

2

A RAND NOTE

AD-A217 000

**The PLO and Israel in Central America:
The Geopolitical Dimension**

Bruce Hoffman

March 1988

DTIC
ELECTE
JAN 19 1990
S D& D

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

40 Years
1948-1988

RAND

9 0 01 18 0 15

This research was supported by The RAND Corporation as part of its program of public service.

The RAND Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research results. The RAND Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The RAND Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of RAND research.

A RAND NOTE

N-2685-RC

The PLO and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical Dimension

Bruce Hoffman

March 1988



Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By <i>lth on file</i>	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
<i>A-1</i>	

PREFACE

In recent years, attention has been drawn to the close relations that exist between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The support, training, and arms furnished by the PLO to the Sandinistas and like-minded revolutionary movements in surrounding Central American countries have often been cited as proof that Nicaragua has been transformed into a base for international terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.

This Note assesses the relationship between the PLO and the Sandinistas. In particular, it examines the geopolitical dimension of this relationship, i.e., the extension or transposition of the conflict between the PLO and Israel in the Middle East to Central America. In this respect, PLO support and assistance to the Sandinistas and other revolutionary movements in surrounding countries has served as a counterbalance to Israeli support and arms sales to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America.

This study was supported by The RAND Corporation from its own funds. It should be of interest to U.S. policymakers concerned with Central American events and issues, and to the general public as well.

(KR)



SUMMARY

The relations reportedly established between international terrorist organizations in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua have been used as a justification for U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua and marshal support for the Reagan administration's Central America policies. The support, training, and arms furnished to the Sandinistas by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have at times figured prominently in this campaign.

Two key elements appear to underlie the ties between the PLO and Nicaragua. The first, the PLO's long-standing commitment to promote solidarity among the world's various revolutionary and national liberation movements, provides an ideological basis for the cooperation, support, training, weapons, and logistical and financial assistance provided by the PLO to other terrorist and guerrilla groups. The second, the geopolitical dimension of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resulting from Israel's long relationship with the deposed Somoza regime, laid the groundwork for the PLO's involvement with the Sandinistas and continues to color that relationship as a result of Israel's military assistance to Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. In this context, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East has been transposed, or has spilled over, to Central America, providing an additional motivation for Palestinian activity in the region.

The origins of PLO-Sandinista ties can be traced back to 1966, when Cuban leader Fidel Castro sponsored the Tri-Continental Conference (also referred to as the Organization of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Conference) in Havana. At that conference, more than 500 delegates from an array of worldwide radical leftist groups—including representatives of the PLO—met to formulate a "global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism." One outcome of the conference was the pact reportedly signed in the late 1960s between the PLO and the Sandinista guerrillas who were then fighting the government of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua—a pact which called for the training of Sandinista troops at Palestinian bases in Lebanon.

The most celebrated case of Sandinista participation in Palestinian terrorism was the involvement of Patrick Arguello Ryan in the attempted hijacking of an Israeli aircraft by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorists in September 1970. During the clashes that erupted in Jordan later that month when King Hussein moved to oust the PLO from his kingdom, Sandinistas fought alongside Palestinian guerrillas against the

Jordanian armed forces. It appears that after the PLO was expelled from Jordan, Sandinista cadres continued to receive training at the PLO's relocated camps and operations bases in Lebanon.

After their victory, the Sandinistas rewarded the PLO for its assistance by opening a PLO embassy in Managua. Indeed, during the weeks following the revolution, delegations of Palestinians arrived regularly in Nicaragua, while Sandinista officials frequently visited PLO bases in the Middle East. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat was among the dignitaries who attended celebrations in the capital on the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory, in July 1980. Soon after, reports began to surface of 25 PLO advisers who had arrived in Nicaragua sometime during 1980.

Apparently, PLO aid to the Sandinistas has not been confined to guerrilla training and weapons supply. In January 1982, Arafat was quoted by the Beirut newspaper *al-Safir* as stating that PLO pilots had been sent to Nicaragua. The PLO has also provided the Sandinista regime with economic aid. In November 1981, Arafat announced that the PLO had loaned Nicaragua \$10 million. Additional loans amounting to \$12 million appear to have been made in succeeding years. The PLO has also played a leading role in forming a Nicaraguan national airline. In late 1979, the first of several Boeing 727 aircraft was reportedly donated by the PLO to Aeronica, the Nicaraguan airline.

The expansion of PLO support for the Sandinistas since the late 1970s must, however, be viewed alongside the increasing military assistance provided by Israel to the beleaguered Somoza regime during the same period. It can be argued, in fact, that the confluence of PLO and Israeli involvement in Nicaraguan affairs since that time has resulted in a reconfiguration of the Sandinistas' internal revolution into a geopolitical struggle, represented on the one hand by PLO support for the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and on the other by Israeli aid to the Sandinistas' opponents.

Israel's close relations with the ruling Somoza regime date back to 1948. During Israel's war of independence, Nicaragua was one of the few countries to sell arms to Israel and indeed was among the first to recognize the new state—two actions the Israelis never forgot and that served to cement relations between the two countries until Somoza's fall in 1979. Given the extent of Israel's support of Somoza, it is neither surprising nor illogical that the Palestinians and the Sandinistas should have gravitated toward one another. By the same token, it is not surprising that as PLO-Sandinista ties solidified after the revolution and PLO military assistance to the FSLN increased, Israel became involved in U.S.-backed efforts to aid the Nicaraguan rebel groups known as the contras in their opposition to the Sandinista regime. Although the enmity between Israel and the PLO appears, on the

surface, to account for this development, an examination of Israeli motivations reveals a different—and more complex—set of foreign policy imperatives at work.

In recent years, Latin America has emerged as one of Israel's principal markets for defense-related exports. Indeed, Israel's aggressive arms export policy is at the root of Israeli involvement in Central America. But, pragmatic economic considerations aside, there are other, equally compelling, political and diplomatic concerns behind these sales. Israeli policy in this regard is part and parcel of Israel's self-perceived role as a defender of Western interests—a role that has led to claims that Israel acts as a U.S. surrogate in extending aid to Latin American governments, authoritarian military regimes, or rebel groups (such as the contras) who, because of human-rights violations or other issues objectionable to U.S. domestic political opinion, would otherwise be unable to obtain such aid from the United States.

The geopolitical confrontation in Nicaragua between the PLO and Israel has also spilled over into surrounding Central American countries. PLO arms and training have been provided to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Force (FMLN) in El Salvador (a coalition of the five principal rebel groups in that country), as well as to the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), a rebel force operating in Guatemala. At the same time, Israel has been equally active in Central America, providing arms and assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Israel's arms trade with these Central American countries has irreparably damaged its already strained relations with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were formally severed in August 1982, three years after the revolution that brought the FSLN to power.

However, although close—and long-standing—ties have indeed been forged between the PLO and the Sandinistas, and considerable support and assistance has been provided by the PLO to the FSLN regime, the assertion that Nicaragua has become a base for Palestinian terrorist operations in Central America or in the Western Hemisphere as a whole cannot be substantiated. Data compiled in the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism reveal that only thirteen terrorist incidents attributable to either Palestinian terrorists or indigenous, regional terrorist groups acting at the behest of the PLO or in demonstrations of "revolutionary solidarity" with the Palestinians have occurred in Latin America since 1970, and none have occurred since 1983. Palestinian terrorists were actually responsible for only one operation, an attack against Israel's embassy in Paraguay in 1970. Moreover, only four of the thirteen incidents occurred in Central American countries.

Thus, while expressions of revolutionary solidarity between the PLO and the Sandinistas initially formed an ideological framework for their relationship, it appears that the real motivation of the PLO has been the opportunity to counter—and thereby exploit—Israel's longer and more extensive involvement in Central America. Accordingly, it seems likely that as long as Israel continues to supply military assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Nicaraguan rebel groups, a PLO presence will remain in Nicaragua, and Palestinian ties to leftist insurgent groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica will remain as well.

This is not meant to imply that Israel is somehow responsible for the PLO's presence in Central America or that the PLO would cease operations in Managua if Israel stopped providing military assistance to any of Nicaragua's enemies. The point is that, until recently, the PLO's involvement in the region—despite revolutionary lip-service to the contrary—was minimal at best and certainly much less than Israel's. Israel's backing of Somoza, provision of aid to the Contras, and supplying of weaponry to Nicaragua's neighbors appear to have enabled the PLO to gain a foothold in Nicaragua and to build upon it through relations with leftist groups in other Central American countries.

At the same time, however, PLO activities in Nicaragua do not appear to have been designed to use that country as a base for terrorist operations against Israeli or Jewish targets elsewhere in Latin America. Although Nicaragua admittedly could serve as a PLO base for terrorist operations in the Western hemisphere in the future, this seems unlikely. The lone instance of a Palestinian terrorist attack in Latin America seventeen years ago, the relative paucity of surrogate operations against Israeli or Jewish interests in the region during the febrile period following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the complete absence of surrogate activity since 1983 provide no indication of a reversal of this situation.

Much depends, of course, on the future course of Palestinian terrorism. A change in Sandinista policy regarding the Palestinians and the use of Nicaragua as a base could only follow a radical shift within the PLO itself. The PLO's interests in Nicaragua appear, rather, to be commercial (as demonstrated by the organization's alleged ownership of 25 percent of Aeronica) and—like Israel's interests in other Central American countries—aimed at exploiting an available market for weapons and military assistance and training.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions made by Anthony Maingot of Florida International University and Nikola Schahgaldian of the RAND research staff, who reviewed an earlier draft of this Note. Without the encouragement and support of Barbara Williams and Richard Darilek, Head and Associate Head, respectively, of the Behavioral Sciences Department at RAND, the research reported here would not have been possible. A special debt is owed to Janet DeLand, whose masterful editorial skills greatly improved the manuscript. The views expressed in this Note, as well as any errors, are, of course, entirely the author's.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO NICARAGUA	3
The PLO's Intervention In Nicaraguan Affairs	3
Israel's Intervention In Nicaraguan Affairs	12
III. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO CENTRAL AMERICA	22
Israel's Involvement in Central America	22
PLO Involvement in Central America	30
IV. CONCLUSION	35
BIBLIOGRAPHY	39

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the relations reportedly established among international terrorist organizations in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua have served as a justification for U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua and marshal support for the Reagan administration's Central America policies. The support, training, and arms furnished to the Sandinistas by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have at times figured prominently in this campaign.¹

However, while much attention has been focused on the PLO and the Sandinistas as separate revolutionary phenomena, comparatively little has been paid to the actual links between them. Moreover, those few analyses that have examined PLO-Sandinista relations and are considered the principal sources of information on this subject² have largely ignored the geopolitical dimension of this relationship, whereby the conflict between the PLO and Israel in the Middle East has been extended, or transposed, to Central America. PLO support and assistance to the Sandinistas and other revolutionary movements in surrounding countries has occurred alongside of, or as a counterbalance to, Israeli support and arms sales to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America.

