
Ceasefire Talks	207.04	9	3.10
Economic Impact	203.45	10	3.04
Civilian Casualties	203.23	11	3.04
Congressional Debate	201.81	12	3.01
Personality Profiles	188.33	13	2.81
US/Military Strategy	173.03	14	2.59
Arab League Matters	140.63	15	2.10
Post-war Iraq	137.09	16	2.05
Allied Casualties	102.53	17	1.53
Iraqi Motives	82.00	18	1.23
Hostages/POW's	80.71	19	1.20
Demonstrations Against	75.35	20	1.13
Arab-American Concerns	47.45	21	.71
Opposition Casualties	44.83	22	.67
Public Reaction To Start Of War	36.85	23	.56
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	28.05	24	.42
US/USSR Relations	27.75	25	.41
War Initiation Announcement	26.50	26	.40
Minority/Female Involvement	25.30	27	.38
Jordanian Issues	24.20	28	.36
Israeli Retaliation Plan	23.38	29	.35
Attack Announcement	19.11	30	.29
Environmental Damage	14.85	31	.22
Demonstrations For	-	-	-
Terrorism	-	-	-
Duration of Conflict	-	-	-
Total	6691.93		100%

**Table 4 - Weighted Coverage - NYT**

# **Topical Frequency - LAT** **Desert Shield-Desert Storm**

Subjects	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Tot	% Tot	Rank
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	18	21	4	43	14.53	1
Purpose of US Involvement	3	16	7	26	8.78	2
US/Allied Diplomacy	8	15	-	23	7.78	3
US/Military Strategy	3	17	-	20	6.76	4
Military Readiness	3	10	5	18	6.08	5
Economic Impact	1	6	9	16	5.41	6
Iraqi Commentary	1	13	-	14	4.73	7.5
Allied Casualties	-	9	5	14	4.73	7.5
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	10	1	11	3.72	9.5
UN Participation	5	5	1	11	3.72	9.5
Personality Profiles	3	3	-	6	2.03	13.5
Civilian Casualties	-	5	1	6	2.03	13.5
Post-war Kuwait	1	5	-	6	2.03	13.5
Public Reaction	2	2	2	6	2.03	13.5
Congressional Commentary	-	4	2	6	2.03	13.5
Terrorism	1	4	1	6	2.03	13.5
Post-war Iraq	-	4	1	5	1.69	18.5
Demonstrations Against	-	2	3	5	1.69	18.5
Congressional Debate	-	3	2	5	1.69	18.5
Arab League Matters	1	4	-	5	1.69	18.5
Ceasefire Talks	4	-	-	4	1.35	21.5
Media Issues	-	3	1	4	1.35	21.5
Opposition Casualties	-	3	-	3	1.01	24
Baker Visit	2	-	1	3	1.01	24
Environmental Damage	-	1	2	3	1.01	24
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	-	2	-	2	.68	27.5
Impact On U.S. Military	-	1	1	2	.68	27.5
Demonstrations For	1	1	-	2	.68	27.5
Iraqi Military Strategy	-	2	-	2	.68	27.5
Weapon Technology	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Summary Story	-	-	1	1	.34	38.5
Iraqi Exiles	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
U.S. Jewish Reactions	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Kuwaiti Economy	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Minority/Female Involvement	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Hussein Assessment	-	-	1	1	.34	38.5
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Iraqi Motives	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Jordanian Issues	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Arab-American Concerns	-	-	1	1	.34	38.5

Table 5 - Topical Frequency

Chinese Public's Support	1	-	-	1	.34	38.5
Internal Saudi Problems	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Occupied Kuwait	-	1	-	1	.34	38.5
Iraqi Readiness	1	-	-	1	.34	38.5
Duration of Conflict	-	-	1	1	.34	38.5
US/USSR Relations	-	-	1	1	.34	38.5
Total	59	183	54	296	100	-

**Table 5 - Topical Frequency (Continued)**

# **Cumulative Weighted Coverage-LAT** **Desert Shield-Desert Storm**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	1706.29	1	15.28
Purpose of US Involvement	1080.51	2	9.67
US/Military Strategy	759.75	3	6.80
US/Allied Diplomacy	724.37	4	6.49
Allied Casualties	686.56	5	6.15
Military Readiness	615.86	6	5.51
Iraqi Commentary	487.80	7	4.37
Economic Impact	486.21	8	4.35
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	463.90	9	4.15
UN Participation	357.36	10	3.20
Personality Profiles	286.23	11	2.56
Post-war Kuwait	276.15	12	2.43
Public Reaction Stories	248.26	13	2.22
Ceasefire Talks	239.44	14	2.14
Civilian Casualties	234.67	15	2.10
Post-war Iraq	230.79	16	2.07
Terrorism	206.76	17	1.85
Demonstrations Against	182.79	18	1.64
Congressional Commentary	175.87	19	1.57
Media Issues	164.30	20	1.47
Congressional Debate	136.63	21	1.22
Arab League Matters	121.16	22	1.08
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	111.96	23	1.00
Opposition Casualties	94.47	24	.85
Iraqi Military Strategy	93.11	25	.83
Baker Visit	91.00	26	.81
Environmental Damage	90.24	27	.81
Weapon Technology	86.08	28	.77
Summary Story	66.71	29	.60
Impact On U.S. Military	66.26	30	.59
Iraqi Exiles	62.59	31	.56
U.S. Jewish Reactions	62.18	32	.56
Demonstrations For	61.89	33	.55
Kuwaiti Economy	47.76	34	.43
Minority/Female Involvement	46.87	35	.42
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	45.76	36	.41
Hussein Assessment	33.35	37	.30
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait	31.16	38	.28
Iraqi Motives	30.39	39	.28
Jordanian Issues	30.13	40	.27
Arab-American Concerns	29.87	41	.27
Chinese Public's Support	28.62	42	.26

