

DTIC FILE COPY

2

STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE AC/RC FORCE MIX -- HAS THE PENDULUM SWUNG TOO FAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK WINTRICH, IN

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

15 MAY 1990

DTIC
SELECTED
JUL 02 1990
S & D



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

AD-A223 401

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The AC/RC Force Mix--Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?"		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Frederick M. Wintrich		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 15 May 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 43
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The current force structure reduction decisions hinge on the Army correctly assessing their requirements for the future force mix. This study seeks to determine how the USAWC Class of 1990 views the current AC/RC force mix through the use of an informal questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to elicit the War College students' "feelings" about the AC/RC missions, capabilities and structure. The study found that a majority of the respondents believed that we should build a stronger, more capable, (Continued)		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

20. ABSTRACT--Continued.

albeit smaller AC force to respond rapidly to worldwide contingencies and rely on the RC to provide "back-up" units for a prolonged (longer than 90 days) conflict. The students' responses showed that they strongly believed that the Army needs a new force structure "philosophy" to create a smaller, more balanced, more capable total force among the three components (Active, Guard and Reserve) and various type units (combat, combat support, and combat service support). In these times of shrinking budgets and "vanishing threats" it is imperative that the Army articulate its requirements clearly and forcefully for a rational and reasonable force mix. It is only by completely reviewing and then clearly stating our requirements that we will be able to ensure that our nation has the deterrent capabilities it needs to preserve peace. This study attempts to define those requirements for the proper mix of AC and RC forces.

2

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE AC/RC FORCE MIX -- HAS THE PENDULUM SWUNG TOO FAR

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Wintrich IN

Lieutenant Colonel(P) Charles S. Rousek AR
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
15 May 1990

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 02 1990
S B D

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
Introduction.....	1
Status of the Current Army Force Structure.....	2
Today's Force Mix -- Reliance on the RC Partner.	5
Training and Readiness -- Are We as Capable as Advertised.....	10
Design of the USAWC Survey.....	13
Survey Analysis.....	15
Force Mix Balance -- Risk.....	16
Force Mix -- Budget Considerations.....	18
Future Force Mix.....	18
Combat Divisions.....	20
Conclusions.....	22
ENDNOTES.....	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	25
APPENDIX A.....	27
APPENDIX B.....	29
APPENDIX C.....	30
APPENDIX D.....	33

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Frederick M. Wintrich, LTC, IN

TITLE: The AC/RC Force Mix -- Has The Pendulum Swung Too Far


FORMAT: Individual Study Project Intended For Publication

DATE: 15 May 1990 PAGES: 39 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Active Component Reserve Component
The current force structure reduction decisions hinge on the Army correctly assessing their requirements for the future force mix. This study seeks to determine how the USAWC Class of 1990 views the current (AC/RC) force mix through the use of an informal questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to elicit the War College students' "feelings" about the AC/RC missions, capabilities and structure. The study found that a majority of the respondents believed that we should build a stronger, more capable, albeit smaller AC force to respond rapidly to worldwide contingencies and rely on the RC to provide "back-up" units for a prolonged (longer than 90 days) conflict. The students' responses showed that they strongly believed that the Army needs a new force structure "philosophy" to create a smaller, more balanced, more capable total force among the three components (Active, Guard and Reserve) and various type units (combat, combat support, and combat service support). In these times of shrinking budgets and "vanishing threats" it is imperative that the Army articulate its requirements clearly and forcefully for a rational and reasonable force mix. It is only by completely reviewing and then clearly stating our requirements that we will be able to ensure that our nation has the deterrent capabilities it needs to preserve peace. This study attempts to define those requirements for the proper mix of AC and RC forces.

Introduction

The reserve component element of the "One Army" shoulders an enormous part of the overall defense burden of the United States. The reason for this reliance on the reserve components is rooted in the very fabric of our nation's birth. It was the Minuteman at Lexington and Concord, and the "citizen soldier" of George Washington's fledgling Army that wrested our independence from our British "masters". These American patriots learned early that security and defense were a "common" problem and that to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"¹ required citizens that were ready to take up arms to protect the new nation. This paper is however, not a history of our reserve component forces. We know we are a nation of "citizen soldiers". Now that we are nearing the end of the twentieth century, it is over 200 years since our first "citizen soldiers" took up arms, and we are at a crossroads in planning our national defense strategy. We are faced with gargantuan debt that threatens to swamp our nation's economy. We have rapid and complex changes occurring in the world balance of power, and we must gain control over the scourge of illegal drugs that threatens the fabric of our society. With all of this turmoil, the question for defense planners remains, what is the proper balance of forces for our Army? What is the best mix of active and reserve component forces? How well trained and ready must



Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

the reserve components be? What types of capability are best placed in the reserve components? Are we as ready as we advertise? Can we quickly assimilate the RC forces into active duty units and organizations? This paper explores the structure of the current Army force mix to demonstrate that, like the radical changes that we will be forced to make in the AC structure, the RC must also be prepared to make bold, significant changes. We cannot afford the luxury of a force structure, bloated by politics, in either the active or reserve components.

Status of the Current Army Force Structure

Has the pendulum swung to far? Are the missions and roles assigned to our reserve component (RC) forces realistic and achievable? Are decisions about force composition based on capabilities and requirements or fiscal constraints and political decisions? Are we kidding ourselves and our civilian masters about the "total force"?

These are harsh words. The realities of the situation are even more difficult. Since the inception of the All Volunteer Force and the One Army Concept, there has been an ever increasing reliance on the abilities of our RC forces to shoulder a greater portion of the defense burden. "The roll of the RC clearly has expanded from one of wartime augmentation only, to now being an integral part of the deterrent force. Today's Army can meet no major contingency without the Reserve Components."²

After Vietnam the size of the Army was reduced to thirteen active divisions consisting of about 800,000 troops. This 13 division force presupposed a greater reliance on the reserve components. The primary mission of the reserves being to act as individual "fillers" for AC units. These forces were primarily of two types, Vietnam veterans in the inactive reserves serving out the remainder of their six year obligation, and non-Vietnam veterans who had joined the RC for a variety of reasons during the war years. Recognizing the past problems that had plagued these components, Secretary of Defense Laird stated his expectations of the reserves, and what was to be done for them, in the future. "Increase the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve and individuals of the Reserve."³ However, in the early/mid 1970s there was little need perceived for "rapidly deploying" forces in the RC. The AC forces, primarily the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, were considered sufficient to meet the requirements for our contingencies. Thus in the mid/late 1970s the Army convinced the Administration and Congress to restore the Army's force structure to sixteen active divisions. This however, was accomplished without an increase in active duty end-strength, which had fallen to 784,000. This increase in the number of "combat" divisions was a result of the "tooth-to-tail" debate that had raged in the Pentagon and Congress.⁴

Interestingly, it was during this "great debate" over the All Volunteer Force (AVF) and the One Army Concept that the serving Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, made the


following statement, "such heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserve divisions for the initial defense missions would be imprudent... If we are to act responsibly toward the National Guard and Reserve, we should stop pretending that we can use all of them as full substitutes for active duty ground forces."⁵ In effect Secretary Schlesinger was telling us to beware, less we swing the pendulum to far.