This Note assesses and analyzes the PLO-Sandinista relationship within the context of Israel's relations with the deposed Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista rebel groups known as the contras, and surrounding Central American states such as Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. It examines the historical background of Palestinian and Israeli involvement in Nicaraguan affairs, their intervention in the internal conflicts of other surrounding Central American countries, and the potential

¹U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Sandinista Military Build-up*, Washington, D.C., May 1985, p. 34; and U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, Washington, D.C., August 1985, p. 14.

²*Ibid.*; and Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," *Spotlight on the Americas*, Washington, D.C., February 1984; Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," *Spotlight on the Americas*, Washington, D.C., February 1984; David J. Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, The Cuban-American National Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1984; Eileen Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," *Backgrounder*, No. 281, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., August 2, 1983. The lone exception is Ignacio Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," *Research Report*, Nos. 2 and 3, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, January 1986, pp. 18-19.

implications of this situation on future international terrorist activity in Central America sponsored by Nicaragua and facilitated by Palestinian support. The Note thus provides a case study of a long-standing regional conflict between an established state and an opposing revolutionary movement in one part of the world manifesting itself in an indigenous conflict in another part of the world.

This work is based entirely on open sources and does not incorporate any classified material.

II. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO NICARAGUA

Two key elements appear to underlie the ties between the PLO and Nicaragua: the PLO's long-standing commitment to promote solidarity among the world's various revolutionary and national liberation movements, and the geopolitical dimension of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The commitment to solidarity provides an ideological basis for the cooperation, support, training, weapons supply, and logistical and financial assistance provided by the PLO to other terrorist and guerrilla groups.¹ In addition, Israel's long relationship with the deposed Somoza regime laid the groundwork for the PLO's involvement with the Sandinistas and continues to color that relationship as Israel continues to provide military assistance to Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East has been transposed, or has spilled over, into Central America, thus providing an additional motivation for Palestinian activity in that region.

THE PLO'S INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUAN AFFAIRS

The PLO-Sandinista ties can be traced back to 1966, when Cuban leader Fidel Castro sponsored the Tri-Continental Conference (also referred to as the Organization of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Conference) in Havana. More than 500 delegates from worldwide radical leftist groups, including representatives of the PLO, met to formulate a "global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism."² One outcome of the conference was the pact reportedly signed in the late 1960s between the PLO and Sandinista guerrillas who were then fighting the government of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, whereby Sandinistas would be trained at Palestinian bases in Lebanon.³

¹See, for example, the interview with George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in *al-Nahar*, March 5, 1969, cited in Shaul Mishal, *The PLO Under 'Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1986, p. 43; the statements attributed to Arafat regarding PLO-Sandinista relations quoted in Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 5; and Jillian Becker, *The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985, pp. 166-167.

²Quoted in Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 5; see also U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 1; and Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 2.

³Juan O. Tamayo, "Sandinistas Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists," *Miami Herald*, March 3, 1985; see also Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 2.

According to a study published by the Center for International Security, the first contingent of Sandinista guerrillas arrived in Lebanon in 1969. They included Pedro Arauz Palacios, Eduardo Contreras, and Tomas Borge, the present Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior and one of the nine *commandantes* of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) National Directorate.⁴ A meeting held later that year in Mexico City between a senior FSLN official, Benito Escobar, and three representatives of the PLO resulted in 50 to 70 additional Sandinistas being dispatched to PLO-Cuban training camps in Lebanon, Algeria, and Libya.⁵ The Vice Minister of the Interior of Nicaragua, Rene Vivas, the Minister for External Cooperation, Henry Ruiz, and the late Minister of Telecommunications, Enrique Schmidt (who was killed in combat against Contra rebels in November 1984), were among the Sandinistas trained by the PLO during 1969 and 1970.⁶

Particularly close ties were established between the Sandinistas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The global revolutionary aims of the PFLP, which was founded by a radical Marxist, Dr. George Habash, created a natural affinity with the Sandinistas.⁷ Indeed, the most celebrated case of Sandinista participation in Palestinian terrorism was the involvement of Patrick Arguello Ryan in a PFLP aircraft hijacking.⁸ Arguello was already "wanted by several Central American governments for subversive activities,"⁹ when, together with Leila Khaled (a PFLP terrorist and veteran of a previous aircraft hijacking), he attempted to hijack an El Al passenger jet on September 6, 1970. In the ensuing struggle with Israeli security agents on board the aircraft, Arguello was killed.¹⁰

⁴Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2.

⁵*Ibid.*; see also U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 1.

⁶U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 1; see also Associated Press, August 7, 1985.

⁷See, for example, the interview with Habash in *al-Nahar*, March 5, 1969, cited in Mishal, *The PLO Under 'Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch*, p. 43.

⁸See Edgar O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism*, Presidio Press, San Rafael, Calif., 1979, p. 136; Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; and U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 2.

⁹Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, *Fedayeen: The Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas*, Valentine, Mitchell, London, 1972, p. 145.

¹⁰See Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1973, pp. 184, 189-191, 193; Schiff and Rothstein, *Fedayeen*, p. 145; O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence*, p. 136; and Christopher Dobson, *Black September: Its Short, Violent History*, Robert Hale, London, 1975, p. 80.

Khaled later eulogized Arguello as epitomizing the spirit of international revolutionary solidarity embraced by the PLO:

In joining the struggle for dignity and peoplehood, you have given us a lesson in international solidarity and brotherhood and cemented the bond of affection between the people of Latin America and the people of Palestine. . . . You are at once a Lafayette, a Byron, a Norman Bethune, a Che Guevera—a Patrick Arguello, a martyr for Palestinian freedom. You are not dead. You live. You will live forever! You are the patron saint of Palestine.¹¹

During the clashes that erupted in Jordan during September 1970 (referred to as “Black September”), when King Hussein moved to oust the PLO from his kingdom, Sandinistas fought alongside the Palestinian guerrillas against the Jordanian armed forces.¹² After the PLO was expelled from Jordan, Sandinista cadres apparently continued to receive training at the PLO’s relocated camps and operations bases in Lebanon. A former Israeli intelligence officer who had been based in Nicaragua before the revolution reported that at least 150 Sandinistas were trained at PLO camps run by the PFLP in Lebanon throughout the 1970s.¹³

During this same period, Tomas Borge was reported to be a major go-between in aid and arms negotiations between the Sandinistas and the PLO and between the Sandinistas and various radical Middle Eastern and Communist-bloc countries. According to the Department of State, “While acting in his dual capacity as the Sandinistas’ PLO liaison and as Castro’s emissary, the wide range of contacts he amassed in the radical Middle East served him well as he prepared for the Sandinistas’ own revolution.”¹⁴ Borge was allegedly

¹¹Khaled, *My People Shall Live*, pp. 178-179. Arguello’s literary afterlife was subsequently commemorated by three Japanese Red Army members who staged the Lod Airport massacre in Israel, at the behest of the PFLP, in May 1972, calling themselves the “Patrick Arguello Commando.” (See Dobson, *Black September*, p. 80.) The Sandinistas also named a geothermal powerplant in Nicaragua after Arguello. (See Tamayo, “Sandinistas Attract a Who’s Who of Terrorists,” *Miami Herald*, March 3, 1985.)

¹²Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, Crane Russak, New York, 1984, pp. 64, 136; Center for International Security, “The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World,” p. 2; U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 2; and U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Sandinista Military Build-up*, p. 34.

¹³Unidentified former Israeli intelligence quoted by Tamayo, “Sandinistas Attract a Who’s Who of Terrorists,” *Miami Herald*, March 3, 1985.

¹⁴U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6.

instrumental "in funneling Libyan money and PLO technical assistance into Nicaragua, and he arranged shipments of arms from North Korea and Vietnam into Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras."¹⁵

There is some disagreement, however, about the extent of PLO-Sandinista relations during the 1970s. The most critical study of PLO support for the Sandinistas, that of the Center for International Security, notes, "There is little documentation on the Sandinista-PLO tie during the next several years" (i.e., following September 1970).¹⁶ Moreover, a report published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs (IJA), a research institution based in London and associated with the World Jewish Congress, presented a balanced and objective analysis of PLO-Sandinista relations,¹⁷ arguing that, "While it was later claimed that Sandinista-PLO links went back to 1969 and included training in Palestinian camps as well as combat experience during the Jordanian-Palestinian battles of September 1970 . . . evidence to support these charges . . . is hard to come by."¹⁸ Arguello is cited as the "only solid proof" of this connection, but even his involvement is dismissed as that of "an individual recruit," not as part of a wider, more formal, cooperative venture.

It is widely agreed that no *formal* working relationship was established between the PLO and the Sandinistas until 1978.¹⁹ In February of that year, Benito Escobar again met in Mexico City with a PLO representative, Issam Sli, a member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and, according to the U.S. State Department, "the Latin American liaison of the PLO." After the meeting, on February 5, a joint communique was issued expressing the "bonds of solidarity which exist between [the] two revolutionary

¹⁵Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; see also U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6.

¹⁶Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2.

¹⁷Many of the analyses cited above (including those of Kapilow, Scully, and the Center for International Security), which are cited frequently in the U.S. Department of State report, were published by ostensibly ideologically conservative research institutions such as The Cuban-American National Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, and the Center for International Security. The IJA report is regarded as a more objective analysis primarily because the IJA is an ideologically independent research body.

¹⁸Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 18-19.

¹⁹*Ibid*; Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; and U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6; see also *Washington Post*, July 12, 1979.

organizations" and condemning U.S. "imperialism" and Israeli "Zionism."²⁰ On March 6, a second joint joint communique was issued from Havana, announcing a mutual "declaration of war"²¹ against "Yankee imperialism, the racist regime of Israel," and the Somoza dictatorship of Nicaragua.²²

The more practical dimensions of this alliance were first revealed on July 11, 1979, when a PLO-chartered cargo jet en route from Beirut to Costa Rica landed to refuel in Tunisia. Although the plane's manifest listed medical and relief supplies for Nicaraguan refugees who had fled across the border, Tunisian authorities discovered that the crates, which bore the symbol of the Red Crescent (the Arab world's equivalent of the International Red Cross), contained 50 tons of Chinese-manufactured arms and ammunition, including three artillery pieces.²³ According to the U.S. Department of State, this was only the latest consignment of Libyan-financed weapons shipments dispatched by the PLO to the Sandinistas that year.²⁴ Jorge Mandi, a Sandinista spokesman, commented in an interview published by the Kuwaiti newspaper *al-Watan* on August 7, 1979,

There is a long-standing blood unity between us and the Palestinians. Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the Black September battles.²⁵

Rhetoric regarding the legacy of PLO-Sandinista cooperation aside, the more salient point appears to be that "whereas available evidence does not suggest that Palestinian weapons were delivered to the Sandinistas before 1979, there is no doubt that the PLO had a part in the success of the Sandinista final offensive that year."²⁶

²⁰Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4. This meeting is recounted almost verbatim in Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; and U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6.

