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THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

VERNON D. SCRELL

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
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THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

Vernon D. Sorrell



Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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



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Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts.

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To J.K.A. Groenewoud

Daar waar gij roemvolle overleveringen hebt,
die gij de Uwe moogt noemen, rust ook in de
toekomst op U de taak deze in eere te houden.

H.M. Koningin Wilhelmina

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Combat Infantryman's Badge
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INTRODUCTION

Dutch national security is inextricably linked and depends upon the collective military strength of the Alliance. The heavily militarized frontier between East and West is only a few hundred kilometers from major industrial and urban centers in the western Netherlands. This frontier, extending from the Baltic to the Alps, is the Central Front and has the greatest concentration of troops and combat power in the world. Irrespective of the recent West European euphoria resulting from Gorbachev-inspired unilateral Warsaw Pact force reductions and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Talks in Vienna, NATO continues to directly and precariously confront Warsaw Pact forces along the Central Front with forward deployed, largely mobilizable formations. These mechanized units, grouped in eight army corps, represent NATO's conventional deterrence to war. Accordingly, NATO deterrence credibility is largely dependent on each member nation's ability to rapidly and effectively mobilize and deploy sufficient forces to defend assigned sectors on the Central Front.

One critical aspect of Western credibility, therefore, is the perceived reliability and capability of the Royal Netherlands Army. A Dutch Army corps bears responsibility for defending a vulnerable sector in the northern West German plains leading to Bremen, behind which US reinforcements are expected to deploy. Additionally, elements of the Dutch Army

are responsible for securing and facilitating NATO Lines of Communication (LOC) within the Netherlands under Host Nation Support agreements. Despite general public support for the Alliance and the crucial tasks assigned to its army, however, the Netherlands has been suspect within the Alliance by virtue of its pacifist and neutralist traditions; its failure to contribute initially to political solidarity within NATO by accepting cruise missile deployments; and having failed to meet the 3% annual real growth in defense expenditures, as agreed on by NATO members in a 1978 conference on burden sharing. Furthermore, the Royal Netherlands Army has been stigmatized by its rapid collapse during World War II and the unionization of its rank and file in the 1960s.

In this paper, relying exclusively on unclassified and readily obtainable sources, I will present a discussion on the Royal Netherlands Army and its role within NATO. Following a brief account of its history, I will examine the force structure and organization of the army, its ability to effectively mobilize, deploy, and defend its assigned sectors, its role within Dutch society, and its contributions to the Alliance. Where appropriate, I will compare and contrast the Dutch Army with the other armed services of the Netherlands and other allied armies. In essence, I will provide answers to the question "Is the Royal Netherlands Army an efficient military organization, capable of effectively mobilizing a well-equipped combat force and

successfully accomplishing its primary missions on the Central Front and in support of NATO reinforcements?"

Finally, in epilogue, I will offer an assessment on today's Royal Netherlands Army and the appropriateness of its motto "Je Maintiendrai," an heraldic device originating with the House of Orange and symbolic of the close ties between the Dutch monarchy and the army, which is translated to mean "I will maintain."

* * *

CHAPTER I

Combat History of the Dutch Army

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has tended to favor neutrality or abstentionism over involvement in continental conflicts during modern times. Whereas this national inclination to pacifism appears deeply rooted, it does not hold that the Dutch Army is without a heritage born in battle. To this extent, the following presents a brief historical outline of the Dutch Army, focused on its combat participation, as it evolved over 400 years.

Origins of the Dutch Army (1576-1648)

The Royal Netherlands Army (Koninklijke Landmacht: hereafter referred to as the KL) has its origins in the Revolt of the Netherlands, traditionally called the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648). Following the iconoclastic fury unleashed in the low countries during the 1560s, the subsequent Dutch revolt was partly a religious civil war and partly a rebellion against perceived Spanish oppression.¹ Initial resistance, under Prince William of Orange (William the Silent and Father of the Nation, 1533-1584) against Spanish authority, was provided by foreign hirelings and renegade Dutch corsairs (Geuzen or Sea Beggars). The Geuzen, in particular, played a significant role in the early stages of the the revolution by capturing the fortified town of Den

Briel (1572) and causing a general uprising in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland. In 1576, rebels in the northern provinces convened the States-General, the highest governing body of the Netherlands, and authorized the establishment of the Dutch States Army.

Upon the Union of Utrecht, the establishment of a Dutch defense league in 1579, and despite numerous contributions by foreign soldiers² and while displaying much combat tenacity, the States Army suffered successive losses and proved incapable of repulsing Spanish offensives from the northeast. Dutch fortunes reversed dramatically, however, when Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625), son of the assassinated William the Silent, took command of the States Army in 1588 and introduced a series of innovative and far-reaching military reforms.³ Under the leadership of Maurice, succeeded in 1625 by his half-brother Frederick Henry (1584-1647), the States Army successfully defeated Spanish forces in a series of decisive engagements (Turnhout, 1597; Nieuport, 1600; 's-Hertogenbosch, 1629; Maastricht, 1632; and Breda, 1637), thereby establishing a frontier which roughly corresponds to the current boundary between the Netherlands and Belgium. The Eighty Years' War concluded with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Republic of the United Provinces was formally established.

The States Army emerged after 1648 as a modern, well-disciplined and experienced force, not only by virtue of its

successes during the revolution but by its involvement in several external conflicts. The Treaty of Westphalia, besides having terminated the Eighty Years' War, also ended Dutch military participation in the Thirty Years' War. Additionally, Dutch soldiers, who customarily accompanied merchants abroad, were committed to battle in the Portuguese-Dutch War in the East Indies (1601-1641), the Dutch-Portuguese War in West Africa (1620-1635), the Amboina Massacre (1623), the Dutch War in Brazil (1624-1629), and the Siege of Malacca (1640-1641).⁴

The Dutch Army during the Republic (1648-1795)

Despite the renowned efficiency of its decentralized administration,⁵ the Dutch Army proved unprepared and ineffective against numerically superior French forces which invaded the Republic during the Third Dutch War (1672-1678). Slowed by the employment of siege warfare techniques, however, the French were denied conquest of Holland by the strategical inundation of selected lands.⁶ The Dutch, allied with the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs, subsequently rebounded, defeated a French force and captured Bonn (1673). A final and indecisive clash of arms occurred between Dutch and French forces at Seneffe (1674).

Under William III (Prince of Orange and future King of England, 1650-1702) Dutch forces invaded England at the request of Parliament in 1688 (the Glorious Revolution) and

forced James II to seek refuge in France. William's ascent to the English throne brought about a period of close military cooperation between the two countries. Anglo-Dutch regiments thwarted an Irish-French challenge during the Irish Wars (1689-1691) and vanquished the French Army in the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697), after having suffered several early humiliations. In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), Dutch-Anglo forces under command of the Duke of Marlborough and in collaboration with the Austrians, defeated the French-Bavarian armies in the Battle of Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), Oudenaarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709). In Spain, Austrian and Anglo-Dutch units captured Gibraltar in 1704. During these wars, Dutch regiments fought well and at Malplaquet, reputedly the bloodiest battle,⁷ Dutch losses exceeded the combined total of all other allied casualties.

Dutch Army contingents returned to England three times under the amended provisions of the Townshend Treaty,⁸ between 1715 and 1744, and frustrated the armed challenges of James II and Prince Charles, pretenders to the English throne.

In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the Dutch Army was defeated in the battles at Fontenay, Tournai, and Rocoux by the French Army, which threatened to exploit its successes to the north. French territorial conquests were annulled, however, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).

After the failures experienced by its forces during the

War of Austrian Succession and weary of the financial burdens associated with maintaining a large standing army, the Dutch Republic drifted towards a position of neutrality and its international role, as well as its military power, declined.

From the Batavian Republic to World War II (1795-1940)

The United Provinces of the Netherlands were again invaded by the French Army in 1795, assisted by a series of bloodless, anti-Orange coups throughout the country, and the Batavian Republic was proclaimed. The newly-formed, all-volunteer Batavian Army closely resembled the French model and initially consisted of 35,000 men, including 7,200 Swiss soldiers.⁹ This army supported France militarily and participated in campaigns in the Rhineland (1796) and southern Germany (1805), repelled a British expeditionary force at Den Helder (1799), and joined the French Army in the siege of Würzburg (1800).

In 1806, the Batavian Republic gave way to the Kingdom of Holland and the former Batavian Army, heavily depleted, was reorganized into a 22,000 men army and a 7,000 men elite Guard. Dutch regiments continued to participate in French campaigns (Prussia, 1806; Swedish Pomerania, 1807; Spain, 1808; and Westphalia, 1809). In 1810, France imposed an extremely unpopular conscription system on the Dutch and Dutch units were incorporated into the French Army.¹⁰ During the remaining three years of French occupation, some 15,000

Dutch soldiers, mostly conscripts, fought as part of the French Army in Russia (1812) and at Leipzig (1813).

Following the French conquest of the Netherlands, expatriated Orange loyalists assembled into "free Dutch" units (the "Rassemblement of Osnabrück," the "Dutch Brigade," and the "Dutch Legion of Orange"), which, except for the latter, were forced to disband by 1802. In 1813, the first battalion of the Dutch Legion of Orange assisted Russian and Prussian armies in expelling the French from Dutch territory.

William Frederick, son of William V, returned to his homeland in 1813 and laid claim to the throne of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, as King William I. In 1815, a hastily formed Dutch Army joined the Duke of Wellington and Dutch Army elements helped defeat Napoleon's armies at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo.¹¹

Following the Second Treaty of Paris (1815), and despite King William's efforts to create and sustain an important role for the United Netherlands as a continental power, the Dutch Army fell into decline and, by 1828, conscripts outnumbered regulars by a ratio of more than three to one. In 1830, the Royal Army was forced to retire to fortifications within Antwerp and Maastricht, after mass desertions by southern revolutionaries. Irrked by a lack of progress in reaching a negotiated settlement in the North-South dispute, William I ordered the Royal Army to reoccupy the southern provinces, resulting in the Ten Days Campaign (1831). Threats

of French military intervention, however, prompted the Dutch to withdraw to the North. With the loss of the southern provinces, hereafter Belgium, the Netherlands was permanently reduced to a small power and the Dutch increasingly favored abstentionism from European conflicts. Subsequently, the wartime organization of the Royal Army was completely dismantled and, by 1870, the Army proved incapable of mobilizing sufficient forces to man Dutch frontiers.¹²

Perceived threats to Dutch national security produced new legislation aimed at upgrading the Army in 1901. Army reforms, which included the introduction of a universal and compulsory service obligation, enabled the Netherlands to successfully mobilize the Royal Army in 1914 and 1939 with 177,500 and 250,000 men, respectively.¹³ Although, 20th century reforms improved the Royal Army's deterrence posture, the impact of the Great Depression (1929), the excessive strategic reliance on frontier fortifications along natural hinderances, and strong pressures to curb military expenditures by unilateral disarmament advocates,¹⁴ resulted in the fielding of a relatively large, but ill-equipped and poorly-led force on the eve of World War II.

World War II and Beyond (1940-1955)

On 10 May 1940, thirty German divisions invaded the Netherlands in support of operation Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow). The Dutch Army, previously alerted but unprepared to fight,

was forced to withdraw to its main line of defense fairly rapidly upon commencement of hostilities. Despite local restrictions which had prevented proper defensive preparations,¹⁵ Dutch soldiers halted the German advance at the Grebbe-linie for three days. Defense of the southern Peel-Raam Linie proved largely futile when German paratroops captured the critical Moerdijk Bridge, located well to its rear.¹⁶ Following the escape of Queen Wilhelmina, the destruction of Rotterdam and the rapid deterioration of Dutch resistance, General Winkelman, Commander of the Dutch Army, capitulated on 15 May 1940. Scattered fighting continued for several days, however, by Dutch units under command of Prince Bernhard in Zeeland.

The Royal Army ceased to exist under German Occupation. Several Dutch units had been captured in their entirety and prisoners of war were reluctantly repatriated. Some soldiers escaped to England where they joined the Free Dutch forces, elements of which formed the Prinses Irene Brigade and accompanied the Allied drive to liberate the southern Netherlands in 1944. A number of Dutch officers, who had remained in the occupied Netherlands, were executed by local occupation authorities in 1942.¹⁷ Others, joined with collaborators, participated on the Eastern Front in Waffen SS formations.

From liberation in 1945 to 1951, the reconstituted Dutch Army was initially organized on the British model and

primarily engaged in the East Indies. Largely as a result of the German Occupation and developing East-West tensions, the Netherlands abandoned its preference for neutrality in 1948 and became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In recognition of its NATO obligation, the Netherlands established the Dutch Field Forces Command in 1951 and the First Dutch Corps (1e Legerkorps: hereafter 1LK) in 1952. Initially, deployed along NATO's Dutch frontier (IJssel-Rhine), the 1LK was redeployed to its present sector following West German entry into NATO in 1955. Subsequently, in order to provide security within the Netherlands and to facilitate reinforcement and resupply of NATO forces in West Germany, the National Territorial Command (NTC) and the National Logistical Command (NLC) were formed. Together, these three separate commands (1LK, NTC and NLC), in addition to several minor commands,¹⁸ form the modern Royal Netherlands Army (KL).

The East Indies, Korea and the United Nations (1825-1983)

The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) was formally established during the Java War (1825-1830). Placed under the direction of the Colonial Department, the KNIL developed independently from the Royal Army. Apart from the obvious geographically generated dissimilarities as related to climate, territory, and length of supply lines, the composition of the KNIL also differed from the Royal Army by

virtue of its missions against an elusive enemy requiring high land or amphibious mobility, physical stamina and logistical self reliance.¹⁹ Unable to compete effectively for new recruits with the Royal Army at home, the KNIL relied heavily on foreigners and natives to replenish its ranks.²⁰ Financial shortages and an intense rivalry with the Royal Dutch Navy resulted in the KNIL being downgraded from an army to a police force between 1927 and 1939.

Although conscription had been introduced, for Europeans in 1912 and for natives in 1939, the KNIL was largely untrained and understrength when Japanese forces invaded the archipelago following the Allied naval defeat in February 1942. Dutch resistance collapsed within several weeks.

After the Japanese defeat in the East Indies, Dutch forces returned for "mop up" operations. Guerrilla activities by Indonesian nationalists resulted in two Dutch counterinsurgency operations (1947, 1948-1949). Although highly effective, the KNIL was forced to suspend both police actions at the request of the United Nations.²¹ Subsequently, the KNIL was recalled to the Netherlands, its veterans absorbed into the KL,²² and deactivated when the United Indonesian Republic was declared in 1949.

In 1950, the Dutch Army was tasked to provide a battalion in support of the United Nations efforts in South Korea. The Dutch volunteer contingent (NDVN) became part of the American 38th Infantry Regiment and participated in combat from 1950

to 1953. ²³

Tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia resulted in several armed confrontations between the Dutch Army and Indonesian infiltrators in New Guinea (1957-1962).²⁴

Most recently, the Netherlands furnished the United Nations with an all-volunteer infantry battalion for duty in Lebanon (1979-1983).

Summary and Conclusions

Elements of the Dutch Army have participated in more than 30 wars during the 400 years since its creation in 1576. Under the leadership of internationally renowned generals, i.e. Maurice of Nassau, Frederick Henry, William III, and the Duke of Marlborough, Dutch soldiers distinguished themselves in battle from 1588 to 1714. Following humiliation in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), however, the quality of the Dutch Army declined dramatically. Since then, despite individual unit achievements in various theatres of war, the Dutch Army has compiled a mediocre combat record.

This lackluster performance in modern times has led some to believe that the Dutch Army was merely representative of a people traditionally inclined to pacifism and, therefore, lacked the discipline required of an effective military organization. While there is an element of truth in this assessment, it should not be overstated. The principal causes for the decline of the Dutch Army, since 1748, were

threefold: 1) a greater public and political pragmatism regarding the limited size of the country and its relatively small population; this was further exacerbated by the Belgian Succession in 1831; 2) the huge costs associated with maintaining a large, well-equipped standing army, which was thought to retard normal economic and social developments, and resulted in consecutive cutbacks in military expenditures; and 3) an increasing anti-militarism fueled by conscription and which, after 1900, came to be represented by various labor and social organizations.

The impact of these three considerations on the present KL will be examined in successive chapters.

* * *

Chapter I - Endnotes

1. For a detailed and authoritative study on the early history of the Dutch Army in English, the reader is invited to consult H. Amersfoort and P.H. Kamphuis, eds., Je Maintiendrai: A Concise History of the Dutch Army, 1568-1940. (The Hague: The Historical Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1985).

2. Foreign military advisors included the Duke of Anjou, brother to the French king, and Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, who commanded the Dutch rebel army until relieved by Maurice. Furthermore, from the 16th through the 19th centuries, foreign hirelings have traditionally formed part of the Dutch Army and many eventually settled permanently in the Netherlands. See: H.L. Switzer, "The Dutch Army during the Ancien Regime," Je Maintiendrai, 21 and 33.

3. Maurice's reforms within the army caused the Venetian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Girolamo Trevisano, to observe: "I do not believe that there is any other place or country where the army observes discipline and rules as well as here," in Relazione Veneziane, 1600-1795, P.J. Blok, ed. (The Hague, 1909) and quoted by Switzer, Je Maintiendrai, 34. For additionally reference on reforms introduced by Maurice, refer to John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, Who's Who in Military History from 1453 to the Present Day (London: Hutchinson, 1987) 219-220; and Jacob de Gheijn, Wapenhandelinge van Roers, Musqvetten ende Spiessen ('s-Gravenhage: Staten Generael, 1607).