Another explanation for the nation's rush to increase our reliance on the RC might have been the belief that we must never again become involved in a Vietnam-like situation where a protracted war was prosecuted without calling-up the reserves. Mr. James Lacy, a Yale University professor, states as the premise of his 1986 article in the Yale Law and Policy Review, "If reserves must be activated in order to sustain active forces in anything more than limited contingencies, Presidents will be less inclined (and politically less able) to become involved in military actions without extensive national debate and political consensus."⁶ Our own Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams was of the same opinion. In 1974 he stated that "he hoped the return of the Army to the structure it had known throughout much of the twentieth century would correct one of the major deficiencies in the Vietnam war -- commitment of the Army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the American people as expressed by their representatives in the Congress. In effect both Mr. Lacy and General Abrams felt one way to ensure the national will supported any future conflict was to ensure that the politicians, starting with the President and then

the Congress, must "call-up" the reserves to have a viable, sustainable force.

Today's Force Mix -- Reliance on The RC Partner

With this background, where do we find ourselves today? What is the true composition of our current force? What functions do we rely most heavily on the RC to produce? The chart below is reprinted from The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Years 1990/91 and is the best data available at the time concerning the composition of the Army by component in the combat, combat support, and combat service support segments of the total force. This chart reflects our heavy reliance on the RC for the Army's overall force composition.



The chart shows that in FY 90, 52% of the Army was in the reserve component. Nearly half(44%) of our combat force was in the Army National Guard(ARNG). In the combat support(CS) and combat service support(CSS) arenas 67% of the structure is in the RC (40% USAR & 27% ARNG). "Over one third of the combat divisions and more than 80% of the aggregate combat support and combat service support capabilities are in the Army's reserve components...Some types of units are primarily in the ARNG or USAR."⁹ We know from information received during the current fiscal year(FY 91), that the FY 90 force mix has not changed significantly, and that if it does, the change is likely be an increase in the RC portion of the total force.

This over reliance on the reserves, particularly in the CS and CSS areas is what former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and others have warned us about. Mr. Martin Binkin, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institute, states the same warning in different terms, "past Administrations have managed to live with these gaps between rhetoric and reality, and future ones may choose that course, either in bliss of ignorance or with fingers firmly but secretly crossed."¹⁰

To further understand the extent of our reliance on the ARNG and USAR, we must assess the reserve structure itself and examine it more closely to determine the types of capabilities we have placed in these components. All National Guard and Army Reserve elements of the United States armed forces are assigned to one of three categories:

Ready Reserve: Comprised of military members of the National Guard and Reserve. Some are organized into units. The Ready Reserve consists of three sub-categories -- Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard.

Standby Reserve: Consists of personnel who maintain their affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve. These individuals are not required to train and are not in units. The size of the Standby Reserve is decreasing as a result of DOD emphasis on accession and retention of personnel in the Ready Reserve.

Retired Reserve: Comprised of all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay resulting from their active duty and/or reserve service; all reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay, have not reached age 60, have not elected discharge, and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve; and other enlisted members who retired with 20 or more years of service.

**COMPOSITION OF THE READY RESERVE
FY 1988**

READY RESERVE 1,661,200			
SELECTED RESERVE 1,170,500 ¹			INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE/ INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD 490,700
UNIT AND FULL-TIME SUPPORT 1,059,900 ²		INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES 26,000	
UNITS 927,600 (PAID DRILL STRENGTH ONLY)	FULL-TIME SUPPORT 132,300 (AGR, TAR, AND MILITARY TECHNICIAN ONLY) ³		
MILITARY TECHNICIANS 68,900			

1. Includes 84,600 in the training pipeline.
 2. Military Technician strength counted only once.
 3. AGR - Active Guard Reserve. TAR - Training and Administration of the Reserve.
 4. Numbers rounded to nearest hundred.
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the reserve components.

What has the trend been in the last eight years for manning the various categories and sub-categories of the Army reserve components? The charts at Appendix A show the totality of the AC and RC personnel strength in all of the armed forces as of September 1988. While this set of charts includes all services it is easy to discern the overall strength of the active Army and reserve components, and to realize the relative size of each. Focusing on the strength of the Ready Reserve compared to the active component shows the steady increase in the size of the RC versus the AC from 1981 to 1989. A portion of Appendix A is reprinted here for ease of comparison :

<u>Category/Component</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
<u>Ready Reserve</u>				
		(in thousands)		
ARNG	389	451.9	455.9	457.3
USAR	<u>232</u>	<u>313.6</u>	<u>312.8</u>	<u>324.3</u>
Total	621.0	765.5	768.7	781.6+160.6
<u>IRR/ING</u>				
ARNG	10.5	10.3	9.0	10.3
USAR	<u>205.9</u>	<u>287.5</u>	<u>292.9</u>	<u>300.9</u>
Total	216.4	297.8	301.9	311.2
<u>Ready Res.Total</u>	837.4	1063.3	1070.6	1092.8
<u>Active Comp.</u>	781.0	780.8	771.8	771.8 -9.2
<u>AC/RC Tot.</u>	1618.4	1844.1	1842.4	1864.6
%RC	51.7%	57.7%	58.1%	58.6%
%AC	48.2%	42.3%	41.9%	41.4% ¹²

In FY 89, the Ready Reserve accounted for more than 58% of our total force. The structure of the Army is clearly skewed in relying on the reserve components. When viewed from a functional perspective the contrast between the active and reserve components is even more apparent considering the mix of combat and support forces in each component (percentages of authorized manpower by function):

<u>Function</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
Combat	48%	44%	8%
Support	33%	27%	40% 13

The charts at Appendix B show the National Guard and Reserve contribution to the Total Army by "type" unit. Appendix B shows that among other things 80% of the separate combat brigades; 55% of the infantry battalions; 49% of the mechanized infantry battalions; and 45% of the armor battalions are in the reserve components. Select virtually any functional area, from aviation to logistics, you will find a preponderance of the force structure in the RC. Some of the more glaring examples are:

<u>Capability</u>	<u>% in RC</u>
Chemical	72% -- Smoke Gen. Co.
Engineer	77% -- Bridge Co.
Medical	77% -- Hospitals
CA	97% -- Civil Affairs Bn.
Signal	57% -- Corps Signal Co.
MP	65% -- Non-Div MP Co.
TC	67% -- Truck Co. 14

Is this all bad? I would contend it is not a matter of good or bad, but rather a question of capabilities and requirements. If you believe that we have sufficient AC forces to respond to our most likely threat and that we are in fact more likely to fight a "low intensity" conflict that will not require the introduction of major forces, than perhaps our current reliance on the RC is not unrealistic. However, if you believe, as many professional military planners do, that you must be structured to respond across a broad spectrum of possibilities, than you should question the Army's current posture.

Training and Readiness -- Are We as Capable as Advertised

While the U.S. "combat" experience in Grenada is no paradigm of force projection, the introduction of American forces into Grenada points out the necessity of the RC contribution and its utility to our overall capability. Even in this very limited operation, reservists were deployed to provide various capabilities to the overall operation. The significance is, if we required reserve support to prosecute the Grenada intervention, than the Army cannot be expected to execute virtually any combat operation without Guard and Reserve support. Most recently we were involved in combat operations in Panama. Here again we required the limited, "voluntary call-up" of reservists with specific skills necessary to support the operation. What this means is that in many respects the RC must be as "ready" as their AC counterparts. We may be very close to

the goal described by General Abrams in the early days of the All Volunteer Army and the One Army Concept, that is, the United States cannot prosecute a war without the "explicit support of the American people". We must rely on our reserve forces for even very small, limited combat operations.

