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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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FM 19-40: Enemy Prisoners of War,  
Civilian Internees and Detained Persons;

Doctrine in Need of Revision - Anyone Listening? Anyone Care?

An Individual Study Project Intended for Publication

by

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U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
2 April 1990

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE   |                       | READ INSTRUCTIONS<br>BEFORE COMPLETING FORM                 |
|---|-----------------------|---|
| 1. REPORT NUMBER  | 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. | 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER                               |
| 4. TITLE (and Subtitle)<br>"FM 19-40: Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons; Doctrine in Need of Revision - Any Listening? Anyone Care?"  |                       | 6. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED<br>Study Project         |
| 7. AUTHOR(s)<br>Lieutenant Colonel H. Paul Mansky   |                       | 5. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER                            |
| 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS<br>U.S. Army War College<br>Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050  |                       | 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)                              |
| 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS<br>Same   |                       | 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS |
| 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)   |                       | 12. REPORT DATE<br>2 April 1990                             |
|   |                       | 13. NUMBER OF PAGES<br>42                                   |
|   |                       | 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)<br>Unclassified        |
|   |                       | 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE                  |
| 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)<br><br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.  |                       |   |
| 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)  |                       |   |
| 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   |                       |   |
| 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)  |                       |   |
| 20a. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)<br><br>Historically, prisoners of war have placed tremendous burdens on capturing units and logistical systems. Numerous World War I and II after-action reports cite the lack of planning for enemy prisoners of war (EPW) operations as a major shortfall. Such planning failures had the very real potential of adversely affecting the outcome of several decisive battles and campaigns. With very minor differences, today's enemy prisoners of war doctrine is but<br><br>(continued) |                       |   |

## 20. ABSTRACT--Continued.

a carry-over of the World War II experience. "Doctrine in Need of Revision - Anyone Listening, Anyone Care?" is a critical review of today's EPW doctrine as contained in FM 19-40. Through selected points of argument, the study critically examines areas in conflict: the compatibility of EPW doctrine to the Airland Battle; our inability to execute the EPW mission under current doctrine without significant degradation of other essential missions; the need for innovative solutions to the problems that are not parochial, but serve the betterment of the whole; the recognition that there are major disconnects between the prime players in the EPW arena--Military Police, Military Intelligence, Transportation, and the Health Services; and lastly, the identification of force structure shortfalls that impact on EPW operations in the corps and division.

The study examines significant doctrinal voids and disconnects, provides possible alternatives, and strives to stimulate individual thought on the subject. The terminal objective of the study is to solicit support of its conclusion that today's EPW doctrine is not compatible with the Army of the 1990s, and that FM 19-40 is in need of revision.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: H. Paul Mansky, LTC, MP

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FORMAT: Individual Study Project Intended for Publication

DATE: 2 April 1990 PAGES: 35 Unclassified

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INTRODUCTION

The intent of this study project is to review current Army doctrine as it applies to the security and movement of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) from the division through the corps rear boundary. This paper will use the European non-nuclear environment as the base scenario, since it is from that environment most if not all of the data was generated which led to the doctrine contained in FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons. Without doubt, the analysis will generate far more questions than provide answers. It is precisely for that reason, the existence of more questions than answers, that this project was undertaken. Furthermore, it is the intent of this project to define significant voids and uncertainties in our current doctrine which will support the premise that a critical review of FM 19-40 and other supporting manuals is needed to bring them in line with today's AirLand Battle doctrine, force structures, and unit capabilities - thus applying some answers to many of the questions that exist today.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO THE CORPS - AN OVERVIEW

MP Missions

The AirLand Battle places tremendous demands on all of our units and systems. Military police are no exception. Current doctrine has the military police performing four primary missions. The first mission, battlefield circulation control

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(BCC), is in its simplest definition assisting in the movement of units, supplies, people, and equipment within and through the corps, from its rear boundary through the brigade support areas (BSA) in the divisions.

The second mission, the enemy prisoner of war operation, is intense in manpower, material, and logistical support, and historically has placed heavy burdens on commanders, units, and support systems. EPW operations are both critical and complex. They must be carefully planned and executed to minimize the demands on combat units and our overtaxed combat support systems.

The third mission, area security, includes area reconnaissance, security of critical facilities and personnel (including designated units and headquarters), intelligence collection, and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) detection and reporting. Additionally, in the early 1980's, it was decided by the Army that the military police would also be given, as part of fulfilling their area security mission, a significant role in finding, fixing, and defeating level I and II Soviet threats in the corps area. Level III threats, being beyond military capability to defeat, were to be primarily the mission of combat forces.<sup>1</sup> However, significant doubt exists as to the availability of combat forces to react readily to such incursions. Therefore, as an interim measure, the military police are expected to engage level III threats by way of non-decisive delaying actions until the appropriate combat power can be applied. With this new and explicit direct action role, the

military police assume a tremendous responsibility that dictates the rapid assembly of forces, extensive and timely communications demands, and the ability to effectively conduct limited ground combat operations. In concept and in practice, it is a mission requirement jeopardized by the very nature of military police doctrine which requires dispersal of its forces throughout the entire corps area of operations, to include the division rear.

