




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PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
IN A CHANGING EUROPE

BY

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Italian Army

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91 5 28 069

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCAB	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Carlisle, PA 17013		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Prospects for Nuclear Deterrence in a Changing Europe					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Colonel Vittorio Ghiotto					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Student Project	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 91/04/01		15. PAGE COUNT 3134	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The present study project consists of two parts. The first concerns the changes in the politico-strategic situation which occurred in recent times in Europe. It tries to explain how the nuclear strategy is closely linked to historic evolution. Since the situation is changed, it is necessary to rethink the role of nuclear weapons. The second part - after an appraisal of the still remarkable Soviet nuclear threat and after examination of recent changes in NATO nuclear strategy - is focused on future prospects for nuclear deterrence in Europe. Among various solutions (from securing both theater and global deterrence only, through strategic nuclear deterrence, and basing deterrence in Europe on French and British national nuclear deterrence; to establishing demilitarized areas), the author favors a so-called "essential deterrence," which has as its principal elements: (1) rely, in the foreseeable future, on U.S. nuclear weapons; (2) significantly reduce the amount of nuclear weapons in Europe; (3) use, as theater nuclear weapons, only those systems with longer ranges that can be launched by air or sea platforms; (4) give these weapons a					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Col. Winkler / Lt. Dembrowsky		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717-245-3207		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AUC 18	

Block 19 continued:

"political" deterrence role instead of a "military" warfighting role as in the past.

In summary, the present research tries to demonstrate that despite the positive evolution of the international situation, European security still needs to be guaranteed by American nuclear weapons, although in accordance to different ends, ways and means.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
IN A CHANGING EUROPE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.

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AUTHOR: Vittorio Ghiotto, COL, ITA

TITLE: Prospects for Nuclear Deterrence in a Changing Europe

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: April 1991 PAGES: 31 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The present study project consists of two parts. The first concerns the changes in the politico-strategic situation which occurred in recent times in Europe. It tries to explain how the nuclear strategy is closely linked to historic evolution. Since the situation is changed, it is necessary to rethink the role of nuclear weapons. The second part - after a appraisal of the still remarkable Soviet nuclear threat and after examination of recent changes in NATO nuclear strategy - is focused on future prospects for nuclear deterrence in Europe. Among various solutions (from securing both theater and global deterrence only through strategic nuclear deterrence; and basing deterrence in Europe on French and British national nuclear deterrence; to establishing demilitarized areas), the author favors a so-called "essential deterrence," which has as its principal elements: (1) rely, in the foreseeable future, on U.S. nuclear weapons; (2) significantly reduce the amount of nuclear weapons in Europe; (3) use, as theater nuclear weapons, only those systems with longer ranges that can be launched by air or sea platforms; (4) give these theater weapons a "political" deterrence role instead of a "military" warfighting role as in the past.

In summary, the present research tries to demonstrate that despite the positive evolution of the international situation, European security still needs to be guaranteed by American nuclear weapons, although on the basis of different ends, ways and means.

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Unannounced	☐
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INTRODUCTION

What does "nuclear deterrence" mean? Before entering into the merits of the present research, it can be useful to say a few words to clarify this fundamental concept.

In Appendix 1 there is a series of definitions concerning the notion of deterrence, whose main elements are:

- a subject: the deterrer;
- an object: the deterred;
- a relation that connects the two parts: the commitment of the deterrer to prevent the deterred from taking hostile actions;
- a way to express this commitment: the fear of retaliation or punishment.

To be effective, deterrence requires that the threat be conveyed to the deterred (communication), that the deterrer indeed be perceived by the deterred as resolved to carry out his threat (credibility), and that the significance of the threat by the deterrer be comprehensible to the deterred (rationality). When to the term "deterrence" the adjective "nuclear" is added, it means that the coercion is obtained through the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In summary, using the words of Y. Harkabi:

to deter means primarily to compel inaction, to restrain. Coercion is not achieved by actual violence, but by the threat of violence. Restraint may be defined as an abstention from changing the status quo.¹

At this point another important element comes out from this analysis: deterrence is intended to preserve a certain stable and peaceful situation, while the evolutionary course of history proceeds. So a continuous adjustment is made between strategy, an important element of which is deterrence, and the character of a period, particularly the dynamics of the era's international relations.