Table 6 - Cumulative Weighted Coverage - LAT

Internal Saudi Problems	20.60	43	.18
Occupied Kuwait	20.10	44	.18
Iraqi Readiness	13.65	45	.12
Duration of Conflict	5.67	46	.05
US/USSR Relations	4.38	47	.04
Total	11,168.90		100%

**Table 6 - Cumulative Weighted Coverage - LAT (Continued)**



# Topical Frequency - NYT and LAT

## 2-14 August 1990

	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Total	%	Rank
Purpose of US Involvement	4	12	6	22	24.18	1
Economic Factors	2	8	6	16	17.58	2
United Nations Participation	6	2	2	10	10.99	3
Iraqi Commentary	1	8	-	9	9.89	4
Military Readiness	2	2	4	8	8.79	5.5
Arab League	2	6	-	8	8.79	5.5
Terrorism/Hostages	-	3	2	5	5.49	7
US/Allied Diplomacy	3	-	-	3	3.30	8
US/USSR Relations	1	-	1	2	2.20	9.5
Iraqi Motives	-	2	-	2	2.20	9.5
Internal Saudi Problems	-	1	-	1	1.10	13.5
Occupied Kuwait	-	1	-	1	1.10	13.5
Duration of the Conflict	-	-	1	1	1.10	13.5
Unit/Soldier/Equip Performance	-	1	-	1	1.10	13.5
Personality Profile	1	-	-	1	1.10	13.5
Iraqi Invasion	-	1	-	1	1.10	13.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>

Table 7 - Topical Frequency

## Weighted Coverage - NYT and LAT 2-14 August 1990

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Purpose of US Involvement	1058.17	1	33.42
Economic Factors	419.44	2	13.25
United Nations Participation	354.09	3	11.18
Iraqi Commentary	344.98	4	10.90
Military Readiness	241.06	5	7.61
Arab League	240.73	6	7.60
Terrorism/Hostages	159.71	7	5.04
Iraqi Motives	82.00	8	2.59
Unit/Soldiers/Equip Performance	59.50	9	1.88
US/Allied Diplomacy	49.96	10	1.56
Personality Profile	46.74	11	1.46
US/USSR Relations	32.13	12	1.01
Iraqi Invasion	31.16	13	.98
Internal Saudi Problems	20.60	14	.65
Occupied Kuwait	20.10	15	.63
Duration of the Conflict	5.67	16	.34
<b>Total</b>	<b>3166.04</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 8 - Weighted Coverage**

## Topical Frequency - NYT 2-14 August 1990

	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Tot	%	Rank
Purpose of US Involvement	2	7	3	12	30.77	1
Economic Factors	2	4	2	8	20.51	2
United Nations Participation	1	2	1	4	10.25	3.5
Arab League	1	3	-	4	10.25	3.5
Military Readiness	-	2	1	3	7.69	5
Iraqi Motives	-	2	-	2	5.13	7.3
Iraqi Commentary	-	2	-	2	5.13	7.3
Hostages	-	1	1	2	5.13	7.3
Unit/Soldier/ Equipment Performance	-	1	-	1	2.56	9.5
US/USSR Relations	1	-	-	1	2.56	9.5
<b>Totals</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

**Table 9 - Topical Frequency**

# Weighted Coverage - NYT

## 2-14 August 1990

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Purpose of US Involvement	642.74	1	43.51
Economic Factors	198.50	2	13.43
United Nations Participation	154.50	3	10.45
Arab League	140.63	4	9.52
Military Readiness	84.75	5	5.73
Iraqi Motives	82.00	6	5.55
Unit/Soldier/ Equipment Performance	59.50	7	4.02
Iraqi Commentary	45.50	8	3.08
Hostages	41.25	9	2.79
US/USSR Relations	27.75	10	1.87
<b>Total</b>	<b>1477.12</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 10 - Weighted Coverage**

## Topical Frequency - LAT 2-14 August 1990

	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Tot	%	Rank
Purpose of US Involvement	2	5	3	10	19.23	1
Economic Factors	-	4	4	8	15.38	2
Iraqi Commentary	1	6	-	7	13.46	3
United Nations Participation	5	-	1	6	11.54	4
Military Readiness	2	-	3	5	9.62	5
Arab League	1	3	-	4	7.69	6
Terrorism/Hostages	-	2	1	3	5.77	7.5
US/Allied Diplomacy	3	-	-	3		7.5
US/USSR Relations	-	-	1	1	1.92	11.5
Duration of Conflict	-	-	1	1	1.92	11.5
Personality Profile	1	-	-	1	1.92	11.5
Iraqi Invasion	-	1	-	1	1.92	11.5
Occupied Kuwait	-	1	-	1	1.92	11.5
Internal Saudi Problems	-	1	-	1	1.92	11.5
<b>Totals</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>100.00</b>	

**Table 11 - Topical Frequency**

# Weighted Coverage - LAT

## 2-14 August 1990

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Purpose of US Involvement	415.43	1	24.60
Iraqi Commentary	299.48	2	17.73
Economic Factors	220.94	3	13.08
United Nations Participation	199.59	4	11.82
Military Readiness	156.31	5	9.26
Terrorism/Hostages	118.46	6	7.01
Arab League	100.10	7	5.93
US/Allied Diplomacy	49.96	8	2.96
Personality Profile	46.74	9	2.77
Iraqi Invasion	31.16	10	1.84
Internal Saudi Problems	20.60	11	1.22
Occupied Kuwait	20.10	12	1.19
Duration of the Conflict	5.67	13	.34
US/USSR Relations	4.38	14	.26
Total	1688.92		100%