The fourth mission, law and order, has minimal impact on military police support capabilities. The requirements for this mission are most often met while performing the other three.

### Priorities

An important point to remember is that all missions are conducted concurrently. The priority of effort applied towards the four missions is dictated by the corps and division commander in his guidance to the MP brigade commander or division Provost Marshal. However, as battlefield circumstances develop, priorities initially established will frequently change. The priority of effort is molded by the vision of the corps and division commander based on how he intends to fight the battle.

For instance in the XVIII Airborne Corps, the only contingency corps in the United States Army, the commander places EPW operations as the top priority, especially during the forced entry phase. The opposite of that was found in III Corps, where past corps commanders placed the priority of military police effort on battlefield circulation control. Different still are the corps commanders in Europe. One places equal importance on area security and battlefield circulation control, while the

other has gone so far as to make the MP brigade commander the Rear Battle Captain.<sup>2</sup> Regardless which mission or missions have initial priority of effort, military police units are expected to continuously perform all four missions.

### Capabilities Questioned

Like artillery, military police forces are not held in reserve to counter a surge in requirements generated by the ebb and flow of battle. It is because area security, battlefield circulation control, and EPW operations are so manpower intensive and conducted over such a large geographical area that serious doubt is placed on the ability of the MP to perform simultaneously all four missions in support of the AirLand Battle.<sup>3</sup>


Airland Battle doctrine has dictated that all branches of the Army closely review how to best support the battle while simultaneously facing both greater battlefield requirements and a reduction in the Combat Service Support and the Combat Support force structure. The Army and the Military Police School have extensively analyzed battlefield circulation control and area security operations. Their efforts have paid off with innovative ways to do more with less, including the fielding of equipment suitable to the missions. However, military police capability to perform in war all four missions, and most importantly the "big three", is to this day highly questionable.



MP ORGANIZATION IN SUPPORT OF THE DIVISION AND CORPS


Division MP Company

Prior to the implementation of force structure reorganization under the Army of Excellence (AOE), the Division 86 military police company was organized as shown in Figure 1.<sup>4</sup> As Figure 1a shows, AOE reduced the 19217J200 Military Police Company by twenty-nine spaces. Twenty-seven of the spaces came from the general support (GS) platoons, reducing the company capability by one GS platoon. It is important to remember that it is the GS platoon that performs the bulk of the EPW operations within the division.



**PRE-AOE HEAVY DIVISION MP COMPANY (TOE 19217J200)**


**FIGURE 1**



## POST AOE HEAVY DIVISION MP COMPANY (TOE 19217J400)

FIGURE 1a

The basic employment of the division MP Company calls for each maneuver brigade to receive, in a direct support role, one MP platoon. The division Provost Marshal retains the GS platoons in the division rear and employs them in an area support role. Figure 2 illustrates their typical employment.



## TYPICAL EMPLOYMENT OF A DIVISION MP COMPANY

FIGURE 2

In the light divisions it is normal to have two less GS platoons than in the AOE heavy division. What must be remembered when considering MP personnel in the divisions are the disparities in strengths between the AOE heavy company (9-0-144=153) and the AOE light division company (6-0-75=81). While AOE did not specifically mandate which MP organizations would lose space authorizations, analysis often led to the decision to reduce division MP company strength. The rationale used to justify these reductions was based on the premise that sufficient corps military police force structure existed which would allow habitual forward support to those AOE divisions now devoid of 53 enlisted personnel (TOE 19-17H710 AIM vs AOE TOE 19-217J400 HVY). The loss of 53 spaces equates to the loss of over two

platoons in the division MP company prior to AOE reorganization. However, in retrospect and after a period of living with the AOE organization, it is apparent that detailed consideration was not given to the full spectrum of MP requirements facing the corps military police.

Possibly the biggest factor not considered in sufficient detail was the force requirements necessary to satisfy the tremendous EPW burden faced by the division and corps commander. This should not be totally surprising, since Division 86 reorganization took six years to design, and TRADOC was given 90 days to establish the AOE organization.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of AOE it became the rule, as opposed to the exception, to push forward a corps MP company in a direct support role to each committed division. AOE analysis did not consider in a realistic context the void created in the corps area by the requirement to habitually provide divisions a corps military police company. At the USAWC recently, a speaker from force development in the Pentagon equated the workload generated by a committed division to the support capabilities of one corps MP battalion. To complicate this situation further, no additional force structure is being added to the MP brigade supporting the corps. Meanwhile, the brigade commanders' missions have expanded significantly, especially in light of the direct action role associated with the rear battle.


#### **Corps MP Brigade and Battalions**

Doctrinally, each corps is supported by one MP brigade composed of up to five battalions. Each battalion has from two to

five MP companies. The composition of companies varies. Most often they are MP Combat Support Companies (TOE 19-77) with an AOE strength of 5-0-171=176. There are circumstances when a battalion has mixed company TOEs. This is usually an exception, however, as most battalion companies at corps level are primarily of the 19-77 combat support vintage.

