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
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THE LIGHT INFANTRY IN A HIGH-INTENSITY COMBAT ENVIRONMENT

COL CHARLES R. HUGGINS, USA

1989

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE LIGHT INFANTRY IN A
HIGH-INTENSITY COMBAT ENVIRONMENT?

by

Charles R. Huggins
Colonel, USA

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor:

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1989

DISCLAIMER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Light Infantry in a High-Intensity Combat Environment?

AUTHOR: Charles R. Huggins, Colonel, USA

The formation of the light infantry division was accompanied by considerable controversy. The controversy was due to the light infantry having the requirement to fight and win in combat environments from low-intensity through high-intensity. The Air War College study examines the light infantry in the central European theater in a high-intensity conflict environment. The numerous operational evaluations, conducted, to assess the light infantry, recognize roles for the light forces in Europe, with proper allowance and augmentation. The concept of "heavy-light mix" has promising potential for success. The employment of light forces in an actual high-intensity environment will provide a true conclusion.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Huggins is from High Springs, Florida, and holds a B.S. degree from Florida State University. As a Army officer, he has served in infantry unit leadership positions from platoon leader up to and including battalion command. He has served in CONUS, Alaska, Egypt, and a combat tour in Vietnam. Colonel Huggins is a graduate of Air War College, Class of 1989.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, General John A. Wickham, Army Chief of Staff, announced the decision to form the new light infantry division.

The light division is organized, equipped and trained to respond to a broad spectrum of conflict environments and a wide array of contingencies. Light infantry focuses on capabilities to defeat light forces in a low-intensity conflict (LIC), while retaining a capability for employment in other scenarios. (10:1)

The light infantry is strategically responsive and requires a vastly reduced number of sorties to deploy. What can light division do in combat and what is its sustainability? That is the kind of question that was posed in regard to the light infantry division.

This study will examine the light infantry's organization, firepower, sustainability, augmentation requirements, and the potential of light infantry to operate with heavy forces in Central Europe.

CHAPTER II
INFANTRY MISSIONS

The United States Army Infantry is divided into three types of infantry: (1) armored infantry; (2) regular infantry; and (3) the light infantry. What do each of these infantries do to fulfill their mission requirements? They obviously have different equipment and personnel authorizations that correspondingly give them potentially different operational capabilities, though they may have overlapping roles and may be task organized to operate together.

Armored Infantry

Armored infantry is designed to operate either mounted or dismounted with the Bradley Infantry Fighting or the M-113 armored personnel carrier. The Bradley is designed to protect and move infantrymen, supported by organic Bradley 50 caliber machine gun, 25 mm chain gun, and the TOW anti-armor system during offensive maneuver in concert with main battle tank units.

Armored infantry is primarily an offensive force, though it possesses an inherent defensive capability. But again, armored infantry operates in conjunction with tanks, providing security with advancing dismounted infantry, suppresses enemy infantry anti-armor weapons systems as tanks maneuver. (9:11)

Regular Infantry

The regular infantry has been a part of our Armed Forces since colonial days. The regular infantry may be provided with a variety of mobility assets, but it fights dismounted. (9:12)

Though lacking the armored vehicles of an armored infantry unit, the density of wheeled vehicles in combat, combat support, and combat service support, coupled with over 18,000 soldiers, constitute a significant requirement for strategic deployment assets

Given suitable restrictive terrain, such as heavily forested areas, built-up urban zones, and other forms of mobility inhibitors, the regular infantry is a formidable defensive force against any form of enemy.

Offensively, the regular infantry is capable of breaching fortified positions and developing an initial penetration for tank heavy units to exploit.

The key to regular infantry employment is limit the exposure of their tactical vehicles to combat roles, ensure they are employed in terrain which restricts enemy mobility; allowing for a mobile counter attack force in the form of tanks, attack helicopters, etc., and recognizing regular infantry has a limited mobility and sustainment capability.

Light Infantry

The light infantry division is described in a 1984 White House paper by General Wickham, Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, as "an Army unit with a focus on low intensity conflict, but it must retain utility for deployment in a mid-to-high intensity environment when properly augmented."(11:9)

The 10,000 men light division provides the Army with a combat division with strategic mobility requiring 500 C-141 sorties.