This is especially true if what is going on in Europe is considered, where, since the end of World War II, security has been assured by U.S. nuclear weapons in the presence of a threatening superpower, the USSR.

But what could happen in the future? Will the security of Europe still have to rely on nuclear deterrence? Is it possible to create the political and military conditions for a different security arrangement? How does Western Europe's nuclear strategy have to adjust itself to a changing world and in particular to a changing Europe?

The present study will try to answer these fundamental questions outlining the elements of a possible strategy that could take into account present changes and their positive developments while continuing to assure an adequate level of deterrence. This strategy, that could be defined as "essential deterrence," is consistent with the aim of reducing NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal, but will certainly require the maintenance in Europe of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

The research will be focused mainly on the future of theater nuclear weapons on the assumption that the strategic component is specifically aimed at ensuring a mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union more than in solving the security problems in the European theater.

The paper will reflect personal views and will be examined from a "European" perspective.

The script is divided into two main parts, the first part focuses on the political and military situation in Europe; while the second part concentrates on the nuclear strategy of Western Europe. A series of thoughts, summarizing possible prospects for nuclear deterrence in Europe, concludes the research.

PART ONE
THE CHANGING EUROPE

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE

Since Gorbachev has risen to power, the USSR has made a significant change in its internal and international policy previously oriented toward a strict, centralized control as well as toward an active achievement of communist revolutionary goals.

"Perestroika" represents a radical change in the Soviet policy due to the acknowledgment of communism's limits, especially in the economic field. Communism, in fact, can be considered a theory that, in a certain way, is useful--but not necessary--to elevate the conditions of people from poverty to an acceptable degree of welfare, but unable to support the next step toward a wealthy, modern, competitive and peaceful society.²

This perspective can explain the opening to a free market economy and to a more flexible approach towards the autonomy of various components of the Soviet empire.

But this second Soviet revolution is not without uncertainties. The USSR is facing tremendous internal, social, economic, cultural, political problems, repressed by 70 years of Stalinism and totalitarianism, that today are appearing all together, producing an explosive mixture which has proven to be difficult to control.³

Will "Perestroika" succeed? The answer to this question is very difficult, keeping in mind the fact that the internal results have been, until now, below expectations.

A delusion crisis is always possible particularly if Gorbachev is forced to compromise with the conservative wing of the party for internal security measures.

The Red Army stands alone in this rapidly evolving scenario as the only power capable of assuring internal stability for an empire that is becoming deprived of the past's security and predictability.

"Perestroika," however, has undermined the historic closeness of the Red Army, causing a dangerous discord between high ranking officers who are actively defending a past favorable situation, and mid-low ranking officers, especially of non-Russian origin, who favor the new course.⁴

The trouble that the Soviet Union is suffering does not therefore seem to have spared the Red Army, which represents the basis for traditional support for Soviet policy and the real cement of a multinational empire.

Not much can be done by the Western world to influence these events. Soviet problems are essentially internal problems, in which every external action risks being unuseful if not negative.⁵ But uncertainties and difficulties of the Soviet situation force the Atlantic Alliance to maintain a prudent attitude vis-a-vis security in order to guard against a possible change of course that could seriously threaten Western European security.

EASTERN EUROPE: TOWARD DEMOCRACY OR "BALKANIZATION?"

The situation is equally serious in Eastern Europe. These countries are undergoing a dramatic reconstruction process of their cultural and political identity which have been humiliated and restrained by decades of military and ideological Stalinist domination. Confronting positive changes - the end of Soviet imposed regimes, steps toward democratization, increased recognition of basic human rights, movement toward free market economies - Eastern Europe is shadowed by threatening clouds looming on the horizon.