²¹Quoted in Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2.

²²Quoted in U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6.

²³*Washington Post*, July 12, 1979; see also U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6.

²⁴U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6.

²⁵Quoted in Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2.

²⁶Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 17-18.

After their victory, the Sandinistas rewarded the Palestinians by opening a PLO embassy in Managua. The establishment of "government-to-government" relations between the FSLN regime and the PLO was, according to both the Center for International Security and the U.S. Department of State, "unprecedented."²⁷ Whereas most countries have permitted the PLO to open no more than an "office," Nicaragua accorded the PLO ambassador and his staff full diplomatic privileges.²⁸ The embassy staff soon began to expand, increasing to about 70 officials.²⁹ Despite this solidification of PLO-Sandinista bonds, Nicaragua did not break off diplomatic relations with Israel for another three years.

During the weeks following the Sandinista victory, delegations from the PLO and radical Arab regimes became "regular visitors" to Nicaragua.³⁰ Sandinista officials similarly traveled on official visits to the Middle East, and frequent joint solidarity declarations were issued. In late August 1979, just five weeks after coming to power, the Sandinistas held a special memorial ceremony at the gravesite of Patrick Arguello.

PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat was among the dignitaries who attended ceremonies in Managua in July 1980 celebrating the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory.³¹ At a state reception given in his honor, Arafat extolled the "strategic and militant ties between the Sandinistas and Palestinian revolutions." During the ceremony, Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge lauded the PLO's role in the Sandinista victory, and in response, Arafat declared, "The links between us are not new. Your comrades did not come to our country just to train, but also to fight. Your enemies are our enemies."³² Trumpeting a

²⁷Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 2; and, U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 6; see also Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4.

²⁸U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 7.

²⁹Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; and Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3.

³⁰Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family*, Random House, New York, 1985, p. 145.

³¹Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3; and U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 7. In *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family*, however, Christian states that Arafat did not arrive in Managua until "after [the] anniversary day" (p. 164).

³²Identical accounts of the reception are reported and quoted in Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3; U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 7; and Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 5.

familiar PLO battle cry, Arafat added, "The road to Jerusalem leads through Managua," affirming the PLO's commitment to fellow revolutionaries.³³ In an interview broadcast that same day on Radio Sandino, Arafat expanded on the meaning of PLO-Sandinista ties: "The Nicaraguan people's victory is the victory of the Palestinians. . . . The freedom in Nicaragua is the same in Palestine. . . . The only way, then, is for increased struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism." Later that day, at the Cesar Augusto Silva Convention Center, Arafat declared before an audience which included the nine FSLN *commandantes*, "Anyone who threatens Nicaragua will have to face Palestinian combatants."³⁴

Reports soon began to surface of 25 PLO advisers who arrived in Nicaragua sometime during 1980.³⁵ According to the U.S. Department of State, Arafat assigned Colonel Mutlag Hamadan to lead the advisory mission, which had been dispatched "to instruct the Sandinistas in the use of Eastern-bloc weapons." By the following May, the PLO was reported to be "deeply involved in military and guerrilla training activities in Nicaragua. Reports in mid-1982 indicated that PLO officers were involved in special guerrilla training in Nicaragua."³⁶ However, in March 1982, at a major news conference detailing the Soviet and Cuban military buildup in Nicaragua, the Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman, was unable to offer any conclusive proof of PLO advisers in Nicaragua.³⁷ In September 1985, the U.S. State Department again reported that "a 25-man PLO team instructed the Sandinista forces in the use of East bloc military equipment," but offered no evidence in support of this claim.³⁸

³³Quoted in Becker, *The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization*, pp. 166-167.

³⁴Quoted in U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 7.

³⁵Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 19.

³⁶U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 7.

³⁷*New York Times*, March 10, 1982. The above-mentioned Department of State report cites as sources for these statements Robert F. Lamberg, "The PLO in Latin America," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, June 1982; *Business Week*, May 3, 1982; and Clifford A. Kiracofe, "The Soviet Network in Central America," *Midstream*, May 1981. See U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, pp. 17ff., 30, 31.

³⁸Quoted in Associated Press, September 3, 1985.

Whether PLO advisers were conducting training in Nicaragua or not, evidence of Sandinistas training at PLO camps in Lebanon was uncovered when the camps were overrun by Israeli forces in June and July 1982.³⁹ According to one observer, "The seized documents reveal a remarkable spirit of camaraderie that seems to tie the PLO very intimately to the Communist bloc. . . . Other Third World Communists, notably Cuba's Castro and the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, have either extended aid or served as models for PLO ideologues and military planners."⁴⁰

It also appears that PLO aid to the Sandinistas has not been confined to guerrilla training and weapons supply. In January 1982, Arafat was quoted by the Beirut newspaper *al-Safir* as stating that PLO pilots had been sent to Nicaragua. "The Palestinian identity," he explained, "is one of revolutionary struggle, not racist."⁴¹ When reporters pressed George Salameh, the deputy director of the PLO's Managua embassy, on the exact number of PLO fliers there, he refused to answer. "The number does not count," he said. "It's the fact in itself. A small thing is sometimes more significant."⁴² In 1985, the Associated Press quoted a Pentagon spokesman as stating that there were approximately 40 to 50 Palestinian advisers in Nicaragua.⁴³

The PLO has also provided the Sandinista regime with economic aid. In November 1981, Arafat announced that the PLO had loaned Nicaragua \$10 million.⁴⁴ Additional loans amounting to \$12 million appear to have been made in succeeding years.⁴⁵ The PLO has also played a leading role in the creation of a Nicaraguan national airline. In late 1979, the

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Raphael Israel (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1983, p. 33. It should be noted that none of the PLO documents referred to above are actually reproduced in this volume.

⁴¹Quoted in Associated Press, January 12, 1982; see also Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3; Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 13; U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 7; and U.S. Department of State and the Department of Defense, *The Sandinista Military Build-up*, p. 34.

⁴²Quoted in Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 14.

⁴³Associated Press, August 7, 1985.

⁴⁴Associated Press, January 12, 1982.

⁴⁵Ibid., and September 3, 1985; see also James Adams, "The Financing of Terror," *TVI Report*, Vol. 7, No. 3, p. 31; Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 14; and Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4.

first of several Boeing 727 aircraft was reportedly donated by the PLO to Aeronica, the Nicaraguan airline.⁴⁶ The PLO's largesse in this regard led some observers to suggest that the organization owned 25 percent of Aeronica.⁴⁷ In addition, after the Reagan administration canceled \$75 million in economic aid to Nicaragua's private sector, the PLO arranged for a six-month \$100 million loan from Libya, which has reportedly since been renewed.⁴⁸

Further evidence of the intimacy of PLO-Sandinista ties was revealed in 1984 when Arafat met with FSLN representatives in Baghdad, Iraq. The meeting was described by the Voice of Palestine (the PLO radio station) as having taken place

within the framework of bolstering the militant relations that exist between the PLO and the world liberation movement and in order to mobilise [sic] resources and efforts against the imperialist-Zionist onslaught by every method and means through supporting the world revolutionary forces, particularly in Latin America. . . . [Accordingly,] a comprehensive review was made of the Central American situation as well as developments in Palestinian-Nicaraguan relations and the means of strengthening them at all levels.⁴⁹

The extent of these relations was most recently demonstrated by reports that al-Fatah, the PLO member group founded and led by Arafat, was using Nicaraguan aircraft to ferry men and weapons to Lebanon from PLO bases in North Yemen.⁵⁰

⁴⁶Adams, "The Financing of Terror," p. 31. See also, Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3.

⁴⁷Adams, "The Financing of Terror," p. 31.

⁴⁸Cline and Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, p. 70; see also Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, pp. 3, 14. In 1985, Pentagon spokesmen reported that Libya had contributed a total of \$300 million in loans and grants to the Sandinistas (see Associated Press, August 7, 1985). However, according to *Miami Herald* reporter Juan O. Tamayo, the \$100 million loan was a "one-shot deal" and was followed only by a \$20 million loan. (Conversation between the author and Tamayo, May 5, 1985.)

⁴⁹"Voice of Palestine," British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, June 12, 1984.

⁵⁰Jerusalem Domestic Radio Service, Israel, January 5, 1987. The broadcast stated that "Israeli security sources" had confirmed a report published in the Israeli newspaper *Davar* on January 5, 1987, citing the West German newspaper *Die Welt* regarding the airlifts.

The U.S. Department of State reported in 1985 that the FSLN regime had actively abetted Palestinian terrorist activities in Central America, providing "Nicaraguan passports to radicals and terrorists of other nationalities . . . thus enabling them to travel in Western countries without their identities being known. . . . The Sandinistas' willingness to provide new documentation and a base from which to travel is undoubtedly one reason why Nicaragua has become a haven for terrorists and radicals."⁵¹

ISRAEL'S INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUAN AFFAIRS

The expansion of PLO support for the FSLN since the late 1970s, however, occurred as Israel was providing increasing military assistance to the beleaguered Somoza regime. It can be argued, in fact, that the confluence of PLO and Israeli involvement in Nicaraguan affairs resulted in a reconfiguration of the Sandinistas' internal revolution into a geopolitical struggle.

Israel's close relations with the Somoza regime date back to 1948.⁵³ During the Israeli war of independence, Nicaragua was one of the few countries that sold arms to Israel. (It also provided Israeli arms agents with "diplomatic covers necessary for purchasing arms in Europe.")⁵⁴ Nicaragua was among the first nations to recognize the new state.⁵⁵

As early as the mid-1950s, Israel was providing military assistance to Nicaragua.⁵⁶ In February 1957, a \$1.2 million arms deal was negotiated by a Nicaraguan delegation with the Director General of the Israeli Defense Ministry, Shimon Peres.⁵⁷ Israel continued to

⁵¹U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 13. Ironically, identical charges that "the Israeli consulate in Costa Rica has . . . allegedly provided false passports to Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries for travel throughout Central America" have been made against Israel (see Cynthia Aronson, "Israel and Central America," *New Outlook*, March-April 1984, p. 21).