To enhance the RC's readiness to meet the increasing demands, the RC has undertaken a number of programs to improve their level of training. The RC has attacked the readiness and training problem in several ways, individual and unit training, and their Full Time Support(FTS) program. On the individual level there are increased opportunities to attend resident service schools. High priority RC units along with individuals are authorized up to 36 additional drill periods per year. As indicated in the chart below the RC FTS program has continued to receive the emphasis required to insure that RC units have a cadre of full time personnel.

***Full-Time Support Personnel
(End Strength In Thousands)***

	Actual		Planned	
	FY 1980	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
Army National Guard	33.0	55.5	55.6	56.1
Army Reserve	17.0	27.7	27.9	28.4
Naval Reserve	20.8	32.0	33.1	33.9
Marine Corps Reserve	4.8	7.7	7.6	7.7
Air National Guard	25.8	34.2	34.8	34.7
Air Force Reserve	11.9	15.3	15.9	15.7
Total	113.3	172.4	174.9	176.5
Percent of Selected Reserve	13.1	14.7	14.9	14.9

* Includes active guard and reserve, military technicians, active component, and civil service personnel.

In the last decade this program increased rapidly from a total of 113.3 thousand personnel in FY80, to 172.4 thousand in FY89. The plan for FY 90-91 includes a small increase to 176.5 thousand personnel in the FTS program (includes DA civilians, active duty, civilian technicians, and AGR personnel).

The importance of the RC training issue is no more apparent than in the "Round Out" program. These RC units, designated to become the "third brigade" of their parent division, are extremely hard pressed to keep pace with their AC counterparts. Currently seven of the CONUS based AC divisions have round out brigades. Their missions are to be prepared to deploy with their active divisions.

The issue of mission capability and overall readiness is succinctly stated as follows, "the combat capability of reservists depends on three elements: the individual competence of the troops, the standard of collective training of the units, and the availability and effectiveness of weapons and other equipment."¹⁶ These factors are "the key" to the length of the arc on the pendulum. It is easily and justifiably arguable that given the available time to train, thirty-eight days a year for the majority of the RC forces, these units will never achieve the required level of proficiency to enable a combat division to incorporate them into its formations without considerable post-mobilization training. Post-mobilization training is unfortunately a luxury that few believe would be available in any crisis. Coupling the lack of training time with other factors, inadequate manning levels and the Army's inability to equip RC

units with modernized systems, only exacerbates the problem of full AC/RC integration. In order to demonstrate some of the current feelings about these issues and in an effort to determine a correct picture of the "readiness and training" issue in the RC, an informal survey instrument was administered to the War College Class of 1990. The "results" of this survey reveal some interesting perceptions about the RC, its readiness, and its relationship with the active force.

Design of the USAWC Survey

The survey was given to the entire class as part of the course of instruction. The purpose was to elicit "feelings" from the class about their views on the current AC/RC force mix and whether they thought it needed to be changed. A copy of the survey is attached at Appendix C. The questionnaire was comprised of 28 questions. The first five questions derived the background and experience of the population. The last 23 questions dealt with the AC/RC force mix, readiness, and future force structure decisions. There were 231 responses:

Active Component Army	161
Reserve Component Army	21(12-USAR/9-ARNG)
Air Force	14
Navy/Marine/Coast Guard	16
Civilians	12
International Fellows	7
Total	231

The focus of the analysis of the data will be on responses received from the active and reserve component Army participants. Nearly all respondents had some experience with the reserve component forces. One hundred and twenty (120) participants had evaluated RC units during annual training (AT) periods. Ninety-one (91) respondents had conducted training that included RC unit participation. Fifty-three (53) officers had served in units that included RC roundout units. A majority of the respondents had had experience with the RC units since 1980. This is particularly significant because it is in this period (1980 to present) that the Army has placed so much emphasis and reliance on the reserve components with the One Army Concept. It was during this decade that an increasing number of RC units were required to be as ready as their AC counterparts.

To increase the reliability and validity of the survey each question was critically examined statistically to determine the range and distribution of responses on the Likert scale¹⁷ (strongly agree -- strongly disagree). It was determined that to be "significant" a question should have a single mode, that is, 92 responses of a single "feeling". There were seven questions that clearly exhibited a "single mode" or feeling. Similarly a question was also considered "significant" if it exhibited an "adjacent mode" that is, 173 responses in either the A-B (agreement), or D-E (disagreement) category. There were twelve questions that exhibited this "adjacent mode feeling". Four questions were determined to be "insignificant" because they failed to yield a strong feeling in either direction. These

questions were discarded and not considered in the analysis.

The survey was designed to ascertain the personal and professional judgements of the USAWC population on certain RC issues and to obtain some insight into how the 1990 War College class viewed the current Army AC/RC force mix. A copy of the survey with the data analysis is attached at Appendix D.

Survey Analysis

The majority of officers surveyed believed the One Army Concept had "significantly contributed to the deterrent factor of our national military strategy for the past 15 years" (Q-5). Significantly 163 of 231 respondents agreed (or strongly agreed) that the total force policy was a significant contributor to deterrence. Interestingly, the population also overwhelmingly agreed (200 of 231) that we should build "stronger more capable AC forces to rapidly respond to worldwide contingencies and rely on the RC to provide "back-up" units (additive) to support a larger more protracted conflict" (Q-11). One hundred and eighty-eight participants felt that the AC forces should include sufficient combat(CBT), combat support(CS), and combat service support(CSS) forces to deploy, fight and sustain themselves for 90 days without RC augmentation. Additionally 134 respondents disagreed with the statement that "the roundout concept is valid and will work in regard to successfully accomplishing initial(first 30 days) combat missions"(Q-13). 188 officers agreed that "lack of training time inhibits RC readiness"(Q-15).

There appears to be some contradictions in these answers. A majority of the respondents feel that the Army's "total force policy" contributes significantly to deterrence, yet the same group believes that we need more capable AC forces to respond to our worldwide commitments, and that RC forces should be just that, "reserves" or "back-up" forces. The population also felt that the AC force should have a well-balanced capability (CBT-CS-CSS) to withstand the first 90 days of combat, and RC forces lacked readiness due to an inadequate amount of training time available. The concern is obvious, there is not a problem with the One Army Concept, it is how we resource and plan for its execution that is of concern to AC officers. Active component officers (the majority of the respondents) know that the One Army Concept is here to stay, and that while they may want more AC structure to be more capable, thus less risk, there is probably little chance of this occurring. In fact the recently released FY 91 DOD Budget reflects the active Army will experience a sharp decline in manpower over the next three to five years. Another explanation for the contradictory feelings may be that the respondents feel that our potential adversaries believe and respect our One Army Concept more than we do. Hence the "deterrent effect" is greater in the minds of our potential enemies than perhaps our own and in reality.