4. For a complete listing of wars and battles in which the Dutch participated, consult George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Anchor Books, 1987) and George Bruce, The Paladin Dictionary of Battles (London: Paladin-Grafton Books, 1986). A complete campaign history of Dutch infantry units is presented by H. Ringoir, De Nederlandse Infanterie (Bussum: C.A.J. van Dishoeck, 1968).

5. Switzer, 31-33.

6. "Fortress Holland" was created by advantageously flooding low lying lands north of the rivers Maas and Waal, in the Amsterdam-Naarden-Huesden-Gouda sector.

7. Switzer, 28-29.

8. Ibid., 30.

9. C.M. Schulten, "De Koninklijke Landmacht en Haar Geschiedenis sinds 1813," Ons Leger, March 1987, 23.

10. J.P.C.M. van Hoof, "The Army from 1795 to 1813," Je Maintiendrai., 42.

11. The dominant Waterloo monument, Butte du Lion, was constructed by the Dutch in honor of the wounded King William I, in an unusual display of affection.

12. H. Amersfoort, "The Nineteenth Century," Je Maintiendrai., 63-64.

13. Despite successfully mobilizing in 1914, the Dutch Army was unprepared for war and the Netherlands was fortunate to retain its neutrality and integrity. According to J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study in Dutch Foreign Policy (The Hague, 1979), the Netherlands was spared due to "... the balance [of power] between Britain and Germany plus an opportune Dutch timidity and considerable good fortune..." as quoted by C.M. Schulten, "The Netherlands and its Army (1900-1940)," Je Maintiendrai., 77-78 and 85-86.

14. Schulten, "The Netherlands and its Army," Je Maintiendrai., 79; J.P.C.M. van Hoof, "Fortifications in the Netherlands (c. 1500-1940)," Je Maintiendrai., 197-123; and Gerald Newton, The Netherlands: A Historical and Cultural Survey, 1795-1977 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978) 118-124 and 133-134.

15. Local authorities prevented the removal of buildings and the thinning of orchards during defensive preparations at the Grebbe Linie, thereby limiting the ranges of observation and obstructing the defensive fields of fire. Accordingly, German troops were able to close on the defenders while remaining largely undetected. See: Klaas Jansma and Meindert Schoor, Onze Vaderlandse Geschiedenis (Leeuwarden: Uitgeverij IC van Seijen, 1987) 400-401; and "De strijd om de Grebbeberg," De Onderofficier, May 1987, 130-136.

16. Schulten, "The Netherlands and its Army," Je Maintiendrai., 89-90 and Newton, The Netherlands., 134-135.

17. Jansma and Schoor., 423.

18. Other commands within the current KL include the Training Command (COKL), the Medical Command (GCKL), and the Communications Command (CVKL). Source: Inleiding Defensie Organisatie (The Hague: HKS, 1985) 27-30.

19. Although largely centralized on Java, the KNIL was

responsible for securing the "outer islands" from both an internal as well as external threat. No small task, given that the combined length of coastlines in the territory exceeded the circumference of the earth. See: G. Teiler, "An Outline of the Military History of the Dutch East Indies," Je Maintiendrai., 141.

20. Early in the 19th Century, the KNIL became known as a "foreign legion." While trying to maintain at least a ratio of 1 European to 3 natives (usually Ambonese or Javanese), the KNIL was rarely successful. See: Teiler, *ibid.*, 135.

21. Newton, The Netherlands., 165-169.

22. The KNIL was originally formed in order to avoid the high transport costs associated with the maintenance of an overseas army. After 1945, the Dutch government had little choice but support the KNIL with fresh recruits. Between 1945 and 1950, nearly 100,000 Dutch soldiers rotated between the Netherlands and the East Indies. See: C.M. Schulten "De Koninklijke Landmacht en Haar Geschiedenis sinds 1813," Ons Leger, March 1987, 23.

23. J.W.M. Schulten, "Een Bijna Vergeten Oorlog," Ons Leger, March 1987, 83-90.

24. Kohn, "Indonesian Wars of 1957-1962," Dictionary of Wars., 216.

CHAPTER II

The Netherlands and National Security

Dutch politicians during World War II, while in German detention camps or exiled in England, formulated a "new postwar order which would depart radically from the seabound neutral commercialism of the past."¹ As a result of continued Soviet territorial expansion and despite an initial hesitancy regarding "pactomania,"² the Netherlands abandoned its traditional policy of abstentionism and became a founding member of the Brussels Treaty (1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949).

Today, the Dutch Foreign and National Security Policies are complementary. The foreign policy actively pursues peace by advocating a more equitable world distribution of power, prosperity and welfare. The Netherlands is a strong advocate of detente and disarmament, and is the host country to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The security policy of the Netherlands is centered on NATO and is primarily concerned with protecting the territorial integrity of the Netherlands and preserving international peace and security through military deterrence.

Geostrategical Considerations and Threat Perceptions

The Netherlands is a small country, favorably situated in

the estuaries of the Rhine, Maas and Scheldt rivers, and is known as the "Gateway to Europe." A vast network of roads and waterways connects harbor and airfield facilities in the Netherlands to the heavily industrialized Ruhr. Dutch transit trade has traditionally been the cornerstone of its economy and currently accommodates nearly 40% of all European cross-border trade.³ Its geostrategical location, however, has also made the Netherlands crucial to the defense of Western Europe and, conversely, vulnerable to attack by the Warsaw Pact. Dutch territorial security considerations in Europe, therefore, are inextricably linked to interests within NATO and must be considered in a broader regional, if not in a Europe-Atlantic, context.

The Dutch urban and industrialized heartland is located primarily along its 451 kilometer coastline and within 600 kilometers from the heavily militarized Central Front.⁴ Accordingly, the Netherlands is vulnerable to attack by land, sea and air.

The postwar superpower confrontation in Central Europe poses three principal external threats to the Netherlands in the event of heightened East-West tensions: foreign military intimidation leading to international political dependency and subordination; interruption of commercial shipping and obstruction of energy resources flow resulting in retardation of economic development; and armed violations of its territorial integrity. Additionally, the Netherlands, by

virtue of its international economic interdependence and former overseas and colonial relations, is susceptible to a number of threats originating outside of Western Europe, primarily in the Third World. Whereas an externally generated confrontation between the superpowers might spill over into the Central European Region and result in a general war, the primary threat to the Netherlands involving the Royal Netherlands Army is the offensive deployment and preponderance of Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.⁵

Notwithstanding several recent developments regarding Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and proposals to reduce conventional forces in Europe,⁶ the Warsaw Pact continues to face NATO with numerically superior forces. In the Central Region alone, the Warsaw Pact has 61 armored or mechanized divisions deployed in forward areas or held in a high state of readiness.⁷ Warsaw Pact ground forces are supported by 4,580 combat aircraft, outnumbering NATO forward deployed aircraft by more than 2:1 and a variety of tactical Short Range Nuclear (SRNF) weapons.⁸ Of particular interest to the Dutch are the 2nd and 20th Guards Armies of the Group Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), elements of which are deployed opposite the Dutch sector of the Central Front (see Appendices D and E).

As a member of the Atlantic Alliance, the Netherlands shares NATO concerns of a surprise attack by Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact forces. Numerous scenerios have been developed

within NATO regarding a possible war in the Central Region; the most pessimistic one runs as follows:

"... On a Sunday morning in August, 20 crack Soviet divisions slash across the border between East and West Germany. There is no warning. The West has been lulled by a Soviet "peace offensive," including radical disarmament proposals and a planned visit to the United States by the Soviet leader. Under the cover of Warsaw Pact maneuvers, an invasion force has massed near the inter-German border. Soviet commandos have infiltrated the West. Now, as the offensive begins, the commandos blow up bridges across the Weser and Aller rivers and sabotage ferry boats on the English Channel. NATO's ability to reinforce itself is further sapped when Soviet warplanes bomb allied airbases and civilian airports. Millions of refugees fleeing westward also prevent NATO defenders from reaching their positions after a belated mobilization. The Soviet spearhead batters relatively weak British and Dutch forces on the northern end of the front and then swings south. A second echelon strikes from Czechoslovakia, driving through Austria and circling behind the strong US and West German divisions on the southern flank. Their defenses crumbling, the Western allies have two options: to go nuclear, or to surrender."⁹

Dutch military planners, despite the unlikelihood of the above scenerio and in concert with their NATO counterparts, tend to prepare for the worst case scenerio.¹⁰ Accordingly, as a small non-nuclear nation, the Netherlands is forced to reconcile its political idealism and public opinion with a pragmatic security policy within NATO.

The Dutch Security Policy

Upon entry into NATO, Dutch security policy objectives were essentially:¹¹ 1) Alliance arrangements should tie the Netherlands to regional security schemes in a way that would

maximize the involvement of the United States; 2) The antagonism of the Soviet Union should be minimized; 3) Regional arrangements should not be anti-German, because it was crucial that Germany be brought into the economic and political networks of Europe; and 4) Any security arrangement should serve as a conduit to greater economic cooperation throughout Europe.

Thirty-five years later, in 1984, the Netherlands reaffirmed its commitment to NATO, its opposition to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the coupling of its military strategy and security policy within context of the Alliance.¹² Revisions in the Dutch security policy, however, addressed fundamental changes in the relationship between European allies and the United States. Accordingly, Dutch policy objectives stressed greater European cooperation in security matters, complementary to that of NATO but in the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Western European Union (WEU). Currently, the Netherlands is an advocate of Western defense task specialization¹³ and supports: 1) The elimination of all INF weapons in Europe; 2) A fifty percent reduction of all strategic nuclear weapons (START); 3) Universal elimination of all chemical and biological weapons; 4) A balance of conventional forces in Europe; and 5) Verifiable and bilateral force reductions, inclusive of SRNF weapons.¹⁴

Defense Organization and Force Structure

Ministry of Defense

Under Article 98 of the 1983 Amended Constitution of the Netherlands, the Dutch government has ultimate responsibility for the armed forces and national security.¹⁵ The Minister of Defense is accountable to the bicameral parliament (Staten Generaal) and participates in the General Defense Council (AVR). This council is comprised of the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the ministers and assistant ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Transportation, Finance and Economic Affairs.¹⁶ Generally, the commander of the armed forces, the commanders of the individual services and the chief of civil defense are invited to participate in council discussions. In this forum, Dutch national and international security concerns are coordinated and developed into specific objectives for realization.¹⁷ The Council of State interacts with the General Defense Council in an advisory capacity and must be consulted regarding all legislation prior to review by the monarch. Both chambers of parliament are empowered by the constitution to influence defense matters, either through a formal demand for public clarification of a specific issue or by rejecting funding requests.

Following a 1974 reorganization, the Defense Ministry is structured in essentially four administrative levels (the

ministry, the central organization, the armed service boards, and the armed forces). These levels are further structured along operational and functional lines (see Appendix B). Currently, as the largest national concern, the Defense Ministry employs 26,332 civilians and is responsible for maintaining the peacetime collective armed services strength of 106,728 men and women. Within the central organization of the ministry work 4,554 civilians and 1071 uniformed personnel. As a result of recent governmental austerity programs, however, the elimination of 3,667 civilian positions (13%) is anticipated by 1990.¹⁸

The Royal Netherlands Navy

The Royal Netherlands Navy (KM) concentrates on protecting the sea lines of communications (SLOCS) to Western Europe under direction of the Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN), with emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. Additionally, the KM is operationally associated with the Royal Belgian Navy since 1948 and the Naval Commander of the Netherlands also functions as Admiral Benelux (ABNL). Furthermore, the KM provides for the defense of the Netherlands Antilles. Naval and Marine Corps peacetime strength stood at 16,900 in 1988, of which 15,545 were regulars and conscripts numbered 1,355. Current KM equipment includes: 18 frigates, 5 submarines, 22 minesweepers, 3 service support vessels, 3 hydrographic research vessels, 13

Orion patrol aircraft, and 22 Lynch helicopters.¹⁹

Traditional public confidence in the KM was seriously damaged during the mid-1980s as a result of the Walrus Affair. This much-publicized episode first gained notoriety in 1985 when the General Accounting Office (AR) reported a 370% production cost overrun in the construction of two Walrus-class submarines, from 213 million to nearly one billion guilders. Subsequent investigations revealed a lack of proper service coordination and fixed responsibility with the Admiralty Board. In consequence, partly as parliamentary punishment and partly as result of the negative publicity generated by inept KM administrators, several high ranking naval officers were promptly discharged.²⁰ The Walrus Affair ended when the original prototype was destroyed in drydock by fire in 1987, resulting in the accelerated launch of the second prototype, the Zeeleeuw. The production start on two additional submarines (Dolfijn and Bruinvis) has been postponed until after the anticipated 1990 launch of the refitted Walrus.²¹

The Royal Netherlands Air Force

The Royal Netherlands Air Force (KLu) provides primarily close air support (CAS) as part of NATO's Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF) and is expected to maintain a high state of combat readiness. The Dutch Air Force is currently comprised of six fighter squadrons which are nearly

all equipped with operational F16 fighters, one transport aircraft squadron, and approximately 100 helicopters for use by the army. Air defense is an additional KLu mission and is provided by several ground-launched missile squadrons, Hawk and Patriot. In 1988, the KLu consisted of 13,302 regulars and 4,960 conscripts, for a total of 18,262 personnel.²²

Factors adversely impacting on KLu combat readiness are training limitations, personnel shortages and financial restraints. Dutch fighter pilots are unable to conduct realistically-simulated combat fighter training in Western Europe as a result of civil noise restrictions, forcing them to fly at artificially high altitudes over 500 or 1,000 feet. Consequently, the KLu must expend considerable budgetary resources in order to rotate elements to North America for training programs and exercises. In addition, the KLu has an acute shortage of qualified fighter pilots. The costs to train one fighter pilot are currently estimated at four million guilders. Whereas formerly, nearly 30% of all pilots would remain with the KLu upon completion of their initial eight year service obligation, this trend has decreased substantially. In 1987, more than half of the 200 active duty pilots in the KLu planned to transfer to civil aviation at the first opportunity. This personnel drain has resulted in decreased combat readiness, financial austerity and, most alarmingly, in a lack of experienced pilots.²³

The Royal Netherlands Army

The main missions of the Royal Netherlands Army (KL) continue to be the defense by the First Dutch Army Corps (1LK) of a 100 x 170 kilometer section of the North German Plain and to provide support and security to NATO reinforcements under Host Nation Support requirements. The KL's peacetime strength is approximately 66,000 soldiers, of which 43,345 are conscripted. A detailed discussion of the KL follows in Chapter III.

The Royal Military Police

In peacetime, the Royal Military Police (Marechaussee) conducts routine police operations within the armed forces, assists local and national police forces, and is engaged in anti-terrorist activities. During wartime, the Marechaussee can be deployed as an infantry element, although security requirements will in all probability necessitate its continued functioning as an elite police force. The Marechaussee currently numbers 4,140 men, of which 413 are conscripts.

The Defense Budget

The Dutch state budget is publicized annually in September during the opening ceremonies of parliament. The 1988 budget reflected an income of 141.5 billion guilders and expenditures of 168 billion guilders, resulting in an annual

deficit of 26.5 billion guilders.²⁴ This 1988 deficit is the equivalent of \$12.6 billion²⁵ and amounts to a \$855 annual per capita increase of an already substantial public debt. The proposed annual defense allocation of 13.7 billion guilders was exceeded by appropriations for education (29.1), interest on the existing public debt (21.8), social welfare and unemployment (17.3), and housing and environment (15.0).²⁶

Despite allocations amounting to only 8.2% of the 1988 state budget, Dutch defense expenditures have remained fairly constant between 1984 and 1988 and accounted for a steady annual growth rate of 1.8%, 3.8%, 1.7% and .3%, respectively.²⁷ Except for 1986, the Netherlands has failed to meet the 3% annual growth rate in real terms as agreed to by NATO members in 1978. Significant, however, is the real growth in defense expenditures between 1970 and 1988, climbing 11.2% between 1970 and 1980 and an additional 17.1% between 1980 and 1988.²⁸ Furthermore, whereas defense expenditures between 1978 and 1987 increased at an annual average rate of 1.9%, the increase between 1983 and 1987 exceeded the 2% annual growth rate called for in the 1984 Defense White Paper, a yearly average of 2.25%.²⁹

Within the Ministry of Defense, annual budget allocations by service and functional area have also remained constant. Between 1984 and 1988, the army has generally been allocated 40% of the defense budget, the navy and air force 20% each,

the Marechaussee 2%, and the central organization, pension funds and other administrative activities roughly 17%.³⁰ From the annual 13.7 billion guilders defense appropriations in 1988, 46% was expended on personnel training, pay and allowances, 16% on maintenance of equipment and infrastructure, 27% on research, development and procurement, and 10% was allocated for pensions and partial pay allowances.³¹

External Military Relations and Cooperation

External Dutch military activities are compatible with the changes expressed in the 1984 Netherlands White Paper towards greater West European military cooperation. In addition to having supported the United Nations with military elements for participation in the Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) and the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Netherlands is an enthusiastic participant in most West European defense initiatives. Several NATO and West European joint military development and production projects in which the Netherlands participates are: production of precision-guided 155mm artillery ammunition; development of an air defense artillery (ADA) computer recognition language; Link 11 improvements; the NATO frigate project (NFR90); the development of a maritime-transport helicopter (NH90); and a new West European command, control and communication (C3)

system (EDDS).³² In the first instance, however, the Netherlands remains solidly committed to NATO and pursues West European defense arrangements primarily as an alternative should the Alliance collapse as result of an American troop withdrawal from Europe.³³

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

As previously mentioned, the Dutch military commitment to NATO is formidable. The entire Dutch Air Force with 162 operational F16 fighters is dedicated to TWOATAF for a role in the Central Region. The Royal Navy is distributed between CINCHAN and the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), a mine counter-measure force. The Marine Corps, a brigade sized element, is under operational control of Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force (AMF) and projected for combat duty in Norway. The First Army Corps, with a wartime strength of approximately 90,000 men, is tasked with defending a section of the Central Front under operational command of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Additionally, a large number of soldiers and civilians are to be mobilized in order to support allied reinforcing operations within the Netherlands. Furthermore, the Netherlands is well represented within the military and civilian command structures of the Alliance.