⁵²U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 13.

⁵³Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18; Milton Jamail and Margo Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1986, p. 27; *Miami Herald*, March 3, 1985; and *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁵⁴Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*; and Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18.

⁵⁶Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington and London, 1985, p. 133; and Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27.

⁵⁷Peres is presently Israel's Foreign Minister; he previously served as Prime Minister.

sell tanks, light aircraft, armored cars, automatic rifles, and ammunition to the Nicaraguan military,⁵⁸ and by the 1970s, Israeli weapons sales accounted for 98 percent of Nicaragua's arms imports.⁵⁹

During the final weeks of Somoza's rule, Israel was among the few nations that did not abandon him or seek to enter a dialogue with his potential successors.⁶⁰ This aid was especially critical following the U.S. embargo on arms shipments to Nicaragua.⁶¹ It is not surprising to find that as PLO-Sandinista ties solidified after the revolution, Israel became involved in U.S.-backed efforts to aid the anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan rebels known as the contras. Although on the surface, the enmity between Israel and the PLO would appear to account for this,⁶² a far more complex set of foreign policy imperatives was in fact at work.⁶³

Israeli weapons sales form part of a "diplomatic offensive" that has assumed global proportions in Israel's campaign to combat the PLO and international terrorist groups linked to it. Assistance to Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica thus forms part of a "broad diplomatic strategy of countering Arab and PLO influence or pressure upon third party countries whenever, wherever and however possible, including . . . the use of arms leverage."⁶⁴ At the same time, however, this strategy is also a reflection of the overall international arms trade:

⁵⁸Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27.

⁵⁹Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited in Jamail and Gutierrez, *ibid.*

⁶⁰Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18.

⁶¹*Ibid.*; Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 27; Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 4; Associated Press, August 7, 1985; *New York Times*, December 17, 1982; and *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁶²See, for example, Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20; and *Time*, May 7, 1984.

⁶³Indeed, according to unidentified U.S. State Department and intelligence officials quoted in a 1982 *New York Times* news article, "The opportunity to combat the Palestine Liberation Organization which is supporting the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua . . . [is an] added but not critical element" in Israel's involvement in Central America (*New York Times*, December 17, 1982).

⁶⁴Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 42.

Israeli leaders, having committed themselves and the indigenous arms industry to a competitive export drive, and perfectly aware that other sellers show few inhibitions in closing contracts, must confront the choice of either gaining influence by making sales or of losing it by refusing to compete because of unilateral restraint. Israeli arms diplomacy aims, therefore, at precluding others from achieving those very same goals of influence and income which it seeks for itself.⁶⁵

In recent years, Latin America has emerged as one of Israel's principal markets for defense-related exports.⁶⁶ Moreover, Israeli arms sales and military assistance have long exceeded all other Israeli sales to the region,⁶⁷ expanding by 608 percent between 1972 and 1982.⁶⁸ Israel ranks ninth in the percentage share of world arms exports⁶⁹ and heads the list of Third World country arms exporters.⁷⁰

At the root of Israel's arms export policy is the desire "to build markets essential to the economic strength of its large military industries and to cushion [the] diplomatic isolation caused by Arab diplomacy."⁷¹ Israeli leaders reason that because of Israel's international

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶For example, according to the Israeli government, a total of \$1.2 billion in arms sales was recorded in 1980. One-third of the receipts, according to the *Washington Post*, came "from sales to Argentina and El Salvador. Since then, sales to Central and South America are reported to have escalated" (*Washington Post*, December 7, 1982). See also George Black, with Milton Jamail and Norma Stoltz Chincilla, *Garrison Guatemala*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1984, pp. 55, 146, 154-158; Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 16-18; Aharon S. Klieman, *Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects*, The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, No. 24, February 1984, pp. 43-44 (although his forename in this publication is spelled differently, Klieman is also the author of *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*); Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," pp. 26-30; Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1986, pp. 16-22; and *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁶⁷Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 16.

⁶⁸Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 132.

⁶⁹According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Center for Defense Information, the United States is first, with 38.7 percent, followed by the Soviet Union (27.6), France (10.6), Great Britain (4.7), West Germany (4.0), Italy (3.8), the Peoples' Republic of China (2.3), Spain (1.2), and Israel (1.0) (cited in *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986).

⁷⁰Israel's percent share of Third World arms exports is 28.0, followed by Brazil (21.0), Egypt (15.0), South Korea (6.0), Singapore (3.0), South Africa (1.5), Indonesia (1.2), and Argentina (0.7) (cited in *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986).

⁷¹*New York Times*, December 17, 1982.

isolation, they cannot be particular about the kinds of regimes they assist.⁷² Yohana Ramati, the former head of the Israeli *Knesset's* foreign relations committee, explained:

Israel is a pariah state. When people ask us for something, we cannot afford to ask questions about ideology. The only type of regime that Israel would not aid would be one that is anti-American. Also, if we can aid a country that it may be inconvenient for the US to help, we would be cutting off our nose to spite our face not to.⁷³

But there are also other, equally compelling, political and diplomatic concerns behind these sales. "Israel's Third World involvement," according to Rubenberg, "is the significant congruence of interest between Israel and the United States in these areas. Israeli policies are not dictated by U.S. wishes, but they frequently advance what Washington perceives to be its own interests in many Third World countries."⁷⁴ There is a great deal of overlap between Israel's anti-Arab, anti-PLO policies and the goals of closer alignment with the West in general and with the United States in particular.⁷⁵ Thus, it can be argued that Israeli assistance "significantly augments United States policy . . . and answers the call of the American administration for greater contributions from allied and friendly countries able to render different forms of such assurance."⁷⁶

Israeli weapons sales to Third World countries, therefore, serve "as an instrument in the service of U.S. and Western global security."⁷⁷ Israel acts as a surrogate in extending U.S. and Western military assistance⁷⁸ to Latin American governments and authoritarian military regimes or rebel groups (e.g., the contras) that, because of human-rights violations or other issues objectionable to U.S. domestic political opinion, would otherwise be unable to obtain such aid.⁷⁹

⁷²Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 16; see also Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 42.

⁷³Statement by Yohanah Ramati made at a public lecture at Florida International University, Bay Vista Campus, March 6, 1985, quoted in Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 16.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 42.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁷⁷Klieman, "Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects," p. 43.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁷⁹Associated Press, August 7, 1985.

A case in point are the persistent reports that arms were supplied to the contras by Israel between 1982 and 1985. The shipments apparently began in late 1982, when "several thousand AK-47 assault rifles" captured from PLO stockpiles during the invasion of Lebanon earlier that year were delivered to the contras.⁸⁰ According to one account, some 500 AK-47s were provided to the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance led by Eden Pastora, one of the three principal rebel groups, and the balance went to another contra guerrilla force, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, commanded by Edgar Chamorro.⁸¹

Israel's involvement with the contras may be linked to an offer supposedly made by a group of Israeli intelligence officials to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1982 to supply untraceable weapons to the Nicaraguan rebels. The approach, it is claimed, was prompted by the appearance on U.S. news broadcasts of contras using "identifiable American weapons." Fears within the Reagan administration that these revelations might provoke widespread public and Congressional opposition to U.S. efforts on behalf of the rebels had led the Israelis to make the offer.⁸²

Although this offer was apparently rejected, it was reported in 1983 that "at the request of the United States," Israel was shipping weapons captured from the PLO to the contras through Honduras. The shipments included artillery pieces, mortar rounds, mines, hand grenades, and ammunition. Citing "senior Reagan administration officials" as its source, the *New York Times* observed that "Israel's coordination with the Americans marks a departure from its previous activities in Central America as an independent supplier of arms. The new role brings Israel closer to acting as a surrogate for the United States."⁸³ Israel's motives were described as a desire to improve relations with the United States, which were described as "cool during the first half of the Reagan administration" and which had been further strained by the invasion of Lebanon and Israel's occupation of the southern part of that country.⁸⁴ The initiatives were said by some sources to be motivated by the

⁸⁰Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28; see also Associated Press, August 7, 1985; *New York Times*, December 17, 1982, and July 21, 1983; and *Washington Post*, November 12, 1983, and December 12, 1986.

⁸¹Jane Hunter, "Reagan's Unseen Ally in Central America," *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 1984, p. 1.

⁸²*New York Times*, February 8, 1987.

⁸³*New York Times*, July 21, 1983.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

desire to increase Israel's leverage over Washington's Middle East policy,⁸⁵ while other sources cited concern over possible Congressional limitations on U.S. involvement in Central America as the reason the Reagan administration had encouraged these Israeli activities.⁸⁶

The politically sensitive nature of Washington's use of Israeli support of the contras to circumvent Congressional restrictions on U.S. aid decreed that a complex web of deception be grafted on to the arms transfers. Israel was a particularly appealing partner for this arrangement because of its reputation for knowing how to run a secret operation.⁸⁷ Both Israel and the United States have repeatedly officially denied the existence of such an agreement.⁸⁸ Thus, to preserve *official* deniability, two covers were developed to facilitate the Israeli weapons shipments.

The first, as previously mentioned, was the use of Honduras as a conduit for Israeli arms supplies to the contras. The use of such a "third party" is a key aspect of Israel's international arms trade. Weapons are transferred through a third party—a country or a private agent—to avoid complications and to enable spokesman to insist that arms are not being supplied to a belligerent directly.⁸⁹ Reagan administration officials were quoted in the *New York Times* on July 21, 1983, as saying that Honduras "has been a silent partner with the United States in organizing and supporting the insurgents" and, more specifically, in channeling to the contras captured PLO weapons purchased from Israel by the Honduran military. The groundwork for this circuitous arrangement may have been laid during an "unpublicized visit" by General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, then commander of the Honduran armed forces, in early 1983 to a Central Intelligence Agency training center in Virginia, where he reportedly examined samples of the captured Palestinian weapons.⁹⁰

The second cover was the use of private Israeli arms dealers to handle the weapons sales, thereby preserving the veneer of official deniability for the U.S. administration. Confirmation of this arrangement was subsequently provided by Edgar Chamorro, a director

⁸⁵Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 16.

⁸⁶*New York Times*, July 21, 1983.

⁸⁷*Time*, 7 May 1984.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, December 17, 1982, July 21, 1983, April 27, 1984, January 13, 1985, February 8, 1987, and February 28, 1987; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28; *Time*, May 7, 1984; and *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁸⁹Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 197.