Table 12 - Weighted Coverage

## Topical Frequency - NYT and LAT 1-14 November 1990

	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Total	%	Rank
Military Readiness	-	12	1	13	28.89	1
Congressional Commentary	-	4	3	7	15.55	2
Purpose of US Involvement	-	3	3	6	13.33	3
US/Allied Diplomacy	1	3	1	5	11.11	4
Demonstrations Against	-	1	2	3	6.66	5.5
Baker Mideast Visit	2	-	1	3	6.66	5.5
Economic Impact	-	-	2	2	4.44	7
Congressional Debate	-	-	1	1	2.22	10.5
Personality Profile	-	1	-	1	2.22	10.5
Demonstrations For	1	-	-	1	2.22	10.5
Jordanian Situation	-	1	-	1	2.22	10.5
Military Strategy	-	1	-	1	2.22	10.5
Terrorism/Hostages	-	1	-	1	2.22	10.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>

**Table 13 - Topical Frequency**

## Weighted Coverage - NYT and LAT 1-14 November 1990

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Military Readiness	493.22	1	31.61
Purpose of US Involvement	194.32	2	12.47
Congressional Commentary	194.12	3	12.44
US/Allied Diplomacy	141.70	4	9.07
Demonstrations Against	125.08	5	8.02
Baker Mideast Visit	91.00	6	5.83
Economic Impact	73.83	7	4.73
Congressional Debate	69.97	8	4.48
Personality Profile	58.16	9	3.73
Demonstrations For	36.57	10	2.34
Jordanian Situation	30.13	11	1.93
Military Strategy	27.55	12	1.77
Terrorism/Hostages	24.72	13	1.58
<b>Total</b>	<b>1560.37</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 14 - Weighted Coverage**



**Topical Frequency - NYT**  
**1-14 November 1990**

	Fav	Neu	Unf	Tot	%	Rank
Military Readiness	-	7	-	7	38.89	1
US/Allied Diplomacy	-	3	1	4	22.22	2.5
Congressional Commentary	-	2	2	4	22.22	2.5
Purpose of US Involvement	-	-	2	2	11.11	4
Personality Profile	-	1	-	1	5.56	5
Totals	0	13	5	18	100.00	

**Table 15 - Topical Frequency**

# Weighted Coverage - NYT

## 1-14 November 1990

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Military Readiness	260.85	1	44.10
US/Allied Diplomacy	118.52	2	20.04
Congressional Commentary	92.92	3	15.71
Purpose of US Involvement	61.05	4	10.32
Personality Profile	58.16	5	9.83
<hr/>			
Total	591.50		100

Table 16 - Weighted Coverage

## Topical Frequency - LAT 1-14 November 1990

	Fav	Neu	Unf	Tot	%	Rank
Military Readiness	-	5	1	6	22.22	1
Purpose of US Involvement	-	3	1	4	14.81	2
Congressional Commentary	-	2	1	3	11.11	4
Demonstrations Against	-	1	2	3	11.11	4
Baker Mideast Visit	2	-	1	3	11.11	4
Economic Impact	-	-	2	2	7.41	6
Demonstrations For	1	-	-	1	3.70	9.5
Terrorism/Hostages	-	1	-	1	3.70	9.5
Jordanian Situation	-	1	-	1	3.70	9.5
Military Strategy	-	1	-	1	3.70	9.5
US/Allied Diplomacy	1	-	-	1	3.70	9.5
Congressional Debate	-	-	1	1	3.70	9.5
Totals	4	14	9	27	100.00	

**Table 17 - Topical Frequency**

# Weighted Coverage - LAT

## 1-14 November 1990

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Military Readiness	232.37	1	24.00
Purpose of US Involvement	133.27	2	13.75
Demonstrations Against	125.08	3	12.91
Congressional Commentary	101.20	4	10.45
Baker Mideast Visit	91.00	5	9.39
Economic Impact	73.83	6	7.62
Congressional Debate	69.97	7	7.22
Demonstrations For	36.57	8	3.77
Jordanian Situation	30.13	9	3.11
Military Strategy	27.55	10	2.84
Terrorism/Hostages	24.72	11	2.55
US/Allied Diplomacy	23.18	12	2.39
Total	968.87		100%

**Table 18 - Weighted Coverage**

**Topical Frequency-NYT and LAT**  
**1-23 January 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Fav</b>	<b>Neu</b>	<b>Unfav</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Total</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	4	21	5	30	17.50	1
US/Allied Diplomacy	5	21	4	30	17.50	1
Purpose of US Involvement	1	8	6	15	8.78	3
Civilian Casualties	-	8	2	10	5.84	4
Congressional Debate	-	5	4	9	5.26	5
Iraqi Commentary	-	7	1	8	4.68	6.5
Military Readiness	2	4	2	8	4.68	6.5
Allied Casualties	-	4	3	7	4.09	8.5
US/Military Strategy	-	7	-	7	4.09	8.5
UN Participation	1	5	-	6	3.51	11
Economic Impact	1	2	3	6	3.51	11
Congressional Commentary	1	3	2	6	3.51	11
Personality Profiles	1	2	1	4	2.34	13
Media Issues	-	2	1	3	1.75	15
Public Reaction Stories	-	2	1	3	1.75	15
Demonstrations Against	-	-	3	3	1.75	15
Minority/Female Involvement	-	2	-	2	1.17	17
Summary Story	-	-	1	1	.58	24.5
U.S. Jewish Reactions	-	1	-	1	.58	24.5
Environmental Damage	-	-	1	1	.58	24.5
Impact On Military Families	-	-	1	1	.58	24.5
Terrorism	-	1	1	1	.58	24.5
Hussein Assessment	-	-	1	1	.58	24.5
Iraqi Motives	-	1	1	1	.58	24.5
Iraqi Military Strategy	-	1	1	1	.58	24.5
Arab-American Concerns	-	-	1	1	.58	24.5
Opposition Casualties	-	1	1	1	.58	24.5
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	1	1	1	.58	24.5
Demonstrations For	-	1	1	1	.58	24.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Table 19 - Combined Topical Coverage**