The mission of the MP Bde is to perform the four MP missions already discussed. They perform these missions throughout the entire corps area, providing adequate support to each division to ensure its mission capabilities are not degraded as a result of insufficient MP support. For this reason it is not unusual to find an MP battalion positioned directly behind each committed division with one MP company deployed or prepared to deploy on order to the division in support of their operations. An MP brigade supporting a three division corps is doctrinally deployed most often in the manner depicted at Figure 3.

When reviewing Figure 3, what must be kept in mind are the dimensions associated with a corps area of operations. Considerations such as terrain, enemy activity, trafficability, congestion, refugees, battle clutter, damage, human endurance, time distance factors, and all the other realities and consequences of war must be held in perspective. Movements within and through a corps area of operations (AO) will be time consuming, dangerous, complicated, frustrating, and confusing.



**TYPICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE CORPS MP BDE**

FIGURE 3

## FM 19-40: DOCTRINE IN QUESTION

### Facing the Problem


The control, care, and movement of EPWs is not generally regarded by commanders and soldiers as a mission filled with the glamour and excitement of war. Yet it is a problem that is as much a part of war as the soldier himself. United States history has shown that in every conflict prisoners of war have placed tremendous burdens on tactical and support commanders. Yet in virtually every war we have fought, EPW operations have taken on the appearance of an unexpected event. For example, Third U.S. Army's After Action Report shows they processed 765,483 EPWs from 1 August 1944 through 8 May 1945. The availability of MP units was woefully inadequate. As a result military police units were reinforced with field artillery and tank destroyer battalions.<sup>6</sup>

In my analysis of FM 19-40, I will highlight what I perceive to be some of the major examples of doctrinal disconnects that create the abyss between FM 19-40 and current Army doctrine applicable to the AirLand Battle. I will be quick to point out my perception that our greatest failure in EPW doctrine lies in the absence of coordination between branches responsible for formulating and fielding innovative EPW doctrine in the division and corps that is realistic and consistent with unit capabilities and the demands of today's and tomorrow's battlefield.

### Movement and Control of EPW

Fundamentally, the problem facing today's EPW doctrine lies in those procedures necessary to affect their control, and rapid

movement out of the division and corps area. Figure 4 illustrates which MP units are responsible for the movement of EPW at each echelon.



**ECHELONS RESPONSIBLE FOR EPW MOVEMENT**

**FIGURE 4**



While the illustration at Figure 4 looks easy enough, the realities associated with the movement of literally thousands of sick, wounded, diseased, and disheartened soldiers becomes extremely complicated at the time of execution. Scarce transportation assets, military intelligence requirements, and finite military police resources are the three primary reasons the expectation of expeditious movement of EPWs will not occur. The degree of complication is heightened even more in the absence of workable plans and coordinated doctrine clearly understood by all.

### Planning Considerations

Military planners are trained to consider all the factors that have both positive and negative impact on future operations. Why, then, in our planning and training do we habitually fail to consider the impact battlefield success will have on our ability to sustain the momentum? Is it not possible that a decisive operation may lose its momentum because we neglected to consider the consequences of success? What a shame it would be to have to grind to a halt because we failed to plan for the disposition of EPWs. Is that thought any less worthy of consideration than planning for fuel or ammunition? The end results are the same-- momentum is lost!

What are the alternatives? Disarm the EPW and turn them loose with directions? Divert scarce and critical forces to secure EPWs, or follow the thinking of some who advocate prisoners will not be a consideration at such moments of

importance? I refer the latter form of thinking to AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War: Administrative, Employment and Compensation, which stipulates that responsibility begins "from the moment of capture, and cannot be waived due to combat imperative or enemy provocation." Failure to meet this responsibility is a "serious and punishable violation" under the UCMJ. If this is not sufficient motivation, I am sure future leaders will read of their final disposition as we today read of General Yamashita and others who faced post-war tribunals for their war crimes.

To the commander, not one of the above alternatives is acceptable because they all work against him. Yet there are countless examples where commanders have had to divert significant forces to secure EPWs. In WWII, "the 106th Infantry Division had about forty thousand soldiers assigned to prisoner of war guard duties."<sup>7</sup> The irony is that the same problems have occurred numerous times in every major war yet we fail to learn from the book of "lessons learned."

So where do we start? I propose that the first step is to inculcate the EPW equation in our mental planning just as we do other factors that influence the battle. One elementary but effective way to do that is to add another letter to the factors of mission, enemy, troops, terrain and time available (METT-T). That sixth letter would be "S" for sustainability. Let's get accustomed to asking what factors will adversely impact upon our ability to sustain the effort. I submit captured enemy soldiers

and their potential intelligence value will surface high on the list of considerations embraced by the sustainability factor.