⁹⁰*New York Times*, July 21, 1983.

of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), one of the contra groups. Chamorro said that in October 1983 his group received about 2,000 weapons from Israel (mostly AK-47s taken from the PLO's stockpiles in Lebanon) in a deal orchestrated by a private arms dealer; he emphasized "that this was a one-time shipment."⁹¹ However, considerable evidence exists to suggest that the weapons shipments not only continued, but were increased during 1984 and 1985.⁹²

Following the Congressionally mandated suspension of U.S. aid to the contras in 1984, Israel reportedly was one of the countries the CIA turned to "to fill the gap."⁹³ The weapons provided by Israel in 1984 included "Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenade launchers and grenades, assault rifles, and ammunition," which were delivered to the Honduran army and subsequently transferred to the contras.⁹⁴ Although the Israeli Foreign Ministry formally denied any participation in these sales in April 1984, stating that it had not "provided Soviet-made arms to Nicaraguan rebels,"⁹⁵ details of the shipments were uncovered by the Israeli newspaper *Maariv*, which published copies "of user certificates for these weapons, signed by Honduran military officials." The newspaper also quoted unnamed arms dealers as saying the weapons "ultimately ended up with the contras."⁹⁶ An additional tip-off that the transfers had been executed by Honduras was the fact "that the Honduran army is not known to use the RPG-7 grenade launcher, but the contras are."⁹⁷

Further evidence of Israeli arms shipments reaching the contras through Honduras during this period was presented by Jack Terrell, a U.S. citizen who was based in Honduras between 1984 and 1985 and was involved in assisting the contras. Terrell recalled a meeting

⁹¹*Time*, May 7, 1984. A "contra leader and former officer in Somoza's National Guard" was quoted in an NBC Nightly News broadcast on April 23, 1984, as also confirming the shipment of Israeli arms to the contras (see Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28).

⁹²Associated Press, August 7, 1985; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28; *New York Times*, January 13, 1985, February 8, 1987, and February 28, 1987; and *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁹³*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁹⁴*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁹⁵Quoted in *New York Times*, April 27, 1984.

⁹⁶*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*

with Adolfo Calero, a director of the FDN, in November 1984, when the group was planning a commando raid. Terrell reportedly told Calero that the raiding party would need Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns and 9-mm ammunition for the operation. Calero was quoted by Terrell as saying, "I'll get this as soon as I can. We're expecting two ships in from Israel in February. When they get in, you will get your stuff."⁹⁸ Additional Israeli weapons shipments were carried out in 1985, according to Terrell, following a visit by Calero's brother, Mario, to Israel to arrange the purchase of "10,000 Soviet-made AK-47 rifles" captured from the PLO. Terrell explained that he was told in Honduras that the weapons were shipped with the necessary documentation signed by Honduran military officials. The weapons were then sold to the contras; the Honduran officers made a 30 percent profit on the deal. The sales were arranged by Israeli arms dealers who were acting "with at least the tacit approval of their government."⁹⁹

At least three Israeli arms merchants were identified as key figures in the arms traffic. One of them was later involved in "secret White House arms sales to Iran," which were the subject of the aforementioned U.S. Congressional investigations into the Iran-contra affair.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, these investigations concluded that the Israeli government "aided the contras through private arms dealers as a means of winning points with the Reagan administration."¹⁰¹ According to transcripts of the Congressional hearings, Yaacov Nimrodi "played a key role in setting up the secret exchange between Washington and Tehran" in 1985 that involved shipping U.S. arms to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages being held in Lebanon. Nimrodi was described as a London-based arms dealer who was the military attache at the Israeli embassy in Iran in the days of the Shah. Citing "informed sources in Washington," the *Washington Post* claimed that Nimrodi "handled shipments of arms to the contras purchased with Israeli funds that were supplied at CIA director [William] Casey's behest in 1984." A second Israeli allegedly involved in the shipments was Pesah Ben Or, "a former Israeli paratrooper who divides his time between Guatemala and Miami." Ben Or, according to a report published in *Maariv*, "arranged the three shipments that were delivered to the contras via the Honduran army." David Marcos Katz, an Israeli arms dealer based in Mexico City, who reportedly specialized in sales of jet fighters, artillery, and radar, "helped broker another deal with the contras in 1985."¹⁰²

⁹⁸Quoted in *New York Times*, February 8, 1987.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

¹⁰¹*New York Times*, February 8, 1987.

¹⁰²*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

In addition to increasing the flow of weapons to the contras, Israel was reported to be providing the rebel forces with military advisers.¹⁰³ According to *Time* magazine, Israeli intelligence experts helped the CIA train the contras, and retired or reserve Israeli army commandos were hired by "shadowy private firms" to assist the rebels.¹⁰⁴ In some cases, these advisers were said to have been officially assigned to these duties by the Israeli Defense Forces.¹⁰⁵ Israel, however, has "repeatedly and emphatically denied providing any assistance to the contras."¹⁰⁶ In December 1986, Israeli Defense Minister Itzhak Rabin informed the *Knesset* that Israel did not maintain contacts or ties with the rebels in Nicaragua or supply them with arms: "Israel did not grant permission to any Israeli to assist, supply know-how or sell weapons from Israel to the rebels in Nicaragua."¹⁰⁷ Two months later, Rabin again denied aiding the contras, stating that Israel had rejected repeated overtures from the Reagan administration to do so.¹⁰⁸

Rabin's denials flew in the face of evidence presented in the report on the Iran-contra affair issued by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in January 1987. Former White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan testified that "he had attended a briefing of President Reagan [in September 1986] an hour before a meeting . . . with Shimon Peres, then the Israeli Prime Minister," during which an offer made by Rabin to deliver a "shipload of Soviet-made weapons to the contras" was discussed. In an interview broadcast on Israeli television in February 1987, Rabin disputed Regan's account, maintaining "that no weapons were sent and that Israel had declined a direct request by a National Security Council aide for assistance to the contras." However, an Israeli source cited by the *New York Times* claimed that the weapons shipment had in fact been dispatched by Israel, but it "was recalled en route immediately after the Iran-contra affair became public."¹⁰⁹ Rabin then recanted his denial, but insisted that the request for the shipment had "originated with the White House."¹¹⁰

¹⁰³Ibid., January 13, 1985.

¹⁰⁴*Time*, May 7, 1984.

¹⁰⁵*The Guardian*, October 11, 1985, cited in Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 28ff, 38.

¹⁰⁶*New York Times*, February 8, 1987; see also *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

¹⁰⁷Quoted in *Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

¹⁰⁸*New York Times*, February 8, 1987.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid., February 28, 1987.

Additional evidence concerning Israel's involvement in contra aid schemes was presented in the Tower Commission report.¹¹¹ A White House memorandum made public by the Commission revealed that Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North, who at the time was on the staff of the U.S. National Security Council, had described to Vice Admiral John Poindexter, then President Reagan's national security adviser, an Israeli offer to provide the contras with military instructors. In a statement issued on behalf of Rabin by the Israeli Defense Ministry, the offer referred to in the memorandum was dismissed as "totally groundless." Indeed, the Israeli statement again stated that it was the United States that asked for such help, which was refused by the Defense Minister."¹¹²

¹¹¹Shortly after news of the secret U.S. "arms for hostages" deal with Iran broke in November 1986, President Reagan appointed a special commission, under the chairmanship of former Senator John Tower, to conduct an investigation of the incident. The Commission concluded that "Israel was heavily involved in encouraging the United States to approach Iran and attempt to exchange arms for hostages" (Ibid.).

¹¹²Rabin said that during a visit to New York in May 1986, he received a request from North for an "urgent meeting." He continued, "Colonel North dwelt at length on the problems of the contras and said he had suggested to the U.S. President [the idea of organizing] a private group of some 20 to 50 Israeli or British instructors. Colonel North said that he preferred a group of Israeli instructors, since they have greater experience and also speak Spanish." North was also quoted as stating that in his opinion the matter had to be conducted privately, and not via the governments (quoted in Ibid.).

III. THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO CENTRAL AMERICA

The geopolitical confrontation in Nicaragua between the PLO and Israel has spilled over into surrounding Central American countries as well. The U.S. Department of State has reported that "PLO agents working in Central America . . . use Nicaragua as their base of operations" in the Western Hemisphere,¹ and Scully contends that "the PLO works closely with Nicaragua's radical Sandinista regime and [in particular] is helping those who are trying to overthrow El Salvador's democratically elected government."² PLO arms and training have been provided to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Force (FMLN) in El Salvador (a coalition of the five principal rebel groups in that country) and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG).³ At the same time, as noted above, Israel has been equally active in providing arms and assistance to Central America.⁴

ISRAEL'S INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

In addition to the weaponry channeled through Honduras to the contras, Israel has provided direct military assistance to the Honduran military. In 1977, Israel sold 12 refurbished French-made Dassault Super-Mystere supersonic bombers to Honduras.⁵

¹U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, p. 13.

²Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 1.

³*Ibid.*, p. 5; Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, pp. 4, 13, 31; Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 17; and Associated Press, August 7, 1985.

⁴Between 1970 and 1983, Israel supplied El Salvador with Arava STOL (short take-off and landing) military transport aircraft—said to be the favorite choice of rural counterinsurgency strategists (Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155), Fouga Magister trainers, Dassault Ouragan fighters, 80-mm rocket launchers, Uzi submachine guns, and ammunition and spare parts. Guatemala also received Aravas, along with Kfir combat aircraft, armored cars, large stocks of Galil assault rifles, mobile field kitchens, helmets, infantry equipment, other light arms, and ammunition. Honduras was provided with Galils and Uzi submachine guns, mortars, Aravas, Westwind reconnaissance aircraft, Dassault Super-Mystere fighter-interceptors, Kfir combat aircraft, coastal naval patrol vessels, and armored cars. And Costa Rica received a variety of small arms and ammunition, including Galils and Uzis (Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 135; see also Klieman, "Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects," p. 43; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29; and *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982).

⁵*Washington Post*, December 7, 1982; see also *New York Times*, December 17, 1982.