What are the limitations and vulnerabilities of the light division design? Field Manual 7-2 describes the limitations of the divisions close combat maneuver battalion as follows:

Its tactical mobility is constrained by its limited organic vehicles and the limited aircraft and ground transport systems in the division. Designed to maximize the combat to support ratio, there is little redundancy in the light infantry battalion. This will require cross training in several low-density military specialties. When deployed into a hostile environment, the battalion will normally require local air superiority and naval gunfire if available.(1:6)

The most prominent combat vulnerabilities are described as:

- NBC Attacks
- Attack by Heavy Forces (Armored Infantry and Tanks)
- Attack by Indirect Fire
- Air Attacks--Due to Limited Air Defense Artillery

Assets(1:7)

These stated limitations and vulnerabilities notwithstanding, the light infantry possesses multiple mission capabilities unique to itself. The very foundation of this

capability is the flexibility that the strategic mobility provides for strategic planners.

The light infantry provides a limited forced entry capability and a combat nucleus upon which combat force buildup may be accomplished.

Rugged terrain, adverse weather, and reduced visibility are the operational environmental factors which most favor light infantry employment.

The offensive maneuver of light infantry is best conducted when the element of surprise and audacity are present. Light forces capitalize on its ability to move undetected in decentralized, small unit maneuver and massing for violent action at decisive locations unanticipated by the enemy, effectively capitalizing on enemy weaknesses. The infiltration attack has been executed with particular success against formidable opposing forces on a continuing basis at both the National Training Center and The Joint Readiness Training Center. (4:39)

The ambush and raid are two forms of offensive maneuvers for which the light infantry is particularly well suited. Once again, these offensive maneuvers exemplify the combat multiplier provided by surprise and stealth operations.

In a low intensity tactical environment, light infantry is fully capable of performing most conventional defensive missions. Light infantry is best at defensive missions in a

nonlinear battlefield environment. The light doctrine places emphasis on the light infantry being proficient in the execution of the following:

-- Reverse Slope Defense: Protects the infantry from direct fires and reduces the effectiveness of indirect fires by terrain masking. (1:4-30)

-- Seamless Web: A series of mutually supporting strong points that capitalize on terrain configurations to canalize the enemy. The defender makes extensive use of obstacles and minefields covered by direct and indirect fire. (1:4-39)

-- Urban Web (Archipelago): A defensive task that combines the elastic defense, seamless web, and strong point defense technique to deny the enemy a key urban area. (1:4-41)

CHAPTER III

LIGHT INFANTRY ORGANIZATION

The design and organization of the light division has been dynamic from 1984 to date and will likely continue to evolve based upon mission requirements and enhanced weapons.

Figures 1-10 will provide a look at the light division as it is currently configured by division, brigade, and battalion sized units.

- Fig 1 Division
- Fig 2 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
- Fig 3 Infantry Battalion
- Fig 4 Aviation Brigade
- Fig 5 Division Artillery
- Fig 6 Support Command (Brigade)
- Fig 7 Reconnaissance Squadron
- Fig 8 Engineer Battalion
- Fig 9 Military Intelligence Battalion
- Fig 10 Air Defense Artillery Battalion

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION





Figure 1



EQUIPMENT RECAP

18 HMMWV	11 SAW
7 5T TRKS	5 M60 MG

Figure 2




Figure 3

AVIATION BRIGADE




Figure 4

• UH60, WHEN EQUIPPED W/UHID - 73

DIVISION ARTILLERY





Figure 5

SUPPORT COMMAND


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|--------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| 113 CUCV | EQUIPMENT RECAP | 17 SEMI TRL 22 1/2T |
| 92 HMMWV | 19 TRK TRAC 5T | 4 SEMI TRL VAN |
| 84 TRK 5T | 3 MOTORCYCLE | 21 TRK FORKLIFT |
| 9 TRK WKR 5T | 2 UH-60 | 6000 LB. |
| | 14 TRK FORKLIFT 4000LB. | |