The ethnic, religious, and territorial contrasts, artfully restrained for years in the name of internationalism, are now coming out and appear much more serious since they combine with a disastrous economic situation.⁶

There is a real risk that the Eastern European countries will go back to the past confrontational history known as "Balkanization," with possibly dangerous repercussions in the international field. What can the Western world do to prevent this situation? First, NATO must continue to ensure stability and, second, Western Europe must open its doors to Eastern Europe's increasing demand for change, cooperation and a desire to rejoin the common European home.⁷

Since hunger is a bad counsellor, every effort must be made to support the economic crisis that torments these countries. As far as the security problem is concerned, the Western world can be thankful for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and for the resultant neutrality along its eastern borders.

EMERGING THREATS FROM THE SOUTH

Europe must not only be concerned about East-West relations; there is also a problem regarding North-South relations, especially in these days when rapid changes are having continually increasing importance.

As a matter of fact, the problem of security in the Mediterranean must be seen as a specific aspect of European security which should be viewed within a global framework of cooperation of which the military element is only one component. The potentially dangerous situation that frequently arises in the Mediterranean, springs externally from the interaction of multiple tensions - demographic, economic, ethnic, social, religious - which to varying degrees have an impact on the security of Europe.⁸

The Mediterranean is, at present, the area with the largest demographic imbalance and the widest disparities in living standards. Finally, the Mediterranean immediately reflects the emerging crisis in adjacent geographic areas (e.g., the Gulf War), and this makes the geopolitical and strategic situation in the area even more intricate.

TOWARDS A NEW EUROPE

Western Europe, itself, is not exempt from this uncertain scenario.

After decades of enjoying a relatively stable international situation, mainly due to the status quo imposed by the confronting superpowers, a new historical direction has begun.⁹

Some historical reference points are no longer valid. Others, with evolving and ambitious programs in the economic, political and security field have become the center of important discussions.

In the economic sphere, the European Community (EC), after years of planning and a difficult start, has taken the right road and offers promising results.

EC success is encouraging considering the unique European market since 1983, the common banking system since 1984 and a possible common currency during the present decade.¹⁰

With respect to addressing the devastated economies of the East, Western Europe is doing more and more, establishing basic elements to build a political entity in which the interests of each member country can find an agreed solution. Much is left to be done, and many areas of resistance have to be overcome, but the finish line is clear.¹¹ After thousands of years of often difficult history, the time has come to give concrete expression to the common sentiment of Europe's public: a United Europe, able to play an appropriate role in the political arena for the defense of the common values of the Western world.

But it is not possible to create a new political entity only on an economic basis without taking into account an appropriate security system.

In this area, the region's internal and international interests continue to play an important role. There are many ideas, but concrete plans have yet to be precisely defined.

There are some, like Italy, that favor the transfer of security issues from the Western European Union (WEU) to the European Community (EC).¹² On the other hand, the United Kingdom believes that Europe, in the near future, can not renounce its close link with the United States and consequently advocates the indispensable role of NATO. Then there is Germany that foresees the possibility of creating a new security system based on the structures coming out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The debate is still open and it is too early for a commitment to a specific solution, since every solution possesses strengths and weaknesses and that the overall scenario is in evolution.

This writer believes that in the mid-term, NATO should continue to play the stabilizing role as it has done so well in the past. In the long-term, however, the author does not exclude the fact that the international situation could allow the establishment of a new European security system. This seems much more valid if consideration is given to NATO geographic boundaries vis-a-vis the challenges to European interests coming from the South. In any case, vital trans-Atlantic relations must

be preserved. The USA-Europe axis must continue to be the fundamental factor of any new security system.

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

Official political choices that can be summarized in the Bush Administration's support to the European economic and political integration as well as European security,¹³ clash with U.S. public opinion that appears even more reluctant to maintain the American commitment to Europe.