Subsequent Israeli sales included three Arava transport aircraft, a Westwind executive passenger jet, Galil automatic rifles, Uzi submachine guns, RBY Mk armored cars, 106-mm mortars, and five rapid patrol boats.⁶

In 1982, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Defense Minister, made a secret (but subsequently much publicized) visit to the region.⁷ Accompanied by the head of Israel's air force, General David Ivry, the Director-General of the Israeli Defense Ministry, General Aaron Bet Halmachi,⁸ and David Marcos Katz,⁹ Sharon met with several senior Honduran government and military officials, including President Roberto Suazo Cordova, the Commander-in-Chief of Honduras's armed forces, General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the Defense Minister, Jose Serra Hernandez, and the Foreign Minister, Edgardo Paz Barmica.¹⁰ At a news conference held shortly after his arrival, Sharon stated, "During my brief stay, I could take advantage of the opportunity to sign agreements of a military nature with Honduras, as well as some agreements on agriculture, health and cultural assistance."¹¹

Sharon reportedly offered to supply arms captured from the PLO in Lebanon free of charge to Honduras and Costa Rica, if they would pay the shipping costs.¹² In addition, according to Honduran military officials, an agreement was made for the purchase of Kfir fighter jets, tanks, and Galils, and the provision of Israeli training personnel, significantly escalating the Central American military buildup.¹³ Honduras already had the most advanced air force in the region, largely as a result of its earlier purchase of the Super-Mystere aircraft.¹⁴ Shortly after the Defense Minister's tour was completed, Katz

⁶Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29; and *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982.

⁷*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 19; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 14, 1982; Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 162; and *New York Times*, December 8, 1982.

⁸*Christian Science Monitor*, December 14, 1982; see also Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155; and Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.

⁹*Washington Post*, 12 December 1986.

¹⁰*New York Times*, December 8, 1982.

¹¹Quoted in *Ibid.*

¹²Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155; and *New York Times*, December 17, 1982.

¹³*Christian Science Monitor*, December 14, 1982.

¹⁴*Ibid.*; and *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982.

was reported to have signed several deals with the Hondurans on behalf of the Israeli government.¹⁵

Honduras did, in fact, eventually receive three more Aravas, four Mystere fighter planes, and 12 Kfir combat aircraft from Israel.¹⁶ Honduras's desire to obtain the Kfirs followed a U.S. refusal to sell U.S.-manufactured F-5 aircraft to Honduras, and apparently reflected Alvarez's determination to lessen his dependence on Washington.¹⁷ Klieman notes,

Although most of Honduran military needs are filled by the United States, arms deals of a modest nature had been concluded with Israel in previous years; its leaders are vitally concerned at the inability of the United States to contain revolutionary forces backed by Nicaragua and Cuba in the arc of instability surrounding Honduras; and they therefore are permitting the country to serve as a Western base for counterinsurgents, training, prepositioning supplies, and intelligence activities while at the same time seeking to diversify their own sources of supply.¹⁸

Although the Sharon visit and subsequent arms deals appear not to have been undertaken at the behest of the United States, a high U.S. State Department official commented that the Reagan administration was not unhappy with the Israelis helping out.¹⁹ Sharon's visit and the agreements signed, in fact, underlined Israel's growing role as an arms broker and U.S. proxy in Central America.²⁰ Klieman explains,

The advantages to the United States are appreciable since tacit arrangements permit the U.S. to keep at a safe distance from Israel publicly; yet, the United States stands to benefit geopolitically: pro-Western states bolstered militarily and inflicting defeats upon Soviet-armed clients, the assurance that American equipment will be employed more effectively under Israeli supervision, etc.²¹

¹⁵*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

¹⁶Deduced from figures cited by Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 135.

¹⁷Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 19.

¹⁸Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 134.

¹⁹*New York Times*, December 17, 1982.

²⁰*Christian Science Monitor*, December 14, 1982.

²¹Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 169.

Israel has long maintained close relations with Costa Rica. Indeed, Luis Alberto Monge served as Costa Rica's ambassador to Israel before becoming president of Costa Rica in 1982.²² Moreover, Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries that officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and maintained an embassy there.²³ These warm relations are also apparent in Costa Rica's arms purchases from Israel over the years and the Israeli advisers who have accompanied the sales.²⁴ The Costa Rican civil guard is armed with Israeli-made Galils and Uzis,²⁵ and Israeli intelligence experts assist the civil guard with intelligence activities.²⁶ Foreign Minister Itzhak Shamir²⁷ visited Costa Rica just six weeks before Sharon's trip, offering, among other things, to "help [Costa Rica] with internal security" matters.²⁸

El Salvador has been a particularly fertile market for Israeli arms exports.²⁹ Between 1975 and 1983, 83 percent of El Salvador's military purchases were made from Israel.³⁰ The weaponry furnished by Israel reportedly included 25 Aravas, six Fouga Magister training aircraft, 18 Dassault Ouragan jet fighters, 200 80-mm rocket launchers, Uzis, ammunition, and spare parts.³¹ Israeli advisers also instruct Salvadoran military

²²Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.

²³*Time*, May 7, 1984; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 22; and Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 134.

²⁴*New York Times*, December 17, 1982.

²⁵Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.

²⁶*New York Times*, December 17, 1982; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 22; Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 134; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30; and *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982.

²⁷Shamir at present is Israel's Prime Minister.

²⁸*Washington Post*, December 14, 1982; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 22.

²⁹See, for example, Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 134; *New York Times*, December 17, 1982, July 21, 1983, and January 13, 1985; and *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982.

³⁰Cited in Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.

³¹Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 135; see also Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.

personnel in the use of this equipment,³² and Israeli intelligence specialists have assisted El Salvador's security forces, particularly in setting up a computer system to help the military and police "seek out government opponents more systematically."³³

A quid pro quo of military assistance in exchange for diplomatic concessions was established with the signing of the first arms agreement in 1973, when El Salvador opened an embassy in Israel.³⁴ Ten years later, following the signing of another arms deal, El Salvador agreed to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.³⁵ Israeli military assistance to El Salvador has also been linked to U.S. interests in that country. In 1981, "Israel transferred \$21 million in arms credits to El Salvador, following a request from Washington, thus enabling the Reagan administration to bypass Congress."³⁶

Israel's most extensive relationship in Central America is with Guatemala. Israel has been described as Guatemala's main weapons supplier,³⁷ and Guatemala is said to be the only country in Central America where Israeli arms sales rival those of the United States.³⁸ Guatemala began to purchase weapons from Israel in 1971,³⁹ and the two countries drew closer in 1975 after the United States, responding to a British request, warned Guatemala not to go through with a planned invasion of neighboring Belize, which was then negotiating its independence from Britain.⁴⁰ By the end of 1975, the first consignment of Arava aircraft, RBY armored cars, artillery, and small arms, accompanied by Israeli advisers and technicians, had been delivered to the Guatemalan military.⁴¹

³²*New York Times*, December 17, 1982; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 21.

³³Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30; see also Aronson, "Israel and Central America," pp. 20-21.

³⁵*Time*, May 7, 1984.

³⁶Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30.

³⁷Associated Press, August 7, 1985; see also *New York Times*, July 21, 1983.

³⁸Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20.

³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 18 and 19.

⁴⁰Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 146.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 155; and Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," pp. 19-20.

The Carter administration's decision to make the human-rights issue a cornerstone of its foreign policy further polarized U.S.-Guatemalan relations. When the U.S. State Department issued a report criticizing Guatemala for human-rights abuses in 1977, the Guatemalan leadership announced that it would not tolerate such interference in Guatemalan internal affairs and declared that it would reject categorically any further military assistance from the United States. In response, the U.S. Congress, acting on a request from the Carter administration, voted to suspend U.S. military aid to Guatemala. Guatemala was subsequently placed on a State Department list of "gross and consistent violators of human rights," compelling U.S. officials not to support Guatemalan applications for multilateral loans from either the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank unless the loans demonstrably financed "basic human needs."⁴²

Israel was quick to exploit this souring of relations between the United States and Guatemala. Israel put no conditions on its arms sales⁴³ and soon became Guatemala's principal arms supplier.⁴⁴ In June 1977, a 26-ton shipment of Israeli arms and ammunition in transit to Guatemala was discovered by customs officials in Barbados after an Argentine cargo plane transporting the shipment made a refueling stop there. In December 1977, Israeli President Yipham Katzir paid a week-long visit to Guatemala which resulted in a new, and more extensive, arms agreement. Shortly afterward, the Guatemalan Defense Minister reportedly traveled to Israel to negotiate an additional arms deal. Subsequent meetings were held early in 1978

between the defense ministers of the two countries, as well as between Guatemalan officials and their Israeli counterparts. . . . The defense ministers discussed the supply of weapons, munitions, military communications equipment (including a computer system), tanks and armored cars, field kitchens, other security items and even the possible supply of the advanced fighter aircraft, the Kfir. They also talked about sending Israeli personnel to install computer and radar systems, to assist in training and equipment maintenance, to establish an electronics school, and to train and advise the Guatemalan army and internal security police (known as G-2) in counterinsurgency tactics.⁴⁵

⁴²Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20; see also Associated Press, August 7, 1985; Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155; *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982.

⁴³Ibid.; Associated Press, August 7, 1985; Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155; *Washington Post*, December 7, 1982.

⁴⁴Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155; see also Yo'av Karny, "Byzantine Bedfellows," *New Republic*, February 2, 1987, p. 25.

⁴⁵Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.

Within two years, Guatemala had received all the materiel requested. Although purchase of the Kfir was initially held up by U.S. restrictions on its sale because of its American-built engine,⁴⁶ the aircraft were eventually delivered to the Guatemalan air force.⁴⁷ By 1980, the Guatemalan army had been completely reequipped with some 10,000 Galil assault rifles, at a cost of \$6 million,⁴⁸ and by 1983, 17 Aravas, five mobile field kitchens, armored cars, helmets, other infantry equipment, and ammunition had been delivered.⁴⁹ Israel's assistance to Guatemala was so extensive that, according to *Time* magazine, army outposts in the Guatemalan jungle had become "near replicas of Israeli army field camps." In Huehuetenango, Guatemalan troops were using Israeli communications equipment, mortars, submachine guns, battle gear, and helmets.⁵⁰ A "key figure" in the deals was the aforementioned Israeli arms merchant, Pesah Ben Or.⁵¹

However, the most controversial aspect of the Israeli-Guatemalan relationship has concerned the role of Israeli advisers in formulating and implementing Guatemala's counterinsurgency strategy.⁵² The Guatemalan ruling elite looks to Israel for models, expertise, arms, and advice, especially police and internal security assistance. When a U.S. program was terminated as a result of the 1977 arms embargo, Guatemala turned to Israel for help.⁵³ In 1979, the first Israeli technicians arrived in Guatemala City to set up a national computer center containing the names of a reported 80 percent of the country's population.⁵⁴ Israeli advisers also worked with the Guatemalan police intelligence organization.⁵⁵ In 1982, approximately 300 Israeli advisory and training personnel were operating in Guatemala.⁵⁶

⁴⁶Ibid.; see also Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155.

⁴⁷Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 135.

⁴⁸Ibid.; and Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 155.

⁴⁹Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*, p. 135. Enough helmets were reportedly furnished by the Israelis to supply "virtually an entire army." (Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20.)