The EPW problem is not faced solely by the maneuver commander. Control, accountability, security, and movement of EPWs only begins to solidify into the workable realm when they have finally been turned over to COMMZ EPW units. In the COMMZ the force structure exists which can very effectively handle EPW operations, even though of the 47 EPW units in the force structure only six, four Guard Companies and two Escort Guard Companies are active. The remaining 41 are in the National Guard and Army Reserve.<sup>8</sup> However, regardless when these units enter the theater, the corps commander is faced with the certainty he will have to deal with an EPW population that historically has been numbering in the thousands. How does he safeguard, control, exploit (interrogate), and expeditiously move these prisoners out of the corps to the COMMZ camps? Using today's doctrine he simply cannot expeditiously move such numbers.

#### **The Problem of Movement**

The availability of transportation, the most critical asset to ensure expeditious movement, is in such great demand and in such short supply that any realist can clearly see EPW movement is going to be relegated to an afterthought. Consider that a Light Truck Company has sixty five-ton cargo trucks. Using a 75% operational readiness (OR) rate, this unit can move on a line

haul, using two shifts, 3,600 passengers or 540 short tons (STON) of cargo.<sup>9</sup> To resupply an armored division in a seven-day, 350 kilometer-deep attack, a total of almost 27,000 STON of supplies is required. Class IV alone calls for 2,007 STON per day.<sup>10</sup> Can a commander afford to relinquish cargo space for 540 STONS just to move vanquished soldiers? More often than not, the allocation nod will go to the movement of critical cargo.

Some would be quick to point out that there are other forms of transportation that I have not considered, such as air, rail, and footmarching. FM 19-40 clearly recognizes these as viable means of moving EPW and encourages the maximum use of all available modes. However, after considering all factors associated with each mode, I submit truck movement will remain the primary means of transporting the EPW. I hold this belief for the following reasons:

- Aircraft, because of their criticality, relative small numbers, operational cost, and vulnerability will be used primarily for high pay-off missions. Allocation of aircraft for EPW moves will be the exception and not the rule. Planners should consider their use but not on a routine basis.

- Rail transportation is the ideal conveyance to move the EPW. Unfortunately, trains and their track systems are both high on the enemy's target list and are extremely vulnerable to air and other forms of interdiction. We should anticipate frequent and major disruptions of the rail system, thus negating their availability, especially in the division and corps. Unlike trucks, trains cannot extemporaneously negotiate obstacles placed

in their path.

- The footmarch is the least desirable method of evacuating EPW. Footmarching is guard intensive, logistically heavy, extremely time consuming, hard to control, and potentially disruptive to the flow of our own vital supplies. For those reasons, movement by marching is considered only as a last resort. Figure 5 serves to illustrate the doctrinal points where military police have contact with the EPW during the evacuation flow.




FIGURE 5

**EPW in Medical Channels**

It should be noted that military police are not shown to be

in the medical evacuation channels. FM 19-40 addresses the issue by saying, "PW guards are provided from other than medical or medical service personnel as prescribed by the SOP of the appropriate command."

FM 19-4 tries a more direct approach by saying, "Because only seriously wounded are placed in medical channels, no MP guards are needed." Both attempts to extricate military police from this task find little support from realistic observers, including the Health Services Command.

The FM 19-40 approach is destined to lead to the doorstep of the military police. After all who, by doctrine, is responsible for EPW control, security, and movement? What commander would detail in SOPs other MOS personnel to perform this task? Reading further into FM 19-40, we find that it specifically tasks the MP brigade commander to provide "...guard support to divisions for evacuation of PW in either routine or medical channels."

There is a third approach taken by FM 19-1 which envisions only gravely wounded EPW in medical channels. Both FM 19-1 and 19-4 dismiss entirely EPW captured that are diseased, sick, and/or suffering from varying degrees of battle stress. Undoubtedly, such prisoners will enter medical channels, and hospital commanders will, without question, need guards to protect his facilities, other patients, and staff personnel.<sup>11</sup> For military police not to plan for such commitments seriously distorts our capacity to visualize when, where, and how we will

will support battlefield requirements.

The guard matter has risen to such a level of concern in the Health Services Command that they are actively seeking recognition of the requirement in doctrine or through TOE revisions to authorize military police in certain medical units.<sup>12</sup> With these concerns in mind, any rewrite of FM 19-40 and other manuals would undoubtedly have to address in a non-contradictory manner specifically who, if anyone, will provide guard support to wartime medical facilities.

### Division MP Limitations

At the maneuver unit level, the first military police contact with the EPW occurs at the brigade rear (BSA), where they operate a very austere forward collection point. It is beyond military police capability to habitually operate forward of the BSA for two reasons. First, their mobility is limited by wheeled vehicles and, secondly, they lack light armor protection, especially for the exposed machine gunner. MP vehicles (HMMWVs) do not provide ballistic protection against 7.62 and 5.56mm projectiles. Additionally, they lack sufficient mobility to allow them to keep up with and relieve the combat units of the EPW burden.<sup>13</sup> Thus a fundamental, but significant, weakness exists in our equipment allocation at division level.