Evolving USA-USSR relations based upon a decreasing threat, increasing budget problems, military involvement in other theaters, and global security responsibilities, are some of the factors that have contributed to diminished American attention with respect to Europe.

Moreover, another important socio-psychological factor must also be added: currently the majority of the American population does not have close familial links with its countries of origin any longer. In the past, to defend Europe was almost to defend your own country; now this feeling, in the writer's opinion, has become much weaker.

In addition, there are the recent disappointments in the U.S. about the inadequate European support for American involvement in the Gulf to defend mutual principles and interests that many Americans felt should have been predominantly the concerns of Europeans much more than American concerns.

Finally, it must be considered that due to the end of the Cold War and the newly emerging European entity, Europe is moving towards a new political order in which the role of the superpowers appears reshaped with respect to the past.

In this evolving and potentially volatile situation, the U.S. faces new challenges. The first is to help keep Europe stable. Second, the U.S. needs to maintain its influence on the Continent in a situation in which the Western Europeans are less dependent on U.S. protection and also less responsive to U.S. economic and political interests. Third, the U.S. should participate in supporting the Soviet Union's liberalization process in order to prevent a Soviet regression to Cold War militancy. The fourth challenge is to ensure that the evolving Europe will not become "hostile" to U.S. interests.¹⁴

PART TWO
THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

A STILL REMARKABLE NUCLEAR THREAT

Shortly before the 1988 Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow, George Arbotov, the Director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada told American reporters: "We are going to do something terrible to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy."¹⁵

Is there any truth in these words? Has the threat that for more than 40 years kept Western European and North American countries together really disappeared? How is the residual threat perceived by the USA and by Europe?

It is extremely hard to answer these crucial questions. However, this writer cannot escape expressing views on this difficult subject; views that are the result of systematic research as well as personal speculation.

First, the Soviet threat that faced the West until last year does not exist anymore.

Soviet economic, ethnic, and social difficulties, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Red Army's withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the formulation of "reasonable sufficiency" doctrine,¹⁶ and the results of the arms control talks are some of the most impressive aspects of the changing scene. But, despite all this, and even after the implementation of CFE and START agreements should they occur, the Soviet Union will remain the principal military power on the European continent. By

implication, the Soviets will be able to take advantage of a more favorable geostrategic condition, with respect to the United States divided from Europe by the Atlantic ocean.

As far as the nuclear dimension to change in Europe is concerned, it must be stressed that the Soviet Union is systematically modernizing its strategic offensive forces, and maintaining a trend toward improved force lethality, responsiveness and survivability.¹⁷ Recent "evidence" easily supports this evaluation:

- ICBM SS-25 and SS-24 transportable, respectively, by truck and railroad;
- Typhoon and Delta IV class submarines carrying modern SLBM SS-N-23 and SS-N-20;
- Bear H and Blackjack bombers equipped with long-range ALCM AS-15.

Apart from the SS-20, expected to be destroyed by June 91 in accordance with the INF Treaty, the Soviets likely will continue to effectively satisfy their critical theater targetting requirements by means of their existing nuclear-capable aircraft as well as through the ongoing modernization of their strategic forces.¹⁸

The Soviet short-range nuclear forces (SNF) consist of five different types of short-range ballistic missiles and five types of dual-capable artillery with a significant numerical advantage over NATO launchers (nearly 16:1) and nuclear-capable artillery (4:1) in the Atlantic-to-Ural region.¹⁹ The Soviet Union's SNF modernization program includes replacing FROG rocket-launchers

with SS-21 and older towed artillery systems with improved self-propelled versions.