Figure 6

RECON SQUADRON



EQUIPMENT RECAP

12 OH-58	23 MOTORCYCLE
8 AH-1S	8 TOW
1 UH-60	11 TRK 5T
33 CUCV	38 HMMWV

Figure 7

ENGINEER BATTALION





Figure 8

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION




EQUIPMENT RECAP

- 17 3/4 T. TRK
- 10 5/4 T. TRK W/COMM SHELTER
- 3 5 T. TRK
- 5 HMMWV

Figure 9

ADA BATTALION



17

EQUIPMENT RECAP

18 PIVADS	40 STINGER TM
4 FAAR	13 5T TRK
103 HMMWV	3 CUCV

Figure 10

CHAPTER IV
HEAVY-LIGHT MIX

The Training and Doctrine Command has devoted considerable time and effort evaluating the light infantry capabilities at The National Training Center, Ft Irwin, California, The Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft Chaffee, Arkansas, and multiple training exercises in Europe.

The concept of integrating a light brigade with a heavy brigade or heavy division has shown significant potential in operational evaluations. Some of the most common lessons learned from these evaluations are:

- Use light forces offensively, even in the defense.
- Use light forces in close or restricted terrain to offset mobility disadvantage.
- Battalion task force is the most lethal and effective light infantry organization.
- Light forces provide additional ground surveillance, reconnaissance, and counter-reconnaissance capabilities to the heavy forces.
- Light forces require aggressive counter-fire programs to protect them from indirect fire.
- Light forces may require augmentation when attached to heavy forces in a mid and high-intensity operations.
- Light forces require resupply more frequently than heavy forces, but with less materiel.

- Push combat service support to light forces. (4:2)

These lessons learned are generally self explanatory, but their breadth are indicative of their value.

Heavy-light operations were conceived to allow the strengths of each type unit to offset the weaknesses inherit in the other type unit when operating cooperatively. A recent Ft Leavenworth study says: "The key to successful combined heavy-light operations is to exploit the capabilities of each force and minimize the limitations." (4:4)

The combat multiplier potential provided by heavy-light cooperative employment are worth examining.

The infantrymen of a light unit can provide critical security for heavy fighting vehicles moving through restricted terrain like forests, urban areas, and heavily compartmented geographical zones. Additionally, the light infantrymen can protect heavy infantry armored vehicles from dismounted enemy assaults, while the heavy vehicle systems provide long-range anti-tank fires. The light brigade providing for the defense of a town or village requires a mobile counter attack force, and once again a heavy battalion or brigade working toward mutual objectives can provide the "hammer" to crush an enemy against the light infantry "anvil." These two cited scenarios are but a couple of examples of the combat multiplier benefits of heavy-light mix.

A reduction in augmentation requirements commonly attributed to successful light infantry combat operations in

mid-to-high intensity environments may also be accomplished. This augmentation reduction is realized by employing the light infantry under the "umbrella" of a heavy brigade or division's combat, combat support, and combat service support assets. In the case of combat assets, an example is a heavy brigade operating in conjunction with a light brigade with an integrated TACFIRE system provided by the heavy brigade. The combat service support leverage may be provided by using task organized division support command vehicles to supplement an attached light brigade's limited logistics haul capability.

CHAPTER V
AUGMENTATION

Augmentation to give the light division more killing power, survivability, and sustainability is a common thread of professional opinion among Army leaders. The augmentation would mainly consist of the following:

- Anti-Armor Systems
- Heavy Artillery
- Engineers
- Air Defense Systems
- Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defense Units and Systems
- Transportation
- Service Support Units^(9:3-7)

Anti-Armor Systems

The quick answer of issuing large numbers of TOWs is not a viable alternative because it grossly constrains the light infantry's ability to fight the way it is organized and trained. The light infantry would sacrifice its restricted terrain mobility and could most properly be referred to as regular infantry. The new anti-armor system-medium (AAWS-M) provides a possible answer to light infantry weapons' needs. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, former 7th Division (light) Brigade Commander said:

The combination of AAWS-M and a responsive hand held laser guided system increase the effectiveness of the light infantry formations in the Centag scenarios examined many

fold over. They would also diminish the requirement for heavy force augmentation in many instances, freeing up combat potential to be used elsewhere. (9:7)

The AAWS-M would give the light forces a potent anti-armor system with a range in excess of 2,000 meters and a high probability of kill. A multi-role, lightweight laser designator would further enhance light forces' ability to provide terminal guidance to high technology "smart munitions."