**Cumulative Coverage-LAT and NYT  
1-23 January 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	1075.67	1	17.98
US/Allied Diplomacy	965.10	2	16.14
Purpose of US Involvement	661.03	3	11.05
Civilian Casualties	373.03	4	6.24
Allied Casualties	339.76	5	5.68
Congressional Debate	276.97	6	4.63
Military Readiness	256.53	7	4.29
US/Military Strategy	238.88	8	3.99
Iraqi Commentary	218.48	9	3.65
Congressional Commentary	188.78	10	3.16
UN Participation	182.02	11	3.04
Economic Impact	151.10	12	2.53
Personality Profiles	131.40	13	2.20
Demonstrations Against	121.47	14	2.03
Public Reaction Stories	115.44	15	1.93
Media Issues	113.45	16	1.90
Minority/Female Involvement	72.17	17	1.21
Summary Story	66.71	18	1.11
U.S. Jewish Reactions	62.18	19	1.04
Environmental Damage	44.63	20	.75
Impact On Military Families	37.85	21	.63
Terrorism	33.73	22	.56
Hussein Assessment	33.35	23	.55
Iraqi Motives	30.39	24	.51
Iraqi Military Strategy	30.06	25	.50
Arab-American Concerns	29.87	26	.49
Opposition Casualties	28.07	27	.47
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	27.04	27	.45
Sanction Effects	26.50	28	.44
Demonstrations For	25.32	29	.42
Jordanian Poll	24.20	30	.40
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<b>Total</b>	<b>5980.95</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 20 - Combined Coverage-Period 3**

## Topical Frequency - NYT 1-23 January 1991

	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Tot	%	Rank
US/Allied Diplomacy	2	10	4	16	25.39	1
Unit/Soldier/ Equipment Performance	1	10	1	12	19.04	2
Civilian Casualties	-	4	1	5	7.93	3
Purpose of US Involvement	-	1	3	4	6.34	5
Iraqi Commentary		3	1	4	6.34	5
Congressional Debate -		2	2	4	6.34	5
Congressional Commentary	1	1	1	3	4.76	7
Military Readiness	1	-	1	2	3.17	9.5
Personality Profile	-	1	1	2	3.17	9.5
Demonstrations Against War	-	-	2	2	3.17	9.5
Military Strategy	-	2	-	2	3.17	9.5
UN Participation	1	-	-	1	1.58	15
Minority/Female Involvement	-	1	-	1	1.58	15
Economic Impact		1	-	1	1.58	15
Prisoners of War	-	-	1	1	1.58	15
Jordanian Poll	-	1	-	1	1.58	15
Public Reaction	-	1		1	1.58	15
Sanction Effects				1	1.58	15
Totals	6	9	18	63	100	

Table 21 - Topical Frequency

# Weighted Ranking-NYT

## 1-23 January 1991

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
US/Allied Diplomacy	469.81	1	22.46
Unit/Soldier/ Equipment Performance	468.32	2	22.38
Civillian Casualties	157.30	3	7.52
Purpose of US Involvement	152.90	4	7.30
Congressional Debate	140.34	5	6.70
Iraqi Commentary	124.49	6	5.95
Congressional Commentary	114.11	7	5.45
Military Strategy	87.16	8	4.16
Demonstrations Against	75.35	9	3.60
Military Readiness	62.70	10	2.99
Personality Profile	57.75	11	2.76
Prisoners of War	39.46	12	1.88
Public Reaction	38.85	13	1.76
Sanction Effects	26.50	14	1.26
Minority/Female Involvement	25.30	15	1.20
UN Participation	24.25	16	1.15
Jordanian Poll	24.20	17	1.19
Economic Impact	4.95	18	.23
<b>Total</b>	<b>2093.74</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 22 - Weighted Coverage**



**Topical Frequency-LAT**  
**1-23 January 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Fav</b>	<b>Neu</b>	<b>Unfav</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Total</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	3	11	4	18	16.67	1
US/Allied Diplomacy	3	11	-	14	12.96	2
Purpose of US Involvement	1	7	3	11	10.91	3
Allied Casualties	-	4	2	6	5.56	4.5
Military Readiness	1	4	1	6	5.56	4.5
Civilian Casualties	-	4	1	5	4.63	8
UN Participation	-	5	-	5	4.63	8
US/Military Strategy	-	5	-	5	4.63	8
Economic Impact	1	1	3	5	4.63	8
Congressional Debate	-	3	2	5	4.63	8
Iraqi Commentary	-	4	-	4	3.70	11
Media Issues	-	2	1	3	2.78	12.5
Congressional Commentary	-	2	1	3	2.78	12.5
Public Reaction Stories	-	1	1	2	1.85	14.5
Personality Profiles	1	1	-	2	1.85	14.5
Summary Story	-	-	1	1	.93	16
U.S. Jewish Reactions	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Minority/Female Involvement	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Demonstrations Against	-	-	1	1	.93	16
Environmental Damage	-	-	1	1	.93	16
Impact On Military Families	-	-	1	1	.93	16
Terrorism	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Hussein Assessment	-	-	1	1	.93	16
Iraqi Motives	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Iraqi Military Strategy	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Arab-American Concerns	-	-	1	1	.93	16
Opposition Casualties	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	1	-	1	.93	16
Demonstrations For	-	1	-	1	.93	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>100%</b>	