A clear appraisal of the Soviet SNF modernization process can be found in "SOVIET MILITARY POWER-1990":

Reductions in numbers will be at least partially offset by improvements in delivery systems. In the future, the Soviet SNF probably will be a smaller, improved and formidable force, possessing the capability to conduct extensive nuclear operations.²⁰

FROM THEATER TO SUB-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The role of nuclear weapons in the European security system is changing. Before the adoption of the strategy of flexible response, nuclear weapons represented the essential component of NATO defense. Since flexible response, conventional forces have been gaining importance in order to elevate the so-called nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the nuclear weapons that were redesignated from tactical to theater weapons have assumed both deterrence and warfighting roles:²¹

- deterrence role, to couple European defenses with strategic American deterrence to deter the Soviet Union from employing nuclear weapons against NATO,

- warfighting role, to balance NATO conventional force inferiority.

To counter this threat, NATO has deployed numerous, different types of nuclear weapons in Europe:

- short-range nuclear forces (SNF) for direct support of ground defense assets and deep interdiction;

- intermediate range nuclear forces (INF), ideal, in European eyes, to ensure "the strategic coupling."

The elimination of ground-based INF, as a result of the agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union in Washington on 7 December 1987, has put the entire NATO nuclear strategy up for critical examination.

This raises an important question: with the elimination of INF in Europe, is NATO deterrence still credible and is flexible response still practicable? In this regard, there are two schools of thought.

Some believe that the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons has implied less reaction capability and as a consequence, more difficulties in fulfilling NATO's strategy.²²

While others underline that, notwithstanding the fact that NATO's deterrent capability has decreased, the threat has diminished to an even greater extent. As a result, without INFs, Europe finds itself with the balance of power present in the '70's, when the West believed that deterrence was assured.²³

These two views can be argued, the writer's view is that deterrence is now diminished for other reasons. First, because the use of ICBMs to respond to an aggression against Europe might imply a retaliation against the USA, the price becomes so high that the U.S. would not be ready to pay. Second, because the use of SNFs would restrict nuclear war only to Western Europe, the USSR might consider such a restriction acceptable. Third,

because the dual-capable NATO aircraft are unable to ensure, due to their limited number and range, the same results and then the same degree of deterrence as INFs.

In conclusion, flexible response is now less flexible, American and European interests less coupled, and deterrence less credible. This is the reason why military planners have been thinking about appropriate measures to face the new situation; measures such as:²⁴

- to deploy, in Europe, American strategic bombers (B-52, B-1 and dual-capable F-111, F-16).
- to convert to a nuclear role another part of the dual-capable NATO bomber force;
- to rely on intermediate-range sea or submarine launched weapons;
- to increase the number of SNFs in Europe and provide for their modernization.

This, of course, is a technico-military point of view. Other sensitive political, economic, social and psychological aspects must be considered, such as the American trend to decrease their commitment to Europe, strong German opposition to SNF modernization, and the necessary public support for the disarmament process.

All of these reservations were certainly present in the minds of the North Atlantic Council representatives when they met in Brussels in May 1989.²⁵ In that session important decisions on the future role of nuclear weapons were made.

The first important aspect concerns the fact that "theater nuclear weapons" (SNFs and some INFs) have changed their name to "substrategic nuclear weapons." It is not a mere cosmetic adjustment, but an important change of their roles: roles that find these systems more oriented to ensure deterrence than to face operational problems, indeed, more political than military assets.

In that summit, it was also decided to subordinate talks on SNF reduction until after a balance on conventional forces is reached. This summit decision has prevented a complete denuclearization of Europe.

These ideas were confirmed during a Nuclear Planning Group meeting held in Canada in May 1990. At that time some other steps in the evolving NATO nuclear strategy were taken, such as:

- a recognition of the diminishing need for nuclear systems of the shortest range;
- increasing importance of substrategic nuclear systems, offering both flexibility and longer range.