Heavy Artillery

The light division is currently assigned 54 M-102 Howitzers (105 mm) and 8 M-198 (155 mm) towed howitzers. The 105 mm howitzer should be retained due to training implications, but provisions to stock 105 mm ammunition in theater requires examination. Currently, there is little demand for stockage of 105 mm ammunition due to European artillery units employing 155 mm artillery systems. The most practical solution would be augmenting light forces with additional 155 mm units and sustainment capability on a mission basis. (9:2)

Force planners must be sensitive to the light forces lack of the tactical fire control system (TAC Fire) and the corresponding difficulty of interfacing with Corps artillery and other division artilleries. In the event of critical tactical situations, the timely introduction of reinforcing artillery fire power without a TAC Fire interface is doubtful. This is both a training and equipment shortfall upon introduction into theater. (9:8)

Engineers

The 312-man light infantry engineer battalion provides a very limited capability to coordinate and execute a comprehensive defensive plan capable of defeating a Soviet offensive thrust. The light infantry requires substantial fighting position preparation, complemented by a detailed obstacle network, to prevail from a defensive posture. The minimum engineer augmentation should be one Corps engineer battalion. Engineer assets could practically be provided by Corps reserve units without severe impact on the Corps combat capability. (9:3)

Air Defense Systems

The lack of tactical mobility, in concert with a very basic and limited quantity of air defense artillery systems, renders the light infantry, vulnerable when their position is discovered by the enemy. The 18 20 mm vulcan canons and 40 stinger teams, in most scenarios, would not be sufficient to prevent enemy attack air efforts. This is particularly acute in a more static strong point or defensive situation. (9:3)

Theater war planners must ensure the light infantry is reinforced with additional air defense assets, moreover, an adjustment in the theatre air defense umbrella may be required dependent on the air threat and the location of deployed light infantry units.

Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defense

The light infantry possesses a severely limited Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense capability. This capability is limited to the individual soldier NBC defense ensemble and a basic detector, and individual decontamination kit. Upon exposure to an NBC environment, a unit would be considered combat ineffective in a matter of hours with little organic alternative to regain combat effectiveness.

A light division requires a minimum of one chemical company augmentation prior to deployment into theater. This chemical company would require additional augmentation from Corps chemical defense assets in the event of NBC escalation within the theater. (9:2)

Service Support

The light division was organized with the understanding service support augmentation would be required to allow sustained combat operations under most circumstances.

The two key areas needing augmentation are maintenance elements and transportation required to move classes of supply tonnages forward on the battlefield.

The maintenance support requirement could be alleviated by allocation of Corps or theater assets on a mission required basis. The evacuation of large equipment items would be constrained due to limited organic heavy assets of a light division.

Defensive scenarios, in particular, show how important early introduction into theater can substantially reduce logistical transportation requirements upon completion of an initial surge to preposition required classes of supply. Thus, limited logistical transport would be required during the actual conduct of combat operations. (9:3)

CHAPTER VI

TWO WELL SUITED MISSIONS

The light infantry may be particularly well suited for both the rear area combat operation (RACO) and military operations in urban terrain missions (MOUT). A look at these two missions is worthwhile.

Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO)

The large number of agents and spetznaz units anticipated to be employed in the rear area of NATO is a big challenge to counter. The light infantry is a potentially well organized unit to assume the RACO role. The light infantry division could provide command, control, and communication (C³) and the infantry forces to protect a corps' rear area. A recent study notes:

With one or two infantry brigades, the combat aviation brigade and division artillery and other division troops the light division could provide control, surveillance and immediate reaction to any heliborne, airborne, or advance detachment in a corps area. Active patrolling by light infantry units, surveillance by military police and territorial outposts can be coordinated into an effective screen between installations and base clusters. (9:3)

Additionally, the light division could be reinforced by additional combat units and assets as the rear threat might dictate. The command and control afforded by a light division in a RACO role could be critical in orchestrating the employment of reinforcing assets.

The light division is afforded considerable tactical mobility on a limited scale by its organic combat aviation

brigade assets. However, additional mobility assets may be required if the rear area situation escalates. The early reconnaissance advantage enjoyed by a light unit in a RACO role will assist in directing, reinforcing units to decisive locations in a timely manner.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)

When we consider military operations in Europe, the implications of "urbanization" are paramount.