Force Mix Balance -- Risk

Another key issue that surfaced during this survey was the

issue of risk and the relationship between force mix (AC/RC and CBT/CS/CSS) and our ability to respond militarily to a wide range of contingencies(Q-16). 177 respondents agreed that assigning more responsibilities and missions to the RC will increase force imbalance and increase risk. While this may be an obvious statement, the companion questions concerning "risk issues" provided more insight. The officers surveyed were nearly unanimous (216 of 231) in the belief that "a new philosophy of force structuring is required to create a smaller, more balanced, capable total force among all components and all type units"(Q-18). This may not be startling to some. It is in fact a "blinding flash" of what appears to be the current direction being pursued by force planners at Department of the Army (HQDA). If the population sampled in any way represents a cross section of the mid to senior level leadership of the Army, it says that we must be more radical in our approach to designing a force structure for the 90s and beyond. There must be a new paradigm to deal with the realities of today's budget and today's world. We simply cannot afford to disregard what is happening all around us and articulate "no change". The Army (and its sister services) will become significantly smaller in the next decade. The question is, will this change be managed intelligently and programmatically or will we reduce our forces, as we have in the past with "spasms and spurts", that bear little resemblance to what is required for a cohesive strategy of national defense? The current force structure methodology, with its heavy reliance on RC forces for the bulk of CS and CSS capability is recognized

as incurring a "considerable risk". The officers surveyed were clear in their agreement (190 of 231) on this point. There are simply too many CS and CSS units and mission capabilities in our reserve components.

Force Mix -- Budget Considerations

The survey respondents felt very strongly (210 of 231) that the force structure mix is decided by "budgetary requirements and fiscal constraints rather than an over-arching national military strategy"(Q-28). There is no doubt money will always be a limiting factor in any deliberation about national policy and goals. However, it is this fiscal constraint that drives the primary impetus to make dramatic changes in our security and defense posture. We are at a point in history where changes in the world scene make it mandatory for us to review the entire national defense equation and determine what our true, vital, national interests are and what forces are necessary to defend these interests militarily, should the need arise.

Future Force Mix

Where do we go from here? What should we rely on our reserves to do? What is the best combination of active and reserve forces by type?

Change in the world order is clearly affecting the perception of the threat that we must be prepared to face. The

diagram of the "operational continuum" has changed dramatically in the last six months. The relative probability and relationship between the low, mid, and high intensity conflict has changed. As Martin Binkin and William Kaufman succinctly state in their book, US Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, the key issue revolves around the proper roles and missions for both the active and reserve component forces:

"By heeding its political masters requests to be ready to prepare for everything, it(the Army) is not able to do a great deal of any one thing. Because so many assets are in the reserve components, it is not in particularly good shape to execute a worldwide "strategic concept" of multiple contingencies... Yet neither is it well postured to use its active duty forces to deal rapidly with a single but significant threat. ... the combat service support for them --counting potential host nation support...--- could probably sustain no more than ten to twelve divisions for more than a week..."¹⁸

This issue of "rhetoric and reality" which is the title and thesis of Binkin's book, is a syndrome we must break. Those who have worked with the reserve component forces know that, in the main, they are long on "can-do attitude" and short on capability. The survey conducted as part of this study leads to the same conclusion. The first requirement is to realistically determine the threats we face as a nation. If mid to high intensity combat on the plains of Germany is now a remote possibility, we should recognize that change and look to reprioritize the "heavy" side of our structure (both AC and RC). If we believe that the most likely scenario is a regional, low to mid intensity conflict against an enemy with a wide range of combat capability, then we

must have a capable AC structure trained, equipped, and maintained to meet this threat.

The AC force must also be able to deploy, fight and sustain itself without augmentation for at least 90 days. How do we achieve such a force? We should reduce the size of the AC force to a level as small as 11 or 12 active divisions. We should use some of the spaces generated by this reduction to "buy back" the combat support and combat service support structure that is "required" in the active component.

In addition, if the decade of the 90s repeats the last decade in terms of what portion of the defense budget the Army receives than we better be prepared to make drastic reductions. Even when times were good and budgets were increasing the Army always received a disproportionately smaller share. "Over the first seven years of the Reagan Administration...it(the Army) only received about 25% of the defense budget, while 34% went to the Navy and 32% to the Air Force."¹⁹

Combat Divisions

Currently the Army has 28 combat divisions, 18 active and 10 reserve. As it has been reported in a number of publications since early 1990, the current Army plan optimistically projects that this number will be reduced to 15 active divisions in the next five year period. The active structure will be reduced by 135,000 soldiers, leaving us with the smallest peace time active force since the close of World War II. Simultaneously the

reserve forces are projected to be reduced by 131,000 and lose two combat divisions. These cuts in the total Army force are strictly budget driven and are not particularly related to the changing world situation, arms control negotiations, or a total review of threats to our vital national interests. However, these reductions plus additional ones are manageable, if they are planned and programmed to allow us to provide more robustness, resiliency, and reliability in our active structure. To enhance our overall capability we should review the possibility of reducing the AC force to a total of 11 or 12 divisions. The spaces generated by the AC structure reduction should be used to "reconstitute" our AC divisions to full MTO&E strength by eliminating roundout units. We should also maintain an active structure with a fully capable CS and CSS force to sustain the combat elements. This must be done in conjunction with ensuring our ability to expand our force rapidly to counter potential threats. We should retain four Corps headquarters in the AC, and retain the Echelons Above Corps(EAC) structure in both Europe and Korea. This will ensure that we are able to return and build-up forces to either Europe or Korea quickly while having the command and control structure in place.

Some of the AC structure "generated" by the smaller number of combat divisions should be used to enhance the training of the reserve component. We should review the feasibility and desirability of a composite AC/RC command structure in RC units at division level and below, particularly in battalions. This "type of cadre" system is well documented in our history. We

should make the AC portion of the Full Time Manning (FTM) system a reality. If we truly want our reserve forces to be better trained and more ready, than we must pay the bill in terms of providing the best resources (manpower, dollars, equipment) to them. We must do better in the AC/RC training partnership. The FTS program is one part of this "partnership". As Colonel (P) Fred Leigh, currently serving as the ADC of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) put it during a recent discussion on the subject of RC readiness "every increment of excellence, no matter how small, reduces the risk on the first day of war."²⁰ The imperative for the "future force" is to be highly trained, self reliant, and immediately deployable.

There are a number of significant contributions that the reserve component forces can make to the overall national defense effort. The most critical is to be trained to assist and ultimately assume responsibility for the expansion of the Army if indeed we have a national emergency that requires mobilization. This expansion or mobilization mission is extremely important particularly as the AC force shrinks. It is also a mission the RC can be reasonably expected to train to and accomplish with great success.

Conclusions

The Army' "game plan" for the "Total Force" policy appears to be unrealistic. The issue of the proper mix of AC and RC forces must be addressed and corrected. This is a dilemma that

the Army must seek to articulate and solve quickly and logically or we will find ourselves "herded" into an untenable security posture by the fiscal realities of the 1990s. We must, at a minimum, state more explicitly and honestly the true capabilities of our reserve components, the necessary balance between the three components, and the resulting capabilities that the Congress and the people of our nation can reasonably expect from this "Total Force". It is only in articulating our requirements clearly for a rational and reasonable force mix, that we can assure our nation of an adequate defense capability in the future. In the event that our political leaders do not take our advice about force levels, capabilities and mix, we must be brutally honest with them about the risk that their decisions would incur for the survival of the nation. Now is not the time for our senior military leaders to be timid or reticent about what they believe is best for our country. As budgets shrink and many needs become more acute, our national military leadership must not abrogate its responsibility to make the proper case, forcefully, for a continued military capability that will keep America the leader of all free nations.