Table 23 - Topical Frequency

**Weighted Coverage-LAT**  
**1-23 January 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	607.35	1	15.62
Purpose of US Involvement	508.13	2	13.07
US/Allied Diplomacy	495.29	3	12.74
Allied Casualties	300.03	4	7.72
Civilian Casualties	215.73	5	5.55
Military Readiness	193.83	6	4.99
UN Participation	157.77	7	4.06
US/Military Strategy	151.72	8	3.90
Economic Impact	146.15	9	3.76
Congressional Debate	136.63	10	3.51
Media Issues	113.45	11	2.92
Iraqi Commentary	93.99	12	2.42
Public Reaction Stories	76.59	13	1.97
Congressional Commentary	74.67	14	1.92
Personality Profiles	73.65	15	1.89
Summary Story	66.71	16	1.72
U.S. Jewish Reactions	62.18	17	1.60
Minority/Female Involvement	46.87	18	1.21
Demonstrations Against	46.12	19	1.19
Environmental Damage	44.68	20	1.15
Impact On Military Families	37.85	21	.97
Terrorism	33.73	22	.87
Hussein Assessment	33.35	23	.86
Iraqi Motives	30.39	24	.78
Iraqi Military Strategy	30.06	25	.77
Arab-American Concerns	29.87	26	.77
Opposition Casualties	28.07	27	.72
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	27.04	28	.70
Demonstrations For	25.32	29	.65
<b>Total</b>	<b>3887.21</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 24 - Weighted Coverage**

**Topical Frequency-NYT and LAT**  
**16 Feb-7 Mar 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Fav</b>	<b>Neu</b>	<b>Unfav</b>	<b>Tot</b>	<b>% Tot</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	23	17	-	40	22.22	1
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	18	1	19	10.58	2
US/Military Strategy	3	14	-	17	9.44	3
Iraqi Commentary	1	10	-	11	6.11	4.5
Allied Casualties	1	6	4	11	6.11	4.5
Post-war Iraq	-	8	1	9	5.00	6
Ceasefire Talks	5	3	-	8	4.44	7
Purpose of US Involvement	2	4	1	7	3.89	8
Post-war Kuwait	1	5	-	6	3.33	9
Personality Profiles	3	2	-	5	2.78	10.5
US/Allied Diplomacy	1	4	-	5	2.78	10.5
Opposition Casualties	-	4	-	4	2.22	12
Civilian Casualties	-	2	1	3	1.67	15
Public Reaction Stories	2	1	-	3	1.67	15
Environmental Damage	-	1	2	3	1.67	15
Military Readiness	1	2	-	3	1.67	15
UN Participation	-	3	-	3	1.67	15
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	-	2	-	2	1.11	18
Economic Impact	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Terrorism	1	-	-	1	.58	28.5
Media Issues	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Weapon Technology	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Iraqi Military Strategy	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Kuwaiti Economy	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Iraqi Exiles	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Chinese Public's Support	1	-	-	1	.58	28.5
Impact on Military Families	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Arab League Matters	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Iraqi Readiness	1	-	-	1	.58	28.5
Demonstrations Against	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Congressional Debate	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Arab American Concerns	-	-	1	1	.58	28.5
Congressional Commentary	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
US/Israeli Aid	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	-	-	1	1	.58	28.5
Saudi Leadership	1	-	-	1	.58	28.5
Israeli Retaliation	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
Attack Announcement	-	1	-	1	.58	28.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Table 25 - Overall Coverage - NYT and LAT**

**Weighted Coverage-NYT and LAT**  
**16 Feb-7 Mar 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	1667.68	1	23.31
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	759.27	2	10.61
US/Military Strategy	666.36	3	9.31
Allied Casualties	489.06	4	6.83
Ceasefire Talks	446.06	5	6.23
Post-war Iraq	367.88	6	5.14
Iraqi Commentary	323.26	7	4.51
Purpose of US Involvement	282.19	8	3.94
Post-war Kuwait	276.15	9	3.86
Personality Profiles	238.26	10	3.33
US/Allied Diplomacy	156.25	11	2.18
UN Participation	122.18	12	1.71
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	111.96	13	1.56
Opposition Casualties	111.23	14	1.55
Military Readiness	109.74	15	1.53
Public Reaction Stories	101.70	16	1.42
Weapon Technology	86.06	17	1.20
Civilian Casualties	64.87	18	.91
Iraqi Military Strategy	63.05	19	.88
Iraqi Exile	62.59	20	.87
Congressional Debate	61.47	21	.86
Environmental Damage	60.47	22	.85
Media Issues	50.85	23	.71
Kuwaiti Economy	47.76	24	.67
Arab-American Concerns	47.48	25	.66
Economic Impact	45.29	26	.63
US/Israeli Aid	36.30	27	.51
Terrorism	29.85	28	.42
Chinese Public's Support	28.62	29	.40
Impact on Military Families	28.41	30	.40
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	28.05	31	.39
Congressional Commentary	26.53	32	.37
Saudi Leadership	23.65	33	.33
Israeli Retaliation	23.38	34	.33
Arab League Matters	21.06	35	.29
Attack Announcement	19.11	36	.27
Iraqi Readiness	13.65	37	.19
Demonstrations Against	11.59	38	.16
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,155.41</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 26 - Weighted Coverage - NYT and LAT**