Field Manual 100-5, "Operations," states: "Weather and terrain have more impact on battle than any other physical factor including weapons, equipment, or supplies." (3:3-1)

In regard to the terrain, planners estimate in excess of 50 percent of central European geography favor employment of light infantry forces. The average brigade zone in Germany has 25 villages and the distance between these villages is only 3.5 kilometers. (8:3-1)

Defense analyst Paul Bracken sees the "Urban Sprawl" in central Europe as follows:

Villages and forests comprise nearly 60 percent of the available terrain, and--because of their spatial distribution and the domination of roads and open avenues of approach through the sector--attacking Warsaw Pact tanks would be unable to bypass one village without immediately running into another. (2:255)

This type of mobility restricting terrain is ideal for the employment of light infantry in a defensive role. Retired General James F. Hollingsworth, a US Army Armored Regimental Commander in Europe during World War II, recognized the

suitability of German terrain for infantry employment when he wrote in 1983:

On a recent trip to Europe, I could not help but note how built-up Germany has become. There is little open terrain that is not broken up by forests and growing towns--most of which are less than one or two kilometers from each other. Most engagement ranges are less than 1,000 meters. There is plenty of infantry country in western Europe. (5:85)

What would be the best way to employ light infantry based on the above description of German terrain? Defense of urban terrain (MOUT) appears to be an obvious choice. Urban terrain affords a considerable degree of protection to the defender, particularly when appropriately reinforced by a comprehensive defensive plan, including well prepared fighting positions, counter mobility obstacles and minefields. In this type of terrain, the defender is afforded a considerable advantage and the mobility advantage, normally associated with attacking Warsaw Pact armored and infantry forces, is practically negated. The firepower of precision guided munitions would disrupt the timing and tempo march tables dictated to Soviet commanders by doctrine. Moreover, exploiting tank units would require additional artillery and sizeable dismounted infantry in order to prevail. This required massing of forces could provide lucrative targets, to US precision guided munitions and weapons of mass destructions.

Light infantry employed in urban strong points potentially allows the employment of "freed" heavy units in another area, or as a counter attack force to supplement the light infantry defensive plan.

CHAPTER VII

LIGHT INFANTRY IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Is there a place for light infantry on the central European battlefield? There are certainly some strong opinions varying from emphatic negative to a strong yes, the light infantry can win anywhere! Most would probably agree light infantry properly employed, considering its strengths and weaknesses, can be a distinct force multiplier in central Europe.

Political Implications

The political dynamics in Europe have normally been evolutionary in nature, but the Gorbachev initiatives have reduced the perceived threat posed by Soviet forces in central Europe and threaten to impose revolutionary change in the near term.

Gorbachev has received substantial credit for the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. This treaty coupled with significant unilateral conventional force reduction in the central region, has significantly enhanced the Soviets' image as "Peace Seekers." The Soviet leadership is taking major strides to portray their military presence in the region as defensive in nature.

This "erosion" of the Soviet threat is producing increasing political pressure on regional NATO leadership and the NATO alliance. Correspondingly, the United States' leadership is examining response alternatives and some leaders

believe the reduction of US troop strength and weapon systems is inevitable.

The West Germans have unilaterally announced a reduction in their Army end strength. Moreover, the West Germans are more than a little hesitant to directly address the issue of modernizing nuclear weapons systems in NATO. Additionally, the West German populace has become exceedingly vocal in regards to disruption of their homeland by military air and ground maneuver training.

So, what does this have to do with light infantry? The reduction of US troop strength in Europe could have a profound negative impact on perceived US resolve toward the NATO alliance. However, the NATO alliance certainly must do something in response to the political/military initiative announced by Gorbachev.

The introduction of light infantry into Europe as a replacement for armored infantry is a course of action worth examining. The light infantry can rightfully be characterized as a defense force, portraying the defensive strategy employed by NATO. In addition, the light infantry requires a limited area to conduct training when compared to training area requirements for heavy infantry. The West Germans would most likely find this very appealing, particularly when noise abatement is realized.

proposed
↓
yes

The forward deployment of light forces in Europe would significantly enhance their mission readiness by allowing early

terrain reconnaissance, fighting position preparation, and war materiel prepositioning.