Since the large US budget deficit popularized the "burden sharing" issue again within NATO, the Netherlands has consistently joined other West European members in stressing

the "hidden costs" of its NATO contribution with respect to providing conscription forces, infrastructure, training areas, etc. Leading individual politicians have not ruled out larger Dutch contributions to NATO, however, provided the Netherlands is given a greater say in the US-dominated Alliance.³⁴

FINABEL

The Comité Finabel de Coordination was formed by the Army Chiefs-of-Staff from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in 1953, in order to facilitate member cooperation pertaining to conventional ground force employment developments. The committee was enlarged with the membership of West Germany (1956) and the United Kingdom (1973). The Finabel objectives are to exchange information; sponsor and encourage tactical and logistical research; and to conduct training with, and testing of, existing equipment. Finabel does not pursue matters relating to research and development (R&D) or procurement.³⁵

Western European Union

The Western European Union (WEU) is an extension of the original Brussels Pact (Treaty of 1948) and since 1955 includes West Germany and Italy. The WEU, under French leadership organized the Standing Armaments Commission (SAC) in 1955. SAC was the forerunner of the current Conference of

National Armaments Directors (CNAD), a NATO agency, and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). The original SAC tasks have been completely absorbed by Finabel in recent years.³⁶

During the 30th anniversary of the WEU (1984), foreign and defense ministers from the respective member states, led by France and the United Kingdom, agreed to revitalize the Union. Since that time, the WEU has played an increasingly larger role in publicizing West European contributions to the Alliance and has served as a forum for discussion of strictly European security issues. In August 1987, within the context of the WEU, the UK and France persuaded Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands to dispatch naval forces to the Persian Gulf and assist in escorting oil tankers. During a conference in The Hague, October 1987, the members released a strongly worded statement entitled "Platform on European Security Interests," which stressed the need for retention of some nuclear forces and an increase of conventional forces in order to maintain a viable military deterrence in Europe, and also reaffirmed their mutual defense pledges. The WEU is considered a prospective West European alternative to the Atlantic Alliance should the US return to its traditional isolationism or unilaterally reach an accommodation with the USSR, a fear greatly increased by the Reykjavik Summit of 1986. Since 1984 other European NATO states have applied for membership: Portugal (1984), Turkey (1987), and Greece,

Norway and Spain have all recently expressed an interest in the WEU.³⁷

Eurogroup

The Eurogroup is an informal organization of defense ministers from all European NATO members, except Iceland, and was formed in 1968 to promote better European military cooperation. The Eurogroup is primarily concerned with strengthening the Atlantic Alliance by means of: 1) Encouraging greater European coordination in military procurement and training; 2) Providing member states with an informal forum to exchange views on defense related issues; and 3) Publicizing European contributions to NATO.³⁸

Independent European Programme Group

The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was formed in 1975 by Eurogroup members in an effort to include France in cooperative military R&D and procurement activities. Most important to this organization is the efficient use of funds for research, development and procurement; an increase in equipment standardization and interoperability; and to maintain a viable West European defense industrial and technological base. Dutch initiatives within the IEGP framework include responsibility for studies relating to light infantry weapon systems, dual production of 155mm artillery ammunition, and information exchange on air

to air missile developments.³⁹

Summary and Conclusions

The Netherlands is vulnerable to three primary threats: political intimidation, interference in normal economic development and an invasion. In recognition of its small size and limited capabilities to secure its territorial integrity, the Netherlands has actively participated in military alliances since World War II. The three primary armed services, the KM, KL and KLu, are almost entirely dedicated to NATO. Dutch defense expenditures have remained fairly constant in recent years and reflect a marginal incremental annual increase, despite a substantial national deficit and failure to meet the 3% annual real growth rate required by NATO. Among the armed services, the army has generally been allocated the greatest share of defense funds as it is the largest service.

While pursuing collective security within the Alliance, Dutch politicians are confronted with a declining public interest regarding the threat, increased budgetary austerity, and a growing fear of American political unilateralist tendencies with respect to East-West relations. In an attempt to reconcile public opinion with less costly and pragmatic security options, the Netherlands is active within a number of European military consortiums, most notably the WEU and the IEPG. The Netherlands is a strong proponent of increased

regional cooperation and stabilization in economical, political and military matters while, simultaneously, it advocates the retention of a visible American presence in Europe. In this fashion, the Netherlands hopes to enhance its national security posture and participate in the presentation of a viable Western military deterrence to the Warsaw Pact.

* * *

Chapter II - Endnotes

1. Maarten Huygen, "Dateline Holland: NATO's Pyrrhic Victory," Foreign Policy (n.d., 1986) 167.

2. William K. Domke, "The Netherlands: Strategy Options and Change," Evolving European Defense Policies, ed. Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987) 274.

3. The Economist (5-11 March, 1988) 106. The Dutch transport and communications network currently consists of 12 ports (inclusive of the Rotterdam-Europoort and Amsterdam-IJmond harbor complexes); 28 airfields, including Schiphol and 18 others with permanent surface runways; 6,340 km of inland waterways of which 35% is navigable by craft of 900 metric ton capacity or larger; 108,360 km of roads and 2,824 km of railroad track. Source: The World Factbook (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1987) 176.

4. The World Factbook., 177; and F. Von Senger und Etterlin, "The Defence of Central Europe: The Challenge of the 1980s," NATO's Fifteen Nations (Special, February 1981).

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6. Phillip Gold, "The Risky Race to Arms Control" and "Reshaping Rival Forces," Insight (February 20, 1989) 8-9 and 12-13; "US Thwarted in Efforts to Verify INF Treaty," FPI International Report (February 10, 1989) 1-2; "No room to barter on the Central Front, NATO leaders says." Army Times (November 21, 1988); Michael R. Gordon, "Good Sign in Vienna," and "Cutting Arms in Europe." The New York Times (January 25 and March 7, 1989).

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9. John Barry and Russell Watson, "Can Europe Stand on Its Own Feet?" Newsweek (December 7, 1987) 12-14.

10. Interview with Defense Minister W. van Eekelen by Rik Kuethe, "In de Walrus-affaire valt mij werkelijk niets te verwijten." Elseviers Magazine (October 4, 1986) 18.

11. Domke, 274-275.

12. "The Basis of Netherlands Security Policy," The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984: Summary and Excerpts (The Hague: Ministry of Defense, 1984) 6; and "Grondslagen van het Veiligheidsbeleid," Defensienota 1984 in Kort Bestek (The Hague: Directie Voorlichting Ministerie van Defensie, January 1984) 5-17.

13. J.M. Bik, "Ideeën Volten omstreden op Defensie: Taakverdeling NAVO niet voor het eerst, en niet voor het laatst, ter discussie." (NRC Handelsblad, 25 March 1987); Pieter Maessen, "Gedachte om defensietaken af te stoten moet gestimuleerd." (NRC Handelsblad, 28 March 1987); and Rijksbegroting 1988, 14-15.

14. Rijksbegroting 1988, 10.

15. De Herziene Grondwet ('s-Gravehage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1983) 30 and 76.

16. Currently, the members of the AVR are by name, position and political party affiliation: R. Lubbers (PM - CDA); R.W. de Korte (DPM and Economic Affairs - VVD); M. Brands (Defense, replacing W. van Eekelen - VVD); C.P. van Dijk (Home Affairs - CDA); H. van den Broek (Foreign Affairs - CDA); N. Smit-Kroes (Transportation - VVD); and H.O. Ruding (Finance - CDA). Source: Arthur S. Banks, Political Handbook of the World (Binghampton, NY: CSA Pubs, 1988) 414 - 415.

17. Inleiding Defensie Organisatie (The Hague: HKS, VI-IDO-1, December 1985) 17-20.

18. The Netherlands Defence White Paper, 39; and Rijksbegroting 1988, 45.

19. The Netherlands Defence White Paper, 17-27; Rijksbegroting 1988, 45; and R. Krijger, "De Zeemacht in Nederland," Ons leger (March 1987) 40-45.

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21. Rijksbegroting 1988, 21-22.

22. The Netherlands Defence White Paper, 31-35; Rijksbegroting 1988, 45; and H.J.M. Vendrig, "Het Commando Tactische Luchtstrijdkrachten," Ons Leger (March 1987) 66-70.

23. Els Flipsen, "F16 vlieger stapt zo snel mogelijk over van schietstoel naar 'zetel' in Jumbojet," and "Veel jachtvliegers vertrekken naar burgerluchtvaart." NRC Handelsblad (February 28 and March 2, 1987).

24. "Rijksbegroting 88: Inkomsten en Uitgaven van het Rijk," NRC Handelsblad (September 15, 1987) 23.

25. Based on current foreign exchange rates of one Dutch guilder being equal to \$.4757 US. Source: New York Times (March 12, 1989).

26. "Rijksbegroting 88," NRC Handelsblad, 23.

27. Based on constant 1980 currencies. "Documentation: Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries 1970-1988," NATO Review (December 1988) 30.

28. Ibid., 30.

29. Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance (Brussels: Defence Planning Committee Report, December 1988) 15; and "Financial and Economic Policy," Netherlands Defence White Paper, 50.

30. In 1988, the Defense Ministry allocated its budget accordingly: Ministry (1,015.1 million guilders or 7.4%); Pensions and allowances (1,390 or 10.1%); KM (2,769.1 or 20.2%); KL (5,439.4 or 39.6%); KLu (2,830.3 or 20.6%); Marechaussee (252.1 or 1.8%); and Civil Defense preparations (27.1 or .2%). Sources: "Rijksbegroting 88: Uitgaven 1987 en 1988," NRC Handelsblad, 25; Netherlands Defence White Paper, 50; and Rijksbegroting 1988.

31. "Rijksbegroting 88: Defensie Uitgaven 1984-1988," NRC Handelsblad, 28; and "Begrotingskrant 1987," Defensiekrant (September 16, 1986) 1 and 9.

32. Rijksbegroting, 12-14 and 24-27.

33. L. Bücher, Europese Defensiesamenwerking (HKS Lecture Transcript, 1-33, September 4, 1987); NAVO Vademecum (The Hague: Ministry of Defense, January 1981); and "Defense in Europe," PBS (Spring 1988).

34. Derived from comments by PvdA parliamentary representative, Stermerdink, and chairman D'66, H. van Mierlo, during a conference in Washington DC, "NATO turns 40," CSPAN (November 28, 1988).

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37. Banks, "Western European Union," Political Handbook, 833-834.

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CHAPTER III

The Royal Netherlands Army

The mission of the Royal Netherlands Army (KL), in concert with the KM and KLu, is to protect the interests of the state. In order to accomplish its principal task, the KL is equipped and organized primarily for the prevention of war, control of crises and conflicts, and territorial defense within a national, NATO, WEU, and/or United Nations context. The current strength of the KL is approximately 66,000 active duty personnel (careerists and conscripts) and 146,500 reserves. For the prevention of war, and to strengthen the NATO deterrence value, the Netherlands has dedicated all of its dual-capable field artillery and most of its conventional combat forces to the Alliance. In the event that deterrence should fail, however, the KL is tasked with the following: 1) To defend its assigned sector along the Central Front; 2) To secure and defend Dutch territory; 3) To maintain and secure LOCs in support of NATO reinforcements; and 4) To support allied elements operating in the Netherlands.¹

Organization and Structure

The Army Staff

Following the 1976 reorganization of the Army Staff, the Army Board is chaired by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (BLS), known also as the Chief of the Army Staff (CLAS).² In

addition to the BLS/CLAS, the board is comprised of the Personnel Director (DPKL), Materiel Director (DMKL) and the Director for Economic Management (DEBKL). Board gatherings are accessible to the Minister of Defense and the Deputy Ministers for Army Plans and Materiel. Various specialists are regularly invited to provide technical expertise and assistance.

The board meets primarily to implement the General Defense Council planning guidance, as it pertains to the army, and to coordinate army plans with other services and agencies within the Defense Ministry. A division of functional areas of responsibility and the 1976 reorganization have led to the creation of the three directorates. The DPKL is responsible for the recruitment, retention, training, health and welfare of army personnel. The DMKL is charged with maintenance of equipment and infrastructure, research and development (R&D), procurement and property disposal. The DEBKL is tasked with developing the army budget, organizational modifications, cost-benefit analyses, and information networking.³

The BLS, a Lieutenant General and the highest KL authority, is accountable to the Minister of Defense and is seated in the AVR. The BLS is tasked with maintaining a high state of combat readiness within the army as required by national and NATO directives. Furthermore, the BLS is responsible for the discipline and morale within the army,

mobilization, war preparations, and territorial aspects of Dutch national security. To meet these responsibilities, the following organizations are under the operational command of the BLS: the First Dutch Army Corps (1LK); the National Territorial Command (NTC); the National Logistics Command (NLC); the Communications Command (CVKL); the Training Command (COKL); and the Medical Command (GCKL).

First Dutch Army Corps

The First Dutch Army Corps (1LK), tasked with defending a sector approximately 100 kilometers wide and 170 kilometers deep in northwestern Germany, is under wartime operational command of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). The 1LK is commanded by a Lieutenant General and is currently headquartered in Apeldoorn. In peacetime the 1LK has a personnel strength of roughly 35,000, which in wartime reaches 90,000.⁴ The combat strength of the 1LK consists primarily of 10 semi-independent brigades. The KL is unique among Western armies, in that brigades rather than divisions are operationally and functionally self-supporting. The 10 combat brigades (3 armored, 6 mechanized infantry and one infantry brigade) are generally task organized equally among the three divisions (1st, 4th and 5th divisions) but can randomly be redistributed without major difficulties or loss of combat efficiency.⁵

Four brigades (the 51st, 52nd, 53rd and 101st brigades)

are entirely mobilizable and the other brigades, except for the 41st Armored Brigade, are partially mobilizable. The brigades have a stable task organization and are customarily formed by three maneuver battalions,⁶ one mechanized field artillery battalion, a combat engineer company, a logistics company, a maintenance company and a medical company. The 101st Infantry Brigade, however, is an exception as it consists primarily of light infantry and is tasked with securing the 1LK's rear area.

Additionally, the 1LK has reconnaissance battalions, engineer groups, field and air defense artillery groups, signal elements and a helicopter group at its disposal. These elements are generically referred to as Corps Troops. All logistical support elements, not belonging to individual brigades, form the 1LK Logistical Command (LLC) and are tasked with supplying, maintaining and transporting 1LK assets, providing medical care and evacuation, and administering the combat replacement system of personnel and equipment.

Nine combat brigades organic to the 1LK, as well as most of the logistical support elements, are based in the Netherlands.⁷ This situation necessitates the rapid redeployment of 1LK combat elements during a crisis to assigned sectors in West Germany, over distances of 300 to 500 kilometers. To reduce bulk transport requirements, the KL has since 1984 prepositioned stocks in West Germany,

inclusive of ammunition, spare parts and fuels. Additionally, at the request of NATO, the Netherlands has acquired a number of railroad flatcars between 1984 and 1986 to facilitate the transport of armored and mechanized vehicles to forward assembly areas. The road network between the Eastern Netherlands and the 1LK Area of Operations (AO), however, is inadequate to accommodate large numbers of transport vehicles.⁸

The 41st Armored Brigade is the only forward deployed major Dutch maneuver element in West Germany. It is comprised of two armor battalions, a mechanized infantry, a field artillery, a reconnaissance, and an engineer battalion, plus several service support companies. These elements are stationed at Seedorf, Hohne and Langemannshof kazernes and are within 90 kilometers of their forward battle positions.⁹

National Territorial Command

The National Territorial Command (NTC) is relatively new.¹⁰ It was established in 1975 by combining the staffs and units of the Territorial Commanders East, West and South Netherlands. The NTC has a peacetime personnel strength of nearly 10,000 (an equal mix of military and civilian personnel), which following mobilization would exceed 40,000. The NTC headquarters is located in Gouda and has a permanent staff of approximately 300.

While the National Territorial Commander retains overall

responsibility for NTC missions, local implementation authorization has generally been delegated to the Provincial Military Commanders (PMC) and the District Commander North (PMC of Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe). These PMCs are initially responsible for mobilization preparations, security missions, enlistment and training of reserve platoons at the provincial level.