The above equipment shortcomings have two implications. First, it necessitates that the EPW be brought to the forward collecting point by soldiers from the capturing unit, thus taking forces and equipment away from their primary mission. Secondly, the commander is compelled to expeditiously move the EPW from

harm's way by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, STANAG 2044 and AR 190-8. As stated previously, it is a matter of responsibility devoid of combat imperatives or enemy provocation.

### Interrogation Problems

Unlike the division, the corps has two major problems that negate the expeditious movement of EPW. The first problem is common to both: reliance on scarce transportation support to move the EPW. The second problem, EPW intelligence interrogation, is predominately a corps problem, generated by the battlefield imperative that timely and accurate intelligence is essential. To acquire such information, military intelligence interrogation units are doctrinally co-located at the corps cage where they screen all EPWs and select from the screenings those considered worthy of interrogation. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, states that screening must be conducted at every echelon to determine which sources can best be exploited in order to satisfy the commander's need for timely information of intelligence value. During WWII, the Germans learned quickly that Soviet PWs were more willing to give reliable and accurate information when they were still overcome with the depression of being captured.<sup>14</sup>

In regard to the interrogation process, FM 19-40 simply states "...only MI personnel interrogate EPWs, that interrogation cannot jeopardize EPW safety, and that any special transportation for priority EPWs is the intelligence officer's responsibility." However, FM 34-52 states, "The senior interrogator coordinates



with the military police to ensure that the site is set up to enable operations between the interrogation operations and the holding area." It continues by saying, "...the interrogation operation is located within the secure perimeter of the holding area and that the interrogation element's mission does not include providing for its own perimeter security." Lastly, FM 34-52 expects guards to accompany EPWs throughout the interrogation process.

In contrast FM 19-4 states, "MI interrogates prisoners at a location near the collecting/holding point." It continues with "...the interrogator may request a guard. A guard should be provided if assets are available." The conflict of expectations contained in these three manuals is but another example of the labyrinth of uncertainties that surround today's EPW doctrine.

While screening EPW serves an undeniably valuable purpose for the military police, it adds yet another obstacle in the path of rapid movement of the EPW to the COMMZ. Combined with the absence of reliable and sporadic transportation support, the addition of the MI screening and interrogation process leads to the conclusion that the corps cage can expect to routinely maintain a significant EPW population. The impact of such a buildup brings with it many implied tasks and missions that were not envisioned when the doctrine in FM 19-40 was initially fielded.

#### **Corps Holding Area**

FM 19-4, Military Police Team, Squad, Platoon, Combat Operations (which incidently does a better job than FM 19-40 at

trying to articulate EPW doctrine on the "how to" level), states, "Corps EPW holding areas, like division collection points, are only intended to hold prisoners temporarily." However, it goes on to say, "...but at Corps Military Police must:

- Receipt for each prisoner, his documents and equipment.

- Provide medical treatment.

- Take necessary sanitation measures at the processing area.

- Provide bathing facilities if available.

- Provide clothing, food and water.

- Make prisoners available to MI for screening and interrogation.

- Acquire necessary equipment and supplies to operate a holding area.

- Select holding areas with shelters for EPWs from artillery, mortar or air strikes.

- Delouse each prisoner and disinfect his clothing.

- Acquire additional tents to be used as a receiving and processing area."

#### **Processing - Yet to be Defined**

The last requirement of FM 19-40 implies corps military police must "process" the EPW. However, FM 19-40 nor 19-4 articulate what processing really means at the corps level. The ambiguity of "process" invariably leads to individual interpretation. As I have observed personally, interpretation leads to unnecessary requirements such as photographing, fingerprinting, ID card make-up, clothing exchange and issuing of unauthorized PW numbers, all of which are specific functions

assigned to and better carried out at the PW Camp organizations found in the COMMZ. It is appalling to have this critical issue so ill defined that solutions are left to the personality on the spot. Some commanders may respond to the challenge, others may not. Regardless, in either case there are too many variables which are unfamiliar and which have not been addressed by coherent and consistent doctrine.

### Evolution of The Mini-Camp

After reviewing some of the expectations of the MP unit performing the corps EPW mission, there is little doubt that the term temporary holding facility has conflicting meaning in FM 19- and FM 19-40. Realizing the magnitude of the constraints opposing expeditious movement of the EPW to the COMMZ, most MP brigade commanders have resigned themselves to the fact that the corps holding area has in reality evolved into a modified "mini-camp". It is because of this mini-camp problem at corps that new and innovative ways to cope with the situation must be explored.

## WAYS TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

### Available Force Structure

Since the movement of the EPW is the most significant problem, solutions should be focusing on ways to minimize the demands we place on our sparse and vital transport assets and still relieve the commander of the EPW burden. One possible approach would be to doctrinally "legitimize" a mini-camp at the corps level. As a means to create this mini-camp, it would first be necessary to examine closely the military police force


structure in the COMMZ. Close scrutiny will very likely result in a concept that calls for elements from the MP EPW brigade (COMMZ) to be pushed forward in a cellular TOE building-block manner to support the corps MP brigade. The force structure to support this concept exists today. There are MP Guard Companies and MP Escort Guard companies that can be pushed to the corps to guard and escort the EPW.