ENDNOTES

1. The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States.
2. USAWC Reference Text, Army Command Management: Theory and Practice 1989-1990, p.13-2.
3. Martin Binkin and William Kaufmann, U. S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, 1989, p.24.
4. Ibid. p.26.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. p.34.
7. Ibid. p.34-35
8. The Honorable John O. Marsh Jr. and Carl E. Vuono, The Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Years 1990/91, Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989, p.23.
9. Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1988, p.14.
10. Binkin, p.128.
11. Reserve Component Programs 1988, pp.3-4.
12. Ibid. pp.38-39.
13. Marsh and Vuono, p23.
14. Reserve Component Programs 1988, p. 18
15. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1990, p.22.
16. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 1989-1990, The Military Balance, p.240.
17. United States General Accounting Office, Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, Developing and Using Questionnaires, July 1986, pgs. 62-67.
18. Binkin, p. 126.
19. Ibid.
20. Interview with Colonel(P) Fred Leigh, Faculty Instructor, USAWC, January 1990.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Binkin, Martin.; and Kaufmann, William. U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989. pp. 162.
2. Binkin, Martin. U.S. Reserve Forces The Problem of the Weekend Warrior. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974. pp. 63.
3. Kitfield, James. "Rethinking Defense." Government Executive, February 1990, pp. 28
4. Wilson, Bennie J. ed. The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force The First Decade 1973-1983. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1985. pp. 345.
5. Starr, Frederick. "The Disintegration of the Soviet State". Wall Street Journal, 6 February 1990, p.A 18.
7. Cheney, Dick. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington D.C.: January 1990. pp. 90
8. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Active/Reserve Force Mix Report, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. pp. 123
9. The National Guard Bureau, Vista 1999... A Long Range Look at the Future of the Army and Air National Guard. Washington D.C.: 1982. pp. 77
10. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1988, Washington D.C.: 1989. pp. 190.
11. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Reserve Affairs, Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, Washington D.C.: 1987. pp. 23.
12. Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Improving the Reserves, Washington D.C.: 1985. pp. 59
13. Congress of the United States, Comptroller General Report, Difficulties In Selected Army Reserve Recruiting Under the All-Volunteer Force, Washington D.C.: 1979. pp. 26.
14. Congress of the United States, Comptroller General Report, Can the Individual Reserves Fill Mobilization Needs, Washington D.C.: 1979. pp. 34.
15. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Overseas Study of Reserve Component Issues, Washington D.C.: 1988. pp. 30.

16. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, Washington D.C.: 1988. pp. 51.

17. Leigh, Fred, COL(P). USAWC Department of Command Leadership and Management, Carlisle Barracks PA. January 1990.

18. Kail, Richard L., COL(Ret), and Rousek, Charles S., LTC(P). Thinking About Risk, USAWC Working Paper, 20 November 1989, pp. 10

19. United States General Accounting Office, Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, Developing and Using Questionnaires, Washington D.C.: July 1986, pp. 62-67.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH
(In Thousands)¹

	<u>FY 81²</u>	<u>FY 87²</u>	<u>FY 88²</u>	<u>Percent Change FY 87-88</u>	<u>Percent Change FY 81-88</u>	<u>Projected FY 89²</u>	<u>Percent Change FY 81-89</u>
READY RESERVE							
Selected Reserve							
ARNG (486.1) ³	389.0	451.9	455.9	0.7%	17.0%	457.3	17.6%
USAR (311.9) ³	232.0	313.6	312.8	-0.3%	34.8%	324.3	39.8%
USNR (146.1) ³	98.3	148.1	149.5	0.9%	52.1%	152.6	55.2%
USMCR (42.7) ³	37.3	42.3	43.6	3.1%	16.9%	43.6	16.9%
ANG (118.2) ³	98.3	114.6	115.2	0.5%	17.2%	115.9	17.9%
USAFR (88.6) ³	62.3	80.4	82.1	2.1%	31.8%	82.4	32.3%
TOTAL DoD	917.2	1150.9	1158.4	0.7%	26.3%	1176.1	28.2%
USCGR (27.5)	11.9	13.3	12.1	-9.0%	1.7%	12.1	1.7%
TOTAL Sel Reserve	929.1	1164.2	1170.5	0.5%	26.0%	1188.2	27.9%
IR/ING							
ARNG	10.5	10.3	9.0	-12.6%	-14.3%	10.3	-1.9%
USAR	205.9	287.5	292.9	1.9%	42.3%	300.9	46.1%
USNR	99.3	78.4	84.0	7.1%	-15.4%	86.0	-13.4%
USMCR	51.4	44.6	42.4	-4.9%	-17.5%	49.0	-4.7%
ANG	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0%	-100.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAFR	43.7	48.3	55.9	15.7%	27.9%	43.9	0.5%
TOTAL DoD	410.9	469.1	484.2	3.2%	17.8%	490.1	19.3%
USCGR	8.1	4.8	6.5	35.4%	-19.8%	6.0	-25.9%
TOTAL IR/ING	419.0	473.9	490.7	3.5%	17.1%	496.1	18.4%
TOTAL READY RESERVE	1348.1	1638.1	1661.2	1.4%	23.2%	1684.3	24.9%
ACTIVE COMPONENT⁴							
Army	781.0	780.8	771.8	-1.2%	-1.2%	771.8	-1.2%
Navy	540.2	586.8	592.6	1.0%	9.7%	593.2	9.8%
Marine Corps	190.6	199.5	197.4	-1.1%	3.6%	197.2	3.5%
Air Force	570.3	607.0	576.4	-5.0%	1.1%	571.0	0.1%
TOTAL DoD	2082.1	2174.1	2138.2	-1.7%	2.7%	2133.2	2.5%
Coast Guard	39.8	38.6	37.8	-2.1%	-5.0%	38.0	-4.5%
TOTAL AC Personnel	2121.9	2212.7	2176.0	-1.7%	2.5%	2171.2	2.3%
TOTAL READY RESERVE & ACTIVE COMPONENT	3470.0	3850.8	3837.2	-0.4%	10.6%	3855.5	11.1%
STANDBY RESERVE							
ARNG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAR	5.0	0.4	0.4	0.0%	-92.0%	0.3	-94.0%
USNR	20.0	11.2	10.8	-3.6%	-46.0%	12.0	-40.0%
USMCR	1.8	1.4	1.5	7.1%	-16.7%	1.4	-22.2%
ANG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAFR	37.1	24.5	21.8	-11.0%	-41.2%	28.3	-23.7%
TOTAL DoD	64.0	37.5	34.5	-8.0%	-46.1%	42.0	-34.4%
USCGR	0.9	0.4	0.5	25.0%	-44.4%	0.6	-33.3%
TOTAL STANDBY RESERVE	64.9	37.9	35.0	-7.7%	-46.1%	42.6	-34.4%