The NTC is charged with the preparation and execution of the following principal tasks:

- 1) The territorial security of the Netherlands; in peacetime this is restricted to army property and installations. During times of crisis or war, however, the NTC can mobilize two infantry brigades, three security battalions, one commando battalion, and 50 separate infantry security companies. Additionally, 143 platoons of the National Reserve Corps are available to the NTC for security related missions.

- 2) Mobilization - 75% of the army's wartime personnel strength - is mobilizable. Additionally, the NTC facilitates mobilization related matters such as the assignment of personnel, logistical support, which includes the maintenance and security of 60 national mobilization centers, and refresher training courses conducted under the auspices of COKL at Ossendrecht.

- 3) Coordination of civil-military activities, including: preparations for, and implementation of, martial

law, coordination between civil and military authorities at local and provincial levels, providing military assistance to civilian communities, and refugee settlement.

4) Logistical support for the KL and NATO reinforcements in the Netherlands. The NTC maintains five US Army Prepositioned Organizational Materiel Centers (POMCUS) in the Netherlands.

5, Road transport and traffic control within the Netherlands. Upon commencement of hostilities, the NTC is authorized to requisition civilian vehicles for the transport of military supplies from 10 locations within the Netherlands to the front by existing pre-arranged agreements.

6) Other administrative tasks relating to billeting, training areas and firing ranges.

7) Explosive ordnance disposal. Each year, the army's Explosive Ordnance Command (EOC) disposes of some 10,000 shells, 250 missiles, 30,000 bullets, 200 bombs and five V1 rockets remaining from World War II.

Commando Corps

The Korps Commandotroepen (KCT) is based in Roosendaal and consists of the 104th Observer and Reconnaissance Company, the mobilizable 305th Commando Force Battalion (CFB), administrative elements and its own training company. The 305th CFB is dedicated to the NTC for special operations in the Netherlands upon commencement of hostilities. The KTC,

in addition to its own training program, provides airborne training for KL and KM personnel and unit combat training to all mechanized infantry companies of the 1LK.¹¹

Functional Support Commands¹²

National Logistics Command

The headquarters of the National Logistics Command (NLC) is located in Deventer. The NLC supports all elements of the KL in 3rd, 4th and 5th echelon maintenance, except for the 1LK which is 3rd echelon maintenance capable. Additionally, a combat task of the NLC is to transport the bulk of 1LK supplies to its AO in West Germany and evacuate combat casualties to the Netherlands. The approximate strength of the NLC is 4,000 and 17,000 during peacetime and war, respectively.

Communications Command

The Communications Command (CVKL) supports all territorial signal elements and operates the KL communications network. The CVKL fields three signal battalions and its collective strength fluctuates between 2,000 to 4,500. Additionally, the CVKL provides a communications liaison team to the BLS, NTC and NLC.

Training Command

The Traing Command (COKL) headquarters is at Amersfoort. It is responsible for all KL training and schooling requirements, not including the Military Academy (KMA) at Breda or the Higher War School (HKS) at The Hague. COKL administers a total of 23 to 28 branch and specialist schools, such as infantry, cavalry, artillery, military intelligence, driving, and leadership schools for non-commissioned officers. COKL is staffed with approximately 8,000 instructors and administrative personnel and trains an average of 40,000 soldiers annually. The increasing complexity of various weapon systems has taxed current COKL training capacity and has resulted in the continuation of advanced individual training within units of assignment. In wartime, COKL would have the principal responsibility of training replacements and reinforcing operational elements of the KL.

Medical Command

The Medical Command (GCKL) provides 4th and 5th echelon medical service to territorial elements and consists of three medical service groups, each group disposing of one or more hospital battalions. The GCKL is located in Deventer and its wartime strength exceeds 7,000.

Disaster Relief Corps (Korps Mobile Colonne)

KMC consist primarily of fire fighting and medical rescue

teams scattered throughout the country. These paramilitary units fall under operational jurisdiction of the Minister of Home Affairs but the Defense Minister is responsible for their training and upkeep. The principal mission of the Disaster Relief Corps is to reinforce local and national civil defense authorities during large-scale emergencies. Currently, in addition to fire fighting elements, the KMC fields 19 mobilizable medical rescue teams and 36 ambulance platoons.

Equipment and Modernization

The KL is one of the best equipped and most modern forces within NATO. The following presents the current major weapon systems in use by combat elements of 1LK:¹³

<u>Combat Battalions</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>RIM</u>	<u>Mob</u>	<u>Weapons Systems</u>
17 Mech Infantry	10	7	0	973 YPR765 w/ 25mm 265 M113C/-R w/25mm 326 TOW AT (I) 427 DRAGON AT
6 Armor	3	1	0	360 Leopard IV, 105mm
6 Armor	2	4	0	343 Leopard II, 120mm
2 Reconnaissance	1	1	0	108 Leopard IV, 105mm
2 Reconnaissance	1	1	0	102 Leopard II, 120mm
10 Field Artillery	5	5	0	222 M109A2/A3, 155mm
5 Field Artillery	2	2	1	76 M110A2, 203mm
4 Field Artillery	0	0	4	102 M114, 155mm (T)
1 Artillery	1	0	0	8 Lance Launchers

3 Air Defense	2	1	0	95 PRTL, 35mm 60 L/70, 40mm 479 Stingers, SAM
1 Aviation Group	1	0	0	64 Alouette III 29 BO105

Recently, the KL completed the following equipment modernization efforts: modified 468 Leopard I main battle tanks, now designated Leopard IV, at a cost of 579 million guilders; replaced all Centurians with 445 Leopard II main battle tanks at a cost of 3,231 million guilders; completed the replacement of all YP408 infantry vehicles with YPR765 mechanized infantry fighting vehicles in March 1989; introduced the Zodiac C3 system; and extended the range of the M109 and M110 howitzers from 16.8 to 30 and from 14.6 to 18 kilometers, respectively.

Current modernization projects of the KL include: the acquisition of the Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MRLS) to outfit a reorganized field artillery battalion and provide the 1LK with additional firepower in depth; the introduction of hardened recovery vehicles for operations in the forward combat zone; replacement of the 60 40mm L/70 air defense systems with the Flycatcher in the early 1990s; the joint acquisition of AT helicopters with the KLu for use by the 1LK, outfitting all YPR765 vehicles with thermal night vision devices; and replacement of the 66mm AT LAW and purchase new ammunition for the DRAGON AT systems.

Personnel Cycles and Retention

Personnel Cycles

The KL is traditionally a career cadre-militia army; the bulk of officers and non-commissioned officers serve voluntarily and are considered careerists while the remainder consists of conscripts and reservists. Each year, the KL requires an average of 40,000 conscripts to maintain its peacetime strength and insure the availability of a sufficient number of trained reservists.¹⁴ Bimonthly, a number of conscripts are called on active duty for a period of 14 to 16 months. During this service term, a conscript is trained in general military and individualized subjects and tasks and serves 10 months in an active duty KL unit. Following active service, the conscript is subject to immediate recall for a period of six to eight months. Subsequently, conscripts are designated active reserves and are reassigned to identical tasks and duties within Direct Intake into Mobilizable Units (RIM) for a two year term. The conscripts eventually are redistributed to inactive reserve units based on the needs of the service and the age of the conscript,¹⁵ but remain subject to mobilization. While on inactive reserve status, the conscript is expected to attend one to three annual unit training exercises. The process by which a unit initially remains intact, during the immediate recall and RIM phases and is mobilized in its entirety, is

called the Unit Accession System (ONDAS) and is differentiated from individual accessions (INDAS).¹⁶

Conscript Pay and Allowances

The monthly salary of a conscript is generally equivalent to the minimum wage standard of the civilian sector and increases incrementally with age.¹⁷ Volunteers of the same age and rank, however, earn an additional 25% in pay and allowances. As of 1 July 1987, a conscript receives approximately \$900 a month before taxes, assuming a minimum wage of 1,954 guilders at an exchange rate of one guilder being equal to \$0.4757. Twenty percent is deducted from the salary of those conscripts receiving room and board while residing in kazernes, or "on post." Additionally, the conscript earns 21 days annual leave during the term of active duty and a holiday bonus, "vakantiegeld," equal to 7.5% of their annual income (roughly \$800).

Regular Army Officer Education Patterns

The two principal institutes facilitating officer accessions are the Royal Military Academy (KMA) and the Officer Training Center (OCT), both located in Breda.¹⁸ Acceptance by either institute is dependent on the type and length of secondary education completed by the applicant.¹⁹ Those completing a minimum of five years secondary education may apply to the OCT and are upon commissioning referred to

as Category B officers. These officers are restricted to functions within the lower echelons of the KL and generally retire with the rank of major at age 55. Graduates of the more rigorous and prestigious six year secondary education programs offered by the Gymnasium or the Atheneum may gain entry into the KMA and are designated Category A officers upon completion.

Whereas the OCT and the KMA provide primary officer schooling, the Higher War School (HKS) in The Hague presents secondary military education during the 10th year of commissioned service. Category B officers are required to complete a three month staff course (VMV) and function specific schools of short duration upon completion. Secondary level schooling for all category A officers consists initially of a six months staff course (SD). The SD is followed by the Command and General Staff College (HMC) which has an 18 month duration. Only 10% to 30% of category A officers successfully completing the SD are selected for the HMC. Non-selected category A officers tend to function within the middle echelons of the KL and may ultimately attain the rank of colonel. HMC graduates, on the other hand, upon receiving their "brevet" are unrestricted in career mobility and are expected to retire with a rank of no less than colonel. At present, the HMC represents the highest schooling available for KL officers, although creation of a tertiary level has been proposed.

Retention

Together with the KM and KLu, the KL has experienced an decrease in the retention of specialists and careerists. Although at a less alarming rate than within the KLu, the number of KL personnel trading military careers for more lucrative civilian employment has increased significantly since 1984. Twenty officers were discharged in 1983, 22 in 1984, 43 in 1985, and 74 in 1986. Whereas these numbers reflect only between .5 to 1.8% of the total number of officers on active duty (4164), graduates of the senior service colleges accounted for 28 of the total in 1986. Additionally, officer attrition was greatest in the administrative (15, or 4.6% of the administration officers strength) and medical fields (10, or 6.8% of the medical officers strength). Among career non-commissioned officers, the losses were greatest in the communications, engineer and technical service fields.²⁰

Soviet Assessment of KL Personnel

A Soviet article on the KL personnel in 1986 portrayed Dutch Army officers as well-schooled, decisive, and generally favorably disposed to the Atlantic Alliance. The author described the rank and file as primarily drawn from the proletariat, however, and containing a large number of antimilitarists, favoring the removal of US nuclear weapons

from Europe and a curtailment of Dutch defense expenditures.²¹

Summary and Conclusions

The KL is a sizable and well-armed force in Western Europe. It is well structured for its conventional NATO task and has significant forces at its disposal for territorial defense. As a result of economic austerity programs, however, the KL is largely comprised of mobilizable and reserve elements as opposed to combat ready units and is considered "maldeployed." Consequentially, the KL, in order to effectively meet its responsibilities, must mobilize very early during times of crisis or national emergency. Additionally, most 1LK elements must rapidly deploy from their locations within the Netherlands to forward battle positions. In short, therefore, the KL is reliant on an early political decision to mobilize and is most vulnerable to attack during deployment procedures. The impact of these two considerations on the functioning of the KL will be examined in subsequent chapters.

* * *

Chapter III - Endnotes

1. KL Strength figures drawn from The Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988) 72. Mission summary statements translated from Inleiding Defensie Organisatie (The Hague: HKS, VI-IDO-1, December 1985) 22-24.

2. Inleiding Defensie Organisatie Ibid., 24-27.

3. The full Dutch titles are: Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten (BLS); Chef van de Landmachtstaf (CLAS); Directeur Personeel KL (DPKL); Directeur Materieel KL (DMKL); and Directeur Economisch Beheer KL (DEBKL).

4. "41 Pabrig Stelt Zich Voor." Griffioen (February 21, 1986) 1.

5. M.J. Wilmink. "Het Eerste Nederlandse Legerkorps." Ons Leger (March 1987) 32.

6. Ibid., 32; and Griffioen., 1-35.

7. Wilmink. Ibid., 32; Griffioen., 1-35; and Ministry of Defense. The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984 (The Hague: Directorate of Information, 1984) 29.

8. Between the Eastern Netherlands (vic. Hengelo) and Osnabrück in West Germany, a multilane highway is under construction. Until it is completed, however, the KL is forced to rely on secondary roads.

9. Griffioen., 2-6.

10. Information on the NTC is primarily extracted from an information booklet entitled "National Territorial Command." (Gouda: NTC Public Information Section, n.d.).

11. Information on the KTC is primarily extracted from an information booklet published by the KTC entitled "NL: Korps Commandotroepen (KTC)." No author or date given.

12. Ministry of Defense. Defensienota 1984 in kort bestek and The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Facts and Figures - Defence (The Hague: Directie Voorlichting MvD, 1984 and 1980) 30-35 and 15-20, respectively.

13. Whereas a battalion is designated as active, it is not meant to imply that all of its organic elements are combat ready. Most battalions, except for those assigned to

the 41st Armor Brigade, have one or two companies on Immediate Recall or RIM status. These units would rejoin their battalions under ONDAS. Information sources: The Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988) 72-73; Defensienota 1984 30-35; Defence White Paper 1984 23-27; and "Defensie," Rijksbegroting 1988 (The Hague: Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 1987-1988).

14. Wilmink. Ibid., 33-35.

15. Soldiers on inactive reserve status are subject to mobilization until age 35, non-commissioned officers to age 40, and reserve officers to age 45.

16. Onderdeels Aanvullings Systeem (ONDAS), Individueel Aanvullings Systeem (INDAS), Rechtstreeks Instromend Mobilisabel (RIM) unit. Wilmink. Ibid., 33-34.

17. The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Facts and Figures - Defence. (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984) 13-14; and "Verlaging uitkering van IOAW en bijstand." NRC Handelsblad (June 30, 1987).

18. "Briefing on the Netherlands Army Staff College." (The Hague: HKS, 1987).

19. For a short but detailed explanation of the Dutch secondary school system, see: William Z. Shetter. The Netherlands in Perspective (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 108-113.

20. Exit-Onderzoek 1986 ('s-Gravenhage: DPKL, January 1987). Additionally, the officer discharge trend appears to have continued into 1988 and 1989. Three of 20 graduates of the Dutch Command and General Staff College (HMC 1987) have already left the service for jobs in the civilian sector.

21. A. Anikuhin. "Dichtung und Wahrheit over de Koninklijke Landmacht," translated by MvD from Voyenny Vestnik (October 1986). Ons Leger 12 (December 1987) 4-5.

CHAPTER IV

The Netherlands and its Army

Wij wenden ons tot God en Jan Soldaat
Als bittre nood en zware strijd ons wacht
De nood voorbij, het land in vredestaat,
Vergeten wordt de Heer en Jan Soldaat.¹

Today, the army does not perform as central a function within modern Dutch society as it had during the Republic. Not unlike other Western democracies, the Dutch tend to appreciate their armed forces in direct proportion to the intensity of a perceived threat. Accordingly, after more than 40 years of relative peace and prosperity and the presence of a large activist peace movement, coupled with traditional inclinations towards pacifism, it would be reasonable to expect a decline in the level of prestige accorded a military professional in Dutch society as well as a public reluctance to support large standing armed forces. Public opinion polls from 1953 through 1982, however, have indicated a relative stable public acceptance of the military profession and have demonstrated substantial and continual support for the Dutch military contribution to the Alliance.² This chapter examines political and socio-economical factors within Dutch society which impact directly or indirectly on the KL.

Dutch Politics

"Holland is [...] one of the most notable examples of a successful democracy. The social and ideological fragmentation of the Dutch people has

not been an insurmountable obstacle to the development and firm persistence of a stable, effective, and legitimate parliamentary democracy which has served the people well and which has by and large enjoyed their active support or acquiescence."³


The Netherlands is a pluralistic democracy in which three main ideological themes can be discerned: conservatism, socialism and Christian Democratic centrism.⁴ Within these groupings, splintering and political fragmentation have resulted in the creation of as many as two dozen parties and successive coalition governments since 1946. Currently, only ten parties are represented in the Eerste Kamer and only nine parties in the Tweede Kamer of the Staten Generaal, the First and Second Chambers of the Dutch Parliament, respectively. Although in an often seemingly chaotic political climate, there have been 14 national elections and 17 different coalitions since World War II, several trends offering stability and continuity are noteworthy:⁵

- 1) The Dutch Catholic Party has been the only political party which has participated in every postwar governing coalition; formerly as the Catholic People's Party (KVP) and since 1977 as part of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA).

- 2) There has been a general tendency for center and center-right parties to form governing coalitions, even as a minority, thereby excluding the political left. The Labor Party (PvdA) has participated in government only 8 of 17 times and other left-of-center parties have participated only

3) The current right-of-center CDA and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) coalition, originating in 1982 and formed again in 1986, has proven itself exceedingly stable despite the cruise missile deployment controversy and the introduction of several unpopular economic austerity measures.