There are also other TOEs such as 19646L200, MP Battalion EPW/CI, whose mission is to provide administration and logistical support for the operation of an EPW/CI enclosure. This particular organization has the capability to manage up to 2,000 EPW/CIs. There are still others that can manage up to 4,000. The point is that under today's doctrine no serious consideration is given to pushing them forward to help relieve the pressure on the corps. We simply cannot afford to operate, as FM 19-40 suggests by omission, under the concept that once the EPW unit colors are planted in the COMMZ that that is where they will stay for the duration.

#### COMMZ Support Forward

Given the assumption we intend to win the war, it is reasonable to expect that divisions and corps will advance, thereby lengthening, not reducing, air and land lines of communications (LOC). It is certainly not to our advantage to have our EPW camps grow further from the corps holding area as each day of the war passes. Using the push-forward method, selected elements of the COMMZ EPW Brigade would advance with the corps. Eventually an entire MP EPW/CI Battalion would displace.

It is reasonable to expect their displacement would be to the corps holding area, where they would expand the existing facility to the point it would eventually evolve into a full camp or multiple camps as required. Figure 6 illustrates this concept.



### COMMZ EPW BDE FORWARD SUPPORT OF THE CORPS

FIGURE 6

To implement this concept would require close and continuous coordination between the corps and COMMZ brigade commands. It is envisioned that the COMMZ brigade commander would be responsible for coordinating, through Theater assets, logistical support to expand the corps holding area into a future camp. Additionally, doctrine between the Military Police Corps and the Transportation Corps should agree that EPW transport vehicles would come from COMMZ assets, as opposed to current doctrine which requires the losing unit (corps) to provide transportation.<sup>15</sup>

#### Benefits of Forward Support

By pushing elements of COMMZ assets forward to the corps holding area to perform guard, escort, and processing duties, the following benefits are realized:

- The demand on transportation assets is reduced significantly. However, the problem is not totally eliminated as the EPW must still be moved from the division to corps.

- MI literature consistently stresses the importance of the fatigue factor during the screening and interrogation process. A reduction of the time constraints will lessen the strain on MI interrogation personnel to accomplish the screening and interrogation process.

- The concept allows for processing by personnel equipped and trained to perform such functions.

- It would reduce the land lines of communications between the corps EPW and COMMZ EPW operations. Corps MP need only concern themselves with movement distances from division to corps, not to the COMMZ. COMMZ assets would come forward to

escort EPWs to the Theater camps.

- It would provide the corps MP brigade commander the flexibility to support unexpected surges in capture rates, as well as allow him the latitude to establish forward holding areas as the corps advances.

- The concept allows for critically short corps MP assets to be available to concentrate on other vital missions.

It takes one corps combat support MP company to guard up to 2,000 EPW in a holding area having adequate facilities.<sup>16</sup> If the figure of 2,000 EPWs appears excessive and unrealistic, reflect back to Grenada, where 700 plus detainees were handled. More recently, during Operation Just Cause in Panama, several thousand detainees were processed. Both of these operations are not worthy of comparison to a NATO theater, where EPW numbers will reach the hundreds of thousands. Yet, FMs (19-1 and 19-4) consistently depict the corps EPW holding area being managed by a platoon size element. This is a concept totally void of any contact with reality.

#### **EPW Validation Exercise**

To add support to the above statement, I refer to an EPW exercise conducted at Fort Bragg in January 1989. It was the objective of this exercise to validate the tasks, personnel, and logistical requirements necessary to implement a contingency corps EPW holding area as expressed in Field Circular (FC) 19-115, EPW Contingency Operations.<sup>17</sup> This exercise, dubbed "EPW SOP Validation Exercise," replicated in every degree possible the requirements set forth in FC 19-115. Appendix A depicts the

physical layout of the holding facility and the material support requirements necessary to support a population of 250 EPWs. For the propose of comparison Appendix B is the actual configuration that was used during the exercise.

The exercise was conducted over a two day period but planning covered two months. Personnel from two military police companies were used as EPWs and detainees. The total EPWs/detainees exceeded 250. One MP company was used for exterior and interior guard as well as escorts from the division collection points. The Battalion Headquarters Detachment and the battalion staff were responsible for processing the EPW in accordance with the FC 19-115 requirements. The processing tent was configured in accordance with the FC and all teams were organized to perform the functions as shown at Appendix C.

A Military Intelligence Interrogation unit also participated in the exercise. The inclusion of MI was not an FC 19-115 consideration. However, in concert with current MP and MI doctrine, they were included and established their operation within the secure perimeter of the holding area.