PERSONNEL STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 81²</u>	<u>FY 87²</u>	<u>FY 88²</u>	<u>Percent Change FY 87-88</u>	<u>Percent Change FY 81-88</u>
RETIRED⁵					
20 Years Reserve Component Service (Non-Disabled)					
(10 USC 672(a))					
Army	97.5	110.2	114.0	3.4%	16.9%
Navy	50.3	52.0	114.5	120.2%	127.6%
Marine Corps	5.8	6.6	6.7	1.5%	15.5%
Air Force	69.0	60.0	62.0	3.3%	-10.1%
TOTAL DoD	222.6	228.8	297.2	29.9%	33.5%
Coast Guard	1.6	2.3	2.5	8.7%	56.2%
TOTAL RC (Non-Dls)	224.2	231.1	299.7	29.7%	33.7%
20 Years Active Service (Non-Disabled)					
(10 USC 688(a))					
Army	320.4	348.0	353.0	1.4%	10.2%
Navy	285.6	315.7	310.4	-1.7%	8.3%
Marine Corps	51.8	56.2	57.1	1.6%	10.2%
Air Force	402.2	449.5	458.8	2.1%	14.1%
TOTAL DoD	1061.0	1169.4	1179.3	0.8%	11.1%
Coast Guard	14.9	23.7	24.2	2.1%	62.4%
TOTAL Active (Non-Dls)	1075.9	1193.1	1203.5	0.9%	11.9%
Reserve & Active Components (Disabled)					
Army	104.9	108.4	105.1	-3.0%	0.2%
Navy	43.1	44.4	45.1	1.6%	4.6%
Marine Corps	26.7	26.6	26.6	0.0%	-0.4%
Air Force	60.1	55.3	54.6	-1.3%	-9.2%
TOTAL DoD	234.8	234.7	231.4	-1.4%	-1.4%
Coast Guard	3.8	3.7	3.8	2.7%	0.0%
TOTAL RC & AC (Dls)	238.6	238.4	235.2	-1.3%	-1.4%
TOTAL RETIRED	1538.7	1662.6	1738.4	4.6%	13.0%
MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL					
(Active Component, Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired)					
Army	2146.2	2411.1	2414.2	0.1%	12.5%
Navy	1137.8	1236.6	1306.9	5.7%	14.9%
Marine Corps	365.4	377.2	375.3	-0.5%	2.7%
Air Force	1343.1	1439.6	1426.8	-0.9%	6.2%
TOTAL DoD	4992.5	5464.5	5523.2	1.1%	10.6%
Coast Guard	81.0	86.8	87.4	0.7%	7.9%
TOTAL MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL	5073.5	5551.3	5610.6	1.1%	10.6%

Notes: 1. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

2. FY 1981-1989 data submitted by the services and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, (OASD(RA)). Reserve component end-strength includes personnel in the training pipeline (nondeployable) and Individual Mobilization Augmentees who apply against active component wartime requirements.

3. FY 1988 wartime requirement from FY 1990-1994 Program Objective Memorandum.

4. Active component data from OASD (Comptroller).

5. DoD Directive 1352.1 dated February 27, 1984.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY
FY 1988**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>National Guard Percent of Total Army</u>	<u>Army Reserve Percent of Total Army</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Training Divisions and Brigades	0	100	100
Infantry Scout Groups	100	0	100
TOW Light Anti-tank Infantry Battalions	100	0	100
Heavy Helicopter Units	100	0	100
Pathfinder Detachments	50	50	100
Railroad Units	0	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	97	97
Psychological Operations Units	0	87	87
Public Affairs Units	58	29	87
Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies	76	10	86
Separate Brigades	73	7	80
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	52	25	77
Hospital Units	8	69	77
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Companies	18	59	77
Engineer Bridge Companies (Non-Divisional)	43	31	74
Corps Support Groups, Headquarters	15	58	73
Chemical-Smoke Generator Units	6	66	72
Supply and Service Companies	31	40	71
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	30	37	67
Truck Companies	37	30	67
Theater Defense Brigades	50	17	67
Military Police Companies (Non-Divisional)	44	21	65
Conventional Ammunition Companies	18	43	61
Field Artillery Battalions	52	9	61
Armored Cavalry Regiments	57	0	57
Military Intelligence Units	4	54	58
Signal Battalions (Corps Area)	43	14	57
Infantry Battalions	50	5	55
Special Forces Groups	25	25	50
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	47	2	49
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
Area Support Groups, Headquarters	30	15	45
Watercraft Companies	14	29	43
Combat Divisions	36	0	36

Note: Percentage determined by counting like-type units.

Data as of September 30, 1988.

FORCE STRUCTURE SURVEY

The attached survey is designed for your use after the Force Integration Exercise (Lesson 3-28-Ex). The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit your opinions of the current mix/balance of the active and reserve component forces in the U.S. Army and your ideas for their configuration for the future. Your input will be used as part of the research materiel for an MSP.

We need to know how "You" feel about AC/RC force mix and the ability of these forces to execute their wartime missions. All responses will be strictly confidential and no survey participant will be individually identified.

The initial questions are designed to establish "population data" and to determine the depth of experience in the USAWC Class of 1990 with respect to the reserve components.

Thank you for your support.

1. What is your component?
 - a. Active
 - b. USAR
 - c. ARNG
 - d. Other. Specify _____ (Navy, AF, DAC, etc)
2. If you are an active component officer please answer the following question. Circle the response(s) that describe your RC experience:
 - a. Evaluated RC units during annual training periods.
 - b. Served a tour(s) at a Readiness Group.
 - c. Served a tour(s) at a CONUS Army Headquarters.
 - d. Conducted training that included RC unit participation.
 - e. Served in a unit(s) that included a Round Out unit, Brigade or Battalion. My position was _____.
 - f. Served as an advisor to an RC unit. Level _____.
3. The majority of my experience with the RC was during the following period.
 - a. Prior to 1973.
 - b. 1973 - 1980.
 - c. 1980 - Present.
 - d. Throughout my term of service. From _____ To _____.
4. What is the highest level (staff or command) at which you have served?
 - a. HQDA.
 - b. MACOM/CINC.
 - c. Division.
 - d. Below Division.

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY ALL SURVEY PARTICIPANTS. IN THE SPACE PROVIDED AFTER EACH STATEMENT PLEASE ENTER A LETTER THAT CORRESPONDS TO YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE STATEMENT.

- A. Strongly Agree
- B. Agree
- C. No Opinion
- D. Disagree
- E. Strongly Disagree.

_____ 5. Our Total Force concept has significantly contributed to the deterrent factor of our National Military Strategy for the past 15 years.

_____ 6. There are too many key/critical Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units in the ARNG (COMPO 2) and USAR (COMPO 3).

_____ 7. As the size of the active force (COMPO 1) decreases, there will be an increasing reliance on the reserve component (RC).

_____ 8. The RC can absorb more missions if there is an increase in the AC support to the Reserve and Guard.

_____ 9. Our current force structure "requires" the use of reserve component units for the U.S. Army to react to any international conflict or emergency.

_____ 10. The current mix of AC and RC force structure is about right. (Reserves = 52% Cbt. & 67% CS/CSS)

_____ 11. We should build a stronger, more capable AC force to rapidly respond to worldwide contingencies, and rely on the RC to provide "back-up / additive" units to support a larger, more protracted conflict.

_____ 12. AC forces should be structured to include sufficient Cbt, CS, and CSS forces to deploy, fight, and sustain themselves for 90 days without RC augmentation.

_____ 13. The "Round Out" concept is valid and will work in regards to successfully accomplishing initial (first 30 days) combat missions.

_____ 14. RC "Round Out" units are capable of meeting their wartime mission with their AC division.

_____ 15. Lack of adequate training time inhibits RC readiness. RC units spend too much of their training time accomplishing administrative tasks.