Risking an oversimplification of the political party dynamics in the Netherlands, the following diagram presents the current Dutch political spectrum, but is limited to those parties actually represented in either chamber of parliament since 1986 (* denotes Eerste Kamer only).⁶



The growth of the Dutch multiparty system, which emerged from the tendency of political parties to reflect the

interests of particular religious and economic groups, has been reinforced through proportional representation. The major parties are the Christian Democrats (34.6% of the national vote in 1986), the Labor Party (33.3%) representing the socialist ideology, and the socio-economically conservative Liberals - VVD (17.4%).⁷ Individual political parties have generally advocated varied positions regarding national security and defense spending, ranging from an increase in military expenditures to the total elimination of all armed forces. These positions are, if not altogether contradictory and conflicting, explicitly different enough to create confusion and frustration among the electorate.⁸

Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)

Following the gradual erosion in electoral support of the three primary Dutch confessional parties, the KVP, and two protestant groups, the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the Christian Historical Union (CHU), the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) was formed between 1976 and 1980. Key elements of the CDA positions on defense are: NATO membership is vital to national security; conventional forces must be improved; the Netherlands must share equitably in a collective deterrence effort; and inter-European military cooperation must be improved in order to enhance national security. The CDA has been the majority party of the governing coalition since 1982 and is currently represented in the cabinet by

nine ministers, including Prime Minister Lubbers.

People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)

The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) is solidly committed to NATO. It is an advocate of a 3% annual real increase in defense expenditures and opposes unilateral Dutch force reductions. As the junior partner in the current government coalition, the VVD is represented by five ministers in the cabinet.

Labor Party (PvdA)

Formed in 1946 by a union of the defunct Socialist Democratic Workers' Party, left-wing liberals and progressive Catholics and Protestants, the Labor Party (PvdA) strongly favors social democracy and energetically supports European integration. It advocates a reduction in defense spending of at least 5% in favor of social welfare programs. Additionally, it has opted to remain a "critical" member of NATO but wants to eliminate all Dutch nuclear tasks, i.e. F16, Orion and, as first priority, dual-capable artillery. The PvdA is determined to work for a nuclear-free Europe. The PvdA is currently in opposition to the government in parliament. Prior to the 1986 elections, the PvdA publicly opposed US cruise missile deployment in the Netherlands. Subsequently, however, it lost its parliamentary plurality to the CDA.

Democrats 66 and the Reformational Political Federation

Democrats 66 (D66) gained 561,865 or 6.13% and the Reformational Political Federation (RPF) obtained 83,269 or .9% of the national vote in 1986. D66 wants to restructure NATO to reflect a European identity, promote active nuclear disarmament, reduce current national nuclear tasks from six to two and place a greater emphasis on conventional force expenditures. D66 and RPF have little in common politically other than that both share a slightly left-of-center approach to social and economic issues. D66 is the personal creation of its current parliamentary leader, H. van Mierlo, and has lost a significant number of Tweede Kamer seats in 1986: from 17 to 6. The RPF is represented with one seat in both chambers of parliament.

The "Little Left" (CPN, PSP, EVP and PPR)

Collectively the Little Left gained 305,165 votes or 3.32% in 1986. The Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) advocates the immediate elimination of all Dutch armed forces and NATO structures within the Netherlands, as well as terminating the Dutch membership in NATO. The Radical Political Party (PPR) favors gradual and eventual elimination of the armed forces and would oppose all NATO resolutions while remaining a member nation. The Evangelical People's Party (EVP) promotes the formulation of an independent Dutch defense policy. The

Netherlands Communist Party (CPN) appeals to left-wing intellectuals and low-income laborers. The CPN calls for the abolition of capitalism and the monarchy, drastic cuts in defense expenditures, and a withdrawal from NATO. The CPN was polarized in the 1970s between hardline Marxists and a social-democratic, radical feminist faction. The former split with the CPN in 1984 and formed the Alliance of Communists in the Netherlands (VCN). This fragmentation of the CPN led to its low electorate support in 1986 and marked the first time in postwar elections that the CPN did not obtain a single seat in the Tweede Kamer. All parties demand a nuclear-free Europe.

The "Little Right" (GVP and SGP)

As a group, the Reformed Political Union (GVP) and the Political Reformed Party (SGP) won 247,903 or 2.7% of the vote during the last national elections. Both parties see Dutch security inextricably based and dependent on NATO membership. Additionally, both consider nuclear weapons necessary for the establishment of a credible collective deterrence and the SGP favors defense expenditure increases of 3% annually.

Public Opinion and Political Party Platforms

In a 1987 public opinion poll funded by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission,⁹ responses to the following questions

were largely along party lines:

1. Are the WTO conventional forces stronger than those of NATO? Of the possible responses, 49% believed the WTO was much stronger or stronger than NATO, 26% believed both sides were equally strong, and 19% offered no opinion. Sixty-three percent of those affiliated with the VVD responded "much stronger or stronger," 53% of CDA respondents, 44% of PvdA, and 43% of D66.

2. Should the Netherlands continue its membership in NATO? Seventy-five percent of the sample population responded with "Yes," 8% answered "No," and 17% had no opinion. Ninety-four percent of participating VVD'ers responded "Yes," 89% of the CDA, 71% of the D66, and 64% of the PvdA.

3. Do you believe the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal in Europe? Fifty-six percent of those responding did not believe this to be true. Seventy-one percent of VVD participants did not believe the USSR would unilaterally reduce its nuclear forces, 68.5% of the CDA, 60% of the D66, and 44% of the PvdA.

The Surprise of the 1986 National Elections

Despite the number of national political parties and single-interest groups vying for support from the electorate, Dutch elections are generally low key affairs and are fairly predictable,¹⁰ except the national elections in 1986. Within the Netherlands, following the cruise missile debacle, it was

generally understood that the PvdA would return to government and only the victory margin itself was open to speculation. The day before the election, a leading national newspaper (NRC Handelsblad) queried leading politicians regarding their predictions. Across the board, with two obvious exceptions, the expectation was that the PvdA would win 56 and the CDA 46 seats. When the results of over nine million votes cast during a 85.7% turnout were tabulated, however, the CDA had won 54 and the PvdA settled for 52 seats. The CDA gains were sufficiently large to offset a predicted loss of electorate support for the VVD, from 36 to 27 seats, and return the coalition to government with a combined total of 81 of 150 seats in the Tweede Kamer.¹¹ The CDA victory at the polls surprised not only the Dutch but neighboring states as well, i.e. West Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium and France.

The political upset has been largely attributed to Ruud Lubbers's personal magnetism and, if true, would be a first in Dutch politics. The major industrial provinces voted PvdA as expected: Noord Holland, Zuid Holland, Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe. Marginal increases elsewhere, however, were largely offset by larger CDA gains. CDA and VVD support was generally concentrated in the more rural provinces: Zeeland, Gelderland, Overijssel, Noord Brabant, Limburg and Utrecht.

The Economy of the Netherlands

State of the Economy

The 1984 economic recovery, stimulated by a strong domestic and export demand, has slowed down considerably and the Netherlands is currently faced with a strong possibility that its economy will remain relatively static throughout the 1990s.¹² Unemployment, although declining from a peak of 18.2% in 1984 to 11.6% in late 1986, has hovered steadily around 14% the past two years. When natural gas flowed in abundance, the Dutch built themselves a welfare state and public spending rose from 55.5% to 65.5% of the net national income during the 1975-1986 period. Simultaneously, social welfare payments rose to nearly 35% and more than 43% of Dutch households were publicly subsidized. By the mid-1980s, the Netherlands trailed only Sweden in being the most accomplished European welfare state. Unlike Sweden, however, the Netherlands is burdened with a relatively large national deficit. A dramatic drop in natural gas revenues, from 22 billion guilders in 1985 to eight billion in 1986 and equalling a decline of total government revenues by eight percent, has resulted in various economic austerity measures. Accordingly, the government is attempting to decrease deficit spending from approximately 7.6% in 1986 to 5.25% by 1990.

Coupled with high and chronic unemployment, a static export market and a substantial loss of revenues, the Netherlands has a greying population. Currently one of every

five Dutch workers is over 55 and eight of ten presently employed workers will be over 65 in the year 2025. After the year 2000, the Dutch face a sharp decline in population as the birthrate is projected to fall rapidly below the number of expected deaths.¹³ This, in addition to its obvious economic impact, will challenge the ability of the Netherlands to retain current strength levels within the armed services.

The main risks to the Dutch economy, however, continue to emanate from international developments. The Netherlands is more vulnerable to external shocks than most other nations because of its high reliance on trade. These vulnerabilities include, but are not limited to, unstable monetary exchange rates, a West German economic slowdown, and uncontrolled fluctuations in the energy markets.

Dutch politicians attempting to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment by introducing tax cuts are hindered by tight governmental budgetary constraints and established social welfare spending expectations. Currently, the Netherlands taxes its citizens between 50% to 70% of their personal income and a value added tax (VAT) of 20% is customarily placed on goods marked for domestic consumption. Consequently, the Netherlands has a thriving underground "black" economy and, not unlike Belgium, tax fraud has become quite popular in recent years.

Foreign Interests

The Netherlands is an active proponent of closer regional and continental economic cooperation, respectively within the Benelux and the EEC. Despite some minor reservations of the VVD regarding insufficient deregulation provisions, the major political parties all enthusiastically endorsed the "Europe 1992" initiative and the public supports membership in EEC by roughly 80% to 3%.¹⁴ Economically speaking, this is hardly surprising as the Netherlands, with only 5% of the Community's population, handles 20% of the EEC imports and 32% of its exports.¹⁵ Rotterdam and the Europort alone in 1983 accounted for 11.8% of the total world transport of iron ore, 5% of all the coal, 10% of grain, 7.5% of oil. German heavy industry in the Ruhr is heavily dependent on iron ore and coal shipments from Rotterdam.

As a member of the Benelux, the Netherlands is part of the 4th largest economic entity in the world, after the USA, Japan and West Germany. Additionally, the combined capacity of Belgian and Dutch harbor and port facilities trails only American and Japanese capacities.¹⁶

The Netherlands has many foreign economic interests outside of Western Europe. It is one of the largest foreign investors in the United States and several Dutch industries are firmly established in North America, i.e. Philips, Unilever, Shell, and Avacus Partners LP (UPI and FNN). Recent major, non-military Dutch purchases in the US included Boeing

737-300s, 747s, telecommunications equipment, computers and electronics, and agricultural products.¹⁷ Conversely, American Airlines recently ordered 150 Dutch-built Fokker planes for a reported \$3.09 billion. This American Airlines acquisition of Fokker 100s, the largest single order ever received by the formerly financially troubled airplane manufacturer, has raised total US purchases of Dutch aircraft in recent years to 177.¹⁸ Additionally, the Netherlands and the US have established several joint production and cooperative research and development projects; noteworthy among these are the General Dynamics developed F16 combat aircraft and SDI related research.¹⁹

The Netherlands has also been looking to the East and, although decidedly more hesitant than West Germany, is encouraged with the economic prospects offered by Gorbachev-inspired perestroika reforms in developing a market in the USSR. Serious discussion pertaining to increased East-West trade possibilities, however, generally leads to speculation regarding transfers of Emerging Technology and the flow of controlled substances. The NATO edge in advanced technology, with respect to the Soviet Union, and Western restrictions on the shipment of arms and chemicals to selected Third World nations have been compromised in the past by a number of West European firms, i.e. the Kongsberg-Toshiba Affair and the Iran and Libyan cases. Although the Netherlands has been implicated in several covert transactions, primarily in its

transport role, the Dutch government has taken firm action against suspected violators.²⁰

In regard to military purchases outside of Western Europe, the Netherlands is increasingly demanding partial compensatory measures from the supplier. One example of this procedure is the American contractual agreement with the Netherlands for the building and outfitting of a second US evacuation hospital in Limburg. The resulting US financial obligations are a partial compensation for the Dutch purchase of Patriot Air Defense Systems.²¹

Public Perceptions and the Media

"The military organization is rotten throughout. The Dutch people are constantly fooled concerning the functioning of the army. The organization stinks, it is absolutely not capable of performing its mission. It is one large bureaucracy with extremely poor management. The higher, as well as the middle ranks are permeated with inferior people who by lying, deceit and blackmail safeguard their careers. Corruption is evident throughout. The many scandals publicized by the media are but the tip of the iceberg."²²

The above quote was extracted from the lead paragraph of a 1987 Elseviers Magazine article on the Royal Netherlands Army entitled "Sick, Weak and Pathetic."²³ The article went on to address a number of allegedly serious problems within the KL, which included: shortages of almost everything, inferior equipment, poor pay, low morale, and an increasing departure of specialists and highly trained personnel opting

for more lucrative opportunities in the civilian sector.

Normally, one could dismiss allegations of this sort as originating from a few malcontents and the publicity as merely a lack of journalistic prudence, save for three factors. In the first place, the charges were leveled by a career Non-commissioned Officer with 13 years service. Secondly, several allegations were corroborated by fellow soldiers and included admissions from both the former and current Inspectors-General of the army that the KL was indeed facing serious internal problems. Thirdly, Elseviers Magazine has generally been highly regarded as a leading conservative news periodical within the Netherlands.²⁴

The Netherlands has staked its military effectiveness and participation in NATO on unique conscription and mobilization systems requiring considerable cooperation and support from its citizenry. It is, therefore, inclined to take criticism of the KL as a quite serious political matter. Depreciatory articles, such as the one discussed above, tend to appear rather frequently in the national media, however. Whereas the appropriateness of publicizing alleged military weaknesses remains questionable with respect to national security and may violate restrictions on classified information, the Dutch are customarily treated to a wide variety of defense related issues. Each medium presents these issues to the public from its own individual ideological perspective.

The Media

In a linguistic sense, the Netherlands is a relatively closed society as Dutch is neither spoken nor read much outside the territorial confines of the kingdom. Although many foreign language publications are readily available, the majority of Dutch rely extensively on national news sources. Television news is formulated solely by the Netherlands Broadcast Foundation (NOS) and is presented on all three domestic channels without the ideological bias of the major broadcast associations.²⁵ The news is presented in a straightforward fashion but is often followed and augmented by lengthy panel discussions. These talkshows are usually sponsored by the different broadcast associations and reflect their political and/or religious philosophies. In the mid-1980s, an estimated 11.3 million television viewers were watching more than 3.8 million sets; the latter is easily verifiable as the Dutch pay a listening and viewing tax based on the number of radio and television sets in a household.²⁶

More than 10% of the Dutch read more than one newspaper a day. A number of daily papers (there are no national Sunday editions) reflect the ideologies of major political and religious groups within Dutch society. The combined daily circulation of all 90 domestic newspapers is in excess of four and a half million. The eight major dailies can be classified into one of three political categories:²⁷

1. Independent Centrist

De Telegraaf	705,600
Algemeen Dagblad	392,000
	<hr/>
	1,097,000

2. Leftist

De Volkskrant (Socialist)	264,000
Het Vrije Volk (Labor)	198,000
De Waarheid (Communist)	68,500
	<hr/>
	530,500

3. Independent Conservative

Haagsche Courant (Liberal)	190,500
NRC Handelsblad (Liberal)	174,000
Het Parool (Liberal)	140,300
	<hr/>
	504,800

In addition, there are seven major opinion weeklies: Intermediair (Academic and professional orientation, centrist, with 140,168 subscribers); Elseviers Magazine (Conservative, 126,350); Vrij Nederland (Socialist, 96,715); De Tijd (Catholic and centrist, 37,709); Haagse Post Magazine (Independent conservative, 33,870); Hervormd Nederland (Calvinist and centrist, 21,175); and De Groene Amsterdammer (Catering to environmentalists, somewhat similiar to the Greens in other West European countries, 13,599).

Selected Defense Issues

The Alliance

Recent Soviet proposals to unilaterally reduce up to

50,000 troops and 5,000 tanks in Eastern Europe and planned reductions of the Soviet military budget by 14.2% and weapon production by 19.5%, has raised public enthusiasm for even further arms reductions, including the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons from the continent.²⁸ Whereas various public pressure groups have not as yet organized to the extent which was visible during the cruise missile deployment crisis, "Gorby fever" has spontaneously erupted in the Netherlands, although to a lesser degree than in West Germany.²⁹ Irrespective of any real security considerations, public euphoria in response to Soviet efforts to deprive the West of a clearly perceived threat has generated some questions regarding defense expenditures and the Dutch role within NATO.³⁰ An additional complication for Dutch lawmakers in their continuing efforts to reconcile public opinion with security interests of the Alliance is expected to precede the American introduction of a modernized Lance in Western Europe before 1995.

Task Specialization

Response to the current Soviet "peace offensive," increasing fears that the gigantic US budget deficit may result in an American "decoupling" from Europe, and rapidly accelerating costs associated with the purchase of new weapon systems, has been a renewed flurry of proposals designed to strengthen regional military alliances through task

specialization. One such notion was recently popularized by Professor P.M.E. Volten of the Clingendael Institute, a Dutch "think-tank." According to Volten, the individual states within a regional military alliance, such as WEU or Benelux, could achieve a more efficient and cohesive defense if each nation specialized in only one aspect of collective deterrence. The Dutch contribution under this proposal would be task oriented on the maintenance and development of ground forces while dispensing with its air and naval services. Proponents of task specialization have stressed the presumed economic benefits while opponents have argued against the loss of national sovereignty.³¹

Publicity and the KL

In addition to the above mentioned Elseviers Magazine article, the Dutch public is well informed by the media of developments or "horror stories" within the armed services. A sample of articles regarding the KL, as presented by major publications between February and June 1987, is as follows:³²

- An article concerning allegations of sex, drugs and East European spy rings which are reportedly operational at the headquarters of the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) near Maastricht according to Lieutenant General Berkhof in De Telegraaf.