⁵⁰*Time*, March 28, 1983.

⁵¹*Washington Post*, December 12, 1986.

⁵²Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," pp. 18 and 20.

⁵³Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 156.

⁵⁴Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.

⁵⁵Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 156; see also *New York Times*, December 17, 1982, and July 21, 1983.

⁵⁶Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.

The centerpiece of this assistance is the Guatemalan Army Transmissions and Electronics School,⁵⁷ which is designed, staffed, and funded by Israelis.⁵⁷ Guatemalan President Lucas Garcia reportedly described the school's purpose as the training of Guatemalan technicians in electronic counterinsurgency techniques, including enciphering and deciphering and monitoring and jamming radio transmissions.⁵⁸ The importance of Israel's role in these activities was evident during the school's opening ceremony, on November 3, 1981, at which Israel's ambassador to Guatemala praised Guatemala as "one of our best friends," while the Guatemalan Defense Minister lauded Israel for the "gigantic job" it was doing for his country's armed forces.⁵⁹

Israeli assistance to Guatemala has since expanded to encompass various commercial, tourist, and investment activities as well as military involvement.⁶⁰ When the Reagan administration came into office, Israel reasoned that "it could increase its leverage over Washington by performing indispensable functions for the United States in third countries." This rationale was especially trenchant, given the administration's concern about events in Central America, and Guatemala's importance in U.S. regional strategy at a time when Congressional restrictions on direct U.S. assistance were in force.⁶¹ In May 1986, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Guatemala, promising to increase Israeli assistance still further.⁶²

Israel's arms trade with these Central American countries has irreparably damaged its already strained relations with the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were formally severed in August 1982, three years after the revolution that brought the FSLN to power. Although PLO pressure and the regime's desire "to express solidarity with the embattled Palestinians in Lebanon" were the ostensible reasons for the break, U.S. efforts to undermine the Sandinistas and "the use of third countries, including Israel, to achieve this aim were salient considerations."⁶³

⁵⁷Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 20; Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 156; Karny, "Byzantine Bedfellows," p. 25; and Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.

⁵⁸Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 20.

⁵⁹Quoted in Black et al., *Garrison Guatemala*, p. 156.

⁶⁰For details of these activities, see *ibid.*, pp. 156-157; and Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," pp. 21-22.

⁶¹Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," p. 21.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," pp. 17-18; see also the interview with Victor H. Tinoco, Nicaragua's Deputy Foreign Minister, in Goldfield, *Garrison State: Israel's Role in U.S. Global Strategy*, App. II, pp. 72-74.

Sharon's 1982 visit to Honduras was vehemently criticized by Nicaraguan officials. Deputy Foreign Minister Nora Astorga⁶⁴ declared, "With Minister Sharon's presence in Honduras, the Israeli Government is getting even more involved in the Central America region and it is not for Nicaragua to remain quiet. I don't know what type of armaments Israel will supply Honduras, but we can say it is worrisome not only to Nicaragua but to the Central American region."⁶⁵ In 1985, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega cited Israel's past support of Somoza and present military assistance to "U.S.-inspired anti-Sandinista rebels" as the reasons for the termination of relations with Israel. Similarly, Panamanian Rabbi Heszel Klepfisz, a former adviser on educational affairs to the late president of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, contended that Israel's initial support of Somoza and subsequent aid to anti-Sandinista forces poisoned Israeli-Sandinista relations and pushed the regime "into the PLO's arms."⁶⁶

PLO INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The PLO was quick to capitalize on this dissension and increase its involvement with the Sandinistas.⁶⁷ Indeed, in 1981, Arafat boasted to Western newsmen, "We [the PLO] have connections with all revolutionary movements around the world, in El Salvador, in Nicaragua—and I reiterate El Salvador."⁶⁸ The importance of El Salvador in the PLO's Central America strategy is emphasized by Scully: "The immediate goal of the PLO and its allies apparently is to amalgamate the 'revolutionary struggles' of Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. El Salvador is the immediate cynosure of PLO efforts."⁶⁹

The PLO donated a Boeing 707 transport plane to Nicaragua in May 1982 to use in funneling arms shipments to the insurgents in El Salvador through the Belgian Air Charter Service.⁷⁰ As early as 1979, at least some contact between the PLO and the leftist

⁶⁴Until her death in 1988, Astorga was Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United Nations.

⁶⁵Quoted in *New York Times*, December 8, 1982.

⁶⁶Quoted in Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 18.

⁶⁷Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 1.

⁶⁸Quoted in Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, p. 12.

⁶⁹Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 5.

⁷⁰Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," p. 3.

insurgents in El Salvador had been established. In November 1979, Salvadoran guerrillas belonging to the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) kidnapped and murdered South Africa's ambassador to El Salvador. The kidnapers originally demanded that the Salvadoran government sever relations with Israel (as well as with South Africa and Chile) and accord diplomatic status to the PLO. A month later, the Israeli embassy in San Salvador was bombed by the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), another Salvadoran leftist group which is believed to be a "radical" offshoot of the FPL.⁷¹ A statement subsequently issued by the ERP declared that the attack was undertaken "in solidarity with the Palestinian people," and demands were again voiced for the establishment of diplomatic relations between El Salvador and the PLO.⁷²

Whether these terrorist attacks were undertaken specifically at the behest of the PLO or were mounted independently by the two guerrilla groups to curry favor with the Palestinians is not known. However, the PLO is reported to have played a role in the negotiations held in Havana the following month between the five principal Salvadoran guerrilla groups that led to the formation of the FMLN. Within the FMLN framework, a Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was established under the leadership of Cayetano Carpio (the leader of the FPL) to plan and coordinate military strategy. The DRU has provided the "primary linkage" with the PLO and its factions since 1980.⁷³

Within a month of the 1979 meeting in Havana, a delegation of FMLN representatives visited Lebanon, where they toured PLO camps and were briefed by local PLO commanders. In May 1980, another group of Salvadoran leftists traveled to Beirut to meet with Abu Jihad (the *nom de guerre* of Khalil al-Wazir, Arafat's second-in-command) and George Habash of the PFLP. As a result of these meetings, an agreement was reportedly negotiated that included arms purchases and training. A month later, the first group of Salvadoran trainees concluded a course in terrorist warfare at a Fatah camp in Lebanon.⁷⁴

⁷¹Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," *Spotlight on the Americas*, Washington, D.C., February 1984, p. 1; and The RAND Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism.

⁷²The RAND Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism.

⁷³Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 1.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 2.

Since that time, relations between the FMLN and the PLO have continued to intensify. When Arafat attended the Sandinista revolution's first anniversary celebrations in Managua in July 1980, he met with representatives of the DRU. PLO advisers subsequently arrived in El Salvador in September 1980. Later that year, a delegation of Salvadoran guerrilla officials led by Manuel Franco, the movement's head of foreign relations, returned to Lebanon at the invitation of George Habash for further discussions. A more extensive itinerary of meetings subsequently took place in February 1981, again at Habash's behest, when another group of Salvadoran leftists met with representatives of the PFLP, al-Fatah, and the DFLP.⁷⁵

Soon after these meetings took place, Jorge Shafik Handal, the head of the Communist party in El Salvador⁷⁶ and the commander of its military force, the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL),⁷⁷ arrived in Lebanon, accompanied by Ana Maria Achuria, the group's chief of foreign affairs, for a series of talks with Arafat, Nawef Hawatmeh, the commander of the DFLP, and PFLP officials. At the conclusion of this visit, a joint announcement was made of a cooperation arrangement between the PFLP and a new structure established to coordinate terrorist activities of the several Salvadoran revolutionary groups, the National Liberation Front (FNL). In May 1981, Handal made yet another trip to the Middle East, this time to meet with PLO representatives in Damascus, Syria, and strengthen the ties between the revolutionary movement in El Salvador and the Palestinian movement.⁷⁸

Throughout this period, Handal appears to have been the key contact between the Salvadoran leftists and the PLO.⁷⁹ His involvement in such ventures is predicated not only on expressions of revolutionary solidarity between the Salvadoran and Palestinian guerrilla movements, but also on the "ethnic affinity" felt by Central American descendants of Palestinian Christians who immigrated to the region earlier in the twentieth century (Handal's father is reported to have emigrated to El Salvador from Bethlehem in 1921⁸⁰).

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, pp. 4, 13.

⁷⁷Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 2.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid.; Associated Press, August 7, 1985; and Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 5.

⁸⁰Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, pp. 4, 13; see also Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 3; and Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," p. 5. Scully, however, states that Handal's father emigrated from the Gaza Strip, not from Bethlehem.

Moreover, "Handal has boasted that much of the 2,000 member Palestinian community in El Salvador is involved in underground activity, and [that] his brother Farid has been actively promoting the connection between the PLO and leftists throughout Central America."⁸¹

Other prominent Central American revolutionaries of Palestinian ancestry include the Nicaraguan Minister of Transportation, Carlos Zarruk.⁸²

In January 1982, Arafat announced that additional PLO advisers had been sent to El Salvador to assist the Salvadoran guerrilla forces. Two months later, another FMLN emissary known as "Lt. Colonel Martial" met with Arafat in Beirut at the invitation of Abu Jihad. They concluded a new pact whereby the PLO agreed "to provide weapons and military guidance to the Salvadoran revolutionaries." Follow-up discussions were subsequently held in Beirut later that year between Arafat and Carpio. According to the Center for International Security,⁸³

Against this background of conspiracy with the Communist-terror infrastructure in attempting to overthrow the government of El Salvador, the PLO may be seen in a rather different role than that of the ostensible defender of the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs. In El Salvador, PLO involvement is nothing other than direct support and participation in Communist revolution.

However, apart from the kidnap-murder of the South African ambassador by the FPL in November 1979 and the bombing of the Israeli embassy in San Salvador the following month, only one terrorist attack was subsequently mounted against an Israeli target by Salvadoran leftists: The Israeli embassy was bombed by the ERP in December 1979. The embassy reopened the following year, and there have been no further attacks on Israeli targets.⁸⁴

PLO activities in support of other leftist revolutionary groups in Central America have been reported, but reliable information on this assistance is hard to obtain. Various sources have detailed how the PLO has provided arms and training to the URNG,⁸⁵ as well

⁸¹Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists And The PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 3.

⁸²"Voice of Palestine," British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, June 12, 1984.

⁸³Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 3.

⁸⁴The RAND Corporation Chronology of International Terrorism.