Food service support was provided by the mess section of the MP company conducting the interior and exterior security functions. This section fed the prisoners, company personnel, and the battalion staff.

Medical personnel performed sanitation inspections and conducted sick call twice daily. A Red Cross representative visited the site and rendered a report on compliance with moral



and sanitation standards. The only function called for by the FC not included in the exercise was the field shower unit, which was not available.

### Lessons Learned

As a result of this exercise it was determined:

- FC 19-115 is an excellent source document to use in the operation of a holding compound. It is also the best starting point from which a "how to do it" FM 19-40 can evolve.

- The exercise showed that for planning purposes it will take, as a minimum, one military police company to operate the internal and external control and security requirements of a holding area so described in the FC.

- The exercise demonstrated that processing procedures are extremely time consuming and manpower intense. Only 93 prisoners were processed in twenty-four hours.

- MI expectations in regard to prisoner access are demanding and disruptive. Prisoners going to various levels of interrogation required separate guards. The exercise used linguists to include bilingual prisoners. The reliance on linguists from outside the battalion greatly impaired processing and the expeditious movement of the EPW through the process.

- The inclusion of the MI element within the secure perimeter expanded its dimensions and increased personnel requirements. MI personnel held to their doctrine which excludes them from performing their own perimeter security.

- The equipment requirements to support this exercise far exceeded the TOE assets of the MP Battalion. The G4 1st Corps

Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps stated they, too, would be hard pressed to provide the necessary equipment to supply the interior requirements of the holding area.

- The battalion staff would not be capable of conducting an operation of this size while concurrently managing other MP missions such as area security and battlefield circulation control. It was basically a function of not enough personnel to run the operation continuously. The S1, S2, and S4 were particularly hard pressed. However, augmentation from COMMZ EPW units would free the battalion staff to the degree it could manage all the functions necessary to control and support the other three military police missions.

There were, of course, many other valuable lessons learned from this exercise. However, for the purposes of this paper, there are two highly significant lessons generated from the above points. First, that operating a holding area resembling the specifications in FC 19-115, in any environment, will be a major undertaking. Secondly, there will be significant differences between operating a holding area in a NATO environment and operating one under low intensity, contingency conditions. The differences in a contingency environment lie primarily in the narrow logistical base available to support the MP and in the fact there will seldom, if ever, be a higher echelon to accept the detainees. In contingency operations, once the detainees are incarcerated, military police will retain them until final disposition can be made via release, repatriation, or death.

## THE FINAL ANALYSIS

It is obvious from what has been examined that there are a multitude of disconnects, oversights, and omissions that clearly indicate today's EPW doctrine is not prepared to support the Army of the 1990's and beyond.

The time has come for Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Military Police Corps, and other branches with a vested interest in the subject to address jointly EPW doctrine and how it will support the AirLand Battle. In the final analysis it is TRADOC and its branch proponents who must answer the tough questions we now face, and it is they who must bring the big picture into focus. Only through collective participation of all the players can hard analysis and appraisals of the true worth of the issues presented in this study be debated.

### Role of the Military Police School

Without question, the lead for EPW doctrine and the development of FM 19-40 rests with the Military Police School. However, USAMPS is by no means capable of accomplishing the task alone, nor is it licensed to unilaterally levy other branches for the necessary support. Such leverage must come from TRADOC. Doctrine having Army-wide impact cannot be a product molded in a vacuum by the proponent school. The end product must be acted upon by a variety of principal players. In the end, when all the missions and tasks are established and the FM is published, it must suffice as a document which provides current, workable guidance to all appropriate elements of the Army.

Of course, a second order effect of such a capstone manual will be the formulation of bedrock doctrine from which all branches can develop supporting doctrine for inclusion in their functional area field manuals. If this critical path is followed, we can be reasonably assured of an interlocking, doctrinal crosswalk which incorporates missions and tasks based on realistic branch capabilities as opposed to what exists today: a doctrinal labyrinth filled with disconnects, ambiguities, and dead ends.

### The Bottom Line

For the betterment of the whole, we in the Military Police Corps must look to innovative solutions to the problems, even if that means changing some of our institutionalized ways of doing business. The reality being that whatever is decided will have to be done within the context of our existing force structure. That one imperative dictates we question TOE structure at echelons above corps. Are there units that duplicate efforts? Who is over-specialized? Where can we consolidate functions and divert spaces for inclusion somewhere else? Can we CAPSTONE teams and cellular TOEs to battalions? Only the Military Police Corps can provide adequate responses to these questions since they will be the ones who will have to live with the results, pay the eventual price, and fight the next war with them.

The Military Police Corps has in the past lived up to its commitment to support the commander. However, to retain our credibility, what we say we can do must be translated into reliable, competent execution on the battlefield. We have to

acknowledge our limitations and resist the temptation to accept missions simply to legitimize our existence. With EPW operation, law and order, area security, and battlefield circulation control, we already have more missions than we can effectively accomplish.