# Topical Frequency - NYT

## 16 Feb-7 Mar 1991

	Fav	Neu	Unfav	Tot	%	Rank
Unit/Soldier/ Equipment Performance	8	7	-	15	21.12	1
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	8	-	8	11.20	2.5
Iraqi Commentary	1	7	-	8	11.20	2.5
Pur. of US Involvement	2	3	1	6	8.45	4
Ceasefire Talks	1	3	-	4	5.63	5.3
Iraqi Unrest	-	4	-	4	5.63	5.3
UN Participation	-	3	-	3	5.63	8
Allied Casualties	1	1	1	3	5.63	8
US Military Strategy	-	3	-	3	5.63	8
Military Readiness	1	1	-	2	2.81	11.5
Personality Profile	2	-	-	2	2.81	11.5
Civilian Casualties	-	1	1	2	2.81	11.5
Opposition Casualties	-	2	-	2	2.81	11.5
Congressional Debate	1	-	-	1	1.40	18
Congressional Commentary -		1	-	1	1.40	18
Arab-American Concerns	-	-	1	1	1.40	18
US/Israel Aid	-	1	-	1	1.40	18
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	-	-	1	1	1.40	18
Saudi Leadership	1	-	-	1	1.40	18
Israeli Retaliation	-	1	-	1	1.40	18
Attack Announcement	-	1	-	1	1.40	18
Environmental Damage	-	-	1	1	1.40	18
Totals	18	47	6	71	100.00	

Table 27 - Topical Frequency

# Variable Coverage - NYT

## 16 Feb-7 Mar 1991

	Total Pts.	Rank	% Total
Unit/Soldier/ Equipment Performance	568.74	1	22.47
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	295.37	2	11.67
Purpose of US Involvement	258.51	3	10.21
Iraqi Commentary	233.84	4	9.24
Ceasefire Talks	207.04	5	8.18
Post-war Iraq	137.09	6	5.42
UN Participation	122.18	7	4.83
Allied Casualties	102.53	8	4.05
US Military Strategy	85.87	9	3.39
Military Readiness	76.39	10	3.02
Personality Profile	72.42	11	2.87
Congressional Debate	61.47	12	2.43
Arab-American Concerns	47.45	13	1.87
Civilian Casualties	45.93	14	1.81
Opposition Casualties	44.83	15	1.77
US/Israel Aid	36.30	16	1.43
Kuwaiti Vigilantes	28.05	17	1.11
Congress'l Commentary	26.53	18	1.05
Saudi Leadership	23.65	19	.93
Israeli Retaliation	23.38	20	.92
Ground War Announcement	19.11	21	.75
Environmental Damage	14.85	22	.59
<b>Total</b>	<b>2531.53</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 28 - Overall Coverage**

**Topical Frequency-LAT**  
**16 Feb-7 Mar 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Fav</b>	<b>Neu</b>	<b>Unfav</b>	<b>Tot</b>	<b>% Tot</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	15	10	-	25	22.94	1
US/Military Strategy	3	11	-	14	12.84	2
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	-	10	1	11	10.09	3
Allied Casualties	-	5	3	8	7.34	4
Post-war Kuwait	1	5	-	6	5.50	5
Post-war Iraq	-	4	1	5	4.59	6.5
US/Allied Diplomacy	1	4	-	5	4.59	6.5
Ceasefire Talks	4	-	-	4	3.67	8
Personality Profiles	1	2	-	3	2.75	10
Iraqi Commentary	-	3	-	3	2.75	10
Public Reaction Stories	2	1	-	3	2.75	10
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	-	2	-	2	1.83	13
Opposition Casualties	-	2	-	2	1.83	13
Environmental Damage	-	1	1	2	1.83	13
Economic Impact	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Military Readiness	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Terrorism	1	-	-	1	.92	22
Civilian Casualties	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Media Issues	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Weapon Technology	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Iraqi Military Strategy	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Kuwaiti Economy	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Iraqi Exiles	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Chinese Public's Support	1	-	-	1	.92	22
Impact on Military Families	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Purpose of US Involvement	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Arab League Matters	-	1	-	1	.92	22
Iraqi Readiness	1	-	-	1	.92	22
Demonstrations Against	-	1	-	1	.92	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Table 29 - Overall Coverage**

**Weighted Coverage-LAT**  
**16 Feb-7 Mar 1991**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Tot Pts</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>% of Total</b>
Unit/Soldier/Equipment Performance	1098.94	1	23.77
US/Military Strategy	580.49	2	12.55
Soviet/Iraqi Diplomacy	463.90	3	10.03
Allied Casualties	386.53	4	8.36
Post-war Kuwait	276.15	5	5.97
Ceasefire Talks	239.44	6	5.18
Post-war Iraq	230.79	7	4.99
Personality Profiles	165.84	8	3.59
US/Allied Diplomacy	156.25	9	3.38
U.S. Reaction To Iraqi Offers	111.96	10	2.42
Public Reaction Stories	101.70	11	2.20
Iraqi Commentary	89.42	12	1.93
Weapon Technology	86.06	13	1.86
Opposition Casualties	66.40	14	1.44
Iraqi Military Strategy	63.05	15	1.36
Iraqi Exiles	62.59	16	1.35
Media Issues	50.85	17	1.10
Kuwaiti Economy	47.76	18	1.03
Environmental Damage	45.56	19	.99
Economic Impact	45.29	20	.98
Military Readiness	33.35	21	.72
Terrorism	29.85	22	.65
Chinese Public's Support	28.62	23	.62
Impact on Military Families	28.41	24	.61
Purpose of US Involvement	23.68	25	.51
Arab League Matters	21.06	26	.46
Civilian Casualties	18.94	27	.41
Iraqi Readiness	13.65	28	.30
Demonstrations Against	11.59	29	.25
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,623.88</b>		<b>100%</b>

**Table 30 - Weighted Coverage**



## Correlation Analysis Results

### Pearson Correlation Coefficients

	Newspaper	Date	Rating
Newspaper	-	.03265	.04834
Date	.03265	-	.17004***
Rating	.04834	.17004***	-
Graphics	-.14863	-.01520	.09185*
Presidential Approval- Before <sup>a</sup>	.00298	.68115***	.23303***
Presidential Approval- After <sup>b</sup>	.01565	.62532***	.14495**
Mid-East Policy Approval - Before <sup>c</sup>	-.00679	.76015***	.28721***
Mid East Policy Approval - After <sup>d</sup>	.00584	.75547***	.21440***
Use of Armed Forces- Before <sup>e</sup>	-.01688	.25568*	.03680
Use of Armed Forces- After <sup>f</sup>	-.00985	-.02108	-.06505
Clarity of Policy - Before	.02246	-.09791	.11073
Clarity of Policy - After	-.04178	-.38404***	-.30305***
Duration of Military Commitment > Six Months-Before <sup>g</sup>	-.00054	-.82087***	-.11342*
Duration of Military Commitment > Six Months-After <sup>h</sup>	-.02159	-.90800***	

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

\*\*\*p < .001

**Table 31 - Correlation Analysis**

\*Starting on Day 60 we used LAT results, gathered using the same question as the NYT but prefacing it with "Generally speaking..."

\*Starting on Day 48 we used LAT results, gathered using the same question as the NYT but prefacing it with "Generally speaking..."

\*Starting on Day 50 we used the LAT results gathered using the question, "Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling the Iraq situation in the Middle East?"

\*Starting Day 43 we used the LAT results gathered using the question, "Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling the Iraq situation in the Middle East?"

\*Poll results were split between poll results from NYT, LAT and NBC. The questions asked by the three organizations were:

NYT: How long do you expect a large number of U.S. troops will remain in the Persian Gulf area – less than three months, between three and six months, between six months and one year, between one and five years, or more than five years?

LAT: How long do you expect American troops to stay in the Middle East: less than one month, one to three months, between four to six months, up to one year, more than one year.

NBC: How much longer do you expect the U.S. troops to be in Saudi Arabia? < 3 months, 3-6 months, 6 months to one year, 1-3 years, more than 3 years

### **Table 31 - Correlation Analysis (Cont'd)**


## Statistically Significant Correlations Between Selected Story Subjects and Poll Results

p-Value	r-Value	Story Subject	Poll Results
$p \leq .0001$	.45281	Diplomacy	President I
$p \leq .0001$	.29308	Diplomacy	President II
$p \leq .0001$	.39894	Diplomacy	Force I
$p \leq .0001$	.30317	Diplomacy	Force II
$p \leq .0001$	.66096	Diplomacy	Military I
$p \leq .0001$	.60298	Economic Factors	President I
$p \leq .0001$	.32720	Economic Factors	President II
$p \leq .0001$	.62814	Economic Factors	Force I
$p \leq .0001$	.34000	Economic Factors	Force II
$p \leq .0001$	.58627	Economic Factors	Military I
$p \leq .0001$	.34877	Performance	President I
$p \leq .0001$	.45153	Performance	Force I
$p \leq .0001$	.43416	Performance	Force II
$p \leq .0001$	.56177	Performance	Military I
$p \leq .0001$	-.57231	Performance	Duration I
$p \leq .0001$	-.36322	Performance	Duration II
$p \leq .0001$	.28185	Purpose	President I
$p \leq .0001$	.42846	Purpose	Force I
$p \leq .0001$	-.34904	Purpose	Duration I
$p = .0007$	.22269	Performance	President I
$p = .0014$	-.27989	Readiness	Duration II
$p = .0021$	.23608	Diplomacy	Duration II
$p = .0032$	.19203	Purpose	Force II
$p = .0042$	-.24938	Economic Factors	Duration II
$p = .0110$	.30158	Diplomacy	Military II
$p = .0111$	-.21948	Purpose	Economics I
$p = .0114$	-.33597	Economic Factors	Duration I
$p = .0185$	-.25643	Readiness	Economic II
$p = .0229$	.32796	Diplomacy	Economic II
$p = .0271$	-.25189	Readiness	Duration I
$p = .0290$	-.15683	Purpose	Duration II
$p = .0329$	.20355	Economic Factors	Military II
$p = .0442$	.17821	Readiness	President II

**Table 32 - Story Subject Correlations**

# Poll and Coverage Correlation

## August 1990 - March 1991



Presid'tal approval/Overall favor-neutral

# Cumulative Coverage - NYT & LAT Desert Shield-Desert Storm

N - 487




Chart 1

# Nature of Coverage - Comparative

## % of Fav/Unfav Stories By Period




Chart 1A

# Cumulative Nature of Coverage-NYT Desert Shield-Desert Storm

N = 191




Chart 2

# Cumulative Nature of Coverage-LAT Desert Shield-Desert Storm

N = 296




Chart 3



# Sample Means NYT and LAT Desert Shield - Desert Storm Coverage

		<u>Favorable %</u>		<u>Unfavorable %</u>	
		NYT	LAT	NYT	LAT
Period 1		17.95	28.85	20.51	26.92
Period 2		0	14.81	27.78	33.33
Period 3		10.50	9.26	28.60	23.14
Period 4		<u>25.35</u> 53.80	<u>27.19</u> 80.11	<u>8.45</u> 85.34	<u>6.14</u> 89.53
		$\bar{x} = 13.45$ Med = 14.225	$\bar{y} = 20.03$ Med = 21.000	$\bar{x} = 21.34$ Med = 24.145	$\bar{y} = 22.38$ Med = 25.03
		<u>Neutral</u>			
		NYT	LAT		
Period 1		61.54	44.23		
Period 2		72.22	51.85	<b>Averages</b>	
Period 3		61.90	67.60	NYT	Fav Neu Unfav 13.45 65.46 21.34
Period 4		<u>66.19</u> 261.85	<u>66.67</u> 230.35	LAT	20.03 57.59 22.38
		$\bar{x} = 65.46$ Med = 64.040	$\bar{y} = 57.59$ Med = 29.260	<b>Medians</b>	
				NYT	14.23 64.04 24.15
				LAT	21.00 59.06 25.03

**Chart 3A - Sample Means**

# Chi-square Analysis of Coverage New York and Los Angeles Times Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Story Rating	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
NYT: $F_o$	16.23	64.40	19.37
$F_B$	33.33	33.33	33.33
$F_o - F_B$	-17.10	31.07	-13.96
$(F_o - F_B)^2$	292.41	965.34	194.88
$\frac{(F_o - F_B)^2}{F_B}$	8.77	28.96	5.85

$$\sum \frac{(F_o - F_B)^2}{F_B} = 43.58$$

$$\chi^2 = \frac{43.58 \times 191}{100} = \frac{8328.78}{100} = 83.2378$$

df = 2, Reject null at P < .05 (9.21)

	Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable
LAT: $F_o$	19.93	61.79	18.28
$F_B$	33.33	33.33	33.33
$F_o - F_B$	-13.40	28.46	-15.05
$(F_o - F_B)^2$	179.56	809.97	226.50
$\frac{(F_o - F_B)^2}{F_B}$	5.39	24.30	6.80

$$\sum \frac{(F_o - F_B)^2}{F_B} = 36.49$$


$$\chi^2 = \frac{36.49 \times 301}{100} = \frac{10,983.49}{100} = 109.83$$

df = 2, Reject null at P < .05 (9.21)

**Chart 3B - Chi-Square Analysis**

# Results of Two-way Analysis of Variance

Check for significant statistical difference between newspapers:

New York Times				
N	Sum	Mean	Variance	Std Dev
193	379	1.96373	.35805	.59838
				
Los Angeles	Sum	Mean	Variance	Std Dev
N	595	2.02381	.37827	.61504

Newspaper-Rating Variable:

F = 1.1358

Pr>F = .2871\*

\*Pr > F ≥ .05, no significant difference exists

Table 3C

# Nature of Coverage-Overall

Period: 2-14 Aug 1990

N = 91




Chart 4

# Nature of Coverage-NYT

Period: 2-14 Aug 1990

N = 39




Chart 5

# Nature of Coverage-LAT

Period: 2-14 Aug 1990

N = 52




Chart 6

# Nature of Coverage - Comparative Period 1




Chart 7

# Nature of Coverage-Overall

Period: 1-14 Nov 1990

N = 45




Chart 8



# Nature of Coverage-NYT

Period: 1-14 Nov 1990

N = 18




Chart 9

# Nature of Coverage-LAT

Period: 1-14 Nov 1990

N = 27




Chart 10

# Nature of Coverage - Comparative Period 2




Chart 11

# Nature of Coverage-Overall

Period: 1-23 Jan 1991

N = 171




Chart 12

# Nature of Coverage-NYT

Period: 1-23 Jan 1991

N = 63




Chart 13

# Nature of Coverage-LAT

Period: 1-23 Jan 1991

N = 108




Chart 14

# Nature of Coverage - Comparative Period 3




Chart 15

# Nature of Coverage - Overall

16 Feb-7 Mar 1991

N = 180




Chart 16



# Nature of Coverage-NYT

Period: 16 Feb-7 Mar 1991

N = 71




Chart 17

# Nature of Coverage-LAT

Period: 16 Feb-7 Mar 1991

N = 109




Chart 18

# Nature of Coverage - Comparative Period 4




Chart 19


# Subjects Receiving Most Coverage

## Desert Shield - Desert Storm

<u>Most Favorably Covered(by %)</u>	<u>Most Unfavorably Covered(by %)</u>
Unit, Soldier and Equipment Performance 38.03	Economic Impact 44.00
UN Participation 36.84	Allied Casualties 35.29
Military Readiness 15.63	Purpose of US Involvement 32.00
Purpose of US Involvement 14.00	Military Readiness 21.89
Economic Impact 12.00 US Military Strategy 12.00	US/Allied Strategy 11.11


# Duration and Coverage Correlation

## August 1990 - March 1991



# Poll and Coverage Correlation

## August 1990 - March 1991




Use of Force —+— Total Favor-Neutral

Use of Force/Overall Favorable-Neutral


# Poll and Coverage Correlation

## August 1990 - March 1991



# Poll and Coverage Correlation


## August 1990 - March 1991





# Poll and Coverage Correlation


## August 1990 - March 1991



Force/Economic Factors

# Poll and Coverage Correlation

## August 1990 - March 1991



Use of Force/Performance of Forces

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