- Articles in the NRC Handelsblad concerning the inoperability and unmaintainability of the Leopard IV main

battle tanks despite expensive modifications.

- Editorials in the conservative NRC Handelsblad demanding that Brigadier General A.J. van Vuren be relieved of command. Van Vuren had criticized the unkempt appearance in uniform and public intoxication of several Dutch soldiers stationed in West Germany. Additional editorials, regarding this incident, held the Defense Minister personally responsible for the creation of an "intolerable" work climate which resulted in low morale and substance abuse by Dutch soldiers.

Public Perceptions

Despite the frequent exposés and allegations against the KL, coupled with an often less than objective treatment by the media, eighty percent of those polled during the 1980s have consistently expressed the need for a standing army. Since 1963, polls have indicated that the public by and large has seen the army as a necessary evil.³³ Additionally, a significant sector of the Dutch public has expressed confidence in the quality of the armed services, ranging between 43% and 48% in 1982 and 1985, respectively. When queried on the distribution of a proposed budget cut, however, 36% of those polled thought that defense spending should be reduced in an equal proportion to other programs. Furthermore, 20% thought the curtailment of defense appropriations should be disproportionately greater and only

4% felt it should be less.

Social Influences

The Netherlands is internationally renowned for its social magnanimity and permissiveness. Tolerant conditions, social upheavals and anti-establishment provocations during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in Amsterdam gaining notoriety as the drug capital of Europe. Today the urban centers of the Randstad, the densely populated western section of the country including Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht, are increasingly burdened with street crime, vandalism, squatter riots, drug dealers, prostitution and pornography. The century old Dutch tradition of accommodating different religions, ideologies and refugees had in the 1960s become synonymous with weakheartedness and softness regarding law-and-order, thereby eroding the norms of social behavior and even approaching conditions akin to anarchy.³⁴ Historically, the Dutch have been inclined to regard criminals as victims of society and courts have favored rehabilitation over punishment resulting in extremely lenient sentences.³⁵ The failure of this approach has been demonstrated by the rise of thefts in Rotterdam alone, from 8,000 cases in 1960 to 64,000 in 1986. In contrast to conditions in the Randstad, roughly 300,000 people residing in the eastern "Bible Belt," notably in the village of

Staphorst, have traditionally eschewed drastic cultural changes and excessive social freedoms. This rural region represents an alternative life style with little or no crime and continued high church participation.³⁶

Since 1982, Lubbers' center-right coalition has proposed and implemented major legislation which, coupled with public frustration regarding social excesses, has weakened the power once wielded by organized labor and anti-establishment activists. Lasting elements of the social "free-for-all" of the previous two decades, however, are still evident within Dutch society such as equal rights for minorities, semi-legalized euthanasia practices, numerous political action committees and protest movements, street crime and hooliganism, and a relatively large number of heroin addicts.³⁷

Military Interests Associations

This period also brought about a number of dramatic changes within the armed services, especially within the KL as it was to a greater degree dependent on conscription than either the KM or the KLu. Prospective soldiers were exposed to liberalizing trends and ideologies before leaving their homes when mass media, in particular television, became both affordable and popular. To these men, upon being drafted, the existing military institutions seemed antiquated and oppressive. Army leaders, just as the government had done on

a national scale, compromised with the dissidents within its ranks and permitted the establishment of military interests associations.³⁸ The newly formed unions took issue with a number of disciplinary methods and military traditions which led to the elimination of such customary practices as rendering the hand salute, the ban on wearing civilian clothes by off-duty conscripts, and strict grooming standards. As result, Dutch soldiers who appeared in public were often perceived as undisciplined and unprofessional.

Today, the novelty of unions within the military has largely dissipated although most soldiers still "belong" to one of the many associations active within the army. Union leadership in the mid-1980s appeared less radical than its predecessors and open confrontations with military authorities of the KL are relatively rare. The largest association, currently active within the army, is the General Association of Dutch Servicemen (AVNM) with a membership roll of approximately 20,000 conscripts.³⁹ Service unions are generally affiliated with their larger civilian counterparts, primarily the Netherlands Labor Movement Federation (FNV) and the National Christian Labor Association (CNV). In addition to conscript unions, non-commissioned officers and officers have formed various small special interest associations which, however, are able to exert little or no influence within the army.⁴⁰

Minorities and the KL

The Netherlands army has traditionally employed a large number of minority members within its ranks, especially after the redesignation of its colonial component, the KNIL, to the Van Heutsz Infantry Regiment, and its subsequent introduction into the KL. As result of achievements by the feminist movement during the 1960s, the number of women soldiers has increased considerably but proportionally trails the other services; women soldiers currently serving on active duty make up less than 2% of the KL strength. Women and foreign minorities are not subject to the national draft but women may serve voluntarily in combat arms units.⁴¹ A large number of soldiers of Surinamese ancestry, some as Dutch citizens, currently serve within the army as officers and non-commissioned officers. Established provisions since the mid-1970s allow for the immediate discharge of conscientious objectors, even those who claim to be opposed to nuclear weapons in Europe based on moral convictions.⁴²

Recent Mass Movements

The period between 1979 and 1985 was a turbulent one for the Dutch. Peace movements, among which the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) has seemed most influential, have been active within the Netherlands since 1963. In 1977, the IKV organized the campaign against the neutron bomb.⁴³ NATO's double-track decision in 1979, which included plans to deploy 48 US Cruise

Missiles at the Woensdrecht Airbase, resulted in an unprecedented growth of the Dutch peace movement and Europe's largest anti-nuclear weapon deployment demonstrations were held in Amsterdam in 1981 and in The Hague in 1983.⁴⁴ Whereas some protest groups were opposed principally to the projected expenditure of 300 million guilders the government had allocated for preparations in Woensdrecht, and others protested on environmental grounds or against further US militarization of the Netherlands, all factions were united in their opposition to the deployment of the cruise missiles. Between 1985, when the Lubbers-led government finally approved the missile deployments, and 1987, when the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in Washington DC, the peace movement repeatedly blocked movement into and from Woensdrecht and vandalized military and civilian structures in and around the airbase.⁴⁵ At its height, the peace movement was able to submit 3.7 million signatures opposing the deployment to the government prior to its final deliberations.⁴⁶ The presence of soldiers active within the peace movement, led the Soviet analyst, LTC A. Anikukhin, to conclude in 1986 that the Dutch government had failed in its conscript indoctrination efforts.⁴⁷

Summary and Conclusions

The army is by and large representative of Dutch society and tends to reflect the same social currents and cultural

norms. Various political and socio-economical factors impacting on the KL are as follows:

- Military professionals tend to more closely identify with positions of the conservative VVD and the centrist CDA, while conscripts proportionally reflect the national support of the individual political parties and interest groups.

- The greying Dutch manpower pool and the projected population decline after the year 2000, coupled with activities of the feminist movement, have led to an increase of women soldiers on active duty and the possibility of introducing female conscription at the turn of the century.

- Defense spending competes directly with popular social and welfare programs for dwindling government appropriations. Attempts to stimulate the national economy have so far proved largely unsuccessful due to high taxation and a thriving underground economy resulting in lost revenues. This has led to a substantial segment of Dutch public opinion favoring greater cuts in the defense budget while recognizing the implicit necessity of a standing army.

- Compensation purchases are increasingly favored to offset Dutch expenditures and stimulate domestic economic development.

- Despite many varied depreciatory and subjective assaults on the military establishment by the media, the Dutch public has displayed a consistently pragmatic and sober approach to the armed services and seems determined to

formulate its own opinions.

- 'Gorby fever' has complicated political efforts to reconcile pacifist tendencies and security obligations within the Alliance.

- Substance abuse, petty crime and anti-establishment forces exist within the army at proportionally an equal or lesser intensity as within society, in general.

- Military unions, once extremely controversial and powerful, have been institutionalized and tend to be part of the establishment, thereby losing radical tendencies.

- Soldiers participating within various peace activist groups do not represent a failure of the military to properly indoctrinate its rank and file but reflect the Dutch preference for individual expression and tolerance rather than authoritarianism.

* * *

Chapter IV - Endnotes

1. Translated to English as follows:

We turn ourselves to God and GI Joe
When desperate need and heavy battle awaits us
The crisis past, the state at peace,
Forgotten is the Lord and GI Joe despised.

Source: W.H. De Savornin Lohman. "Politiek en Krijgsmacht." Ons Leger (March 1987) 18.

2. Public opinion polls conducted in the Netherlands between 1953 and 1982 accorded the same status level to an army colonel as a highschool teacher. In 1953, religious leaders, priests and ministers, were rated higher than both a colonel and highschool teacher but their perceived status had considerably declined by 1982. Throughout this same period, an army sergeant's position was perceived as more prestigious than that of a policeman but not as high as a local government official, i.e. tax assessor. Source: W.J.A.M. Scheelen. "Nederland en zijn krijgsmacht." Ons Leger (March 1987) 72-77.

3. Arend Lijphart. The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: 1975, 2nd ed., 2) as quoted by H. Daudt. "De ontwikkeling van de politieke machtsverhouding in Nederland sinds 1945." Democratie (The Hague: HKS, 1983) 185.

4. H.H.F.M. Daemen. "De politieke cultuur." Democratie, H. Daudt, ed. (The Hague: HKS, 1983) 51.

5. Although the usual term of Tweede Kamer parliamentarians is 4 years, there have been 14 national elections between 1946 and 1986, resulting in an average term duration of 2.8 years. Additionally, there have been 17 different governing coalitions with an average term of 2.3 years. Sources: H. Daudt. "De ontwikkeling van de politieke machtsverhoudingen." 180 and 184., and Eurobarometer (Brussels: EEC, June 1987) A23.

6. Election results and seat distribution in the Staten Generaal following the 1986 national election and the 1987 provincial elections:

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Vote %</u>	<u>TK Seats</u>	<u>Vote %</u>	<u>EK Seats</u>
CDA	34.6%	54	33.0%	26
PvdA	33.3%	52	33.0%	26
VVD	17.4%	27	15.5%	12

D'66	6.1%	9	6.7%	5
SGP	1.7%	3	2.1%	1
PPR	1.3%	2	2.5%	1
PSP	1.2%	1	0.5%	1
GVP	1.0%	1	0.6%	1
RPF	0.9%	1	0.2%	1
CPN	0.6%	0	0.6%	1
EVP	0.2%	0	n/a	0
Others	1.7%	0	n/a	0
		<hr/> 150		<hr/> 75

Source: Arthur S. Banks. The Political Handbook of the World 1988 (Binghamton, NY: CSA Pubs, 1988) 414-415.

7. "VVD verliest, CDA blijft stabiel bij verkiezingen." NRC Handelsblad (March 19, 1987).

8. Frans Kok. "Belangerijkste programmapunten van de vier grootste partijen." NRC Handelsblad (May 16, 1986) 8; "Verkiezingsgids '86." Elseviers Magazine (April 26, 1986); Haagsche Courant (May 22, 1986) 1-5, 6; and Banks, *Ibid.*, 414-415.

9. Survey sample was reportedly 1,447. Other questions presented were: "Do you think the US is too dominant in NATO affairs?" - 73% answered affirmatively; "Are West European interests adequately represented within the NATO forum?" - only 27 replied in the affirmative; "Do you think costs and other burdens would increase significantly if WEU became a 'European pillar' within NATO?" - 82% answered Yes; and "Would you favor the US 'decoupling' itself from Europe?" - 80% against. Source: Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) as published by NRC Handelsblad (May 26, 1987).

10. William Z. Shetter. The Netherlands in Perspective (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 152 and 154.

11. "Verwachte Uitslag." NRC Handelsblad (May 21, 1986) and "Buurlanden bewonderen overwinning van coalitie." NRC Handelsblad (May 23, 1986) 3.

12. The following sources were extensively relied upon throughout the economic section except as noted: "Open to the winds: A Survey of the Dutch Economy." The Economist (September 12, 1987); "Holland." The Economist (March 5, 1988) 106; Laura Raun. "Member State Report: The Netherlands." Europe (January-February 1988) 38-40; and "Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the US: Netherlands." (The Hague: American Embassy, 1983, 1985 and 1987).

13. F.G. de Ruiter. "Na 2000 daling van aantal Nederlanders." NRC Handelsblad (March 27, 1987).

14. Ernst M.H. Hirsch Ballin and C.J.M. Verkleij. "The Netherlands and the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union." An Ever Closer Union (Luxembourg: EEC, 1985) 275-284., and Eurobarometer (Brussels: EEC, June 1987) A63.

15. Simon Roozendaal. "Rotterdam, de nationale schat." Elseviers Magazine (January 3, 1987) 13.

16. "Benelux in a nutshell" (Brussels: Benelux SG/N, December 5, 1986) 1-5.

17. "Foreign Economic Trends," Ibid., 1987.

18. H.G.J. Pot. "Fokker onder hoogspanning." Elseviers Magazine (February 28, 1987) 112-116; and James Hirsch. "American Plans to Buy 185 Planes." The New York Times (March 23, 1989).

19. US Department of Defense. "SDI Agreement signed with the Netherlands" (The Hague: USIA, July 23, 1987) 1.

20. "Europeans helped boost Soviet defense: Nuclear arms, silent subs built with illegal shipments." The Stars and Stripes, AP Wire Service (October 24, 1987) 4; Michael R. Gordon. "US Chemical Shipment Seized on Way to Iran." The New York Times (March 24, 1989) 4; and Wim Brummelman. "Geen smokkel maar vrije doorvoer wapens via Rotterdam." NRC Handelsblad (March 11, 1987).

21. Janet D'Agostino. "Old factory to be Army's 2nd 'warm-base' hospital." The Stars and Stripes (February 12, 1987) 9.

22. Translated from the following: "De militaire organisatie is door en door verrot. Het Nederlandse volk wordt constant een rad voor de ogen gedraaid over het functioneren van het leger. Het bedrijf deugd van geen kant, is absoluut niet voor zijn taak berekend. Het is een grote bureaucratie met een bedroevend slecht management. Zowel in het hogere als in het middenkader zitten inferieure mensen die slechts met list, bedrog en chantage hun carrière veilig weten te stellen. Corruptie viert op veel plaatsen hoogtij. De vele fraudezaken die via de media naar buiten komen, zijn nog maar het topje van de ijsberg." A. Flipse.

23. Bert Bommels. "Ziek, zwak en misselijk." Elseviers Magazine (January 24, 1987) 20-28.

24. "The Netherlands." Country Data Papers (Washington

DC: USIA, 1985) 1-5.

25. Shetter, Ibid., 191.

26. Country Data Papers, Ibid., 3.

27. Ibid.

28. Robin Knight. "NATO in disarray? This time, reality." US News & World Report (January 23, 1989) 24-27; "NATO modernization faces Gorbachev-inspired troubles." Army Times (January 16, 1989); and Drew Middleton "NATO must deal with Gorbachev's harsh realities." and "Soviet overtures strain West's will to defend itself." Army Times (n.d.).

29. Richard Ullman. "'Gorby Fever' and Mr. Baker." The New York Times (February 16, 1989); Thomas Friedman. "Baker Finds NATO Fear of 'Gorby Fever'." The New York Times (February 14, 1987) 6; Charlie Schill. "Galvin: Don't abandon short-range nuclear upgrade." Army Times (March 6, 1989) 6; and James Markham. "For West Europeans, Another Missile Debate." The New York Times (January 24, 1989).

30. P.M.E. Volten. "De handschoen (behoedzaam) opnemen." Ons Leger (September 1987) 2.

31. David Owen. "Europa moet zorgen voor eigen defensie-identiteit." NRC Handelsblad (March 26, 1987) 8; G. Teiler. "Taakspecialisatie kan kwetsbaarheid verhogen." NRC Handelsblad (n.d.); P.C. van Kerkum. "Voor hetzelfde geld meer defensie. Ja, maar hoe?" Ons Leger (July 1987) 24-25; and "Plan-Volten leidt tot extra oproep per jaar 30.000 dienstplichtigen." NRC Handelsblad (March 25, 1987) 3.

32. H.F. van Loon. "Sex en Drugs rond AFCENT hoofdkwartier." De Telegraaf (21 February 1987); Maarten Huygen. "Leopard I tanks nauwelijks nog operationeel te houden," and "Blindgangers." NRC Handelsblad (April 18 and 22, 1987); "Generaal onacceptabel na kritiek op gedrag soldaten," and "Defensie mede schuldig aan wangedrag soldaten." NRC Handelsblad (June 15 and 17, 1987).

33. Scheelen, Ibid., 75-77.

34. Frederick Painton and others. "Backlash and Debate - Permissiveness: the Dutch are wondering if things have gone too far." Time (August 10, 1987) 18-24; and Joost de Haas and Henk Schutten. "Weimar aan de Waal - Nijmegen: van katholieke provinciestad tot anachistisch bolwerk." Elseviers Magazine (January 31, 1987) 18-14.