The Military Police Corps must concentrate on our four missions and develop sound doctrine to support each. Only then can we be confident that we have provided our leaders and soldiers the best "how to" manuals in the United States Army. START WITH FM 19-40, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND DETAINED PERSONS.

### Endnotes

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
16. Consolidated TOE Update (CTU) 8904, Guide to MP Battlefield Organizations, p. 69.















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Appendix A

TEMPORARY HOLDING COMPOUND

CAPACITY 250 EPW



- |   |                                      |   |                         |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|
|  | GP LARGE TENT                        |  | WATER CANS BAGS TRAILER |
|  | GP MEDIUM TENT                       |  | GUARD POST              |
|  | GP SMALL TENT                        |  | MAXIMUM SECURITY CONEX  |
|  | LATRINE                              |  | PROPERTY CONEX          |
|  | SECURITY LIGHTING GENERATORS         |   | BOMB TRENCHES           |
|  | HOLDING COMPOUND LIGHTING GENERATORS |   | 3-ROLL CONCERTINA WIRE  |
|   |                                      |   | 1-ROLL CONCERTINA WIRE  |
|   |                                      |   | GUARD ECC               |



Appendix A

GENERAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR EPW COMPOUNDS

This appendix outlines general support guidelines which may be necessary to provide humane and secure holding of enemy prisoners in U.S. custody. Additionally, it fulfills an obligation of the United States of America as a signatory to the III Geneva Convention of 1949. This obligation is to provide adequate food, water, shelter, and clothing to enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees under US control. This appendix is an extract from FC 19-115; EPW Contingency Operations.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR 250 EPWs FOR 30 DAYS

|                      |  |                   |
|----------------------|--|-------------------|
| FOOD C-RATIONS (MRE) | (250 people, 3 meals x 30=                       | 22,500            |
| MKT-75               | 1 per 250 people                                 |                   |
| Clothing             | First 30 days retain own w/<br>minor replacement |                   |
| *Drinking Water      | 2 qts per day per person                         | 3,750 gals        |
| ***Latrine           | 1 or 2 provided in each area                     |                   |
| Diagram***Showers    | 1 shower head per 10 people                      | 25                |
| Shelter              | 1 GP large per 22 people and<br>support area     | Total 23          |
| Cot/Sleeping Mats    | 1 per person                                     | 250               |
| Toilet Paper         | 1 per 30 days                                    | 3 cases           |
| *Heater              | 2 per GP large                                   | 34                |
| Light Set            | 1 per tent                                       | 23                |
| Generators (5kw)     | 1 per 4 light sets                               | 7                 |
| POL Generators       | oil/MOGAS  | 40/2100G          |
| 55 Gal Drums         | 4 per guard tower, 4twrs                         | 16                |
| *Blankets            | 2 warm/4 med/6 cold                              | 500/1000/<br>1500 |
| **Cooks              | MKT 75 operators                                 | 5                 |
| Soap                 | 4oz, 1000 per case                               | 1                 |
| Towels               | 200 per case                                     | 2                 |
| Shovels              |  | 50                |
| Picks                |  | 50                |
| Hammers              |  | 10                |
| Hoes                 |  | 50                |
| Laundry Detergent    | 8oz per person per wk                            | 500lbs            |

\* Climatic variables


\*\* May be reduced to two with EPW performing the task. However during contingency missions it is recommended that five cooks, MOS 94B, be utilized.

\*\*\* Comment: Close coordination between the contingency force, medical personnel, and the engineers must be made in order to determine the requirements for water (drinking, showers, laundry, and sanitation), medical material (delousing or insect powders, lime, etc.), and fire protection material requirements.

Appendix A

FACILITY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR 250 EPWs

|   |                       |                 |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Barbed Wire Roll                              | 400 meter X 6 =       | 2,400 meters    |
| Concertina Wire                               | 400 meter X 4 =       | 1,600 meters    |
| Fence Post                                    | 2 X 4, 10 foot long   | 30              |
| Flood lights                                  |                       | 15              |
| Spot Lights                                   |                       | 19              |
| Emerg. Generators                             |                       | 2+              |
| Mess Equipment                                | 1 MKT-75 x 250 people | 1               |
| Water Can/Bag                                 |                       | 7 lister        |
|   |                       | 10 5 gal cans   |
| Water Truck                                   | 2 water trailers      | 400 gal each    |
| Public Address system                         |                       | 2               |
| 55 Gal Drums                                  |                       | 25              |
| Latrine Screens (1 per latrine & Search area) |                       | 7               |
| Locks   |                       | 20 (200 series) |
| CONEX (Max security area)                     |                       | 10              |



|  |                |  |   |
|--|----------------|--|---|
|  | 15KW           |  | LIGHT (POLE)  |
|  | 5KW            |  | GUARD<br><small>(ONLY REPRESENTATIVE OF<br/>ARMOR REQUIRED)</small> |
|  | LATRINE        |  | CONNEX  |
|  | LISTER BAG H2O |  |   |
|  | HYGIENE AREA   |  |   |

**NOT TO SCALE**

Appendix C