16. Assigning more responsibilities and force structure to the RC will increase the force imbalance and increase the risk.

17. The RC force has grown about 40% during the 1980's (ARNG has grown 24% and USAR has grown 47%). More RC growth must be balanced against the demographic trends in the US and in regions of the US where RC growth is anticipated.

18. A new philosophy for force structuring is required to create a smaller, more balanced, capable Total Force among the Active, N.G., and USAR, when considering Cbt, CS, and CSS units.

19. The key element in all AC/RC force structure decisions must be the ability of the RC unit to reach and maintain an adequate readiness level in the areas of manning, training, equipping.

20. Once a decision is reached to place a unit in the RC it must be adequately resourced.

21. Significantly changing the current AC/RC force structure balance now would be premature and result in unacceptable risk.

22. The defense posture of the US would be improved by providing adequate resources to the existing RC forces and using the dollars saved by AC force structure cuts to fully resource a smaller more capable AC force.

23. There is no standard criteria in DOD for implementing the Total Force Policy, specifically deciding which roles, missions, and type units will be AC and which will be RC.

24. The heavy reliance on the RC today for CS (58%) and CSS (70%) units to make up the Total Force results in our incurring a considerable risk.

25. The "One Army Concept" is bankrupt. It is a "shell game" played by Army force planners to try to satisfy all the requirements with a limited amount of resources.

26. RC force structure should account for no more than 33% of the total Army, and should be fully resourced and trained.

27. Army force planners should clearly identify the shortfalls in the difference between the Current Force and the Program Force to the JCS, DOD, and Congress. We should quit playing the "shell game".

28. Force structure decisions should be "driven" by the national military strategy, however it appears that in the current environment of deficit reductions, our force structure mix is decided by budgetary considerations.

FORCE STRUCTURE SURVEY

The attached survey is designed for your use after the Force Integration Exercise (Lesson 3-28-Ex). The purpose of this questionnaire is to solicit your opinions of the current mix/balance of the active and reserve component forces in the U.S. Army and your ideas for their configuration for the future. Your input will be used as part of the research materiel for an MSP.

We need to know how "You" feel about AC/RC force mix and the ability of these forces to execute their wartime missions. All responses will be strictly confidential and no survey participant will be individually identified.

The initial questions are designed to establish "population data" and to determine the depth of experience in the USAWC Class of 1990 with respect to the reserve components.

Thank you for your support.

1. What is your component?

- a. Active-162
- b. USAR - 12
- c. ARNG - 9
- d. USAF - 14
- e. USN/CG- 7
- f. USMC - 9
- g. CIV - 12
- h. IF - 7
- i. TOTAL -231

2. If you are an active component officer please answer the following question. Circle the response(s) that describe your RC experience:

- a. Evaluated RC units during annual training periods.
- b. Served a tour(s) at a Readiness Group.
- c. Served a tour(s) at a CONUS Army Headquarters.
- d. Conducted training that included RC unit participation.
- e. Served in a unit(s) that included a Round Out unit, Brigade or Battalion. My position was _____.
- f. Served as an advisor to an RC unit. Level _____.

3. The majority of my experience with the RC was during the following period.

- a. Prior to 1973.
- b. 1973 - 1980.
- c. 1980 - Present.
- d. Throughout my term of service. From _____ To _____.

4. What is the highest level (staff or command) at which you have served?

- a. HQDA.
- b. MACOM/CINC.
- c. Division.
- d. Below Division.

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY ALL SURVEY PARTICIPANTS. IN THE SPACE PROVIDED AFTER EACH STATEMENT PLEASE ENTER A LETTER THAT CORRESPONDS TO YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE STATEMENT.

- A. Strongly Agree
- B. Agree
- C. No Opinion
- D. Disagree
- E. Strongly Disagree.

5. Our Total Force concept has significantly contributed to the deterrent factor of our National Military Strategy for the past 15 years.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC:	21	87	10	36	3
USAR	2	8	0	0	0
ARNG	6	3	0	0	0
USAF	2	8	0	4	0
USN/CG	1	2	2	2	0
USMC	1	5	1	2	0
CIV	3	7	1	1	0
IF	3	4	0	0	0
TOTAL	39	124	14	45	3

6. There are too many key/critical Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units in the ARNG (COMPO 2) and USAF (COMPO 3).

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	80	58	8	11	5
USAR	2	7	0	1	2
ARNG	5	2	1	1	0
USAF	1	5	7	1	0
USN/CG	2	3	2	0	0
USMC	4	2	2	1	0
CIV	5	5	1	0	1
IF	2	3	1	1	0
TOTAL	101	85	22	16	8

7. As the size of the active force (COMPO 1) decreases, there will be an increasing reliance on the reserve component (RC).

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	47	80	11	21	1
USAR	5	6	0	1	0
ARNG	5	4	0	0	0
USAF	3	9	1	1	0
USN/CG	2	1	2	2	0
USMC	2	3	1	3	0
CIV	4	3	2	3	1
IF	2	3	1	1	0
TOTAL	68	109	18	32	2

8. The RC can absorb more missions if there is an increase in the AC support to the Reserve and Guard.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	9	44	17	73	18
USAR	5	3	0	2	2
ARNG	1	5	0	3	0
USAF	0	3	0	7	1
USN/CG	0	1	3	3	0
USMC	0	1	4	4	0
CIV	2	4	4	2	0
IF	1	5	1	0	0
TOTAL	18	66	29	94	21

9. Our current force structure "requires" the use of reserve component units for the U.S. Army to react to any international conflict or emergency.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	33	66	3	56	5
USAR	4	6	1	1	0
ARNG	2	5	0	2	0
USAF	2	7	1	3	1
USN/CG	3	2	0	2	0
USMC	2	5	0	1	1
CIV	4	3	1	2	2
IF	2	4	0	1	0
TOTAL	47	98	6	68	9

10. The current mix of AC and RC force structure is about right. (Reserves = 52% Cbt. & 67% CS/CSS)

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	1	31	18	76	37
USAR	0	3	0	7	2
ARNG	0	1	0	8	0
USAF	1	3	3	5	2
USN/CG	1	2	0	3	1
USMC	0	1	1	3	4
CIV	0	1	2	6	3
IF	0	2	1	3	1
TOTAL	3	44	25	111	50

11. We should build a stronger, more capable AC force to rapidly respond to worldwide contingencies, and rely on the RC to provide "back-up / additive" units to support a larger, more protracted conflict.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	79	67	2	12	1
USAR	4	3	2	3	0
ARNG	3	3	0	3	0
USAF	6	6	1	1	0
USN/CG	2	2	1	1	1
USMC	5	2	1	0	1
CIV	5	6	0	1	0
IF	6	1	0	0	0
TOTAL	110	90	7	21	3

12. AC forces should be structured to include sufficient Cbt, CS, and CSS forces to deploy, fight, and sustain themselves for 90 days without RC augmentation.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	89	42	4	19	3
USAR	3	6	0	2	1
ARNG	3	5	0	1	0
USAF	5	5	2	2	0
USN/CG	6	1	0	0	0
USMC	6	2	0	0	1
CIV	8	2	1	0	1
IF	3	2	0	2	0
TOTAL	123	65	7	26	6