35. An unpremeditated murder convict was sentenced to

four years in prison, two years of which were suspended. Petty thieves convicted of 46 burglaries were sentenced to a 22-day excursion to a mountain camp on the Mediterranean coastline. Source: Painton, Ibid.

36. Painton, Ibid., 22-23.

37. Painton, Ibid.

38. C.M. Schulten. "De Koninklijke Landmacht en haar geschiedenis sinds 1813." Ons Leger (March 1987) 28; Bommels. "Ziek, zwak en misselijk." Ibid., 28; and R. Jobse. "De FNV en Vrede in Vrijheid." Ons leger (July 1987) 18-20.

39. "Generaal onacceptabel na kritiek op gedrag soldaten." NRC Handelsblad (June 15, 1987).

40. Pieter Maessen. "De machteloosheid van officierenbond." NRC Handelsblad (March 11, 1987).

41. Constance van der Valk. "Vrouw verovert het leger." and "Dienstplicht pas na 2000." Algemeen Dagblad. (January 31, 1987) 49.

42. The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984 (The Hague: MvD, 1984) 38.

43. J.A. Emerson Vermaat. "Moscow Fronts and European Peace Movements." Problems of Communism (November-December 1982) 52-53.

44. Vermaat, Ibid. 52; and Shetter, Ibid., 240.

45. "Ook zonder kruisraketten blijft de onregelmatigheid in Woensdrecht." NRC Handelsblad (March 7, 1987).

46. "Dutch leaders, public at odds on missiles." Christian Science Monitor (October 31, 1985) 9 and 32.

47. A. Anikukhin. "Dichtung und Wahrheit over de Koninklijke Landmacht," transl. by MvD from Voyennyy Vestnik (October 1986). Ons Leger (December 1987) 5.

CHAPTER V

Army Preparations, Plans and Doctrine

In previous chapters we have examined the combat traditions of the Dutch Army, the geostrategical position of the Netherlands and Dutch threat perceptions. We have looked in some detail at the various elements comprising the KL, and at the political and socio-economical factors impacting on the role and functioning of the KL within society and the Alliance. In this chapter, I will present theoretical and practical considerations pertaining to KL war preparations, plans and doctrine.

Training, Mobilization and Deployment

Training

"An Army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch, which proud in the feeling of its victories, never loses its sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat; ... an Army which looks upon all its toils as the means to victory, not as a curse which hovers over its standards, and which is always reminded of its duties and virtues by the short catechism of one idea, namely the 'honour of its arms;' Such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit."¹

Clausewitz describes military spirit as a virtue which develops within an army, not by the artificial bonds of service regulations or a drill book, but through confidence

and pride generated by shared achievements in successfully overcoming demanding challenges.²

In the absence of war, challenges which will eventually lead to greater unit cohesiveness, collective confidence and higher morale can generally only be presented in realistic combat training situations. Urbanization and environmental considerations, however, have restricted the KL in developing adequate training facilities within the Netherlands and existing facilities are limited to firing ranges and small unit tactical training areas. Accordingly, battalion level or larger training exercises are traditionally conducted in West Germany, either in designated military training areas, such as Hohne or Vogelsang, or in the private sector, primarily farmlands and villages. As a result of non-availability, costs and increasing West German environmental concerns, neither the designated military training areas nor the private lands are ideally suited for the creation of realistic combat conditions.³

In the first place, the KL must compete with other NATO elements for training opportunities in the designated training areas. Simultaneously, the KL must reconcile the available opportunities with the training level achieved by the individual units. In other words, a unit which has been formed for only three months and has achieved a minimum training proficiency at crew and squad level is not ready to participate in battalion or brigade level training exercises.

Because of the unavailability of training areas at the right time, and a desire to provide every maneuver element with a least one major training exercise during its active duty phase of 14 months, the KL customarily contracts for training locations with farmers and villagers. In either instance, environmental considerations tend to severely limit realistic combat training, such as soil conservation measures that prohibit the construction of individual fighting positions and reforestation efforts that prevent proper camouflage training. Additionally, collective compensation payments for maneuver damage resulting from movement by armored and mechanized forces during training exercises on private lands are usually exorbitant, thereby discouraging tactical maneuvers.

In 1987, the KL contracted with France for annual brigade level training exercises to be held at the 22,239 acre Mourmelon training area. This development, as well as the possibility of gaining access to the training grounds in Sisonne and Mailly, has provided the KL with a greater opportunity to train 17 maneuver battalions for the desired 38 weeks annually.⁴ Furthermore, the current environmental restrictions in France are considerably fewer than in either the Netherlands or West Germany, thereby allowing the KL to conduct more realistic combat training.

Small unit tactical refresher training for mobilizable elements is conducted annually in the Netherlands by the

Refresher Training Command (COHHON), under the auspices of COKL. The COHHON training exercises are primarily concerned with refamiliarizing soldiers with their basic tasks and equipment and lack both the desired challenge and intensity to build greater team spirit.

Mobilization

All KL personnel not assigned to combat ready units have a wartime function which is periodically updated to reflect changes in rank and age. The wartime function may or may not be the position in which the individual serves at the time of mobilization. This arrangement has been standardized, despite the possibility that it may lead to initial confusion upon mobilization, in order to obtain an equal mix of reservists and professionals in all mobilizable elements.

Immediate Recall

The BLS, with the concurrence of the Defense Minister, can recall all personnel on Immediate Recall (KV) status to active duty within 24 hours during crisis periods.⁵ As the compulsory military service term is legally a 24-month period and the average conscript has served for only a little more than half of this time, parliamentary approval is not required. While on KV status, a period between six to eight months, the soldier remains assigned to his last unit where his equipment and personal weapon are readily available. The

stipulation that KV personnel must report within 24 hours upon notification of recall is considered reasonable by virtue of the short distances involved between unit locations and individual residences.

The RIM System

All maneuver elements of the 1LK that are not combat ready are RIM designated. Mobilization of RIM elements must be approved by the parliament and will in likelihood follow a NATO decision in response to WTO provocations.

The RIM system is based on four factors: 1) Personnel assigned to RIM units are available within a short time after proclamation of mobilization; 2) Individual proficiency regarding tasks and equipment is relatively high because the average period between active service and the end of RIM status is only two years; 3) A relatively high degree of team and crew proficiency is maintained by assigning soldiers to the same teams and crews in which they carried out their active service; 4) Stored RIM equipment is operationally ready and is distributed in unit configurations in over 60 national mobilization centers.

Dutch military authorities assume a quick response by RIM personnel to a national mobilization proclamation followed by a rapid formation of combat ready elements. Upon arrival at the various mobilization complexes, unit representatives will claim their respective unit's equipment and prepare for

deployment. Vehicles and weapon systems are stored with all required ancillary equipment except for ammunition and fuel. Personal equipment, except for personal weapons, is retained at home by the individual soldier and is brought to the mobilization center after receipt of the alert notification.

Inactive Reserves and the National Reserves

Once the individual soldier has completed his RIM service, he is designated as an inactive reservist but remains subject to mobilization. These reservists may be allocated to the NTC or the 1LK, depending on the needs of the service.

The National Reserves (NATRES) is made up of volunteers and can be mobilized during times of national emergency. The primary mission of NATRES elements, in coordination with the NTC, is to secure vital installations and structures within their immediate locality, such as mobilization centers, bridges, etc. Accordingly, and because the efficiency of the entire mobilization process depends on effectively safeguarding these key points, the volunteer reservist retains both his equipment and personal weapons at home in order to be available for duty within only a few hours.

Mobilization Exercises

Occasionally, the KL is subject to large-scale mobilization exercises during which various battalion or

brigade sized RIM elements are actually mobilized. One such exercise held in November 1986, "Donderslag 17," required the mobilization of an entire brigade.⁶ The exercise included a vehicular roll-out and the issue of live ammunition. Whereas the exercise was considered largely successful because the units were able to meet a tight mobilization schedule and sufficient RIM personnel reported to warrant individual units to be rated "deployable," criticism from participants concerned inexperience and a lack of functional proficiency among participating reserve officers.⁷

Deployment

The principal problem regarding deployment facing the KL is the distance ILK elements must travel from their peacetime locations or mobilization complexes in the Netherlands to their battle positions along the Central Front. Ideally the KL would have two weeks to mobilize and deploy its forces. Considering the improved NATO intelligence gathering capability in recent years, Dutch expectations regarding some early warning of WTO offensive preparations are not entirely unwarranted. The length of time available to NATO forces between a first warning of impending aggression by the WTO and the actual commencement of hostilities, however, is open to speculation. Pessimists have noted the quick strike capability of 19 to 20 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe which, conjointly with 17 combat ready WTO divisions, could

attack along the Central Front with less than 24 hours advance notice.⁸ On the other hand, within the same time frame, only the most important RIM elements of the 1LK would be ready to deploy to their forward defensive positions.⁹

Although the Netherlands is not the only NATO member represented in the Central Region which is heavily dependent on early mobilization to meet its obligations, the KL maintains the fewest troops in forward deployed locations, namely the 5,500 men of the 41st Armored Brigade (Reinforced). Conversely, the West German Bundeswehr, by far the largest military presence in the Central Region, numbers 345,000 men in peacetime which following mobilization would be augmented by an additional 700,000. Within two weeks following the first NATO alert, American units in West Germany would be reinforced by dual-based elements stationed in the US during peacetime and double the American presence in Western Europe to 12 divisions. Within one week after mobilization, the UK would reinforce its 55,000 men of 1st British Corps with an additional division. Even the weak 1st Belgian Corps, consisting of only two divisions, maintains two combat ready brigades and several staff and logistics elements, totalling approximately 28,000 men, in West Germany. The remaining four Belgian brigades, two of which are mobilizable, would deploy to their assigned sectors within days following a NATO alert. Accordingly, the Dutch and, to a lesser degree, the Belgian sectors are generally

considered the weakest points of the Central Front¹⁰ and have been a major concern for NATO planners for some time.¹¹

If the Dutch mobilization system works as planned, it is anticipated that all 1LK combat elements will have relocated to their defensive positions within three to four days following mobilization.¹² Some variables which could effect this deployment timetable are: 1) failure of RIM and reserve personnel to report in a timely manner; 2) the operational readiness of personal and stored equipment; 3) the availability of Netherlands Railroad (NS) transports; 4) the availability of prerequisitioned vehicles, materiel and infrastructure; 5) public cooperation and control of the anticipated refugee flow; 6) continued access to major highways for wheeled transports between staging areas in the Netherlands and assembly areas in West Germany; 7) interference by fifth columnists or enemy commandos.

Once hostilities have been initiated, the deployment of 1LK assets becomes increasingly more complicated as all military infrastructure and supply routes become vulnerable to attack.

The Battle on the Central Front

Any discussion regarding the course of specific events during a potential battle must necessarily be based largely on conjecture and speculation. This observation holds true for the following segment which is limited to generalized and

theoretical planning considerations of a possible conventional Dutch-WTO forces engagement in the Central Region. Factors pertaining to a larger NATO-wide conflict and the introduction of nuclear weapons have been omitted as it would exceed the scope of this paper.

Physical Description of the 1LK Area of Operations

The 1LK AO is situated in the North German Plains and is roughly 100 kilometers wide and 170 kilometers deep. The 1LK is flanked in the North by elements of the Baltic Approaches Command (COMBALTA) and in the South by the 1st West German Corps. The area assigned to the 1LK constitutes a favorable potential approach for armor and mechanized formations from the East to the Ruhr and North Sea ports, inclusive of Bremen and Bremerhaven.

Visibility in the 1LK sector is generally limited by darkness and climatic conditions for about 60% of the time.¹³ Potential visibility is further restricted in war by battlefield conditions, i.e. smoke and dust, which implies the need for special observation devices based on thermal imagery technology. Increasing urbanization and afforestation within the AO limits fields of fire and observation to between 1,000 and 2,000 meters which allows precious little time for target acquisition by the defender. The terrain is characterized by dry and flat sandy ground, with some lower marshy areas, and wide valleys containing navigable rivers

running in north and northwestern directions.

Opposing Forces Doctrine

"The offensive is the basic form of combat action. Only by a resolute offensive conducted at high tempo and great depth is total destruction of the enemy attained."¹⁴

WTO conventional forces would doctrinally attack from the march in successive echelons; the stronger the anticipated defense, the more echelons would be employed. Airmobile or airborne units may be employed in the defender's rear area to destroy command, communications and control (C3) facilities, as well as disrupt the flow of logistics. Generally, WTO forces would be concentrated in designated areas for the main assault which is supported by various secondary attacks all along the front. Whereas the Dutch sector is approximately 100 kilometers wide, the 1LK can expect anywhere from one to three combined arms armies (CAA) depending on whether or not the main WTO assault is mounted against Dutch positions.¹⁵ A CAA is typically deployed with two motorized rifle divisions (MRD) in the first echelon and one MRD and one tank division in the second echelon. The combined organic strength of the first and second echelons of a CAA is 1204 tanks, 2280 armored personnel carriers (BMP, BRDM or BTR), 720 artillery pieces (120mm and larger), and 49,925 combatants.¹⁶ Additionally, the CAA is augmented by an independent motorized rifle or tank regiment in reserve. All WTO combat

elements are expected to retain the initiative and continue offensive operations around the clock.

Dutch Defense Doctrine

The 1LK defends its assigned sector with six mechanized infantry brigades deployed forward and retains its three armored brigades in reserve.¹⁷ The 101st Infantry Brigade is employed in the Corps' rear area and secures C3 and logistic installations. The forward positioned 1LK elements may employ either a position defense or an area defense and the reserve forces, by preference, are committed primarily to conduct limited offensive actions, such as surprise fire, counterthrusts and counterattacks. In short, the 1LK doctrinally conducts an active defense.

Force Ratios and Combat Attrition

A fully deployed 1LK could be outnumbered by possible CAA formations in tanks from 1.3:1 to 3.3:1, in mechanized personnel carriers from 2.3:1 to 5.9:1, and in organic artillery from 1.8:1 to 4.5:1.¹⁸ Accordingly, the 1LK would be outnumbered by more than 3:1 in major weapon systems should the WTO mount its main attack in the Dutch sector; a ratio favoring the attacker. A supporting secondary attack into the Dutch sector, however, would result in a force ratio of less than 3:1 for the WTO, thereby favoring the defender.

Predicting combat attrition of personnel and materiel is

an exceedingly complex and inexact procedure. Not all units are engaged simultaneously or at the same intensity level and, accordingly, attrition figures for individual units will depend on the actual situation and will vary considerably. Generally, it is assumed that a unit upon losing more than 30% to 40% of its personnel and equipment has been rendered "combat ineffective" and must be withdrawn from battle. A NATO problem, during the initial days of conflict in the Central Region, is the lack of operational reserves with which to either replace or reinforce potentially depleted frontline units. The US Third Corps, projected to deploy in the vicinity of Bremerhaven and form the operational reserves for NORTHAG, is not to expected to arrive for two weeks following receipt of the initial NATO alert notification.¹⁹ Consequently, it is crucial that all frontline units remain combat effective during the initial stages of the conflict.

Using attrition planning figures supplied by the US Army's Command and General Staff College,²⁰ and assuming that all 1LK personnel are present and equipment is 100% operational at the onset of hostilities, the following attrition rates for the 1LK during the conduct of an active defense are presented:

a. Estimated personnel attrition rates of all battle and non-battle casualties during moderate to heavy fighting in a Central European environment:

<u>Day</u>	<u>Effectives</u>	<u>Casualties</u>	<u>Combat Effective %</u>
0	90,000	0	100.0%
1	86,850	3,150	96.5%
2	85,200	1,650	94.7%
3	83,581	1,619	92.9%
4	81,993	1,588	91.1%
5	80,435	1,558	89.4%
6	78,907	1,528	87.7%
7	77,407	1,499	86.0%

b. Estimated armor attrition rates during moderate to heavy fighting in a Central European environment: (The assumption is made that 80% of daily tank losses are repairable within 10 hours and that 20% of daily losses are catastrophic in nature.)

<u>Day</u>	<u>Initial Strength</u>	<u>Percent Effective</u>	<u>Daily Loss</u>	<u>Percent Loss</u>	<u>Number Returned</u>	<u>Number Lost</u>
0	913	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0
1	913	100.0%	493	54.0%	394	99
2	814	89.2%	113	14.0%	91	22
3	792	86.8%	79	10.0%	63	16
4	776	85.0%	78	10.0%	62	16
5	760	83.2%	76	10.0%	61	15
6	745	81.6%	75	10.0%	60	15
7	730	80.0%	73	10.0%	58	15

The above tables indicate an overall attrition rate for the 1LK in personnel of 14% and for tanks of 20% after one week of moderate to heavy contact while executing the active defense within its assigned sector. Whereas the attrition rates do not take into account that an overwhelming enemy arms superiority may exist, i.e. combat ratios of more than 3:1 favoring the attacker, or a lack of unit effectiveness resulting from sustained combat activity, this cursory assessment indicates that the 1LK by and large would be able

to conduct unassisted defensive operations for at least one week.