⁸⁵Kapilow, *Castro, Israel and the PLO*, pp. 4, 13, 31; Klich, "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," p. 17; and Associated Press, August 7, 1985.

as to leftist insurgents in Costa Rica. Costa Rica's National Security Agency was reported to have evidence that Libya and the PLO were jointly indoctrinating and giving military training to young "Marxist-oriented" Costa Ricans in Libya, Lebanon, and Costa Rica.⁸⁶ With these activities, the PLO

has thus made itself available as a willing instrument for the promotion of terrorism everywhere in the free world, but most particularly in places where the impact of their activity impinges on the security and policy interests of the United States, and consequently on Israel as well. From this standpoint, Central America serves as an enticing target for terror, subversion and chaos.⁸⁷

According to *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*, however, only thirteen terrorist incidents involving Israeli or Jewish interests have in fact occurred in Latin America since 1970, and none have occurred since 1983. Only the attack on Israel's embassy in Paraguay in 1970 was actually carried out by Palestinian terrorists.

Latin American terrorists protesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 attacked Israeli and Jewish targets in Guatemala, including the only synagogue in the country. In Colombia, M-19 terrorists bombed the Israeli embassy and the ambassador's residence in Bogota in September 1982, and the following month several Israeli and Jewish establishments in Brazil received bomb threats from that country's Popular Revolutionary Vanguard. Finally, a number of unclaimed attacks were staged against Israeli and Jewish targets in Bolivia and Ecuador during 1982. Since that time, however, there have been no further terrorist attacks on Israeli or Jewish targets in Latin America by either Palestinian or indigenous terrorist groups.⁸⁸ Hence, claims that the PLO has established a base in Central America for terrorist operations in the Western Hemisphere are by no means persuasive.

⁸⁶Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," pp. 7-8.

⁸⁷Center for International Security, "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," p. 3.

⁸⁸Ibid.

IV. CONCLUSION

The support, training, and arms furnished by the PLO to the Sandinistas and like-minded revolutionary movements in surrounding Central American countries have raised concerns that Nicaragua has been transformed into a base for international terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. This concern has been most prominently articulated by ideologically conservative research institutions such as The Heritage Foundation, the Center for International Security, and The Cuban-American National Foundation. The Heritage Foundation, for example, contends that,

the PLO has been conducting a two-pronged offensive against what it calls "American imperialism, Western colonialism, and world Zionism." One prong is a political campaign against Israel and its allies—the U.S. in particular—waged in every international forum since the late 1960s. The second prong is a transnational terrorist network to attack the allies and supporters of Israel and the United States.

In both cases, the PLO's objective has been to impose upon international, regional, and civil conflicts the anti-Jewish and anti-American rubric of its own hostilities. In this, the PLO has found in Latin America particularly fertile ground.¹

The Center for International Security states:

The Sandinista record is clear, and no amount of apologetics or intellectual sleight-of-hand can obscure the fact of its unholy alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization. . . . The Sandinista-PLO axis must be recognized for what it is—the vanguard of the growing threat to the stability of the free world.²

Identical conclusions have also been published by the Department of State and the Department of Defense.³ The Department of State report, in fact, incorporates material

¹Scully, "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," pp. 1-2.

²Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," pp. 1, 4.

³U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Sandinista Military Build-up*; and, U.S. Department of State, *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*, passim.

from these analyses. The relations established between the PLO and the Sandinistas have thus played an important role in U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua and marshal support for the Reagan administration's Central America policies.

However, despite these relations and the provision of support and assistance by the PLO to the FSLN regime, the assertion that Nicaragua has become a base for Palestinian terrorist operations in either Central America or the Western Hemisphere cannot be substantiated. Of the thirteen terrorist incidents attributable to either Palestinian terrorists or indigenous, regional, terrorist groups acting at the behest of the PLO or in demonstrations of "revolutionary solidarity" that have occurred in Latin America since 1970, Palestinian terrorists were actually responsible for only one, and only four occurred in Central American countries.

Thus, while expressions of revolutionary solidarity initially formed an ideological framework for the PLO-Sandinista relationship, it appears that the PLO's real motivation has been to counter—and thereby exploit—Israel's longer and more considerable involvement in Central America. The PLO's involvement with Central American revolutionaries did not begin in earnest until 1979, long after the Israelis became involved in the region (and particularly with the Somoza regime). The Israeli actions thus served as a pretext for PLO intervention, not only in Nicaraguan affairs, but in those of surrounding countries as well. This point was addressed—and dismissed—by the Center for International Security:

There are those who would argue that this unsavory alliance [between the PLO and the Sandinistas] should be seen in the light of the previous close relations that obtained between Israel and the Nicaragua of Somoza, suggesting thereby that the Sandinista-PLO cooperation reflected nothing more than a temporary coincidence of political interests. Such a benign view of the Sandinista-PLO connection can readily be extended to justify every revolutionary and terrorist activity on the basis of political expediency without regard to the inherent moral basis of such action.⁴

However, as this Note has demonstrated, the relationship between the PLO and the FSLN cannot be treated in isolation from Israel's involvement with the deposed Somoza regime or its subsequent support of the contras and rebel forces in neighboring Central American states.

⁴Center for International Security, "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge To The Free World," p. 1.

At the root of Israel's involvement in Central America is its aggressive arms export policy. But this Israeli policy is part and parcel of Israel's self-perceived role as a defender of Western interests, a role that has led Israel to extend aid to Latin American governments or groups that were be unable to obtain such aid from the United States. Thus, the attention focused on PLO-Sandinista relations by the U.S. government and the concern generated over Nicaragua's alleged transformation into an international terrorist base of operations takes on a new light.

This concern has served to encourage and facilitate Israel's involvement with the contras, alongside—or in tandem with—the Israeli government's own efforts to publicize PLO-Sandinista links. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has frequently criticized the Sandinistas for their support of the PLO, and the Reagan administration's campaign to link Nicaragua to the PLO appears to be an attempt to encourage and facilitate a greater Israeli role.⁵ Although there may not have been any *formal* coordination of U.S.-Israeli endeavors in this regard, there was certainly a tacit understanding that Israeli efforts on behalf of the contras, Honduras, and Guatemala were welcomed and encouraged by the United States.⁶

It seems likely that as long as Israel continues to supply military assistance to Central America, a PLO presence will remain in Nicaragua, and Palestinian ties will be maintained with leftist insurgent groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. This is not to imply that if Israel stopped providing military assistance to any of Nicaragua's enemies the PLO would similarly cease operations in Managua. The point is that, until recently, the PLO's involvement in the region was minimal at best and certainly much less extensive than that of Israel.

At the same time, PLO activities in Nicaragua do not appear to have been designed to provide a base for terrorist operations against Israeli or Jewish targets in Latin America. Although Nicaragua admittedly could serve as a such a base, there is no reason to suggest that this is likely to happen.

Much depends, of course, on the future course of Palestinian terrorism. The wing of the PLO most closely associated with the Sandinistas in recent years has been the moderate faction led by Arafat, and this group has repeatedly spurned attempts by more radical

⁵Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 29.

⁶See Aronson, "Israel and Central America," p. 22; Jamail and Gutierrez, "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," p. 30; and Karny, "Byzantine Bedfellows," p. 25.

elements to begin operations in North America.⁷ Hence, it seems that the PLO's interests in Nicaragua are primarily commercial (as demonstrated by the organization's alleged ownership of 25 percent of Aeronica) and aimed at exploiting an available market for weapons and military assistance and training.

⁷See Bonnie Cordes, et al., *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983*, The RAND Corporation, R-3183-SL, August 1984, p. 18.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books, Reports, and Articles

- Adams, James. "The Financing of Terror," *TVI Report*, Vol. 7, No. 3.
- Aronson, Cynthia. "Israel and Central America," *New Outlook*, March-April 1984.
- Becker, Jillian. *The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Black, George, with Milton Jamail and Normal Stoltz Chincilla. *Garrison Guatemala*. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1984.
- Center for International Security. "The Salvadoran Communists and the PLO: An Unholy Alliance," *Spotlight on the Americas*, Washington, D.C., February 1984.
- _____. "The Sandinista-PLO Axis: A Challenge to the Free World," *Spotlight on the Americas*, Washington, D.C., February 1984.
- Christian, Shirley. *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family*. New York, Random House, 1985.
- Cline, Ray, and Yonah Alexander. *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*. New York, Crane Russak, 1984.
- Cordes, Bonnie, et al. *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983*. The RAND Corporation, R-3183-SL, August 1984.
- Dobson, Christopher. *Black September: Its Short, Violent History*. London, Robert Hale, 1975.
- Goldfield, Steve. *Garrison State: Israel's Role in U.S. Global Strategy*. San Francisco, Palestine Focus Publications, 1985.
- Hunter, Jane. "Israel's Presence in America: Fuzzing a Legitimate Issue," *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 4, March 1985.
- _____. "Reagan's Unseen Ally in Central America," *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1.
- Israel, Raphael (ed.). *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Jamail, Milton, and Margo Gutierrez. "Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1986.
- Janke, Peter. *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography*. New York, Macmillan, 1983.

- Kapilow, David J. *Castro, Israel and the PLO*. Washington, D.C., The Cuban-American National Foundation, 1984.
- Karny, Yo'av. "Byzantine Bedfellows," *New Republic*, February 2, 1987.
- Khaled, Leila. *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary*. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1973.
- Klich, Ignacio. "Latin America and the Palestinian Question," *Research Report*, Nos. 2 and 3, London, Institute of Jewish Affairs, January 1986.
- Klieman, Aaron S. *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*. Washington and London, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985.
- Klieman, Aharon S. *Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects*, The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, No. 24, February 1984.
- Mishal, Shaul. *The PLO Under 'Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1986.
- O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism*. San Rafael, California, Presidio Press, 1979.
- Rubenberg, Cheryl A. "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency," *Middle East Report*, May-June 1986.
- Schiff, Zeev, and Raphael Rothstein. *Fedayeen: The Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas*. London, Valentine, Mitchell, 1972.
- Scully, Eileen. "The PLO's Growing Latin American Base," *Backgrounder*, No. 281, The Heritage Foundation, August 2, 1983.
- Tamayo, Juan O. "Sandinistas Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists," *Miami Herald*, March 3, 1985.
- U.S. Department of State. *The Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals*. Washington, D.C., August 1985.
- U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense. *The Sandinista Military Build-up*. Washington, D.C., May 1985.

Newspapers, News Magazines, Radio, and Wire Services

Associated Press (Washington, D.C.).

Christian Science Monitor (Washington, D.C.).

Jerusalem Domestic Radio Service, Israel.

Miami Herald.

New York Times.

Time (New York).

"Voice of Palestine," British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts.

Washington Post.