Furthermore, it is important to notice that NATO welcomed the prospect of early negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles and President Bush's decision to terminate the Follow-on to Lance (FOTL) program, as well as to cancel any further modernization of American artillery shells deployed in Europe.²⁶

Finally, the most important results regarding the changing nuclear strategy of the Alliance were reached during the North Atlantic Council meeting held in London in July 1990 (London

Declaration). As far as nuclear strategy and the role of nuclear weapons are concerned, the following are the main decisions taken:

- to keep peace, the Alliance must maintain, for the foreseeable future, an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe;

- NATO will modify the size and adapt the tasks of her nuclear deterrence forces;

- there will be a significantly reduced role for substrategic nuclear systems of the shortest range;

- flexible response will be modified to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons;

- nuclear weapons will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war, by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation, in response to military action, might be discounted.

In summary, it could be said that, in line with the favorable change in the political and military situation, the role of nuclear weapons that existed for 30 years, must also change. Then, what does the future hold?

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Composition and doctrine of residual nuclear forces have to be examined, bearing in mind the basic and enduring security interests of all European countries.

Geography can not be modified by arms control talks. Western Europe is the peninsular appendix of the Euro-Asiatic

continent, dominated, from a geo-strategic point of view, by the Soviet Union. This reality is not modifiable by political reforms or by success of perestroika and glasnost, nor by an economic interdependence, or by a rapprochement of Eastern European countries to the Western world.

It is clear already that Western Europe is moving toward a significant reduction of nuclear forces on the continent, whose deterrent role is not expected to be supplemented by the warfighting role.

The best solution could be to deploy a system able to couple American and European interests without a significant impact on conventional operations.

This idea is premised on a convergence between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the Western world, the fact is substantiated by the adoption of a "substrategic" nuclear weapons concept. On the other side, Gorbachev and some Soviet military experts have favored a nuclear deterrence at the lowest level.²⁷

The operational concept for such a theater nuclear deterrence at the lowest level - or "essential" nuclear deterrence - could be rationalized by the French concept of "frappes prestrategique." In fact, in accordance with French nuclear strategy, called "du faible au fort," nuclear weapons are not intended to solve a desperate tactical or operational situation, but, first, to send a "last warning" and then to provide a retaliation.²⁸

Ideally, essential nuclear deterrence should have high mobility, survivability, flexibility and a certain operational impact on enemy military forces. The weapon systems of essential deterrence should be characterized by intermediate range, launched from air, sea or submarine platforms; while the ground-launched, short-range nuclear weapons would be removed from the European theater.

Some strategic experts and political officials have made different proposals about the configuration and the doctrine of a European nuclear deterrence. Some examples are:

- to ensure both theater and global deterrence only through strategic nuclear weapons;
- to base deterrence in Europe on French and British national nuclear deterrence;
- to establish denuclearized areas.²⁹

A deterrence based on strategic nuclear weapons of the superpowers does not seem acceptable to the Atlantic Alliance due to political and strategic reasons more than technical ones.

As far as the technical aspects are concerned, the accuracy and the different capabilities of warheads permit strategic nuclear weapons to perform "counter force" tasks, a peculiarity ~~not~~ shared by theater weapons.

On the other hand, this situation would increase excessively not only the U.S. role in the nuclear decision making process with the exclusion of Allies, but also the risks to which the Allies would be submitted. The cohesion of an Alliance like

NATO, made up of sovereign countries, is based on common interests, risk sharing and vulnerability.

The idea that it is possible to base deterrence on French and British nuclear forces is not acceptable by the United States, by non-nuclear European countries and by France and the United Kingdom. It would not be acceptable to the United States since the U.S. would lose its present dominant position in the nuclear decision making process. It would not be acceptable to the non-nuclear European countries because they are mainly interested in maintaining the strategic coupling with the United States. Finally, it would not be acceptable to France and the United Kingdom, since legitimacy and credibility of their nuclear forces are based primarily on national decisions. It is not possible to charge them with a supplementary burden: to grant nuclear deterrence to other countries.³⁰

Finally, a word or two is in order on an adjunct of reduced theater nuclear weapons in Europe - nuclear weapon free zones. The proposed creation of nuclear free zones in Europe is characterized by advantages that cannot overcome numerous disadvantages. The principal theoretical advantage of a nuclear free zone is associated with a decreased possibility of launching a surprise nuclear attack using land-based shorter-range nuclear weapons. In addition, nuclear-free zones would take nuclear weapon systems away from conventional conflict fluctuations that could cause their early use. On the other hand, the nuclear free zones would create, a "de jure," zones with less security and

where it could be possible to fight a conventional war that might escalate to a nuclear exchange.

In addition, the free zone concept has been overcome by technological evolution of longer-range, nuclear weapons. What does it mean to have a 150 Km deep nuclear free zone if the majority of theater nuclear weapons will be launched from bombers using 450 Km range missiles with an accuracy and effectiveness similar to those of nuclear shells?

CONCLUSION

Actually, nuclear weapons have removed the possibility of employing military power in Europe as a policy instrument. The world may or may not like nuclear weapons, indeed, much of the public abhors them. But these weapons have certainly helped to make a general war less probable and have imposed great prudence on nuclear countries to avoid a direct confrontation that could provoke a conflict.

Those who support complete denuclearization and assert that they want to prevent war by establishing solid strategic stability in Europe are putting forth two contradictory issues. Such advocates of denuclearization are not necessarily pursuing the break of Western strategic cohesion in favor of the Soviet Union, but rather pursuing a form of "national-neutralist" goals. These sentiments seem to be emerging in Europe with a result that could have negative impact on East-West relations, trans-Atlantic relations and internal relations among Western nations.

The preservation of the present strategic arrangement, based on Alliance cohesion and on credible deterrence represents the essential element necessary to maintain stability in a changing Europe.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to refer to the most important views concerning nuclear weapons expressed by the North Atlantic Assembly:

- they will continue to play a key role in ensuring deterrence in Europe;

- the nuclear balance should rely more on longer range weapon systems with a deterrent role, than on shorter range weapons with a warfighting role.

- the conventional force balance should permit a decrease in the amount of nuclear weapons present in Europe;

- any decision on nuclear matters should be taken only after careful consideration of political aspects such as the cohesion of the Alliance and the consensus of public opinion.

Furthermore, referring to the political role of NATO, the Assembly said:

The relationships between Europe and the United States are changing as a consequence of economic and political potential expressed by Western European countries. So they should be more deeply involved in the political, economic and military leadership of the Alliance.³¹

To accomplish this task, the European members of the Alliance should intensify their cooperation on security problems and strengthen the political cohesion of the Western world.

The United States, on the other hand, should favor this European process, confirming the U.S. commitment for peace and stability in Europe. This commitment can be enforced through a military presence in Europe and by maintaining appropriate nuclear forces to grant a credible deterrence to the entire Alliance.

ENDNOTES

1. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace," Military Strategy: Theory and Application, p. 280.

2. The author has tried to explain the reasons for the initial success of communism, coming to the conclusion that they could be found in the "hope for a better life" offered to the social classes oppressed by absolute indigence. This was true for the Soviet Union and for other countries around the world. Subsequently, from this initial, historical and social root, marxism has developed a politico-economic theory - communism - aimed to create and expand, sometimes using force, a new kind of world order with its associated values; order and values that could not bear comparison with the freedom and progress human beings demand.

3. Actually, after the initial enthusiasm subsequent to the "revolution" of 1989, Western attitude toward the Soviet Union is becoming more and more prudent.

4. Richard Pipes, "Soviet Army Coup? Not Likely," The New York Times, 20 November 1990, p. 21.

5. The Soviet Union has always been particularly susceptible to outside interference in its "internal" affairs. To maintain the present, good East-West relations, the United States should deal very carefully with the Baltic Republics problem, forcing itself to refrain from adopting a clear support for their self-determination.

6. In this area, Western Europe, through its social, political and economic organizations, is expected to play a major role. Italy is recommending a "regional" policy among the Mitteleuropean countries (Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) in order to promote stability, integration and economic cooperation. Gianni De Michelis, "Stability and Integration in Mitteleurope," NATO Review, June 1990, p. 8.

7. "East Europe's Security," The Christian Science Monitor, 6 February 1991, p. 2.

8. Mino Martinazzoli, "Changes in the International Politico-Strategic Context," Italian Military Review, September-October 1990, p. 3.

9. Angelo Bolaffi, "Another History Now Begins," Espresso, 16 December 1990, p. 100.

10. "Euro-MPs Put a Common Currency Before Unity," The European, 1 February 1991, p. 11.

11. It is commonly understood that Europe could realize its unity in 20 years time.

12. This proposal has been made by Italian Prime Minister Andreotti during the meeting of the Commission of European Parliament held in Rome in the autumn of 1990. President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl support the idea.

13. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990, p. 3.

14. Ronald Steel, "A Look at Europe After the Superpowers," American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed, p. 7.

15. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power - 1990, p. 21.

16. Actually, it is not clear what the new concept, of "reasonable sufficiency" or "defense sufficiency" mean. In this regard, Soviet Military Power - 1990 states:

Many on the General Staff use the term "defense sufficiency" to imply retaining a capability to execute an offensive-oriented defense that would defeat an enemy by conducting counteroffensive operations deep in his territory. In contrast, civilian advisers of Gorbachev advocate the principle of "reasonable sufficiency," which they believe would involve structuring forces for a defensive-oriented defense on both a strategic and operational scale. This course of action would preclude offensive operations in enemy territory.

17. Ibid., p. 54.

18. Ibid., p. 54.

19. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change - 1989, p. 50.

20. Soviet Military Power - 1990, p. 56.

21. In December 1970, NATO accepted the Provisional Political Guidelines (PPG), a compromise between the two main factions: the "demonstrators" in favor of a rapid escalation and the "warfighters," emphasizing the use of tactical nuclear weapons for operational-military purposes. After approval of the PPG, the decisionmaking process of the Alliance continued its evolution, with the working out of a "strategic concept" adopted at Gleneagle in 1986. The thrust of this effort is the need to diminish collateral damage caused by possible use of nuclear weapons and increase target selectivity.

22. Mario Sardo, "The Double Zero Option and the Flexible Response," Italian Military Review, April 1988, p. 17.

23. Ibid., p. 27.

24. Ibid., pp. 27-30.

25. Carlo Jean, "Substrategic Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe," Italian Military Review, April 1990, pp. 5-6.

26. "NATO Nuclear Planning Group Communique," NATO Review, August 1990, p. 32.

27. Jean, p. 9.

28. Ibid., p. 9.

29. Ibid., p. 13.

30. The French and British nuclear arsenals consist of a relatively great number of SNFs and INFs not considered in the "double zero" agreement. These forces play a limited role in NATO or European security systems since they are not able to grant an "extended deterrence." In other words, no other countries can be protected under such a small nuclear umbrella. According to F. Heisbourg, "The British and French Nuclear Forces," Survival, August 1989, the amount of nuclear weapons is the following:

<u>SYSTEMS</u>	<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>UK</u>
SSBN	6	4
IRBM	18	-
SRBM	32	14
ARTILLERY	-	126
BOMBERS	111	396

31. Italian Army Staff, Review on Security International Problems, April 1990, p. 34.

APPENDIX I

DEFINITIONS OF DETERRENCE

- Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace. Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translation, 1966.

"Deterrence is the inducement of another party to refrain from a certain action by means of a threat that this action will lead the threatener to inflict retaliation or punishment."

- Gary L. Guertner, Deterrence and Defense in a Post-Nuclear World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

"The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction; the denial of gains or the imposition of excessive costs."

- Library of Congress.

"Measures to discourage or restrain an enemy from using his military forces."

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