Host Nation Support and Lines of Communication

LOC and Host Nation Support Infrastructure

The Netherlands, along with Belgium and Luxembourg, forms the geographical gateway to the Central Region for British, Canadian and American reinforcements. All transport lines conveying men and materiel from the United Kingdom and North America through the Benelux countries to the Central Front are known as Lines of Communication (LOC). The US, within a NATO context in 1968, established Host Nation Support agreements with all three Benelux countries, West Germany and the United Kingdom in order to facilitate the flow of troops and supplies to predesignated areas. Additionally, since 1984 the US has stored military equipment valued at \$4.3 billion in 18 Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) sites in four countries.²¹ Four US Army POMCUS sites in the Netherlands are located in Ter Apel, Coevorden, Vriezenveen and Brunssum, which collectively store sufficient equipment to completely outfit one and one-third US mechanized infantry division. Another US Army depot in Eijgelshoven stores primarily reserve parts, clothing and bridging equipment. The five US depots in the Netherlands are maintained by 1,450 Dutch civilians and annual operating costs of \$45 million are

paid by the US government.²²

Under existing Host Nation Support agreements, Dutch public and private infrastructure and transport facilities may be made available to NATO forces while in transit to the forward combat zone. These include, but are not limited to, the Rotterdam-Europort harbor complex, Schiphol airport and the Netherlands Railroads (NS). The importance of the Rotterdam-Europort harbor complex has been mentioned earlier (refer to Chapters II and IV), but the military significance of Schiphol or the NS should not be overlooked. In 1986, Schiphol was ranked the fourth largest air terminal in Europe with an annual cargo transit capacity of 436,062 tons. Recent construction at Schiphol has resulted in a new total of 84 park facilities for large airliners, four runways with a width of 45 meters and lengths between 3,250 and 3,400 meters, and two runways with a width of 60 meters and lengths of 1,800 and 2,018 meters, capable of accommodating all large and wide-bodied transatlantic transport aircraft. All told, 32,000 personnel are employed at Schiphol and it is situated on 4,324 acres near Amsterdam.²³ In 1987, the NS had 569 operational locomotives and in excess of 10,300 cargo wagons, 1,800 of which are capable of transporting armored vehicles and 800 are especially designed for sensitive cargo. The NS employs 27,928 people and maintains 2,824 kilometers of double and single tracked railroads, 1,841 kilometers of which are electrified. Additionally, the NS has established

seven major rapid container transfer points in Rotterdam, Leeuwarden, Heerlen, Amsterdam, Veendam, Vlissingen, and Kampen.²⁴

Furthermore, the Netherlands maintains that portion of the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) which originates in Noordwijk and regulates the supply flow from Rotterdam to Schiphol and military installations in the Netherlands and West Germany. Established in 1956, the CEPS is primarily designed to supply allied forces with required fuels and is multi-product capable.²⁵

All together, 5.2% of all NATO infrastructure construction and peacetime operating costs between 1985 and 1990 are paid for by the Netherlands. This compares favorably with Belgium (4.6%), Denmark (3.8%), Norway (3.2%), Turkey (0.8%), Greece (0.8%), Luxembourg (0.2%), Portugal (0.2%) and France, Iceland and Spain (0.0%).²⁶

Providing air defense around harbor and port complexes is primarily the responsibility of the KLu. Mobilizable forces of the NTC and NATRES provide security elsewhere and assist elements of the Marechaussee in safeguarding allied troop movements and materiel transport between debarkation points in the Netherlands and the Dutch border.

National Emergency Measures

Following a formal declaration of war or a parliamentary decision based on the actual situation or perceived danger of

the situation in close coordination with NATO, a royal decree, titled the National Emergency Decree (SNR), is issued.²⁷ The SNR proclamation constitutes the enactment authorization for a number of applicable laws specifying the degree and duration of extraordinary authority vested in civilian and military officials. Applicable laws which can be enacted include: the War Law (OWN), the Quartering Law (IW), Emergency Transport Law (VNW), Emergency Harbor Law (HNW), Requisition Law of 1962 (VordW), and a number of "normal" laws with emergency provisions, i.e. Traffic Control Law (WVW) and Aviation Law (LVW).

The provisions of the SNR and the OWN are entirely compatible with NATO's Host Nation Support Program as outlined in NATO Document MC 36/2 (revised). As such, various emergency laws can be enacted to support allied operations in the Netherlands. All current emergency laws and emergency provisions are extremely detailed and are carefully and continually updated to address all possible contingencies. Recent revisions in the OWN allow for Dutch civilians pressed into service to take requisitioned materiel outside of the territorial confines of the Netherlands using locally requisitioned transports, i.e. delivering supplies to the 1LK sector. Furthermore, the OWN is subject to additional revision in 1989 in order to comply with changes in the Amended Basic law of 1983.

Whereas the OWN specifically provides for Host Nation

Support operations, the Dutch retain full implementation and execution authority of its provisions. Allied military commanders operating within the Netherlands must request assistance from the Provincial Military Commander (PMC). The PMC is linked to the BLS via the NTC in Gouda. At no time are allied military personnel empowered to act as representatives of the Dutch government or to exercise aspects of the OWN or other emergency measures.

US Reinforcements and REFORGER

In order to practice the actual deployment of US forces to Europe and demonstrate the American commitment to NATO, the US Army developed and has conducted since 1967 an annual exercise entitled Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER). REFORGER 1987, which involved the deployment of 34,000 troops of the US Third Corps to West Germany, was supported by the Dutch under existing Host Nations Support arrangements. In all, some 13,000 troops arrived by air and sea transports in Schiphol and Rotterdam, drew equipment from selected POMCUS sites, and were transported to the operations area in record time.²⁸

As result of the estimated \$60 million cost of staging a REFORGER exercise in 1989 and weakened public support for the Alliance in the wake of the recently announced Soviet troop withdrawals, US military officials in Washington postponed the 1989 exercise to 1990.²⁹

Summary and Conclusions

Dutch war preparations and emergency planning by politicians, military authorities and civilian industries are considerable despite conflicting budget priorities. Pre-coordinated and detailed arrangements currently exist in all areas ranging from mobilization and deployment to the support of transiting allied reinforcements. The fully mobilized strengths of the 1LK, the NTC and the NATRES seem to be both reasonable and sufficient in regards to the threat in either the Central Region or the Netherlands. Preparational deficiencies are most obvious, however, in the area of unit combat training. Notable vulnerabilities exist during the mobilization and deployment stages, due in large part to the extensive reliance on reserve forces, a short reaction time allowance, and concentrations of troops and materiel providing targets of opportunity to opposing forces. Once deployed along the Central Front and properly positioned within the Netherlands, the KL appears capable of accomplishing its assigned tasks within the Alliance.

* * *

Chapter V - Endnotes

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6. "Steun NATRES bij Donderslag." Legerkoerier (February 1987) 30.
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13. J.G. Roos. "The Netherlands: Armour in Defence." NATO's Sixteen Nations (Brussels, Special, January 1985) 65.
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15. Based on CAA fronts of 30 and 80 kilometers in the main and secondary assaults, respectively. Source: Staff Officers' Handbook (Ft. Leavenworth: C&GSC, 1983) 6-37.
16. Ibid., 6-6 through 6-9.
17. Wilmink, Ibid., 32; and Roos. "Armour in Defence." 66-68.

18. Based on 1LK equipment totals as reflected in Chapter III and combined strength figures of one to two and a half CAA.

19. Kuethe, Ibid., 43.

20. Staff Officers' Handbook, Ibid., 7-34 and 7-47 through 7-49.

21. Source: Information sheet issued by the US Army Combat Equipment Group Europe (CEGE), 1987.

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EPILOGUE

Based on discussions in the preceding five chapters in which various historical, organizational, political and socio-economical aspects relating to the Royal Netherlands Army have been examined, my response to the question posed at the outset - "Is the Royal Netherlands Army an efficient military organization, capable of effectively mobilizing a well-equipped combat force and successfully accomplishing its primary missions on the Central Front and in support of NATO reinforcements?" - is a qualified "Yes." The Dutch Army, in final analysis and despite several problems, is a modern, efficient, well-led and relatively large force seemingly capable of meeting its responsibilities once fully mobilized and deployed in its wartime locations.

It has been my intent to examine the organization, the force structure, the disposition and capabilities of the Dutch Army in this paper, as well as acquaint the reader with the various political, economical and social currents within Dutch society which have directly or indirectly impacted on the KL. Accordingly, I introduced this discussion by commenting on several common, but negative, perceptions held by some regarding the nature of the Dutch and the reliability of the KL within the Alliance. Throughout the presentation, however, several themes developed which argued against some of the prevalent views expressed in my initial remarks, such as:

- Dutch traditions of pacifism and neutralism were rooted in political and economic considerations of the nineteenth century but following World War II have been considerably moderated. Since 1949, the Netherlands has been a staunch and dedicated member of the Atlantic Alliance and its military contributions are both formidable and significant.

- Public opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands seems no more unrestrained than in West Germany, the United Kingdom or Belgium and considerably less than in either of the two Scandinavian NATO members, Norway and Denmark, both of which prohibit the introduction of all nuclear weapons.

- Dutch defense expenditures, while failing to meet the annual 3% real growth rate, have been fairly constant in recent years and reflect marginal annual incremental increases which have produced well-paid and well-equipped military forces.

- Dutch military unions appear to have been co-opted by the system and to have lost their radical orientation. Furthermore, while disciplinary and grooming standards remain considerably more relaxed than US military norms, this writer noted a trend away from excessive permissiveness and a greater degree of discipline among young conscripts.

- Comparisons between the modern KL and the Dutch Army of 1940, in terms of reliability, fighting capacity and esprit de corps, are difficult to draw. Generally, attempts to do so

tend to ignore the differences in military preparedness, political orientation, degree of economic development and public support.

- The current KL, by virtue of its reliance on a universal conscription system, is representative of Dutch society in general.

Conversely, the data presented have confirmed several problems with Dutch security measures and vulnerabilities of the KL; i.e. political divisiveness on military issues, increasing public opposition to continued expenditures on defense, the maldeployment of the 1LK, and mobilization and deployment considerations.

Despite the previously mentioned political and socio-economical conflicts, which may be described as normal within a healthy democracy, the Dutch defense effort is considerable and has remained fairly consistent in recent years. This, in addition to impressions formed while attending the HMV, has convinced this writer that the current KL will acquit itself well in a potential East-West conflict, if the following conditions are satisfied: 1) the Dutch are provided with ample warning time of impending WTO aggression; 2) the Dutch government issues the SNR and authority to mobilize in a timely fashion; 3) mobilization and deployment of forces occurs according to plan. These three considerations seem especially pertinent because current Dutch preparations and plans have allowed for little, if any, improvisation or

flexibility on part of the KL during an emergency or crisis.

In conclusion, therefore, I am inclined to assert, that given the opportunity, the Royal Netherlands Army will indeed warrant its motto "Je Maintiendrai."

* * *

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
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APPENDIX A

THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS



COUNTRY DATA

Geography

Total Area: 37,310 square kilometers
Land Area: 33,940 square kilometers
Land Boundries: 1,022 kilometers
Coastline: 451 kilometers
Environment: 30% of land area is below sea level

Government

Official Name: Kingdom of the Netherlands
Type: Constitutional Monarchy
Capital: Amsterdam, government resides in The Hague
Admin Division: 12 provinces and 4 special municipalities
Dependencies: Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles
Legal System: Civil law incorporating French penal theory
Branches: Executive (Queen and Cabinet)
First Chamber, 75 indirectly elected members
Second Chamber, 150 directly elected members

People

Population: 14,641,554 (July 1987)
Annual Growth Rate: 0.51%
Ethnic Divisions: 99% Dutch, 1% Indonesian or other
Military Manpower: 4,064,000 (Males 15-49)
Number of Males Reaching Military Age Annually: 124,000
Religion: 40% Catholic, 31% Protestant, 24% unaffiliated
Labor Force: 5.3 million (1984)
Unemployment Rate: 13% (Annual average 1984-1988)
Organized labor: 29%

Economy

Gross Domestic Product: \$ 124.2 billion
Exports & Imports: \$ 67.9 and \$ 64.9 billion (1985)
Major Trade Partners: EC Exports 71.9%, Imports 53.3%
US Exports 5.0%, Imports 8.8%


Communications

Railroads: 2,824 km w/ 1.435-meter standard gauge
Highways: 108,360 km
Waterways: 6,340 km (inland)
Pipelines: 10,230 km gas, 418 km oil, 965 km other
Radio & TV: 6 AM and 41 FM stations, 30 TV stations

Source: The World Factbook - 1987 (Washington DC: CIA)


APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - THE DEFENSE MINISTRY




Source: The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Facts and Figures - Defence. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY



Source: The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984.
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
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART - MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS



Source: Inleiding Defensie Organisatie.
The Hague: Koninklijke Landmacht, 1985.

APPENDIX C

NATO - WTO CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMPARISON



Source: Extract from Declaration by NATO Foreign Ministers on Conventional Arms Control, Brussels, December 1986.

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
APPENDIX E

1LK AREA OF OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL REGION



Source: "Het Eerste Nederlandse Leger Korps."
Ons Leger (Voorburg, March 1987)

APPENDIX F
PRIMARY PEACETIME LOCATIONS OF 1LK




Legend

- A - Area inclusive of Seedorf, Hohn and langemannshof
- B - Area from Assen to Steenwijk
- C - Area from Epe to Amersfoort to Arnhem
- D - Area from Oirschot to Boxmeer

Source: The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984.
The Hague: Ministry of Defense, 1984.


APPENDIX G

SIMPLIFIED SURVEY OF DUTCH AIR DEFENSES



Source: The Netherlands Defence White Paper 1984
The Hague: Ministry of Defense, 1984.

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF SELECTED LOC SITES



AAI - Air to Air Interface Site
APOD - Airport of Debarkation
DHA - Driver Holding Area
MA - Marshalling Area
SAI - Sea to Air Interface Site
SPOD - Seaport of Debarkation

(H-1)

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED ABBREVIATIONS AND FOREIGN TERMS

1LK	First Dutch Army Corps
AO	Area of Operations
AT	Antitank
AVNM	General Association of Dutch Servicemen
AVR	General Defense Council
Benelux	Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg
BLS	Commander-in-Chief of the Army
C3	Command, Control and Communications
CAA	Combined Arms Army
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal
CEPS	Central European Pipeline System
CINCHAN	Commander-in-Chief Channel
CLAS	Commander of the Army Staff
CNV	National Christian Labor Association
COKL	Army Training Command
CPN	Netherlands Communist Party
CVKL	Army Communications Command
D66	Democrats 66
DEBKL	Army Directorate for Economic Management
DMKL	Army Materiel Directorate
DPKL	Army Personnel Directorate
EEC	European Economic Community
Eerste Kamer	First Chamber of Parliament
EVP	Evangelical People's Party
Finabel	Comité Finabel de Coordination
FNV	Netherlands Labor Movement Federation
GCKL	Army Medical Command
GSFG	Group Soviet Forces in Germany
GVP	Reformed Political Union
HKS	Higher War School
HMV	Command & General Staff College
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
IKV	Interchurch Peace Movement
INDAS	Individual Accession System
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Kazerne	Military post or installation
KCT	Commando Corps
KL	Royal Netherlands Army
KLu	Royal Netherlands Air Force
KM	Royal Netherlands Navy
KMA	Royal Military Academy
KMC	Disaster Relief Corps
KNIL	Royal Netherlands Indies Army
KV	Immediate Recall
KVP	Catholic People's Party
LLC	Corps Logistics Command

LOC	Lines of Communication
Marechaussee	Military Police
MRD	Motorized Rifle Division
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATRES	National Reserves
NLC	National Logistics Command
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
NS	Netherlands Railroads
NTC	National territorial Command
OCT	Officer Training Center
ONDAS	Unit Accession System
OWN	War Law
PMC	Provincial Military Commander
POMCUS	Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets
PSP	Pacifist Socialist Party
PvdA	Labor Party
R&D	Research and Development
REFORGER	Return of Forces to Germany
RIM	Direct Intake into Mobilizable Units
RPF	Reformational Political Federation
SAC	Standing Armaments Commission
SGP	Political Reformed Party
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SNR	National Emergency Decree
SNRF	Short Range Nuclear Forces
Staten Generaal	Parliament
Tweede Kamer	Second Chamber of Parliament
TWOATAF	Second Allied Tactical Air Force
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

VITA

NAME: Vernon Douglas Sorrell

DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH: 5 February 1948 at Medan, Indonesia

EDUCATION:

BA, General, Northwestern State University of Louisiana,
Natchitoches, Louisiana, 1980
MA, West European Studies, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana, 1989 (Expected)

PROFESSIONAL INFORMATION:

Major, 504th Infantry (Airborne) Regiment, U.S. Army

Former Commander, B Company, 3rd Battalion, 10th
Infantry (Mechanized), Fort Polk, Louisiana

MILITARY EDUCATION:

Dutch Command & General Staff College (HNV), The Hague,
Netherlands, 1987
Foreign Area Officer Course, Fort Bragg, NC, 1985
Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Fort Benning, GA, 1982

OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS:

Republic of Vietnam, 1966 - 1971
Republic of Korea, 1974 - 1975
Netherlands, 1986 - 1987

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Silver Star w/ 2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star
Purple Heart w/ Oak leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal w/ V-device
Army Commendation Medal w/ 3 Oak leaf Clusters
Air Medal w/ Oak leaf Cluster
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry w/ Bronze Star
Humanitarian Service Medal
Combat Infantryman's Badge
Hogere Militaire Vorming (HNV) Brevet