13. The "Round Out" concept is valid and will work in regards to successfully accomplishing initial (first 30 days) combat missions.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	4	37	21	76	24
USAR	0	3	3	4	2
ARNG	1	4	0	3	1
USAF	0	4	3	6	1
USN/CG	1	0	3	3	0
USMC	2	0	2	3	2
CIV	0	1	4	7	0
IF	1	2	2	2	0
TOTAL	9	51	38	104	30

14. RC "Round Out" units are capable of meeting their war-time mission with their AC division.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	2	39	34	63	22
USAR	0	5	2	5	0
ARNG	1	5	0	3	0
USAF	0	2	5	6	1
USN/CG	0	0	6	1	0
USMC	0	0	6	3	0
CIV	0	0	8	4	0
IF	1	3	1	2	0
TOTAL	4	54	62	87	23

15. Lack of adequate training time inhibits RC readiness. RC units spend too much of their training time accomplishing administrative tasks.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	50	77	20	7	2
USAR	6	5	0	1	0
ARNG	4	1	0	2	2
USAF	3	7	3	1	0
USN/CG	0	3	4	0	0
USMC	0	2	7	0	0
CIV	2	5	4	1	0
IF	1	2	2	2	0
TOTAL	66	102	40	14	4

16. Assigning more responsibilities and force structure to the RC will increase the force imbalance and increase the risk.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	45	89	13	16	1
USAR	0	7	1	3	1
ARNG	1	3	3	2	0
USAF	2	7	2	2	1
USN/CG	0	5	1	1	0
USMC	0	5	3	0	1
CIV	1	8	2	0	1
IF	1	3	0	3	0
TOTAL	50	127	25	27	5

17. The RC force has grown about 40% during the 1980's (ARNG has grown 24% and USAR has grown 47%). More RC growth must be balanced against the demographic trends in the US and in regions of the US where RC growth is anticipated.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	31	87	44	2	2
USAR	3	8	1	0	0
ARNG	5	2	1	1	0
USAF	0	9	3	2	0
USN/CG	0	3	4	0	0
USMC	2	3	3	1	0
CIV	3	5	4	0	0
IF	1	4	2	0	0
TOTAL	45	121	62	6	2

18. A new philosophy for force structuring is required to create a smaller, more balanced, capable Total Force among the Active, N.G., and USAR, when considering Cbt, CS, and CSS units.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	61	84	5	8	0
USAR	8	2	0	2	0
ARNG	3	6	0	0	0
USAF	3	9	2	1	0
USN/CG	2	3	2	0	0
USMC	2	6	1	0	0
CIV	9	2	1	0	0
IF	3	3	1	0	0
TOTAL	91	115	12	11	0

19. The key element in all AC/RC force structure decisions must be the ability of the RC unit to reach and maintain an adequate readiness level in the areas of manning, training, equipping.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	68	83	4	5	1
USAR	4	8	0	0	0
ARNG	6	2	0	1	0
USAF	3	8	3	0	0
USN/CG	1	4	2	0	0
USMC	1	7	1	0	0
CIV	4	6	2	0	0
IF	4	2	1	0	0
TOTAL	91	120	13	6	1

20. Once a decision is reached to place a unit in the RC it must be adequately resourced.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	84	69	7	3	0
USAR	10	2	0	0	0
ARNG	9	0	0	0	0
USAF	2	3	1	0	0
USN/CG	3	3	1	0	0
USMC	0	8	1	0	0
CIV	4	8	0	0	0
IF	5	1	0	1	0
TOTAL	117	94	10	4	0

21. Significantly changing the current AC/RC force structure balance now would be premature and result in unacceptable risk.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	15	42	36	54	16
USAR	2	3	3	2	2
ARNG	0	4	0	5	0
USAF	1	3	3	5	2
USN/CG	2	0	1	3	1
USMC	0	2	1	4	0
CIV	1	2	5	4	0
IF	2	0	0	5	0
TOTAL	23	56	49	82	21

22. The defense posture of the US would be improved by providing adequate resources to the existing RC forces and using the dollars saved by AC force structure cuts to fully resource a smaller more capable AC force.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	39	69	26	23	4
USAR	4	6	0	2	0
ARNG	4	3	0	2	0
USAF	2	8	3	1	0
USN/CG	1	0	2	4	0
USMC	0	4	2	3	0
CIV	3	5	2	2	0
IF	3	1	2	1	0
TOTAL	56	96	37	38	4

23. There is no standard criteria in DOD for implementing the Total Force Policy, specifically deciding which roles, missions, and type units will be AC and which will be RC.

SURVEY ANSWERS	A	B	C	D	E
AC	24	58	66	15	1
USAR	4	7	1	0	0
ARNG	1	2	2	3	1
USAF	3	4	5	2	0
USN/CG	0	1	4	2	0
USMC	2	4	3	0	0
CIV	2	3	7	0	0
IF	0	2	4	0	1
TOTAL	36	80	92	22	3

24. The heavy reliance on the RC today for CS (58%) and CSS (70%) units to make up the Total Force results in our incurring a considerable risk.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	71	72	6	13	0
USAR	4	7	1	0	0
ARNG	2	4	0	3	0
USAF	3	5	3	3	0
USN/CG	3	4	0	0	0
USMC	5	2	1	0	1
CIV	6	3	2	0	1
IF	0	2	2	2	1
TOTAL	91	99	15	21	3

25. The "One Army Concept" is bankrupt. It is a "shell game" played by Army force planners to try to satisfy all the requirements with a limited amount of resources.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	42	61	18	37	7
USAR	4	1	1	5	1
ARNG	1	0	0	6	2
USAF	4	3	4	3	0
USN/CG	1	4	1	1	0
USMC	1	6	2	0	0
CIV	5	1	4	2	2
IF	0	3	2	2	0
TOTAL	58	79	32	56	12

26. RC force structure should account for no more than 33% of the total Army, and should be fully resourced and trained.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	18	42	41	56	9
USAR	0	1	3	3	5
ARNG	1	1	0	7	0
USAF	2	1	6	4	1
USN/CG	0	1	3	2	1
USMC	0	4	3	1	1
CIV	1	2	5	3	1
IF	1	0	1	5	0
TOTAL	23	52	62	81	18

27. Army force planners should clearly identify the shortfalls in the difference between the Current Force and the Program Force to the JCS, DOD, and Congress. We should quit playing the "shell game".

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	75	70	14	2	0
USAR	9	2	1	0	0
ARNG	2	4	2	1	0
USAF	5	8	1	0	0
USN/CG	3	3	3	0	0
USMC	2	5	1	1	0
CIV	7	3	2	0	0
IF	2	2	2	1	0
TOTAL	105	97	26	5	0

28. Force structure decisions should be "driven" by the national military strategy, however it appears that in the current environment of deficit reductions, our force structure mix is decided by budgetary considerations.

SURVEY ANSWERS:	A	B	C	D	E
AC	92	61	5	4	0
USAR	8	3	0	1	0
ARNG	3	5	0	0	1
USAF	6	4	3	1	0
USN/CG	4	2	1	0	0
USMC	5	2	1	1	0
CIV	5	5	2	0	0
IF	1	4	0	2	0
TOTAL	124	86	12	9	1

NOTE:

IF = International Fellow

USN/CG = The response from the one Coast Guard student in the class were included with the responses received from the Navy students.