Cost

The controversial issues of burden sharing and US defense expenditure are likely to become even more volatile in the future.

What are the relative costs of light and heavy infantry units? Even a quick comparison reveals the higher "Price Tag" associated with heavy infantry units. The M2 Bradley, the main fighting vehicle found in a heavy infantry battalion, costs approximately \$2.8 million in 1989, thus a Bradley battalion of 60 M2 Bradleys will cost \$168 million. In comparison, the light infantry is assigned the high-mobility multipurpose vehicle (Hummv) at \$30,000 a piece, with a total of 33 assigned to a battalion for a total cost of \$990,000. The cost in fuel, ammunition, and maintenance for operating the M2 Bradley far exceeds that of the (Hummv). The large size of logistical support units required to sustain a heavy infantry unit further inflates the cost. (8:47)

Another relevant consideration is the "infantry economy" associated with the light infantry. The number of infantry soldiers in a light division versus support personnel gives a "tooth to tail" ration of 2.7-to-1, which far exceeds the 2-to-1 ration of a regular infantry division. (8:38) This "bonus" of infantry is noteworthy to commanders in Europe

considering the limited dismounted infantry available to perform mission roles in Bradley units. (5:38)

The demand for long-range transport aircraft will far exceed our current capability. This shortfall, coupled with timeliness of arrival in theater, are two additional factors that weigh in favor of light infantry. *ms*

A regular infantry division with an authorized strength of 18,486 and lift requirement of 29,202 short tons requires 1,662 sorties to deploy to Europe over an 11-day period. This time span could go as high as 19 days if only C-141 aircraft were employed. In contrast, the light infantry division requires less than 500 sorties of C-141 aircraft and could be deployed into theater in 6 days. (8:35)

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This analysis has shown how the light infantry, with allowances, can successfully execute combat operations in a high-intensity environment. It examines the light infantry from its conception, organization, and training evaluation from the Joint Readiness Training Center to the central region of Europe, a potential theater of high-intensity combat. The purpose of this paper is not to definitively resolve the issues revolving around the employment of light-infantry, but examine the combat potential in the event of national emergency and follow-on combat operations.

The formation of multiple light divisions in the Army force structure has not been without controversy and in some cases, strong doubters. Though most Army planners would likely argue, the light divisions filled a void in our Army. The ability of a light division to deploy quickly with less than 500 C-141 sorties is certainly very attractive, however, you do not have to examine the light division very closely to realize there are operational shortfalls that require allowances.

The light division was formed in 1983 to alleviate three requirement shortfalls in the Army force structure. The first was to reduce strategic mobility requirements, the second was to reinforce forward deployed forces, and finally to enhance

our ability to respond to low-intensity conflicts. Such a broad-based mission requirement is difficult to fulfill, therefore, contingency planners must up front identify and make provisions for operation shortfalls that exist in the light division.

How does a light division commander adequately train for mission roles required in a low-intensity conflict and still maintain an operational capability to reinforce forward deployed forces in Europe? Is it feasible to place this type requirement on any unit? A commander must have a focus and stated priority on which to base his unit training program. Though there are some similarities, major differences exist between the training proficiency of a unit to combat guerrillas in Central America compared to fighting Warsaw Pact forces in central. The enemy is decidedly different and the equipment required to be successful is certainly different in many cases.

The Future of Light Infantry

The light infantry has been a part of our military since the birth of our Nation, in one form or another. The threat of terrorism and instability in Third World countries will continue to be a breeding ground for conflict of low-intensity, thus we will continue to retain light forces in our Army to respond to these threats. The rising cost of maintaining large active Army will make the light infantry economically attractive when compared to the cost of heavy infantry units.

The light infantry will continue to evolve and given continued technological advances in weapons' lethality, its effectiveness against heavy infantry and armor units will be enhanced.

Light infantry may not be an "all purpose" force, but with augmentation and properly task organized with other infantry and armor units, light infantry is a formidable force.

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GLOSSARY

AAWS-M Anti-Armor Weapons System-Medium
MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain
RACO Rear Area Combat Operations
TACFire Tactical Fire Control System (Artillery)
TOW Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided