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FOR PEACE

by

Yang Dezhi



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Summary of Contents

Comrade Yang Dezhi has followed Heng Hua Mashang with another long memoir.

This memoir is about the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, which caused a sensation throughout the world. Based on his own personal experience, the writer describes the causes and the course of the war and shows the patriotism of the Chinese people, the patriotism of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and the spirit of proletarian internationalism. He also extols the militant friendship between the peoples of China and Korea, as well as the militant friendship cemented with blood between the two armies. *Comrade Yang Dezhi, 1951*

This written work has a simple style; its feeling is sincere. He describes the war with magnificent grandeur and describes individuals with a lively exactness. Much of the historical material presented here will be new to the reader, and many heroes appear vividly on these pages. This book contains precious historical material and has a strong literary flavor. It is a book which can teach our youth the revolutionary tradition.

GRAPHICS DISCLAIMER

All figures, graphics, tables, equations, etc. merged into this translation were extracted from the best quality copy available.

In representing the great will of the Chinese people, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, together with the Korean People's Army, smashed the wildly arrogant plan of the American imperialists to invade and occupy the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and then to go on and invade the Chinese mainland. The Chinese People's Volunteer Army thereby encouraged the peace-loving peoples of Korea, China, Asia, and the entire world and strengthened their confidence in protecting peace and opposing aggression. We ought to express congratulations and respect to the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army.

--Mao Zedong, The opening speech at the third meeting of the First National Committee Conference of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

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
Chairman Mao together with Comrade Yang Dezhi



October 25th, 1952. Kim Il Sung, Prime Minister of the Korean Democratic People's Republic hosts a banquet to receive a delegation from the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and commemorate the second anniversary of the volunteer army's departure from China. The photograph is of Kim Il Sung with Yang Dezhi at the banquet.




National Day, 1953. Yang Dezhi leads the National Day delegation of the Volunteer Army in attending a ceremony celebrating their return to China.



December 19th, 1950. Commander Zhu Dezong gives a mobilization speech in person to the mobilization conference of cadres of the regimental level and above from the 19th Group Army. The photograph is of Zhu Zongde and cadres of the army level and above and was taken after the conference.



10:00 am, July 27th, 1953. Signing the truce agreement. The photograph is of Commander Peng Dehuai signing the truce agreement.




National Day, 1950. Commander Peng Dehuai is celebrating at the First Anniversary of the Founding of the Nation Conference in Xian. From left to right: Peng Dehuai, Zhang Zhizhong, Yang Dezhi.



Comrade Helong and the heroes of the Shangganling (Sang-gan Liang)
[transliteration] Campaign.



Yang Dezhi with writers and artists. The third from the left in the front row is the famous writer, Ba Jin.



November 1953. With Comrade Helong as group leader, greetings are conveyed at the third meeting of the Group to Salute the Going to Korea. The photograph is of Vice-Commander Yang Dezhi representing the Volunteer Army Party Committee in giving a welcoming speech.




August 1st, 1953. The General Headquarters of the Volunteer Army holds a victory gathering to celebrating the armistice. Korean children present commanders of the Volunteer Army with flowers. On the left is the Director of the Political Department, Li Zhimin. On the right is Vice-Commander, Yang Dezhi.



Winter, 1953. Vice-Commander Yang Dezhi inspects the eastern line in Korea.



The leaders of the 19th Group Army command operations from a command post during an advance. From left to right: Political Commissar, Li Zhimin; Director of the Political Department, Chen Xianduan; Vice-Commander, Zheng Weishan; Assistant to the Head of Staff, Kang Boying; Vice-Commander Yang Dezhi.



Valiantly and spiritedly, they cross the Yalu River.



The Chinese army defending the ^{Cheolweon} ~~Tieyuan~~ [transliteration] region
and preparing to counterattack the invader.



In the course of opposing germ warfare, our officers and men spray disinfectants.



An endless column of prisoners of war.

Chapter One, The Expected Surprise

On the eve of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the 19th Group Army was put under the command of the 1st Field Army to fight in the northwestern region of our fatherland. At the time, I served as army commander. Comrade Li Zhimin held the position of political commissar, Comrade Geng Biao was Chief of Staff, and Comrade Pan Zili was director of the political department. Under the army's command were three field armies--the 63rd Army, the 64th Army, and the 65th Army--and some directly subordinate units. We were directly under the command of Commander Peng Dehuai and worked in close coordination with brother units. After the liberation of the important city of Lanzhou in the northwest on August 26th, 1949, we marched independently towards Ningxia. Although the struggle remained arduous, and although conditions were still complex and often changing, even our enemy was forced to admit the situation of the Chinese revolution. It did not matter whether one considered the entirety or the northwestern part, for the people already gripped firmly in their hands the confidence of victory. It was most appropriate that our attack on the enemy took place in the natural setting of the northwest---the autumn wind had swept away the fallen leaves. There was nothing of that atmosphere of two armies assuming their battle postures in preparation for a great showdown.

Not long after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the 19th Group Army's headquarters received an order from Yinchuan, capital of Ningxia to transfer to the ancient capital of Xian. All the subordinate units once again redeployed. The 65th Army, led by Army Commander Xiao Ying Tang, Political Commissar Wang Daobang, and others, stayed in Ningxia and continued mopping up remnants of the enemy. The 63rd army, led by Army Commander Chuan Chongbi, Political Commissar Long Daoquan, and others, was stationed at Sanyuan in Shaanxi. The 64th Army, led by Army Commander Zeng Siyu and Political Commissar Wang Zhao, was stationed at Yuji in Shaanxi. We trained and consolidated our troops, and, at the same time, we reclaimed the wastelands there. We did this while preparing to transfer part of our forces to participate in engineering and construction work on the Tianshui Yuji section of the Longhai railroad.

As the situation was changing, the missions of the armies were changing, and the thinking of the commanders was naturally changing as well. Young comrades today are not able to entirely comprehend that those changes not only influenced the average soldier or private, but strongly influenced us leading cadres at the army level as well. This was not merely because we were at that time all very young, like myself, who was 39 years old (which, according to the current view, is considered young for a cadre). The most important thing is that for many years everyone desired victory and longed for liberation. We desired that the people seize control of the national government, and we longed to have the people masters of their own house. Although this time in which all our wishes were fulfilled was not sudden, yet the sensation of suddenness was exceptionally strong. "The revolution has succeeded" and "We can draw a breath of air" at that time were thoughts which we belonged to many comrades.

During that time, there were many "old revolutionaries" in the army. Almost all the cadres of battalion level and above and quite a few cadres from the companies and platoons were "old Red

Army men" or "Thirty-eights". [Translator's note: This refers to the older generation of revolutionaries who often used .38 caliber guns.] Many squad commanders and soldiers had taken part in the revolution from the time of the War of Resistance against Japan or even earlier. Everyone had fought several, in some cases more than 20, years in areas comprising most of China, in places such as Jinfengshan, South Jiangxi and West Fujian, Hubei-Henan-Ahnui, the route of the Long March, Eastern China, Northern China, and the Greater Northwest. One could truly say that we were like military horses burdened with an urgent mission and that we were partners to fire and blood. The sight of death on the battlefield was like a frequent event of little importance; to hear the report of rifles and the thunder of artillery was like hearing music surging. We considered it our mission to shed blood and make sacrifices for the people's liberation. At the time, some comrades said that if all of a sudden there were no more war to fight, we would have to open up the wastelands, produce, and build railroads. It was as if silence suddenly reigned supreme over the battle positions and left the heart feeling empty. Of course, this was only one part of it. The other part, the main part, was that everyone was as overcome with the joy of victory as the people were. At the time, regardless of whether in the newly liberated regions or in the regions which had been liberated a while ago, the farmers were carrying out (or preparing to carry out) land reform. "Dividing fields and dividing land, they are truly busy."¹ The cities had not received bureaucratic capital, nor had they established the people's regime, reorganized industry, commerce and services, stabilized the socialist order, organized the people's livelihoods, or developed science education and cultural institutions. There was a multitude of things to work on, and all neglected tasks were waiting to be undertaken.

1 "The Poems of Chairman Mao", The People's Literature Publishing Office, 1976, p. 5

all of China was now experiencing unprecedented, enormous changes, which were overturning heaven and earth and growing more profound by the day. How could the army not face this new transition, these new problems, these new challenges?!

After the 19th Group Army advanced to Xian and stationed itself here, the surrounding area settled down. For a period of time, Commander Peng lived here. We had many opportunities to spend time with him. This made it easier to seek instructions regarding our work on a report.

Commander Peng, when facing a weighty problem, considered it thoroughly and with profound understanding, remaining all the while exceptionally calm. He was a leader who, though resolute, did not easily reveal himself. I remember he wanted me to have a hand in working in a few places--that was when I was serving as a member of the political commissar's committee in the northwest--and although I understood his intention, I still revealed my feelings, which were these: "As you know so well," I said, "during the war, there was no strict separation between government work and army work. Many matters were dealt with by having everyone discuss them together. Mission were collectively accomplished. You know me even better. From the day I became a part of the Red Army, I have done nothing but military work, and by the greatest part of my vigour has been spent on the battlefields. As for government work, regional work--particularly in peacetime--I feel completely out of place.

Commander Peng laughed. He said, "I'm no different! When I entered the Xiang Army, I was not yet 18 years old! The situation now is very different from the war. The Chairman and Comrade En are asking us for people; they want many cadres to go and do government work, to work on constructing the nation. This government is not like that government of ours in Duanjin and Shazhouba. This construction is not like what we did in Yanan with the sales department of the new market. I feel that these

new missions are difficult, are quite arduous, for you, for me, for many of us comrades!" Commander Peng paused for a moment, and, gazing at me, said, "As for you, of course you still want to put most of your energy in army work. It's not my opinion; it is what the Chairman told me to tell you. Now--", said Commander Peng, changing the subject, "many of our comrades believe that there aren't any big wars to fight. That's right. And we don't want to fight any more wars. China, this moral and upright nation, has been fighting all over the place, and the people have suffered so much! Affairs of the enemy historically have not been decided by us. After all, it is best to be somewhat prepared! Our minds should be clear! When it comes to the army, I am one who believes these four words: "Be prepared, no disaster".

When Commander Peng was in Xian with us leading comrades of the army, he expressed the thoughts he had expressed to me in that conversation more than a couple of times with cadres of every level, even with some privates. Of course, we understood the spirit of Commander Peng's discussions to varying degrees. I, for example, always felt that although in mainland China the large-scale war had basically quieted down and that the entire party, the entire nation, and a good part of the army would be put to work healing the wounds of war and would go and carry out the great task of peaceful construction, yet Tibet and Taiwan were still not liberated, and even in the liberated areas, things were not yet so stable. It was not like everyone sincerely protected our Communist Party! I remember there was a restricted circular which said that the reactionary Nationalist Party alone planned to send into hiding more than 400 or 500 thousand armed remnants and special agents. In addition, those people in the U.S. government concerned with policies on China had helped Chiang Kai-shek fight for so many years. They had sent people, spent money, expended effort, and for things to end up in this way with them facing an outcome which they absolutely did not want to see. . . . How could they be pleased? How could they leave it at this?

"Fight the enemy where his foothold is not certain and attain an easy victory"--this is the usual policy of soldiers!

Beginning with the end of 1949, the entire army was implementing the Central Committee instructions which Chairman Mao had signed and issued and which called for the army to participate in work to build up production. In the northwestern region where we were located, the situation was quite stable. Before and after the Spring Festival in 1950, restricted circulars and news released from the Xinhua Agency drew our attention to the eastern and southern regions of China. At that time, there was intense combat (including many fierce battles) to liberate the coastal islands of those regions. What attracted our attention was not the general war situation and the outcomes of the battles, but the Nationalist Party's frequent use of U.S. manufactured aircraft in carrying out wanton and indiscriminate bombing against areas which had already been liberated such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, Fuzhou, and peaceful towns and cities on both banks of the Min River. Especially egregious was the "Two-Six" bombing raids on Shanghai, which began on February 6th and continued for six or seven days. A few politically-minded people understood clearly that the dynasty of Chiang Kai-shek, which had collapsed militarily, politically, and economically, had not the courage, much less the strength, to take these actions. These actions obviously were not simply military in their objective, but clearly had an important political objective. The people naturally understood who was the one who had decided the policy behind these actions and who had given the instructions to have them carried out. This could not but be recognized as a signal, a signal which could only stimulate us to be vigilant and to think deeply.

"The sound in the east and the attack in the west"; "The attack is from the inside, but the intent is from the outside"; "A pincer attack on two fronts". The common people all knew this, and for the soldiers it was a regular strategy.

In China, which had just been forged in the smelting furnace of blood and fire, in the Orient, where the five-starred red flag had waved for not yet a year, the people were wondering what storm or evil wave would strike and what trials and tribulations would be visited upon them. These questions did not attract the attention and concern of the Chinese people alone.

How would the situation develop?

We were familiar with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang reactionaries. We had fought with them and negotiated with them. More than a couple of times we had fought and negotiated with them at the same time. From the bloodletting of April 12th, 1927 to 1950, 23 years had passed. As for the American policymakers who had supported Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war, they, in fact, were not strangers to us.

During that period of time, some changes occurred among the comrades responsible for the 19th Group Army. Comrade Li Zhimin and myself stayed, but Geng Biao, who served both as vice-commander and chief of staff and who ever since the Long March was with me day and night and fought at my side, left. Comrade Pan Zili, a political director, had taken part in the revolution during the 1920's, had gone to the Soviet Union to study, and was known affectionately by all as "Civil Officer and Martial General". Now, he too left. They both left the army because, to use Commander Peng's expression, they were "needed and taken away" by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Replacing them were, respectively, Comrades Zheng Weishan and Chen Xianduan. Before he became the 19th Group Army's vice-commander, Zheng Weishan was the commander of the 63rd Army. A little earlier, during the first phase of the war of liberation, he was the commander of the third column of the Puchaji Field Army, where I was at the time. We fought together at Qingfengdian, Shijiazhuang, Xinbaoan, and Taiyuan, and we were together in the march on the Greater Northwest. Before Comrade Chen Xianduan became director of the political department of the

army, he was vice-commander of the Shaanxi Military Region. I knew this old comrade, who had come to Shaanxi from the pivotal Hubei-Henan-Anhui battle, after the 19th Group Army was incorporated into the First Field Army. After sharing the post of Shaanxi Military Region Commander I knew him even better. At that time, the 19th Group Army and the Shaanxi Military Region basically performed the same governing functions. Even the army's little newspaper, "Fraternal Soldiers", was organized and managed cooperatively by the two government offices. The old comrades had a deep understanding of the situation. They knew that the feeling of friendship created between soldiers by just a few days of shared combat was more profound than what several months or even years could produce in peacetime. That the Party Central Committee, Commander Peng, and the leading comrades of the First Field Army wanted us to share responsibility for the 19th Group Army made me very happy.

The spring of 1950 came to an end. Politically and militarily speaking, the blazing hot summer days of 1950 arrived especially early. At the beginning of the year, when the planes of Chiang and the U.S. bombed the eastern and southern regions of China, and the U.S. and South Korea signed the "U.S. Korean Mutual Defense Treaty", we began to sense the hot atmosphere. In May, Johnson, head of the Economic Cooperation Office, was saying, "Equipped with American weapons, the South Korean army of 100,000 troops trained by U.S. advisors has already completed preparations and can begin to fight at any time." By this time, the warm breath of war blowing across the northeast, our coldest region, was already quite obvious. In June, Dulles, State Department Special Advisor, Secretary of Defense Zhanshen [transliteration], Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley, and other high-level personages arrived in Tokyo and Seoul. Dulles, during a speech to the South Korean Army, said they would "display enormous strength in the near future."

Although Dulles's speech contained an obvious threat of war,

judging from his many activities when with U.S. Army officers in Japan and Korea, it was clear that this was no ordinary war cry. For there was a long period of military and economic preparation, a wildly arrogant political ambition, and a gigantic, perhaps carefully thought out, plan.

Indeed, on June 25th, the Korean Civil War broke out.

On June 26th, U.S. President Truman ordered his naval and air forces which were stationed in the Far East to enter the war and support the army of Sygman Rhee and his clique. On the 27th, Truman announced the invasion of Korea and ordered his navy's 7th Fleet to invade the Strait of Taiwan and to seize Taiwan, which is Chinese territory. This is to say that the United States, situated on the North American mainland, stretched two long arms across the Pacific to grab Socialist Korea and China and put them in its pocket.

The People's Democratic Republic of Korea, separated from China by a river, and the Korean people, who have shared a deep and long-lasting militant friendship with the Chinese people, suffered the aggressor's sudden, savage attack.

The dark clouds of war had just left. China, whose smoking fire had not yet been entirely extinguished, again faced the threat of an invader igniting even larger fires of war. The U.S. 7th Fleet came steaming into the peaceful waters of China. China once again was facing a savage invasion from beyond her borders.

Where was peace?

Where was justice?

At the time, some foreign reporters compared new-born China to a "baby". They said that the U.S. wanted to kill this baby in its cradle. This metaphor, though descriptive, was not complete.

For the new China, which was engaged in a struggle with the aggressor, was not longer a "baby" incapable of resistance. To borrow the phrase of a foreigner, he was already a "waking lion of the Orient".

The heroic Korean people and Korean army, under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung, after quickly smashing the attack by Sygman Rhee's army, immediately launched a counterattack. On June 28th, they liberated Seoul. They continued to carry forward the victory. In the Wushan [Translator's Note: Transliteration from Chinese] region, they broke through five U.S. army lines of defense, nearly annihilating the 14th Division of the U.S. army. By the end of July, they had pushed back Rhee's army and the U.S. army east of the Naktong River, to Taegu and Pusan.

Our nation, confronted with this serious U.S. provocation, again and again issued strong protests and warnings. On June 27th, Zhou Enlai, serving as both Premier and Foreign Minister, indicated in a speech that "Truman's staement on the 27th and the actions of the U.S. Navy constitute armed aggression on Chinese territory and complete destruction of the United Nations Charter.... The U.S. Government's instruction to Sygman Rhee's puppet army to attack the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a premeditated act on the part of the U.S. Their aim is to create an excuse for U.S. invasions of Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, and the Phillipines. It is further interference in the affairs of Asia by U.S. imperialism."

Though resisted by the Korean people and surrounded by the protests of the people of China and the world, the U.S. government manipulated the United Nations Security Council. While two permanent members of the council, the Soviet Union and China, were absent, the U.S. illegally passed their draft resolution on the Korean situation. In addition to the U.S., some other nations were gathered together to dispatch troops. Beginning with the end

of August, Great Britain had two brigades engaged in combat in Korea; Turkey and Canada had one apiece; Thailand and New Zealand each had one regiment; Australia, Holland, France, the Phillipines, Greece, Belgium, Ethiopia, each had one battalion; Luxembourg had one platoon; and South Africa had one air force squad. These units together with the South Korean army were made a part of the U.S. 8th Group Army, creating the so-called "United Nations Army". U.S. President Truman ordered the Commander of the Far Eastern Military Region, MacArthur, who was stationed in Tokyo, to become the Commander in Chief of the "United Nations Army". The American imperialist aggressors, secure in the knowledge that they had strong backing, in the middle of September, landed more than 500,000 troops under cover of more than 1000 aircraft from more than 300 ships at Inchon harbor south of the mouth of the Hangang River and 40 kilometers east of Seoul, forcing the Korean People's Army to make a strategic retreat. At the same time, U.S. planes directly invaded the airspace over Andong (now Dandong) and dropped bombs indiscriminately and recklessly, spreading the fire of war so that it singed our sacred national soil.

The situation was very urgent and became more serious by the day. On September 30th, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai warned the invading U.S. army "the Chinese people love peace, but in order to protect peace, they have never been afraid of resisting wars of aggression. The Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate foreign aggressions, nor can they stand idly by and allow the imperialists to carry out wanton attacks on their own neighbor." The invader would not hear these just remonstrances. In the early part of October, the American-Syngman Rhee Army once again crossed the 38th parallel and began an insane march towards the Yalu River. In the middle part of the month, they captured Pyongyang. On Wake Island, the insufferably arrogant MacArthur declared to Truman, "All formal resistance in North and South Korea will come to an end before Thanksgiving." He also said, "The likelihood that the Chinese put up resistance

is extremely small." By the time the invading U.S. army had advanced to the Yalu River, some elements in the military had made the even more insane claim that "the Yalu river historically has not at all been the barrier which separates the two countries (China and Korea)".

Now matter how often our government, our leaders, and our people warned the invaders publicly and resoundingly, they paid no heed. They even went so far as to label as propaganda the "Oppose the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea Movement Week" which we launched, including the Peace Signature Campaign and the call of tens of millions of people (including the army) demanding that real actions to support Korea and resist the U.S. Afterwards, I saw the memoirs of the American generals who were invading Korea that year. They all admitted that they had "erred", but none of them said clearly what their error had been. This, of course, is not at all strange since their position and ours differ, and their premises and methods for viewing problems are also different from ours. I still believe that all aggressors still wish to make the mistake which their predecessors and they themselves have made-- the mistake of not believing in the strength of the people.

In the fall of 1950, not only reporters were considering the new China to be a "baby". Many people did not believe that China, which had just stood up, would dare to take on the Americans. They did not believe that the armed strength of the Chinese people, whose most important arms were "millet and rifles" would dare to fight the so-called "United Nations Army", which was seen as being "armed to the teeth". Included among the people who would not believe were our friends and our comrades.

In fact, we were prepared. In June, when the Korean war had just broken out, the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao foresaw that, as the war developed, a complex situation might appear, and the American imperialist invasion of Korea would reveal an even greater rapaciousness. Therefore, it was decided

that the 13th Group Army would wait in the northeast, ready for battle. After the invader had landed at Inchon and the fire of war had burned to our nation's gate, the Korean government and the Korean people requested the Chinese government to dispatch combat troops to Korea and resist the U.S. aggression. If the lips are gone, the teeth will fall; if the house is destroyed, the mansion is endangered. The Party Central Committee judged the hour and sized up the situation. They saw that dispatching troops to Korea to resist the U.S. invasion would "be of benefit to China, Korea, the Orient, and the world. If we do not send soldiers and allow the enemy to press against Yalu River, the flame of reaction, domestically and internationally, will shoot higher, which in no way will benefit us. . . . In summary, we believe that we ought to fight, that we must fight, and that the benefits of our fighting will be great, while the harm caused by our not fighting would also be great."¹ During the first part of October in 1950, the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao came to a firm decision: organize the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to go and fight in Korea, to resist the U.S. and aid Korea, and, while protecting the nation, to carry out our internationalist obligations. At the time, the level of secrecy surrounding this affair was extremely high.

October 1st was the first anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. At Beijing's Tiananmen Square, 400,000 people participated in a great celebration. At the same time, a massive dress parade took place. Chairman Mao, Commander in Chief Zhu, Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and other national leaders attended the great gathering. Acting Chief of the General Staff Nie Rongzhen served as the review commander. After Commander in Chief Zhu reviewed the naval and air force

1 "Selection of Articles on the Military by Mao Zedong, p. 347

units, he issued an order to all the national armed forces and to the people's militia. The order stated: "The U.S. imperialists are right now invading our neighbor Korea with armed troops. At the same time, they are publicly collaborating with the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's bandit gang to seize and occupy Taiwan. U.S. imperialism is right now using war to threaten world peace." Commander in Chief Zhu ordered us to "carry out preparations fully, strengthen national construction, be ready to fight for the liberation of the entire national territory." On the same day, Shanghai, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Qingdao, Shenyang, Wuhan, and other major celebration sites were scenes of celebration activities and of military parades. The more than 7000 officers and men of the 19th Group Army took part, together with 220,000 people, in the Xian New City Celebrations and were reviewed by Commander Peng Dehuai and other leading comrades. In this great gathering, the most resounding slogan was "Protect the newly born homeland and oppose the U.S. invasion of Korea."

After the celebration in Xian, I reported to Commander Peng on the situation: all the officers and men were eager to fight and persisted in demanding that concrete actions be taken to support their close neighbors, the Korean people, who were positioned at the front lines opposing the war of aggression; many officers and men had written documents in blood expressing their determination to fight. All the troops, one could say, were of a single mind and highly-prepared. They were just waiting for the command. Commander Peng stated that the officers and men were enthusiastic in their patriotism and internationalism, but he did not bring up the matter of the volunteer army. He told me that to the north the Americans had reached the Yalu River, while to the south they had occupied our Taiwan. They had gone mad. Under these circumstances, we absolutely could not yield. Commander Peng repeated again what he had said many times: "I believe in these four words: 'Be prepared, no disaster'" In this particular situation, Commander Peng by again emphasizing "Be prepared, no disaster", he left me with a profound impression. I remember that

when I returned from Commander Peng's office and began talking to Comrade Zhimin, he said, "I feel that it will happen soon. The Central Committee will not make everyone keep on waiting."

I had already had a presentiment that something would happen. I was making preparations.

At the time, my elder sister, Gui Qiu, and her two children were in Xian. They had made a special trip from my old home in Hunan just to see me. Gui Qiu was one of my dozen or so siblings, the only one of my relatives from the old society to survive. Although she was two years older than I, I always respected her as a member of the older generation. The reason I left home to work as a child laborer in the Anyuan coal mines is that she sent me. The first picture I took when I arrived at Shaanbei on the Long March, I sent to her. After spending those years from the time I went to Jinggang Shan until after the found of the People's Republic, I took advantage of the first opportunity I had to take a vacation and went to Hunan to see her. The feeling we have for each other are very deep. After the U.S. army landed at Inchon, I wanted to have her sent back, but I found it very hard to tell her. As her little brother, I had an endless number of things to tell her. As a army commander, what could I tell her? At the same time, my wife, Shen Gejun was pregnant. If my sister, Gui Qiu, stayed, then of course Gejun and the baby would receive better care. However, I was fully aware that, even without Gui Qiu, I wouldn't have to expend much effort to take care of Gejun.

It was quite a coincidence. On October 4th, I saw Gui Qiu off at the train station, where she would take a train to Hunan. Only when I got back to the office did I learn that the Central Committee had dispatched a special airplane to take Commander Peng to Beijing. He left in a great hurry. The airplane and Commander Peng's car arrived at the airport almost simultaneously. Only a minute after Commander Peng got on the plane, it took off. Afterwards, Commander Peng told me that in Beijing, less than a

minute after landing, he was in a car going directly to Zhongnanhai. There, Chairman was right then presiding over a meeting, discussing the matter of dispatching troops to aid the Korean people in resisting the American aggressor.

On October 5th, we received a top-secret telegram, signed and issued by Chairman Mao: Yang Li Zheng Chen: Only your units will advance on December 5th to the Yanzhou ???-Taian-Tengxian line of the Jingpu railroad in Shandong and there assemble and await orders. This was a mobilization order; this was a certification of a call to battle; these were the heartfelt wishes of all the officers and men, without exception, of the 19th Group Army. From the time we had been transferred from Yinchuan to Xian, we, who had not heard the sound of guns, seemed to all of a sudden return to the war-ridden battlefields. Of course, we understood quite well that significance of the telegram, "assemble and await orders". We had defeated the Japanese invader, had defeated the American imperialism-supported Chiang Kai-shek, but, in the final analysis, had never directly engaged the U.S. armies. We had fought over most of China, but, in the final analysis, had never stepped across a national boundary. During the two entire months from October 5th to December 5th, while the invader's scourge spread to the gate of the homeland, what were we to explain? Why had the Central Committee given us all this time? How could we use and allocate these crucial sixty days? The troops' desire for combat and martial attitude was certain and not to be worried over. However, war is not merely based on attitudes and desires. War is science. In a certain sense, war is the strictest of all the world's sciences. The four of us, in accordance with the spirit of the Central Committee telegram, did research all night long.

When we were in Xian putting together the plan to hand over power and set out on our journey, Commander Peng had already led the first group of volunteer armies across the river into Korea. I learned the exact nature of this even only after it took place.

On October 8th, Comrade Mao Zedong, in the capacity as Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Committee, issued this order to organize the Chinese People's Volunteer Army: ". . . convert the Northeastern Frontier Army into the Chinese People's Volunteer Army." "The Chinese People's Volunteer Army will have command over the 13th Army and its subordinate 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd armies as well as the Frontier Artillery Command and its subordinate 1st, 2nd and 8th Artillery Divisions. The units mentioned above must immediately complete preparations and await orders to set out." "Comrade Peng Dehuai is ordered to take up the posts of Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army."

On that day, Commander Peng flew to Shenyang, where he met with the Commander of the Northeast Military Region, Gao Lan, and the Commander of the 13th Army, Deng Hua, and Vice-Commanders Hong Xuezhong, Han Xianchu, et al. Together, they urgently researched matters concerning the deployment of troops across the border.

That evening, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung sent a delegation to Shenyang to provide information on the enemy to Commander Peng, et al.

On October 19th, just as the enemy was recklessly advancing across the Pyonyang-Wonsan line, the Volunteer Army, obeying the orders of Chairman Mao, crossed the Yalu River at Dandong, the mouth of the Changdian River, Jian, etc. and advanced onto the Korean battlefields. Thus began the Great Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea War.

On October 25th and 26th, the campaign reserve forces of the Volunteer Army, the 50th Army and the 66th Army, crossed the river at Dandong and Jian respectively.

On October 25th, Chairman Mao ordered the leadership organs of the 13th Army to become the leadership organs of the Volunteer Army. In addition to assigning Peng Dehua to the posts of

commander and commissar, he ordered Deng Hua to serve as vice-commander and vice-commissar, and he ordered Hong Xuezhi and Han Xianchu to be vice-commanders, Jie Fang to be chief of staff, and Du Ping to be director of the political department. The comrades who had been responsible for the political department, the logistical department, and other organizations would all continue in those capacities.

It was also on this day--October 25th--that the advance units of the 40th Army, led by Commander Peng Dehuai who himself entered the battle zone, broke through the middle of the advancing enemy column and was cut up into several pieces. One enemy battalion and one artillery company were completely wiped out. More than 500 enemy soldiers were captured or killed, and more than 30 vehicles were captured. An American colonel, Lailesi [transliteration], was captured alive. This was the first battle fought by the Volunteer Army after leaving the China, a very pretty and annihilating surprise attack. The prelude to the first campaign had taken place. For this reason, on the eve of the first anniversary of the Volunteer Army's departure from China to fight in the war, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed October 25th, 1950 as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army Departure from China to Resist America and Aid Korea Memorial Day.

The 19th Group Army, in accordance with the demands of the Central Committee, carried out preparations in a hurried yet orderly manner. On November 22nd, I, together with Comrades Zhimin, Weishan, and Xianduan, and with Deputy Chief of Staff, Kang Boying, et al. led the army organizations in an advance from Xian to Yanzhou. Vice-Commanders Ge Yanchun, et al. leading most of the troops, set out at the end of the month.

Riding with me in the car were my wife, Shen Gejun, and our three daughters, Huarong, Baihua, and Qiuhua. At the time, Shen Gejun served as Assistant to the Section Leader of the Organizing

Section of the Political Department. After receiving the order to go and assemble at Yanzhou, she was determined to advance together with the army. However, the children were too young, and it would be hard to find a place for them. After much discussion, we decided to send the children to Taiyuan and arranged to have them stay at the 19th Group Army School.

When the car arrived at the Zhengzhou Station, Shen Gejun got out of the car with our children and put them on the train to Taiyuan. Huarong, who had just turned seven and had always been very lively, was unusually silent, and her eyes revealed her unwillingness to part ways. But the four year old Baihua actually laughed and waved her little hand, saying, "Good-bye!". Although, being involved in military work in various parts of the country year after year, I rarely spent time with them, this time, as I watched them disappear in the distance, my heart overflowed with sorrow at seeing them go.

As we passed through Kaifeng, we heard the news that Beijing had established the General Council for Resisting the U.S. and Aiding Korea, with Comrade Guo Moruo as chairman. The General Council called all the nation's people to develop on a wide scale the Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea Movement. This news heightened our sense of urgency while we hurried to the assembly site.

The people of Shandong, who possess a glorious revolutionary tradition, made thorough and detailed arrangements for our arrival under the guidance of party and government organs at all levels. Some of the masses told us, "We in Shandong are too far from Korea. Otherwise, we would take the comrades across the Yalu River by pushing them across in our carts! We've heard that the Yalu River is not so wide as the Yangtze River, nor does the water run so fast!"

After making a few preparations in Yanzhou, the Military Council informed the comrades and myself that we should go to

Beijing. Commander in Chief Zhu wished to see us in person so as to assign us our missions. I told Zhimin that, before going to Beijing, we should make a special trip to Jinan to visit the commander of the Shandong Military Region, Comrade Xu Shiyou.

I had gotten to know Comrade Shiyou in Yanan. Although for many years we had not had the chance to fight together on the same battlefield, his bold and resolute nature, his inclination to hate evil like the enemy, his seemingly crude yet actually detailed grasp of the commander's art, and his magnanimous and enlightened behaviour deeply impressed not just myself, but many comrades. His first words upon seeing us were: "Welcome, both of you! Welcome, both of you!" He said, "To say I was in the Military Region Command, in the Provincial Committee, or in the Provincial Government is just so much hot air. Let me tell you, now that the 19th Group Army has arrived in Shandong, we will go all out. You need men? We'll get you men. You need materials? We'll get you materials. If you need money, I can go get my spending allowance. By saying this, I am not merely making hot air; I'm not boasting! Old Yang, you've spent some time in Shandong. Shandong has nothing special. But we are the equal of the entire nation with respect to one commodity--the common people! Our people are really too wonderful. Of course, here in the Prefecture of Jinan, there is the Damingchao and the Daotuguan. Tomorrow I'll show you around there."

Old Xu is this kind of man, direct and quick to talk. If he says he'll do something, then he'll do it. On the second day, he took us around Damingchao and Daotuguan, and he very happily invited us to make a guess. When we told him that the Commander in Chief was waiting for us in Beijing and that we in fact could not wait very long, he paused then said, "In that case, I won't keep you. When you see the Commander in Chief, tell him for me that Xu Shiyou is grumbling once again--I've spent half my life fighting wars, and this isn't the first time I've made preparations for feed and provisions in the rear area!"

Although what Comrade Shiyou said was a joke, we were very much aware of his feelings. A great enemy was before us, which commander didn't want to lead his own unit into frontline combat?

I had left Beijing in February of 1949 to participate in the Taiyuan Campaign. I had never thought that in coming back I would find the atmosphere so different. The previous year, when I had left Beijing, the entire city was celebrating victory. Now, beginning with the gate to the train station, every avenue and every little alley was decorated with posters saying "Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea", "Defeat the American Imperialists", "Preserve World Peace", etc. The military atmosphere was quite heavy.

Commander in Chief Zhu received us at Zhongnanhai. We hadn't seen each other for several years. He was still the same: hale and hearty, under long black eyebrows two shining eyes which revealed kindness, intimacy, and warmth. After making our reports, he informed us in detail of the various situations facing us following the assembly of troops in Shandong. He explained to us in concrete detail everything from weaponry to the ideological situation, from army regulations to management of daily activities. He had the staff members bring out a map of Korea. Facing the map, he said to us, "Old Peng has been at the front for more than two months already. He has fought well, but the fighting has been difficult. At present, he is right now crossing swords with MacArthur for the second time; the fighting is intense. He has sent back some telegrams. The Chairman is satisfied. Comrade Kim Il Sung of Korea is also satisfied. You can take a look, get acquainted with the situation, immerse yourself in the situation. Old Peng indicated by name that he wanted your 19th Group Army. You are familiar with him. He has never given the Central Committee any trouble or made any demands on it, but he brought up the matter of the 19th Group Army. Therefore, the Chairman and Comrade Enlai wanted me to discuss this with you. 'Though soldiers might not be used for one hundred

years, one can never forget them for a day." You also know this old saying. Please come, I ask nothing more than that you get acquainted with the situation. See what other questions you need the Central Committee to decide."

We reported to Old Commander in Chief Zhu that army was prepared to hold a meeting for cadres of the regimental level and above very soon. We reported that, as for the military, the main questions to be researched were the question of how to command united modern forces and the question of what tactics we should use in countering certain characteristics of the invading U.S. army; as for political work, the main question to be researched was what political work was required and what methods were to be taken to resist the U.S. and aid Korea; as for logistical work, the main question to be researched was how to provide support in a difficult and complex environment after leaving China. All of us officers and men representing the army invited Old Commander in Chief Zhu to go to Shandong and take part in our meeting and instruct us and be a mobilizer for us. I said, "In 1947, the 19th Group Army fought at Shijiazhuang. That was the first time during the War of Liberation that we attacked a large city. We had no prior experience. During the crucial hours, you came to our army and made a report to everyone. You brought up the matter of 'bravery and skill', providing much encouragement to the troops. We are now to go to Korea, and this, too, is a 'first time'. This first time will be much more difficult than that first time when we attacked Shijiazhuang. If you could go to our army once again, that would be great."

Old Commander in Chief Zhu laughed. He said, "I will report this matter to the Chairman. I can't act on my own!"

Less than a week after returning to the troops, Old Commander in Chief Zhu, bringing only three persons in his retinue, hurried over to Yanzhou.

This was near the end of December in 1950, the weather was very cold. After the 19th Group Army arrived in the Yanzhou region, we found that the regional government had made a lot of preparations, but that Yanzhou, after all, was a very small rural city. Thus, the living quarters were extremely crowded. County offices, schools, and some civilian houses were filled with troops. A few leading comrades of the army received special treatment and lived in a compound surrounding a courtyard. When Old Commander in Chief Zhu came, he stayed with us. At the time, there was not only no heating; there was not even a stove in which to burn the coal. We could only heat Old Commander Zhu's apartment by burning a bowl of charcoal.

On the evening of the day when Old Commander in Chief Zhu arrived in Yanzhou, a few of us leaders of the army discussed matters with him until very late. He knew about our preparations for the meeting. He asked us to tell him what would be required of him and what we hoped he would say. He especially brought up the fact that before speaking he wanted to go to the companies and see the soldiers. Of course, we hoped that Commander in Chief Zhu would be able to go among the soldiers, but the weather was too cold. The troops' quarters were spread out, and Commander in Chief Zhu was at that time 64 years old. We were afraid that he would fall ill. The doctor who accompanied him very much agreed with us and urged him to see several groups representing the officers and men separately in this room where the charcoal was burning. Old Commander in Chief Zhu looked at the doctor and laughing at us said, "This doctor has lazy thinking. If I don't get sick, he won't have anything to do. But as soon as I get sick, he'll have much to bother with. Chairman Mao didn't have me come to the 19th Group Army just to see Yang Dezhi, Li Zhimin, and the rest of you!"

Old Commander in Chief Zhu had influenza and a fever. He was coughing, too, which made us quite nervous and upset. Yet he insisted on acting according to plan. He visited the infantry

companies and also went to the artillery units. To the artillery comrades, he said, "Our current air force is very weak. After you arrive in Korea, you will be the 'ground air force'. You will aim above at the enemy's planes; you will aim below at the enemy's tanks. I hope you shall succeed for the people of China and Korea."

By visiting the troops in person, Old Commander in Chief Zhu gave the officers and men encouragement and strength which is hard to describe. Everyone wanted to see his own revered commander and hear his instructions with his own ears. How could the officers and men know that the 64 year old Old Commander in Chief Zhu was running a fever and was sick while in their midst! His physician told me a few times, "Commander Yang, this isn't right! I am not acting out my responsibility." Yet we were not able to persuade Old Commander in Chief Zhu.

On December 19th, Old Commander in Chief Zhu, still sick, made a report at the meeting of the 19th Group Army, composed of cadres of the regimental level and above. The meeting was held inside the Catholic Church in Yanzhou. Because many of the cadres had not seen their revered Commander in Chief, some of the cadres who were sitting in back couldn't help standing on the pews when their revered general commander entered the meeting area. When Old Commander Zhu saw this, he said to us, laughing, "Many comrades probably don't know what Zhu De is like. O.K., I'll get off this stage and walk around and get to know them!" Saying this, he stepped down from the platform and walked from the front to the rear and back again, walking and greeting the comrades at the same time. When he came across a cadre in charge of a unit he had inspected a few days earlier, he would say, "We've met! We've met!"

Old Commander Zhu made his report without any text. He just had a few sheets of paper on which he had written an outline. He said:

"Chairman Mao sent me to the 19th Group Army to accomplish two missions. The first is to express his good wishes and solicitous concern for the comrades and to give the comrades a proper send off. The second is to encourage the comrades and provide them with new enthusiasm. As for the first mission, I have already told Commander Yang, Commissar Li, and the units which I have visited in the last few days of the Chairman's wishes. Why should he express his concern and support? Because you are about to carry out a glorious and tremendously difficult mission. Comrades, the Korean people are waiting for you, waiting for you to fight at their sides to wipe out the American invader! This message of concern and support represents Chairman Mao and represents all the Chinese people! The second mission is to give encouragement and provide enthusiasm. I came here a few days ago and I have had many discussions with the leaders and troops here. Of the two missions which Chairman Mao has given me, this one, I feel, is the easier to complete? Why? Because you are already quite confident! You are already very enthusiastic! I want to tell this to Chairman Mao when I return to Beijing!"

Old Commander in Chief's simple and brief speech was often interrupted by long periods of warm applause. Although outside the church piercingly cold winter winds blew, cold enough to freeze dripping water, yet in this church, which had no heating equipment, waves of warmth kept rolling through and a tide of feeling surged. Many comrades took off their cotton caps and held them in their hands.

Old Commander in Chief Zhu spoke of the meaning of resisting the U.S. and aiding Korea. He spoke of our army's mission. He mentioned the various difficulties we might encounter. He warned us that we certainly shouldn't be satisfied with our current preparedness and that we certainly should not be satisfied with our enthusiastic martial attitude. He said, "All of you here are cadres, cadres of the regimental level and above. You ask me what

are your instructions, what is required of you? I say there is something. What? It's that you, you and all the troops together, must reveal your problems. You must make clear what the problems are so that everyone can solve them. If you do this, then when you arrive in Korea and engage the enemy in battle you can be assured of victory."

After Old Commander in Chief Zhu spoke, a group photo of him and all the other comrades who had attended the meeting was taken in the cold wind outside the church to mark the occasion. Before leaving Yanzhou and returning to Beijing, Old Commander in Chief Zhu presented each the cadres of the divisional level and above with a copy of a Soviet military handbook called "An Outline of Army Tactics", translated by Comrade Liu Bocheng. On the front of each book he wrote a few words. On my book he wrote, "Comrade Dezhi, study hard. Zhu De."

Commander in Chief Zhu's arrival further heightened the patriotic enthusiasm of all the officers and men to resist the U.S. and aid Korea and to protect the nation. It also further strengthened our confidence in inevitable victory.

At 1900 hours, on February 3rd, 1951, the 19th Group Army, with all its equipment and all its men, said farewell to Yanzhou and said farewell to the people of Shandong. They mounted a military train heading north. At midnight, we arrived at Tianjin. I had never imagined that the municipal committee secretary of Tianjin, Comrade Huang Jing, who fought together with me in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan region during the War of Resistance, had brought some leading comrades from the municipal government and the municipal committee out to wait for us in near total darkness by the railroad tracks far from the station.

That was an extremely cold and clear night.

I was very excited to see Huang Jing. Towards the end of

January in 1944, I received orders to set out with my unit from Puyang District, which at that time belonged to Shandong Province, and go to Shanbei. There, we were to protect Yanan and protect the Party Central Committee there. When I received this mission, it was Huang Jing who saw me off. At the time, he was the secretary of the party committee of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan region and was also a member of the military region political committee. After parting then, seven years passed before we saw each other again, but once again I would be leaving. It was obvious that Huang Jing, too, was exceptionally excited. He gripped both of my hands and said nothing for a long time.

The troops stopped in Tianjin for a few hours. A few of our army leaders and a few of the comrades from the logistical organizations who were attending to government matters stayed for five days. Because we had just arrived in Tianjin, we received a message from the Central Committee--Premier Zhou requested that Comrade Zhimin and myself go to Beijing on the 5th of the month.

Though we were only on our way to battle, the people of Tianjin was already taking us to be heroes on a triumphant return. Even at night, they presented the soldiers with gifts, which they had prepared in great quantities. At noon, on February 4th, the People's Government of Tianjin held a grand welcome/send off banquet for us. Huang Jing, who served as the representative for the hosts made an enthusiastic speech overflowing with hope. He said to me, "The Americans have shown themselves to be quite formidable with this act. There are many people in this nation who are capable of winning this battle, and there are many who are worried." I nodded and said, "To be honest, I was prepared for something like this from the Americans, but in this way, with the conditions changing so rapidly--how can I put it? You could say it was an expected surprise!" "The Central Committee has already shown their resolve!", said Huang Jing. "True!", I said. "Don't fight, and it's all over; fight, and victory is certain." Huang Jing raised a cup of liquor and said, "Come, let's empty a cup of

'fight and victory is certain!'"

At night, the Tianjing municipal government organized a dance party for us. When Huang Jing told us of this arrangement, Comrade Zhimin and I waved our hands in a gesture of rejections several times. I said, "When I was at Yanan I didn't even learn to dance solo. Social dancing is something I am utterly ignorant of. You are forcing us to make exhibitions of ourselves!" Huang Jing said, "Tonight's party will be very simple fun. The Korean people are certainly good at singing and dancing. When you go there, and your Korean comrades-in-arms make an invitation, of course wave your hands and refuse them. If you're going to make exhibitions of yourselves, why not here? But it would be bad for you to do that in front of the Korean comrades." Comrade Zhimin laughed and said, "So you mean this is a political task?" Huang Jing said, "Our political commissar has described it very well!" We danced our first social dance in Tianjin.

While everyone was on the dance floor, my thoughts were on tomorrow's interview with Premier Zhou in Beijing.

Premier Zhou saw Comrade Zhimin and me in his Zhongnanhai office. We were very excited to be able to see Premier Zhou just before leaving the fatherland.

After Premier Zhou made us take our seats, he said, "The Commander in Chief came back from your army and reported on the situation there to Chairman Mao. We are very satisfied with your work. We did not invite you here today because there were new matters to deal with; I simply wished to meet you. You are leaving the fatherland for the sake of the fatherland. I am here in Beijing giving you a proper send off--these are my thoughts."

Here we were facing our familiar and revered Premier, listening to his speech, which though seemingly everyday was full

of deep feeling, and Comrade Zhimin and I didn't know what to say. Zhimin glanced over at me and said, "The Premier must be extremely busy. That you could set aside some time to see us, us. . . "

"This is precisely our job!" said Premier Zhou, laughing.

I said, "Let's give a report on the situation."

Premier Zhou said, "I know something about your situation; I am not asking you to discuss it. You know, the Chairman as told Comrade Dehuai several times that upon arriving in Korea you are to lovingly protect all of Korea's mountains, rivers and lakes, grass and shrubbery, and all of its trees. You are to respect the Korean comrades and respect the Korean people. You are to teach the troops to carry out even more strictly the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention. This is a very important point; you must attach much importance to this point." So that we would have a better understanding of the situation, Premier Zhou spoke about the great leader of the Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung and about the glorious achievements of the Korean people. He also talked of the tremendous victory which Commander in Chief Peng won in the third campaign commanded by him. He went on to talk about the global reaction to the Chinese People's Volunteer Army entry into the war in Korea. He said, "This is a military struggle. It is also a serious political struggle. All the nation's people care about you. And all the world's people are watching you. In fact, they are watching our entire nation. All the comrades in the army should understand and remember this."

We, representing all the officers and men of our army, expressed our resolve.

Premier Zhou said, "There's your 19th Group Army, as well as the two armies commanded by Comrades Yang Yong and Yang Chengwu. All have a glorious tradition and troops who are very capable of

fighting. I have said before that I wanted to take you 'Three Yangs' and call you the 'Three Yangs Lucky Troupe'!"

The Premier's speech so filled Comrade Zhimin and me with emotion that we simultaneously stood up. The Party's trust and the Premier's hope made us very excited. For many years, I did not tell the other comrades what the Premier had said about the "Three Yangs", but for many years these words of the Premier's continuously inspired me and urged me on.

Upon returning to Tianjin, we communicated late into the night to the cadres of the army level and above the instructions and solicitous concern of the Premier.

At zero hours on February 8th, our military train left Tianjin. Before leaving, Huang Jing presented as a gift a large parcel of things. He said, "This is a little something to eat and drink for Old Commander in Chief Peng. Please take this to him as symbol, as a symbol of the Tianjin people's service to him. "

The military train started up. The cities and towns glittered like stars. Endless fields went speeding by. Except for the roar of the train, it seemed like we were entering into a sweet dreamworld. Nevertheless, on board this long and unnoticed train, the hearts of the officers and men were beating violently, and their hot blood was boiling with eagerness to resist the U.S. and aid Korea and save the nation. This boiling hot blood of enthusiasm rushed towards the long white foothills. It rushed towards the Yalu River which surges for a thousand li. It rushed on towards that piece of land burning everywhere with the flames of war, that land to which we were traveling, that land which was strange to us.

That is the scene which would be greeting us. . . .

Chapter Two, The Call of Blood and Fire

The source of the Yalu River, which serves as a border between Korea and China, is at Baitou Mountain. It empties into the surging Yellow Sea at Dandong in Liaoning. The main body of the river is 700 kilometers long. It flows along the edges of two nations and tightly binds together these two fraternal nations, which are as intimately related as lips and teeth and whose peoples have a long martial friendship. The large bridge which crosses the river is like two pairs of gigantic arms stretching from both national territories and meeting over the center of the river. The east side is Korea, and the west side is China. The clear and rushing water of the river was exactly like the pure and true friendship between the peoples of China and Korea. No power is capable of separating the two.

When we arrived at Dandong, which is on the Chinese border and on the west bank of the Yalu River, the people's armies of China and Korea were conducting the third campaign on the Korean battlefields. They had attained a victory. This battle was fought in a straightforward and pretty manner. More than 300,000 Chinese and Korean troops were organized into two groups, western and eastern. Prior to the battle, these groups were concealed near the 38th parallel. They captured Seoul, flew across the Seoul River, occupied Inchon, and pushed the enemy back to the 37th parallel. MacArthur's "Thanksgiving Plan" went completely

bankrupt.

Of course, we payed a great price. We were placed under an extreme degree of military pressure. The clearest evidence of this was that, because our air force was quite weak, we were in a position of backwardness with respect to attacks from the air. By far the most important part of modern coordinated forces combat is control of the air, and at that time we completely lacked that control. The enemy's many and various types of aircraft not only demonstrated their obvious superiority, but they also carried out waves of continuous, night and day, unscrupulous bombing raids. Sometimes these reckless bombings had no apparent military objective. The enemy simply wished to demonstrate his strength, which the enemy calls "air intimidation" . It is in fact a kind of war threat. During these bombings, the Yalu River and the Yalu River Bridge, which comprised the only Sino-Korean land route, inevitably became the most important attack targets of the enemy. The Yalu River was cloaked in heavy smoke and intense fire. Even the water columns and fragments of ice sent flying by the bombs spread burning odor which might cause a person to choke.

Dandong at that time was completely in a pre-battle posture. During the day, the soldiers were busy with various battle preparations. As soon as the sun set, the city would put into effect extremely strict controls on lighting. During the day and at night, the city was always prepared for enemy bombing raids or for attacks from long-range artillery. The hospitals made arrangements for the wounded who came back from the front line in groups. They also had to care for the groups of women, children, old people, and young people who had been injured by sudden bombing raids while they were in their schools, offices, fields, or on the road commuting. The troops said, "What is meant by the fire of war burning to our gate? What is meant by 'if the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold'? Why should we resist the U.S. and aid Korea? Why do we say that to resist the U.S. and aid Korea is to protect our own nation. Having come to Dandong,

having arrived at the banks of the Yalu River, we now understand completely! Leader, let us quickly cross the river!"

We were going to cross the river. We were going to, in the bitterest cold, rush to a true battlefield. Not just the young comrade privates, but also ourselves, the leaders of the army, stood at night on the bank of the Yalu River in the bone-pierce cold wind, facing burning lands which, without the aid of a telescope, we could see clearly. Our sense of rage was hard to suppress.

However, under the conditions at that time, to have an entire army cross the river was easy to say, not do! The 19th Group Army was waiting to cross the river; it was impatiently waiting. It had an urgent need to cross! The snow covered the sky and the earth, and the temperature was forty below. In this severe cold, many troops, who fought in these conditions, had not had time to change to cotton-padded clothes to protect them from the cold because they were in too much of a rush when they entered Korea. Some comrades only wore shoes made of two thin layers. The missions of the units were burdensome: to penetrate, to attack and pursue, to redeploy, and to do these things again and again. Yet the railroads, roads, and even the mountain paths in Korea were continually being heavily damaged by the enemy. Snow and ice made transportation difficult as well. There were materials. The Sino-Korean Army could completely rely on the strength and selfless enthusiasm of the Korean people to support the front line. However, grim objective conditions were the inescapable reality.

The front lines needed ammunition, needed provisions, needed equipment, needed medicine, and had an even greater need of troops. The front lines needed everything. But almost everything which the Volunteer Army needed relied on domestic supplies. When we were in Dandong and on the bank of the Yalu River, we saw all sorts of materials coming from the entire nation. They came in

piles, like mountains. We saw the comrades of the logistical department, who labored day and night with bloodshot eyes. To hear the various reports of the comrades of our logistical department on the difficulties of transportation made use, one could say, impatient like a burning fire. However, the Yalu River bridge, the transportation artery which connected the front line with the rear support area, was after all just one bridge, and this one bridge was located in the middle of the enemy's constant and reckless bombing. It regularly required repair. We, during the past several years of fighting, had almost never encountered this type of situation before.

Yet we had to cross the river, and we had to do it as swiftly as possible. The army's party committee had decided to go in two parts. First, we organized reconnaissance groups, with armies as units, in which army commanders, division commanders, and regiment commanders participated and in which the army commander himself led. These would leave first. During the first phase, they would ride in trucks to a designated assembly area and there conduct a reconnaissance of the terrain and set up the organization. There, they would wait for the large units, after whose arrival, they would immediately enter combat. The three armies subordinate to the group army would not wait for a train or take a train. They would all have to cross the bridge on foot. At the time, our group army had no tanks, no anti-aircraft artillery, and no long-range heavy artillery. The group army had only one artillery brigade. Each division had one horse and mule artillery unit. Some mountain artillery pieces had to be accompanied by two mules. Some 38 field artillery pieces had to be accompanied by eight mules. This required the train to travel back and forth, and crossing over would be very difficult on the Yalu River bridge if there was infantry advancing across the bridge as well. But the situation was urgent, and only in this way was it possible. Aided and supported by the railroad units, the logistical transportation department, and the local people, we set up two very long floating bridges on both sides of the steel Yalu River Bridge. The 63rd

Army and the 65th Army, one on the left and one on the right, crossed on the floating bridges. The 64th Army crossed the steel bridge. Command organs of the group army rode in a few designated cars across the steel bridge. The group army crossed the river in four parts.

February 16th, 1951, was a day which is hard to forget. At dusk on that day, the soldiers of the 19th Group Army left their relatives and left their fatherland for the common good of the Chinese and Korean people and for the sake of peace in Asia and throughout the world. On that day, they joined the fighting on the front lines of the war to resist the U.S., aid Korea, and protect the nation. The train carrying the command organs of the group army crossed the white line signifying the international border on the Yalu River Bridge at precisely 1700 hours on that day.

Valiant, full of mettle
Crossing the Yalu River
Preserving peace, protecting the fatherland
Thus protecting our homes.
Good sons and daughters of China, of one heart and mind,
they closely unite
To resist the U.S. and support Korea, to defeat the mad
ambition of U.S. imperialism.

When the troops stepped onto the floating bridges, when the soldiers strode onto the steel bridge, and our train began to move, the song's heroic and resounding strains converged with the roar of the billowing Yalu River and reverberated on the Yalu River's two shores. "Good-bye, fatherland!" "Good-bye, family!" Such sounds and shouts filled the hearts of all.

The Yalu River Bridge is only a little more than 1100 meters long. Soon after the train started it entered Korean national territory. If one were to say that in Dandong we were approaching

battle, then it ought to be said that, as soon as we crossed Siniuju, that is to say as soon as we stepped on Korean soil, the smoke clouds of war rushed against our faces. American planes came and went continuously in groups of threes and fours. In the distance, the guns were booming like thunder. Everywhere, the boundless land was empty. You almost could not see a complete village. The curtains of dusk descended heavily. On the southeastern horizon, signal flares and star shells appeared, one after an other, splitting apart the raven black sky.

At 6:00 am on the 17th, the locomotive led the first four cars, in which we leaders sat, into a cave south of Chongin. It also pulled the few flatbed cars, which had been behind us and which were loaded with weapons, into the cave opposite us. We prepared to leave at dusk.

When the train entered the cave, all was black. The sky was black, and the people were quiet. The roar of the groups of enemy planes was even clearer. From time to time, a bomb would drop, shaking the ground and mountain, so that it seemed that even the train inside the cave would flip over. You can imagine the magnitude of the calamity suffered by the Korean people.

Without any particular objective in mind, I walked casually through the rail cars. I saw the comrades sitting together in twos and threes, discussing various matters. Some were holding maps. I don't know if they were looking for their hometowns or whether they were looking for their current positions. Some were writing in their diaries. Many comrades asked, "Commander, we're still not leaving?" Some said directly, "Let's go, commander. We've arrived in Korea, and yet we're standing in a cave. How annoying!" Everyone wished stride forward to the positions on the front line.

It was quite difficult to wait for dusk. The roar of the approaching train made everyone very excited. We were poking each

other and dancing about and waving our arms, as though we were an attack unit which was about to attack.

With a sound like "kuangdang", the rail cars began to slowly move and slowly rolled out of the cave. In the obscure light, I felt that the train was not being pulled forward by the locomotive, but that it was moving backwards. As soon as this thought arose, I rejected it as impossible. This probably was a mistaken feeling resulting from having spent a day kneeling in a cave.

It was also at this time that the train suddenly increased speed. The train tilted forwards. Tea cups, teapots, and other items slipped off the tables, clattering on the floors and crashing into each other. The men, even though they held on to their seats, had trouble sitting steady. Some men shouted, "What happened? What happened!?"

The vice-section head of the group army combat section, Yu Zhen, ran over in a big hurry to Comrade Zhimin and myself and said, "We've got big trouble! There's no locomotive attached to our cars!"

I couldn't suppress my shock. Supporting myself with the back of my seat, I leaned out the window and looked to the front and to the back. The train was indeed without a locomotive. The rail cars were rolling from high to low, down the mountain slope. Swift as the wind and quick as lightning, we were sliding down.

"Pull the brake!" Zhimin shouted immediately. Several persons almost simultaneously rushed to the damper brake in the front part of the rail car. However, the slope was steep, and the train was going very fast. The damper brake was of no use already.

The hills, cliffs, and trees retreated into the distance like

lightning. At the time, the rail cars contained not only us leading comrades of the group army, but almost all the men and horses of the group army organs. You could say that here was the nerve center of the 19th Group Army.

A nerve center is, after all, a nerve center. After a brief moment of chaos, it was unusually calm. Zhimin looked at me and Vice-Commander Zheng Weishan and said, "What can we do?" Weishan's response was quite direct and simple: "Jump from the train, organize to jump from the train!" I quickly rejected the idea. "No way, the train is going too fast!"

After more than ten minutes, the train entered Chongin Station. In the distance, we saw a parked freight car facing us. I had just calmed down a little, but now once again I was anxious. As soon as we collided with the freight car, the train would certainly be destroyed, and everyone would perish!

It was just at this critical moment that a boy came racing across the railway platform and quickly pulled the railway switch. Our train slowly came to a stop on a different set of tracks. We felt quite relieved.

I am genuinely grateful to that little Korean child! Weishan and I hurried off the train and expressed our gratitude to him. This boy seemed to be only 13 or 14 years old. His clothes were quite ragged. His hands and face had been made red by the cold. What impressed us was that he had an American submachine, which was not much shorter than himself, hanging at an angle across his chest and that his face and bearing were entirely like an adult's. What a pity we could not understand each other's language. Only by using hand gestures could each of us express his meaning. Afterwards, a 70 year old man came over and spoke in a Mandarin which we could understand. He said that all of the adults here had gone to the front line. This boy was serving in the place of his elder brother as a railroad switchman and was also responsible

for guarding the railroad station. The old man also told us that most of the work done here at the railroad station was undertaken by women and children. These were the first Korean people that we met after stepping foot on Korean soil. Although the boy was only thirteen or fourteen years old, his character, his bravery, and his quickwittedness could not but cause in us adults a feeling of respect. I thought that such a people and such a nationality could not possibly be defeated in war. I had the guard take him some things to eat. After he readily and unaffectedly accepted them, he said something to the old man, and the old man translated, "The boy says, thank you Dongmu (Comrade) of the Volunteer Army!" My guard pulled the child up onto his lap. . . .

At eight o'clock, the locomotive caught up. Only then did we learn why the cars had rolled by themselves. It was because, when the locomotive was pulling the cars, it had not hooked up properly. It had jerked suddenly and the rail cars had rolled down the mountain. This time, the locomotive was hooked up properly. We said good-bye to the little switchman and said farewell to Chongin Station. We were once again stepping on the road which would take us forward. Later on, when we were in the southwest, we would all be a little afraid whenever this incident was mentioned. In thinking of the tension of those moment, we would also find it funny. Comrade Zhimin, who liked to compose poetry, opened his mouth and came out with these verses:

I think of that incident and get all muddled
A headless train rattling along by itself
The dispatched troops, not yet victorious, encountered
danger
A danger which right away startled one hundred men

While he was pondering the last line, Zheng Weishan brought down his big white enamel mug, making a sound like "bing". He said, "I'll add on two lines for you:

The switchman was very alert
And directed the train to stop in Chongin

Zhimin, pounding his fist into his palm, said, "Good!"

Weishan said, "No matter if it's good or not--what he said was true!"

Zhimin said, "Not bad, not bad!" Then he turned to face me and said, "Old Yang, if you come up with two lines yourself, this poem will be complete."

Weishan, also facing me, said, "Make up any poem you want. Just throw together two lines."

I found their excited frame of mind infectious and I invented two lines on the spot:

Risking danger in a danger-free zone resulted in luck
Our combined strength on the battlefield will make for
miraculous success

Midnight that night, we stopped at the Mengzhongli train station. The staff officer on duty said that because the tracks ahead of us had been destroyed by enemy bombing, it would not be possible to advance for a short while. In order to make use of the time, we decided to unload the trucks and cars from the train, fill their tanks, and make adjustments and repairs. Then we get in the cars and continue up the road.

Switching to trucks and automobiles and carrying out a march are very difficult tasks to perform. The usual pattern was that the night-flying aircraft of the enemy would begin flying in groups around 7:00 or 8:00 every evening. They would often drop night flares from the air and light up peaks and hills, forests, and even cemeteries as clear as can be. Thus, our cars and trucks

would have to drive between the enemy fly-overs with their lights off.

Night marching or driving with lights off is not at all difficult on domestic battlefields. But in Korea, it was very different. First of all, the terrain is unfamiliar. "The one who has just arrived, groping, can not find the stove." When relying on the map to find roads we discovered that because of destruction caused by the enemy, the actual conditions differed greatly from the markings on the map. It was also very hard to find any people, and even if we ran across someone, we found it very difficult to ask the way because of our inability to communicate. Groping about, often we went in circles in the mountains. The mountain roads were winding, rough, and rugged. As for fighting battles or advancing on foot, this terrain without a doubt greatly increased our capabilities, like adding wings onto a tiger. But as for mechanized marches--no matter how simple was our mechanization--the terrain was exceptionally difficult.

Zheng Weishan and Yu Zhen rode in the first vehicle. I and Li Zhimin rode in the second and third vehicles, respectively. Behind us were other organization personnel, who travelled in separate sections of three vehicles each. I forgot whose idea it was then. We got together several tall, long-legged privates and had them wear white sheets around their shoulders. They would take turns leading the way. The vehicles would follow their figures in the darkness. At first, it worked out all right, but walking all the time was not possible. We progressed too slowly when the men and vehicles were going at the same pace. Moreover, it was too much for the soldiers to take.

Weishan uses his head well. In one night and one day, he mastered the pattern of the enemy aircraft. During the day, they would begin to dispatch the bombers at 8:00 or 9:00. At 4:00 or 5:00 in the evening, they would fly back. But the night flying aircraft would not begin to be dispatched until 7:00 or 8:00, and

they would return to their nests at 5:00 or 6:00 in the morning. We would take advantage of these lulls in the mornings and evenings to make our mad dashes. Sometimes, when the enemy dropped flares, we would borrow his brightness and pick up the speed of our advance. Then we would wait for the enemy bombers to arrive, for we would already be hidden by then. The privates referred to this method as "fighting a guerrilla war" with the enemy planes or "playing hide and seek" with the enemy planes. Afterwards, the enemy, as much as was possible, took measures to deal with us. But "goodness is an inch, while evil is a yard." By using the forest, the dark night, the high mountains, and the winding roads, we contended with them and did not suffer any excessively heavy damage.

We quickly reported this initial, groping experience to all the troops of the group army and proclaimed that by pooling our wisdom and efforts we overcame the pirate in the sky.

The troops' advance on foot was even more arduous. At the time, each private carried a burden of 44 pounds. In addition to his own gun, bullets, backpack, and four hand-grenades, he also had to carry a week's worth of dry provisions and two mortar shells. This was because the mortar shells carried by a mortar company was far less than what was used in one campaign. At the time, it was precisely the most severe part of winter. There was a lot of snow in Korea. In some places, the snow was from one-third to two-thirds of a meter thick. As soon as a foot stepped through, it would take several comrades before the leg could be pulled out again. In some places, the snow was frozen together so that it was hard like steel. For every step, there were three slips. The soldiers called it the "glass road." Many comrades supported themselves with sticks or were continually falling down. Before one walked forty or fifty steps, the flat soles of his army shoes would have a thick layer of ice clinging to them. Like those boots worn by the actors in traditional operas, they made the soldier rock and sway whenever they took a step. Even when

they supported each other by the arms, the soldiers could not stand steady. The disturbance of the enemy aircraft shuttling back and forth in groups left us no option but to march at night and camp at dawn. But whether marching or camping, there was absolutely no place sheltered from the wind and cold. Gulleys in the mountains and forests were often the best camping sites for the troops. But this so-called camping was nothing more than lying down on the snow or ice. Therefore, many privates preferred to advance arduously than to camp. At night, the enemy would drop from several tens to several hundreds of flares. It simply reached the point where it was difficult to distinguish night from day. Fortunately, the Korean mountains and forest could serve as natural screens for us. The troops avoided turning on lights, stuck to the gulleys, penetrated through the forests, and used every second and minute to advance further. We had never encountered this kind of cold winter climate in our own country. Even the soldiers from the Greater Northwest had never seen so much snow. The wind was truly like a knife, and the snow like a sword. Sometimes the cold caused people to feel that the air had all frozen stiff. There is a saying which goes: "The road is far, and there is no light burden." All the more true for our soldiers carrying their extremely heavy burdens and traveling at night on a very rough and bumpy road! Their legs became swollen from all the running, and blister after blister appeared on their feet. Each step forward was purchased at the price of blood. Some comrades were so exhausted that they spit up mouthfuls of blood. Yet they persisted in walking forward, walking forward. Some comrades would walk and walk and then would lean against a stone wall and stop moving. As soon as the comrades in back pushed lightly, they would fall over onto the ground. No matter how much one would shout, they would not get up. In this way, they made a sacrifice, a sacrifice on the road of the advance. . .

Confronted with this situation, I thought more than once of the Red Army's Long March. Without exaggerating in the least, I can say that, except for the fact that the air here did not lack

any oxygen and that the privates had more and better food, in every respect the conditions that year when the Red Army climbed the snow covered mountains were almost the same as the conditions on this march. Yet when the Long March crossed over the snowy mountains, we did not then have to suffer the constant disturbance caused groups of enemy planes. The revolutionary spirit and the revolutionary resolve of the younger generation of soldiers, one can say, were in not in the least inferior to those of the previous generation.

The farther we progressed into the Korean hinterland, the more startling and obvious was the catastrophe wreaked on the Korean people by the invader. Us old soldiers, who had fought battles for twenty years or more, who had walked through "no man's land", and who had passed through the countryside ravaged by the Japanese policy of "kill all, loot all, burn all" could not restrain our sense of righteous anger nor our extreme agitation.

In the temperate climatic zone, bordered on three sides by the sea, Korea's natural scenery is of exquisite beauty. Rich in products and mineral resources, it has a nation with a long history and a splendid cultural tradition. The people of the northern part of Korea, under the guidance of their own great leader, General Kim Il Sung, walk the long and arduous revolutionary road. After defeating the Japanese invaders, they righteously carried out socialist construction and succeeded magnificently. However, the invaders had lit the fires of war and pushed this beautiful national into a deep abyss. Scorched earth, ruins, remnants of city walls, horror, famine and death were swallowing up this country. The people kept in their hearts a confidence in certain victory while resisting and struggling and while expending their own flesh and blood to preserve their own national dignity and preserve the people glorious and most basic right to survival. A newly-risen nation with a population of only a few million was now facing the U.S. imperialists, proclaimed to be the most powerful nation on earth, and their "United Nations

Army", but they were not afraid. They would not compromise and would not waver in their thoughts, but with an amazing capacity for suffering they towered like a mountain in the east. Naturally, they won the admiration of peace-loving and righteous people around the world.

Patriotism is a flag whose colors never fade.

We were proud of the Korean people for their heroic militant friendship! The comrades of the group army's mass work department brought us an old Korean from the countryside to work as a translator. This old guy was sixty some odd years. He had thick eyebrows and large eyes. He also had sideburns and a loud sonorous voice. He was bold and rugged, very much like the common people from Northeast China. He was an old war veteran. Beginning in 1932, he had taken part in the anti-Japanese Antu guerrilla army which had been created by Comrade Kim Il Sung in the northeast part of China. When the Korean war broke out, he guided an advance force fighting from north to south together with the Korean People's Army. Then he fought from south to north. He was wounded in a battle last October and was left with a family in the nearby mountains. After his wounds healed, he prepared to head south to look for the people's army. It was quite a coincidence that we had caught up with him. He was very happy to serve as our guide, and we were also very happy to have such an outstanding translator.

We asked this translator to make a report to the troops and tell them about the violence of the invading army and of the bandit Sygman Rhee.

After the invading U.S. army landed at Inchon, whenever they captured some territory, they would transform it into a field of slaughter, covered with flesh and blood, and into a hell on earth. Seoul was a typical example.

The armies of Rhee and the U.S. entered Seoul under the slogan of "kill everyone" and established an "army to wipe out the Communists", "the anti-Communist army", and a "self-rule army" and other special-purpose organizations, which went everywhere to kill people. At 9:00 in the morning on September 28th, 1950, they killed more than 700 women and children in the cool air outside of the Eastern Gate on the levees by the Liang [transliteration] Bridge. They then hung the bodies from the utility poles. In the Sunchon district, they massacred 1799 people, among whom there were 520 women and 343 children. 1914 women were raped. More than 41,600 people disappeared. In Sunchon, the enemy massacred more than 1000 people in four days. Babies as well as old women more than 80 years old suffered this misfortune. In many cases, entire families suffered catastrophe. The evil actions of the enemy are truly hard to describe. Even their own journalists were forced to admit the the U.S. invaders' war was an "ugly war". This particular journalist, in an article discussing this topic, confessed, "because they wish to attain victory, they force their own soldiers to employ the most barbaric acts and behavior. This barbarism is not the sort of barbarism which generally unavoidable on the battlefield, but is a behavior even more barbaric and repulsive. Regardless of whether or not the enemy is there, if they see a village, they thoroughly destroy it. They indiscriminately maim and kill refugees."

No people on earth has perished under the butcher knife of an invader. If there is such a people, it is because they did not resist and gave up their struggle. The Korean people, in their struggle to resist the foreign invader, are a heroic people who are being tested and who are maturing and growing strong. Massacres and burnings can only arouse an even greater hatred and fury among them.

While on the road, we saw some women travelling in groups of three or four. All of them had white scarves wrapped around their heads, and they all wore white skirts. White or blue belts were

tied around their waists. Some were carrying children on their back. Others were carrying parcels on their heads. Their expressions were stern, and resolve glimmered in their eyes. Some were more than 40 years old. Their strides were sturdy and quick. They were on their way to the frontline. Throughout the Korean war, Korean women played an extremely important role.

The translator told us that the Korean people had no tears. Their tears had already been burned dry by the fire of war which the invader had lit. As we came into contact with more and more Koreans, we realized this fact again and again. Once, with my own eyes, I saw the invader's aircraft set on fire a house which had been rebuilt by the Korean people. From within the raging fire a woman, falling and crashing into things, came running out. She was carrying a child on her back. Without so much as glancing at at her home, which was in flames, she went away. It was often like this: a husband killed by the enemy bombs, and the wife kowtowing before his body, which lay in a pool of blood. Afterwards, the wife join a guerrilla band and go into the mountains. In the middle of a large field scorched by the enemy fire, in places where the artillery shells shrieked, in darkness where, if you stretched out your arm, you could not see five fingers, and on paths and small roads, the women with their long skirts would pull plows, would transport artillery shells, would provide first aid to the wounded, would quickly repair roads. . . these admirable women, these great women, understood the meaning of hate and understood even better the meaning of love. They loved their own fatherland, their own army, their own leader, and they loved our Chinese People's Volunteer Army. They treated the soldiers of the Volunteer Army as their own sons, their own brothers, their own husbands. For the sake of the Volunteer Army, they were willing to sacrifice even their lives! My feelings often gushed forth in boiling hot streams, and then I would feel that the land of Korean was not only burning with the flames of war, but was also burning with the loving flames of patriotis and internationalism. Fire and blood were calling us! In this

brilliant, intense flame, we would forge a unity like steel and seize a common victory.

On the 20th, we reached the temporary assembly site at Southwest of Yinshan [transliteration]. This was a village composed of thirty-five homes right next to the side of a mountain. The troops camped in the forest, and the group army headquarters was set up by an dirt cliff. A cave was dug in the cliff and some branches were put together outside to make a camouflaged headquarters. This was our command post. A few leading comrades of the group army slept in the barracks made of branches. Inside these barracks, a long ditch, in which one person could sleep, was scooped out from the earth. It was then covered with branches and dry grass. On top of this, we spread some loess. With one's head sticking out, one could nestle in and go to sleep. Some soldiers in the guards company joked, "Our leaders are something else. Sleeping in a place like this, they are an awful lot like the dirt graves in our village!" I said, "As for this kind of dirt grave, the enemy can't strike it, nor can he bomb it. It's both safe and warm. If all of us had such a place in which to rest, wouldn't that be great?" A young comrade looked at me and, laughing, said, "That it is like a grave is a bad thing." "You are not old, yet you have much in the way of feudalistic thoughts! O.K., I'll call it by a new name. I'll call it the 'live grave'. How's that?" Everyone laughed.

We pitched a camp here.

No had imagined that we would, on the morning of the seventh day after entering Korea, suddenly receive a "Volunteer Command" message that said Commander in Chief Peng would come to see us. He would arrive at approximately 2000 hours on that day.

When we had just entered Korea, not yet having built our "nest" or fought a battle, Commander in Chief Peng's sudden arrival was, you could say, very happy news. It is hard to express with words that feeling of excitement and joy. I asked Yu

Zhen, "What precious thing did Comrade Huang Jing of Tianjin give for Commander in Chief Peng? Did you keep it?" Yu Zhen said, "It's some prawns. Fortunately, the Northeast and Korea are both frozen. Otherwise, Comrade Huang Jing's mission would not be completed!" Weishan is a straightforward man. Waving his large hand, he said, "Get it out and get it ready. We must entertain Commander in Chief Peng and present him with his gift!" "You", said Zhimin, "hurry up and look for Old Kang (Deputy Chief of Staff, Kang Boying) and comrades from the combat section and have them prepare a report on ingredients. You don't know what Commander in Chief Peng's temper is like. If the army isn't in order, and he doesn't have his meal, don't imagine that you'll escape the mess you'll be in."

Zhimin, Weishan, Director of the Political Department, Chen Xianduan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Kang Boying, and myself did not even eat, but waited by the side of the road.

It was probably after eight when the thin curtain of the night had covered Yinshan [transliteration] and had covered the trees. At that time two jeeps came flying toward us. We hurriedly went forward to welcome them.

The jeeps stopped. The first to get out was Commander in Chief Peng's staff officer guard, Yang Fengan. Then Commander in Chief Peng himself got out.

"I made you wait a long time, a long time!" said Commander in Chief Peng, shaking our hands.

We accompanied Commander in Chief Peng into our camouflaged headquarters.

In our camouflaged headquarters, Yu Zhen had already set up a rectangular table using artillery shell crates. He had also lit

six or seven candles. When he saw Commander in Chief Peng, he ran over and saluted him. He gave Commander in Chief Peng an artillery shell crate cushioned with a military rug as a seat.

Commander in Chief Peng laughed, saying, "Are you a Korean comrade?"

Yu Zhen immediately shook his head and said, "No, I'm from the Volunteer Army."

Commander in Chief Peng said, "Why should someone of the Volunteer Army be so polite to another member of the Volunteer Army?" Yu Zhen laughed. Everyone laughed. Commander in Chief Peng, glancing at Yu Zhen, said, "You are that comrade who was an operations staff member in Lanzhou!" He did not wait for Yu Zhen's response, but said, "Take it away. I don't want this." Saying this, he cast aside the rug which had been on the artillery shell crate.

I said, "We had just settled down when you came. What is the important mission for us?"

Commander in Chief Peng waved his hand and, laughing, said, "I certainly didn't come especially to see you. I was thinking of it, but the situation didn't permit it. I am here now because Chairman Mao requested that I come back to China to make a report. So I made a detour and came to see you and, representing the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army, to welcome you."

"You're driving back to China in a jeep?" I asked.

"What else can I do?" said Commander in Chief Peng. "We have no planes. It's just as well. If I had a plane, I wouldn't be able to see you."

What Commander in Chief Peng said made everyone laugh.

"How are the troops?" asked Commander in Chief Peng.

I said, "Pretty good. It's just that the soldiers' burdens are too heavy. The march is very arduous. We've had quite a few non-combat losses."

Commander in Chief Peng sighed, "We have no other way. Our two shoulders and two legs must overcome the ten-wheeled trucks of the enemy."

Following this, I reported on the fundamental situation of the units.

Commander in Chief Peng said, "We have already been victorious in three out of three battles. We are right now conducting the fourth campaign. Before we left China to fight, many comrades were very worried. In fact, the truth of the matter was that our feelings were not like they were when we were fighting the Ma Family Army in the northwest. After fighting a few battles, in truth, things became more clear! MacArthur does not have three heads and six arms! He is, after all, the paper tiger of which the Chairman spoke earlier. Of course, you must still recognize that he is a tiger. When fighting, you must regard him as a real tiger. You can't be at all casual about it! After three battles, he has, to some extent, lost control of the situation. Not long ago, some more old soldiers came from the U.S. Ridgeway, the outstanding West Point graduate, who was teaching at the West Point Academy, was also brought over. He certainly is capable of launching a counteroffensive to retrieve lost ground. Their equipment is certainly superior to ours. The skies and the seas have both fallen under their hegemony. On the ground, our legs must compete with their tractor treads. You should tell our soldiers that fighting in Korea is not like fighting in China. Fighting with the American devils is not like fighting with Chiang Kai-shek. You must prepare for a fierce war.

You must prepare for the fact that every battle will be fierce."

Commander in Chief Peng also made a point of asking, "How is the clothing of the privates?" I told Commander in Chief Peng that there was no problem. It was civilian clothing from Shandong which was padded with new cotton and which was very warm. Commander in Chief Peng said, "Korea is a good place. It's just that the weather is too cold. The 9th Group Army has suffered much because their clothing was poorly prepared. Many comrades had their ears frozen off or got frostbite in their hands and feet. And people have frozen to death. When the 9th Group Army entered Korea, it was in a great hurry. When they came, they were still wearing single-layer clothing. With temperatures 40 degrees below zero, they have suffered much. If you have any problems, then speak soon. You should speak the truth and be responsible for your soldiers."

Our Commander in Chief Peng had obviously become thinner. The corners of his eyes were bloodshot. When asked about his health, he, laughing, said, "I became 53 years old this year. And there's nothing wrong with my health. It's just that I haven't slept enough. However, in taking this jeep back to China, I have found that the road could take a little repairing. That hard seat which Yang Fengan made is pretty good!"

When I asked about the 19th Group Army's mission, Commander in Chief Peng first described the new situation to us. Then he said, "Right now, your most important mission is to become familiar with the situation. We aren't preparing to use you for the fourth campaign, but you will take part in the fifth campaign."

We knew that Commander in Chief Peng was in a hurry to get back on the road and had no time to eat a meal. So we had some rice porridge cooked up for him. We stir-fried a few dishes and opened up a bottle of bamboo leaf-green liquor. Commander in

Chief Peng drank it with great joy and pleasure.

I told Commander in Chief Peng that Huang Jing had given him a present. He laughed, "Huang Jing, you know, studied at Peking University prior to liberation. He took part in the leadership of the "One Two Nine" student movement. He's the big intellectual in the party! This guy always thinks so thoroughly. What did he have you bring?" We said that it was prawns. Commander in Chief Peng said, "Good stuff. Take it out, and everyone will eat together. Let's share it!"

When we laid the prawns out on the temporary table, Commander in Chief Peng put down his first prawn before he had even finished eating it. He said, "Korea is a nation with a long coastline. Their sea food products were originally very abundant. But now they are gone. If we let the American imperialists force an entry into our nation, not only prawns, but many, many other things will disappear. The Korean comrades have arrested the American invasion on their own soil and have thereby supported us. We came to fight this war together with them, just as in the song: 'Defeat the reckless U.S. ambition'."

When Commander in Chief Peng left us, it was nearly midnight. When we saw him off to his jeep, he held the jeep door and said, "This time I was unable to see the lower-ranking comrades. Please send everyone my good wishes. Wait for my return. We'll fight the fifth campaign together.

If one were to say that, since our entry into Korean, we had truly felt the call of blood and fire, then it would be fair to say that Commander in Chief Peng's arrival added towards our enormous strength which was rushing towards the battlefields.

We were waiting for the fifth campaign, waiting for the 19th Group Army's first battle after entering Korea.

Chapter Three, The Army's First Battle

After locating the group army headquarters southwest of Dobong Mountain for a very short period of time, we entered Jukjang Dong. This was the site, designated by the Volunteer Army Command, in which we were to assemble and await orders

In Korea, "dong" and "li" both mean village. A "dong" is a small village. A "li" is a large village or a town. A "gun" is very much like one of our districts, and a "do" is like a province.

Jukjang Dong was cradled by mountains. Its back rested against a rather high mountain range. 1500 meters to the southeast, there is a stream. The stream banks, the mountains, and the surrounding forest had all been haphazardly bombed by the enemy planes. Large sections had been burned into scorched wood or withered posts. Scenes like this were very common in Korea at the time. I stayed with Zhimin in the home of a woman whose husband and son had both gone to the front. She was a wonderful hostess to us.

In Jukjang Dong, we both familiarized ourselves with the situation and organized the troops to make defensive fortifications, study, and practice tactics. We asked the

comrades who had arrived in Korea earlier to introduce the situation.

At the time, the main comrade responsible for the Volunteer Army was Peng Dehuai, who served both as commander and commissar. The vice-commanders were Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhong, and Han Xianchu. The vice-commissar was Gan Qiuqi. The chief of staff was Jie Fang. The head of the logistical department was Zhou Chunquan. In order to employ force in a unified manner, as sanctioned by Chairman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Kim Il Sung, the United Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army was established. This was also called the Sino-Korean United Command. Decisions on "the scope of all combat operations and all front-line activities" were made by the United Command. Commander in Chief Peng remained both commander and commissar. On the Korean side, Jin Xiong served as vice-commander, and Piao Yiyu serve as vice-commissar. The Northeast Administrative Region was the General Rear Support Base of the Volunteer Army. Northeast Military Region Commander and Commissar Gao Gang was responsible for this base.

The second group to enter Korea was the 9th Group Army led by Song Shilun, Commander and Commissar, Tao Yong, Vice-Commander, and Qin Jianshen, Chief of Staff. They undertook the task of fighting on the eastern front. The Engineer Command Post entered Korea before them, and the Railroad Department entered after them.

Our 19th Group Army and the 3rd Group Army, led by Commander and Commissar Chen Geng, Vice-Commander Wang Jinshan, and Vice-Commissar Zhang Nansheng belonged to the third batch of units to enter Korea. At the time, Chen Geng had a domestic mission and so arrived later than his troops.

The first units to enter Korea had hurried their advances and had not been familiar with the terrain. They had been unable to

speak the language, and the weather had been very cold. Both their provisions and ammunition were insufficient at the time, and thus their equipment and weaponry were absolutely inferior to the enemy's under conditions of extreme hardship. Yet with daggers, rifles, and hand grenades, they, together with the Korean People's Army, fought continuously for four months in bloody and intense battles with the aggressor, who possessed planes, tanks, and heavy artillery. And they were victorious three times in three campaigns. They dealt a heavy blow to the enemy's insufferable arrogance and turned around and stabilized the Korean situation. Furthermore, they increased the political influence of our army internationally. Without a doubt, they blazed a trail for us and provided us lessons drawn from their experience.

On April 3rd, a "Volunteer Command" message instructed Li Zhimin and myself to hold a meeting.

At this time, the "Volunteer Command" was located in Euijeongbu, nestled in the mountains west of the Injin River. The organizational comrades lived in a camouflaged cave in the slope of a mountain. Outside of the camouflaged cave, there were a few ramshackle, wood board huts. Commander in Chief Peng lived here.

When we first arrived, Commander in Chief Peng received the two of us in his wood board hut. This was both his bedroom and his office. The walls were almost completely covered with maps. An old, crude wooden table stood in the center of the room. Spread out on the table were a few pen containers made from anti-aircraft artillery shell casings, two bottles of ink, and an open black square box. There were crude but sturdy benches on all four sides of the table. I made a point of looking and found that Commander in Chief Peng also sat on a long wooden bench. In another part of the hut, there was a military cot, with a wood frame over which was stretched sail cloth. On this, there lay a white sheet and a yellow quilt, flat and neatly arranged. At the

head of the cot, there were some artillery shell crates stacked on top of each other, on top of which stood half of a silvery white candle, as well as a few books.

Commander in Chief Peng saw the two of us observing his room and said, "Are you going to keep on looking? Of course it's better than yours!"

Li Zhimin shook his head. "It's not as good as mine! I've got a chair at my place. Though it's a little worn down, when I sit on it I have something to lean my back against."

"The superior quality of these benches is even better. Take a look." Saying this, Commander in Chief Peng took off his shoes and lifted his feet onto a bench. "It can also be used as a reclining chair! Not bad, comrades, to have this kind of command post on the Korean battlefield, to have these kind of living quarters. Not at all bad!"

Commander in Chief Peng asked us about the ideological situation and the living situation of our units after entering Korea. He told us that the meeting was mainly to research certain matters concerning the fifth campaign and to let us ponder these matters beforehand. After this, we left.

On the morning of the sixth, the meeting began.

The meeting was located in a large camouflaged cave.

Commander in Chief Peng looked around at the comrades who had come to the meeting and said, "The U.S. imperialists gathered together their vassal states and launched an invasion. These invading armies are called the United Nations Army. In fact, it is our Volunteer Army which is the united army. The region inhabited by any one of our group armies is larger than some of their countries. You were all gathered together from various

places and brought here. Before coming here, there were many comrades among us whom we did not know, and the characteristic operations of the units were all different. In order to fight the aggressor, we must come together. That is to say, we should truly unite, not just in form, but, more importantly, in our thoughts. We should operate in close coordination during combat, complementing each other in such a way that our weaknesses are made up for and our strengths taken advantage of. If we come together as one, we can defeat the United Nations Army led by the U.S. imperialists."

Commander in Chief Peng's speech came straight to the point. Rarely are there opening remarks. Nevertheless, these opening remarks were welcomed by everyone.

"This is the Party Representative Conference of the Fifth Campaign of the Volunteer Army." Saying this, Commander in Chief Peng spread out a few papers on a table. They clearly constituted the draft of his speech, yet he rarely looked at them during the speech.

Commander Peng said, "In this conference we will primarily research combat topics and in focusing on these topics we will solve some other problems. For example, the problem of logistical transportation and the problem of there being no provisions in the area stretching 300 kilometers south of the 38th parallel. These are big problems. There is also the problem of how to coordinate operations in the enemy's rear. This isn't strategic coordination, but campaign level coordination."

Continuing, he introduced to us the situation of the fourth campaign and analyzed both the enemy's situation and our own. Commander in Chief Peng said that in the fourth campaign the enemy continued to attack. The enemy also transferred the 40th and 45th Divisions of the National Guard to Japan. These, together with the 34th Infantry Regiment were organized into the U.S. 16th Army.

The enemy's goal was to execute a landing in our rear area and to coordinate with the frontal attack, thereby realizing the plan to establish a new defensive line across the wasp's waist of Korea. To our front, the enemy has augmented the depth of his defenses, establishing first, second, and third defensive zones. As a result, this time we should get rid of all of the enemy's divisions and all of his regiments. Only by wiping out a good portion of the enemy forces, could we seize the initiative and smash the enemy's plan to execute a landing.

Commander in Chief Peng placed particular emphasis on the strategic policy of the Central Committee, which was: "Prepare for a long-term war, while giving one's all for the short-term struggle." He said that Chairman Mao's recent telegram stated, with regard to the Korean war, that "if it can be won quickly, then win it quickly. If it cannot be won quickly, then win it slowly." We are fighting in turns in order to, as much as possible, take advantage of the short term. Of course, it is also for the purpose of training the troops."

Commander in Chief Peng paid a lot of attention to mobilizing everyone's enthusiasm. He also paid much attention to bringing into play the power of the concrete leadership. After he finished talking about the conditions of our army, he said, "We should use this time to carry out tactical education. I ask Chief of Staff Jie to speak on this problem; I ask the head of the logistical department, Zhou, to speak on material preparation and how to conquer the difficulty of the 300 kilometers where there are no provisions. How is the combat readiness of each group army? Everyone should speak briefly. I invited comrades of the People's Army to speak briefly on how the five group armies of the People's army prepare. Let's exchange intelligence reports and fight together."

When we began discussing campaign dispositions, Commander in Chief Peng firmly and strongly said:

"Each army subordinate to the 19th Group Army Command Post and the 1st Army Group of the People's Army, with the attached 31st Regiment of the 8th Artillery Division, will comprise the right wing attack force.

"Each army subordinate to the 3rd Group Army Command Post and the attached 28th and 29th Regiments of the 2nd Artillery Division and the 403rd Anti-Tank Attack Artillery Regiment will comprise the central attack force.

"Each army subordinate to the 9th Group Army, the 39th and 40th Armies, and the attached five battalions of the 1st Artillery Division and one battalion of the 2nd Artillery Division, and the 401st Anti-Tank Attack Artillery Regiment will comprise the left wing attack force.

"With one part of the forces (the 40th army), we will make campaign breaches in the Jangseong Li-Dongmeon Li line, cutting the enemy into two halves, east and west and cutting off the enemy's east west support. At the same time, the 3rd Group Army will execute a frontal attack. The 9th Group Army and the 19th Group Army will separate into two wings and attack. They will execute campaign-level outflanking maneuvers, forming huge, open-mouthed pincers. First of all, we will concentrate our forces on wiping out the 1st Puppet Division, the 29th British Brigade, the 3rd U.S. Division, the Turkish brigade, the 6th Puppet Division. After that, we will again concentrate our strength on wiping out the 24th and 25th U.S. Divisions. In addition, the 42nd Army will be stationed in the Wonsan and Tonyang areas. The 38th Army will be stationed at Xiaochuan [transliteration], and the 47th Army will be stationed at Pyongyang. The 2nd Army Group of the People's Army will be stationed in the Huachuan and Weiyang [transliterations] regions. The main force of the 6th Army Group will be in the Sariwon and Zaining Regions. In these areas, the units will prepare to wipe out the enemy after he lands. . . . "

Compared to the previous four campaigns, Commander in Chief Peng's deployments for the fifth campaign, regardless of whether one considers the number of units, the width of the front, or the predicted results, would be much larger. These deployments were extraordinary and inspiring!

During the conference, I came to understand in more detail the situation of the fourth campaign, which would soon be over. The enemy, after suffering three heavy attacks, was quickly transferring armies from Europe, the U.S. and Japan to serve as reinforcements. They aim to take advantage of our reorganizing time to invade the north with all their forces. In addition, because the U.S. 8th Army Commander, Woke [transliteration], who commanded all the invading units in Korea, was killed in an attack by a Korean guerrilla unit while he was retreating (the U.S. propaganda version is that he died in an auto accident), Ridgeway, whom MacArthur had selected, had just taken over Woke's [transliteration] position.

Ridgeway was a U.S. Lieutenant General. He was regarded by the Western armies as an alert, quick-thinking general. He exuded a spirit of exuberance and courage and had taken on the assignment with the objective of winning exceptional glory in the first battle. Before engaging in combat, he painstakingly researched our army. Taking advantage of the time when our army was reorganizing after the third campaign, he assembled five armies, a total of sixteen divisions, three brigades, one airborne force, and all the artillery, air force, and armored units. With the western front as the main point of attack, and with air and surface units attacking together, he launched an attack across a front more than 200 kilometers wide. He was going to push us back across the Yalu River with one blow. In fact, this was only his desire. We used three armies to defend the western line and blocked the enemy's main attack group. On the eastern front, we purposely allowed the enemy to launch his auxiliary attack. Then

we assembled the main forces of six armies and launched a counterattack. We annihilated part of the enemy's main force and opened up a campaign-level breach. We then developed the attack into the enemy's rear area, thereby throwing into confusion his dispositions and smashing his attack. As the counterattack developed difficulties in the enemy rear, and while the Chinese units which had just entered Korea had not yet arrived, they set up mobile defenses. In order to conserve forces, reduce casualties, and race with time, and not because we were limited by the idea of winning or losing one city or one place, on March 14th, we initiated a withdrawal from Korea. While conducting mobile defenses, we made use of mountain-to-mountain and river-to-river resistance attacks across a broad and deep front. We used the times in which we changed our positions to kill and wound a great number of the enemy. It was during this period of time that the 187th Division of the 63rd Army of our group army was taken and made to participate in the mobile defense operations. According to the most recent intelligence we had, the enemy had already discovered the Chinese units which had just entered Korea. Add to this the fact that the enemy wanted to inflict on us the cost of 1000 casualties a day, we had no choice but to change from an attack to defense. We had once again achieved victory.

I remember that at the end of his speech that day, Commander in Chief Peng emphasized: "In this campaign, we must integrate our campaign-level penetrations with tactical penetrations. The enemy has very little campaign depth. He has only tactical depth. The enemy's support is mainly horizontal. Vertically, it is possibly very slight. We must open up a breach and cut the enemy into two halves, western and eastern. If we are not able to implement this penetration, we will fail." "Tactical penetrations should be done on a small scale; the enemy should be cut up into small pieces. Large outflanking envelopments and small outflanking envelopments should be tightly integrated."

Commander in Chief Peng especially emphasized: "As for

logistical work, I will repeat myself. You must be particularly diligent in handling the supply of provisions to the five armies on the eastern front. If they don't have anything to eat for a day or two, then they will have no chance of carrying out their plans. If we prove victorious in this battle, then half the glory will go to all the combat officers and men. The other half will go to logistics."

The blueprint was complete. It was as if the plot had already been written. The director's scheme was perfect. Whether or not we could act out the live, majestic play depended on the effort of the directors and the vast number of actors.

That night when the "Voluntary Command" conference came to an end, Zhimin and I hurried back in jeeps to the place where our troops were stationed, Duzhuangdong.

Aprils in Korea are still quite cold in a nippy sort of way. My jeep was in front, and Zhimin's was behind. Although the road was difficult to travel, the vehicles travelled at a speed greater than 50 kmh. At the time, night marches commonly encountered air raids by enemy planes. To avoid being hit in an air raid, we always removed the jeeps' roofs and arranged to have someone in the jeep keep a special look out for enemy planes. During this particular trip, we were employing this same method. The guards, Guo Changrong and Duan Yourong, were acting as look outs. We had probably completed half of the trip when the two of them shouted almost simultaneously, "Enemy planes!" Soon afterwards, we heard the roar of enemy planes. A driver, Li Genzhong, tilted his head to listen and said, "They are 'Hanging Lanterns', night-flying planes." Saying this, he stepped on the gas pedal, increasing the jeep's speed. At this time, the enemy plane did indeed drop a few illuminating shells. It was during this instant when the illuminating shell lit up that I discovered a truck in front of us, flying like a bolt of lightning towards us. Before I could shout the two words, "not good", there was a tremendous sound like

a mountain falling and the earth splitting open, and I lost consciousness.

I don't know how much time had passed when excruciating pain forced me, with great difficulty, to open my eyes. I just saw Zhimin kneeling at my side. I was leaning at an angle against Guo Changrong. I grabbed Zhimin's hand and, with great effort, I managed to stand up. Zhimin asked, "How are you?" I moved my legs and arms for a while. There was no feeling except for the pain. Then I said, "If my leg's not broken, then there's nothing the matter with me." I looked at Guo Changrong and asked, "Are you hurt? How are the two of them?" Little Guo did not answer. It seemed that he was sobbing. I knew that he was worrying about me. I quickly said, "No problem. I am very much alive!" Zhimin told me that no one had suffered serious injuries. Little Guo, Little Duan, and I had been thrown more than ten meters. Li Genzhong had been hit in the chest by the steering wheel. He said, "It's too dangerous! The jeep's bumper was bent in the crash!" At this point, Duan Yourong, holding a carbine in one hand and a private with the other, hobbled over.

The private whom Little Duan had grabbed was the truck driver.

He berated the truck driver, shouting loudly at him. He even shouted, "I will execute you!" Zhimin quickly went and pulled the driver over to me. I asked, "Are you wounded?" The driver lowered his head and said nothing. Zhimin asked him, "Did you doze off after driving continuously for a long time?" The driver nodded, but still said nothing. "Wake up this time. Hurry up and check to see how your car runs. From now, on be careful!" This time the driver raised his head and said, sobbing, "Sir, what unit do you command? Your jeep was wrecked by my truck. Ride in my truck. I will take you back." Little Duan asked him angrily, "What's your unit?" The driver said, "The 19th Group Army." I said, "Good, we belong to the same unit. You can go." The driver

saluted me and said, "Sorry, Commander. I'll be careful as I return to the company." When he finished speaking, he left. Little Duan watched the driver leaving and asked me, "How could you let him go?" I said, "How? You still want to execute him! Come, help me over to the commissar's car. We will leave first. You wait here for a car to pick you up."

In the car, Zhimin, joking, said, "You survived a disaster. You will certainly enjoy good fortune later on." I said, "I am not asking for good fortune later on. I simply hope that this doesn't happen again."

On April 9th, in Jukjang Dong, the group army held a meeting for cadres of the division level and above to let them know the spirit of the "Volunteer Command" conference. After preparing for so long and after having left China such a long time ago, we were looking forward to our first battle. This was particularly the case when the cadres heard that our mission would be to serve as the main force in the attack on the western front. Hearing this, the commanders expressed, one after another, their wish to answer the trust of the higher level commanders with concrete actions. They also wished to answer with victory the hope of the Chinese and Korean people and of people throughout the world.

It was during this time, while we were intensifying preparations at every level, that the news came concerning the dismissal of the Supreme Commander of the "United Nation's Army", MacArthur. A few days later, we saw the message which U.S. President Truman had instructed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley, to give to MacArthur:

"In the name of the President and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, I with great regret dismiss you from the positions of Commander of the Allied Forces in Japan, Supreme Commander of the United Nations Army, and Supreme Commander of the U.S. Far Eastern Army. I request that you hand over your

authority to General Ridgeway."

The comrades of the staff said that from our point of view this little victory report made sense. Of course, Ridgeway's assignment showed that the Truman administration's reckless ambition to occupy Korea militarily persisted and had not changed in the least. On the second day after Ridgeway took over the position of Supreme Commander of the United Nation's Army, seventy aircraft were dispatched which invaded northeastern China airspace and bombed Dandong and its suburbs, wounding and killing peaceful Chinese residents.

This was like adding wood to the fire for the officers and men who were right then in the midst of preparing for their first battle since leaving China. In the course of scouting the terrain, performing tactical drills, and making plans, a new enthusiasm became apparent.

Fanfolite [transliteration] replaced Ridgeway as Commander of the U.S. 8th Army. He would be my main opponent in the fifth campaign. "Know yourself and know your enemy and thus avoid one hundred dangers." I transferred relevant materials from the intelligence department.

Fanfulite [transliteration], too, was a U.S. Lieutenant General. He was fifty-nine years old at the time. Like Ridgeway, he was a graduate of West Point Academy. He had received his graduation diploma at the same time Eisenhower did. During the Second World War, he fought in some European countries. In the summer of 1949, he returned to the U.S. He helped build up the U.S. Army. One should say that he had much experience as a commander. We reported information on him to cadres of the division level and above. We demanded that they could not in the least take him lightly, but should research his characteristics and determine a means of countering him.

I gathered together combat, administrative, and logistical comrades and had them discuss the enemy situation with the political commissar, the vice-commanders, the chief of staff, and the head of the logistical department. We also discussed our resources, offered opinions, made plans, and, by all offering our thoughts, made the most of our ideas. During those days, Zhimin, Xianduan, and the comrades of the political department were all very busy. They went among the troops and learned the ideological situation of the officers and men. Together with political organs of all levels, they thoroughly researched pre-battle mobilization and solved all kinds of ideological problems and practical difficulties by employing workable measures. For the entire group army, they drafted a "Combat Mobilization Order for Fighting the First Battle since Leaving China" in the name of the commander, the commissar, the vice-commander, and the director of the political department. This mobilization order was simple, without any flowery language. It was high-spirited, loud and strong. It contained a strong call and exhortation. Even when read today, it retains its strong martial air. Within the mobilization order, there was this section:

"Comrades! Intensify preparations and await the order to attack! Your chance to distinguish yourselves has arrived. You only need an order. Wherever the higher levels direct you to advance, you shall advance. Everyone is eager to be first. Everyone is alert and lively. When we are to attack, be like a wild tiger. When we are to defend, stand steady like a mountain. Absolutely do not lightly abandon a position. If you are supposed to pursue, then pursue like a madman. You absolutely must not let a single enemy soldier go. You should with great daring penetrate and cut apart the enemy. Separate, envelop, and wipe out the enemy. Take on any tremendous task. Do not hesitate. If you encounter some difficulty, don't cry out that it is bitter or tiring. Do not fear the enemy's planes, tanks, or heavy artillery.

You are to shoot down the enemy's planes, blow up his tanks, and capture his heavy artillery. It does not matter whether we face the soldiers of the U.S., Great Britain, or of the bandit Rhee; we should fight fiercely and fight with pleasure. Fight so that the blows you deal are heavy blows. Fight so that your fighting is fierce. Fight so that you thoroughly annihilate the enemy.

"This is our first battle since leaving China. We wish to plant the flag of victory. Use all our strength in fighting this battle to a conclusion. . . . We shall be tested in our first battle and will succeed in our first battle. . . .

While we were enthusiastically and intensely making pre-battle preparations, the First Appreciation Group, which was dispatched by the people of the fatherland and led by Comrade Liao Chengzhi, arrived in Korea and arrived at the front line. The second section of the group came to our group army. The writers and artists work team which accompanied the group was the Tianjin unit of the folk entertainment work team. In this unit, there was the comic dialogue actor, Comrade Chang Yukun (stage name, Little Mushroom). We had left China only a few months ago. Yet now that we were in a different nation and a different land, soon to leap into our first Korean battle, the feeling of excitement that we had upon seeing one of our beloved ones from the fatherland is difficult to describe in words.

It was very difficult to see a performance then. I remember that the Tianjin folk entertainment unit selected a mountain slope for its first performance. They hung gas lanterns and barn lanterns from the trees. Air raid look outs were posted on a few peaks. We agreed that two shots would signify the arrival of an enemy plane and that in such a case we would quickly extinguish the lanterns. When the enemy planes left, one shot would be

fired, and the lanterns would be lit and the performance would continue. On that day, Chang Yukun's comic dialogue had just started when we heard a sound like "bingbang" coming from the peaks almost simultaneously. Following the shots, there came the roar of enemy planes. As the last lantern was being put out on the slope, the green and red lights of six enemy planes were clearly visible. The first three dropped a few illuminating shells and then left. There was trace of the last three. Experience had taught us that the last three planes were certain to have slipped into an inclined, high-altitude flight in order to spy on targets. After accurately selecting the attack points, they would pounce like evil wolves. We ordered the units to prepare to fire, and we organized with all our strength to ensure the safety of the comrades of the appreciation group.

What happened was not what we had expected. During the instant in which the illuminating bombs went out, the three aircraft, roaring, went into a dive. Almost simultaneously, our ground weapons organized an air fire net. It was obvious that the enemy planes had not expected this. The second plane nearly crashed into the top of the first plane. The three enemy planes dropped a few bombs and then fled in disorder. The bombs were not far from the slope where we were having our performance. After this small affair had quieted down, the lanterns were lit again. The comrades of the folk entertainment unit insisted on continuing the performance. Zhimin, Weishan, myself, and a few other comrades discussed the matter and decided it would be better not to perform. Whenever enemy planes ran into trouble, they would always return to exact revenge. We had to be responsible for our friends sent from the fatherland. Although the performance could not continue, the comrades of the appreciation group brought care, love, hope, and deep feelings of friendship. The officers and men were all made aware of this. Therefore, when later we heard that Chang Yukun and other comrades were sacrificed in an enemy bombing raid, many soldiers who had not seen them perform at all clenched their fists with sincere feeling and shouted the slogan, "Avenge

the deaths of our friends" while charging towards the enemy!"

The fifth campaign began. On April 22nd, the 19th Group Army entered its first battle since arriving in Korea.

As the right wing attack group, our concrete dispositions were: the 63rd Army attacked on the left wing; the 64th Army attacked from the center; the 1st Army Group of the People's Army attacked on the right wing. These were in the first echelon. The 65th Army served as the second echelon. The 31st Regiment of the 8th Artillery Division was responsible for providing cover. After penetrating across the Imjin River, the 64th Army cut through the opposing integrated unit (composed of the British 29th Brigade and the U.S. 3rd Division) and cut their connecting lines. The 64th destroyed Euijeongbu and executed a campaign-level outflanking maneuver. They first wiped out the British 29th Brigade and Rhee's puppet 1st Division. Then, in coordination with the central and left wing attack groups, they enveloped and wiped out the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions. This was a great victory.

At dusk on the 22nd, each unit marched quickly to the north shore of the Imjin River to predetermined assembly points along a line more than 30 kilometers long.

The Imjin River is a large river in central Korea. The river surface is about one hundred meters wide. Because it is affected by ocean tides, sometimes the water is deep, and sometimes it is shallow. During high tide, the water level was level with the banks. During low tide, it was one meter or more deep. Along the south bank of the river, there was an unbroken chain of mountains. The commanding heights were Gamak Mountain, Mai Mountain, and Doag Mountain. The enemy had constructed a strong defensive system relying on key points in the terrain. There were trenches, communication trenches, pillboxes, barbed wire, and mines spread out over hills and mountains. The enemy's main force guarded the first line of heights south of the river and key points in the

rear. There was one floating tank bridge which connected the north and south banks of the Imjin River. Caltraps had been placed in the river. The enemy's artillery fire could control the river surface, key points to the north of the river, and roads.

To penetrate across Imjin River would be very difficult.

The group army headquarters was located in camouflaged barracks right behind the first echelon. The camouflaged barracks were extremely low so that we could not even hang up maps. Under these conditions, the first shots were fired in the fight to cross the Imjin River.

Fire from both banks was woven into an intense fire net. Groups of enemy planes swarmed in intervals into the skies above the river. A dense mass of bombs, like black clouds, came pressing down. The river banks were all flying mud, stones, and smoke. Columns of water shot up from the river, creating a forest of water and billows like ocean waves. From the opposite bank, the enemy's light and heavy machineguns sealed off the bridge, the ferries, and the fords. But they were not able to seal off a huge number of attack points. Our soldiers risked the enemies artillery fire, jumping into waste-deep water, charging to the opposite bank. . . .

After a short while, the report from the advance units came over on the walkie-talkie: four regiments of the first-echelon 187th Division of the 63rd Army had already victoriously crossed the river and were already closing in on the enemy's outpost troops. I looked at my watch. Only an hour had passed since we launched the attack. The speed of this not only amazed the enemy; it surprised us as well. It was really extraordinarily fast. At the same time that I was praising them, I wanted them to develop the victory, sweep away the enemy outpost troops, capture the commanding heights, and push further into the enemy's rear area!

The main reason why the 187th Division was able to cross the river was that we went from the assembly sites to the river bank and set up ambushes there in daylight. The enemy guarding the Imjin River relied on strong defensive fortifications and continuous aerial reconnaissance. They absolutely could not imagine that we would dare to approach the bank in daylight. The 187th Division used this method to perfection. With strict camouflage, the columns travelled on several different routes, maintaining distance. They travelled on small mountain paths and arrived at the river bank. Our plan was to launch an attack even if the surprise attack did not succeed. The result was that the ambush was successful. This not only greatly reduced the amount of time needed to cross the river, but also provided a lot of encouragement to other units.

When the units of the left and right wing attack groups began crossing the river, the enemy's artillery fire became even more intense, and the enemy planes were bombing indiscriminately. Their illuminating bombs and searchlights lit up the river surface like day. Add to this the underwater barbed wire and the land mines, and our casualties were very heavy. However, our soldiers had long before ceased to give any thought to their own personal lives. Our artillery units increased their fire and suppressed the enemy's artillery fire. Our anti-aircraft guns concentrated their fire on the enemy aircraft. As for our soldiers in the water, no sooner had one fallen than another stepped into the breach. Leaping in and jumping forward, they crossed the river. At midnight, due to the high tide and the sudden rise in the water level, our troops were kept back north of the river until dawn, on the 23rd, when the tide was low. Only then did our right wing attack group completely penetrate across the river.

After the 63rd Army crossed the river, it continued to advance towards the enemy's rear. The troops of the 63rd captured four enemy heights in succession. They cut across thirty kilometers of rugged mountain roads and smashed a dozen or so

enemy blocking actions. They captured Gamag Mountain, thus bringing under control the first commanding height south of the river and separating the connections between the British 29th Brigade and the U.S. 3rd Division. The main force continued advancing to the south. At 1800 hours they penetrated the main defensive belt of the puppet 1st Division and the British 29th Brigade. They occupied Mun Mountain, Mitasa, Zhichuanli, Zhongpili [Translator's Note: The last two are transliterations], and the Seven Peaks region. They first annihilated part of the puppet 1st Division and then most of the British 29th Brigade, a total of more than 4000 men. One soldier, Liu Guangzi, of the 561st Regiment, had the achievement of capturing 63 British soldiers. This achievement became big news among the troops. Liu Guangzi's record was exceptional. But because of these captured British soldiers, everyone got badges for the front and back of his army cap. It turned out that these soldiers were from the famous Geluosite [transliteration] regiment. This regiment, in 1801, during a campaign in the Egyptian colonial war, turned a defeat into a victory. The King of England named them the "Royal Army". They wore two insignia as a symbol of this.

After the 64th Army crossed the river and attacked and captured Changpoli and Gaoshidong [transliteration], they were blocked by a U.S. armored force and by bombing that was conducted indiscriminately over a wide area. It was difficult to maneuver and the advance proceeded slowly. This was particularly true for two divisions whose missions were to penetrate and cut up enemy units. They were squeezed tightly by the enemy. If they did not extricate themselves, then the entire course of the campaign would be endangered.

Upon receiving this report, Vice-Commander Zheng Weishan, Deputy Chief of Staff Kang Boying, and I banged our heads to figure out a solution and then sent a message directly to the commander of the 64th Army, Zeng Siyu. We told him that the group

army had decided to dispatch two divisions of the 65th Army to provide support. We told him to suppress the enemy with the greater part of his units and to use one part of his units to execute a high-speed penetration deep into the enemy's rear. He was by all means to complete the mission assigned to him by "Volunteer Command" of cutting up and enveloping the enemy.

The group army reconnaissance detachment was operating in coordination with the 64th Army's penetration mission, and the 3rd Battalion of the 569th Regiment of the 64th Army was executing a frontal attack. At the same time, both were bravely advancing into the enemy's rear area. These two units, during a twenty hour period, defeated seven enemy blocking actions and advanced 120 kilometers. They captured an important traffic route leading to Seoul and a commanding height near Euijeongbu, Dobong Mountain and destroyed a steel bridge that was part of the road below the mountain, thus cutting off the enemy's retreat. So as to support the enemy whose retreat we had cut off, the enemy recklessly pounded Dobong Mountain with artillery. According to later reports, during the first day, no less than several thousands of shells were dropped on Dobong Mountain. The bomb craters on the side of the mountains were themselves cratered with bomb craters. Cypress trees, with trunks thick as bowls, were cut down by the bombs like stalks of sorghum. Our officers and men who were holding Dobong Mountain demonstrated a great and fearless revolutionary spirit. They dug barracks and ricochet trenches. They skillfully hid from the enemy's artillery attacks, and they looked down upon the enemy below the mountain. During the night, they dispatched teams to attack the enemy. It was as though they plunged a steel knife into the heart of the enemy. Here, the fighting persisted for three days and four nights. They blew apart the enemy's in depth defenses. Afterwards, the "Volunteer Command" presented them with the glorious names of "Dobong Mountain Battalion" and "Dobong Mountain Detachment".

While these two units were capture Dobong Mountain, the 189th

Division of the 63rd Army encircled more than 2000 of the enemy at Tugiaochang [transliteration]. After an hour of intense combat, seeing that we had only one battalion to cut off their retreat, the enemy quickly modified his formations. With more than eighty tanks leading and surrounding, the enemy soldiers, who were in the middle, escaped to the south, as more than twenty aircraft provided cover.

During this time, two divisions of the 65th Army had already crossed the river and reached Jangseong Li. The 64th Army suffered a setback at Dongmeon Li, and the other divisions lacked experience in breaking out of envelopments. Because of this, and because of fierce enemy fire, enemy attacks from left and right, and difficulty in breaking through enemy prepared defensive positions, five divisions were squeezed into a thin twenty square kilometer rectangular area on the south bank of the Imjin River. They were pounded by enemy artillery, were fired upon by air units, and their casualties were very heavy. Now, when I think about it, I still feel very sad.

They were engaged in intense combat there for three days. Finally, they penetrated the enemy positions and pushed forward towards the enemy rear. Nevertheless, they had lost three days time, after all. In modern warfare, in which every second counts, three days time, or 72 hours, is really too precious.

The enemy, under our constant attacks, fled to Seoul and the North Seoul River. Most of our units continued to attack and pursue fiercely and bravely. Our group army command post followed closely behind the first echelon, as it advanced to the south.

As we advanced, the enemy planes continued to bomb. Besides wearing branches and woven grass on our heads, we each carried branches in our hands and held them up like umbrellas to cover our heads. When the enemy planes came, we would go to in thickets of shrubs beside the road. When the enemy planes left, we would once

again quickly march down the road. Li Daquan of the operations staff was tall and had long legs. He did not fear fighting or charging. He would run to the very front, and from time to time he would return to take care of me and Zhimin. The rugged mountain roads were bumpy and rough. In one day, we would march seventy or eighty kilometers. Some soldiers legs were swollen from having fallen down. Others had blistered feet. The most serious problem was that, in some units, there was high consumption of the provisions and ammunition they carried themselves, and our transportation system was encountering severe difficulties. During this time, we received a "Volunteer Command" order to stop the advance, replenish ammunition, adjust dispositions, and prepare for another battle. We learned that the enemy had retreated to Seoul, the North Seoul River, and the south bank of the Soyang Gang. There, the enemy forces were quickly constructing new defenses. Moreover, in the Seoul area, they were organizing a continuous and dense fire net zone. The aim was to show us that if we attacked, we would suffer heavy casualties. Having learned all this, we felt that the "Volunteer Command" order to halt the advance was very wise.

In this way, the first phase of the fifth campaign ended on April 29th. After the left wing attack group, led by Commander and Commissar Song Shilun, Vice-Commander Tao Yong, Chief of Staff Jia Jian, and other comrades, penetrated the enemy defenses, the main force, taking advantage of the victory, penetrated deeper into the enemy lines. While advancing, they defeated five enemy intercepting and blocking actions. They wiped out parts of the U.S. 24th Division and the puppet 6th Division and advanced to territory south of the 38th parallel. They victoriously completed their campaign mission of cutting apart the enemy. After the central attack force, led by Commander and Commissar Chen Keng, Vice-Commander Wang Jinshan, Vice-Commissar Zhang Nansheng, Chief of Staff, Wang Yunduan, and other comrades, encountered stubborn resistance from the U.S. 3rd Division and the Turkish Brigade, its progress slowed. After intense combat, our forces wiped out

part of the U.S. 3rd Division. Our right wing attack group wiped out most of the British 29th Brigade and part of the Turkish Brigade. The 1st Army Group of the People's Army annihilated part of the puppet 1st Division. The 5th Army Group of the People's Army annihilated most of the 5th Regiment of the puppet 7th Division. During this phase, we wiped out more than 23,000 of the enemy. This was quite a large victory. But we also saw clearly that, since those of our units which were to execute outflanking maneuvers had not kept to schedule, our outflanking maneuvers and ability to annihilate the enemy were adversely affected at the campaign level. The result was that this phase was a successful rout, but not an annihilating attack. We had attained victory, but not the greatest victory. We had only caused the enemy units to suffer serious damage. We had not been able to deal him an annihilating blow.

Army discipline was, in every aspect, extremely strict. Commander in Chief Peng, who rewarded and punished fairly, was well known to us. Therefore, we had a presentiment that the 64th Army, because it had not been able to complete its mission in the set period of time, would be criticized by "Volunteer Command" and by Commander in Chief Peng. As a matter of fact, after the combat of the first phase came to an end, we did receive a telegram investigating the failure of the 64th Army to complete its assigned mission. Afterwards, Commander in Chief Peng told us, "That telegram was composed by me. I was quite angry!"

The telegram stated:

One. For the first phase of the fifth campaign, your army's mission was to quickly penetrate across Imjin River and proceed to Yizhengfu and other locations to the south, where you were to cut off the enemy's retreat. Why didn't you complete your mission? What's the reason? You must conduct a strict investigation on responsibility for this.

Two. The army (group army) reconnaissance detachment and the 3rd Battalion of the 568th Regiment of the 190th Division were able to rapidly penetrate to Dobong Mountain. Their radio transmissions ceased while they were in transit. It is said that they were still able to dispatch someone to return and communicate with us. The evidence is that someone could have crossed over. Why didn't the main divisional forces continue to advance with them? The army did not carry out strict supervision. The reconnaissance detachment and the 3rd Battalion fought well. All the comrades deserve to have their merit recorded and announced. Please report the names of the responsible cadres right away so as to report their merit citations to the entire army.

Answer the above two questions within twenty-four hours.

After receiving the telegram, Director of the Political Department Chen Xianduan and I hurried over as fast as we could to the 64th Army and participated in the emergency party conference which they had just convened. We became familiar with the concrete situation, integrated lessons learned from the experience, and lifted their morale for the next battle. Zeng Siyu, Wang Zhao, and the main responsible comrades of the two divisions with missions to penetrate enemy lines were in low spirits and were very upset. They diligently conducted sincere self-criticism. The leading comrades of the divisions went so far as to investigate each tactical action. The main reason that the mission to execute a campaign-level outflanking maneuver and cut off the enemy's retreat was not completed was: 1) Some of the cadres in these two divisions were insufficiently schooled in "penetration" and "carving up" tactics. Some even mistakenly

1 The stress was added by Commander in Chief Peng.

believed that "if the enemy dispositions reveal gaps large enough to pass through, then we can penetrate." When there were not gaps, then they did not persist in trying to break through, but hesitated and did not advance, thus losing a good chance to engage the enemy. 2) When they encountered stubborn enemy blocking actions or ambushes, their commands lacked mobility and flexibility. They continued to employ combat methods from domestic wars which were for level ground so that there occurred the very serious problem of command organs being separated from their troops. As a result, progress became slow, and crowding occurred. Although the troops fought heroically, they were unable to attain their objective, which was to annihilate the enemy. To the contrary, they themselves suffered very heavy casualties. As Commander in Chief Peng said when synthesizing the lessons learned from the experience of the fifth campaign, "Our army was born on the battlefields of China. Our methods of combat were to take advantage of massive support and surprise, seeking a quick resolution to each battle. But now, to employ this past method against the enemy occupying his positions is not completely appropriate. . . ." That we were not able to give full play to the power of our artillery is another reason.

Comrade Xianduan and I, representing the group army party committee, accepted our responsibility. While we affirmed the stubborn martial will of the officers and men, we subjected army and division leaders to criticism, which now that I think of it, was quite severe. War is like this. It is not in the least capable of being a mild sort of thing. Based on the opinions of the army part committee, the group army party committee decided to punish the division commanders and commissars of the two advance divisions with demotions and publicized warnings. Comrades of the group army reconnaissance detachment and of the 3rd Battalion, who fought well, had their merit recorded and reported to "Volunteer Command" and Commander in Chief Peng. The conference went well. Strong proof of this lies in the fact that during the second and third phases of the fifth campaign, we fought even better.

The first shots of the second phase of the fifth campaign were fired on May 16th. After the enemy's plot to drive deep into our lines and either inflict heavy casualties or envelop and wipe out our units was recognized and smashed by us, beginning on April 30th part of the enemy forces launched attacks against us. Their aim was to destroy our attack preparations, to conduct reconnaissance on our army's movements, and to provide cover while their main force adjusted its dispositions. We organized our defenses and rapidly modified our dispositions.

After our army had attacked continuously for five days and nights, the 9th and 3rd Group Armies, which were responsible for wiping out the enemy along the eastern front, both charged forward like rapids in a mountain gorge, drowning one after another enemy position, like a flood washing away mud. Like the autumn wind sweeping away fallen leaves, they buried parts of the U.S. and puppet armies under a sea of fire and blood. Our 19th Group Army, which was responsible for suppressing the main force of the U.S. Army on the western front held the main enemy force firmly in place, as though with steel pliers. And, though we had not planned it, we victoriously crossed the North Seoul River. After our bold and powerful attacks on the eastern and western lines, the main force of the enemy was forced retreat helter-skelter and set up defenses. On the western line, the enemy army had no choice but to provide complete support, block up the campaign-level breach, and augment defenses. Since our army had engaged in continuous combat, the provisions and ammunition which we carried with us would soon be exhausted, and for a short while rear support could not provide us with material assistance. Since continuing the attack was already difficult, we made up our minds to halt the attack. Thus, on May 21st, the second phase of the fifth campaign came to an end. In this phase, more than 23,000 U.S. and puppet troops were wiped out.

After the end of the second phase of the campaign, "United

Command" decided to transfer the main forces of each group army northward and to use part of the forces conduct successive blocking attack against the enemy from a mobile defense mode and to race against time to provide support for the main forces while they reorganized.

While each of our group armies was redeploying to the north, the enemy, with four armies and more than thirteen divisions belonging to the U.S. and Rhee, used so-called "task forces" which were composed of motorized rifle units, artillery units, and tanks to attack and pursue us. During this time, the enemy pulled out Ridgeway's phrases from the fourth campaign, namely "magic weapons", "magnetic war", "war of strangulation", "war of attrition", and so on. All this bluster was quite arrogant.

At the time, our most pressing problem was the serious difficulty in providing ammunition and supplies as a result of the extremely poor transportation conditions created by enemy bombing. One ought to say that, under such conditions, the work of our logistical department and of the Korean people in supporting the front line was done extremely well. But, in real life, it is often this way: you expend all your strength, yet you are unable to adapt to objective needs. The officers and men understood all this, so they did not complain. Our soldiers preferred to have their stomachs hungry than to have their guns hungry. There were more and more bullets, and less and less provisions. But, after all, there is a limit. The provisions and ammunition which they carried were only enough for from seven to ten days use. Thus, they were forced to halt the attack.

Ridgeway referred to this weakness of ours as the "week offensive". It was precisely because of this that when we attacked he would rely on his trucks and jeeps and his tanks to purposefully resist and retreat at the same time, thus exhausting our ammunition. After a week, he would use his mechanized forces to stick to us tightly like an iron magnet. This was his

"magnetic tactic". The 180th Division of the 60th Army suffered because of this tactic. Afterwards, Commander in Chief Peng, when recalling that battle, still felt some sadness and said, "This is the loss suffered during the second phase of the fifth campaign. It was the first loss of the entire War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea."

That the enemy would take advantage of the opportunity afforded by our redeployments to implement his "magnetic tactics" was expected by us. On May 22nd, "Volunteer Command", in answering our request for instructions concerning the most recent line of resistance, clearly stated, "As is known from previous enemy practices, the enemy will take advantage of his high level of mechanization to carry out so-called magnetic tactics. His aim is to exhaust and wear down our army. While our main forces are transferred to the north, it is certain that the enemy will tail us and invade the north." Therefore, the "Volunteer Command" made thorough and careful deployments for our army as it moved north so that we could carry out blocking attacks and attacks of resistance.

Based on the "Volunteer Command's" deployments, our 63rd and 64th Armies and the 1st Army Group of the People's Army were to proceed to areas north of Lianchuan and Weichuanli by way of three routes (left, central, and right, respectively). The 65th Army undertook the blocking mission. "Volunteer Command" placed special emphasis on the fact that it should block the enemy for from fifteen to twenty days in the Euijeongbu and Cheongpyeong Cheon areas and that it should guarantee the safety of Yeoncheon and Cheolweon and of the movements of brother units.

1 See The Memoirs of Peng De Huai, p. 262

From Yeoncheon to Cheolweon in the western part of Korea, there is an important traffic route. There is both a railroad and a road. Cheolweon was also an important supply station where we stored materials. If it were captured by the enemy, then our link between the eastern and western fronts would be cut, thus directly influencing the redeployment of all our armies.

After blocking the enemy for four days, the 65th Army suddenly reported: Because the enemy had concentrated forces which our several times our own, and because he was aided by unrelenting attacks from his air force, tanks, and artillery, the troops had suffered extremely heavy casualties, and some positions had already been lost. Some units had been pushed back from twenty to thirty kilometers to Hantan Gang and to areas even farther north. This was an extremely serious situation which could endanger the entire campaign. Besides ordering the 65th Army to overcome all difficulties and continue to block the enemy in strict accordance with the dictates of the "Volunteer Command", we immediately ordered the 63rd Army to hurry over as fast as possible to provide support. At the same time, we reported this arrangement to Commander in Chief Peng. Commander in Chief Peng expressed his agreement, while at the same time further emphasizing that the blocking mission was to be completed according to schedule.

After the 63rd Army was assigned its mission, Army Commander Fu Zongbi himself rushed to the army's first echelon. He carried his command from the front line. First of all, they constructed temporary field fortifications, which were twenty kilometers deep and twenty-five kilometers across. Thus, they had laid down a foundation for stopping the enemy's advance.

The 63rd Army's resolve to complete the blocking mission was very strong, yet we were all very aware that the difficulties which they were facing were numerous. Since penetrating across the Imjin River, the troops had fought continuously for more than

one month. In addition to the serious insufficiency of supplies of weapons, equipment, and provisions, combat and non-combat losses were quite heavy. At first, combat losses among the units were quite normal. When fighting in China, we can replenish our supplies as we fight, but in Korea this is basically not possible. Along the front of their defenses, there four divisions led by Fanfolite [Translator's Note: Transliteration], consisting of more than 47,000 men. On the average, there were more than 700 men per kilometer section. The 63rd Army had only 24,000 men in all. On the average, there were more than 370 men per kilometer section. As for weaponry, at the time, the enemy had various kinds of artillery, totalling more than 13,000 artillery pieces. The enemy also had more than 180 tanks, as well as air support. The 63rd Army's 60th Artillery Force, on the other hand, had only 240 artillery pieces. Moreover, the 63rd had neither tanks nor planes. This is to say the forces of the 63rd Army were supposed to bring to a stop before them an enemy whose weaponry was clearly superior and whose troops were nearly double their own. They were to stop the enemy and prevent him from taking another step forward. This blocking action was not supposed to last one or two days, but from ten to fifteen days. This was Commander in Chief Peng's order. "Overturning a military order is like overturning a mountain." There was not the slightest bit of leeway here.

Army Commander Fu Suibi, Political Commissar Long Dao, and other leading comrades positioned on the front line understood the seriousness of the situation better than we did. As soon as the troops arrived, they entered combat. As for the various kinds of preparation work, these had to be carried out during combat. It was very hard to find the leading comrades in the divisional command post. When they reported to us, they were usually in the divisional or regimental command posts. Sometimes they were even at front line positions. One can see how tense the situation was.

The 63rd Army quickly sent out a report on various arrangements and implementations for completing the blocking

action mission. The report stated that, as for dispositions, deep echelon formations would be employed, in which the forces are clustered together rather than spread apart. In addition, many small combat teams were to advance to areas in front of the front line and get entangled with the enemy, thereby preventing the enemy from forcing his way to our main positions too early. As for organizing fire power, the report stated each kind of artillery and small weaponry would be used to its fullest. With respect to tactical applications, frontal resistance was to be integrated with counterassaults along the flanks, and at night small units were to be dispatched to ambush the enemy, etc. The group army considered this a clear and definite, simple and clean report which matched the actual situation and whose measures would be beneficial. This shows that, since entering Korea, especially since being tested by the campaign's first phase, our commanders were adapting their command skills to a new environment, to new conditions, to a new opponent, and to other areas as well. In every respect, they had improved greatly. The longer the war lasted, the bigger it got, and the art of commanding became more and more refined.

While researching this report, Zheng Weishan said, "Fu Suibi and the rest of them didn't mention any difficulties!" I knew that Weishan was worried that they had underestimated the difficulties and because of this were suffering, but I thought that Fu Suibi and the comrades had purposefully avoided mentioning their difficulties because they were aware of the situation of the group army. Therefore, I said, "This is a problem. We must take the initiative and ask them." Zhimin said, "Let's ask them separately. We must ask specific questions and come up with specific solutions. As for political work, Xianduan and I will ask some quick questions. With respect to this type of work, the key now is how to face the enemy's attack ideologically. Historically, it has been easy to attack and difficult to defend!" Weishan thought a while and then said, "There are also many logistical problems. Let's organize some small logistical teams

and demand that small logistical teams be organized in the army as well. Logistical work does not succeed if you rely on certain people. Logistical work is only successful if everyone does it together."

During this time, the group army's logistical department had already been cancelled. Most of the comrades from the logistical department offices went over to the Volunteer Command Army Logistical Headquarters and to the newly established a few logistical branch offices and filled positions in these organizations. Logistical supply was being implemented by dividing up the work and assigning a part to each office or group. In our 19th Group Army, three branch offices were responsible for supplies. At the time, I suggested that it was necessary to give the comrades of the branch offices a call and fill them in on our mission and on logistical difficulties. Zhimin, joking, said, "Before the fifth campaign began, Commander in Chief Peng said: If this battle is won, half the glory will go to all the soldiers, and the other half will go to logistics. Was this half of the glory won so easily?" I said to everyone, "The greatest difficulty of the 63rd Army is, I believe, that our forces are insufficient. By helping them in this respect, we would be doing the most practical thing. I think that we should transfer some people to their units from the units directly subordinate to the group army. What do you think of this?" Everyone agreed with my opinion.

After getting a call through, I reached Fu Suibi in the positions of the 189th Division. He said, "We have a heap of trouble here! But the army leaders investigated and found that everyone was of the opinion that we should mention none of it." I said, "You said that you weren't mentioning any of it, but you mentioned a heap. We have done some research and decided to transfer 500 men to you from units directly subordinate to the group army!" Fu Suibi said nothing for a long while. "Did you hear me?" I said, "We're giving you 500 men. I've told them to

select as many old, experienced soldiers as possible to give to you." Fu Suibi was rather excited. He almost shouted, "We will report this decision of the group army to every soldier right away!" I asked, "Are there any other problems?" Fu Suibi said, "We have been under a lot of pressure. This being the case. . . please, all you leaders, don't worry. We and the comrades of the 65th Army are making a united effort. Under no circumstances will we allow Fanfulite [Translator's Note: Transliteration.] to advance another step!"

During those days, our group army command post was not alone in continually paying attention to the area in which the 63rd Army was fighting. I believe that Old Commander in Chief Peng, too, did not spend a moment in which he was not paying attention to that area. Everyone knows that the strategy of having the front lines of a large army engaged in executing stubborn blocking attacks to the rear areas is a very large strategic operation. The victory of those who have executed blocking actions is the key to the success of an even larger strategic operation. The success or failure of units to execute blocking actions determines the outcome. That even larger strategic operation is by itself only a visionary hope within a plan. Fu Suibi said that they were under pressure. In fact, we, too, were under this same pressure.

After part of the forces of the U.S.-Rhee army led by Fanfulite [transliteration] executed a day-long probing attack against us, they switched to a comprehensive attack. They relied on formidable heavy artillery fire for support and tank forces for cover. They gradually increased their forces and implemented successive, many-sided, multi-echelon attacks. The troops found the fighting bitter. Some positions were occupied by the enemy and recovered by us, only to be once again captured by the enemy and once more seized by us. Within one day, there were many reversals. It was truly a case of struggling for an inch of ground and of not yielding an inch of ground.

The combat was exceptionally intense. Under these conditions, our 189th Division persisted for three days and three nights. Although the positions were basically firmly under their control, the enemy had penetrated through a few positions. Some regiments suffered heavy casualties, and some battalions and companies basically lost their combat capabilities.

The situation was quite serious. Fu Suibi and Long Daoquan decided that the 189th Division would be switched to the second echelon and that the 188th Division would replace them in their original defensive zone. We told the comrades of the 63rd Army that their mission was to carry out defensive blocking actions, not to firmly guard certain places. The units should be permitted to have gains and losses. Having lost, they would win again, and, having gained, they would lose again. The key was that, overall, the enemy would be checked. The soldiers ought to be cherished; the soldiers ought to be loved. As much as possible, preserve their combat ability.

On the fifth day of combat, after the 2nd Platoon of the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 563rd Regiment of the 188th Division, which had just taken up positions, repulsed two attacks by an enemy battalion, the platoon was surrounded on three sides on top of a solitary hill by two enemy battalions. The 1st Battalion and its 2nd Platoon were known in the domestic war respectively by the glorious names of "The Iron Battalion" and "The Special Success Platoon". The encirclement of the 2nd Platoon affected the hearts of the regiment, divisional, and army leaders. When we learned of this situation, the 2nd Platoon had already lost contact with leaders at all levels. Staffmember Li Daquan told me that, at the time of the last known communication between the 563rd Regiment and the 2nd Platoon, the platoon had only eight men, the highest ranking officer being Platoon Vice-Commander, Li Daquan. I wanted Daquan to report what was known of the situation to us right away. At midnight, Daoquan told me that fire was still emanating from the positions held by the 2nd

Platoon. This showed that our eight heroic soldiers were still fighting and that they still held the position.

The rain fell pitter-patter all night. The rain was crashing on our hearts. I kept thinking of those eight men, who, though I did not know them, were making sleep impossible for me. Daquan told me that the troops sent to free them from the envelopment had failed several times to climb up to them, due to the rain-slickened roads and the tight enemy envelopment. At dawn, the rain stopped. The first report that arrived said that no more gunfire could be heard from the positions defended by the 2nd Platoon. The ground in front of their positions were covered by enemy corpses. The two enemy battalions had retreated, yet there was also no trace of our soldiers. Eight men had resisted an attack by two enemy battalions and had repulsed them. This ought to be called a miracle. But what of our soldiers? What of our heroes? After dawn, the 63rd Army sent a report which said that of the eight brave soldiers, one wounded squad commander leading two wounded soldiers had returned to their unit. Only then did we know what had happened to the eight brave soldiers.

During the that single night, the enemy would launch countless attacks. They only remembered that before each attack there was always from twenty to thirty minutes of artillery fire. The artillery shells dropped on the positions continuously like hail. None of the soldiers could risk lifting his head. The enemy had already charged up to the positions, but all of them had been fought off. After midnight, the eight of them had a total of fifteen rounds of ammunition. The enemy launched an assault. Relying on daggers, rifle butts, and wooden clubs, they fought with the enemy. Later, when there were no more bullets, all that was left was a few hand grenades, yet the enemy's attacks did not in any way lessen. Platoon Vice-Commander Li Bingquan told the soldiers, "Everyone is clear on the situation. Since we are surrounded by the enemy on three sides, it is not possible for us eight men to break out. We wish to fight, yet we have no bullets.

If we struggle with them face-to-face, we will find that they are too many. It would be wrong for us to become prisoners. We are soldiers of the "Special Success Platoon" and the "Iron Battalion". We cannot mar the record of our historic company. It would be even more impossible for use to cast shame on our fatherland. We must let the enemy know that Chinese have hard bones and that the soldiers of the Volunteer Army are iron men. I suggest that we jump off the cliff. If we die, we will not become prisoners!" The seven soldiers agreed with Li Bingquan's suggestion. After once again setting back the enemy's attack, Li Bingquan decided to leave one party member squad commander to lead two soldiers in providing cover. He led four men in jumping off the cliff. The three comrades who were now returning to the units had been injured from jumping off the cliff and had been found and brought back by the troops.

The 63rd Army's Report said that they had already sent men to look for Li Bingquan's other comrades, but had not found them. That cliff was seventeen meters high, and that it was estimated that they had made martyrs of themselves. At the time, Comrade Zhimin demanded that they continue looking, saying excitedly, "Tell the 63rd Army's political department that they should report the names of these eight comrades and should describe their deed. The army and the group army must do a good job of extolling them. These comrades must have their merit recorded!" Later, from the name list which was reported, we knew that these eight comrades were: Li Bingquan, Zhai Guoling, Luo Juncheng, Hou Tianzuo, He Chengyu, Cui Xuecai, Zhang Qiuchang, and Meng Qingxiu.

The 2nd Platoon of the 1st Battalion of the 563rd Regiment fought well. The 8th Company of the 3rd Battalion of this same regiment also fought beautifully. I had asked the regiment commander, Comrade Ma Zaomin, to introduce in detail the course of the battle to the commanding comrades. They made flexible use of forces and cleverly employed tactics. They fought intensely for four days and nights with a brave, stubborn, and unconquerable

spirit. At the cost of sixty casualties, they killed or wounded more than eight-hundred of the enemy and repulsed fifteen large-scale enemy attacks and defended their positions. After the war, they received the name of "Special Success 8th Company". The company commander of this company, Guo Sizhi, attained the glorious names of "First Level Battle Hero" and "Special Class Hero".

Although the 65th Army did not fight well during the first blocking action, they had swallowed a trench-full of experience, and during this blocking attack, they fought with persistence and fought with stubbornness. There arose the "Attack like a Tiger, Defend like Mount Tai" 5th Company of the 577th Regiment and such "Solitary Heroes" as Xu Shen, as well as some advance units and other individual model heroes.

The war itself tested and trained the troops. The troops rapidly improved during the war. The blocking actions in the Cheolweon and Yeoncheon areas went on for a total of thirteen days and nights. They won precious time for the brother units to carry out strategic redeployment in accordance with the dispositions required by Commander in Chief Peng. On June 10th, I ordered the troops which had been involved in the blocking action to retreat from Cheolweon and other areas, while holding the enemy at locations near the 38th parallel, such as Mon Mountain, Samhwan Li, Cheolweon, Geum Hwa, Myeongpa Li, and so on. By this time, both we and the enemy had assumed defensive postures. The fifth campaign ended with a satisfying victory for us.

When we had just begun reorganizing in the Icheon region, having victoriously completed our mission, know expected that Commander in Chief Peng suddenly arrived, pouncing on us like the wind.

At the time, one could honestly say that the soldiers had not the clothes to cover their bodies. Their clothes were burnt and

pierced with bullet holes and hung from them like thorns and brambles. Only a few threads remained, and one could see through these as though through a wind. Some soldiers had nothing to cover their backs up above, while below they had only a pair of shorts to wear. Their hair was long, as were their moustaches. Yet all of them held themselves up straight as writing brushes. Their eyes and brows revealed their determination and confidence. Small smiles hung from the corners of their mouths. Standing at attention and saluting, they were still neat and orderly. It was as though they had not just come from battlefields burning everywhere with the fires of war.

Commander in Chief Peng went among the troops and looked upon them with love. He would pat a bare shoulder. He would caress a bearded face. The soldiers were overjoyed. However, when Commander in Chief Peng said to everyone, "Comrades, you fought well. You fought very well! You suffered a lot, and we sacrificed many comrades. The fatherland and the people will never forget you. The fatherland and the people thank you!", almost all the soldiers hugged each other right away. They shouted loudly, with voices choked with emotion, "Long Live the Fatherland!"

Just before leaving the 63rd Army, Commander in Chief asked Fu Suibi what were his needs. Fu Suibi said, "The units have lost too many men. Some companies have only one or two men left."

"We'll give you reinforcements. We'll give you some veterans, veterans who can fight." Commander in Chief Peng said, "What else do you want?"

Fu Suibi said, "If we have the soldiers, then we need nothing."

"No," said Commander in Chief Peng. "We will supply you with new clothing and new equipment. The people of the fatherland

sent a large amount of appreciation gifts. There's wine, tobacco, and all kinds of canned goods. We will send them to you very soon. These things certainly must first go to the troops. Of course, you commanders will have your share!"

Not long after, 13,000 veterans were sent from the northwestern region to replenish the 63rd Army. And the gifts of appreciation sent from the people of the fatherland also came a truck at a time to each unit.

During the fifth campaign, our army engaged in intensive combat continuously for more than fifty days. We succeeded in wiping out more than 82,000 of the enemy and in capture or exhausting large amounts of enemy materiel. We smashed landings to our rear and flanks, and we smashed the enemy plans to execute a pincer attack against us and to push the battle lines back to Pyongyang and Wonsan. We forced the enemy to switch to a strategic defense, and in a short period of time we received from them cease-fire negotiations. Our troops who had been new to war received training and gained experience in fighting the Americans. From this point on, the Korean battlefields began a process in which, for two years, a combined military and political struggle would be carried out by both negotiating and fighting.

Chapter Four, Regulations

After the fifth campaign came to an end, "Volunteer Command" placed the 47th Army, led by Commander Zao Lihuai, Commissar Li Renlin, and other comrades, under the 19th Army's command. The units were disposed defensively. The 64th Army and the 47th Armies, serving in the first echelon, established defenses in the Toseong Li, Gojak Dong, and Oli Jeong areas. The 63rd and 65th Armies served as the second echelon in the Shingye region, establishing defenses there. The group army command was located in Seonyeo Dong.

Seonyeo Dong is a little village located halfway up a mountain slope. Homes were scattered in groups of two and three across the mountain slope. Surrounding the village, there were groves of mulberry trees and white poplars. A small stream flowed down from the mountains. In the mountain pass, there was a reservoir. This village, situated at the foot of a mountain and besides a stream, certainly had been lovely like its name [Translator's Note: The name of the village means "goddess".] during peacetime. But now it was a stretch of cowering desolation, and all the water had become muddy and turbid.

Headquarters was established in a cave and in barracks behind the village. The political department and the logistical department were separately located in the mountain pass and on the

other side of the mountain. They were separated by 2000 or 2500 meters of road. A few of the group army leaders began to spread apart and live in Korean villages. Afterwards, they too moved into the camouflaged quarters.

After locating in this area, there was temporarily no large military matter to attend to. The troops were constructing defensive fortifications and taking part in skirmishes to capture advance posts, thereby seizing key terrain and providing cover to the construction of the defensive fortifications. The commanding and leading comrades were primarily going among the troops to investigate and research and to solve practical problems. In other words, the environment was more peaceful.

One evening in June, Zheng Weishan, carrying a chessboard, challenged me to a match. Old Zheng plays chess like he commands a battle. He is utterly determined, more so than a wolf, and his movements are rapid. While we were locked together in battle, Yu Zhen shouted for me to answer the phone.

The call was from Commander in Chief Peng.

Commander in Chief Peng told me that he had just received a message from the Central Committee. The message said that on the morning of June 23rd the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Malike [transliteration], during the broadcast of a program set up by the United Nations called the "Cost of Peace" made a speech suggesting that on the Korean battlefield "the two sides in the conflict should enter into armistice negotiations and implement a cease-fire" and that "the two sides should pull back their armies to the 38th parallel."

Commander in Chief Peng said, "The Central Committee and Comrade Kim Il Sung exchanged opinions and are prepared to support this suggestion." He paused and then said, "If we can stop the war, if we can peacefully solve the Korean problem, that of course

would be a good thing. This war was originally forced on us by the enemy! If our our opponents genuinely agree to stop fighting and beginning negotiating, that would go to show that the Korean and Chinese people had hurt them. They can't go on fighting. However, we must certainly educate the troops to make preparations for a long-term war. You must tell everyone that peace is the result of fighting!"

A June 25th editorial in the "People's Daily" solemnly announced: "The Chinese People completely support Malike's [transliteration] suggestion and wish to strive towards its implementation."

On the same day, U.S. President Truman in a speech in Tennessee expressed "willingness to participate in a peaceful solution to the Korean problem."

This important change which occurred one year after the outbreak of the Korean war presented us with many new problems.

At the beginning of July in 1951, the Sino-Korean negotiations team was formed. For the Chinese, there was Comrade Li Kenong, who led Qiao Guanhua, Pu Shan, Hua Jilong, Shen Jianguo, Ding Ming, and other comrades. For the Koreans, there was General Nam Il, among others. General Nam Il was the chief representative. Vice-Commander Deng Hua and Chief of Staff Jie Fang were the representatives of the Volunteer Command delegation. On the U.S. side (they were called the "United Nations Army"), the chief representative was U.S. Vice Admiral Qiaoai [transliteration].

On July 10th, the first meeting of the Korean Armistice Talks was held in Gaesong.

Gaesong is in the western part of Korea. During ancient times, it was the capital of the Kingdom of Gaoli and was called

Kaijing, meaning "the capital that founds a state." It is less than 100 kilometers from Seoul. The population is less than 300,000. Within in a night, it became the center of attention of all the world. Of course, the ones who cared the most about the negotiations were the people of Korea and China and the vast numbers of officer and men on the front line.

We promoted peace. We needed peace. We loved peace. For the sake of Korea, Asia, and even the world, we came to Korea. However, we understood well that the struggle for peace was not easy. As soon as the Korean war began, our government made many calls for peace. In November of 1950, when our government sent Wu Xiuquan as a special representative to the U.N. Security Council to protest the armed U.S. invasion of Taiwan and the armed interference in the internal government of Korea, he again proposed that the U.S. Army withdraw from Korea and the Korean problem be solved by the Korean people themselves. At that time, the U.S. government absolutely would not accept this. Now, on the surface, they were accepting negotiations, but, as for their sincerity, we knew what they were really like. As I have mentioned earlier, the U.S. policy-makers certainly were no strangers to us.

Indeed, things did not happen as they were expected to. As soon as the negotiations began, the representatives on the U.S. side placed many obstacles, making it difficult for the negotiations to progress smoothly.

On the 11th, the U.S. representatives requested that twenty journalists be brought to Gaesong to cover the negotiations. Though we had not yet replied to this request, they employed coercive methods, driving twenty journalists and sixty-five members of the delegation to our defensive area in Panmunjeom. Since no agreement as yet had been reached on this issue, our liaison man naturally did not agree to allow the journalists through. The U.S. delegations then used this as a pretext for

completely pulling back, and they ceased to participate in the talks. Then Ridgeway brought up this problems of the journalists and tied it to the completely unrelated issue of having Gaesong as a neutral zone.

We on the Sino-Korean side participated in the talks with complete security. In order to cause the peace talks to continue, our side sternly pointed out the errors of our opponents, and at the same time agreed to set aside Gaesong as a neutral zone during the talks. Only thus were the talks restored.

If we had given the Americans an inch, they would have taken a mile. While discussing the agenda of the negotiations, they refused to include the issue of a complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea in the agenda. They went on to disagree with using the 38th parallel as a boundary, hoping in vain to seize without a battle Gaesong and 12,000 square kilometers of territory north of the 38th parallel.

On the questions of principle, we of course did not yield an inch. It seemed that Fanfolite [transliteration] had seized on an excuse. Wildly arrogant, he shouted out, "Let bombs and heavy artillery and machineguns go and debate!"

The real face of the U.S. policy-makers had once again been revealed before the people of the war.

On August 18th, Fanfolite [transliteration] deployed forces amounting to three divisions along our defensive front from east of the North Seoul River to the eastern sea coast in preparation for an attack. His aim was to capture our salient on the eastern line and join together his battle lines there. This took place in coordination with the political deceit of the negotiations. This was the "Summer Offensive" of Fanfulite [transliteration]. At the same time as this, they dispatched a large number of aircraft to implement the so-called "war of strangulation", also know as the

"air blockade campaign". They bombed our transportation and shipping lines, separating the battlefields from the rear support and trying in vain to cut off our rear support supplies.

In fact, once again there was proof that the enemy absolutely did not wish to fairly and reasonably carry on the negotiations. After the summer of 1951, the battlefields would witness a complex combined military and diplomatic struggle. We had to diligently implement the guiding policy of Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central Military Committee which had been laid down for us: "Fully prepare for a long-term war and strive to use the peace talks to bring an end to the war." Fighting simultaneously on military and political battle lines, the fighting and talking were integrated. Fighting was used to give impetus to talks and as part of an effort to solve the Korean problem on a just and reasonable basis.

Before this, the 20th Group Army of the Volunteer Army, led by Comrade Yang Chengwu, had already entered Korea. The Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps of the Volunteer Army had also entered Korea and were thrown into combat. Along the eastern front, the Korean People's Army heroically and stubbornly resisted the enemy's "Summer Offensive". Our troops on the western front and the Korean people together began the struggle to smash the enemy's "war of strangulation" and the serious problems caused by unusually heavy flooding.

During the summer of that year, Korea suffered the worst flooding it had seen in forty years. Beginning on July 16th, until August 27th, torrential rain fell almost every day. The floods rose and destroyed many bridges and cut through many roads. Cars and horses were swept away. Sometimes a person would be driving a car across a bridge and all of a sudden the flood would suck the bridge, with the car on it and the person in the car, into the depths. Many of our defensive fortifications also collapsed or were damaged. As for our tents set up in high

places, "when it was raining hard outside, it rained a little inside. When it was not raining outside, it was dripping inside." Our officers and men were soaked with the muddy water every day. There was not a dry spot on their bodies."

The continual rainstorms and the destruction caused by the enemy's "war of strangulation" blocked traffic on our side, and we could not ship provisions. The limited chow mein we had became a sticky paste after soaking in the water. In the winter, it was a handful of chow mein and a handful of snow. Now the chow mein was blended with rain water for drinking. But I can assure you that chow mein mixed with rain water is not bad. After a while, all the bags of chow mein were empty. We turned some of the bags upside down and rinsed them with water again and again. No use, we had to stave off famine with wild vegetables. The heavy rains would not stop, and the floods came in torrents. Many trees were knocked over and swept away. Where could we go to look for wild greens!

Under these extremely trying circumstances, the troops still wanted to persist in carrying out emergency repairs of the defensive fortifications. They had to always be prepared to fight with the ambushing enemy, and they had to think of methods of capturing positions from the enemy. The officers and men expended great amounts of physical force. The cadres and the privates had obviously grown skinny. Many comrades had bloodshot eyes because they had no chance to sleep. Many had swollen faces because they had eaten wild greens, and many had festering wounds because they had been soaked by the rain for such a long period of time. . . . Yet our officers and men did not complain a bit; they were highly optimistic. I was at a position of the 63rd Army and saw a platoon commander whose whole body was covered with mud and water. He said to me cheerfully, "Commander, the Korean God of Heaven has been exceptionally considerate to us. He was afraid of burning us, so he bathed us every day." There was a regimental commissar who modified a line of an ancient poem: "In the tent, it drips.

outside the tent, it stops. I think that it is not clearing (loving), yet in fact it is clearing (loving)." [Translator's Note: "Clearing" and "loving" are homonyms in Chinese.]

"An army without gear and baggage will perish. Without provisions, it will perish, and without stores, it will perish." The commanders of the "Volunteer Command" and the leaders of the Logistical Headquarters of the Volunteer Army understood well the difficulties of the soldiers at the front. They understood even more clearly that the quick supply of provisions and ammunition to the front was an important matter which would tolerate no delay. For this reason, they thought up many solutions. However, our railroads, roads, and bridges had been for the most part destroyed by the enemy's "war of strangulation" in the rear areas. Moreover, our trucks loaded full with provisions and ammunition were prime targets for the enemy's "war of strangulation". Thus, we were not able to guarantee victory for our battle to defend our positions. And it was very hard of us to pressure the enemy into changes at the negotiating table.

The "Volunteer Command" stated: You must resolutely smash the enemy's "war of strangulation"; using a thousand methods and one hundred plans, guarantee the transport of supplies to the front line; as quickly as possible, transport materials to the front.

The "war of strangulation" was a brutal air war tactic of Ridgeway's which relied on the superiority they possessed in the air. It was used to destroy our resupply centers, repair and maintenance bases, railroad hubs, troops assembly sites, and military nerve centers. Often with several tens of aircraft, with hundreds of aircraft, they would concentrate on bombing a single

1 Sunzi: "Chapter on Military Conflict"

target until they paralyzed it, or they even went so far as to remove the target from the face of the earth before finally stopping.

During the entire time of its aggression, the U.S. military, relying on its air superiority, made it a part of its strategy to blockade and destroy our installations and traffic and transportation lines in the rear areas. Moreover, as the war developed, these actions increased. According to relevant materials and records, in October of 1950, when our army entered Korea, the enemy had already made eleven wings, four groups, and four squadrons part of the strategic and tactical air forces over Korea. There were also four naval air groups. In all, there were 1100 aircraft, more or less. By July of 1951, the enemy had twenty-four groups and ten squadrons in action over the battlefields. In all, there were 1680 aircraft, of various models.

For this "war of strangulation", Fanfolite [transliteration], under orders from Ridgeway, made use of 80% of his air strength. Almost all fighter bombers and strategic bombers were put to use. The plan was to completely destroy the railroads and the main road system in northern Korea within three weeks and cause our rail transport and road transport to come to a halt. Without a doubt, their goal was to cut off supplies of provisions, weapons, and ammunition to the combat troops and thus cause them to lose their combat capability. Seen from this angle, Ridgeway's "war of strangulation" was a great threat to us.

To smash the enemy's "war of strangulation" was the urgent mission at the time. For our ground troops the important part of this mission was to daringly and effectively combat the teams of enemy aircraft. Since we had no experience of this from past wars, it was necessary to undergo a process of familiarizing ourselves with the enemy situation, of testing and training the units, and of creating and enriching our experiences.

When we had just entered Korea, the troops heard many rumors. It was said that some enemy planes could not be fired on and that if you shot down one, a whole group would come. Some said that the enemy planes flew very low, so low that the pilot in the plane's cabin could reach out his hand and grab your hat. Some said that the planes flew very wildly and that they sometimes even hit concrete utility poles and broke them in half, etc., etc. Although the men did not believe these rumors, when they first came into contact with the enemy planes, they really were not so sure. Facing forty or fifty or sixty aircraft covering half the sky in black swarms like ravens and watching a village or a large piece of a forest immediately bursting into a sea of fire as the bombs fall, the men could not help feeling somewhat nervous at first. The enemy employed a tactic which was similar to what we would now call "dividing up the work and having everyone do his share." This tactic was to divide up the regions and have planes especially responsible for certain zones. Night and day, they would patrol and bomb. Thus, the assigned aircraft became very familiar with the topography and man-made features of their zones. If a new situation transpired, they would use the reconnaissance by firing method or would dive and attack. This made it exceptionally difficult for us to fire upon them. The enemy planes always stayed close to the mountains and canyons looking for targets and flying very low. They would fly along the edge of forests and along main roads. We called these "planes searching the mountains." Another method of searching for targets was photography. The planes responsible for a certain zone would photograph the zone every day and would compare today's with yesterday's, thus locating suspicious places (such as a white stump left by a chopped down tree). They would then launch surprise attacks. I remember that, soon after we moved into Jukjang Dong, the horse and mule artillery unit had not been camouflaged too well, and as a consequence it was hit twice. Several tens of horses and mules ran off because of the enemy bombing, leaving their herds and disappearing into the wilds. So

as to counter the enemy air raids, we organized units and employed various kinds of weapons to fire on the enemy planes.

Our heroic, fearless men were full of wisdom and creativity. Researching features of the enemy aircraft models and of their flights, they identified their patterns and established methods for firing on them. While organizing anti-aircraft attacks, the infantry privates led by a regiment commander of the 63rd Army, Zhang Yinghui, actually shot down a "sword bearer" with concentrated rifle fire. As this plane, trailing a long column of smoke, landed in the foothills, the troops jumped with joy. The group army seized on this example of rifles shooting down a plane and reported it to each army, requiring that they learn from the comrades of Zhang Yinghui's regiment. Thus, the group army demanded that the armies pool their wisdom and combine their efforts, smash the enemy's "war of strangulation", and break the enemy's superiority in the air. The victory of shooting down the enemy plane with rifles caused the cadres and privates to make firm their confidence and resolve in combatting the enemy planes. The enemy planes did not count for anything. We needed only to dare to fight, to excell in fighting, and to think up methods of fighting. In this way, we would certainly be able to defeat their reckless and insufferable arrogance!

The 19th Group Army began a competition to shoot down enemy planes, thus setting in motion a tide of enthusiasm for shooting down enemy planes. In the companies and in the platoons they competed in an organized fashion; four or five men would compete together, and those units with anti-aircraft weapons would look for competition. They learned about war by fighting a war, and through experimentation they accumulated experience. Sometimes, we would shoot down every third or fifth plane. Sometimes we would shoot down four or five planes in a day. Each unit's red arrow continuously climbed on the "Capture the Flying Bandits Competition bulletin board", and the height at which the enemy planes flew also continuously climbed. No longer did they dare to

arrogantly and casually fly low.

In order to counter the enemy's war of strangulation, our young troops of the anti-aircraft units thought up many ideas. For example, one idea was to hide anti-aircraft weapons near bridges, train stations, and traffic hubs. When the enemy reconnaissance planes arrived, we would pretend that we did not know and would wait for a large group of enemy planes to come. Then we would fire on them with many guns all at once, and the enemy would be caught unprepared. This might be regarded as "giving someone latitude at first so as to capture him later", a tactic which is found in old military books. The stratagem of "making something out of nothing and using the false to overturn the real", which comes from the Thirty-Six Stratagems was also made use of. In order to greatly weaken the enemy's air strength, we selected some advantageous terrain to make some counterfeit cargo trucks, and we hid our anti-aircraft artillery in these advantageous terrain. When the enemy began to recklessly carry out saturation bombings of these false targets, our anti-aircraft weapons took advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness to attack fiercely with concentrated fire. In this way, we could shoot down a few, maybe a dozen, enemy planes.

Our anti-aircraft artillery units developed rapidly. Their tactical progress was quite pleasing. During the first phase after the Volunteer Army entered Korea, at the end of the year in 1950, we had only one anti-aircraft artillery regiment. By the end of July, 1951, this had developed into four divisions, three regiments, and five independent battalions. As our air defense strength was augmented, our attacks on enemy planes became more and heavier. In December of 1951, the anti-aircraft units alone shot down thirty-eight planes and damaged sixty-eight planes.

The young air force of the Volunteer Army played a very important role in smashing the enemy's "war of strangulation". The Volunteer Army's air force first participated in combat in the

beginning of January, 1951. In March, Comrade Liu Zhen was established as commander of the Sino-Korean Air Force United Command. In September, it officially entered the war. By the end of December, five divisions had been dispatched, which conducted a total of 3562 sorties and shot down seventy enemy planes, damaging 25. During the entire War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, our air force dispatched a total of 2457 groups of aircraft, a total of 26,491 sorties. They shot down 330 enemy planes and damaged 95 enemy planes.

During the intense air combat, our air force demonstrated extreme heroism and extraordinary cleverness. A squadron leader of the 12th Regiment of the 4th Air Division, Zhang Jihui was only twenty-four years old. He shook off an enemy plane which had been tailing him, climbed above the enemy plane, and quickly and fiercely opened fire. He thus shot down a squadron commander known by the U.S. military as "master of the skies", of Lieutenant Colonel Daiweisi [transliteration], who had participated in World War II and who held the record, having shot down twenty-one planes. With one blow, Zhang had destroyed the myth of "U.S. invincibility in the skies" and had greatly raised the morale of the Chinese and Korean troops. The Volunteer Command gave him the title of "First Class Combat Hero" and he received the "Second Rank Medal of Independence and Freedom" from People's Democratic Republic of Korea. A group commander of the 9th Regiment of the 3rd Air Division, Wang Hai, leading his group in combat, shot down fifteen enemy planes in just one month. Wang Hai, at that time, was only twenty-three of twenty-four years old. The air force pilot fought with wits and courage; the commander was quick and decisive. I remember that during an air battle in mid-November 1951 the six fighting eagles which he led would sometimes rush to a high altitude and would sometimes dive, attacking the enemy planes. After continually climbing and diving several times, they threw into confusion an enemy formation composed of more than one hundred planes. Their group, by itself, shot down five enemy planes in this one encounter. Throughout the air war, the group

which he led always maintained flexible, mobile, and united combat, as well as a heroic and stubborn martial attitude. They gloriously attained a first-class, collective merit, and they became known as "heroic group of Wang Hai's". Comrade Wang Hai himself shot down or damaged nine enemy planes. He glorious attained a special class merit and was honored with the title of "First Class Combat Hero" and with the "Second Rank Medal of Independence and Freedom" of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. After the war, I discussed the subject of our young air force's victory in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea with Comrade Wang Hai. His heavily-accent Jiaodong dialect revealed his heartfelt emotion: "Old Commander in Chief Zhu spoke the truth. He said, 'Bravery plus skill equals tactics'. Us pilots, who on the average had from fifteen to twenty-two hours of flying time in MIG-15s fought with the U.S. pilots who had experienced the Second World War and won. What we relied on was a brave spirit unknown until then. What we relied on was experimenting in actual battles and thus mastering techniques. Lacking either one of these two, it would have been very hard to win." Comrade Wang Hai's insight came from practical experience. These experiences, synthesized from blood and fire, were channelled into a dialectical relationship between man and weapon. I believe that this would be very useful to our present day military build up.

Chairman Mao Zedong was very satisfied with the victory of our youthful air force. I have seen Chairman Mao's written comments and instructions on 3rd and 4th Air Division reports. On a 4th Air Division report, Chairman Mao wrote with his own hand the comment, "The 4th Air Division's combat is quite good and very much appreciated". When Chairman Mao read the 3rd Division's report, he wrote, "I extend my congratulations to the 3rd Air Division." Our enemies were amazed by our air force's rapid development. On November 21st, 1951, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, Fandengbao [transliteration] stated at a press conference: "Communist China became one of the main air powers of the world almost overnight."

At the same that we were combatting the enemy planes, the railroad corps and engineer corps of our Volunteer Army, as well as the heroic Korean army and people, hurriedly repaired traffic and transportation lines. They worked continuously night and day, with one thousand plans and one hundred methods.

Within the various arms of the Volunteer Army, the railroad corps was a young and courageous group. They had to combat the enemy, and they had to struggle with the floods. They also had to struggle with a lack of materials and tools when carrying out quick repairs on railroads and locomotives. In order to prevent the destruction of locomotive equipment by enemy planes, they skillfully established water supply stations or took advantage of mountain springs to supply water, thus ensuring the operation of locomotives. Wood for railroad ties was insufficient, so they went deep into the mountains and old forests to chop wood. There were not enough railroad spikes. So they looked for some near the tracks or they forged them in kilns of their own construction and with bellows blowing loudly. The enemy planes often dropped bombs at set times on our traffic routes. They wished to get rid of them and explode them. Even if they would fall into the water, they would still drop them. During our selfless struggle, many heroes stepped forward, about whom we could sing or weep. The exceptional hero Yang Liandi was their outstanding representative.

Yang Liandi won the title of "Lofty Hero" during the domestic War of Liberation. At that time, Steel Bridge No. 8 on the Longhai railroad in Huzongnan had been destroyed, and thus our army's supply line to the front had been cut. Yang Liandi created a single-faced scaffold and risked ascending it up into the blue sky, with the bridge piers in the deep gorge below him. He straightened out the piers and on his own carried out one hundred successive demolitions, thus creating this lofty bridge repair miracle. He and his fellow soldiers used less than three months to repair the No. 8 Bridge, which according to experts should have

taken three years to repair. That year when he came to Korea, he was already thirty-one years old. Once while carrying out an emergency repair of a bridge, he volunteered to climb barehanded up a seventeen meter high isolated steel beam. He did so and brought down some materials. In addition, he paid no heed to danger during the flooding and set up floating bridges three times, victoriously completing his mission. To everyone's sorrow, on May 15th, 1952, our hero, while repairing the Qingchuan River Bridge, was gloriously martyred. His company was named the "Yang Liandi Company".

Our engineer comrades repaired wrecked bridges and built new bridges. They repaired roads and made new ones. This, too, was arduous and heroic. One bridge in particular was often subject to repeated bombings by enemy planes. In order to ensure that trucks could immediately cross, they would carry out repairs right after the bombings. Sometimes they carried out emergency repairs while being swept by the indiscriminate fire of enemy planes. Destruction is easy, and construction is difficult. Moreover, it often happened that just as you finished repairing a bridge, the enemy would once again arrive and destroy it with bombs. They thought up many solutions. For example, we would prepare boards, each of which was the appropriate size for a hole in the bridge left by a bomb. When the trucks arrived, we would fix up the bridge with the boards. When the trucks left, we would pull the boards off. The enemy planes would see that it was still a wrecked bridge and would not bomb it again. They constructed some bridges which could be taken apart and put back together again. When our trucks came, we would put them together. When the enemy planes came, we would take them apart. At night, they would be put together, and, during the day, they would be taken apart. This process of assembling and disassembling entailed painstaking and difficult calculations as well as a lot of sweat and quick thinking.

The people in the Korea rear support area were our bodyguards

who augmented our forces along traffic routes. The enemy planes blew one hole after another in the roads. Some craters were wide and round like ponds. While marching one night, two or three vehicles fell in, and it was still not yet full. Heroic Korean women, carrying babies on their backs and sand, dirt, and rocks on their heads, shuttled back and forth, filling the holes in the road one at a time. The people would rush to wherever a crater appeared. For them, there was neither night or day. All that existed was to support the war a piece at a time; all that existed was a gallant loyalty towards protecting the fatherland.

In order to destroy our truck transportation, the enemy often had enemy planes that were passing over scatter some "four-legged nails". Each nail had four sharp points. If cast at random on the ground, there would always be one point pointing upwards. When the trucks drove over, the tires might be pierced right through. During the Second World War, when the U.S. was attacking the Japanese island of Okinawa, the U.S. forces suffered a lot of damage because of the Japanese "four-legged nails". It caused the vehicles to break down everywhere, and there was nothing that could be done about it. Now, the U.S. aggressor was repeating the trick that the Japanese aggressor had used against the U.S. forces. As soon as the sun began to set, the enemy planes, flying over the roads, dropped thousands and thousands of "four-legged nails". Sometimes, the road surface was covered with a layer. The enemy guessed that our trucks would break down and would quickly rush back and saturation bomb the area. Our air defense sentries were always observing the actions of the enemy planes. While the enemy planes were scattering nails up in front, the sentries would be sweeping them off the road from behind. When the enemy finished scattering, the sentries would be finished sweeping. Our trucks drove in accordance with this pattern. Once an operations section chief of the group army, Yuan Xing, brought back a number of "four-legged nails" from the sentries. He put one in each room to serve as a candlestick. So these nails turned out to be quite useful.

Our truck corps also figured out a number of methods for combating enemy planes. That auto accident I experienced soon after entering Korea happened mainly because the driver was not familiar with the regulations and characteristics of night travel. The fires of war forged drivers whose bloodshot eyes could see with great clarity. Gradually, driving trucks at night over the mountains of Korea, it became like walking through the gate to one's home in daytime. I remember a convoy of forty-four drivers and twenty-two trucks which transported materials for eight months under a constant, night and day, enemy blockade. They went back and forth between the front areas and the rear areas, without any incident occurring. Not one person was injured, and none of the trucks was damaged. They said: We have figured out the details of how the enemy planes operate. Not only do they not hit us, but their illuminating bombs actually are a help to us! Because the enemy planes sometimes dropped illuminating bombs along a 7500 meter stretch of road, these bombs would stay lit for fifteen minutes. When dropping the illuminating bombs, the enemy planes would have to circle back to see the target. Our drivers took advantage of this light to make a mad dash. At the very least, they could cover from 5000 to 1000 meters of road. They said, "The enemy hung lanterns for us!"

I remember a movie called "The Steel Transport Line". It referred to the resupply line of that time as a steel transport line. This was really quite accurate. Our transport line was really a steel transport line which could not be cut by bombing and which could not be destroyed by shells or bullets. The contribution which the steel transport line made in smashing Ridgeway's and Fanfolite's [transliteration] war of strangulation will never be forgotten by any of the soldiers of the Volunteer Army. Even Fanfolite [transliteration] had to admit, "Although the air force and navy of the United Nations Army exhausted all their strength in an effort to block the supplies of the Communist Party, nevertheless, the Communist Party showed stubbornness and

resolve that was difficult to believe and transported materials to the front, producing a startling miracle." Miracles were continually occurring in our Sino-Korean Army. During that "Summer Offensive" I mentioned above, the U.S. 2nd Division (which included a French battalion) continuously attacked, employing forces equivalent to either a battalion or a regiment, Height 851 of the right wing of the 2nd Army Group and other heights to the south. This went on from early September to early October. They were aiming to capture these heights and modify their defensive situation. The Korean People's Army skillfully organized a variety of infantry weapons. In particular, they made use of mortars, and they put up a stiff resistance and often launched counterassaults, causing more than 15,000 of the enemy to become cannon fodder. Afterwards, the enemy called Height 851 and the line of heights to the south "Heartbreak Ridge". This is sufficient proof of the sorrow they felt at their defeat. On October 10th, the enemy launched a fierce, final attack to "end the heartbreak affair". They used two full divisions, which operated in coordination with the air force and with fifty tanks. However, because of the determined resistance put up by the People's Army, the enemy was again defeated. The Associated Press at that time released a news story which stated: "An intense counterattack by the Communist Army forced the fatigued United Nations Army to abandon the important summit called 'Heartbreak Ridge' on the 12th of this month." "This once again proves that the name 'Heartbreak Ridge' is very appropriate."

Nevertheless, even as the enemy was mourning, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army was arranging another "Heartbreak Ridge" for the aggressor along the western front. This was Maliang Mountain. Maliang Mountain is located to the northwest of the

1 Fanfolite [transliteration], May 31st, 1952, from a speech at a press conference in Seoul.

Imjin River, in a bend in the river. It is colinear with Goyangdae, Zhonggaozhan [transliteration], and Gowang Mountain. Our 64th Army set up defenses in this region.

While the enemy was directing a strong attack on our eastern front, we guessed that the enemy generals would direct an even larger attack against our western front and threaten our Gaesong flank, so as to set the stage for capturing Gaesong, a strategically important site. We made ample preparations for this. The 65th Army was transferred to the Gaesong region to augment the dispositions protecting Gaesong. Afterwards, the 63rd Army was brought into the Janghwa Dong and Hwajang Dong areas to prepare to coordinate with the 65th Army, which would be attacking the enemy as he approached Gaesong. The 47th Army established defenses in the Yaweol Mountain--Cheondeog Mountain belt. The "Volunteer Command" reinforced each first echelon army in the main defensive directions with anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft weapons.

The event took place on the morning of August 19th. Comrade Yao Qingxiang, who was leading our military police on a routine patrol mission, suddenly encountered an enemy ambush. This was a neutral zone into which intrusions were illegal; it was disgusting violence perpetrated by several tens of soldiers from the U.S.-Rhee bandit army who had been hiding in ambush in the dense forest. After Yao Qingxiang and Private Wang Renyuan were seriously wounded, the enemy still fired two shots into Comrade Yao Qingxiang's forehead. Our Comrade Yao Qingxiang was gloriously martyred. His fresh blood stained the ground of the neutral zone red. The U.S.--Rhee soldiers stole his pistol, pen, watch, and diary. We made a strong protest to the Americans and demanded that the murderer be punished. The Americans, when faced with the facts, not only tried to deny them by any means, but also aggravated the situation. They dispatched planes to bomb and sweep with fire the place in which the Sino-Korean negotiations

representatives lived.

This evil behavior by which the enemy destroyed the armistice negotiations filled all of us in the army, from the generals to the privates, with righteous anger. From everywhere, from the command organizations, the companies, and even the sentries, came forceful requests:

"We cannot let our martyr's blood flow in vain!"

"Let us avenge the death of Comrade Yao Qingxiang!"

The enemy intentionally and arrogantly broke off the peace talks. This caused us to have an even clearer presentiment that there would be a large military action. I phoned each army's "front commander" and demanded that they stand in combat readiness and strictly punish the invader. In addition, I emphasized again and again the combat principles of the "Volunteer Command": "Guard defensive positions; steadily resist attacks; repeatedly struggle; annihilate the enemy".

As expected, the 3rd U.S. Division, with two infantry regiments and sixty tanks and with the support of one hundred artillery pieces, began by attacking the Yaweol Mountain--Cheondeog Mountain areas, which were defended by the 47th Army. Their attack was focused on the Yaweol Mountain area, which was guarded by one infantry company. This was the beginning of the enemy's so-called "Fall Offensive".

During the first day of combat, the enemy attacked fiercely and continuously for twenty-one hours. Our officers and men on the front line, with the support of artillery, repulsed fourteen enemy assaults and inflicted more than 800 casualties. But the enemy, employing a large number of artillery pieces, completely destroyed our defensive fortifications. Finally, all the heroes of one platoon which was defending an important summit were

martyred. The enemy occupied our positions on Yaweol Mountain.

Then the enemy concentrated the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, two regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division (which included one Phillipine unit and one Thai unit), the British Commonwealth 1st Division (composed of the original British 28th and 29th Brigades and the Canadian 25th Brigade) and executed a fierce attack across a forty kilometer front against our 64th and 47th Armies which were defending the Gowang Mountain--Cheondeog Mountain line. More than 200 tanks operated in coordination with this attack, and the attack was supported by more than 300 artillery pieces with calibres of 105 mm or more and by a large air force.

The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was not at all a cavalry unit, but was a superbly equipped mechanized unit. It was known as the "Washington Pioneer Founding Unit". It was the U.S.'s so-called crack unit. However, this trump card [Translator's Note: "Crack" and "trump card" are represented by the same characters in Chinese.] had already been hit so hard by us that it could not be played again. This time, relying on massive heavy artillery, the enemy hoped to restore some honor to this crack unit.

The 47th Army fought very well. With a determined resistance and continuous counterattacks, they inflicted many casualties on the enemy. Each position was involved in several, perhaps a dozen battles. Shooting hero, Zheng Yueguan, in one day killed more than 112 enemy soldiers. The 7th Squad, which was defending a certain height, skillfully hid from the enemy's more than one thousand rounds of artillery shells, repulsing seven assaults by an enemy battalion. An officer of a U.S. artillery unit and a first pilot, Xifoleng [transliteration], who was captured by us, said, "When I was conducting air reconnaissance, your positions truly became a section of scorched earth. Only when I was captured did I see that it was your men covering the place." During this attack in which the enemy poured more than 10,000 artillery shells on our positions every day, the "United Nations

Army", led by the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, threw away more than 6700 "united" lives in this region alone.

Along the front of the 64th Army defenses, the attacking enemy was the British Commonwealth 1st Division. Its attack was focused on Gowang Mountain and Maliang Mountain. Their tactic was to concentrate forces and fire on successive points. Concentrating their superior artillery fire, they first executed a fierce and intense attack on our positions. In just four hours, more than 20,000 artillery shells dropped on Height 317 and Height 216.8 on Maliang Mountain. A meter-deep layer of earth was stripped from the surface. At the same time, eight enemy aircraft bombed, one after the other, dropping napalm bombs. After this, they executed an infantry attack. Although some of our fortifications were destroyed, our officers and men still put up stiff resistance. During the day, they made use of trench warfare. At night, they organized a counterattack.

Comrade Zeng Siyu, the commander of the 64th Army reported this situation to me by phone. He reported that they had modified their operational scheme in response to the enemy situation. Only when I asked him did I learn that he had led his army in an advance to Wontong Mountain, less than ten kilometers from the front. I agreed with his operational scheme and reminded him to pay attention to safety and to make full use of artillery strength. Then I phoned Vice-Commander Huang Dengbao of the 8th Artillery Division and told him to seize the opportunity and be certain to provide the infantry with strong support.

This battle was extremely intense. The 7th Company of the 571st Regiment, which was defending Height 216.8 and which was under the leadership of Vice-Commander Yan Zhigang, repulsed twenty-three collective assaults. The 29th Brigade of the British Commonwealth Division lost more than 600 lives. All members of a squad of first class meritorious service, which was defending another height, were wounded. Their ammunition was running out,

but they continued to resist and killed every soldier in an enemy company. The telephone technician, Zhu Delu, reconnected the telephone line, which was cut again and again by enemy artillery, twenty-seven times. When he last inspected the line, four fingers on his left hand had been shot off. He bore the pain and used his teeth in place of his hand, thus connecting the line and guaranteeing the command post's commands could be communicated. As a result, the front-line unit was victorious, killing more than 150 of the enemy.

The enemy concentrated his attack on one point and then another, and our army defended one peak and then another. We put up successive resistances and repeatedly engaged the enemy in combat. In front of every height enemy corpses were piled in confused masses. Afterwards, the leaders of the "Volunteer Command" praised the blocking action at Maliang Mountain, saying "One mountain, one fortress." The Xinhua Press Agency released a news bulletin with this as its topic.

During the battle to defend Maliang Mountain, our artillery gave full play to our artillery strength. At the beginning of the battle, the artillery, closely coordinated with infantry, killed with precision a great number of the enemy. The enemy, employing forces equal to two battalions, which operated in coordination with twenty aircraft and four combat vehicles, launched an attack on Height 216.8 and attempted in vain to execute outflanking maneuvers to the rear of Maliang Mountain. West of Height 216.8, at Geumchek, the enemy assembled forces equal to one battalion and planned to launch a frontal attack, but our artillery units first discomfited the enemy at Jinchidong with a fierce artillery barrage. Then, together with the infantry, the units repelled thirteen consecutive attacks by the enemy. The last artillery attack was the fiercest. One platoon's artillery shells followed another platoon's artillery shells. They went straight from the mountain slope directly down to the foot of the mountain. At first, one could hear the sound of the artillery shells leaving

the guns and the sound of the shells exploding. Later on, one could only hear the roar of the mountain shaking. The enemy, who was slithering up the mountain, was blocked by our infantry. The enemy troops gathered together in a confused group and, racing with each other, fled for their lives. The few enemy soldiers who had escaped by chance again were hit with our artillery fire as soon as they got to the road below. They could only run back in a great hurry. They gathered like the spines of a hedgehog in a patch of woods below Height 216.8. Artillery shells rained down on the forest like hail. After he was captured by us, a captain of the Royal Scottish Frontier Regiment, whose left leg had been blown off, kept on asking, "What kind of eyes does your artillery commander have?" Gasping in admiration, he said, "Incredible! I never imagined that the artillery of the Volunteer Army would be this good!" An Associated Press reporter dispatched a news report to the U.S. which sighed, "The defense of Maliang Mountain is the western front's heartbreak ridge for the United Nations Army."

After the battle ended, Commander in Chief Peng praised the 64th and 67th Armies several times. The Volunteer Command Headquarters sent a silk banner as a gift to the artillery units. On the flag, there were five large characters, which read: "Extraordinarily Brave Artillerymen". Six months later, we received a beautiful silk banner which was brought back from the fatherland by the Volunteer Army's Homecoming Delegation. Embroidered on it were these gold words, "Struggling to Protect Peace in the Orient and the World". They indicated that the banner should be delivered to the heroes who defended the positions on Maliang Mountain.

By the end of October, the enemy attack was forced to a halt. Their so-called "Fall Offensive" was completely smashed by us. After more than one month of the "Fall Offensive", the enemy had only penetrated three or four kilometers into our positions on the western front. Along the eastern front, they penetrated from six to nine kilometers. No wonder that the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Bradley, stated in a report to U.S. President Truman: "Waging this kind of war, Ridgeway will have to spend at least twenty years before he arrives at the Yalu River."

During the beginning forty days of armistice negotiations, the enemy, without any reason, broke off the talks three times. Our army smashed the enemy's "Summer and Fall Offensives" and went on to launch two offensives with limited objectives. During these, we inflicted many casualties on the enemy and, to a great extent, wore him down. After dealing a blow to his reckless arrogance, the representatives of the so-called "United Nation's Army" had no choice but to once again sit down at the negotiating table on October 25th.

The representatives of the "United Nations Army" sat down at the negotiating table, but their generals did not rest at all. Perhaps a new battle, on an even larger scale, would break out in the midst of negotiations. We had often experienced the fact that the U.S. Generals took advantage of peace talks to carry out war preparations. We began to feel that, for the U.S. Generals, there was a regulation which dictated that their temporary cease-fire was for the purpose of more fighting. They could fight no longer, so their regulation dictated that they participate in the talks.

Chapter Five, Bombs and Germs

On the Korean battlefields, from MacArthur to Ridgeway to Clark to Fanfolite [transliteration] to Tyler (who came later), the U.S. demonstrated a superstitious faith in bombs. From both the sky and the ground, the enemy was always hurling tons upon tons of steel on our positions and pouring them onto Korean territory. The vice-commander of the operations section of our group army, Yu Zhen, performed a small experiment. He randomly drew a 0.33 m square on a position on a bare mountain and picked out 287 little pieces of artillery shrapnel. The operations section performed a statistical analysis. During the defensive phase after the 19th Group army entered its positions, the enemy hurled more than 7,784,000 bombs onto our positions. These shells would fill more than 51,000 trucks or more than 4,400 railcars. To say that the earth under our positions was churned to a depth of one meter and that not an inch of grass was left is not an exaggeration. When the men walked across the light, loose soil around the positions, sometimes they would sink to their ankles and sometimes to their calves. During that time, our positions were easily identifiable. The height which was bald and bare was the one on which our positions were located.

Under these circumstances, it was very difficult to preserve oneself, defend one's position, and at the same time inflict casualties on the enemy--many casualties. A learning process was

involved here, and in the beginning there was much suffering.

Before the enemy's "Fall and Summer Offensives", our 65th Army established defenses in the Gilsu Li and Jishuili [transliteration] regions to the south, west, and east of Gaesong in order to protect Gaesong. Their mission was quite onerous. In the midst of battle, there were some practical problems which needed solving. The group army's party committee determined that Li Zhimin and I would go there and research together with them to come up with a solution. We hurried over to the command post at dusk. The command post was located in a camouflaged cave halfway up a mountain slope. A few candles were lit on a table that was made of rough-hewn boards. A gas lantern which had just been lit was not yet glowing. Army Commander Xiao Yingtang, Commissar Wang Daobang, and Director of the Army Political Department, Cheng Yigui were all there. On a battlefield, there is no exchange of conventional greetings. Xiao Yingtang immediately said to us, "These two days the fighting has gone poorly. The men have suffered many casualties."

We were aware of this situation. We had come precisely in order to solve this problem. After the 65th Army entered the Gaesong region, there came the slogan, "Firmly defend every inch of ground in the Gaesong area." This slogan was correct. But after the troops entered their positions, they met with a continuous, unceasing, fierce artillery barrage from the enemy. Because their ideological preparation was insufficient to begin with, emergency response measures were not immediately implemented. Although the positions were not abandoned, in two days casualties amounted to nearly two battalion's worth of forces. The army's motto never went beyond one word, "passive". The problem which the 65th Army was confronting at that time was precisely this. At that time, the army cadres were holding a meeting to find a way to change this situation.

Before arriving at the 65th Army, Zhimin, Weishan, myself,

and other comrades discussed the situation, and our unanimous opinion was that though the 65th Army's mission was to defend Gaesong (and it was not to waver in the slightest in this regard), it could not understand "defense" to mean "defense to the death". Mobile combat while attacking and defending was the effective approach which many years of experience had taught us. It was also an important component in the system of Mao Zedong Thought. The Korean War, in every respect, from battle sites to battle opponents, was completely different from the domestic war. But because of this difference, it presented us with an opportunity to enrich our experience. In the view of the commanders, the idea, "Fight a war; progress a step", should first manifest itself in strategic thinking and tactical application. Therefore, I said to Xiao Yingtang and the other comrades, "I still promote the idea of defense while mobilizing and mobility while defending. We should change this situation of passivity into one of mobility. In fact, this is our old way of fighting wars: If you try to hit me, I'll make sure you can't. But when I hit you, I will beat you to death. The current problem is that we must first think of a way to keep the enemy from hitting us. Then we can solve the problem of how to beat the enemy to death. I hope you all spend some time thinking and discussing along these lines."

That night we talked until very late. We considered the fact that for two days the troops at the front had been experiencing a very bitter fight and had suffered heavy casualties. Zhimin used the authority of our names to get a call through to the comrades in a front-line command post. Zhimin was very excited on that day. He said, "Commander Yang and I have come to visit everyone. We are now at your army command post. You are the defenders of Gaesong, and Gaesong is the site of armistice negotiations about which all the world's people cares very much. Comrades, to defend Gaesong is to defend the armistice negotiations. Your mission is enormously difficult and very glorious! Therefore, we not only hope that you will carry forward our army's glorious tradition of continuous combat, heroic struggle, and willingness to be martyrs,

but we also hope that, in accordance with the new conditions, you will pool together your thoughts and make a united effort and that you will figure out a way to reduce casualties and a way to win an even greater victory. Commander Yang and I have come here for these few days. We are waiting for good news from you!"

Among the cadres of the 65th Army, there were a few who had participated in the Shijiazhuang campaign. I asked them to recall the conditions of that campaign. The most difficult part of that campaign, from our point of view, was that it was the first time that we were attacking strong fortifications. We had to attack and overcome a large city with solidly-established defensive fortifications. In order to overcome this difficulty, the method we employed was to construct fortifications for staging attacks. We mobilized a large number of troops and positioned them in trenches and tunnels which the enemy had not yet discovered. We then ambushed the enemy, with very good results. By bringing up the Shijiazhuang campaign, I caught their strong interest. After everyone discussed this enthusiastically for a while, I entered into a long meditation. During the initial phase of the war to resist Japan, whenever we were fighting a defensive battle, I thought, if the we were near a slope or a height, we would dig out a bunker and bore a few holes. Thus we were immediately able to conduct reconnaissance on the enemy and were also able to fire on the enemy from darkness. Wasn't this a good way? The fortifications used for staging attacks (later called "troop-stationing caves" on the Korean battlefields) were a type of experiment. Could we try a few more experiments here?

Comrade Xiao Yingtang said that it was recently discovered that some of the officers and men, in order to defend against artillery, were digging anti-artillery holes behind the positions, with good results.

"Very good!" I said. "We must diligently synthesize our experiences, augment instructions, and stimulate creativity among

the officers and men. Our men are capable of producing miracles." I suggested that we go see some of these "anti-artillery holes".

Xiao Yingtang felt a little uncomfortable. He said, "During these few days, the artillery barrages have been intense. If you leaders wish to go, perhaps you should first wait a while and then see."

I laughed. "If we wait until the war is over, then it will be too late. Let's go." At this time, Comrade Wang Daobang wanted the chief of staff to report our action to "Volunteer Command". I said, "Don't report it, don't report it. If Commander in Chief Peng learns of it, we won't be able to go."

The seven or eight of us separated and rode in two vehicles. When the vehicles arrived at an area more than one hundred meters from the positions, we dismounted and advanced on foot. In order to reduce target size, we separated into two small groups. Zhimin and I proceeded separately. He still managed a joke then, saying, "Let's separate. If one is 'glorified', then there will still be another!"

I said, "Neither of us is 'glorious' yet. It is still not the time of 'glory' now."

Walking on positions which had been "plowed" by bombs several times, our steps sunk directly down. There was not a single whole tree on the entire height. The tree trunks, cut in half, stuck out at crazy angles, and large sections of roots were exposed to the air. By chance we came across a couple of trees. They were only one or two thirds of a meter high, their tops were scarred and gaunt.

The combat trenches were as deep as a man. Inside, one could walk without bending over. Some of our soldiers were polishing weapons and some were involved in discussions. When they saw us

coming, they stood up quickly, in a neat and orderly manner. Though all of their faces were covered with soot and dust, their pairs of bright eyes were exceptionally spirited and revealed vigor and resolve. Their feet were placed together in pairs, side-by-side. Their bodies were straight like writing brushes. Some of them had bandages wrapped around their heads and arms. Nevertheless, the comrades wrapped in bandages stood erect like the others. I felt a rush of warmth in my heart. These were our brave soldiers, who were undaunted by one hundred failures and who always bravely forged ahead.

"Thanks everyone! Thanks comrades!" Shaking pairs of hands that were covered with hard calluses, caressing their uniforms which had been shredded by shrapnel, I did not say anything else. I just felt that I should thank them--should thank our officers and men. Only when Commissar Li Zhimin finished speaking did I suggest that we go take a look at their invention.

The company commander (I do not remember his name clearly) was a comrade from Sichuan. He was of typical Sichuan stature. His whole body was full of spring and vigor. He took us to an area in back of the positions.

In back of the positions, along a dirt cliff, several anti-artillery holes had been dug (similar to today's "cat ear holes"). The company commander told us that in each hole one person could kneel. In some cases, two holes were connected to each other, forming a small V-shaped tunnel (this was the smaller version of the tunnel defenses which came later). A few more people could hide in these. The company commander said that when the enemy fired artillery, we would retreat and hide in these anti-artillery holes. When the enemy artillery stopped, we would return to the battle trenches. "Very good!" I praised their invention from my heart. I said to the company commander, "You could also remain steady and wait for the enemy to approach and then open fire!" The company commander nodded and said yes. I could not help

thinking again of the fortifications for staging attacks of the Shijiazhuang campaign. I asked the company commander, "Is it possible to dig deeper? What if we connect the tunnels with each other, then bore through a few spy holes and dig a few embrasures? Wouldn't that save the men from running back and forth and crawling up and down?" "Yes, yes!" The company commander was so happy he clapped his hands and said, "We'll do it right away!"

This visit to the 65th Army was very fruitful. Not long after we returned to the group army, we received a report from the 65th Army. They had connected the V-shaped tunnels together. It could easily take a squad, a platoon, even a company. The cadres and troops were in high spirits and were tunneling forwards. I remember that at the time Xiao Yingtang said to me, "Our 65th Army is made up of remnants of the North China Group Army. It looks as though we are importing the tunnel warfare of Hebei province!"

I reported by telephone to Commander in Chief Peng on the situation of the 65th Army. Commander in Chief Peng was very happy. He said, "This is a creation. I don't believe that the Americans will be able to smash through the planet Earth!" Commander in Chief Peng told me that there were some other units which were also in the process of digging anti-artillery holes and that we should diligently synthesize our experiences and write a report for him.

On the day after we sent our report concerning the construction of tunnel works, Commander in Chief called to give his approval. He asked that the report be circulated throughout the army. Afterwards, during a meeting, after Commander in Chief Peng presented the instructive policy on the "long-term combat and active defense" strategy, he once again gave his approval to the tunnel works. He said, "This is an excellent manifestation of the interaction between political qualities and military qualities of the revolutionary army. For the sake of long-term positional warfare, extremely advantageous conditions have been created."

Through Commander in Chief Peng's advocacy and encouragement, all the battlefields were swept with a hot tide of enthusiasm for building such fortifications.

So as to better implement "Volunteer Command's" directive, and synthesize our experiences, and for the benefit of the next combat effort, the group army held a meeting for cadres of the division level and above at Seongyeo Dong.

Although we belonged to the same group army and fought on the same battlefield, we still experienced the pleasure of reunion after long separation now that we were meeting surrounded by artillery fire and gunpowder.

At that time, the cadres of the division level and above from the group army were thirty or so years old. War and weighty duties had given them a maturity and stability beyond their years. But during this gathering, the vitality, animation, and even mischievousness of youth often revealed itself, making everyone even more happy. I told the comrades of the office that they should be good hosts to them, for these cadres rarely could wake from a peaceful night's sleep on the battlefield. They should be allowed to have a good rest for a few days. The comrades of the group army's cultural group should put on a show for them.

Although we, as much as was possible, met each other many times at the conference site, the leading comrades of the group army went to their rooms each night and took it easy. They played poker and chess together and chatted about family matters or the situation of the units. If anyone felt like dancing, they were allowed to go dancing. If someone did not know how to dance, the comrades of the cultural group would teach him. At that time, the friendships between the comrades were very close. There were no differences in the ways comrades of different ranks treated each other, nor were there misunderstandings between comrades of

different ranks. Each comrade just felt that he was a member of the revolutionary forces. All were brothers and sisters in one big family. Whoever has falseness or secrets in his heart will feel shamed by the name of "revolutionary army."

At the meeting, everyone reported on the situation and analyzed it. With everyone's opinions and practical conditions as a basis, I, representing the group army's party committee, made a report. It mainly discussed conditions and tactical principles.

As for the situation between us and the enemy, it had already become a matter of confrontation. The enemy was composed of seventeen nations, large and small, with more than 500,000 troops. Their tactical weapons were absolutely superior to our own. Moreover, the enemy had already established three strategic lines of defense in South Korea. Our troop strength was superior to that of the enemy, but our tactical weaponry was inferior to his. All our supplies had to be shipped in from China. Added to this was the fact that the Korea was long and narrow, and the enemy's forces were concentrated. Therefore, it would be very difficult to wipe out the enemy through rapid mobilization. Similarly, since the enemy had suffered many crushing defeats, he did not dare to take any risks. Thus, from this time on, the main types of combat would be positional combat, positional attacks, and positional defense. Our war policy was one of long-term war, and our tactical principles were in keeping with Comrade Mao Zedong's instruction: "the piecemeal sticky candy". We would use ambushes, surprise raids, and counterattacks all integrated into a whole. And we would inflict casualties on the enemy, accumulating small victories to make a big victory.

In accordance with long-term operational principles, I offered some practical opinions with respect to unit management, tactics education, cadre education, and even records organization. I made a point of stressing attack tactics, defensive tactics, and the use of small units in launching attacks. I emphasized that,

in constructing defensive fortifications, we had to pay attention to integrating mountain (or hills) peaks, mountain slopes, and bases of mountains. Level ground and mountainous ground had to be integrated, and the same was true of barracks that had been dug out of the ground and tunnel firing points. In order to guard against outflanking maneuvers by the enemy, our positions had to be organized so that they were in staggered rows or organized so that they were like fish scales. Thus, mutual support would be facilitated. I also emphasized the matter of small units launching attacks at night. Night combat was the traditional method of combat at which we excelled. Historically, it was an effective method of combat by which our army, using inferior weaponry, defeated enemies with superior weaponry. Having small units launch attacks at night was a way of organically integrating night warfare with mobile warfare. You might say that this was a dagger forged by our army in the long-burning fires of war. It was rarely seen among the world's armies. Our units would go out at night, launching a strike at some point and then quickly leaving. A fist here and a foot there, like Sun Wukong drilling into the Iron Fan Princess's stomach. In this way, we would make it impossible for the enemy to lie down or sit down in one place for long. This is a precious method that should be often employed during positional defensive warfare.

The meeting was very successful. Just by looking at the brows and listening to the voices of these commanders, one could tell that it had been successful. Their steady gazes and vigorous, resonant voices were full of confidence. Confidence is the strength to advance. And for soldiers, confidence is the backbone of success on the battlefield.

Commander in Chief Peng often said, "In waging war, the most important thing is to rely on soldiers. Ever since ancient times, troop strength has been number one. Strong generals are only successful insofar as they are commanders of successful infantry. Commanders can be compared to conductors of music bands. It is

certainly not possible to have a good band, but no good commander. But it is also not possible to have only a good commander without a good band." After the group army conference was over, our men and our commander organized a symphony for constructing tunnel works. We performed a new movement.

Working in the bellies of mountains, we had to deal with rocks, mortar, and cave-ins. We had no advanced tools and lacked the proper skills. In every area, we had to rely on our pairs of hands. We wore down our picks so that they went from long to short and from short to bald. In the end, it was down to a hammer-sized piece of steel. We had no carts to carry out the rubble, so we attached a few wheels to artillery shell boxes. There were no lights in the caves, so we lit pine oil. In daytime, we would use pieces of glass or metal to reflect sunlight into the caves. It was truly impossible to use tools, so we made a cast iron stove by ourselves. Blisters kept appearing on the men's hands, and in turn these blisters became layers and layers of calluses.

At that time, if you went to the positions, you would be sure to hear the rumble of the mountain being opened up, regardless of whether it was day or night, wind or rain. After having experienced arduous, heated battles, a strong point defensive system with a tunnel as its backbone was being gradually formed. "Underground Great Walls" were being born in the hands of our soldiers. Firing fortifications, communication trenches, main tunnels, branch tunnels, tunnels which were vertical-horizontal interlocking, dormitories, restaurants, toilets--everything needed was there. Some were called underground skyscrapers by the men; others, club auditoriums. As for the tunnel of the group army's commander's office, a bathroom was constructed. These simple and ugly halls, corridors, rooms, and auditoriums were as different as can be from those constructions bearing the same names in China. Even so, the men chose nice-sounding names like these. This was an expression of their revolutionary optimism. But it was a great

improvement over the time we spent at Jukjang Dong. It was many times better than the living environment we had when we first arrived in Korea, when we ate our chow mein together with a handful of snow. When the thousands of heavy artillery shells hurled by the enemy exploded on the hilltop above us, our commanders peacefully sat in their own fortified quarters reading books or newspapers, playing chess, and playing poker.

Later, the following statistics were on display at the "Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea Exhibit" that the Volunteer Army organized: In three years, our army dug 1250 kilometers of tunnels. This was equivalent to a large tunnel of stone beginning at Lianyungang on our eastern coast, crossing Jiangsu, Henan, the Yellow River, and ending up in Xian in Shaanxi. The temporary trenches and communications trenches which we dug totalled 6240 kilometers in length, similar to the length of the greatest construction in our nation's history, the Great Wall. We built more than 100,000 bunkers, excavating more than 60,000,000 cubic meters. If we piled this dirt together so that it was one meter high and one meter deep, it would circle the earth's equator one and a half times. This was the crystallization of the sweat and wisdom, as well as the courage and resolve of the commanders of the Volunteer Army. It was also our pride and glory.

Chairman Mao Zedong had high praise for the tunnel-centered strong point defensive system we had created on the Korean battlefields. In August of 1952, he said in a speech, "The question of whether or not we can defend was answered last year. The solution is to dig tunnels. We have dug two-level fortifications so that when the enemy attacks we can enter tunnels. Sometimes the enemy might capture the surface, but the earth below him will still belong to us. We wait for the enemy to enter the positions and then counterattack, inflicting extremely high casualties on him. We use this crude type of method to deal with the foreign soldiers. The enemy can do nothing to us. As for the matter of eating, this is also a matter of guaranteeing

provisions. For a long time we could not solve this problem. At the time, we did not know that we could dig caves and put the provisions in caves. Now we realize this, each division has three months of provisions; each has depositories and auditoriums. Living conditions are very good."

Once the units had their fortifications and various kinds of materials stored away, they began to aggressively execute small unit combat operations. The small unit operations then were not only operations by reconnaissance teams or small numbers of combat personnel. They were operations led by infantry units, which had support from artillery fire and reserve units. These operations included patrols and reconnaissance, but they were mainly ambushes, counterambushes, and raids. During the beginning phase, most were defensive in nature. They mainly attacked the enemy's reconnaissance operations, covered our army's constructions and fortifications, and guaranteed the security of our main positions. After we created our tunnel-centered strong point defensive system, most were of an attack nature. We gradually began to contend for the middle zone and to attack and capture protruding enemy positions on the front line. We also began attacking and capturing platoon and company strong points. The number of troops we employed gradually increased. They already had the standard qualities for storming fortifications.

Of the methods we usually employed, I remember three rather clearly: One was called "Grab a Handful". This meant that we would select advantageous terrain. Then, against targets which we did not need to control or which we could not control, we would employ the "quick-fight quick-decision" method, and, after having attacked, we would leave. The objective was to inflict casualties on the enemy. The second was called "Squeezing Positions". This

1 See Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, p. 67

meant that we would use a thousand methods and one hundred plans to squeeze the enemy out of the middle zone or out of salients which presented a rather large threat to us or out of platoon or company strong points. Then we would occupy these positions or zones. Of course, the enemy did not wish to lose these kinds of positions. Therefore, we had to repeatedly contend for them. It was a tug-of-war which went back and forth, back and forth. We took advantage of these times of repeated struggle to wipe out as many of the enemy as possible. The third was called "The Spike". We would send small units to slip into units guarded by the enemy in daytime and abandoned at night. There, we would bury mines. When the enemy soldiers entered the positions the next day, they would suffer casualties. Sometimes we would dispatch small units to penetrate deep behind enemy lines, where they would raid enemy artillery positions.

At the same time that we were occupying the middle zones and attacking and capturing strong points along the front line, we were carrying out sniper actions along the entire front. This was also called the "sniper's shot, sniper's shell war". Both infantry units and artillery units were thinking of ways to lay ambushes, conceal themselves, and aggressively capture or wipe out exposed enemy targets. The result was that a large number of crack shots and crack artillerymen came to the fore. At that time, no matter which position you went to, you almost always could hear a fast tempo melody like this:

The positions are our live target field
We must promote the method of killing the enemy by sniping
We'll see who's got the best technique
We'll see who's the best in martial arts.
One gun, one shot aimed and fired
Sending them, one by one, to see the King of Hades
By accumulating a few into many, our victory is great
Our achievements are posted high, our beautiful names extolled

Under our accurate and skillful sniper fire, the enemy did not dare to take reckless action. That haughty and reckless attitude of his was shot down. A journalist of the Associated Press described the U.S. troops in this way: "The brothers of the United Nations Army creep across the ground and climb into their positions. Often a chill runs up their spines, for they don't know when the enemy's artillery shells will land on top of them. They make the sign of the cross on their chests and pray for God's protection so that they can crawl peacefully into the pillboxes." Nevertheless, the pillboxes were unable to protect them. Our crack artillerymen often used accurate artillery fire to open the pillboxes to the skies.

In addition, we organized mobile artillery to carry out mobile attacks and to execute attacks on moving enemy tanks and other vehicles. We also, in a planned and organized manner, destroyed the enemy's artillery positions.

According to incomplete statistics, from May to August of 1952, sniping attacks killed more than 13,600 enemy troops (not including the effects of mobile artillery "sniper" attacks), inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and effectively suppressing the enemy's daytime operations from his positions.

Of course, night was even more under our control. Small, crack units regularly launched attacks, striking enemy depots and artillery positions and raiding enemy camps. At the very least, we would capture a few enemy soldiers and gather information from them. This type of warfare left a deep impression on our enemy. In the memoirs which General Ridgeway wrote in the 1960s, he says, "The Chinese liked to launch attacks at night." "It was often the case that soldiers who were guarding scattered and isolate pillboxes would again and again be surprised to find the enemy appearing suddenly and soundlessly out of the darkness onto our positions. Our soldiers also often made the discovery that four or five Chinese wearing sneakers had already soundlessly slipped

into the zone between their side and the advance sentry line. At such moments, signal flares would often rise up from the enemy battle lines and wild sound of enemy bugles would scare our sentries into their bunkers. There was almost no time to utter a verbal command before the first shots were fired." "The Chinese night attacks were particularly mysterious and difficult to detect. They were inscrutable."

In fact, there was nothing mysterious about them, and they certainly were not inscrutable. It was a matter of playing up our strengths and avoiding our weaknesses, of taking the advantage and avoiding harm, and of struggling out of passivity to gain the initiative. Historically, these were the guiding combat principles to which we adhered. When an army equipped with inferior weapons fights a war against an army with superior weapons, one should further elaborate on this principle. On the Korean battlefields, night warfare and mobile warfare were the means of combat by which we raised up our strengths and avoided our weaknesses and by which we took the advantage and avoided harm. Of course, the night warfare we waged on the Korean battlefields differed in some respects from what our army had been carrying out in the past. It was not merely extensively used in tactical areas, but was developed to the extent that it reached a campaign-level scale. It was not only extensively employed in mobile warfare, but was also extensively employed in positional warfare. It permeated the entire course of the Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea War. It became one of the features of the Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea War.

After we had seized to an appropriate extent the initiative in the war, the battlefield situation tended to stabilize. Now that the 1952 New Year was about to arrive, the office units were actively preparing to welcome their first new year on Korean soil.

On an afternoon a few days before the new year, Comrade Weishan and I were going for a walk along a reservoir outside our

group army's office. While we were walking, a guard, Guo Changrong, panting, ran towards us, shouting, "Commanders, a guest has come! A guest has come!"

A guest? Weishan and I stopped walking and looked towards the sound. It turned out that it was our landlady from Jukjang Dong who had come with her daughter. Weishan and I hurried over to them with quick strides to greet them. The arrival of the mother and her daughter was an important event at the office. Everyone welcomed them as though they were welcoming their own relatives and took them to Seonyeo Dong to pass the new year.

On the night of the new year, headquarters and the political department held separate parties. We invited the villagers from Seonyeo Dong and comrades from the Labor Party's committee in Shibianli [Translator's Note: This is a transliteration of three Chinese characters meaning "city edge village"]. Except for our inability to communicate, the event was exactly as it would have been in China, and in China it would not have been possible to experience the militant friendship between the Chinese and Korean people.

After the new year, the group army, in accordance with the unified requirements of the Volunteer Command's party committee, stated the main missions of 1952: to finish the war and strive for a peaceful solution to the Korean problem. In keeping with the guiding spirit of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Central Military Committee, we were, like the units in China, to carry out reductions and reorganization, as well as the "Three Antis" Movement (anti-corruption, anti-wastage, anti-bureaucraticism). We were to continue to overcome difficulties and make prominent an attitude that reflected our arduous struggle.

We were expecting that the enemy would continuously attack us

on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, but we did not foresee the U.S. aggressor would dare to fly in the face of world opinion and conduct inhuman German warfare against the Chinese and Korean people.

On the night of January 28th, "Volunteer Command" reported to us that, over the Gumguek Li-Waiyuandi [Translator's Note: This is a transliteration of three Chinese characters meaning "remote site".]-Yongso Dong-Yongsoo Dong belt southeast of the Inchon, enemy planes dropped three kinds of insects which the local Koreans had never seen before. One appeared to be a black fly. Another was like a flea, and a third was both like a tick and a little spider. The situation demanded our strict attention, and we organized the medical department to perform chemical tests. The troops were organized to quickly exterminate them.

On January 29th, enemy planes once again scattered a batch of flies and fleas over the Inchon area.

On February 11th, four enemy planes flew slowly over the area where our group army headquarters was located. An amorphous mass milky, viscous liquid fell onto my sleeve. Following this, Shibianli reported that Shibianli [transliteration] and surrounding villages had discovered a large number of flies, which were stuck in a milky viscous liquid on paper packages, pieces of paper, and small pictures. The troops also reported that the same discoveries were made surrounding Xiannudong.

Results of the chemical tests performed by medical personnel proved that the flies, fleas, spiders, and the sticky liquid all carried cholera and other viruses. This was an extremely serious situation. We reported this to "Volunteer Command" as soon as possible, and we had the medical department take emergency measures. "Volunteer Command" informed us that in Cheolweon, Pyeongyang, Shuoning [transliteration], and other sites enemy planes were known to have scattered fleas, flies, mosquitoes,

crickets, spiders, sand fleas, and other small insects. After undergoing tests, it had been shown that these small insects were carrying plague bacilli, cholera vibrio, typhoid bacilli, dysentery bacilli, meningitis diplococcus, meningitis filterable virus, etc. In all, there were more than ten kinds. It was necessary for us carry out preventive work and exterminate the insects. At the same time, it was necessary to perform ideological work among the troops. Turmoil could absolutely not be allowed to break out. In particular, we had to pay attention to the combat frame of mind of the front line troops. This absolutely could not be allowed to influence their fighting.

During the first phase of the effort to cope with germ warfare, the practical difficulties were enormous. The main thing was that we lacked the necessary ideological and material preparation. We had no experience.

The party and the people of the fatherland are eternally our source of strength and the force which backs us up.

At the same time that the U.S. aggressors carried out germ warfare in Korea, they also dropped germ bombs on Fushun, Xinmin, and Dandong in the northeastern part of our country, as well as on the coastal city of Qingdao. Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou En Lai issued a statement which solemnly pointed out that "the Chinese people, together with the people of the world, will struggle to the end to put a halt to this evil and made behavior of the U.S. government."

Towards the end of February, we continually received instructions from the Army Committee, which required that "cadres and offices at every level must make immunization work the main current mission among the troops and residents." "No matter whether or not there are occurrences of infected individuals, you must quickly and resolutely carry out immunization work. It is not permitted that there be any delay or hesitation."

In March, the Central Committee established the Central Immunization Commission organized by Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Guo Moruo, Li Dequan, He Cheng, Su Jinguan, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Teng Daiyuan, Zhang Bojun, Lu Dingyi, Xie Juezai, Li Fucheng, Zhang Hanfu, Nie Rongzhen, Li Yu, Liu Lantao, and Xiao Hua--eighteen comrades. Zhou Enlai served as director of the commission. Guo Moruo and Nie Rongzhen served as deputy directors of the commission. The Central Immunization Commission announced that every area should establish immunization units and should speed up research and development, production, and distribution of large amounts of vaccines, disinfectants, and pesticides. Before a month had passed, the entire nation had established a total of 129 immunization units--20,000 persons in all. During the second half of March alone, 5,800,000 doses of vaccine were shipped to Korea, basically satisfying the needs of the front line. At the same time, the party and the nation organized more than forty comrades to participate as specialists in the Volunteer Army's Immunization Inspection Team. Among them were the bacteriologists, Yang Shuya, Fang Liang, Guo Chengzhou, and Xie Zhiru, the parasitologist, Wu Guang, the entymologist, Liu Zhiying, the epidemiologist, Yu Huanwen, the pathologist, Yan Jiagui, and technicians from Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hangzhou, and other places. They were divided into three teams. One of these teams worked with the 19th Group Army.

The inhuman, violent behavior of U.S. imperialism inevitably provoked a powerful, righteous fury among all the world's people, including the American people.

The People's Democratic Republic of Korea and its government first of all issued a statement of protest. Then the chairman of the World Peace Council, Yueliao--Juli [transliteration] made a statement in Paris vehemently denouncing the U.S. aggressor's use of germ weapons as evil behavior. The World Federation of Labor Unions, representing 78,000,000 union members, the World

Democratic Federation of Women, representing 1,035,000,000 women from 62 nations, the World Democratic Youth Alliance, representing 72,000,000 young men and women from 84 nations, as well as some national governments, various social organizations, and noted personages, made statements and declarations one after the other protesting the U.S. aggressor's use of germ warfare.

The International Democratic Legal Workers' Association organized an investigation group made a special trip to Korea and the northeastern part of China to carry out an investigation. It acquired firm proof of the U.S.'s practice of germ warfare. The association shared this information with the world and demanded strict punishment for the murderers.

"The International Scientific Commission to Investigate the U.S. Germ Warfare Incident in Korea" also arrived in Korea and then the northeastern region of China to carry out an on-site investigation. Their investigation reported that "the people of Korea and Northeastern China have already become the targets of germ warfare attacks. The U.S. military has, by means of many different methods, employed these germ weapons. It seems that among these methods are some which are improvements on germ warfare methods used by the Japanese military during the Second World War."

"The Group for Investigating the U.S. Imperialism Germ War Crime", composed of the Chinese Red Cross, various civilian groups, and relevant experts, also announced the results of its investigation to the world.

Our nation held exhibits in Beijing and Shenyang to put on display objects and pictures of the U.S. imperialist germ warfare crime. The Chinese Xinhua Agency announced again and again the confessions of twenty-five captured U.S. pilots. These confessions were of the U.S. military's use of germ warfare. These real, live facts not only refuted the U.S. aggressor's

shameless denials of responsibility but won, to an even greater extent than before, the extreme sympathy and support of all the world's people and extended a unified anti-aggression battle line.

At the same time that we were exposing the enemy's use of germ warfare, the Volunteer Army, together with the Korean people, were fighting, negotiating, and launching an anti-germ warfare struggle, all at the same time. In this way, they won one victory after another.

During this time, a large number of writers and artists arrived from the fatherland and immersed themselves in the lives of the troops. The ones who came to the 19th Group Army included the famous writer, Mr. Ba Jin, and a veteran from the 19th Group Army who had served in a regimental political committee, the writer of Who Is the Most Lovable Person, Comrade Wei Wei. Zhimin, Weishan, myself, and other comrades had several discussions with them, introduced them to the situation, and provided them with leads to write about. They were very welcome among the troops. They also played an active role in the struggle against germ warfare. The article they wrote and jointly signed was based on facts seen with their own eyes, and it denounced the U.S. aggressor's use of germ weapons. I wrote down their names in my memorandum book. They are: Ba Jin, Gu Yuan, Song Zhidi, Ge Luo, Bai Lang, Li Rui, Huang Guliu, Wang Xijian, Han Zi, Wang Xin, Luo Gongliu, Xin Jie, Xi Hong, Dai Fei, Yi Ming, Xi Ye, Gao Hong, Han Feng, Li Zhihua, Du Zhen, and Yang Shuo.

After spending nearly a year in an intense struggle, we finally defeated the U.S. imperialists' germ in the winter of 1952. The officers and men said, "The U.S. imperialists cannot out-fight us, nor can they out-negotiate us. What's the use of cause some flies and mosquitoes to come?" In fact, it did have its use. I can see at least two of them: First, it proved that on two fronts--on the battlefield and at the negotiating table--

the American imperialists were not our equals. By conducting germ warfare, they suffered a humiliating defeat, both morally and politically. Even some of their "allies" were forced to distance themselves from them. U.S. imperialism became even more isolated in the world. Secondly, it opened our eyes and strengthened our confidence in a final victory over the enemy. We announced our victory to all the world: The Chinese and Korean people are not afraid to fight or to negotiate. Nor do they fear any kind of warfare, including germ warfare. Neither bombs nor germs would be able to save the aggressors from a disgraced exit.

Chapter Six, Seonyeo Dong, Huechang Li, and Mokdan Bong

Nature's regulations cannot be resisted by any force. It did not matter that, before the arrival of spring in 1952, the U.S. aggressor conducted extremely destructive germ warfare in Korea. Spring, striding forward on its own, still came to the land of Korea. The Jindalai [transliteration] flower, which the Korean people cherish, still covered the high mountains, the level plains, and the battlefields of Korea with its blossoms. She displayed her human-like stubborn strength and beautiful ambition.

The Korean race is great and strong. The Korean people are also great and strong. The war which the invader had initiated had destroyed their gardens, destroyed their livelihoods, destroyed their happiness, and had cast an upright socialist country into the fires of war. Yet they stubbornly continued with their lives, their struggles, and their creations.

The Korean race is an extremely friendly race. The Korean people regard true friendship as important as life. The friendship between the peoples of China and Korea was cemented by fresh blood. When we were in Korea, not a moment went by when we were not deeply aware of this precious friendship. Not a moment went by when did not draw enormous strength from this friendship.

Although the place where we were located, Seonyeo Dong, was

not the front line, it often was disturbed by enemy planes and enemy artillery. Life there certainly was not peaceful. Surrounding us were a small number of Korean people (mainly women and children). Under these circumstances, life had to be quite regulated. The war tested them, and they adapted to a "peaceful life" in the midst of war. Their manner of despising the enemy and of not fearing difficulties truly won our admiration. Except for those who were currently involved in important missions, all of these people, young and old, took part in opposing germ warfare. In addition to washing clothes and cooking food for patients in the Volunteer Army hospital, they levelled out bomb craters and plowed the land all night long. During this excellent spring, they quickly planted crops. Seeing them completely self-composed like that, you could not feel that you were in a country burning everywhere with the fires of war. The women and girls often gathered some Jindalai flowers and gave them as gifts to the officers and men. It was often the case that, after levelling an area and planting paddy, the paddy would grow to a good height, but then at some point an artillery barrage by the aggressors or fire from a sky pirate would cause the green field to lose its vitality. The enemy would bomb the fields, and the women would continue levelling the soil and would once again plant paddy sprouts, revealing a great and fearless revolutionary spirit and a formidable resolve. They said that they were not doing it for the little bit of food. They just wanted the invaders to know that the Koreans cannot be oppressed and cannot be defeated. Korea belongs to the Korean people.

After spring came and went, there really were sturdy bunches of paddy growing up in the area surrounding Seonyeo Dong. I think that these emerald-green crops and colorful Jindalai are just like the indomitable character of the Korean people and Korean race.

In the summer of 1952, I was given a new job. On July 11th, the Army Committee ordered me to serve as the 2nd Vice Commander of the Volunteer Army. At the time, Commander in Chief Peng was

not in Korea, and 1st Vice Commander Deng Hua and Chief of Staff Jie Fang were concentrating their energies on the negotiations in Kaicheng. As for the other three vice commanders of the Volunteer Army, Comrade Hong Xuezhi was still at the site of the logistical headquarters in Chengchuanli; Comrade Song Shilun had been transferred back to China to serve as headmaster of a high level infantry school of the Military Commission; Comrade Wei Xianchu went to replace me at the 19th Group Army. Under these circumstances, I deeply felt the heavy responsibility I had. Fortunately, we could at any time ask Commander in Chief Peng for instructions concerning some large problems. Comrade Hong Xuezhi had been fighting on the front line ever since the first shots were fired in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea. The responsible comrades of the Volunteer Army's headquarters, logistical department, and political department, led and organized by Commander in Chief Peng himself, and the comrades of the offices were all very experienced. By relying on the leadership of these comrades and by relying on the leadership of the Central Committee and Commander in Chief Peng, I came to believe that I would be able to do my work.

At the same time that I received my orders, the Vice-Commander of the 19th Group Army, Comrade Zheng Weishan was ordered to serve as Acting Commander of the 20th Group Army. All these changes happened quite suddenly.

Although Comrade Zheng Weishan and I had not known each other long, we had, from the start of the War to Liberate the Fatherland to 1952, fought on the same battlefield and in the same army for six or seven years. This comrade had been born into a poor family. His mother, father, and elder sister had all been either killed by the reactionaries. From early on, he was a fierce general in the Four Directions Army. After the Four Directions Army smashed the enemy's six paths encircling attack, he participated in all the major battles. Before he began working for the 19th Group Army, he almost never had served in the

capacity of a deputy. This comrade's greatest characteristic was that he was straightforward and principled. Of course, his temper was sometimes somewhat violent. He often said that his own mouth lacked a "sentry" and that his stomach could not hold three sentences. Although this was not an exaggeration, he solved problems right away, his strict behavior towards himself and towards others was well known to all.

Weishan left the group army on July 17th. I, together with the comrades from the office, accompanied him on his jeep. That first night, we talked until very late. Of course, the topic did not depart from war or wander from the armistice negotiations. Nor did we stop talking about building up the army. I asked him what suggestions and hopes he had for me. Laughing, he said, "You know me. From Puchaji to Pingjin, Taiyuan, Lanzhou, to Ningxia, my suggestions have gone the way of artillery shells. As for hopes, there's just one. I hope that under your leadership more good battles will be fought. Other than that, I've got nothing to say." His speech was sincere and clear. These were his characteristics.

After we had seen Weishan off, I, too, prepared to leave the group army. From the autumn of 1947 to my appointment as Commander of the Puchaji Field Army to the conversion of the field army into a group army, I had worked here for more than five years. I had lived together with some of the leaders of the group army and with comrades from the offices day and night. We had fought shoulder to shoulder. From Qingfengdian to Xinbaoan, from the battles of Taiyuan to the battles of Lanzhou to the liberation of Ningxia and our entry into Korea from China, we had shared the joys of victory, and, together, we had borne the frustrations of setbacks. But it not matter when--we all communicated our feelings to each other. In our work, we all trust and rely on each other, and we all support each other. Having served as an important commander in the group army, I am extremely grateful to the comrades. I recall this unit with much nostalgia. After

surrendering my position, I visited extra units as much as possible. I often went to see our troops, and I saw them again and again; I would visit our officers and men.

The comrades, too, did not wish to see me go. Some comrades carried on a long discussion with me throughout the night. A few of them shed tears. I will forever cherish this kind of sincere affection and sincere friendship which one among war buddies. Comrade Zhimin stated that the group army office was holding a gathering to see me off. Although I politely refused several times, it had already been arranged. The big gathering that day did not only include the group army office and cadres of directly subordinate units from the platoon level on up. Zhimin had also invited several responsible comrades from the armies, and he also especially organized the comrades of the folk art groups of the 40th and 39th Armies (which had just been placed under the command of the group army) to put on an excellent show. Zhimin gave a speech. Several responsible comrades from the armies also gave speeches. Their speeches were pure, unadorned and short, but the meaning was sincerely affectionate. I was greatly moved.

Parts of my speech had been prepared. Since I had been working for this unit for a long time, I was very familiar with the situation. That I did not say some things makes me feel that I wronged everyone. It was not right. These six hopes were what I had come to understand, one might say, after many years of work in the 19th Group Army. They were also my thought with reference to the current mission and situation.

First: I hope that party committee member at all levels will further strengthen their ideological leadership, strengthen political education among the troops, strengthen political theory study, and strengthen self-cultivation of ideological consciousness. You must consolidate an ideology of long-term combat, and you must continue to extol the militant spirit of arduous struggle and heroic resistance.

Second: Among the most precious strengths of this unit, the 19th Group Army, are that your combat attitude is one of bravery and resolve, that you do not fear hardship, and that you do not bow your heads or complain of hardship under any circumstances. At the same time, there exists a serious flaw, which is that your tactical level is low. The main reason for this is that some of you stick too closely to conventions, think too conservatively, and do not clearly recognize the tremendous significance of improved tactics in adapting to modern warfare. I have mentioned political work and various other kinds of work. All of these must be effectively coordinate with and guarantee the raising of the troops tactical level.

Third: I hope that the discipline education of the units will be strengthened. There must be strong military discipline, and there must be strong political discipline. Iron discipline is one of the most important signs of the revolutionary army's combat strength.

Four: I hope that management of the armies can be strengthened and army management methods are improved. Cadres at all levels must lovingly protect their men. If the men should have something, they should be given 100% of it.

Five: I spoke of my hopes for office work. I hope that the offices will overcome bureaucratism and will provide the troops with concrete and practical guidance and help. Work efficiency must be improved.

Finally, I hope that, under the leadership of the group army party committee, all the officers and men become even more unified and even more resolved to struggle.

The meeting that day went very well.

I left the 19th Group Army on August 8th. On the first night, Comrade Zhimin and his wife, Liu Ping, organized a small "family banquet" for Shen Huajun and me. The four of us had basically never separated since 1946, when we worked together in the Puchaji Second Column. When we left China to fight this war, we made a decision. After Liu Ping and Shen Huajun found a place of their children, they, too, came to Korea in the early part of the year. The adults fought the war shoulder to shoulder, and the children, too, were exceptionally close. Arranged from oldest to youngest, they were: Yang Huarong, Li Xinsheng, Yang Baihua, Li Xinxing, Yang Qiuhua, and Li Jingsheng. There was also the recently born Yang Jinghua. They addressed each other like blood brothers and sisters, and continually sent letters to us at the front, which were addressed to us as a group: "Mamas and Papas". To this very day, the relationship between our two families is very tight.

During the "family banquet", the on-duty staff member called me over to receive a telephone call. The person who was calling was Comrade Song Shilun. His first sentence was: "Are you coming or not? Is there really a goddess which you have fallen in love with at Seonyeo Dong?" [Translator's Note: Seonyeo Dong means "Goddess Cave".]

I laughed, "There are no goddesses. But there's a band of 'gods' who are causing me to hesitate!" He said, "Tomorrow there will be a car going back to China. I will have to leave. Back in China, they are urging to make a report!" We said farewell on the phone, and wished each other pleasant journeys. We made a few jokes. It was often this way during the war years. Everyone was used to it.

Comrade Song Shilun was one of the comrades who participated in the Long March. He had abundant experience with respect to army work. As for his departure, I still miss him very much.

At that time, the location of the "Volunteer Command" was Guicangli. The commander's office was located in an abandoned gold mine. This was an ideal underground fortification. After undergoing Commander in Chief Peng's painstaking attentions, it had already become a rather complete underground military camp.

I stayed in a camouflaged cave halfway up a hill. There were two rooms, one inside and the other outside. There was also a corridor, a toilet, and a tunnel which penetrated right through the hill. To the left were the quarters of Commander in Chief Peng. To the left was the vice commander for Korea in the Sino-Korean army, Comrade Cui Yongjian. Hong Xuezhi, who was both a vice commander and logistical commander for the Volunteer Army, lived approximately 2,500 meters away in Chengchuanli.

Before arriving at "Volunteer Command", I was told on the phone by Commander in Chief Peng that I would be mainly responsible for combat work. After I arrived at "Volunteer Command", Deputy Chief of Staff, Wang Zhengzhu, and Deputy Director of the Office, Yang Fengan, introduced me to the situation. I met Comrade Wang Zhengzhu after the liberation of Taiyuan. At that time, the 19th Group Army was incorporated by the 1st Field Army. He was a deputy chief of staff for the 1st Field Army. I remember that, at the time of the Lanzhou campaign, he went over to me and transmitted Commander in Chief Peng's instructions. He is a Red Army Comrade who participated in the Long March. He was a "scholar" who had succeeded by studying on his own while in the army. He and Comrade Yang Fengan, one should say, were old acquaintances. Before he came to "Field Command", he was a member of the operations staff of our group army's operations section. When the group army was put under the command of the 1st Field Army, he was selected to work at Commander in Chief Peng's side. This comrade was more than 1.8 meters tall and could be said to have a tiger's back and a bear's waist, like a basketball player. Yet he was very meticulous in his work.

The first step I took upon arriving at "Volunteer Command" was to assign myself the mission of getting to know the situation. of mastering the situation, and of adapting to the requirements of the new work. During this time, Deng Hua, Hong Xuezi, Gan Qiuqi, Jie Fang, Acting Chief of Staff Zhang Wenzhou, and other comrades all gave me a lot of help.

At "Volunteer Command", the comrades again and again told me the story of Chairman Mao's eldest son, Mao Anying.

The twenty-eight year old Mao Anying was martyred on the Korean battlefield. I knew of this before leaving China. But to once again hear the comrades speak of the events of his martyrdom here, where Mao Anying had lived and fought, gave me a very different feeling from what I had while in China.

I heard about Mao Anying's experience while I was in Yanan. When he was very young, he and his mother, Yang Kaihui, both spent time in prison. After his mother was martyred, the party spent several frustrating weeks before they finally found him. He was studying in the Soviet Union. Moreover, he had participated in the Great Anti-Fascist War. That, upon returning to Yanan, he became a farmer and regarded the farmers as his teachers became well known in Yanan and throughout the country. He applied on his own and competed on his own to serve in the Volunteer Army. He was in the first group to enter Korea. He did outstanding work working at Commander in Chief Peng's side. But he was in Korea for only two months. He was killed by U.S. imperialist bombs in the area of the Volunteer Command Headquarters. Mao Anying was a common soldier in the Volunteer Army as well as the son of the great leader of the Chinese People, Chairman Mao. Commander in Chief Peng told me that when he reported the details of Mao Anying's martyrdom to Chairman Mao, Chairman Mao was very sad. But Chairman Mao told Commander in Chief Peng, "In battles, there are always those who will die. In order to oppose aggression and for the sake of world peace and international Communism, the

Chinese people's Volunteer Army has already martyred many outstanding soldiers. Anying is one of them. He is the Party Chairman's son, but he is above all a soldier like all the rest." Afterwards, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung suggested that Mao Anying's remains be transported back to China for burial. Chairman Mao said, "Anying is also a soldier of the Volunteer Army. Let him be together with his martyred comrades of the Volunteer Army." Anying together with the other Volunteer Army comrades resting in peace in Korean soil symbolize the militant friendship, cemented with fresh blood, between the two parties, two nations, and two peoples of China and Korea.

Not long after I arrived at "Volunteer Command", I led Volunteer Command delegation to Pyongyang in response to the invitation of the Prime Minister of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, Kim Il Sung. We were to participate in a large gathering to celebrate the second anniversary of the Chinese people's Volunteer Army's coming to fight in Korea.

On October 22nd, we arrived in Pyongyang.

Also responding to the invitation at that time were the representatives of the second Chinese people's appreciation group to go to Korea. The chief of this appreciation group was Liu Jingfan. The deputy chiefs of the group were Chen Yi, Li Mingbin, Hu Juewen, and Zhou Qinchou.

Pyongyang is the capital of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. It is a city with an ancient history. Korea is a mountainous country, yet Pyongyang is situated on a vast plain. This plain was formed by the flow of the Taedong River. It is said that Pyongyang gets its name from this. Pyongyang is Korea's political, military, economic, and cultural center. It is a place filled with historic interest and scenic beauty. But when we went there, it was one flat expanse of land, with hardly a house standing on the surface. Everywhere a scene of devastation met

the eye. Ruins were everywhere. Nevertheless, Pyongyang was busy and bustling. This was a city at war, a heroic city. Men and women, old and young, and comrades from the people's army all collected rubble and levelled the streets every night. It was a scene of industry and enthusiasm.

The Korean government and the Korean People's Army gave us a warm and solemn welcome. In those years the sound of guns were forever in one's ears. Yet they organized a group of young people and children to give us flowers and to dance for us. The chief of staff for the People's Army, Jin Guangxia, the head of the Central Political Office, Cui Zongxue, and other comrades took us to Mudanfeng.

Mokdanbeng is a famous scenic area on the bank of the Taedong River in Pyongyang. Because the hilly land undulates like a fully opened peony, it got its name, "Peony Peak". Because the scenery is so beautiful, in ancient times it was referred to as "The Embroidered Mountain". It also was praised as the "First River Mountain under Heaven". On the peak, there is an ancient pavilion. It is known as Yimitai. If one climbs up to the pavilion and gazes out, one's eyes will take in distant mountains and nearby rivers, especially the Taedong River. Like a white banner, its silver waves billowing, it flutters and slowly reaches out to the edge of heaven. It made one's heart carefree and happy.

The arrangements were for us to be in an underground guesthouse. Only when we went down there did we know there was an enormous-looking underground city. The Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party, the Korean Government, the Supreme Headquarters of the People's Army, and other central decision-making offices were all located here. There were also a few schools and some residential areas.

On the day on which the Volunteer Army delegation arrived,

the Prime Minister of the Cabinet of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung hurried over to see us. When Prime Minister Kim came, everyone was very excited.

This was the first time that I saw Comrade Kim Il Sung. At that time, he was only forty years old. He had an imposing physique, and his face beamed. He grasped my hand tightly and, in fluent Chinese, said, "General Yang, we are not at all strangers. We have been on familiar terms since long ago!" I was somewhat surprised. He laughed and, grasping my hand with his right hand and patting it with his left hand, said, "The 1st Regiment in the Red Army during the Long March, Yang Luogeng's Group Army on the battlefields of liberation. . . . "

That was true. Comrade Kim Il Sung was familiar with our army and with our nation. Similarly, we knew about this great leader of the Korean people. In the past, there had been the sweat and blood of Korean comrades on Chinese soil. Now, the sweat and blood of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army was on Korea soil. Our friendship had been cemented with fresh blood.

Comrade Kim Il Sung's warmth, frankness, and affability soon had everyone engaged in small talk as though we were relatives who were getting together after a long separation.

On the 24th, in the auditorium under Mudanfeng, the conference to commemorate the second anniversary of the departure from China of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to fight in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea was under way. The head of the Korean People's Army's Central Political Bureau spoke with all of us during the conference.

On the 25th, again in the same auditorium, Kim Il Sung hosted a large banquet, in which representatives from seven nations participated, to welcome the Volunteer Army delegation and the Chinese people's appreciation delegation. He also gave an

important speech. Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed high praise for the friendship between the Chinese and Korean nations and for the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. He said, ". . . in the past, under the long-term control of Japanese imperialism, the Korean people lost their fatherland. In Northeast China and in Shanhaiguan, we stood together along a common battle line and carried out the struggle to resist Japan. We received every kind of help and protection from the Chinese people. Now, we, the Korean people are in the midst of the most arduous period of the War to Liberate the Fatherland, and the Chinese Communist Party has sent its own outstanding sons and daughters to come and help us. The brave soldiers of the heroic Chinese People's Volunteer Army love Korea intensely, as though they were loving their own fatherland. Together with the Korean People's Army, they are protecting the cities and villages of Korea with fresh blood. In order to lessen the misfortune and suffering of the Korean people and for the sake of their happy and blessed future, they exhaust all of their own strength and strong feelings, no matter what the hardship or sacrifice. The Chinese People's Volunteer Army, in supporting the Korean people's struggle for glorious victory and in protecting the long-term peace of the Orient, is making a tremendous sacrifice. . . . "

He led the toasts: for the health of the great leader of the Chinese people, Chairman Mao Zedong, a toast; for the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, a toast; for unity between the peoples of China and Korea, a toast.

Then I gave a speech. I, representing all the officers and men of the Volunteer Army, expressed my heartfelt gratitude to Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung, to the heroic Korean people, and to the great Korean people. . . .

This was an international diplomatic banquet. But the gratitude to the Korean people and to Comrade Kim Il Sung which I expressed in my speech absolutely was not diplomatic language. My

speech came from the bottom of my heart. It represented the common feelings of all the officers and men of the Volunteer Army and of all the Chinese people as well. I remember that after the fighting stopped, our Supreme Commander Chen Yi visited Korea. During a Volunteer Army meeting, he said these words: "Was it we who helped the Korean people more, or was it in fact the Korean people who helped us more? One should say that the Korean people helped us more. If there had been no Korean people to fight at our sides and no Korean people to make such tremendous sacrifices, we could no possibly have a peaceful environment like this. It would not be possible for this day to exist. The ones who should be thanked are not ourselves, but the Korean people. We should thank the Korean people!"

Yes. We should thank the Korean people.

After three or four years of personal experience in Korea, after seeing with my eyes and hearing with my ears, I became deeply aware that the Korean people deserve to be called a heroic race. They are strong, brave, industrious, and kind. They possess a very strong sense of national honor. They love their own fatherland to an incomparable extent.

You could say that all of Korea was fighting the aggressors on the Korean battlefield. From old persons sixty or seventy years old to children who were just beginning to understand what was going on, from the privates on the front line drenched with the blood of fierce battle to the masses in the rear support areas who had no home to return to, all had one longing: to drive away the invader. All had a single activity: they all acted for the sake of the front line.

In Korea, especially in the villages of Northern Korea, plowing had, since ancient times, been the work of men. Moreover, only men who had the experience of farming for many years could do this work. However, after the war broke out, all the men went to

the front line. The rear had to produce; it had to support the front line. So the women began plowing. At first, the plow would not do what the women wanted it to do. It moved back and forth, causing them to fall this way and that. They would fall onto the ground and get up and begin plowing again. If they scratched or wounded themselves, they would grab a handful of dirt, rub it over the wound, and continue to work. Some fell so much that their legs were black and blue, and their arms were swollen. Yet they would not let go of the plow. They finally tamed the plows. During the 1952 spring plowing alone, several tens of thousands of women came out to plow in Northern Korea.

In order to protect themselves from bombing raids by enemy planes, the farmers from Hamgyeong Nam Do, Gongweon Do, and Pyeongan Nam Do dug more than 282,000 foxholes in the ground. When the enemy planes came to bomb, they would hide in the foxholes. When the planes left, they would work as usual. During the harvesting and threshing season, they would insist on working on moonlit nights. The farmers of Younggang Li in Gyeongsung Gun of Hamgyeong Bug Do removed 390 mines from a large field where they had been dropped by enemy planes and completed their crop planting task on time. The farmers of Tongcheon in Jianyuan [transliteration] Do organized an armed planting team. In three successive intense battles with small forces of U.S. pirates attempting to land, they killed, wounded, or captured 137 enemy soldiers, and they provided protection which allowed the farmers to complete their plantings. They were all acting for the sake of supporting the people's armies of China and Korea!

The Korean workers, too, continued their day's work into the night. After the men went to the front, their wives, daughters, sisters, and even mothers took their places working. No matter what, the machines had to keep on operating. Korean Comrades told me about the extraordinary affair of Kim Chunxi. After her husband, who was a pneumatic drill operator, went to the front, she went to the quarry and got her husband's pneumatic drill. To

master a pneumatic drill requires both technique and strength. You can imagine how difficult it was for a young woman. However, she did not give up. Though her hands and chest were injured, she continued to work as she was trained to. When she succeeded in learning to use the pneumatic drill, she gleefully shouted, "I can also master weapons to kill the enemy!" The amount of ore that she collected in one day was 25% more than what the male pneumatic drill operators collected. She did this for the sake of supporting the people's armies of China and Korea.

Korean patriots organized guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. They destroyed enemy communication equipment, raided enemy command posts, and ambushed trains used by the enemy army and enemy truck transport teams. Not long after we arrived in Korea, we heard that the guerrilla units included a female soldier, Zhao Yuji, whose deeds will never fade away. She is the number one female hero of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. Before the war broke out, she was head of the Women's League Committee in Byeogsung Gun. After the enemy invaded and occupied Byeogsung Gun, Zhao Yuji, in accordance with the party's instructions, organized a guerrilla unit and operated in the Enpa San area. Thus, it became known as the "Enpa San Guerrilla Unit". She led the Enpasan guerrilla unit like our plains guerrilla units or our railroad guerrilla units earlier. They came and went like a shadow; news of them caused terror in the hearts of the enemy. During one battle, she unfortunately fell into the diabolical hands of the enemy. Like the Red Maiden of the Soviet Union, like Zhao, Man, and Yang of China, though subjected to severe torture, she remained strong and would not yield. In the name of justice, she shouted loudly: "My beautiful fatherland, I wish you eternal glory!" Our soldiers called her the "Korean Liu Hulan". Their heroic acts also were done for the sake of supporting the people's armies of Korea and China.

Old people and children also leaped at the chance to participate in the struggle to resist the invasion. An eleven

year old child carried large artillery shells on his shoulders, and he followed the army for eight days. A thirteen year old child, driving a livestock truck, travelled with the army for more than ten days. The People's Army wanted them to return, but they insisted on accompanying the soldiers to the objective. We often saw old women who were graying at the temples and yet were carrying large jugs on their heads. They would bring their rice, which they hated to part with, and give it to the People's Army. A sixty-two year old man from Huizhou brought his three sons and one daughter to the front line. . . . Their arduous labor was also done for the sake of the people's armies of Korea and China!

The war's destruction brought hardship to the Korean people which is hard to imagine.

They chose to eat wild greens and drink thin gruel so that they could save provisions to send to the front line. During the struggle to smash the enemy's summer offensive, many comrade's chow mein bags became empty. Famine was a serious threat to the commanders of the Volunteer Army. A Korean mother heard of this. Carrying more than fifteen kilograms of provisions, which is all she had, on her head, she walked about fifteen miles to give them to our army. When she was just about to arrive at the front lines, she was unfortunately shot by an enemy plane and was severely injured. When our soldiers ran over to her side, she, lying in a pool of blood and pulling a soldier's hand, said, "The rice, the rice, quick, take it. . ." Before she had finished what she wanted to say, her eyes shut. . . .

The great Korean mother, An Yuji, in order to save a Volunteer Army reconnaissance scout who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, sacrificed her own life and became known by the Volunteer Army as "Mother Korea".

The Korean people treated our Volunteer Army like flesh and blood, like brothers. If our soldiers had headaches, the Korean

"mamas", "aunts", or "misses" would stay beside them day and night, taking meticulous care of them. As for our wounded, they were even more thorough and painstaking. It was deeply moving. Almost every time there was a battle, the Korean people organized stretcher teams to go with us. So that our wounded would not be bumped around, they set the stretchers on their heads when they crossed rivers or climbed mountains. So that our wounded would not be frozen, they covered them with their own clothes. For the sake of the lives of our wounded men, they eagerly donated their own blood. When they encountered enemy bombing, they did not hesitate to lie on top of our wounded men. . . . What is this spirit? This is the spirit of internationalism; this is the spirit of Communism; this is the love of the world's greatest comrades. We relied on a pure and just love, which was mutual and completely comradely, to defeat the common enemy and attain victory in the war. Our Supreme Commander He Long had earlier said something like this: "The heroic struggle of the Korean people does not only guarantee the independence and freedom of their fatherland. At the same time, it protects the security of China. If we are not victorious on the Korean battlefield, if we do not drive the enemy to near the 38th parallel and stabilize the war, then it will not be possible to think that our fatherland can peacefully carry out large-scale construction. The help which the Korean people are supplying to the Chinese people is tremendous. Their offering to peace in the Far East and the world is also tremendous. . . . that the Chinese people have heroic neighbors like this is our pride and glory."

Standing on Greatest Victory Terrace at the highest point on Mokdan Bong, gazing over the entire city of Pyongyang, gazing over the turbulent and rushing Taedong River, I sense even more strongly the greatness of the Korean race, the greatness of the Korean people--I sense even more strongly that the friendship between the Korean and Chinese peoples is like the waters of the Taedong River, flowing on and on. . . .

Chapter 7. Victory in Autumn

Historically, there are some matters which contain a fortuitous element, which might be called coincidence. But they are not completely like this. During the two months before the Military Commission ordered me to work at "Volunteer Command", in May of 1952, the highest level commanders in the U.S. Army, which was invading Korea, were also given new posts. Ridgeway, who had served as Supreme Commander of the "United Nations Army" for a little more than one year, left. There were rumors which said he was going to take over Eisenhower's job and become the Supreme Commander of the N.A.T.O. Armed Forces. The man who replaced him was another U.S. general, named Mark Clark. We knew something about Clark already. What left me with a rather deep impression was that in February of 1951, in the capacity of a U.S. Army field unit drill commander, he led a group of military specialists to the Korean battlefields to perform an on-the-spot investigation, using new recruits trained in the U.S. It was said that he was a life-long friend of MacArthur's. When his father, Charlie Clark, was a major, MacArthur was an engineer first lieutenant. He would often go to his house to spend the holidays. His relationship with Ridgeway was very similar. In addition to being classmates at West Point together, they maintained a close relationship throughout their contemporaneous army careers. We were certain that, with respect to implementing the basic policy of the American government, he would not be to any extent different from his predecessors. We had to consider, in facing such an opponent,

what we should do and how to do it.

Not long after I arrived at "Volunteer Command", Comrade Jie Fang returned from Panmunjeom, where the armistice negotiations were taking place on the front line, and stayed a few days. Deng Hua, Gan Qiuqi, Zhang Wenzhou, Du Ping, myself, and other comrades together listened to his report on the circumstances of the negotiations.

In the past, I had never worked together with Comrade Jie Fang. But I knew something about his situation, especially since, after entering Korea, Commander in Chief Peng told me quite a bit. I knew that the demands which Commander in Chief Peng placed on the cadres was quite strict. To be able to serve as his chief of staff and to keep him satisfied naturally was not easy. Yet Jie Fang did it. A comrade told me that Commander in Chief Peng, in studying combat problems, often said, "Ask Prince Ge Liang to come in for a talk!" By "Prince Ge Liang" he was referring to Jie Fang. Among the military commanders of our unit, Jie Fang was a very special person. He could communicate in two foreign languages, English and Japanese. In 1938, when he was twenty-three years old, he was entrusted by the mayor of Tianjin, Zhang Xueming (the younger brother of Zhang Xueliang) with the mission of negotiating with the Japanese. He was successful. After joining the army, he worked as a staff member and served in no other capacities. He served as the chief of staff for a rather long period of time. He had a strong physique and an exuberant spirit, and people remembered him as being a comrade who was out of the ordinary.

He reported the unreasonable demands of the Americans in the negotiations, and he reported the ruthless oppression and bloody massacres by the Americans of captured soldiers of the Sino-Korean army. Of course, he analyzed possible military actions which could be taken while the unreasonable requests of the Americans remained unattainable. After I arrived at "Volunteer Command",

these problems were often pondered.

Honestly, the tactic which Chairman Mao set for us, "Pieces of Sticky Candy", had already been proven brilliant by many victories. When employed, it was effective. However, "Whenever the laws of weapons are applied, there is no condition of regularity for host and guest, and there is no regular form to fighting and defending." The international situation was changing, and the domestic situation was changing. It was not possible that these facts would not be reflected at the Korean battlefield peace talks table. Although it was not possible that there could be a basic change in nature between Clark and his predecessors, yet he had his own unique characteristics. "When a new official takes over, he has three handfuls of fire" is a Chinese saying. Clark did not necessarily know it, but he would certainly deal with matters in accordance with this Chinese saying which he did not know.

"In every matter, preparation will bring success; lack of preparation will bring failure." It is better "dig a canal and construct a dam" at an early stage than to have "the water come and cover everything".

After Jie Fang returned to Panmunjeom, I expressed my ideas separately to Acting Chief of Staff Zhang Wenzhou and Deputy Chief of Staff, Wang Zhengdu, and I asked them to discuss these problems more often with the comrades of the administrative office and the operations office.

When Commander in Chief Peng was at "Volunteer Command", the office at headquarters was also his operations study room. In

addition to being responsible for confidential telegrams and documents, he was responsible for guaranteeing that he himself studied operations. Commander in Chief Peng liked to allow the comrades in the office present him with information, while he himself would stand before a map, meditating and devising strategies. After he came up with a plan, he would hand it over to the operations office for discussion, where it would be revised. Finally, it would be transmitted to him, and he would examine and approve it.

The method which I usually employed was to carefully read and study documents and telegrams before the battle, analyze the enemy situation, repeatedly ponder the facts, acquaint myself with the situation, memorize the situation, form an embryonic scheme in my mind, and once again listen to the opinions of the comrades in the operations office or of other comrades in the surrounding areas. I also might have everyone discuss it together, select the best ideas from the group, and blend them together with my own thoughts. I would choose the best and patch up weak areas, form a plan, and once again offer it to general discussion. Finally, I would make up my mind.

The methods differed, but the objectives were the same. Lucky for my "dumb birds must start flying early" method, I was able to get help from the surrounding comrades.

At "Volunteer Command", my work locations were mostly located, in addition to my living quarters, in the operations room at headquarters. During this time, the headquarters had already moved out of the gold mine. Next to the gold mine, a bow-shaped tunnel (if bent a little more, it would look like a horse shoe) was constructed. All the offices and rooms, including the head office, were located on the spine of the "bow". On the bow string, we had a wood house put up. It had four large windows in front and in back, which were fitted with glass. This was the operations room at headquarters. In the middle of it, there stood

a rectangular table like a ping-pong table. Surrounding the table, there were also work desks for communication and confidential personnel. The chief of staff, the head of the operations office, myself, and other relevant comrades sat around the table. Everyone looked at telegrams, telegrams on the enemy situation, and other relevant materials. If there was a new situation, we would immediately study it. If there were problems I had to understand, I would always ask them. When it was time for me to give the verdict, I could make my decision right away. These days, certain offices send people off to travel on leisurely official trips, but in those days it was different. War does not permit one to wander around.

One day, I had just come into the operations room and had sat down when Wang Zhengzhu brought me a telegram on the enemy situation. It was just one sentence: "The enemy perhaps will carry out new actions."

The report synthesized intelligence on the enemy gathered from August onwards.

On the 12th, Clark, Fanfolite [transliteration], the commanders of the 1st, 9th, and 10th Armies, and the head of the operations office at Far East Command suddenly lowered inspections of the U.S. 7th Division's region. On the 15th, the U.S. air landed the 187th Regiment forward from Juji Island, augmenting the defensive support for the 7th Division. On the 17th, Clark announced that, beginning on that very day, all the units on the Korean battlefields would be prohibited from declaring their designations. On the 20th, Fanfolite [transliteration], on the night before he was to accompany Ridgeway on his return trip, went to the Gaesong region to inspect a puppet 9th Division. The day before, each ship in the navy was given large resupplies of ammunition. As for the U.S. 1st Division, transportation was very busy from the 9th to the 22nd. Trucks made as many as or more than 800 round trips in a day. The U.S. aircraft carriers

"Qinshi", "Dujiao", and "Xixili" [Translator's Note: All are transliterations into Pinyin.] separately cruised to the eastern and western coasts. . . . Special agents of the puppet army were given orders to intensify collection of intelligence on the Chinese areas of Yeon-An and Baecheon and to recognize "the importance of the overall current political situation". Also, according to confessions from prisoners, the reason why the enemy was delaying armistice negotiations was that he was seeking to capture Kaifengjun and Yanbojun. . . .

Beginning with the end of August, a strange and deep silence settled over the front line. There was again and again hidden in tranquility--this was the experience of many years. I made the staff send the report on the enemy situation to Acting Commander Deng Hua, Vice Commander of "United Command" Chao Fang, Deputy Commissar Gan Qiuqi, and other relevant persons and departments. I also reported the enemy situation to all the armies. At the same time that I, in my capacity at "Volunteer Command", was sending down to each unit "Instructions Concerning Current Changes in the Enemy Situation Which Demand Our Strict Attention" (A Complete Survey of the Enemy Situation), it seemed that the enemy was considering an even larger modification. It was still hard to predict whether his aim was to execute a coastal landing or whether he was planning a partial offensive with rotating units. Therefore, each unit, in paying strict attention to developments and modifications of enemy forces on the front, quickly implemented the deployment of reconnaissance teams and made use of combat actions to capture enemy soldiers. The 68th and 15th Armies, in particular, immediately organized reconnaissance actions to learn the facts on deployments in the U.S. 1st and 7th Divisions. The "West Sea Finger" increased implementation of coastal defense observation work. In every location, immediately after any sign of enemy activity appeared, it was absolutely necessary that a report be made to higher levels.

What action, after all, was the enemy planning to take? Deng

Hua and I concluded that, within two days, "United Command" commander should hold a meeting to analyze intelligence on the enemy. We also indicated that the intelligence office should intensify collection of information and immediately make a report of it. At the same time, I also sank into deep, deep thought.

During this time, the units had already carried out the new command relationships, namely: in designating command areas, they disregarded the set limits of the group armies, instead taking into account troop strengths, terrain, and needs. Thus, each group army controlled the mobile forces of one or two armies. They could smoothly respond to every kind of situation.

Our army spent spring and summer in struggles to consolidate our positions. During this time, the entire battle line stretched 230 kilometers across the Korean peninsula. It had already become a tunnel-centered strong point defensive system with a depth of from twenty to thirty kilometers. Moreover, in the third defensive belt, core fortifications were established in the key areas. And we were beginning to construct tunnel fortifications reaching up to the front in key regions from coast to coast, regardless of whether the terrain was rough or even. We were also starting to build reinforced concrete defensive fortifications, which we planned to complete by the end of November. Thus, our army's entire defensive system not only was more consolidated than it had been, but was also better and more complete. Added to this was the fact that communications, transportation, and materials supply were all vastly improved, thereby further augmenting the defensive fighting capability of our army.

During this time, our men were right then carrying out anti-germ warfare on a grand and spectacular scale and were also conducting sniping actions with rifle snipers and "artillery snipers". Morale was high; spirits were roused and inspired. People need the encouragement of success. Armies need victories to provide strength. A victory in small-scale positional attack

and defend combat causes the officers and men to have an even more definite faith in the inevitability of victory. It also causes them to glow with the knowledge of this inevitable victory. Life in the tunnels was dull and dry, yet our men made it an enriching experience. With their own hands, they wrote various kinds of stories and made various kinds of devices. For example, for two-stringed instruments, the sound boxes were made by covering cans with snake skin or frog skin. The shafts were sticks from Chinese little leaf box trees, and copper threads from electric cords served as the strings. Long horse tails served as the bows. One artillery regiment used more than forty of these two-stringed instruments to organized a band, which was very much like a real band. Some percussion musical instruments were even more interesting. There were some "rod" pianos which were made by arranging into order steel rods of varying thicknesses. There was an "artillery shell launcher zither" made by hanging together various sizes of artillery shell launchers. There were large and small gongs made of fragments of brass and worn-out steel spades. There were small drums made from chow mein boxes. When I went to visit the troops, I would often see our men in the tunnels or in forests organizing various kinds of evening parties. I would hear the strong and martial strains of "The Song of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army":

Ours is a righteous and victorious banner
Representing the hope of the people of the Orient
We are pushing forward the wheel of history
No power can hold us back
Advance
Advance
Glorious Volunteer Army!
Doing battle shoulder to shoulder with the Korean people
Putting out the invader's fire of war
Driving the enemy into the Pacific Ocean
Resist the U.S., aid Korea, defend the nation, protect
our homes.

"Armies are based on soldiers."¹ With high-spirited and vigorous soldiers such as these, who were capable of making something out of nothing and making sweetness out of bitterness and who had such high morale, is there any enemy we cannot defeat? The enemy armies were the opposite. Although they continued to maintain a superiority in technical equipment and had constructed very strong defensive positions, their troop strength was insufficient, and their morale was low. As for the superior firepower of their air forces and artillery forces, these became increasingly useless when confronted with our solid tunnel positions. When they attacked, they repeatedly took a beating. When they defended, they again and again lost both men and ground.

Under these circumstances, we were certain to smash any new enemy plot. Of course, under these circumstances, Clark absolutely could not act rashly. He could not choose any of the attack methods employed in previous missions. Thus we had to pay very close attention. We both had to prevent him from executing a landing from the sea and had to prevent him from launching a frontal attack. We also had to work along both lines, preparing for him on both land and sea.

At a brief meeting of the leaders of "United Command", I spoke in general terms of the aforementioned ideas. Comrade Deng Hua expressed his approval. He said, "Uncle Sam is now riding a tiger and is finding it hard to dismount. If he continues to fight, he will keep on getting thrashings, and the people of the world will berate him. The American people will also berate him. As for not fighting, this is not possible. It's easy to get on stage, but hard to get off of it! Even more important is the fact that his munitions cannot become bread for eating. During this

1 Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, p. 500

presidential election, the Korean problem has become a very important issue. Thus, Eisenhower has no choice but to make public promises. He expressed again and again that he would become president, would personally visit Korea, and would put an end to this war. That is what he said, but I see that it is not so easy. When certain presidents of capitalist countries give speeches, I always have the feeling that I am listening to a snake oil salesman from one of our villages or to the opening remarks to an acrobatics show or to a performer shouting before receiving his money. Clark and Eisenhower are both in the Republican Party. Let's watch Clark and see how he acts."

Deputy Commissar Gan Qiuqi laughed and laughed. Then, with mock seriousness, he said to the vice commander for the Korean side, Cui Yongjian: "So let's hurry up and mobilize the printing presses of our Korean comrades!"

"Huh?" Cui Yongjian was utterly confused. For a moment, I could not make any sense of it either.

Gan Qiuqi said, "So that we can print a great number of safe-conducts!" Everyone broke out laughing. Cui Yongjian said, in fluent Chinese, "Don't worry. I guarantee the supply. I guarantee the supply!"

Comrade Gan Qiuqi's joke had a basis in reality. Almost every one of the "United Nations Army" soldiers we had captured carried on his person the "safe-conducts" and the "documents requesting surrender" which we had printed. On each one, our army's policy on capturing was separately indicated in English, Chinese, and Korean. On the back were written words like these:

Our army commander:

You must receive the surrendered foreign soldier who bears this document with care. Regardless of nationality or

rank, safety of life and property is guaranteed completely. Killing, maltreatment, and verbal abuse are not permitted. Escort safely to the nearest headquarters or political department. We hope that every unit will abide by these rules.

Korean People's Army
United Command
Chinese People's Volunteer Army

Printed on some of them were photographs of "United Nations Army" prisoners living happily in our prisoner barracks.

An old American soldier who had participated in the Second World War and who had been sent to Korea as a replacement after the fifth campaign said, "We were hoping to get safe-conducts. Your safe-conducts were more effective than our 'protective talismans'."

To this day, I remain confused as to whether the "protective talismans" of the officers and men of the U.S. Army were distributed together with their equipment and weapons. I just know that, when we had just entered Korea, nine out of ten captured U.S. soldiers had a bible in their pocket and a hand-written "protective talisman" in their hands. This legend was circulating in the U.S. Army: During the First World War, a private put a bible in his left pocket, with the result that it stopped a bullet and saved his life. After this, the bible became God for the American army. As for the words of the hand-written protective talisman, I do not know whether to laugh or cry. It went something like: ". . . no matter who carries this proof, God will provide him with superhuman strength, so that he need not fear knives, guns, swords, or explosives, nor need he fear bandits and criminals. He will not suffer injury or be captured. Amen!" Countless facts had already smashed this pitiful little comfort. Now, they could only place faith in our safe-conducts. At a

transfer station in the prisoner barracks, an American army captain, holding a safe-conduct in both hands, said, "This is our real god. If Ridgeway does not send planes to bomb us, then there is no safer place on earth than this." Therefore, the "safe-conducts" and "certificates of surrender" which our reconnaissance units and the guerrilla units of the Korean People's Army placed in areas usually haunted by the "United Nations Army" became the "present" which they welcomed most.

After debating many aspects of the situation, we analyzed that the enemy, in order to adapt to certain political needs and to coordinate with the armistice negotiations, possibly would once again launch a major autumn offensive. He would possibly concentrate forces equivalent to two divisions and, in coordination with his air force and navy, carry out landing operations on Yeon-An Penninsula. He would thereby outflank our army on the western lines from our rear and our flank, or he would occupy the Yeon-an and Baecheon areas, thus creating a situation in which Gaeseong would be surrounded and threatened. At the same time, in order to coordinate with his landing operation, the enemy might also launch a frontal offensive to pin us down. The major part of the offensive perhaps would be in the Pyeong-gang region.

Based on the prediction described above, "Volunteer Command" immediately produced "Deployments with Respect to Preventing the Enemy from Landing at the Yeon-An Penninsula". On August 28th, we ordered the Volunteer Army's 19th Group Army to command the 21st Brigade of the Korean People's Army to immediately modify their dispositions and prepare to both resist an enemy landing and protect Gaeseong. We ordered each army on the front to augment reconnaissance and stick to their positions and wait. If the enemy attacked, we had to resolutely respond. We ordered the units on both coasts to complete combat preparations. At the same time, we decided to report to the Military Commission. Our army had a policy of rotating combat. In accordance with the original plan, during the months of September and October, the 13th, 24th,

and 46th Armies entered Korea, replacing the 20th, 27th, and 42nd Armies, which returned to China.

The day after we sent down the orders, we received a report from the 9th Group Army and the 64th Army ("West Sea Finger") concerning their receiving of "United Command's" scheme to defend against enemy landing operations. Every aspect of the scheme had been determined and set, and the dispositions had been carefully formed. In the command post, one could sense a strength which could conquer all, an atmosphere like a bent bow, a hope of victory in one's grasp. One could sense this from the telegrams which gave off an aroma of black ink and from the manner of speech of the commanders of the group armies and the various armies. From the point of view of commanders, this is a kind of enjoyment, a unique enjoyment unattainable by others.

For someone who is a military commander, there are four battlefield situations which might be described as the highest peaks of this kind of enjoyment: The first is when you accurately discern the enemy situation. The second is when your planning or deployments are proved to be accurate by victory and the judgments of your subordinates. The third is when you award the troops subordinate to you with medals, and you stand for so long that your legs become sore. The fourth is when group upon group of prisoners, stretching farther than the eye can see, drop countless weapons at your feet and walk on.

By the early part of September, each of our positions on the front line were like bow strings with the arrows already on them or like swords drawn from their scabbards. Every single matter had been prepared, and we needed only to wait for the enemy to arrive. But this time the enemy did not come. Once again there was a change in the enemy situation. The frequency of activities in the central part of the enemy's front lines had increased. In the Geumhua region, along the front of the defensive zone of the 15th Army of the 3rd Group Army, enemy planes dropped a great

number of smoke bombs to cover enemy transportation. During a week's time, trucks made a total of 1300 round trips, an increase of over 100% from the previous week. According to units which had infiltrated to make observations, more than 1000 active enemy trucks and jeeps were discovered across from the 45th Division of our 15th Army. More than 100 of these vehicles were loaded with fully armed U.S. troops.

After repeated verification, this intelligence made us clearly recognize that the enemy, perhaps deterred by our army's preparation, had abandoned his plan to execute landings to attack our flanks and was going to launch a partial frontal attack. Historically, soldiers have promoted the strategy of "making the first move so as to make oneself strong" and of "attacking the enemy when he is unprepared, thus causing him to miscalculate". One must take the enemy's plan for a partial offensive and nip it in the bud.

Therefore, the leaders of "United Command" immediately formed a resolution and reported to the highest-ranking commanders, Korean and Chinese. On September 10th, a telegram, authorized by Deng Hua, Gan Qiuqi, myself, and the Korean Deputy Commissar was sent to the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party. It went like this: "So as to seize the initiative, we shall forcefully attack the enemy, thereby giving the new replacements even more experience. We plan to carry out continuous tactical counterattacks before the defensive rotations are completed using the 39th, 42nd, and 48th Armies as the major elements. Each will select from three to five targets. They will seek to annihilate part of the enemy army and will seek to inflict heavy casualties during repeated battles with the enemy. The other armies will select one or two targets in addition to providing support. We surmise that in every area where we counterattack, the enemy will put up a fight and perhaps will even retaliate by carrying out partial offensives. This will be of even greater benefit to our efforts to inflict casualties on the

enemy. We plan to conduct the counterattack operations from the 20th of this month to the 20th of October. At the end of October, the defenses will be rotated. Please indicate whether the above is permissible or not so that each army can carry out preparations."

Two days later, we received a brief yet clear and definite return telegram from the Military Commission: "Received your telegram on September 10th. Agree with your defense rotation plan for the three armies at the end of September. Agree with the tactical maneuvers before rotation of defenses."

This quick affirmative response by the Military Commission to our scheme made us leading comrades at "United Command" all very excited. After Deng Hua, Wen Zhou, and myself read the return telegram together, we nearly simultaneously thought of one thing: move immediately! Thus, at 6:00 p.m. on September 12th, just one hour after we received the reply telegram from the Military Commission, we immediately sent down orders to the 12th, 39th, and 68th Armies.

At 23:20 hours on September 14th, "United Command" sent out an order concerning the tactical counterattacks to all armies. The order set the time period for the tactical counterattacks: they would be carried out from September 20th to October 20th. The separate counterattack time periods for each target were to be determined by each army on its own. The armies were to take complete preparation as their operating principle. The order emphasized that this was to be annihilating combat and that in forcefully fighting in front of the positions, the attacks would invariably overcome the enemy and would invariably wipe out the enemy. Immediately after attacking and capturing enemy positions, the armies were to prepare to resist continuous enemy counterassaults. While engaging in repeated battles with the enemy, the enemy was to be wiped out. As soon as the attack suffered a setback, our armies were to rapidly withdraw and not

linger in battle.

Chairman Mao had always supported the idea that we should not fight battles unprepared and that we should not fight battles which were uncertain. This battle which we were going to fight was the first complete front counterattack after the fifth campaign. Therefore, the orders demanded: 1) that the units complete preparations, then fight; hurried attacks were prohibited; 2) that the units carry out repeated reconnaissance. After becoming completely certain about the situation, the units were supposed to set careful and thorough plans and organize coordination between infantry and artillery; tanks were to be used in a fearless manner in coordination with infantry and artillery operations; 3) that pre-battle training and combat drills were to be organized and carried out; in addition, "troop stationing holes" should be dug in the assault launching zones so as to reduce casualties preserve the element of surprise in combat; 4) that troops were to be concentrated; during combat, these troops were to be thrown into the second echelon at the appropriate time as the situation demanded, thereby guaranteeing the counterattack victory. The main requirement was that the soldiers not fight then finish, but fight to win. We wanted the newly assigned Clark to "get to know" the Chinese People's Volunteer Army.

After the order was sent down, we telephoned each group army to gather information on their preparation situations. Because the 39th Army's preparation work was completed ahead of schedule, its counterattack time was also set at an earlier date, to begin on September 18th.

If one unit acts, all the other units will continually follow. Along the positions of our 180 kilometer long front, we selected twenty targets to attack in succession. The enemy, upon seeing our fierce artillery fire and our complete-line maneuvers thought that we were launching a comprehensive offensive. On September 24th, the Supreme Commander of the armies which were

invading Korea, Clark, hurriedly flew to the front lines. He held a meeting with Fanfolite [transliteration] and the commanders of each army to discuss measures to cope with the situation. Moreover, he transferred the U.S. 40th Reserve Division to the front to replace the puppet 8th Division in its defensive mission. He transferred the puppet 1st Reserve Division to the front to replace the U.S. 3rd Division in its defensive mission.

One could see that Clark had lost his cool too early. In fact, the first phase of our counterattack was on a very small scale. One army, making use of one or two regiments, in attacking one target, used only a few platoons or companies. As for our counterattack targets, at the most, we used four companies; at the least, we used one squad. It is just that we made a little extra noise. That's all. "Soldiers hate deceit." This created a psychology of confusion for the enemy. I remember being in the operations room, laughing and saying to Wen Zhou, "It seems that Clark still is very much in need of training!" Zheng Zhu, continuing my line of thought, said, "You can't blame Clark entirely. As far as I know, the number of battles which the U.S. Army fought in World War II is much less than the number of battles we fought in the War of Resistance." Deng Hua said, "Let's forgive this general!"

The first phase of the tactical counterassault ended on October 5th. Each army, in accordance with preset operational plans, had attacked and overrun the enemy positions. The total number of enemy soldiers wounded, killed, or captured was more than 8300. 2000 of them were U.S. soldiers.

Although this phase of the operation did not last long, it certainly provided us with some problems which deserved further consideration and study. First of all, with respect to organization and implementation, we took complete preparation as our principle, and, under the requirements of a unified policy, we continuously launched staggered attacks. In this way, the units

were given full authority to make decisions. This allowed each unit's commander to give full play to his own intelligence, knowledge, commanding skills, and aggressiveness. For example, the 20th Group Army, in order to improve the positions on both sides of the North Seoul River, commanded the 12th and 68th Armies to launch a simultaneous counterattack on the 28th against five neighboring enemy positions. This counterattack had enough force to knock a mountain into the sea and threw the enemy into disarray, so that his head could not care for his tail. After the counterattack, I spoke with Comrade Zheng Weishan about this counterattack. He said, "I initiated combat a full ten days later than the first unit which began fighting. During those ten days, I gained three advantages: 1) With respect to materiel and dispositions, I prepared even more fully. 2) As for the spiritual aspect, the commanders saw the brother units become engaged in combat and win victories. Our whole bodies began to overflow with energy. As soon as the order came, each of us pounced like famished tigers pouncing on a meal. 3) The enemy was paralyzed. When fighting broke out at the other positions, the enemy across from us began to get quite nervous for a while. Then, he saw that we had not stirred, and he relaxed a little. As soon as he relaxed, we struck him like thunder that comes so fast you have no time to cover your ears. Five positions opened fire simultaneously, causing each soldier to try to save himself, like cattle drinking water. Thus, we fought steadily, and we also fought fiercely. As for the result of the fighting, it was a greater than it might otherwise have been.

Secondly, with respect to the employment of troops, if you compared the attack troops with support troops, the attack troops (infantry) comparatively decreased. The support troops (artillery) correspondingly increased. During this counterattack executed by our army, the ratio of our troops strength to theirs was generally 2:1 or 1:1. In attacking the positions of one enemy company, our supporting artillery units on the average should have assembled and employed from eight to ten mountain artillery, field

artillery, howitzer, and mortar companies (forty pieces). Since this did not happen, we did not sufficiently destroy the enemy's solid positions. It was also very difficult to suppress enemy artillery located near the targets.

Thirdly, in combat which was conducted quickly and resolved quickly, we suffered few casualties. The majority of units attacked and captured the enemy's positions within thirty minutes. In these instances, we entirely wiped out or partially wiped out the defending enemy. The ratio of enemy casualties to our own was 4:1 overall.

Fourthly, if the enemy lost, he would inevitably retaliate. Each time we occupied a piece of ground, we would have to fight enemy counterassaults. It was like pulling back and forth on a saw. Only after repeated battles could the occupations be consolidated. For example, after the 68th Army attacked and partially captured Heights 57 and 4, the enemy assembled forces equivalent to six battalions. With the support of eighty-eight planes, eighteen tanks, and many artillery pieces, the enemy launched sixty-five counterassaults. In the course of repulsing the enemy's continual counterassaults, we killed or wounded approximately 3000 enemy soldiers. Only after having done this, were we able to consolidate the captured positions. During the entire phase, we repulsed more than 168 counterassaults by enemy forces ranging from one platoon to one regiment in strength. A large number of enemy soldiers were wounded or killed.

After the first phase of the counterattack, there was no large change in the enemy situation other than Clark's successive transfers of the two divisions. Therefore, we decided to expand the victory and implement the second phase of the tactical counterattack.

A popular saying goes: "Water has no regular shape; armies have no regular form". "Appear, disappear, and change, and the

enemy is unable to make a guess. This is what is called tactics."

In the second phase of the counterattack we made deployments which were different from those of the first phase. The units did not separately launch their own attacks on the basis of their own preparation statuses. This time, they began their maneuvers in unison in accordance with a single, fixed time. If some units had not completed their preparations, they would have to make coordinated feints so as to spread out the enemy's troops and firepower, thereby presenting the enemy with a stronger attack.

At dusk on October 6th, as soon as the audible command was made, seven of our front-line divisions organized forces amounting to one regiment, three companies, twenty-three platoons, and thirty-five squads. Supported by fire from 760 artillery pieces, they launched an attack across an 180 kilometer front simultaneously directed towards twenty-three targets. You could really say that the artillery fire covered the sky, that war cries shook the earth, that the mountains toppled into the sea, and that it was all as powerful as a thunderbolt. This sort of vast and mighty wave and unstoppable force, this exciting and moving spectacle was rarely seen by us during the several years of the Civil War. The soldiers said, "It seemed like the entire Korean Peninsula was shaking under our feet."

The combat was exceptionally intense, and the results of the battle were extremely pleasing. Except for two targets which were not overcome after several attempts, all of the targets (twenty-one) were attacked and captured that night or on the following day. Moreover, the attacking units took advantage of their victory to continue their attack against new targets. At this speed, the units could halt their counterattack on October 22nd and keep to the original plan. They could then switch to regular defenses and, in accordance with the predetermined steps, carry out the rotation of defensive duties, reorganize, and prepare to

resist the enemy's probable retaliation.

We few leading comrades of "Volunteer Command" had a custom. If there was no special situation, we would all eat together. At the dinner table we could discuss the situation, study problems, freely fraternize, and act in a completely unrestrained manner. Some very important matters were discussed and decided here. At noon on the 15th, there were some units which had not yet sent complete reports on the results of their attacks. We comrades were both talking and discussing the enemy situation and our next plan. Everyone felt that we should quickly report information on the battle, as it had developed up to now, to the Military Commission. At the same time, we had to repeatedly remind the units to increase their vigilance and remind them that they could not become numb as a result of their victory. We also had to tell them to rapidly complete preparation work to protect against the cold of winter and to pay special attention to making full preparations to fighting possible enemy retaliations.

Before we left the dining table, the confidential office sent the telegram report of the 15th Army which was defending at O-sung Mountain area.

The report said: In the Sang-gam Liang region, the enemy had continuously mounted two days of air force and artillery fire attacks beginning on the 12th. At 0300 hours on the 14th, the enemy began two hours of fierce artillery preparation. At dawn, 0500 hours, using both U.S. and puppet forces totalling seven battalions, with support from more than 300 pieces of artillery (105 mm or wider), more than thirty tanks, and more than forty aircraft, the enemy launched an attack along six routes towards two of our north mountain positions on Heights 597.9 and 537.7. At the same time as this, U.S. and puppet forces equal to six battalions executed separate diversionary attacks in the directions Height 391, the northwestern mountains of Sang-ga Mountain, Ye-cheon Mountain, and Height 419, all of which were

along the front of the 44th and 29th Divisions. On this day, the enemy, employing forces amounting to from one platoon to one battalion, executed continuous, uninterrupted multi-route, multi-wave assaults on the northern peaks known as Height 597.9 and Height 537.7. In all, the enemy fired more than 300,000 rounds of artillery, and his aircraft dropped more than 500 bombs. Our 135st Regiment, reinforced by two companies, had support amounting to only fifteen mountain, field, and howitzer artillery pieces and twelve 82 mortars when the fighting first broke out. At approximately 1300 hours, our field fortifications were almost entirely destroyed. Many of the men had been killed or wounded. Most of the surface positions had been occupied by the enemy. Our defending units now switched to tunnel operations. At 1900 hours, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's foothold was not secure, we organized a counterattack and once again recovered the positions. The telegram was signed and sent out by Commander Qin Jiwei of the 15th Army and Commissar Gu Jingsheng.

After reading the telegram, I said to Deng Hua, "You should forgive Clark, but he won't forgive you!" Wen Zhou said, "The maneuvers are so quick, and the targets so concentrated. It's clear that Clark must have long premeditated this." "Now, that's not very polite. Accompany him to the door!" said Deng Hua.

I thought to myself that, on October 8th, the U.S. unilaterally announced indefinite adjournment of the armistice negotiations and Clark immediately afterwards initiated the attack. This obviously was an action which had been completely prepared early on.

Without finishing our meal, we returned to the operations room.

Sang-gam Liang was located at the southern foot of O-sung Mountain (north of Geum Hwa). To the south of it, the northern peaks of Height 597.9 and Height 537.7 were the company strong

points in front of our O-sung Mountain positions. Their total area covered only 3.7 square kilometers. The O-sung Mountain terrain is dangerously steep and is more than 1000 meters above sea level. On the western approach, there is the Pyeong-gang plain. To the east, it chokes the throat which leads from Geum Hwa through Geumsong to Tongcheong. This terrain was located along the central part of our defensive lines, where we were going to attack. The northern peaks of Height 597.9 and Height 537.7 were like two fists reaching out from O-sung Mountain, wedged into the enemy positions. From these heights one could overlook all of the enemy lines in the Geum Hwa area and could threaten traffic from Geum Hwa to the north.

Obviously, the enemy's objective in launching the attack was to, first of all, occupy the northern peaks of Height 597.9 and Height 537.7 and then to capture the O-sung Mountain area. By changing the situation of the Geum Hwa defensive region, the enemy would destroy our attack goals, discover our tunnel situation, and establish conditions which would be advantageous for attacking Pingkang, Geumsong, and areas further to the north.

When the enemy arrived, of course we would have to meet his attack. Moreover, we would have to fight this battle to a successful conclusion. We studied and made a decision: the entire-line tactical counterattack could not come to a halt on the 22nd; it had to be continued to the end of October so as to coordinate with the 15th Army's offensive to smash the enemy. At the same time, we decided to immediately change the plan which had originally called for a counterattack by the 40th Division of the 15th Army. Now, forces were to quickly travel to O-sung Mountain and assemble there so as to concentrate forces to counterattack the enemy's aggression and secure our positions on O-sung Mountain.

At that time, the 15th Army was put under the command of the 3rd Group Army. The commander and commissar of the 3rd Group

Army was Comrade Chen Geng. After Commander in Chief Peng went back to China, Chen Geng worked for a while as a replacement commander at "Volunteer Command". The responsible comrades of the 3rd Group Army in Korea were Vice Commander Wang Jinshan, Vice Commissar Du Yide, Chief of Staff Wang Yunrui, and Director of the Political Department Liu Youguang.

So that the 3rd Group Army and the 15th Army would know of "Volunteer Command's" decision more quickly and so that they would learn the concrete conditions more quickly and could thereby exchange opinions, I had the on duty staff members place a telephone call through to headquarters at the 3rd Group Army. The person who answered the phone was Chief of Staff Wang Yunrui.

Wang Yunrui was an old comrade. During the War to Resist Japan, he was the Chief of Staff in the southern Hebei military region. Chen Zaidao was the commander. During the War of Liberation, Chen Xilian served as commander of the 3rd Group Army. Wang was chief of staff. When the main army moved south and established the Chuandong military region, Chen Xilian was Commander. Wang was once again the chief of staff. You could say he was an old chief of staff.

Comrade Yunrui reported to me on the deployment situation of the group army. In particular, he explained that from the time that the enemy had begun his attack, the command organs of the group army, the armies, the divisions, and the regiments had all been transferred forward.

I told him the decision made by "Volunteer Command". I also told him that, although the enemy had just begun to attack, an analysis of the enemy's deployments of troop strengths and the imposing manner of the attack in its early stage showed that this would be a fierce battle of the sort rarely seen in the last few years. I asked him to tell the comrades of the 15th Army that even if their preparation work were thorough (and it would have to

be), they would still have to prepare to pay an enormous price. The positions on O-sung Mountain were our screen. We absolutely had to defend them steadily. I told him that "Volunteer Command" would support them with all its strength.

Yunrui said, "The commanders need not worry. Comrade Qin Jiwei and others have already developed a "hard-boned" movement with the slogan: 'If one man surrenders his life, it will be hard to stop another ten.' The first line commanders have stated that in the past we have sworn that we would perish together with our positions and that now we are saying that we absolutely will not yield half a centimeter of our positions. The positions shall survive, and the men shall also survive."

I praised this secretly in my heart. This was the development of heroism. It was also an expression of an invincible revolutionary will. With commanders like this, with soldiers like this, there were no positions which could not be held. But I also was clearly aware that this defensive battle was going to be exceptionally arduous. Clark was going to put all his eggs in one basket. The 3rd Group Army, especially the 15th Army, was about to undergo a trial which perhaps would be worse than anything that had preceded it.

This battle lasted a total of forty-three days and nights, beginning October 14th and ending on November 25th when we thoroughly smashed the enemy's attack. It started on a tactical scale and developed into a campaign-level operation. The defensive battle at Sang-gam Liang, because of its unique features and its role in history and because the commanders of our army caused an earth-shaking event, one could even say that history has no prior record of heroic achievement equal to this. One can unashamedly record this battle in the annals of history of world war.

This campaign can be divided into three phases.

The first phase (October 14th to 20th) was the phase in which the enemy's attack was resisted and continual counterassaults were launched.

On the first day, the enemy threw forces equal to seven battalions against our positions, which covered only 3.7 square kilometers. During one day along the O-sung front line, nearly 300,000 rounds of artillery fell. On the positions flanking Height 597.9 alone, more than 45,000 rounds fell in one day. Below the main peaks of O-sung Mountain artillery shells fell at a rate of five or six per second. This lasted for half an hour. Our positions' surface fortifications were almost entirely destroyed. The enemy, employing groups of platoons and battalions, executed assaults on our positions. Our defending units carried out fierce counterattacks against the concentrated assaults of the enemy. They did this by responding to each possible fire point. In the course of fighting to recover positions captured by the enemy, Platoon Commander Sun Zhanyuan led an attack unit in carrying out a stubborn struggle. Although both his legs were broken in the fighting, he still continued to command. After we captured positions, the enemy again executed mad and reckless counterassaults. Comrade Sun Zhanyuan operated two machineguns by himself continuously until the bullets ran out. The enemy once again charged. He pulled the pin out from his last remaining grenade and met his end together with the charging enemy. The name of Sun Zhanyuan is associated with O-sung Mountain. Sun Zhanyuan is a banner.

From the 15th to the 18th, the enemy, in succession, threw into combat two regiments and four battalions. With support from a great number of artillery pieces and aircraft, the enemy continued to carry out a continuous and fierce attack against the northern peaks of Height 597.9 and Height 537.7. Our defending units contended repeatedly with the enemy. A positions lost during the day would be recovered at night. Combat was

exceptionally intense.

Comrade Qin Jiwei was a prescient, clever, and decisive commander. He quickly made new deployments. On O-sung Mountain, he established a united command post for the 134th and 135th Regiments. The command post of the 133rd Regiment was transferred to a peak north of Sang-so Li. In addition, the divisional command post was transferred forward to Deshanxian.

At 1750 hours on the 19th, after the enemy had occupied our surface positions for nearly forty-eight hours, two companies of the 134th Regiment launched a surprise attack from within the tunnels, and the 6th Company of the 135th Regiment launched a surprise attack from the foot of the mountain. These actions were executed with the support of a single rocket volley and heavy artillery fire from the Rocket and Artillery 209th Regiment. In an instant, we formed what was an extremely good situation for us: a pincer attack from both inside and outside of the enemy. This surprise attack was fierce and fast. We very quickly recovered heights number four, five, and six of Height 597.9. One could really say that 10,000 things happened in the blink of an eye on this battlefield, for just as this victory was about to be firmly grasped, the enemy fire from height no. zero suddenly increased, trapping our troops on the ridge beneath the peak. The situation had changed, and our troops suffered very heavy casualties. The frontal-attacking 6th Company had only sixteen survivors, of whom only nine were combat-capable. This truly is an example of arriving at the crucial moment. If height no. zero was not captured, then not only would the successes of a whole day of struggle be wasted and lost, but as soon as the next day began the enemy would, by relying on height no. zero, carry out a counterassault, and the positions which we had already captured would be difficult to defend.

The 15th Army was prepared. The 15th Army was a heroic unit which could both attack and defend. The commander of the 15th

Army was a completely trustworthy person! When the crucial moment arrived, the battalion chief of staff led a correspondent, Huang Jiguang, up the hill. There were only two of them. Their role had already been proven by history to be gigantic.

The political instructor and the commander of the 6th Company and the guide made a report to the battalion chief of staff: After the successive failures of three demolition teams which they had dispatched, now there only the two of them and two correspondents who could take on the demolition mission. They requested that they take personal charge of the matter. The battalion chief of staff had no time to answer. The twenty-two year old Huang Jiguang was already standing together with the three cadres. He said just two words: "I go!" To the battalion chief of staff, the company commander, and the political instructor, these two words did not sound like a request, but sounded like an order given by a superior. The company commander handed over the two correspondents to Huang Jiguang. Huang Jiguang removed his Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea Souvenir Badge from his chest where it had been pinned and handed it to the chief of staff. Afterwards, I asked the comrades of the 15th Army many times: Did Huang Jiguang say anything at that time? They said that only when he was about to begin the charge up the slope did Huang Jiguang say to the chief of staff: "Please tell the people of the fatherland, please tell the comrades of the appreciation group to listen for the news of our victory!" He spoke in an extremely calm manner; he did not shout it out, nor did he yell it out. The comrades of the 135th Regiment also told me that, at that time, they only knew that the second appreciation group from the fatherland had arrived in Korea. However, they had not yet seen a single comrade from the appreciation group.

After this three-man demolition team went up and blew away the two firing points, one comrade was martyred. Huang Jiguang and another comrade were wounded and fell to the ground. The machine gun inside the enemy's pillbox became even more wild. The

grenades which they threw were to no avail. Our troops were trapped rigidly in front of it and found it very difficult to advance. Huang Jiguang stood up. Bearing the pain, he approached the pillbox from the side. Without hesitating, he stretched out both arms and leapt towards the embrasure which was spitting fierce flames. Our troops, charged up along the way which Comrade Huang Jiguang had used his life to open. The soldiers, shouting the loud and strong slogan, "Avenge the death of Comrade Huang Jiguang!", completely wiped out the enemy defenders and completely recovered the position.

Many years have gone by, but the name of Comrade Huang Jiguang is still engraved on the hearts of the Chinese and Korean peoples. The heroic image of Comrade Huang Jiguang will always live in the hearts of the people. He is a kind of symbol; he is a kind of power; he will always be a model who urges us forward.

After the positions were recaptured, the enemy again launched a wild and unrestrained struggle to take them back. At 0500 hours on the twentieth, the enemy, with coordinated support from thirty aircraft and a great number of artillery pieces, used two battalions to execute rotating attacks on our positions. The intense combat lasted all day, except for three northwestern heights in Height 597.9 which were under our control, all of the surface positions were again occupied by the enemy. Our defending units once again retreated into the tunnels to carry on the combat there. This is when the second phase of the complete-line tactical counterattack began.

During this phase of the operation, the enemy threw in seven regiments and seventeen infantry battalions. Our 45th Division threw in three regiments and twenty-one infantry companies. They all made use of exceptionally fierce artillery fire. The enemy employed eighteen artillery battalions, more than 300 artillery pieces. We employed nineteen companies with mountain artillery (and better artillery)--forty-six pieces of artillery--and

employed six rocket companies with twenty-four launchers. The enemy attacked during the day. We counterattacked at nightfall. It was the usual pattern. During seven days of combat, besides executing continuous counterattacks during the day, we also executed seven planned counterattacks at night, three of which completely recovered positions and four of which partially recovered positions. 7000 enemy soldiers were annihilated by us. According to the confessions of prisoners, the companies of each battalion of the eighteen enemy battalions which participated in the battle rotated two or three times. In one day of combat more than half the soldiers of the U.S. 7th Regiment were killed or wounded. In one company, only one person, a second lieutenant survived. For our twenty-one companies which took part in the battle, the casualty rates were generally higher than one half for each company. In one tunnel on the front line, twenty-four comrades continued to fight. They had originally come from thirteen companies. Thus one can see the intensity and cruelty of the combat. Because the combat would not stop at night or in the day, the tunnels lacked water, dry provisions, and medicine. Ammunition and equipment also were in great need of resupply.

After learning of this situation, I immediately telephoned Commander Gao Cunxin at the artillery command post and requested that he provide the 15th Army with artillery support. Comrade Cunxin had served as a brigade commander for the artillery brigade of the 19th Group Army. He was a commander with a great deal of experience in artillery operations. We decided on the telephone to reinforce the 15th Army with one battalion from the 7th Artillery Division and four companies one anti-aircraft regiment from the 2nd Artillery Division.

After making the telephone call, I had a discussion with Deng Hua and decided to provide the 45th Division with 1200 troops as reinforcements. I ordered the 29th Division of the 15th Army to take part in the battle. I ordered the 12th Army, which was then right in the middle of handing over its defensive mission to the

67th Army and preparing to return and reorganize, to halt its return to the north, quickly advance to the south, and place itself under the command of the 3rd Group Army as a campaign reserve force. I ordered each nearby military depot to step up its transportation efforts and guarantee supplies of ammunition, food, and other materials to the 15th Army. At the same time, I decided to have Comrade Deng Hua telephone front-line commanders and, representing the leaders and offices of "Volunteer Command", wish them well. I also decided to carry out more mobilizations.

At this time, the second appreciation group from the fatherland arrived at "Volunteer Command". They, each and every one of them, requested to go to the front-line positions at Sang-gam Liang in order to show their appreciation. Some of them also requested to participate in the stretcher bearer teams or in the transportation teams. We completely understood the feelings of the appreciation group comrades, yet we were unable to meet their demands. It was hard work explaining this to them, and we wasted a lot of talk. In order that our friends from the fatherland could comprehend the situation of the officers and men on the front line and could see in what manner their brothers were fighting with the aggressors, we dispatched a guard company to escort a few of the appreciation group comrades to a mountain from which they could view Sang-gam Liang way off in the distance. Thus, they could see their soldiers, about whom they thought night and day, through telescopes. At the same time, we sent the appreciation letters and the appreciation gifts which the appreciation group had brought to the positions and into the tunnels. We also told our soldiers that our friends from the fatherland were right behind them and that the friends from the fatherland were waiting for the happy news of their new victory.

On October 24th, the Central Military Commission gave an official reply to the report we had given not long ago on the entire-line tactical counterattack. This official telegraphed reply had been issued and signed by Chairman Mao himself.

The reply said: Our Volunteer Army, in coordination with the People's Army, began a tactical counterattack operation against the entire enemy line on September 18th. Within one month, they have annihilated or wounded more than 30,000 enemy soldiers and have achieved a great victory. The Central Committee and the Military Commission extend their warmest congratulations to all the commanders and all the fighting comrades. This operation was carried out on the basis of a certain number of selected essential tactics. We concentrated our army's superior troop strength and firepower, made use of sudden maneuvers, and inflicted annihilating attacks on all or part of the enemy, which was grouped in platoons, companies, and battalions. Then, when the enemy presented us with an opportunity by carrying counterattacks against us, we inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in the course of repeated battles. Then, on the basis of the situation, we made decisions concerning the strong points which we had captured. If there was a strong point which we could defend, we would defend it. If there was one which we were unable to defend, we would abandon it. We maintained our own initiative and prepared for a later counterattack. If we continue to implement this kind of combat method, we will certainly be able to grab the enemy by the throat. We will certainly be able to force the enemy to seek a compromise to end the Korean War. Beginning in July of last year, when our army made use of reinforced positions in combat, the amount of damage inflicted on the enemy exceeded by far the amount of damage that had been inflicted in each mobile operation that took place before July of last year. At the same time, our army's casualties were greatly decreased. If we just examine the Volunteer Army, casualties for the fifteen months beginning last year are on the average two-thirds (or more than two-thirds) less than the casualties for the previous eight months. This situation is the result of relying on positions to implement the aforementioned method of combat. During this period of time which began on September 18th, this method of fighting is showing itself to be even more organized and even more

comprehensive. Therefore, much importance ought to be attached to this. Now that two years have passed since the Volunteer Army left China, I hope that you synthesize the lessons you learn from experience and that you further raise the level of organization. I hope that you improve tactics and save ammunition and that you cooperate even more closely with the Korean comrades and the Korean people. I hope you will attain even greater victories in your battles from now on.

Rather than say this official reply was an official reply to our report, one ought to say that it is a summary of the work we had just done and that, being from the Central Committee, it viewed everything from a higher angle. Not only did it affirm the battle which we had just one; it also provided even better tactics and strategy and even clearer requirements for everything that followed. Chairman Mao stood tall and saw far. He added to our enormous strength. We immediately took the official reply of the Central Committee and transmitted it to the units which were right then carrying out their entire-line tactical counterattack mission. We also transmitted it to the commanders involved in the defensive operations at Sang-gam Liang.

After I took care of the official reply, on the 24th, I led a Volunteer Army delegation to Pyongyang to participate in a celebration by the Korean party and government of the second anniversary of the Volunteer Army's departure from China. I spent three days in Pyongyang. When I returned on the 27th, Deng Hua, responding to a summons, had already returned to China to report on the Korean war situation to Chairman Mao. At the same time, Gan Qiuqi, the deputy commissar, also returned to China. Thus, the only leaders left at Volunteer Command were Acting Chief of Staff Wen Zhou, Deputy Chief of Staff, Wang Zhengzhu, Director of the Political Department, Du Ping, and myself. Vice Commander Hong Xuezhi still was at Seongcheon Li.

As the responsible commander of operations, the situation

which was of greatest concern to me was, of course, the defensive operation at Sang-gam Liang. When I left "Volunteer Command" to go to Pyongyang, I handed over my responsibilities to the comrades of the office and the operations room. The first thing I did after I got back was to listen to their reports. At the time, the cadres in "Volunteer Command" were few. The comrades of the operations department were very competent. They had very high work efficiency, and they worked meticulously and did good, solid work. I had left "Volunteer Command" for only three days, and they had already prepared a report and some materials which were extremely detailed and extremely concrete and which both described the overall situation and analyzed it. Although the cadres of the office were not at the front line, their work was very difficult. Their work was very tiring, and very few people knew about that. The cadres of the offices, the staff officers, the clerical workers, and the secretaries could all be called nameless heroes.

Compared to the first phase of the operation, the second phase of the operation was even more arduous and even more difficult. We defended each and every peak. We defended each and every surface position. Because both our side and the enemy's side were very clear, whoever really captured a position would seize the initiative to implement a decisive counterattack operation.

During the first phase, the enemy attacked fiercely for seven days straight. Casualties were quite heavy, and the enemy was not able to attain his predetermined goal. However, the U.S. aggressor still was not willing to or able to abandon the attack. After the 21st, the enemy used various methods to encircle our tunnel units. The enemy forces also continued to execute attack and to carry out redeployments. The mission of defending and attacking Height 597.9 was handed over by the U.S. 7th Division east of Hantan Cheon to the puppet 2nd Division. The U.S. 7th Division was then transferred to the west to defend our attack on the enemy right wing west of Hantan Cheon. Part of the puppet

2nd Division's defense mission was handed over to the puppet 6th Division which was positioned on the right wing. The U.S. 3rd Division took over the defensive mission of the puppet 9th Division in the Cheolweon area. The puppet 9th Division was then transferred to the Shicangli [transliteration] area south of Geum Hwa to serve as a campaign reserve force.

At this time, the 29th Division of our 15th Army had already taken part in the battle. It had taken over from the 45th Division for the entire defensive mission, excepting Heights 597.9 and 537.7. The 45th Division concentrated its forces so that they could be used in combat on the two heights. The main force of the 12th Army had already been transferred to the O-sung Mountain and Zhuangzi [transliteration] Mountain areas. One battalion of our 7th Artillery Division, four companies of our 2nd Artillery Division, and one regiment of our Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps had all been thrown into combat.

During this phase, our units which were defending the tunnels continued unceasingly to organize small scale counterattacks, also known as small unit actions. The intelligent and clever commanders generally employed three methods. One method was to execute a strong surprise attack and wipe out the enemy soldiers outside the tunnels. Then, as soon as the enemy launched an attack against us, crack teams, which had been organized earlier in the tunnels, would wait for the enemy to approach an area near the tunnels. Then they would suddenly act and annihilate the enemy. The second method was to emerge from secrecy and execute a strong attack, annihilating the enemy while he is maneuvering. While the enemy is searching for us but has not yet found us, we, having discovered the enemy, immediately organize a formidable surprise attack. The third method is to ambush the enemy in the tunnels and wipe him out. Along the entire line, after we began to defend the tunnels, we launched 158 small-scale attacks on the enemy. Except for nine failures, they were all successful, annihilating more than 2000 enemy soldiers. This number is not

large when placed in the context of the entire campaign. However, this type of warfare created tremendous confusion in the minds of the enemy. It caused them night and day to have no peace. The enemy was in lit areas, while we were in dark areas. The enemy could not know when or where he would be wiped out by a few protruding gun muzzles or by a few brave soldiers leaping out from the darkness. A comrade making a report to me spoke of a small matter. He said that a U.S. soldier found a place sheltered from the wind--at the foot of a stone embankment--to have a bowel movement. He had not yet pulled up his pants when he was pulled by two outstretched hands into a tunnel. From then on, someone who had to defecate would be accompanied by two other men. The two others would hold their guns facing the wind. Although this was a small matter, it speaks very vividly of the threat presented by our small units. It also shows that even if the enemy occupied our surface positions, he still felt fear as though he were in combat. He lived in a world where the sound of the wind blowing, the shrubs and trees, everything was to him an enemy soldier.

Clark regarded our tunnel warfare as a nail in the eye or a thorn in the flesh. He both hated and feared it. In order to consolidate positions which had been occupied so as to further develop their advance into our lines, he employed a variety of measures to encircle and attack our units which were defending the tunnels. He sealed off the tunnel areas, bombed them, blew them up, burned and smoked them, blocked the entrances, or threw poison gas cannisters into them. These measures were very destructive and caused many casualties. Some of these measures were very cruel. It was very difficult to overcome some of them. Thus, cleverness was required; bravery was required; and an extraordinary endurance and tenaciousness were required. Many situations are difficult to conceive of by the ordinary person.

After several tunnel sections and openings in Height 597.9, which was defended by the 133rd Regiment, were collapsed or blown open by enemy artillery shells, the enemy used eighty-one

artillery and chemical mortar shells in an insane and reckless attack, which shortened the tunnels and blocked them. Only one small opening was left, which became like the opening of a well facing the sky. Not only could the enemy soldiers, looking down from the elevated locations where they crouched, attack the tunnel opening wildly and recklessly, but they also cast sulfur bombs into the tunnels and then used dirt to cover up the tunnel opening. Moreover they placed barbed wire along the tunnel opening. They were aiming to cause our officers and men who were defending the tunnels to die inside. This was an extremely appalling method.

Since the tunnels had been shortened by the fighting, their capacity was naturally reduced. Because combat went on unceasingly day and night, some surface positions were again occupied the enemy. Our wounded comrades and the remains of our martyrs could not be moved out. It was very crowded in the tunnels. It was not possible to give the wounded comrades a piece of ground to lie down. Even when everyone was standing, backs pressed against backs or chests against chests. Because of the shaking caused by the artillery attacks, it was not possible to light a lantern inside (some simply had no lanterns). Gunpowder smoke, sulfur, blood, feces, urine, and the smell of sweat and grime filled the tunnels. The air in the tunnels was extremely foul. The foul air which rose up near the tunnel openings was like smoke billowing from a factory smokestack. It was twenty or thirty degrees below outside the tunnels, but inside, even if you wore a single layer of clothing, it was like being steamed over a hot fire. It was hard to bear. Only if a soldier kneeled down or leaned against a tunnel wall could he cause the air to flow a little. To be utterly honest, this environment had already become one in which a normal person could not survive. However, our soldiers (including the wounded) not only lived here, but were always preparing to face combat, to take part in combat, or to make martyrs of themselves. Nobody here complained of the bitterness; no one was pessimistic. Some were cooperating to

overcome the difficulties together. They were not afraid of sacrificing themselves; they had a fearless revolutionary spirit of joy in making a contribution. Under these circumstances, the officers and men still sent out their written statements of opinion, the basis of which was the situation along the entire line. These were supplied to the commanders' offices for reference. The people of the fatherland called these soldiers "the most loveable people". I think that they unashamedly should be regarded this way. The officers and men of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in Korea, in the O-sung Mountain, Sang-gam Liang, and other campaigns demonstrated a strong patriotic and internationalist spirit and an all-conquering revolutionary resolve that one hundred setbacks could not disturb. They cast aside their hardships and with the lofty virtue of selfless sacrifice our officers and men have left behind a precious spiritual wealth for the people of our nation. The people can never, should never forget them.

Leaders and offices at all levels, from Volunteer Command to the group armies to the armies to the divisions to the regiments, were all paying attention to O-sung Mountain and Sang-gam Liang. They cared about the bloody, intense battles there. They thought up all sorts of solutions. They sent ammunition, provisions, and all sorts of appreciation gifts to the men. But this was very difficult to do.

A front line transportation worker supporting the 5th Company went to a tunnel to deliver ammunition and carried along an apple. The company commander, seeing his clothes drenched with sweat and dry, cracked lips did not accept it and let the worker eat it himself. But the worker insisted on giving it to the company commander. The water had been cut off for seven days. This company commander, whose throat had long been hoarse, took this bright and shiny, pretty red apple in his palm, considered it, and then gave it to the walkie-talkie operator. The walkie-talkie operator licked his lips, which were crusted over with scabs, and

gave the apple to a wounded soldier who was right then moaning and groaning. Because the wounded soldier had not been given water and was lacking medicine. He had already fainted a few times. But when he discovered that there was only one apple, he took the apple and handed it over to the commander. The commander did not know what to say. He accepted it and then passed it on to the medic at his side. The medic, without even pausing, gave it to the wounded person, who once again gave it to the company commander. At that time, the 5th Company had only eight comrades left. In a hoarse voice, the company commander mobilized his troops and solemnly ordered each person to take a bite. This little apple went around in the circle of these eight men, going from hand to hand. There was still more than half left. . . .

In Tunnel #2 at Height 597.9, there were twenty-four commanders belonging to sixteen companies. Most of them were wounded. Because there were many organizational systems, but no unified command, ranking became a little confused. Some of them supported the notion of bursting out and fighting. Some supported the idea of finding a way to establish a link with the surface or with other tunnels. Some others suggested that they wait and seen. Opinions varied greatly. One comrade with a wounded left arm who was a little older than the rest stood up. He described himself, saying, "I am a company quartermaster and a member of the Communist Party. Before coming to Korea, I fought a few battles during the Huai-Hai Campaign. I will take responsibility here for a while. You shall all obey my orders." He first made Party members and then League members raise their hands. He established a Party unit, and he also established a League unit. He said to everyone, "We are a contingent of Communist Party Leaders. We are sons of the People's Republic of China. We left China to fight a war to resist the U.S. and aid Korea. We cannot give our nation cause for shame. Communist Party members should play the exemplary roles of the Communist vanguard. Our small party unit will lead the collective. We must take good care of our wounded class brothers. We must now make full preparations to meet a

counterattack." He organized all the unwounded and lightly-wounded comrades into an attack platoon, which kept on fighting.

The report of the office comrades made us very excited. I even thought of making a trip to the 15th Army and looking around O-sung Mountain, but, under the conditions at that time, this was impossible. Therefore, I decided to put through a call to 3rd Group Army Headquarters. Comrade Wang Yunrui, who answered the phone, told me that on the 25th the 15th Army held an operations meeting. Because the enemy's and our army were in a stalemated struggle, and because the enemy obviously had his hands tied with no options, the 15th Army decided to implement combat deployments for a decisive counterattack. It was determined that first of all forces would be concentrated for a counterattack to occupy Height 597.9. After that, forces would be concentrated for a counterattack to occupy the northern peaks of 537.7. In addition, the 15th Army was preparing to use one battalion and five companies from the 29th Division to throw into the Height 597.9 counterattack operation and were preparing to use the 91st Regiment of the 31st Division of the 12th Army as a reserve force. Moreover, five companies of the 29th Division were being prepared for the Height 537.7 counterattack operation. In order to guarantee the necessary provisions and ammunition, the logistical strength of the armies and divisions was being organized to hasten transportation, and three battalions of the 29th Divisions and office personnel of the regimental and divisional levels were especially transferred to undertake the mission of transporting supplies along forty kilometers of front-line mountain road.

Very good! In particular, the organization of front-line transportation was really a very important measure. During this time, the entire army's combat and living supplies had been fully guaranteed because of the two years of arduous service and effort of our front-line logistical comrades. One could say that it was a matter of "the soldiers and horses being strong and provisions

and ammunition being sufficient". The problem of the provisions and ammunition not being supplied ("leaning against a mountain of provisions and having nothing to eat"), which occurred during the first and second phases of the Sang-gam Liang Campaign, was mainly a result of the reorganization of transportation work not being done immediately under the new conditions. Of course, the enemy had also exceeded past reckless and wild blockades, creating extremely great difficulties. After I approved the 15th Army's method, I told Comrade Wang Yunrui that we should still complete ideological preparation for long-term fighting. I told him that we should fully apply the lessons drawn from our experience during the defensive operations (the experience of relying on repeated battles with the enemy to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy) and thus create an even greater combat gains. I repeatedly emphasized the problem of supplies, saying to Comrade Yunrui, "Up to now the fighting has been very bitter. We must expend all our strength to guarantee that the comrades on the front line have enough ammunition, have enough food, and have enough medicine. You must tell the comrades who take part in transportation work that they have a great responsibility in determining whether the troops on the front can fight even better than they have previously."

After I finished talking to Comrade Yunrui on the phone, I once again used the phone to contact the commander of the front-line transportation headquarters, Liu Juying. Comrade Juying was truly worthy of the word "intellectual". He was a very enterprising person and a good problem solver. He achieved a great success in the construction of our "steel transportation line". I told him of the 15th Army's plan to prepare to organize front-line transportation teams for forty kilometers of mountain roads. I requested that he arrange supplies outside of the forty kilometers of mountain road.

Juying said, "Don't worry, commander! As the saying goes, everything for the front line; everything for victory. I have

already arranged for two groups of trucks to transport ammunition." After he told me about the units, the vehicles, and the routes, he went on to say, "I had been worrying that the bottleneck was too thin to get through, but now, with this front-line transportation, the problem is solved."

I said, "The total counterattack time can't be too long. Do you have any other problems?"

"Logistical supplies, getting these things to the front lines as quickly as possible is extremely important! When necessary, I will need to have a few units especially transferred to escort the supplies."

I said, "Right! I will tell Chief of Staff Zhang and Deputy Chief of Staff Wang. Whenever you need units, you go ahead and tell them directly."

On October 30th was the third phase of the Sang-gam Liang Campaign. A decisive counterattack was executed, which thoroughly smashed the beginning of the enemy's attack.

At 0200 hours on the 30th, three companies from among our units which were defending the tunnels first launched an assault on the enemy. Following this, outside of the tunnels, five companies of the 45th Division of the 15th Army and two companies of the 29th Division were quickly thrown into battle. They executed a pincer attack against the enemy. After five hours of intense battle, four defending enemy companies were completely wiped out and several counterassaults by enemy forces equal to one battalion were repulsed. By the morning of the 31st, all the positions on Height 597.9 were recovered, except for one squad position. From October 31st to November 3rd, the enemy threw into combat one regiment of the puppet 9th Division, three battalions of the U.S. 7th Division, the U.S. 189th Airborne Regiment, and the Ethiopian battalion, one after the other. Every day, enemy

forces equal to one or two or more regiments, with the support of fierce fire from their air force and artillery, carried out continuous counterassaults. On November 1st, our army threw the 91st Regiment, a reserve force into the battle and also transferred nine artillery companies so that they could participate in the battle. The 4th Squad of the 8th Company of the 91st Regiment established the glorious feat of having annihilated more than 400 enemy soldiers, while the squad itself suffered only three casualties.

Our artillery units did their job very well. Of course, it was very intense and very difficult. Outside of the tunnels, the cold wind howled. The temperature on the mountain dropped to twenty-seven or twenty-eight degrees below zero. But in the artillery fortifications, our artillerymen kept on sweating. This was particularly true of the loaders. Even when their shoulders were bare, they were drenched with sweat. As soon as they took off their hats, they let off hot air like bamboo steamers. The barrels of the artillery guns became red, and the guns shook. If the loader's hand was blistered by the hot barrel of the artillery piece, he would use an arm to pick up the artillery shells and put them inside. When combat was intense, they would push the artillery pieces outside of the fortifications and from there would directly aim and fire. In order to coordinate with the tunnel units in annihilating the enemy, they would send out walkie-talkies to the front-line tunnels so that the units there could indicate firing targets. In continuous combat, the soldiers of the artillery units became very fatigued. Whenever the combat quieted down just a little, some of the artillerymen would lean against the shaking artillery pieces and fall asleep. Even if an enemy artillery shell landed right next to the fortifications and exploded, still they would not wake. However, when the command post sent out an order, they would quickly and immediately leap into their artillery positions. They paid very close attention to the shouts of the infantry, and always and everywhere they provide them with fierce supporting fire. Owing to our accuracy

of reconnaissance, the immediacy of fire, and the tacit understanding of successive coordinated actions, we destroyed one after another enemy artillery position and groups of enemy tanks. In order to thank them, the infantry comrades selected the best of their captured infantry rifles and presented these as souvenirs for the artillerymen. During the autumn battle, the combat performance of our artillery units received universal praise from our infantry.

Chairman Mao gave high praise to the artillery units which fought in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea. In December of 1952, while analyzing the Korean war situation he, pointed out: "During the autumn campaign of this year, in a victory such as this, in addition to the bravery of the officers and men, the strength of the fortifications, and the appropriateness of command, fierce artillery fire and accuracy of fire were truly factors which contributed to the victory."

On November 5th, we received a "Concerning Combat Dispositions at O-sung Mountain" telegram report from Vice Commander Wang Jinshan and Vice Commissar Du Yide. In accordance with the new situation and conditions on both ours and the enemy's side, they made new deployments so as to consolidate Height 597.9 and recapture the northern peaks of Height 537.7. They had decided to take three regiments of the 31st Division of the 12th Army and throw them into combat at these two heights and decided to make two regiments of the 34th Division serve as reserve forces. With the exception of artillery, communication, and logistics, the 45th Division of the 15th Army was pulled back from the front line for reorganization. So as to rationalize command, the O-sung Mountain Operations Command Post, was organized by the vice commander of the 12th Army, Li Desheng, at Deog-san Hyun. It was to unify command of all combat units. The artillery command post organized by the division commander of the 7th Artillery Division, Yan Fu, unified command of all subordinate artillery units. These two command posts were put under the command of the

commander of the 15th Army, Qin Jiwei. With respect to tactical leadership, they determined: "After we counterattack successfully, the main peak bases must be defended. As for the others, if they can not be defended, then they should not be defended. If they can not all be defended, then those which are advantageous should be defended, while those which are not should not be defended." After the enemy positions were occupied by the enemy: "If we are prepared, we shall counterattack again. If we have not prepared, then we should not force ourselves to counterattack: if there is an opportunity, then we counterattack, but if there is no opportunity then we create the proper conditions." As for "uses of the tunnels both inside and outside" and "integrating small and large counterattacks", clear and definite rules were set. The report also stated: "Not all our tactical methods should be standardized". It also emphasized: "We must give full play to the mobility of the commanders and maintain tactical initiative."

As could be seen from this workable scheme, whose contents were full and accurate and which had been thoroughly arranged, the 3rd Group Army, in order to successfully fight this battle, had used its brains at every level. We immediately relayed the report to the Military Commission. At the same time, we made a report to the Military Commission on "the resolutions and deployments to augment the 15th Army combat region".

On November 7th, we received an official telegram reply from the Military Commission. The Military Commission approved our resolutions and deployments to augment the 15th Army combat region as accurate. It also indicated: "This time, the operation near O-sung Mountain has already developed into a campaign-scale operation and has attained a tremendous victory. We hope that you will urge on this army to persist in combat so that it will win a complete victory through intense combat."

On November 9th, we again received a telegram from the

Military Commission and the General Staff Headquarters giving approval for the Sang-gam Liang region combat units. The telegram from the general office of the Military Commission also mentioned that on November 8th Chairman Mao had signed citations given by "Volunteer Command" to the 15th Army and other units participating in the campaign and gave them to all the military regions throughout the country, to each special branch of the military, and to civil and military academies. On the same day, 7192 new soldiers had already dismounted at Yangde. They were reinforcements for the front-line combat units, and they were right then going to designated assembly sites.

One piece of good news after another--it really made one excited. We immediately reported to the 3rd Group Army, and at the same time demanded: "Urge the combat units of the 15th and 12th Armies and the special units which are operating in coordination to persist in their fighting so as to win a complete victory and so as to recover and consolidate all the positions. In the course of intense combat, the units are to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy."

At 1600 hours on November 11th, two companies of the 92nd Regiment of the 31st Division, with the direct support of of seventy mountain, field, and howitzer artillery pieces, twenty mortars, and twenty-four rocket launchers, launched an assault along two routes. After intense combat until 1700 hours, the northern peaks of Height 537.7 were recaptured and all the defending enemy troops were wiped out. At the same time as this, In order to coordinate with the counterattack operation of the 92nd Regiment, our 31st Division, employing part of the 93rd Regiment, recovered a position on Height 597.9 which we had originally abandoned. On the 12th, the enemy, employing forces equal to one regiment, launched a counterassault against the northern peaks of Height 537.7. After intense combat, the enemy occupied four positions at the foot of two peaks. After this, an intense struggle for territory developed between us and the enemy

over the positions at the foot of the two peaks. The 93rd Regiment of the 31st Division and the 106th Regiment of the 34th Division were thrown into battle, one after the other. Intense combat continued until the 25th, when finally we repulsed the enemy's frenzied counterassaults, thus consolidating the positions of the northern peaks of Height 537.7. Because enemy casualties were very heavy, the enemy was forced to pull back the puppet 2nd Division and the U.S. 9th Division. The defensive missions of these two divisions were taken over by the puppet 9th Division and the U.S. 25th Division respectively. After this, the enemy's attack was basically brought to a halt. The Sang-gam Liang campaign ended victoriously.

The Sang-gam Liang defensive campaign lasted forty-three days. Both the enemy's and our army, in a small narrow area of 3.7 kilometers, threw into combat a large number of troops and conducted a sustained back-and-forth struggle over territory. The intensity of this combat was unprecedented. In particular, artillery fire was very dense. The density (number of shells that landed per surface area) was to a degree rarely seen in the 2nd World War. During the campaign, the units which the enemy threw into combat, one after the other, included: the U.S. 7th Division, an U.S. airborne regiment, the puppet 2nd Division, the puppet 9th Division, an Ethiopian battalion, and a Colombian battalion--a total of eleven regiments and two battalions (during the campaign they were reinforced with more than 9000 troops). In addition, there were eighteen artillery battalions with more than 300 artillery pieces of 105 millimeters or more. There were also more than 170 tanks and more than 3000 sorties flown by aircraft. The total troop strength was approximately 60,000 troops.

The units which our army threw into combat, one after the other, included: the 45th Division of the 15th Army, the 25th Division, the 31st Division and one regiment of the 34th Division of the 12th Army, the 2nd Howitzer, the 7th Division, the 209th Rocket Regiment, the artillery regiment of the 60th Army, and part

of the 601st and 610th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiments. There was a total of 114 mountain, field, and howitzer artillery pieces, twenty-four rocket launchers, and forty-seven anti-aircraft artillery pieces. There was also the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Engineer Regiment and a stretcher battalion. The total troop strength was approximately 40,000 men.

During the campaign, the enemy fired approximately 1,900,000 rounds of artillery shells and dropped more than 5000 bombs. In one day, more than 300,000 artillery rounds were fired and more than 500 bombs were dropped. At the time, some news reports stated, "the hills have been flattened by the bombing, and the tunnels have been shorted by the bombing". These words were not an exaggeration. The stones and earth on our two heights had been loosened to a depth of one or two meters by the bombing. Walking on the heights was like stepping onto a pile of earth. The loose earth was up to the knees. Of course, all the trees on the heights were gone, and even shrubs and grass could not be found. Both sides, the enemy's and our side, called it the "red mountain".

During this campaign, according to incomplete statistics, we repulsed twenty-five enemy counterassaults (of a battalion or more). As for counterassaults by battalions or smaller units, we repulsed 650. At the same time, we carried out many counterattacks, which in the end smashed the enemy attack. During this campaign, we killed or captured more than 25,000 enemy troops. We shot down or damaged more than 270 enemy aircraft. We destroyed or damaged more than 61 large bore artillery pieces and fourteen tanks. The enemy stated his equipment and materiel suffered losses in this campaign equal to the losses for the entire year of 1950. I have seen a news report sent out by the Associated Press from the center section of the Korean battle lines. It stated: "During the first part of this campaign, the army officers of the United Nations Army predicted that this battle would be an intense, yet a typical, limited hill attack.

However, this campaign has become the Fanerdeng [transliteration] of the Korean War. . . . "¹

The Sang-gam Liang Campaign was, for our army, a severe test of the tunnel-centered strong point defensive system. The campaign victory made even more clear its extremely important role on the Korean battlefield. At the same time, it added new elements to our army's tactics for defending positions. The reason we were able to cause Clark's one million artillery shells to become scrap metal was that we had tunnel-centered position fortifications. The reason we were able to lead Fanfolite [transliteration] by the nose, causing him to throw great numbers of troops and weapons at several points along the front line (and not along a wide front) and the reason why we inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in the course of counterassaulting and contending for territory were that our army had tunnel-centered fortified positions. During the course of struggling over ground, we needed only hold onto the tunnels. In this way, the entire positions could not be lost. Moreover, the tunnels could make each position into a pillbox for wiping out the enemy. Thus, operations to defend tunnels became a new topic in tactics for

¹ Fanerdeng [transliteration] is an important town and the largest key base in the northeastern part of France. It is located along the French-German border. During the First World War, the French and German armies fought a fierce battle here. At first, the German army launched several attacks against the French base at Fanerdeng. Because the French army relied on deep defenses, the Germans were not able to attack successfully. Afterwards, the French Army carried out many counterattacks, pushing the German army back to their positions before the attack. From then on, the German, Australian, and Turkish defensive lines collapsed day by day.

defending positions. The Sang-gam Liang Campaign provided extremely precious experience on this point.

During the Sang-gam Liang campaign, the coordination between our various combat units was quite close. The campaign victory could be said to be a victory by cooperative struggle and coordinated actions. After the fighting broke out in the Sang-gam Liang region, each army (included the Korean People's Army) along the entire line operated in very close coordination. When the infantry launched assaults, artillery provided cover. When artillery was firing, infantry took the initiative to point out targets. Great amounts of ammunition were expended at the positions, so the transportation units both day and night carried an endless stream of supplies. Both roads and bridges were blockaded by enemy artillery fire and by aircraft bombing. Therefore, our engineer units and the Korean people risked the bombs which fell thick and fast to carry out quick repairs of bridges and roads. Our anti-aircraft artillery units day and night were on the watch for enemy aircraft, thereby ensuring that the transport lines would stay open. In mountain operations, gas-powered vehicle transport becomes difficult. Our office cadres took part in the front-line transportation teams delivery of ammunition and various kinds of materials to the front line. Political work was exceptionally brisk. As soon as a battle began or ended, small battleground newspapers filled with the appreciation of the leaders for heroic feats that had just taken place were delivered into the hands of the privates. The comrades trapped in tunnels, even while they lacked provisions and water and were suffering from the threat of enemy gas and artillery fire, were concerned about the counterattacks of our surface units and would send up information and suggestions. When our surface troops were concerned about their comrades in the tunnels, they would risk their own lives and would deliver, by a thousand methods and one hundred plans, provisions, water, ammunition, and appreciation gifts (brought by the fatherland appreciation delegation) to the tunnels. While our Volunteer Army was

defending positions here, the Korean People's Army and the local Korean government organized stretcher teams, first-aid teams, and transportation teams to provide support.

The support which the Korean people gave the Sang-gam Liang campaign was tremendous. It was such that one can never forget it. From the time the first shots of the campaign were fired to the end of November, a total of 8237 people were mobilized to participate in combat and logistical work. These people were all from nine "mian" villages in two districts (Geum Hwa and Huaiyang [transliteration]) within a battlefield zone having a circumference of less than thirty-five kilometers. All of the self-defense personnel from two of these "mian" (Geum Seong mian and Huaiyang mian) participated in from two or three logistical and combat duties. They organized 1867 auxiliary stretcher-bearers and transferred 1760 of our wounded soldiers, thus ensuring the second-line (from the regimental medical posts to the divisional rear areas) transfer of all our wounded.

In these detachments, there were fifty year old mothers, teenage children, and fathers and sons in the same stretcher bearer teams. There were mothers, daughters, mothers-in-law, and daughters-in-law all together at tea stands and first-aid posts. When the enemy planes were raiding, Comrade Piao Zaigen used his own body to protect our wounded men and was as a result severely injured. In this detachment, he was just one of the heroes who arose, a great representative of the Korean people. A stretcher bearer from Geum Seong mian of Geum Hwa Gun, Kim, when assembling with other stretcher bearers, was martyred by enemy bombs. His father, the fifty-seven year old Kim, registered to participate in the stretcher team. Many Korean women suffered cold and wind to set up tea stands along the roads. They sliced apples into thin pieces and fed the wounded soldiers on the road. The women of Wangxiali and Shangsongguanli [transliterations] also organized song and dance teams. They brought more than 200 appreciation letters and tofu which they themselves made. They

also gave our wounded soldiers crutches and presented them with flowers. They sang songs and danced for them to show their appreciation. The women of Langumian [transliteration] washed more than 3000 pieces of bloodied clothes for the wounded men. One old woman among them washed more than 700 pieces herself. She rubbed her hands so much that they bled. The soldiers lovingly shed tears. They all called her "Volunteer Army Mama". The leader of the Women's Alliance in Langumian [transliteration] gave a blood transfusion to one of our wounded soldiers. . . . The blood of two different races mixed together. . . . These moving feats cannot all be cited. We asked that the Korean comrades working at "United Command" represent us, represent all of the comrades of the Volunteer army in expressing our most sincere feelings of gratitude to the Korean people. The Sang-gam Liang victory and all the victories that took place in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea cannot be separated from the strong support of the Korean people. The Chinese people will forever thank the Korean people for the generosity and depth of feeling they showed the Chinese people.

In the Sang-gam Liang campaign, which unfolded on positions covering less than four square kilometers, there appeared heroes and their heroic deeds, and the news of these has already been spread across the thousand miles of Korean mountains and waters. This news has also spread across the 9,600,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory. Sang-gam Liang, this common mountain peak which originally no one knew about, has already become famous throughout the world. We and our enemy both take it as a kind of symbol. No one can forget it.

Sang-gam Liang serves as a symbol of the cooperative victory of the Chinese and Korean peoples. It shall forever tower on the national territory of Socialist Korea. It shall forever tower in the eastern part of the world.

Sang-gam Liang is an historical witness.

Only after the Sang-gam Liang campaign did the U.S. Army representatives come to sit down at the negotiating table at Panmunjeom. Comrade Jie Fang told me that the U.S. representatives did not mention the matter of Sang-gam Liang to our side. It was as if this place had never existed on the earth, as though this forty-odd day campaign had never occurred. I think that the reasons for this can be understood.

After the Sang-gam Liang campaign, Clark no longer hurriedly went about making use of new military maneuvers, as he had when he first received his assignment. But we knew that he still might try out new maneuvers. We were fully prepared for this.

Chapter Eight. The Source.

The second appreciation delegation from the people of the fatherland had already been in Korea some days. Although "Volunteer Command" had held a welcoming conference, and although all the subgroups within the appreciation delegation had gone among the troops to perform activities, Deng Hua, myself, and several responsible comrades of Volunteer Army Headquarters, because a few pressing matters related to the Sang-gam Liang battle and the negotiations at Panmunjeom had kept us busy, had not at all been able to sit down and have a good discussion with the head of the appreciation delegation, Liu Jingfan.

As soon as the Sang-gam Liang campaign ended, the head of the delegation, Liu Jingfan, and several deputies came to visit us.

Comrade Jingfan was an old comrade from Shanbei. I got to know him after the Long March arrived at Yanan. When he arrived in Korea, he was the deputy director of the inspection commission of the Government Administration Council. Before coming to Korea, I had stayed in Xian. Thus when Comrade Jingfan introduced me to his deputy heads he said, "Commander Yang is my old buddy. If you need anything then ask freely."

I said, "If the comrades wish to go to Sang-gam Liang, we will heartily welcome them. To be honest, when the combat at

Sang-gam Liang was at its most fierce and most trying, Comrade Deng Hua and I thought of inviting the comrades of the appreciation delegation to go. By this, I do not mean going to a separate peak to look through a telescope; I mean going among the soldiers. However, we could not get ourselves to make this decision. The comrades are friends sent to us from the fatherland. If you should have encountered any small problem, not only would we have been unable to explain it to the people of the fatherland, none of the commanders of the Volunteer Army would have agreed. However, early on we told the troops the news of the comrades' arrival. We delivered the appreciation gifts of the comrades, who represent the people of the fatherland, to the troops. Therefore, the comrades not only participated in the Sang-gam Liang Campaign, but also played a very important role in this campaign. The comrades already are aware that, before the combat hero, Comrade Huang Jiguang, hurled himself at the firing point, he said only one sentence. That sentence was none other than: 'Please tell the people of the fatherland; please tell the appreciation delegation: Listen for the news of our victory!'" When I got to this point, I became somewhat excited. I paused and then said, "I am now the leading comrade representing the Volunteer Army. I represent all the commanding officers of the Volunteer Army. I especially represent the comrades who participated in the Sang-gam Liang Campaign. Comrades, the commanders there think of you. They think very much of you, these friends who have arrived from the fatherland!"

Comrade Jingfan and all the deputy heads of the delegations were also very moved. One after another, they described the impressions they had after arriving in Korea. They all unashamedly said that the men of the Volunteer Army were the most loved people. Their speech revealed their boundless feelings of love and esteem for their soldier brothers.

They also described to us the manner in which the appreciation delegation was organized. This appreciation

delegation was very large. Its representative nature was quite extensive. It was a large assemblage of superior personages from every area around the nation. There were representatives from the Chinese Communist Party and from each democratic party faction. There were representatives from the Han, Manchurians, Mongolians, Moslems, Cang, Mao, Uygur, Yao, Korean, Kazaks, Tartars, and other brother peoples. There were also representatives of overseas Chinese, workers, farmers, PLA soldiers, students, youths, women, artists, and journalists, as well as representatives from commerce and industry and from the world of religion. In all, there were 1091 persons.

We had received the mandate of the fatherland and of the people of the fatherland to go to Korea and fight. To resist the U.S., aid Korea, and protect the nation is the righteous mission of each and every commander and soldier of the Volunteer Army. Each of our victories in Korea was a result of the support of the Chinese and Korean peoples. If we are to speak of just the commanding officers of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, the concern, love, support, and assistance of the people of the fatherland were the source of our strength. To fight for the fatherland, to fight for peace in the Orient and the world--these were the most resounding slogans among the troops. We were doing what we were supposed to be doing. That the fatherland and the people of the fatherland should show us such deep concern and such tremendous encouragement caused us to feel a little uncomfortable in our hearts.

When I saw the name list for the members of the appreciation delegation, my inner feeling of excitement was hard to describe. Among the representatives, there was a construction worker who had come from a place with an elevation of more than 5000 meters in the northern Mountains of Heaven in the western border region of the fatherland. There was a representative of our army's engineer corps. There was a shepherd representative from the steppes of Qinghai. There was a Tibetan representative from Xikangdanba

[transliteration]. There was a combat hero from the navy of the southeastern marine defensive line. There were representatives of overseas Chinese. From a geographical point of view, the southwest and northwest border regions of the fatherland are separated from the Korean front line by great distances. However, they too dispatched their outstanding representatives. The people of the fatherland and the soldiers are closely bound. There does not pass a moment in which the people of the fatherland do not think of their sons and brothers.

Within the appreciation delegation, there were famous personages from every kind of battlefield, such as the model worker, Ma Hengchang, and the model agricultural laborer, Zeng Guangfu. There was the model driver, Wang Xianzhang, from the desert border regions of the west. There was the father of the combat hero, Comrade Dong Cundang. There was the representative of the model martyr family, Dong Quanzhong. There was the father of the combat hero of the Volunteer Air Force, Zhang Zhihui. There was the representative of the model armyman's family, Zhang Benzhou, etc.

In the appreciation delegation, the folk art work group, organized from song, dance, Beijing opera, northern opera, and folk song performers, included a total of 495 members.

The comrades of the appreciation delegation told us about many things from before the departure of the representatives from China.

A few days before Yi Jidong, the representative from an agricultural bumper crop model village, set out on his journey to Korea, his home was crowded with people both day and night. He was urged again and again for a year; his friends wrote letters or signed their names; young women used a thousand needles and ten thousand threads to sew appreciation bags, embroidered handkerchiefs, and insoles for him to carry himself to the front

line to give the Volunteer Army. As Zhang Lirong, a nineteen year old woman representative from the southwestern region, was setting out on her journey, she was told by a peasant woman who was carrying her baby on her back in spite of the rain that: "When you get there, ask a lot of questions and look at a lot of things. Bring back many heroic feats of the Volunteer Army." When an Uygur peasant, Musharouzi, from Xinjiang province, saw off their representative, Asaide, he firmly grasped Asaide's hand and said, "I really want to go all the way with you to see the most loveable people. You will represent the Uygur people. You will especially represent me, Musharouzi, in expressing my most lofty respect for these most loved people. You must shake hands like we are shaking hands now. You must go and shake hands tightly with the soldiers of the Volunteer Army and of the People's Army. Take my love to them. You must learn their greatest needs and what they like most. Then I will prepare "

The day before a Chinese Christian preacher, Bai Yuying, was to set out, her mother died from an illness. A comrade mentioned that it was not necessary for her to go. But her eighty year old father, Bai Chengyi, said to her, "The death of your mother is a small matter; it is a family matter. Your going to show our appreciation for the most loved people is a great matter; it is a public matter, an important national matter. You certainly must go. You certainly must leave on time!" As soon as a representative of the Yao people in Guangdong province, Deng Lingwei, was informed that he would be going to Korea to show his appreciation, he crossed ten miles of mountain road on foot to get to the assembly site.

To this day, I still remember Fang Lingru, a Xiadan University professor of Chinese who was already fifty years old then. Before she set out, she went to book stores and libraries to buy suitable reading materials for young soldiers. She even went through the books she had stored up over the years. She brought many literary reading materials for the soldiers on the

front line. During the party at the Volunteer Army headquarters to receive and welcome the appreciation delegation from the fatherland, Comrade Jingfan and I made a special point of meeting her. When our representatives of the front-line commanding officers expressed their gratitude to her, her eyes became moist. She waved her hand, and said, "Ai, what are you talking about? I generally am caring about my sons and daughters. Now my love for the soldiers on the front line exceeds my love for my children. This is not easy! For the fatherland, for peace, for us and our students, you have suffered countless hardships. Now that I have arrived at the front line and have seen our soldiers, I like them; I am fond of them; I love them!" She grasped my hand and fell silent. . . .

The comrades of the appreciation delegation in fact brought us the love of the hundreds of millions of people of the fatherland. They in fact brought us boundless, inexhaustible strength!

One night not long after the appreciation delegation arrived at "Volunteer Command", Comrade Deng Hua came to our office. He placed before me a beautifully designed and bound book. He said very excitedly, "Take a look at this."

This was the registration book of the appreciation delegation which represented the appreciation gifts from the fatherland. At that time it was called the "gift list". It was a very thick book, and each page was packed with dense writing. . . . When I was working in the group army, we had regularly received appreciation gifts sent from the fatherland, and we regularly heard reports on the appropriate departments distributing appreciation gifts. But this was the first time I received such a solemn and full list as this detailed account of appreciation gifts. It was too much! The fatherland had thought so carefully of its children! Deng Hua was moved. I, too, was moved. I believe that every comrade who sees this register will be moved.

Because truly the fatherland came; the people of the fatherland came. The fatherland and the people really came amongst the soldiers!

Books, pictorials, and pictures are wordless messages and are great propagandists. They described to the children distant from the fatherland the Chengyu railroad in the greater southwest, from when its construction first began to when it began bearing traffic, ahead of schedule. They unfolded before the eyes of the soldiers the joyous scene of the inauguration of the Tianlan railroad in the greater northwest--eight months ahead of schedule. I think that, for the commanding officers of the 19th Group Army who had fought in the greater northwest, this would be even closer to home. The vast, large-scale Huai River flood control project in the eastern part of China truly provided encouragement, and the change in appearance of the Kangzang plateau was impossible for us to imagine. There were a set of pictures called "The Great Fatherland". This name was quite appropriate and quite wonderful.

The soldiers of the Volunteer Army came from every part of the fatherland. And the many and various kinds of appreciation gifts also came from every region. There was tea and white medicinal powder from Yunnan. There was sausage and duck from Guangdong. There was Maotai from Guizhou, tremella from Chuanbei, Dragon's Well tea from Hangzhou, and Fen liquor from Shanxi. There were apples from Yantai. There was ham from Jinhua and Yiwei. There were raisins from the Tulufan basin. There were cantaloupes from Xinjiang. . . . The peoples from the ethnic minority regions sent shoes and socks, which had been sewn and exquisitely embroidered by young women in Qinghai. The Ugyur people especially made Ugyur hats. The Tibetan people offered their most precious gifts, hadas. The comrades of the Southwest Military Region sent their most recent accelerated literacy learning textbooks, literacy cards, and writing cards to the front line. .

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An even greater number of items were necessary articles that everyone can use every day: towels, handkerchiefs, soap, deodorant, toothbrushes, toothpaste, watches, clocks, chopsticks, spoons. . . . Even toilet paper was sent. It was truly a case of there being much of everything.

There were also 700 embroidered banners praising the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and urging the leaders and heroes of the Volunteer Army to kill the enemy. The appreciation letters written by the Chinese People's Central Commission to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea and by the Chinese people amounted to 190,000 letters. The total weight of the appreciation gifts and appreciation letters was approximately 6000 tons. These 6000 tons required 1500 large trucks just so they could be delivered.

Among the appreciation gifts were some gifts which were especially for Comrade Kim Il Sung from the Chinese people. The Hetian people of Xinjiang wove a wall rug especially for Comrade Kim Il Sung. Porcelain workers of Jingde village in Jiangxi especially made a porcelain statue of Comrade Kim Il Sung. The Zhongqing Steel Factory sent a Chinese style rail which the words "For Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung" engraved upon it. Embroiderers from Hunan sent embroidered doves of peace. . . .

I was dumbstruck and filled with strong feelings. For a long time, I said nothing.

During this time, office comrades delivered several appreciation gifts. There were enamel mugs with large, bright red characters printed on them, which said, "Donated to the most loved people" and "Donated to the heroic Korean People's Army"! A black, shiny bakelite tobacco pipe had six large characters carved on it, which said: "The homeland--my mother!" Letter paper and envelopes had "resist the U.S., aid Korea, and protect the nation" emblems printed on them. Finely made tobacco boxes had the heroic

shapes of Chinese and Korean soldiers printed on them. There were even cigarettes with such words as "Attack the aggressors" and "Preserve peace" printed on them. . . .

Deng Hua let out one long breath of air. Then, as though he were talking both to himself and me, said, "It's too heavy! The burden of the fatherland is too heavy!!"

Yes, the burden of the fatherland was too heavy.

Everything that the 900,000 soldiers of the Volunteer Army ate, wore, and used had to be shipped out from China. Weapons, ammunition, and vehicles all had to come out from China. In addition to the great amount of appreciation gifts from national centralized organizations, appreciation gifts were continuously being sent to the front line from each province (autonomous regions), area, and city. However, our fatherland had, after all, just arisen from a catastrophe. We, the people, who had just awoke, had not yet cast off poverty or the torment of illness. Our fatherland was like a giant who was in the first stage of recovery from an illness. It was waiting to recover fully, and this recovery period would be rather long.

Nevertheless, under these circumstances, the people of the father land spent every moment thinking of, caring about, and devising countless plans to support us with their tremendous strength. Chairman Mao called upon the people of the entire nation to "increase production, practice strict economy so as to support the Chinese People's Volunteer Army". The people of the entire nation cut back on both clothing and food. It was a bitter struggle. They saved up money a penny at a time to donate an aircraft cannon. The people of the fatherland heard that our lives were very difficult, that when we ate chow mein we would mix in snow water. So they thought up every way to improve supplies. They especially developed compressed dry provisions, egg yolk powder, and so on. They made special use of 14 lb. cloth to make

new cotton clothing for us. When the enemy began scattering germs and poisonous insects, the people of the fatherland immediately dispatched immunization teams, which transported various kinds of immunization needles and insecticides, thereby allowing us to quickly smash the enemy's germ war. The people of the fatherland knew about the anxiety of our tense lives on the front line, and so they sent a large amount of recreational equipment, pictures, and books. They also sent out many folk art groups and film teams to perform at the front-line positions. The people of the fatherland understood our feelings with respect to being far from our hometowns and caught up in war. A widespread correspondence campaign was developed in every part of the entire nation for the Volunteer Army. Thus, happy news from their hometowns and the feelings of their friends and relatives were continuously transmitted to the soldiers. Spiritually, this was a tremendous comfort and encouragement. Not only did the fatherland care about the Volunteer Army in a big way, but it also provided exceptional care to the families of the the Volunteer Army soldiers.

Throughout the nation the Movement to Support the Army and Give Preferential Treatment to Families of Armymen was initiated; it was great in its strength and impetus. Politically, the families were given glorious reputations, and, for their daily living, they were provided with comprehensive help, thereby erasing anxiety about families of the officers and men on the front line. The people of the fatherland knew the difficulty caused by the fact that our Volunteer Army was equipped with inferior weapons, while the aggressor armies, led by the U.S., were armed to the teeth. Yet they sent their most outstanding sons and daughters to the Volunteer Army. Throughout the nation, there appeared a huge number of vivid examples of wives sending off their husbands, mothers sending off their sons, and brothers and fathers going to the battlefield together. This greatly augmented our power to smash the enemy attack. The fatherland, with respect to the Volunteer Army and the great struggle to resist the U.S. and aid Korea, truly gave its all. "If you need men, we have them; if you need money, we have it; if you need provisions, we have them."

Throughout the country, appreciation gifts were being collected to support the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea. We were aware of this in Yanzhou, before we entered Korea.

This movement was launched by the Chinese People's Commission to Preserve World Peace and to Resist the U.S. Aggressors. They made a special statement to the entire nation. The statement said:

"In order to show appreciation for the heroic struggle against the U.S. aggressor by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army in the snow and cold weather of Korea, in order to succour those who have suffered from the rampages of the U.S. aggressor and his running dogs and to succour the Korean refugees who lack clothing, blankets, provisions, and housing, this commission has decided, together with the Chinese People's Relief Commission and the Central Committee of the Chinese Red Cross, to launch a large-scale drive throughout the nation to collect appreciation gifts and relief gifts. Moreover, this commission shall be responsible for coordinating the entire collection effort. The collection of the appreciation gifts and relief gifts must completely rely on the volunteerism of the Chinese people themselves. Therefore, we hope that this commission and the subcommissions for each area will quickly invite the relief collectives and other people's collectives, offices, factories, and school representatives to launch a mass drive to collect appreciation gifts and relief gifts. In the northeast, the collection of provisions is most important. In cotton-producing areas, the collection of cotton cloth is the most important (part of the collection can be clothes, too). In other regions, especially those which are far from Korea and those in which transportation is difficult, the collection, for the most part, can be cash. (This includes renminbi and gold and silver jewelry."

This announcement was issued on January 14th, 1951.

After this, the Chinese National Women's Association called on all their sisters to quickly take action, expend all their strength and potential to show their appreciation for their relatives and friends and for their Korean brothers and sisters.

The Chinese people, who had just awoken, were very capable of feeling pity for the pain of the Korean people, who were being trampled under the hooves of the aggressors. The good-hearted Chinese people are full of a sense of righteousness and sympathy. As soon as the announcement was made, it was as if a prairie fire been set ablaze; the entire Chinese nation was quickly boiling over noisily.

According to incomplete statistics of the Chinese People's Commission to Preserve World Peace and Resist the U.S., within a period of time lasting longer than one month (from January 14th when the announcement was made until February 17th) people from every region donated cash (to mention one item alone) amounting to more than 36,500,000,000 renminbi (old currency).

In the vast countryside, many peasants donated the fruits of their own labor. And many young women donated their own cherished gold and silver jewelry. 800 cotton-growing households in the Datun cotton-producing village in Shandong in two days donated more than 1100 pounds of cotton. In Wandu village, more than 600 farmers donated their cooperative's rewards for carrying pine wood. This amounted to more than 5,000,000 yuan (old currency). More than fifty women of the Longyan District of Fujian Province donated the money they earned from carrying coal and cutting wood. This amounted to 200,000 yuan (old currency). A peasant woman from the countryside of Henan, Wan Xiulian, donated her gold bracelet which had worn only three days during her marriage.

In the northwest region, shepherds of each ethnic group

together donated more than 4000 pounds of beef. In Qinghai, a Living Buddha from the Zen Taer Temple, donated 2,000,000 renminbi (old currency). Many students from Hangzhou did not return home during their winter vacations. They took the money they saved and donated it as an appreciation gift.

According to the relevant records, in 1951 alone, the total amount of materials sent to Korea included more than 360,000 pieces of cotton clothing, 150,000 shoes, 192 boxcar loads of grain provisions, 20 boxcars of meat, 150,000 towels, and 1,279,000 boxes of other materials.

On that day, when Deng Hua and I discussed the matter of the people of the fatherland donating aircraft cannons, I as a matter of course mentioned the famous Henan opera singer, who was in Korea to perform for a second time. Her name was Comrade Chang Xiangyu. Before leaving China, we had seen her perform in Xian and knew that the "Xiangyu Opera Company" which she led enjoyed a very good reputation throughout the nation.

After she learned of the announcement of the Commission to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea concerning the donation of weapons to support the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, she immediately decided to use the reputation of "Xiangyu Opera Company" to donate one aircraft on her own. At that time, one plane cost 1,500,000,000 renminbi (old currency). She sold her own family's car to get cash and prepared five excellent plays. Neither wind nor rain prevented her from racing about the country. She performed for half a year, and she exceeded the money-raising goal she had set. In doing this, she and all the comrades of her opera company must have expended a lot of energy and sweat! Chang Xiangyu and her comrades are very good representatives of Chinese artists and performers. Their lofty patriotic thinking and their selfless, public-minded spirit of sacrifice should forever be extolled and glorified by Chinese artists and performers.

During this time, one could say that, in response to a righteous call and a beneficial undertaking, as soon as the arm was raised and the call went out, the respondents gathered together like clouds. As soon as the Chinese People's Commission to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea sent out the call to donate weapons to support the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, the National Committee of Unions, the National Women's Alliance, the Central Committee for Youth Groups, the Association of Students, the Committee of Natural Scientists and Specialists, the Committee on Science and Technology, the Chinese People's Relief Commission, the Chinese Red Cross, etc. quickly dispatched resolutions or announcements or notices in response to this call. Every part of the country and every level of society became active and formed a vast, momentous, down-to-earth mass movement which surged forward on a magnificent scale. This movement was integrated with the movement to increase production and increase income. It was also integrated with a deepening of patriotism and self-education. National construction, the lives of the people, patriotism, and party consciousness all were obviously strengthened and improved.

Deng Hua went on discussing with me the exciting news from the fatherland which he had heard continuously during that period of time at the front. For example, the people of Comrade Mao Zedong's home village in Xiangze District donated a "Mao Zedong" fighter plane. The women of Beijing donated a "Beijing Women" airplane. The National Athletic Conference donated an "Athletics" plane. People from every sector of society donated "Beijing Railroad Workers", "Chinese Shopkeepers", "Luxun", "Teachers", "People's Cinema", "Wolf Tooth Mountain", "Baiyangdian Lake", etc. As for some provinces, cities, and autonomous regions, some donated one artillery regiment and an artillery division. Some donated armored brigades. Shandong Province donated the "Shandong Air Division", which contained more than 120 aircraft. By May of 1952, the Chinese people had donated enough money to buy, at 1,500,000,000 per fighter plane, 3710 aircraft, with 62,306,834 renminbi left over.

While the donations were being made, people from every sector of our nation expressed a high level of intense patriotism. They came up with a resounding slogan: "If you have money, give money. If you have strength, give strength. If you have provisions, give provisions." Even to this day, when I think about it, I am as though struck by a fever. When I was on the Korean battlefields, I received a letter from an old war buddy, Huang Jing. This mayor of Tianjin described in his letter how weapons were being donated in the city of Tianjin. In his description, he mentioned some professors and writers who donated the money they made from publishing. Students from the universities took the money they earned from their summer vacation work-study program and donated all of it. Liu Fengying, a housewife, took her daughter's dowry, 120 ounces of silver, and donated it. A woman named Li donated two pieces of silver which, even when she went hungry under the Japanese occupation of Tianjin, she had not been able to part with before. . . .

I remember that at the time some literature said: one monk in the Mongolian Autonomous Region donated 8000 silver yuan by himself. The Lama Kulun Temple donated 100 pieces of jade. In Xinjiang, a 103 year old man, a Ugyur, took the money he had earned from selling wheat and spun thread and donated all of it. Many cadres every month left only the money to be spent on meals for the staff and workers, took the rest of their salaries, and gave it all as a donation. High school and elementary school students, even toddlers, saved their breakfast and candy money and donated it for weapons. . . .

Materially, the people of the fatherland used all their strength to support our Volunteer Army. Spiritually, they cared with great solicitude and were thoroughly concerned.

Before the fifth campaign, before the first appreciation group from the fatherland went to Korea, the great majority of

soldiers were not able to read any books or newspapers, because of the intensity of the war. Some soldiers for a long time did not even see block characters written with pencils. When one company commander saw, in a Korean newspaper, a headline which used Chinese characters, he was exceptionally happy, and cut out the headline which contained Chinese characters with scissors. He gave it the troops to see and ordered them not to mess it up. The men acted as though they were seeing a relative from the fatherland. You hand it to me, and I'll hand it to you--they passed it around. Finally, the company commander stored it away and kept it until the fifth campaign came to an end. You can imagine what the feelings of our officers and men would have been if they had received letters sent from the fatherland at this time.

In fact, at this time, the letters had already arrived. They had come from every part of the country. They had been sent to newspapers, sent to every level of government, sent to the Commission to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea. It was ardently hoped that these agencies would as quickly as possible send the letters on to the front line, into the hands of the officers and men of the Volunteer Army which was resisting the U.S. and aiding Korea. A journalist comrade from the People's Daily said to me: After the news of the victory of the shoulder-to-shoulder struggle of the Volunteer Army and the Korean people was transmitted to the fatherland, every part of the fatherland, one after the other, wrote appreciation letters to the Volunteer Army. The People's Daily alone received as many as several thousands of appreciations letters every day. At the very least, they would received several hundreds.

I remember, while on a march during the second phase of the fifth campaign, the head of the operations sections, Yuan Xing, came rushing over. Panting loudly, he walked before me and very mysteriously and excitedly said, "Commander, I have brought you an extremely precious present. You will certainly like it very

much." At that time we were low on provisions, I thought that perhaps he had found some things to eat. I did not expect that he would pull out a large package of letters. From among them, he picked a few and gave them to me. The rest he distributed to the surrounding comrades. While distributing the letters, he said, "These are letters for us from the people of the fatherland. 'The beacon-fires of war burn for three months, and a letter from home is worth 10,000 pieces of gold.' Each letter is deep and sincere. Every word is ten thousand pounds!"

I opened up one envelope. It was written by an eighty-four year old man. I can't remember his name clearly now. The characters had been written with a writing brush. He wrote very well, with authority and grace. Some of his sentences were somewhat classical in their style. To this day, I still remember the main message of the letter: In fighting the aggressor, you have accomplished much for the people and the nation. I have led my son, my grandchildren, and my great grandchildren--in all, four generations--in extending gratitude and respect to all those officers and men who are laboring under great hardship for the happiness of the people. I am old and unable to hold a gun. But I have sent off my grandson, and I also wish to send my son, who is more than fifty years old, off to the front line. Moreover, I would like to lead all those living at home to succeed in production to support the front line. I remember that there was a sixty-eight year old Ugyur woman, who said in her letter that she hated the countless evils of the aggressor and that she loved the children of the Volunteer Army. She was old, but her health was still good. Her shoulders were still strong. She asked to go to the front line to wash clothes, light fires, and cook for the Volunteer Army. . . . Some of the comrades were so moved they shed tears. Some of them made requests, saying, "Commander, after we have settled down, let's hurry up and write a letter to the old mother asking her not to worry and asking her absolutely not to come. We will certainly fiercely attack the aggressor!" There was also a letter mailed from Hankou. A woman worker at a bedding

and garment factory in Hankou sent her only son, who had fallen seriously ill to stay with her sister, so that she could stay up all night making forty cotton military uniforms. However, on the second day, when she returned home, her sister, overcome with sadness, cried, for her son had died! She herself was very sad and cried. Some people wished to report this matter to the authorities or write letters telling the Volunteer Army. At first, she would not let them. After constant efforts at persuasion, she said, her eyes filled with tears, 'If you are going to write, then tell the Volunteer Army not to be sad for me. That forty soldiers not suffer from the freezing cold is worth the death of my son. . . .'" When the comrades heard this, they immediately went quiet, and for a long time did not say anything.

The bags which the first appreciation delegation had sent us were all stuffed with small red books. This was a collection of poems written by the famous poet Yi Zhongping to show his appreciation for the Volunteer Army. The poet had written this poem on the title page of every little book:

Each act to show appreciation is filled with a certain
feeling
Each feeling is stuffed into an appreciation letter
Tens of thousands of industrious, courageous laboring people
Have sent you several tens of thousands of industrious,
courageous hearts

This poem expressed the deep feelings of the many men and officers of the Volunteer Army.

My wife, Shen Gejun, had to stay at the rear office in the rear support area at Dandong when I went into Korea. After she entered Korea, she told me about many experiences she herself had while in the rear support area.

One evening at dusk, she went out with the manager of the

rear office. They encountered two persons leading horses. One was more than forty years old, and the other was more than twenty years old. They both wore leather caps, long robes, and riding boots. The horses were carrying bulging packages on their backs. These two men followed the women all the way to the rear office. Only after asking many questions did they realize that these two men were uncle and nephew. They had come from the steppes of Inner Mongolia. Earlier, sixty young men from their region, riding horses, had joined the Volunteer Army. The nephew was out shepherding and was not able to catch up. But the uncle accompanied him here and said that he too would not return. The uncler wanted to go to Korea to fight the aggressor as well.

The rear office had received a contingent of stretcher bearers, composed of more than twenty persons. Most of the members of the team were men who were more than forty years old and from Canton Province. There was only one young lad. He had a fair and clear complexion and was a very dexterous worker. His friends said he was a mute. The manager, who was attentive to detail, discovered that he went to sleep later than the others and got up earlier than the others. What was even stranger was that he was never discovered going to the toilet. This manager made a point of observing a few times. It was not that this young lad did not go to the toilet, but that he did not go the rear office's toilet. At daybreak or after sunset he would run outside. Only after three inquiries did she uncover the secret. A girl had disguised herself as a man. She was like the famous Hua Mulan, the female soldier of ancient times.

When I mentioned these incidents, Deng Hua said that he had heard people say that at the conference for women representatives in Jiao District of Shandong Province some of the women stood up and insistently demanded that they be allowed to join the Volunteer Army.

The sincere and unadorned patriotism of the people and their

public-minded, selfless, heartfelt, lofty virtue truly instilled feelings of respect. It is hard to forget.

That evening, Deng Hua and I also discussed the performing comrades who had come to Korea to perform appreciations shows.

Among these performers, many had high artistic reputations. There were artists who had received profound welcome and joyous affection from the masses. They were famous in China, even throughout the world. For example, there were the Beijing opera performers Mei Lanfang, Zhou Xinfang, Cheng Yanqiu, Ma Lianliang, Tan Fuying, Qiu Shengjie, Yan Huizhu, Chen Quefeng, Gao Shenglin, Li Yuqie, Wang Yurong, Wang Xichun, Ye Shenglan, Du Jinfang, Zhang Yunxi, Zhang Chunhua, and so on. There were the northern "ping" opera performers "Little White Jade Box" and Xin Fengxia. There were the Sichuan opera performers Chen Shufang and Zhou Qihe. There was the Han opera performer Chen Bohua. There were the Shanghai opera performers Ding Shie and Shi Xiaoying. As for Pu opera, there was Ding Guoxian; Guilin opera, Yi Yi; Hebei opera, Li Guiyun and Han Junqing; Xiang opera, Xu Shaoqing and Tan Baocheng; Huai opera, Xia Wenyan; Qin opera, Su Yumin; Henan opera, Changxiang Yu; Shaoxing opera, Xu Yulan and Wang Wenjuan; Shandong clapper ballads, Gao Yuanjun; movie actor, Jin Yan; musician, Ma Sicong; singers, Yu Yixuan, Zhou Xiaoyan, Wang Kun, Lang Yuxiu; dancer, Zuo Hala, and so on and so on.

At that time, many art and culture groups had not yet been made part of the national system and belonged to private individuals. They supported themselves with their incomes from performances. The incomes of famous performers were at that time very high. I remember Comrade Mei Lanfang making a joke in which she said to me that by performing the "Drunken Concubine" just once--about half an hour--she earned much more money than I, a commander, earned in a month. I believe that this was true. However, when they went to Korea to put on appreciation performances, not only did they not get any special reward--

sometimes they had to risk being wounded or even risk sacrificing their own lives. This is a fact which I saw with my own eyes.

I remember that several times performers, after coming to Korea to put on shows, they would stay for a while in Korea to work with the Shaoxing opera group of the Central Political Department of the Military Commission in escorting prisoners of war.

The predecessor to this Shaoxing opera group was the "Yulan Shaoxing Opera Company", which was famous during the 1940s in Shanghai. The main actors were Xu Yulan, Wang Wenjuan, and other comrades. Not long after the founding of the nation, they donned military uniforms and became common soldiers in the People's Liberation Army. This was quite a feat! (During the first years after the founding of the nation, cultural groups in the army received the same treatment as did common soldiers.) Not long after these young women from Shanghai put on their military uniforms, they took the initiative to request to go to the Korean front line so as to show their appreciation to the Volunteer Army. They said: We are soldiers. To go to the front line and put on a performance for the soldiers there and thereby serve the army is a mission which we must carry out. I remember that once they let me talk to them about the situation on the battlefield. On that day, the weather was fine. While talking, we walked to a high slope up above the gold mine. We talked and talked. Then suddenly there came three "Wild Horse" planes. The young ladies of the Shaoxing opera group had no experience of this. The office comrades instructed them to scatter. Xu Yulan and Wang Wenjuan kept on standing there, watching the planes. I grabbed one by the hand and pulled her into a tunnel. Right after we entered the tunnel entrance, the bombs which the enemy planes had dropped exploded. It was very dangerous then, but the comrades of the Shaoxing opera group showed themselves to be very much like soldiers. Indeed, these young women from Shanghai did not have the shyness of young women. Some had the bravery of soldiers and the

enthusiasm of soldiers. They did not care about the bombings of the enemy planes or about artillery fire attacks. They spent eight months performing among the front line combat units. This was quite a feat.

In my opinion, the main reason why the cultural groups were especially welcomed by the officers and men at the front line (besides the fact of their excellent artistic abilities) was that they gave their hearts and minds to the troops and because their thinking and behaviour with respect to serving the army was excellent. In the minds of the officers and men, they were above all representatives from the fatherland. And the slogan "Fatherland above everything and everything for the fatherland" was very real on the front line.

The soldiers said that when an appreciation group came, the fatherland came. This was quite sincere. This was because they had brought not only news of victory in national construction and the care, love, and hope of all the nation's people, but also the people's resolve and ambition to resist the U.S. and Aid Korea. They provided the officers and men with a tremendous strength.

The fatherland will always be the source of strength for the People's Army.

That night, Comrade Deng Hua and I stayed up very late, talking.

We had a discussion and came to a conclusion: we would educate the troops. We would make each soldier feel that behind him there were 500,000,000 of his countrymen in the great fatherland. We would make each soldier aware of how he should act and what attitude he should take in response to the solicitude of the people of the fatherland. Deng Hua also suggested that we send out a letter in our names to all the officers and men of the Volunteer Army. The topic which Deng Hua selected for this

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letters was: Answer the solicitude and support of the people of the fatherland with a new victory.

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Chapter Nine. Springtime in Winter

Winter in Korea comes early and leaves late. Moreover, it is a very fierce winter. When combat is intense, there is no time to notice. When the fighting dies down, this feeling is exceptionally intense.

The winter of 1952 was like this. The military situation continued to be one of confrontation. Because of damage done by the enemy, the armistice negotiations were broken off for a long period of time. We had sunk into a stalemate. At the same time that we were closely observing the enemy, we were having to cope with the sever winter.

On the afternoon of December 2nd, we received a report from the Military Commission. The report said that the 34th President of the United States, Eisenhower, the new Secretary of Defense, Wilson, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley, the Pacific Fleet Commander, Leidefude [transliteration], and others would arrive that day in Korea. This U.S. President, as soon as he had taken office, came to Korea. Moreover, most of those who accompanied him were high-level leaders of the military. We could not but pay close attention to this. The Military Commission wanted us to be even more on guard than we had been and to be always sure that the dynamic enemy situation was normal.

I immediately phoned each front-line commander. I requested

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that their intelligence offices should pay strict attention to the enemy situation and gather information. They then should immediately make reports containing analysis.

Eisenhower could be called a famous person. After Ridgeway left Korea and replaced him as Supreme Commander of NATO forces, Eisenhower returned to the U.S. to participate in the U.S. presidential elections. I read some literature on him, especially after he was elected president.

When Eisenhower was twenty-one years old, he tested into West Point Academy. After he graduated, he served the army in Texas. He participated in the First and Second World Wars. During the 1930s, he worked as an assistant to Supreme Commander MacArthur, who first invaded Korea. (At that time, he was the Army Chief of Staff.) In December of 1944, he was promoted to five star general. He had served in the army for over forty years. Among U.S. presidents, he had the longest record of military service. This kind of army life was rare among the leaders of the world's various nations as well. Before he became president, he was Army Chief of Staff, President of Columbia University, and Supreme Commander of NATO. The Americans said he was a president who had worked in the realms of the army, government, and education.

The very experienced Eisenhower knew that Truman's two years of aggressive war was causing strong dissatisfaction and desire to end the war among the American people. The cry to put an end to the war was getting louder and louder. "All women dislike war in Korea and other places. Many mothers wish to seize any kind of promise against throwing their sons into war." (Washington Star Newspaper) Therefore, in a speech on October 24th before the main election, he made a promise to the voters. He said that if he became president he "planned to go to Korea and make an on-site effort to stop the war." He said, "Where will the new government start? First of all, with a a simple and decisive solution implemented by the president. This solution is to cast aside

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previous enmities, cast aside political disputes, and gather our energy to put an end to the Korean war. We shall end the war with honor. This requires that I myself go to visit Korea. I assure you that this is what I will do. Only by these means will I be able to learn how to serve the American people in the practice of peace. I will certainly go to Korea." This promise won him many votes. It allowed him to defeat his opponent, Stevenson, who belonged to the same political party that Truman, the previous president, did.

Truman knew Eisenhower. Therefore, he called Eisenhower's "promise" a "trick". Later on, in his memoirs, he stated the dissatisfaction he felt at that time: "A responsible military man, a man who knew very well the finest details of our negotiatons to bring a halt to hostile actions, suddenly took advantage of this tragedy for the sake of political advantage. What I regret is that this chapter will be recorded in the annals of our nation's history."

One may feel regret, but the basis of regret should be fact. Only when there were facts which made the U.S. generals feel regret did the U.S. generals really feel endless pity.

Eisenhower came to Korea. But we knew very clearly that he did not come to stop the Korean war. He had said that he wanted to end the "matter" of the Korean War with "honor". All the people of the world knew what was meant by Eisenhower's honor. If there was going to be his "honor", then there would not be any dignity for the Chinese and Korean peoples.

From December 2nd to December 5th, Eisenhower was active in Korea for four days. He conducted a series of meetings with Clark, Van Fleet, Rhee and others. The contents of these meetings were of course top secret. However, the activities of the enemies cannot escape our eyes. During that time, we kept on getting reports such as: The enemy is conducting beach landing excercizes

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and air landing exercises with greater frequency than previously. We captured a special agent who had infiltrated our west coast to gather intelligence. He confessed that the puppet army of Rhee had recently organized two infantry divisions, six independent regiments, and twenty-eight artillery battalions. The news also leaked that the enemy would launch a large-scale offensive in February of 1953, so as to end the Korean War with "honor", etc., etc. These occurrences indicated that Eisenhower had come to Korea to make new deployments.

Not long afterwards, the Military Commission reported to us Eisenhower's statement after returning to the U.S. In his statement, he said, "There is no simple solution to quickly resolve this war victoriously. However, this realization at the very least will cause us to be prepared with respect to the tremendously arduous mission that confronts us." He declared that training and expansion of Rhee's puppet army would be hastened. He also declared that he would use "acts" and not "words" to break the stalemate. Thus, Eisenhower revealed his true face to the people of the entire world, including the U.S. According to later sources, Bradley, before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, revealed in a secret testimony that, after Eisenhower arrived in Korea, he finalized plans for an "Eisenhower Offensive". The plan included questions on "bringing a few divisions from the Chinese Nationalist Party onto the battlefield", "bombing Northeast China", "blockading China", and even "using tactical atomic weapons".¹

Right when we were in the middle of studying how to cope with changes in the enemy situation by carrying out new deployments, Comrade Deng Hua, who had been summoned for an interview with

1 See United Press International, March 6th, 1977, Washington.

Chairman Mao, returned from Beijing. That was the afternoon of December 15th. It was snowing heavily. Flurries of snowflakes had been blowing about all morning. The hills were white. The trees were white. The roads surfaces were white. The entire area surrounding "Volunteer Command" was a world wrapped in pure white.

As soon as a young People's Army comrade working at "United Command" met Deng Hua, he said, "General Deng, Korea has welcomed you back with pure, white snow!"

Deng Hua said, "Thank you! But I brought this snow with me from Shenyang!"

That comrade laughed a friendly laugh.

Deng Hua said with great solemnity, "Really. Yesterday, I arrived in Shenyang. In Shenyang, it snowed. Today, I arrive here, and it snowed here. It follows me wherever I go! There is an ancient Chinese saying: 'If there's fresh snow, then the harvest will be abundant. I am very lucky. Abundant harvests are following me!"

Zhang Wenzhou very gently and gracefully ventured a statement: "If tomorrow you go to Hainan Island, the snow won't follow you any longer."

I said to Deng Hua, "It does not matter whether or not the snow follows you. What I am happy about is that came back at just the right time!"

That evening, several leaders of "Volunteer Command" gathered together and went to the operations room to listen to Denghua tell us the instructions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao. Comrade Hong Xuezhong also came. He was wearing a large leather cap. When he entered the room, he removed his cap. His

large bald head, which had been shaved not long ago, was steaming!

The first sentence Deng Hua said was: "Chairman Mao, Commander in Chief Zhu, and Premier Zhou told me to wish everyone well. The commander in chief made especially clear that I was to wish each and every one of you well. Otherwise, I would not have completed my mission!" He paused. He somewhat mysteriously removed four bottles of Maotai liquor from his shoulder bag and set them down on the table. He said, "The premier himself gave me these four bottles of Maotai when I was making a report to the Chairman. The premier said to me, 'New Year's will arrive soon. During the holidays, one doubly longs for home. These bottles of liquor are for you to take back. You could say they are New Year's presents!" The Chairman then laughed and said, 'Aren't these gifts rather insufficient?' The premier said, 'The presents are light, but the thought is heavy!'" Deng Hua picked up a bottle and weighed it in his hand and said, "As for the mission assigned to me by Chairman Mao, Commander in Chief Zhu, and Premier Zhou, I have completed it." I said, "Keep this liquor and wait until we win a great victory. Then we will drink it!"

Deng Hua presented to us the Military Commission leaders' analysis on the Korean situation. He said, "The Military Commission surmises a possibility that the enemy will land to our flanks and our rear. This estimation is based on: 1) Although the U.S. has suffered great losses and much damage in Korea, these losses have not reached a level where the U.S. would be willing to immediately stop the war. For no reason, they broke off the Panmunjeom talks. This shows that they still wish to fight. 2) Eisenhower has arrived in Korea. Militarily, he has a new strategic plan. 3) The Political Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the resolution sponsored by India concerning a solution to the problem of prisoners in the Korean War. This resolution echoed the desire of the U.S. to forcibly take custody of our prisoners of war. To a certain

extent, it encourages them to think of seeking a military advantage. 4) If we strictly examine the military lay out here in Korea, we can see that the the probability of the enemy launching a frontal offensive against our rather strong, deep defensive fortifications is not as great as the probability that he will execute landing operations from our rear or flanks. According to the Military Commission analysis, if we are able defend the positions along the northeast coast of North Korea and cause the enemy's plan to execute beach landings to fail, and if coordinating tactical operations are carried out along the front line (thereby inflicting even more casualties on the enemy), then the Korean military situation can become even more stabilized and will tend to develop even more in our favor."

Deng Hua said that when he saw Chairman Mao he was very moved. He said that Chairman cared very much about the officers and men of the Volunteer Army and cared very much about the Korean War. He ordered his secretary to give him telegrams from the front line as soon as they arrived. There should not be even a minute's delay.

I said, "I remember once we sent our a telegram at one in the morning. At two in the morning, the official reply, signed by Chairman Mao, returned. Only one hour was spent between two nations."

Deng Hua said, "I mentioned this matter to the Chairman when I saw him. Moreover, I urged Chairman Mao to pay more attention to his health and not get too fatigued. Chairman Mao said, 'Speed is precious in war.' Even if I am always up at midnight or one in the morning here, I am still on a red carpet. You are under the big guns. If you people were not in Korea, I would be uncomfortable here!"

When Chairman Mao analyzed the war situation in Korea, he emphasized that the Volunteer Army should set an active policy

based on the judgment that "the enemy will certainly land, that he will land on the northeast coast, and that he will certainly land between the Seoul River and Cheongcheon River". The enemy would land perhaps in spring, but possibly even earlier. That old saying still applies: "It is better to prepare too early than to prepare too late."

Without us realizing it, our little meeting went on to midnight. The charcoal stove in the operations room spit out sapphire-colored flames. I don't know who it was or when it was that someone placed a few sweet potatoes under the stove. They were giving off a sweet odor that filled the senses. Outside the room, the snow was knee-high.

I thought that at this time Chairman Mao, too, had not yet rested. Could he be waiting for our report?

We decided to hold a conference on December 17th for army commanders and commissars from all the armies, division commanders of all the independent divisions, and for cadres of higher levels. In the meeting, we would inform them of the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee. We would discuss and study the resolutions and strategic plans of "Volunteer Command". A comrade suggested that we immediately report this decisions to the Central Committee. I solicited an opinion from Deng Hua. He said, "Let's wait a little while, until dawn. Let's send it after eight in the morning!"

Our meeting for the cadres went very well. The day before the meeting ended was December 20th. On that day, we received "Instructions on How to Prepare All the Necessary Conditions, on How to Smash the Enemy's Risking a Landing, and on How to Win and Even Greater Victory" from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was signed and dispatched by Chairman Mao himself. The "Instructions" stated that the stubborn and heroic struggle by our Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army, which

began more than two years earlier, against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen armies, had won us great and glorious victories. It went on to say that we had already found out the enemy's real nature and had overcome very many difficulties and that in the process had accumulated much valuable experience. The U.S. imperialists had employed many means in fighting with us, and not one of them had not failed. Now what remained was to risk a landing along our flank and two our rear. The enemy wished to attack us by these means. We only needed to eliminate this means of his and cause his risky undertaking to fail so that his ultimate failure would become certain. The Central Committee resolutely believed that our Volunteer Army together with the Korean People's Army would be able to smash the enemy's risky plan. The Committee hoped that the comrades would be careful and cautious, as well as tenacious and that they would mobilized all their strength in a race against time to complete the preparation work for the enemy landing operation. We needed only to prepare well, and the victory would be ours.

In order to strengthen the leadership of Western Sea Command, the instruction clearly stated that Deng Hua, was acting commander and political commissar of the Volunteer Army should serve as both commander and commissar of the Western Sea Command. I would be responsible for work at Volunteer Army headquarters.

According to the Central Committee's instructions, we should further investigate ways of countering landing operations.

First of all, we improved the command organs on both the western and eastern coasts. Using some of the personnel from the Volunteer Army headquarters and the personnel from the western coast united command post, we organized a united command for the west coast armies. Wu Xinquan and a cadre from the Korean People's Army served as vice commanders. Du Ping served as vice commissar. Moreover, an air force command post and a navy operations office were established within the command post.

Using the command organizations of the 1st Armored Division as a basis, and by adding on to this some of the cadres of the 2nd Armored Division, we organized the 2nd Armored Command Post, which was responsible for commanding the armored armies on the western coast. The headquarters of the 3rd Group Army and the headquarters of the 9th Group Army were exchanged. The 3rd Group Army Headquarters also served as the eastern coast headquarters. Wang Jinshan and a cadre from the Korean People's Army served as vice commanders. Du Yide served as vice commissar.

As for deployments of forces, our 1st, 16th, and 21st Armies, our 1st Armored Division, and the already reequipped 33rd Division entered Korea, one after the other, in order to increase troop strength. The 54th Army (one division of this army had already entered Korea) was assembled in the northeastern region in preparation for participation in the anti-landing operation. It served as a strategic reserve force for the Volunteer Army. There were also six regiments and three battalions of ground artillery. There was one regiment and one battalion of anti-aircraft artillery. These were to be used to reinforce all of the front line armies and the coastal units. There was one air division, one naval torpedo boat fleet, one sea transport fleet, and two coastal artillery companies. They were also preparing to participate in the operation to oppose the landing. In order that the units which had just arrived in Korea could be trained in depending on frontal fortifications and thereby gain experience, we transferred the 38th and 40th Armies, which had been toughened in Korea, from the front line to the west coast. We also transferred the 16th Army and the 130th Division of the 54th Army to the west coast. We transferred the 15th Army and the 12th Army to the east coast. We also transferred one division and one regiment of the 21st Army and the 33rd Division to the east coast. Thus, the coastal defenses became more and more strong. We also planned to transfer the 47th Army to the Gushan [transliteration] region to serve as a reserve force for Volunteer Command. The armies which took over the original battlefield defensive mission

were the 23rd, 24th, 46th, and 1st Armies. In order to augment transportation and battlefield first aid, the Military Commission transferred the 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Railroad Divisions and 5000 railroad workers into Korea. They would work together with the Korean 3rd Railroad Brigade. Under commands to construct new railroads, they would be responsible for building a latitudinal railroad from Guicheng to Dechuan [transliterations] and for building a longitudinal auxiliary line, the Jingyi railroad, from Jiachuan [transliteration] to Eunsan. It would connect with three large railroads, thus changing the situation in which railroad transportation was concentrated near the Korean west coast on the Jingyi line. In addition, the rear supply dispositions were modified. The first, second, and third logistical units were made responsible for supplying each of the front line armies. The fourth unit was responsible for all the armies of the eastern coast, and the fifth unit was responsible for all the armies of the western coast. Moreover, the fifth unit was reinforced.

On the day on which the meeting ended, Volunteer Command organized a grand banquet. Deng Hua and I had decided early on that we would take the Maotai which he had brought from Beijing to the banquet. Denghua also said, "Tell everyone the story behind this liquor. It is an important part of our meeting." When the Maotai was placed on the table, Deng Hua waved a hand and said loudly, "Comrades, this Maotai given to me by Premier Zhou so that I could bring it to everyone. The premier wanted me to wish every one well. The premier wishes everyone victory soon!"

Everyone clapped for a while.

Denghua then said, "Our Chairman Mao and Commander in Chief Zhu send everyone here their best wishes!"

Again, everyone clapped enthusiastically.

Before the clapping stopped, someone shouted out, "I suggest that we drink a toast to our great fatherland!"

"A toast to the fatherland!" responded a hundred voices. Feelings at the party reached a high tide, and many comrades shed tears of excitement.

New Year's, 1953, had arrived.

On New Year's Eve, the Pyongyang Working People's Art Group of Korea and appreciation groups organized in every state went to Volunteer Command to wish us well. They brought many things for the holiday. Friends from Huechang Li brought several white and tender cakes of tofu which they had made especially for us. A piece of red silk was tied onto the carrying pole. Following the tofu carrying pole was a sixty year old man, his white beard fluttering in front of his chest. When he saw us, he was all smiles. He could read Chinese and could speak Chinese. He said to me, "The hometown of tofu is China. Only by crossing the river and giving itself in marriage was it able to come to Korea." He had memorized a tofu poem. I asked him to write it down in a notebook using Chinese characters:

Food with no flavor for a long time
Tofu is cut into new squares
It's easy on the toothless
It really helps an old body
Fish, thinks the guest from the south
Yoghurt, thinks the barbarian
Our land is beautiful
Heaven kindly nurtures its people

The office comrades were all busy making preparations. Everyone was putting up banners and preparing things for the new year, making the place seem a little like a club and rehearsing this holiday which we were creating. Everyone wished to enjoy a

fruitful and pleasing new year.

It was also at this time that Comrade Li Zhimin was assigned director of the political department of the Volunteer Army. He quickly came with his wife, Liu Ping, to fill the post. My old lady came at the beginning of the new year again to be with me. Naturally, it was quite a pleasant experience. Shen Gejun and Liu Ping were even more overcome with joy.

On the night of the 31st, the offices at Volunteer Command held a joyful party. Those who could sing sang. Those who were good at dancing danced. Those who liked to tell stories told stories. As for those who could neither dance nor sing and who did not want to tell stories, they went to see the performance put on by the cultural group. It was like "the eight immortals crossing the sea", with everyone showing off his particular talent. The party was extremely noisy and lively. Someone suggested that the new director, Li Zhimin, sing a song. Zhimin got up very slowly and said, "I'll sing my song. It's just that there is a pair of outstanding singers here with a great variety of talents. They are outstanding in Peking opera, Hebei opera, and flower drum plays. Let's welcome this couple in first giving us a performance!" Saying this, he led a round of applause. I knew that this guy was referring to me. When with the 19th Group Army, Gejun and I had taken part in the fun at some parties. After coming to Volunteer Command, we retired. I had not thought that this would be brought up again.

"Does everyone know who this pair of performers is?" In order to create the proper atmosphere, Zhimin purposefully posed this rhetorical question. "They are our Commander Yang and his wife She Gejun!"

Everyone began clapping. "Welcome Commander Yang and Section Leader Shen for giving us a performance of the Hunan flower drum play, 'Liu Hai Chops Firewood'". The sound of clapping blended

with the sound of shouting. It was very rhythmic. It was like companies singing songs to each other on an athletic field.

She Gejun shouted over the din, "Director Li's Comrade Liu Ping used to be a member of a cultural group. Let's everyone welcome a performance from them!" Unfortunately, her voice was too soft. It was smothered by everyone's shouting and clapping.

Happy get-togethers between officers and privates are a glorious tradition of our army. I said to Shen Gejun, "Since everybody wants us to, then let's perform!"

The party only ended after going on and on deep into the night. Everyone was quite happy. Early on New Year's Day, we paid courtesy calls to each other. This made the holiday atmosphere even more festive. Although we were away from our home towns in a distant place, we had not feeling of being away. The warmth of the Korean people filled the holiday with a warm, family-like atmosphere. The special setting of the battlefield added color to the new year. This year was very interesting.

One afternoon, a few days after New Year's, each and every comrade of the Volunteer Command offices happily moved tables and benches into a large room. They carried teapots and tea cups. Some were arranging fruits. It seemed like they were going to hold an important gathering. I suddenly realized: wasn't the deputy director of the office, Yang Fengan, going to get married? Earlier, I had heard the chief of staff mention this affair. I asked, and sure enough that is what it was.

Yang Fengan was perhaps twenty-seven or twenty-eight years old. His fiancée, Lu Hongyun was just a couple of years younger than he. If it were not for his being in the army, if it were not for this war, they may have already become parents.

Lu Hongyun was also in the headquarter's office then. She

was a confidential secretary. This comrade, when only seventeen years old, was the director of the local women's rescue committee. After joining the army, she worked with Comrade Su Yu as a confidential worker in the Huadong. After the third campaign, a number of excellent confidential personnel were transferred to Korea. That is when she arrived at Volunteer Command. This young lady from Jiaodong was especially alert and resourceful like a person from Jiaodong, and she had the "spicy" personality of Jiadong. She and Big Yang made a very good couple.

Since I was the vice commander in charge of work at home, I naturally had to go wish them well at their wedding. But I feared that by going I would put a damper on the young people's merriment. I thought it over again and again and decided to select another day to hold a banquet for these young people who were to be married on the battlefield. I made the comrades from headquarters all go to participate in Big Yang's wedding. As for myself, I went on duty at the operations room.

It was quite a coincidence. Soon after I got to the operations room, Comrade Hong Xuezhi called me on the telephone. His voice always vibrated so much that the receiver itself would shake. "Hello. New Year's has past. Spring will come soon. By the time spring comes, who knows, perhaps the war will have broken out again. Since there's little to do these days, you come over to my place. Things to eat, things to drink, things to play---I have prepared everything. Let's happily pass through this year ahead of schedule. How about it?"

I was very happy. I was very happy to this kind of true war buddy.

I told him that I wanted to go very much, but that I could not go alone. I would have to take a group of people with me.

Xuezhi said, "The more, the merrier. Do you think that the

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logistical commander won't be able to come up with food! Bring a bunch of people. I'll drive over and pick you up."

I told him that Deng Hua and Du Ping had already gone to "Western Sea Command" and that Zhimin was preparing to go and see the troops. I would take whoever was left at the offices at headquarters. At the same, I told him about Big Yang's wedding.

As soon as Xuezhi heard that Big Yang was getting married, his voice got even louder. "Make him come. Make him and his new bride come together. We can celebrate their marriage here. Leave someone on duty and bring the rest of them!"

I told Xuezhi that Big Yang's wedding was right then underway. They absolutely could not go today. I had to be on duty today and absolutely could not leave.

"In that case, you arrange a time!" From listening to his voice, I could tell that Xuezhi was a little anxious.

I said, "I will certainly go to your place. As soon as I can set a time, I will tell you. You just get ready, that's all."

On the evening of the next day, I asked Big Wang in the kitchen to prepare several dishes. I invited the Yang couple to my apartment. Since Shen Gejun returned to China feeling ill after New Year's, I only needed to invited a few comrades to accompany us and to congratulate the Yangs on their new marriage. Marriage is a wonderful and important event in the life of a person. On a battlefield, it becomes even more wonderful. Although there was none of the trumpets, firecrackers, and crowds of well-wishing people, young and old, as you would find in peaceful surroundings, here were close war friends, bound by ties of life and death. And here we had machine guns and artillery and a celebratory style which not just anyone could enjoy. A wedding concluded among sounds of artillery and machine guns will be more

certain and enduring than one which was given birth under the moon and before flowers. Everyone wished them well from the bottoms of their hearts. The newly-weds, too, were quite moved.

I had not forgotten Xuezhi's kind invitation.

As soon as the Spring Festival came, I made some simple arrangements and set off for Seongcheon Li, the site of the Volunteer Army's logistical headquarters. I remember that the new deputy director of the political department, Zhang Nansheng, the head of the cadre supervision office, Comrade Yuan Shengping, the Yangs, and seven or eight other comrades all travelled with me. Comrade Yuan Shengping said to Yang Fengan and Lu Hongyun, "We are guests accompanying Commander Yang. You are the honorable guests selected by Commander Hong!"

It was after ten when we arrived at Seongcheon Li. The snow had stopped falling, and the sky was clearing. The sun, which has been covered for a few days, came out. It seemed carefree and full of zest. It very generously spread its light over the snow-covered ground. The ground reflected points of dazzling light. To say that it was a silver world then would be accurate.

Seongcheon Li was situated in a saddle between two hills. The two hills reached out like two long dikes. Approaching the hills was like advancing up a dried up river bed. . Since this "river bed" was between the large hills, some places there had not suffered severe destruction from the war. Therefore, even during this severe winter seasons, one could see trees on the hills and below the hills; one could see pear trees and white poplar trees, one stand after another. One could see apple orchards and pine woods, the one connected to the other. I was thinking that when spring came the land would be covered with luxuriant and colorful growth.

At the road entrance to Seongcheon Li, three large arches

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towered loftily, spanning the road, with upturned eaves. They were a lot like China's ceremonial archways. Of course, they had to be much bigger than these archways and much more majestic. Both sides of the gates were covered with antithetical couplets. On the first gate, the couplet was:

Resisting the U.S. and aiding Korea, blazing yellow sons
and grandsons display their valor
Protecting their homes and defending their nations, the
sons and daughters of China perform miraculous feats

The horizontal scroll was: "For peace"

On the second gate, there was written:

The north wind and heavy snows blew upon and beat upon
the new year
The big artillery guns and machine guns noisily welcome
victory

The horizontal scroll was: "Battlefield holiday".

I do not remember clearly what the couplet was on the third pine gate. I just remember that the horizontal scroll was on a horizontally framed palace lantern. It said: "Welcome friends of the fatherland!" Obviously, this arch had been erected when the appreciation delegation from the fatherland was being welcomed. Now, it was being used again. This old Mr. Hong was really quite capable!

It was true. Comrade Hong Xuezi was a very competent leader.

In carrying out the first through fifth campaigns of the Volunteer Army, it was discovered that each offensive could last from seven to ten days only. Ridgway had taken advantage of this

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weakness and had come up with "magnetic tactics". His reason for this was that our transportation ability was insufficient. The ability of logistics to keep up and provide support was very poor. For this reason, Commander in Chief Peng was very distressed. Hong Xuezhi, who was logistical commander, was even more upset, so much so that he could hardly sleep. He put a pack on his back and went among the troops. He went to four or five divisional command offices and went to seven or eight positions. When he came back, he presented a plan: divide up the tasks. This meant establishing branch offices and military service stations in the combat direction and having them divide up the task of supplying the armies. As for the army level and lower levels, they would supply subordinate units, going from level to level in accordance with their own configurations.

Commander in Chief Peng highly approved of this: Very good! Implement it immediately!

The result of implementation was indeed quite good. By implementing this kind of supply system, the number of transfers of materials is reduced. The distribution levels raised the efficiency of supply. At the same time, the logistical branch offices received direct leadership from the campaign direction group army commanders. Thus, they could know immediately their operational goals. As soon as the right to take the initiative in one's work was introduced, it became even easier to meet the needs of the troops. Once, Comrade Xuezhi and I began discussing this matter. He said, "These were the inventions of the troops. I took advantage of the favor of Heaven, the productivity of the land, and the support of the people. With 500,000,000 people supporting this little Volunteer Army, as logistical commander I certainly should be able provide satisfactory supplies. Otherwise, I would just give it all up, return home, and hug my kids."

There was one other thing which to this day I remember very

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clearly.

After the fifth campaign ended, the "Volunteer Army" newspaper received a stream of letters from the officer and men reporting a number of problems which still existed among the troops. The newspaper took these reports and at regular intervals arranged them and sent them as a report to the Volunteer Army commanders and the command, political, and logistical offices. Comrade Hong Xuezhí saw a report concerning logistics. After reading it, he picked up his pen right away and wrote a reply to the newspaper. "Volunteer Army" put this on the first row of the first page. The original reply letter was like this:

To the responsible comrades of the Volunteer Army newspaper office:

On July 9th you relayed to me "Reference material on the troops' situation". I have read it twice; it is very good. I am very grateful that you were able to gather reports on the living conditions of the troops and send them to me. I hope you continue to do this from now on. As for those reports on logistical problems, each department is studying them as I write now.

As for the problem of gas-powered vehicles and air raid sirens, we have stated this very strictly at a transportation conference. We ought to carry out education among the car and truck units. In order to solve these problems, we will extend the monthly four day reorganization periods to six days, augment education, raise their sense of responsibility, and implement the vehicle relay system.

As for the problem of sending funds, we have already brought this up with the departments concerned and have asked them to come up with a way of solving this problem. After the logistical conference in June, there was a very great improvement. It has become one of the missions with respect

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to supplies at present. However, at present, we are still not able to meet the needs of the units. We are still impatiently awaiting improvements. Each army should be prodded to take further steps in this direction.

Inform all the departments again that supplies to the troops must be increased. We must adhere to standards more strictly. The troops must be given provisions in accordance with regulations. Less than full compliance is not permitted.

Hong Xuezhi

July 17th

This letter created an extremely strong reaction in the Volunteer Army. All the many soldiers now knew that "Volunteer Command" had a competent Commander Hong, who looked after and dealt with real matters for the sake of the the officers and men. Afterwards, if some low-level cadres or privates had difficulties, they would write directly to Commander Hong and would thus have their problems solved.

Commander in Chief Peng was very satisfied with Comrade Xuezhi's work. He said more than once: "If I had to give out medals, the first medal would go to Hong Xuezhi." Over two years time, the leading comrades of the Volunteer Army headquarters exchanged positions many times. Only he stayed continuously at one position--in logistics, an important department related to the life of the entire army.

When I arrived at Seongcheon Li, I could not but feel somewhat strange. Many houses here had been recently built. In addition to those rows of simple houses (which as soon as you look at them you know they were built by the army for the army), there were single and double rows of houses, some even at right angles, which had roofs with two slopes or, even more often, had two

slopes for the upper half and four for the lower half. In Korea, this was called the "rest mountain style". It was quite pretty.

Right when I was gaping at these, Old Hong came out to greet us. Wherever his tall body went, his resonant voice went also. "How are you? My commanding officials. This place is a lucky place!" He waved his arms about, as though he were pulling the entire mountain village into his lap. His words revealed his proper sense of pride.

I asked him when all these houses were built. Again, he laughed openly and said, "I came up with a hasty attack and provided Seongcheon with a one hundred year plan. . . ." It turned out that this village, too, had suffered enemy bombings. When the logistical headquarters were stationed here, it was a piece of waste land. At first, our Volunteer Army lived in concealed caves. After this, the war situation entered into a stalemate, and Old Hong made up his mind to help the masses build houses. He "attacked" for a spring, and the old face put on new colors. Afterwards, the Central Committee stated that the Volunteer Army should help the Korean people build their homes and gardens. Everyone said that Old Hong took the lead.

At noon, there was a large banquet. Old Hong suddenly brought out a Korean "god's stove". It nourished the body and pleased the mouth. It was elegant and graceful. Its shape and use was very similar to our "fire pot". As with the "fire pot", coal is lit in the middle, and around the coal are placed vegetables and meats. Orange-red flames emerge from the round "chimney". Everywhere around it, clouds of white vapor are being spit up. It has somewhat of a mysterious air about it.

On the second day, Comrade Xuezhi accompanied us as we went to see the comrades of units directly subordinate to the logistical department and of a few branch offices. Here, we researched in detail many logistical problems of future combat.

The reception which Hong gave us was quite warm, and the gatherings were happy. The spring of 1953 left me with wonderful memories.

Only a couple days after returning from Seongcheon Li, the Military Commission sent us a report. The report said that on January 20th the newly elected U.S. President Eisenhower had formally assumed office. In his first State of the Union Address after taking office, he strongly promoted a policy of all-out aggression. He also announced the eradication of "Taiwanese neutrality" in a vain attempt to cause the Taiwanese Nationalist Party to harrass our mainland in coordination with the U.S. military undertakings in Korea.

A couple of days later, we saw Chairman Mao's speech at the Fourth Meeting of the National Committee of the First Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Chairman Mao, in speaking of the Korean problem, said, "We must strengthen the struggle to resist the U.S. and aid Korea. Because the U.S. imperialists persist in detaining prisoners of the Korean War, in torpedoing the armistice negotiations, and in expanding, to no avail, their war of aggression, the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea must be augmented. We desire peace, but if for just one day U.S. imperialism does not abandon its brutal and unreasonable requirements and expands its plots of aggression, the resolve of the Chinese people is together with that of the Koran people: to keep on fighting. This is not because we like to fight. We would like to stop fighting immediately; the remaining problems can be solved in the future. But the U.S. imperialists do not wish to do this. Well, that's O.K. We'll fight on. For however many years the U.S. imperialists wish to fight, we will fight with them. We will keep on fighting until imperialism wishes to give up. We will keep on fighting until the Chinese and Korean people have completed their victory."

Chairman Mao's speech completely expressed the strong will of all the Chinese people to persist in fighting the aggressors to the end while loving peace and not fearing war. It also completely expressed the faith and confidence of all the Chinese people in resolving, together with the Korean people, to defeat the aggressors. Chairman Mao's speech indicated a clear direction for the Volunteer Army. I immediately had a discussion with Li Zhimin in which we concluded to rapidly send out a notice, in the name of the Volunteer Army, to all the armies asking them to study, with a serious and diligent attitude, and thoroughly familiarize themselves with Chairman Mao's important speech. We would also request the armies to adopt a pre-battle attitude and to get a good grasp on the concrete actions needed in anti-landing preparation work in response to Chairman Mao's call. At any time, we would completely wipe out the enemy who might dare to land or dare to invade.

Chapter Ten. The Last Battle.

Around sunset in January of 1953, while our army was preparing for the anti-landing operation in accordance with the originally determined plan, a front-line command post reported that, on Height 205 in the Seong San and Zhishandong [transliteration] areas northwest of Cheolweon, the enemy situation manifested obvious changes beginning on January 10th. The number of enemy artillery shells that dropped there increased from 500 per day to 2000 per day. On the 14th, enemy planes flew 140 sorties. They bombed in waves continuously for six hours. Every night small contingents of enemy troops would emerge to harrass us. In front of the positions, the enemy released large amounts of smoke camouflauge to cover their transportation. In addition, small jeeps approached the front line for reconnaissane. . . . What did these changes foretell?

Because the shape of Height 205 was like a nail, we called it "Ding Hill". [Translator's Note: "Ding" is homophonous with the Chinese word for "nail".] The enemy called it "Hill 'T'". The "point of our nail" pierced the middle of the enemy's positions. Although it faced the enemy on three sides, the terrain was not to our advantage. However, it was quite obvious that it presented a serious threat to the enemy.

Every sign indicated that the enemy was going to launch an

offensive here. And it seemed that this attack was not an earlier version of what the enemy arrogantly called the "February Offensive". Looking at it from the vantage point of a situation which we controlled, the enemy had not yet completed preparations for his attack. Even if his preparations had been complete, he would not have selected this small "Ding Hill" as his penetration point. According to a standard analysis, because the Chinese and Korean armies were in the midst of preparing on a grand scale to resist landings and because of our having won victory after victory on the front (there was also the fact that our units were at full combat readiness), the enemy would not dare to foolishly execute a small action. But the fact was that the enemy was really moving. What was behind this move? What was its object?

The unit which was defending "Ding Hill" was a battalion of the 23rd Army of the 19th Group Army. I immediately put through a call to the group army front-line command post. I discussed with them the thoughts I have described above. Moreover, I asked them to fully prepare and resolutely smash the enemy's attack. At the same time, I had them pay close attention to carrying out reconnaissance on the enemy situation; they could report to Volunteer Command at all times.

On January 25th, the enemy attacked. First came the scouting planes. Immediately after those came a fierce and sudden artillery attack. Then a reinforced battalion, covered by more than thirty tanks, approached the height. . . Except for the boats, which were not able to come, everything was used by the enemy: tanks, planes, and artillery. It truly was a "combined land-air attack".

Our officers and men who were defending "Ding Mountain" fought very bravely and stubbornly. They were also very clever. They scattered a small number of troops among the trenches to meet the attack of the enemy. Most of the comrades hid in tunnels, pulled the lids off of hand grenade boxes and handed them, box

after box, to those outside. In this way, they both supported the role of the officers and men who faced the enemy and avoided unnecessary casualties, thereby preserving combat capability. They experienced intense combat and smashed eight enemy attacks, one after the other. When it was getting close to dusk, the enemy had no choice but to flee under the cover of the tanks. They left more than 150 corpses in front of the "Ding Hill" positions. In addition, seven aircraft were damaged or shot down. Only seventeen of our soldiers were wounded or killed. The ratio of enemy casualties to ours was nine to one.

On the second day of combat, we received a report on the enemy situation. This enemy attack was actually hiding a "secret".

It turned out that Fanfolite [transliteration], the commander of the U.S. 8th Army and supreme commander of the United Nations Army ground forces, received an order after the New Year's dismissing him from his duties and causing him to leave the war and return to the U.S. This U.S. lieutenant general had fought on the Korean battlefields for two years. You could say that "limited objective offensive", "1952 fall offensive", "heartbreak ridge", "Old Bald Mountain", and "Sang-gam Liang" were his "representative works". To bad that all that is spoken in memory of him are his failures, which have become famous throughout the world. He was not happy with having to leave the war in this way. He wanted to leave a glorious record. After having carried out thorough preparations, he launched this attack.

He thought that his own preparations were ample and that victory was certain. So he invited a number of "high-level officials" and some foreign journalists stationed in Korea to come and see him direct, in person, the second to last item on his theatrical program. He thought he could borrow their pens and mouths to describe some glorious scenes for him. The result was the opposite of what he wanted. He left a record all right, but

it was not a glorious one. A press report from Washington on the 27th reported this news: "The unfortunate aftermath of the attack on 'Ding Hill' and the positions has put all congressmen into a state of anxiety." These congressmen, who were very upset, said, "No matter what measures are taken, the list of U.S. troop casualties gets even longer."

On February 10th, Fanfolite [transliteration], left his position and returned to the U.S. U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff Tyler took over for him. A number of foreign generals lamented Fanfolite's "bad luck". In fact, there was nothing strange about it. No aggressor is capable of having good luck. The longer they stay on the battlefield of aggression, the more severe become their "misfortunes".

On both the eastern and western coasts our army had constructed fortifications on a large scale. All the troop deployments had been adjusted. New troops and large amounts of combat materials continually flowed into the units. Our front-line positions and fortifications had been made even more strong. Combat materials were quite sufficient. Everyone at every level of the army was motivated and had high morale. On both our wings, at the two coasts, we were strongly fortified. As a consequence of all this, we were certain about smashing the seven division enemy attack on the western coast. It was no problem annihilating the five enemy divisions on the eastern coast. Under these circumstances, the supreme commander of the invading U.S. forces, Clark, sent us a letter suggesting that before a halt to the hostilities we first carry out an exchange of wounded or ill prisoners. He was trying to use this as a way to bring about a change in the situation and restore armistice negotiations.

It had always been our hope and desire to restore the armistice negotiations and peacefully solve the Korean problem. However, because the U.S. aggressors and the Rhee clique had again and again torpedoed the talks, they had eventually become

unattainable. This proposal of Clark's, regardless of whether or not he was sincere, was in the final analysis a turning point. We naturally agreed and suggested that the armistice negotiations be immediately restored.

At this time, we received a telegram from Chairman Mao, which instructed: "Strive to bring about a halt, but prepare to have things drag on. As for the armies, they should plan to have things drag on. They should not care about talking, only about fighting. They should not relax, but in every respect should continue according to the original plan." By "continue according to the original plan", Chairman Mao was referring to our plans for anti-landing operations.

In accordance with these instructions, we decided to continue strengthening the defensive fortifications along the eastern coast. At the same time, beginning with the end of March, we selectively attacked and wiped out enemy targets (companies and smaller units). Along the western line, the 46th Army attacked the hill west of Matali [transliteration] and the hill east of Meixianli [transliteration] Mountain (the enemy called it "Vega Hill") and completely wiped out three U.S. platoons and one puppet squad which were defending there. In the course of attacking the hill east of Shangpufang (the enemy called it "Old Bald Mountain"), the 47th Army completely wiped out one company of a Colombian battalion, as well as three platoons, one armored platoon, and two U.S. squads, all of which were defending there. Along the central part of the front, our 23rd Army, in the course of attacking the hill north of Shixiandong [transliteration] (the enemy called it "Pork Chop Hill"), completely wiped out three platoons and two squads of the U.S. Army. As a result of back and forth fighting over the aforementioned three locations, we wiped out more than 3000 enemy soldiers. On the eastern line, our 67th Army attacked the hill west of Guandaili [transliteration], wiping out more than 350 enemy soldiers. For the entire month of March, we carried out a total of forty-eight tactical counterattacks and

raids. If this is added to the other fighting, we annihilated a total of more than 15,000 enemy soldiers. In April, we carried out a total of forty-six tactical counterattacks and raiding operations. If this is added to the other fighting, a total of more than 14,000 enemy soldiers were wiped out. For the entire anti-landing preparation period, our front line units carried out forty-seven attacks to annihilate enemy units (platoon to company). They effectively supported the armistice negotiations and the preparation work on the east and west lines.

Our repeated victories on the battlefield caused the chill of the Panmunjeom armistice negotiations to begin to thaw. On April 26th, the negotiations, which had been broken off for six months, were once again restarted.

By this time, every aspect of our army's anti-landing preparation work was already fully completed. It was sufficient to guarantee an anti-landing operation victory. The preparation work was carried out with great thoroughness and attention to detail. If we were to break it down into categories, in general we would divide it into four parts:

One: The construction of the defensive positions on the east and west coasts and the strengthening of the front line position fortifications had all been fully completed. On the eastern and western coasts, two rows of defensive zones had been established, with a depth of ten kilometers. In areas behind the lines which might lend themselves to enemy airlandings or tank maneuvers, anti-airlanding positions and anti-tank positions were also constructed. The total number of man-days spent exceeded 60,000,000 (on the average, 500,000 men participated in the construction every day). They dug more than 8090 tunnels--a total length of more than 720 kilometers. It was like opening up a tunnel from Yongxing [transliteration] in Korea to Gum San. They dug more than 3100 kilometers of temporary trenches and communication trenches. In addition to all this, they also

constructed 605 permanent cement fortifications and a large number firearms bunkers (the preceding sentence includes the total from part of the construction by the People's Army). Along the two coasts and the front line (more than 1130 kilometers of continuous defensive lines), they had already formed a strong point defensive system which was centered around reinforced concrete fortifications and tunnels. This was the result of 120 days of arduous war preparation by the officers and men, with the strong support of the people of the fatherland, the Korean government, and the Korean people. In 1978, when I went to visit Korea, I made a special point of going to the two coasts to see the fortifications from that year. Though twenty-five years had passed, the fortifications were still perfect. Unable to control my feelings, I pounded on a wall of a reinforced concrete fortification and then put my ear up against it and listened. The wall emanated a "wengweng" sound. Some of these fortifications were already being made use of by the Korean people. They were made into stables or silos. Back then they were used to defend against the aggressor's war, and now they are used in making the people prosperous. These two are symbols of the friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples. When you see them, you cannot but think of those years when we fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Korean People's Army and with the Korean people.

Two: By the end of February, 1953, our mission to store up materials had been completed, exceeding the set figures. A total of 123,800 metric tons of ammunition, an average of more than 3100 metric tons per army, had been stored. Each artillery division stored more than 1000 metric tons. The total amount of provisions stored was nearly 550,000,000 pounds. This could feed the entire army for eight and a half months. (This all was shipped from the fatherland; it had been saved by the people of the fatherland a mouthful at a time.) In addition, the units received 90,000 new soldiers in reinforcements. All the units along the entire line were basically full with respect to people

and equipment.

Three: The railroad corp and the engineer units took on a combat posture, modifying and perfecting the transportation network in the northern regions of Korea. They constructed new railroads one month ahead of schedule, on April 15th, 1953. First the section from Guicheng to Jiachuan and then the section from Jiachuan [transliterations] to Eun San. In this way, the three main rail routes had already been connected together into one system within our rear. Thus, the transportation pressure on Anju, Xipu, and Jiachuan, those three areas, was reduced, and the problem of supplying the armies with materials and mobilizing troops in the event that the line to the capital (which is near the coast) were to be cut by the enemy during an anti-landing operation was solved. At the same time, the original railroads, roads, and traffic and communication lines were repaired. Along the railroads, thirty-five new bridges were built, and detour lines were built in four locations. In addition, water supply and communication facilities were improved. Eight new roads were built. Together with repaired and widened roads, the length was a total of 566 kilometers. The total number of bridges was forty-seven. The road and railroad construction described above greatly lessened our army's traffic, communication, and transportation difficulties.

Four: While the defensive fortifications were being constructed, all the armies with missions to defend the coasts carried out intense pre-battle training and actual troop drills in accordance with the operations plan. Moreover, during this same period of time, cadres of the platoon level and over carried out anti-landing (combat with enemy ships, defense of islands, coastal defense), anti-airlanding, and anti-tank positions training (they did this in turns). This was in order to establish a foundation for anti-landing operation tactics.

There is an old saying, which goes, "The horse is mounted,

and the bent bow awaits an arrow." It was just like that then.

On the morning of April 1st, the secretary brought over the telegram which Comrade Wang Jianan, Commander of the 9th Group Army, had sent out on March 31st. Comrade Jianan believed that, as could be seen from the situation on the front in March, especially after such battles as "Ding Hill", "Old Bald Mountain", and "Vega Hill", there was much fear among the enemy troops. At present, the defending enemy units were scattered. There was at most one platoon, one company, or one battalion guarding positions. Therefore, he suggested that if the enemy launched a front attack and a landing operation on the east coast, each of our front-line armies should launch a counterattack in May. Under conditions of fully organized preparations and thorough plans and strategies, it was, under specific conditions, certain that an attack by one of our armies would annihilate one enemy battalion's positions. If each army along our front were to launch a campaign-level attack together, this would create even greater panic among the enemy troops. If the enemy executed landing operations on the eastern and western coasts in April, our front-line armies should all launch tactical counterassaults, with each army selecting one or two sites for carrying out counterattacks under certain conditions. The entire line needed only to be under one strategy and one command at one time to act together in order to create in the enemy a misconception and to to make easy our own counterattack victory. All that was needed was sufficient supplies of ammunition and full troop reinforcements in order to make completely possible the launching of an entire-line campaign-level counterattack or of tactical counterattacks.

Upon seeing this telegram, which was full of the confidence of victory, I felt as though I were seeing once again those eyes of his, containing self-confidence and optimism. It was like hearing again that resonant voice that went on and on when he got excited. Comrade Jianan was three years older than I. He was from Hongan in Hubei, and he had raised and educated 200 generals

for the sake of the revolution. During the War to Resist Japan, I was working in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan military region, and he was serving as the commander of the Shandong military region. Thus we got to know each other. After working together for more than a year in the Korean War, our mutual understanding became even deeper, as did our friendship. He was a frank, take-charge comrade, who was upright, never stooped to flattery, and was open and above board.

His suggestion made me very happy. It also made me think of a number of problems. At that time, Comrade Deng Hua was at "Western Sea Command" organizing the anti-landing preparation work. I immediately sent Jianan an official reply and sent Jianan's opinion to the Military Commission. The statement which I made was like this:

Report of Comrade Jianan to Commander in Chief Peng of Military Commission and then to Deng Hua:

Received telegram of March 31st. Jianan launching one campaign-level counterattack very good. If the enemy does not attack before May 10, I agree with launching, after Military Commission's approval, one counterattack operation. Our 23rd Army, 46th Army, and 47th Army recently fought at "Ding Hill", "Old Bald Mountain", "Vega Hill", and other places. They have spent a rather long time thoroughly organizing and fully preparing. Moreover, this attack would be against enemy companies and smaller units. As for counterattacking one enemy battalion position, based on past experience, we must be even more cautious. There have not been many battles in which we have wiped out enemy battalions. Regarding the counterattack time, only when 47,000 new recruits have assembled in the northeast. From the southwest 100,000 recruits will be driven to the northeast. This will be completed by June, no sooner. Moreover, all of them must undergo some training. In order

to guarantee that the combat, as it develops, has a continuous supply of new soldiers to serve as replacements, the earliest date should be late in May. At present, the war preparation work has not been entirely completed. Each army in April needs to take war preparation as its central mission. At present, we cannot involve the vigor of the units in this project. As stated in the previous telegram, the counterattack preparation should be carried out by the beginning of May. Please fully prepare opinions and materials. When the time comes, Volunteer Command will call together a study meeting.

Please let the Military Commission instruct me as to whether the above is suitable.

Yang Dezhi

April 1st, 1953

At dawn on April 4th, I received the Military Commission's official reply:

Comrades Dezhi and Jianan:

Have read both Jianan's telegram of March 31st and Dezhi's telegram of April 1st. Under the current circumstances, with our side having fully prepared, it would be advantageous to carry out small-scale annihilating operations. In each of these operations, one or two enemy platoons or as much as one or two enemy companies would be annihilated, as was the case in "Ding Hill", "Old Bald Mountain", and "Vega Hill". By means of such operations, our 9th Group Army and other group armies would gain new combat experience, and the armistice negotiations would be given impetus. . . . As for launching an entire-line campaign-level operation in which ten main enemy targets are attacked, it would be best to wait until mid-May or late May.

Military Commission

April 3rd, 1953

In accordance with the instructions of the Military Commission, we decided to continue strengthening the defensive fortifications on both coasts, always preparing to smash the enemy's attack, while at the same time implementing a policy of tit-for-tat. In addition to carrying out individual tactical counterattacks, if the enemy did not attack us in early May, we would execute a campaign-level counterattack similar to the one of the autumn of 1952. The Central Committee approved of our decision.

On April 20th, in order to implement the campaign-level counterattack, we sent out campaign instructions to the entire army. Then on April 30th we held a group army cadres conference.

Comrade Deng Hua, who was organizing the anti-landing preparation work at "West Coast Command", returned to lead the conference. He also made a report called "A Few Suggestion Concerning the Execution of the Summer Campaign-Level Counterattack". Comrade Li Zhimin made a report opposing bureaucratism. Chief of Staff Jie Fang, who had just come back to Volunteer Command from the negotiations at Panmunjeon on the front line, also participated in the conference. The leading comrades of each group army all wanted him to speak about some interesting sidelights in connection with the negotiations. He almost became the conference's "man in the news".

The other persons I remember participating in this conference were: the vice commander of "West Sea Command", Liang Xingchu, Vice Commissar Du Ping, Chief of Staff Wang Zhengzhu, the newly appointed commander of the 3rd Group Army (and "West Sea Command") Xu Shiyou, Vice Commander Wang Jinshan, Vice Commander Du Yide, Commissar and Commander of the 9th Group Army Wang Jianan, Chief of Staff Hu Bingyun, the new commander of the 9th Group Army,

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Huang Yongsheng, Vice Commander and Chief of Staff Zeng Siyu, Vice Commissar Chen Xianduan, Acting Commander of the 20th Group Army Zheng Weishan, Commissar Wang Ping, Chief of Staff Xiao Wenjiu, Artillery Command Post Commander Gao Cunxin, Engineer Command Post Commander Tan Shanhe, commander of the front-line transportation headquarters, Liu Juying, and so on.

It was April in Korea and spring had just arrived. It probably was because we had spent much of the severe winter in resisting attack that we felt that it had not come easily. Thus, we felt that the spring here was especially lovely.

The group army cadres who participated in the conference felt exactly like the Korean spring: clean and fresh, bright and beautiful, full of confidence, and permeated with an early morning spirit. In conference and out of conference, the flames of enthusiasm leapt up towards the sky, and the laughing and talking were like a wind.

Everyone recognized that the battlefield situation was getting better and better for us. Having done the anti-landing operation preparation, our army could attack and could defend. Strategically, we had taken even more initiative. Strategically, the enemy was tending towards passivity. This was particularly true on the front. The enemy was in a position where he had no recourse. The probability of the armistice negotiations starting up again and the war stopping had become much greater than it had been. However, American imperialism had always not desired to have a fair and reasonable solution to the Korean problem with respect to such problems as the "return and release of prisoners of war" and "armistice verification". And it was always possible they would come up with other problems. Moreover, looking from a global strategic perspective, perhaps the U.S. needed to bide time so that some militarists in the U.S. administration could together with the South Korean Rhee clique oppose the armistice. Thus, the possibility that the war would go on still existed. Therefore, we

would as before persist in following the policy which Chairman Mao had set for us: "Strive to halt the war, but prepare to have it drag on. The armies should plan to have the war drag on. They should only concern themselves with fighting and should not concern themselves with negotiating. They should not relax, but in every respect should act according to the original plan."

I described to everyone the basic situation for us and the enemy. The total troop strength of the enemy had already reached 1,200,000 men. They had twenty-four ground divisions. Rhee's puppet armies had greatly increased; there were now already sixteen divisions, and another was being added on. With both naval and air forces included, Rhee already had a total of 640,000 men, and his equipment and firepower were already approaching the U.S.'s in quality. The enemy armies, positions, and fortifications had all increased since the fall of 1952. The enemy's basic positions had tunnels or tunnel-style bunkers, In addition, there were a large number of pillboxes and various kinds of barriers. All of these were quite solid. I especially reminded everyone to pay attention to the fact that the enemy now had a very rich educational experience from having been beaten. This seemed to be a joke, but in fact was not. It is easier to remember a lesson learned from having been beaten than from beating someone.

The total troop strength of our army was 1,800,000 men (including 450,000 in the Korean People's Army). There were twenty-five armies in the ground forces (including six army groups in the Korean People's Army). Troop strength and firepower had been greatly improved, and the positions were even more consolidated. There were abundant amounts of combat materials. What especially made the enemy expect the worst was the selfless spirit of sacrifice and fighting attitude which our officers and men had. Of course, we had weak points, too. For example, we had insufficient experience with regard to attacking reinforced enemy positions. Our troops which had just arrived in Korea had no

experience of real battle.

Based on the conditions described above, the conference studied and set guiding policies and strategies for the campaign. On May 4th, the conference ended. On May 5th, using the names of Deng (Deng Hua), Yang (Dezhi), Jie (Fang), and Li (Zhimin), we sent down "Addition Instructions Concerning Preparation Work for the Summer Campaign-Level Counterattack". These "Additional Instructions" were concerned with everything from campaign objectives and guiding ideologies to the selection of attack targets, concrete methods of attack operations, various requirements for application of tactics, and even the preliminary date for the campaign. In "Questions of Strategy in the Chinese Revolutionary War", Chairman Mao says, "The stage upon which generals act is constructed on objective material conditions. Nevertheless, generals, relying on this stage, still can direct many noisy and colorful live plays of martial heroes and brave soldiers." Our "director's plan" ("Additional Instructions") clearly indicated that the campaign objective was to wipe out the enemy, train troops, and gain some experience, in coordination with the Panmunjeon negotiations. In accordance with the distribution of enemy forces, the main attack against the U.S. forces would be on the western line, and as for attacking the puppet forces, it would be on the eastern line. The basic spirit guiding the campaign could be summed up in these few words: "Go ahead steadily and strike fiercely." "Fierce" means that one ought to fight and repeatedly contend with the enemy, thereby inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and causing the enemy not to dare to launch any more counterassaults. "Steady" means that we should gain control of the long-term combat and be able to smash enemy attacks at any time, causing the enemy not to want to carry them out. In order to make real this word, "steady", we demanded that the troops pursue a policy of accumulating many small victories and making them into one great victory. The operating principle for this was that the units were not to attack targets larger than battalions. The best way was to wipe out from

one or two platoons to one or two companies at a time. In addition, after annihilating the enemy, we had to always be prepared to cope with a revenge attack by the enemy on a scale similar to that of "Sang-gam Liang" or a revenge attack equal to two or three "Sang-gam Liangs". Under the premise that the principle of using terrain to our advantage in annihilating attacks should be emphasized, we integrated our selection of attack targets with improvements to our positions. At the time, the enemy did not wish to sign an armistice agreement. Since some of our positions might end up on the other side of the boundary whenever the armistice boundary was drawn, in attacking our targets we should as much as possible consider advancing our front-line positions. If there was a space then we should fill it so that after the armistice we would control advantageous terrain. Moreover, in this way we would be telling the enemy with solid facts that if he fought, we would respond and that if he made the fighting drag on, we would not be afraid. What he had to realize was that, whether at the negotiating table or on the battlefield, his thinking was stupid and his ambitions in vain.

In order to make the victory even more certain, we made detailed requirements for the target and method of each counterattack. For example, after attacking and taking those solid fortifications which had tunnels and whose terrain made it to our advantage to control, we were to persistently and stubbornly defend them. Moreover, while fighting the enemy counterassaults, we were to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. These kind of targets were supposed to become the main points of counterattack. As for those fortifications, which though rather solid did not have tunnels or had terrain which was not much to our advantage, after attacking and taking them we would decide depending on the situation whether to defend or take the initiative to surrender them. Then, using a second or third group of troops, we would take advantage of the fact of the enemy's not having a stable foothold to counterattack. After repeated, tug-of-war battles, we would inflict heavy casualties on the enemy,

and in the end the target would be controlled by us. As for those fortifications which were weak and whose terrain was not to our advantage, if they were not important targets, then the special objective would be to wipe out the enemy. After attaining this objective, we would quickly retreat (i.e., after "taking a bite", we would leave).

So that the counterattack operation could be continuously maintained, each army front selected a few extra targets. But these were to be separate, with one following the other. As for key targets, at any certain time, each army could keep only one. There could not be too many second or third class targets. The best way would be to have one main target and one second-class target at one time. When the enemy counterassaulted, throwing into combat one division of forces, each army could keep one important target. If the the enemy threw two or more divisions into combat, then one group army could keep only one main target. If the enemy counterassaulted for a long time and on a large scale, then the entire line would only keep two main targets. In every other area, we would stop contending with the enemy so as to guarantee concentration of firepower and troops and supply of equipment and ammunition.

The campaign objectives and the guiding doctrines were now clear. The order in which targets were to be attacked was now clearly designated. Tactically, we would energetically strive to annihilate completely and quickly. If we were not going to fight then we did not. If were going to fight, then we would certainly annihilate. If we attacked, then we would certainly conquer. If we defended, then it would have to be a stubborn defense. If it was to our advantage, then we would defend. If it was not to our advantage, then after inflicting a certain number of casualties on the enemy we would surrender it. From beginning to end, we would keep the initiative. For this reason, we had to especially reinforce the second echelon of each army so as to maintain the sustainability of the counterattack and to prepare to combat the

enemy's vengeful attack.

The "Additional Instructions" stated that the entire counterattack operation was set to begin the beginning of June and end near the end of July. All the preparation work had to be completed before the end of May. After the campaign began, we would employ a method in which centralization and scattering were integrated. The campaign was divided into three phases of implementation. Each phase would last ten days. Rest and preparation would be five days. At the beginning of a phase, the entire line would act in unison. During the second and third phases, either the entire line would be unified or each group army would be unified. This would depend on the situation. In order to spread out the enemy's troops and firepower, each phase operation was supposed to select two or three sites along the front of an enemy division for simultaneous attacks.

In order to guarantee the victory of a counterattack operation, we made adjustments again with respect to troop strength. First of all, we transferred five infantry divisions from among the second line units. From the western sea coast and the reserve artillery corps, we transferred eight field artillery and howitzer battalions, four rocket regiments, one defensive artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft artillery division, two anti-aircraft regiments, and six engineer battalions. Each first-line army which took part in the counterattack operations was separately reinforced. Their firepower was added to, and we made certain that each of these armies had two divisions of reserve forces so as to increase their ability to sustain combat. Secondly, the deficiencies in each army were made up for by part of the new group of soldiers that had been trained in the northeastern region of China. In addition, each front-line army was given a supplementary regiment of from 3000 to 4000 men so as to ensure that replacements could be made as the fighting took place and thus that the fighting could continue. Thirdly, the 16th Army, the 54th Army, the 1st Howitzer Division, two regiments

of the 2nd Howitzer Division, and two regiments of the 21st Rocket Division served as a Volunteer Command central reserve force. Fourthly, in order to augment the defensive capacities at the rear and along the flanks, we determined that the 7th Railroad Division would replace the four regiments of the 21st Army which had arrived in Korea earlier and take over its mission of constructing fortifications in the Xianxing region [transliteration]. The 21st Army was then assembled and prepared for support the western coast operation. At the same time, the six railroad divisions which were constructing new rail lines had the mission of supporting anti-beach landing and anti-airlanding operations. Fifthly, in order to guarantee complete supplies during the campaign, the air force and anti-aircraft artillery units were ordered to aggressively attack enemy planes and strengthen air cover for traffic and communication lines from Pyongyang on north.

After the additional instructions for the summer counterattack operation were sent out, the entire army underwent a thorough political and ideological mobilization. Preparation for the campaign was begun on a grand and spectacular scale. Our commanders were extremely confident and high-spirited and vigorous. Their eagerness for battle was like it was during that first summer in Korea, flourishing and full of vitality. Their spirits were high day after day. All our commanders of the army level and higher felt that quite possible this campaign would be the "last act" on the Korean battlefield. They knew that in this "last act" they could only win; they could not fail. Moreover, they knew it was going to be a complete victory, a very pleasing victory. And only by means of an outstanding victory and an absolutely solid victory could it become the "last act", could it mark a period on the Korean War history book. For these reasons, they prepared with exceptional attention to detail and with exceptional effort.

Each unit participating in the selection of targets for annihilating attacks generally understood the underlying

situation. They painstakingly organized reconnaissance and captured enemy soldiers. After uncovering the enemy situation, they set an accurate operations scheme based in accordance with the concrete situation of enemy firepower, troop strength, and position fortifications. Relying on this operations scheme, they repeatedly conducted combat drills. At the same time, military democratization was extensively developed. A mass campaign was launched to "describe the situation and think of policies to deal with it" (some units called this "mention difficulties and think of solutions"). After each drill, the cadres and the privates were encouraged to completely describe difficulties they had discovered such as how to avoid making noise during an advance (for example, the langing together of displaced, falling stones, coughing, implements, and weapons). While laying an ambush, the troops had to eat, drink, and relieve themselves. What could they do? What were they supposed to do if they encountered a small enemy patrol unit? And so on and so on. To cope with the difficulties which were brought up, we made use of the method in which the masses think up a solution. In this way, we would "drill--describe difficulties--think up solutions--drill again". If we did this again and again, we would find that, though the heart contains many difficulties, everyone has a solution. In order to maintain the effect of surprise in our operations and to reduce casualties from mobile enemy units, each unit secretly constructed assault launching sites 200 meters in front of the attack targets. These were caves or holes in which troops were kept, or a place which lent itself to concealment was selected as an ambush area. By the beginning of May, except for the fact that there were units which had not yet completely prepared for attacking main targets, each unit participating in the campaign had basically completed preparations for attacking small targets.

During this time, news came from Panmunjeon. The U.S. representative had opposed the program to solve the problem of prisoners of war which the Sino-Korean delegation had proposed. Moreover, the U.S. had come up with a "counter-suggestion". A

stalemate in the negotiations had been reached over the problem of prisoners of war. The Sino-Korea delegation had proposed this program: All those prisoners who wished to return to their own countries should be allowed to return directly. As for those who did not wish to return directly to their own countries, they could go to the neutral nation return committees organized by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India. Moreover, the nation to which the prisoner belonged would provide four months of explanation so that the feelings of fear and confusion which the prisoner suffered after his capture would be relieved, allowing the prisoner to return home, free from worry. Following the completion of the explanation period, if there were prisoners who had still not returned, the means of dealing with them would be decided by both sides in negotiations at a political conference. Our program was announced to the whole world. It both opposed forced detentions and did not promote forced returns. It fully respected the wishes of the captured prisoners as well as their determination of their own views. This program was obviously fair and reasonable. However, the U.S. side refused to discuss this suggestion. In contrast, the U.S. side proposed that "all Korean prisoners of war who do not directly return be released on site when the armistice becomes effective". Their objective was quite clear. They wished to detain by force prisoners from the Sino-Korean side. No matter how strongly fair-minded public opinion, in the U.S. and around the world, criticized this proposal by the U.S., the U.S. side's attitude remained extremely stubborn. Thus, the possibility for an armistice ceased to exist before June.

Deng Hua, Jie Fang, Zhi Min, and I all recognized that the enemy would not cry until he saw the coffin. We also discussed the party campaign which Commander Liu Bocheng and Commissar Deng Xiaoping had directed when Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou went to celebrate and negotiate after the victory in the war against Japan. Everyone remembered what Commander Liu and Comrade Xiaoping said then: "The better we fought, the greater the strength of Chairman Mao at the negotiating table." I remember

that Comrade Li Kenong said to me many times, after coming to Korea and taking part in many negotiations, "Over there, I am 'a gentleman uses his mouth but not his fists'. But this mouth of mine is backed up by your fist!" During the era of the red army, Kenong served as head of the Security Office. After the Long March, he served as head of the Liaison Office of the Central Committee. During the war against Japan and the war of liberation, old comrades who often negotiated with a variety of opponents had much experience and they were what we comrades, who were working on the military fronts, hoped for and required. Now was the time when we were going to use our fists and use them fiercely. We decided that whichever unit prepared to attack targets of company-size or smaller could begin their operations right away. As for the other annihilating attack targets, we would complete attack preparations before May 30th as we had originally planned. On June 1st, we would launch an attack. After we signed this resolution, Jie Fang was especially excited. Laughing, he said, "Leading cadres, only when you made this decision did I feel that I had truly returned from Panmunjeon. Let's fight!"

This decision came out on May 11th. On the morning of May 12th, I received a telephone call from Zheng Weishan. His voice, like always was loud and clear and full of confidence.

He said, "Yesterday's decision was very good. If you had not moved up the date, I would have exploded. Our cadres and privates are already making a great clamor."

I laughed, saying, "The one making the biggest clamor was, I bet, yourself." I asked him when he would begin.

He said, "Tomorrow. Tonight I am sending the units to the ambush areas. We will hit him so quick he won't know what has hit him."

I asked, "You plan to take how many points at first?"

"Two. To begin with, we will stress sticking to two. The 67th Army will attack Kehuli [transliteration]. The 60th Army will attack Fangxingshan [transliteration] (or "Square Mountain"). I have already given orders to fight to the death. These two locations must be taken. After we take them, we must hold on to them. In the course of fighting again and again over it, we must kill many enemy soldiers. The other targets are back ups. If we can take them, we'll take them. There's no chance we'll come up empty-handed."

We also discussed the troop deployment situation and some problems which we needed to pay attention to. At the time, his telephone call stirred me up so that I was all excited. Zheng Weishan was not taller than 1.6 or 1.7 meters and was very skinny. One could say there was nothing startling about his features. But as soon as he began fighting, if you listened to his strategies and saw the lay out of his positions but did not see him, you would think that he was tall with a robust physique, like a giant. Some comrades said that he was a type of "dry cell battery", for his features were wizened, and his inner capacity was very great. It made some sense.

On that day, we also received a report from the 9th Group Army. The 23rd and 24th Armies were preparing to separately attack predetermined targets on the 13th.

Thus, the first shots of the summer campaign counterattack were fired on May 13th.

The summer campaign counterattack can be divided into three phases. Or you might say there were three attacks. These were formed during combat in response to changing conditions.

The first attack began on May 13th and ended on May 25th.

The main units involved were the 20th Group Army and the 9th Group Army. In succession, they launched twenty assaults, large and small, against the enemy, wiping out a total of more than 4100 enemy soldiers. The ratio of casualties between us and the enemy was 2.1 : 1.

On the fourth day of the campaign, we received instructions from the Military Commission: "At present, negotiations are still being delayed. It is still hard to predict when we can stop. Because of this, our combat policy in Korea is to persist in pursuing the past policy of 'making steady progress and striking fierce blows for the long term'." The report also stated that in order to "prepare to smash the enemy counterattack which would be on a scale even larger than last year's" and "in order to avoid having our counterattack take on too great a task at first, having the battle drag on, having problems occur with the ammunition, or becoming to passive, we should divide the counterattack campaign into three steps. Generally, for each step, we will take the scope of one group army as a unit, selecting several counterattack targets for the opposing enemy forces. . . . "

In accordance with the Military Commission's instructions, our 20th and 9th Group Armies continued to execute counterattacks against targets of company size and smaller. By May 25th, they had carried out sixteen tactical counterattack operations, wiping out the enemy at eleven locations. Thus ended the first counterattack. The second counterattack began on May 27th.

After undergoing slight modifications, the 60th and 67th Armies, which were subordinate to the 20th Group Army, expanded the attack targets to enemy battalion positions in accordance with the previously determined plan. That evening, I received a report: the 67th Army, led by Commander Qiu Wei, Commissar Kuang Fuzao, and other comrades, had captured the two foothills northeast and northwest of Hill 190.1, which was next to Xiangpi [transliteration], and had captured the hill south of Lidong

[transliteration]. They had wiped out one enemy company and nine platoons and four squads. They had also annihilated most of one company headquarters, one reconnaissance post, and one platoon. Moreover, they had repulsed thirty-eight attacks by enemy forces ranging from one platoon to two battalions. On May 28th, on the western line, the 19th Group Army also began to counterattack. The 46th Army, led by Commander Xiao Quanfu, Commissar Wu Baoshan attacked and wiped out two Turkish platoons at a hill west of Matali [transliteration] and a hill southwest of Meixianli [transliteration]. It repulsed twenty-three enemy counterassaults and also attacked and wiped out a British company at a hill southwest of Pingcun [transliteration]. According to incomplete statistics, during these few operations, more than 4100 enemy soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured.

Our counterattack operation's continuous successes shook the Supreme Commander of the "United Nations Army", Clark. They also shook Washington. On May 23rd, Washington gave special instructions to the U.S. negotiating team. The team was asked to "hand over all Korean prisoners of war together with Chinese Communist prisoners of war to neutral nations. As for the question of rules of procedure for the neutral nation repatriation committees, accept the principle proposed by the Communist side of the minority following the majority."

From this, it becomes readily apparent that Eisenhower, under the pressure of our successive military victories and fair-minded public opinion, had retreated somewhat. In response to the instructions quoted above, Clark presented a program on "arrangements for indirect repatriation" which basically accepted what our side had proposed on May 7th. On June 8th, both sides in the negotiations reached an agreement. Thus, the only obstacle to achieving an armistice, the problem of prisoner repatriation, had been finally removed after more than one year. This is to say, that by this point every item on the armistice negotiations agenda had been agreed upon. The remaining problems were the details of

once again drawing the military boundaries and of drafting and signing the armistice agreement.

Nevertheless, the Rhee clique wantonly proclaimed "opposition to any compromise", announcing that they wished to "advance to the Yalu River" and "fight on alone". Moreover, in Seoul, Pusan, and other locations, they led "mass parades" which opposed the armistice.

This phenomenon revealed a situation in which the master "wanted peace" and the slave "wanted to fight". This could not but draw our attention. The U.S., viewing the fact of repeated setbacks for their side on the Korean battlefields at that time, agreed to sign an armistice agreement; the U.S. had obviously forced into this. One wanted to "sign", and the other was shouting "fight". Each was considering its own interests and needs. We clearly recognized that in its support for Rhee and opposition to the Korean Democratic People's Republic and the People's Republic of China had not changed one bit. However, the U.S., after all, had agreed to sign. This was to the advantage of the entire war situation.

"The sickness changes ten thousand times. The medicine also changes ten thousand times." Therefore, we decided to change the original plan in which the main attack was directed against the U.S. to a plan in which the main attack was directed against the puppet army. As for the armies of Great Britain and other armies, we would temporarily cease hostilities. We ordered our 16th, 54th, and 21st Armies, which had just arrived in Korea, to go to the front line and prepare to enter combat. Comrade Deng Hua said to me, "We must tell the troops not to feel that in fighting Rhee there is no profit to be gotten. We call this killing a chicken and showing it to the monkey. Whoever is dishonest will be fought and punished!"

In accordance with this decision, each group army and each

army modified their combat plans. One after another these were reported to Volunteer Command for examination and verification.

So that each of our front-line armies would transfer their targets to the puppet armies, Deng Hua and I separately put through telephone calls to each group army. Again and again, we emphasized that we had to make the best use of our time to deal a painful blow to Rhee's puppet armies and thereby help to bring about an early signing in the armistice negotiations.

When I got through to the commander of the 9th Group Army, Comrade Wang Jianan, Jianan told me that the commander of the 3rd Group Army, Xu Shiyou, and and Vice-Commissar Du Yide, were with him. He asked me whether I wished to speak to them.

Since heavy fighting had been temporarily suspended then, I reminded him that before we had come to Korea I had seen him in Jinan and that he had wanted me to talk to Commander in Chief Zhu for him. I said, "So you actually came to Korea. You don't need to grumble to Commander in Chief Zhu any more. You have a mission now." He then laughed and laughed. His tiny, squinting eyes revealed a brave spirit. Comrade Shiyou was a general who liked to fight big battles and difficult battles. Now that the possibility of the armistice being signed was very great, he still wanted to fight and could only fight Rhee's puppet armies. He certainly was not satisfied. Indeed, he said on the phone, "I had wanted to find out how tough Clark really is. Now I won't have that chance. That's O.K. By fighting early, we stopped early. By stopping early, everything is O.K. early. From early on, the peoples of China and Korea had been looking forward to this day."

He said that two days from then he would go to the 20th Group Army. He asked me if there was anything else to discuss.

I said, "The new commander of the 20th Group Army, Yang Yong, has already arrived. Zheng Weishan is prepared to exchange

positions. Pleased wish the two of them well for me."

After I finished my call to Shiyu, I prepared to call the 20th Group Army and get a hold of Yang Yong and Zheng Weishan for a discussion. Then a call came from Zheng Weishan.

Zheng Weishan told me that on June 4th the 20th Group Army was holding an operations conference to adjust strategies once again and to prepare to concentrate strength to attack the two puppet divisions (the 8th and the 5th) located on both sides of the North Seoul River. Then he spoke in a general way of their plans. After he finished, he said, "This conference of ours is very good. There's also a handing over conference. I've been an acting commander, and I'll be able to stop 'acting'. I have introduced the situation of the troops to Comrade Yang Yong."

I said, "Comrade Yang Yong has not been in Korea long. You might stay with the group army a few days longer."

Weishan said, "I don't want to. If I spend a few more days here, Comrade Yang Yong won't be able to fight this battle. He's seen all of the first attack. As for the plans for later attacks, he knows them well. He has experience. It's certain that he can fight even better. Don't worry about it."

I said, "Well, then you need not rush back. After you've handed over your position, come to Volunteer Command. Wait together with us for this 'last act' to be sung. Then we'll have a drink and send you off properly on your triumphant return."

He agreed.

I then had a few words with Yang Yong.

Yang Yong and I were old war pals. He called me "Old Brother Yang" and then went on to say, "Commander Zheng has arranged

things very thoroughly. He has explained the situation in great detail. I would like to have him stay here until we have finished this battle together and then send him off with a little party. But he's quite antsy. I'd best do as he says. I have told the comrades that after we finish the battle, we will use the victory to give Commander Zheng a proper send off."

After the operations conference of the 20th Group Army ended, another week of preparation passed. On June 10th, the 60th Army attacked Hill 883.7 and Hill 902.8 east of the North Seoul River and some unnamed hills to the south and the east where the 27th Regiment of the puppet 5th Division had its positions. On the night of the 9th, in order to achieve the effect of surprise and to reduce casualties, this army secretly placed six companies and two platoons in front of and to the sides of enemy positions where they waited in ambush.

On the night of the 10th, with the support of 259 mortar and other artillery pieces, they suddenly launched a multi-route, multi-echelon attack which came from two directions, north and east. After fifty minutes of combat, they completely annihilated one defending regiment. Now it was done. We immediately reported to the Military Commission. At the same time, we reported our praise in the name of "United Command" to the entire army.

The 60th Army fought this battle well. The battle was quite cruel and fierce. In the midst of fierce and cruel combat, our commanders displayed a high degree of courage and revolutionary spirit.

While the ambush was being laid, enemy sniper bullets and artillery shells often fell in the ambush area. On the morning of the 10th, an artillery shell landed on Private Si Zhenjiang, blowing off both his legs. A few other comrades were wounded. Si Zhenjiang and his comrades unflinchingly persisted in staying still and quiet. By this time, the sky was already bright, and

the slightest movement would reveal the target, thereby seriously influencing the execution of the entire plan. Si Zhenjiang was in such pain that he passed out a few times. His wounded comrades were hurting so much that they all stuck their hands into the hard, solid earth. But they all held on until the entire attack began.

When I heard this report, I could not but think of the eve of the Sang-gam Liang campaign, when Comrade Qiu Shaoyun was gloriously martyred in combat on Hill 391 between Pyongyang and Gum San. That too happened while an ambush was being laid. An enemy incendiary bomb ignited the grass around Comrade Qiu Shaoyun and ignited the camouflauge and clothes on Qiu Shaoyun's body. Behind him was a ditch. He only had to walk back a few steps and roll around a bit in the mud and water. In this way, he could have put out the flames. However, he did not move; he did not move at all. He knew that the enemy's telescopes were right then observing the ambush area. If he had moved just a little, he would have endangered the lives and security of more than 500 of his comrades, and he would have adversely affected the chances of victory in this operation. He resolutely bore the burning fire until the brilliant flames gradually died away on his body. The ambush was successful and a glorious victory won. The enemy on Height 391 was completely wiped out. The red flag was planted on the main peak of the height. On November 6th, 1952, Comrade Qiu Shaoyun was posthumously awarded a special merit. The Korean people carved these words on a stone wall on the main peak of Height 391: "Eternal glory to the great soldier Comrade Qiu Shaoyun who selflessly sacrificed himself for the sake of victory and of the collective!"

These, too, were Qiu Shaoyun-like heroes!

These, too, were great soldier who were willing to sacrifice themselves for victory and the collective!

During the assault, when the troops had charged to a place just a little more than 100 meters from the peak, their advance was blocked by barbed wire. The two sappers did not succeed in demolishing it. For the moment, the troops were trapped by artillery fire near the barbed wire. If they did not quickly continue their charge forward, they would lose this opportunity and would give the enemy a chance to run off. The following troops swarmed up from behind. Now all the troops were gathered here. The number of casualties was certainly going to increase. Under these extremely urgent circumstances, Sapper Li Yunfeng suddenly leapt forward onto the barbed wire, shouting out loudly, "Comrades, for the sake of victory, cross over on my body." For a moment the comrades were dumbstruck, and once again he urged them loudly, "Hurry, hurry up and cross. Comrades, for victory!" For the sake of victory, they could not waste any more time. His comrades, filled with the fire of anger, crossed over on his body and charged toward the enemy. He used his own flesh and blood to safeguard the advance.

According to reports, there were a few other comrades who spread out their bodies over barbed wire to open the way to victory.

For more than thirty years, brave Li Yunfeng's cry has of sounded in my ears: "For the sake of victory, cross over on my body!" Every time I think of it, I always get excited. Yes, our victory, our newborn homeland, crossed over on the bodies of a billion such heroes. If there had not been one billion martyrs willing to use their own flesh and blood to lay a foundation for the undertakings of the fatherland and the people, our revolution would not have been able to strive forward. And today we would not have this tower of socialism. I still often think that for the sake of tomorrow we still need this kind of spirit today: "For the sake of victory, cross over on my body!"

On the night of the 10th, after our shock troops had wiped

out one regiment of the puppet 5th Division, the puppet fifth division and the reserve puppet third division began to execute continuous counterassaults. By the 14th, we had repulsed a total of more than 190 counterassaults executed by units ranging from platoons to battalions. We killed more than 7000 enemy soldiers. We took advantage of the opportunity presented by the weak, continuous enemy counterassaults to employ the 180th Divisions and a reinforced regiment of the 203rd Divisions to continue launching an attack against the enemy. So as to suppress the enemy opposite them, the 33rd Division, which was positioned along the left flank and commanded by the 60th Army on the nights of the 14th and 15th attacked the area defended by a battalion of the 62nd Regiment of the puppet 20th Division. The 33rd also repulsed a number of enemy counterassaults. The enemy had been beaten badly by us. He quickly transferred the puppet reserve 7th Division to the front to augment support for the puppet 20th Division.

Close on the heels of the 60th Army, we launched an attack on Cross Hill, which was defended by the 21st Regiment of the puppet 8th Division, on the night of June 12th. In this attack, we employed the two regiments of the 200th Division and one regiment of the 201st Division, which were supported by more than 300 mortar and better artillery pieces and eight tanks. Cross Hill is called Shouyedong [transliteration] South Hill. It had strong, solid fortifications, with bunkers set in the woods. Each strong point had two or three tunnels. The enemy called it a "model position" and a "capital fortress". The 67th Army carried out complete preparations in order to attack and annihilate this enemy. After the operation was begun, artillery was fired continuously for twenty-eight minutes. The troops launched a quick assault, fought for one hour and thirty minutes, and completely captured the enemy surface positions. Thereupon, the troops immediately switched to cleaning out the tunnels of the remaining enemy soldiers. By 10:00 a.m. on the 13th, the operation ended victoriously. Thereupon, we continuously repulsed more than fifty second echelon counterassaults executed by the

puppet 10th Regiment. On the 14th, we exploited the victory and occupied all of the puppet 21st Regiment's positions, which were to the north of Dragon Tiger Village and to the east of Fox Slope Road [Translator's Note: Transliterations, respectively, are Longhudong and Huxian.]

Both before and after the 20th Regiment launched attacks against the enemy on both sides of the North Seoul River, the 23rd and 24th Armies, which belonged to the 9th Group Army on the right wing, and the 3rd and 7th Army Groups, which belonged to the Korean People's Army on the left wing attacked in succession twenty-three positions held by battalions or smaller units. In all, they inflicted more than 11,000 casualties.

On the evening of the 15th of June, I was in the operations room in front of the sand table observing the situation of the armies developing along the front and both wings. Suddenly, I heard someone-I did not know whom--shout out loudly: "Hurry up and look! Our artillery fire has lit up the sky!"

Several of the comrades in the operation room ran out. I, too, walked to the door. The western half of the sky was like a glowing piece of metal. A small, colorful cloud looked like it was going to be burned up. A large black cloud was suffused with purple and border with a thick edge of gold. The sun had sunk behind the hills a while ago. This was a reflection of the sunset. In the two years since we had come to Korea, this was the first time that we had seen a beautiful scene such as this. Just when I was able to see God, Yang Fengan brought a telegram and said, "A telegram from Commander in Chief Peng has arrived!" His voice betrayed a certain amount of excitement. I quickly opened it, and read it as I walked:

To Acting Commander Deng Hua and then to each army group commander of the Korean People's Army, each group army commander and commissar of the Volunteer Army, and Comrade

Kenong:

In accordance with a telephone call from our armistice negotiating delegation:

The military boundaries have basically been agreed upon. At exactly 2400 hours tonight (June 15th), all the positions occupied on both sides before 2400 hours will become effective. After this (beginning at 0000 hours), any positions captured will not count. Our Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army, in order to accelerate the realization of the armistice, will begin defending positions on the 16th and will no longer initiate attacks. However, we must keep alert and stick closely to our positions. We should resolutely strive to annihilate any enemy unit which dares to invade any of our positions. There can be no carelessness.

Peng Dehuai

June 15th, 1953, 1800 hours

I had Comrade Yang Fengan quickly deliver the telegram to Acting Commander Deng Hua. At 1900 hours, we sent out a "Beginning on the 16th, cease initiating attacks on the enemy" order to all the army groups of the Korean People's Army and all the group armies of the Volunteer Army. Thus, our second attack came to a conclusion on June 16th.

During this attack our army had carried out sixty-three successive attacks against fifty-one regiment and smaller unit positions. During those few days of continuous combat, we wiped out most of an enemy regiment in one attack, penetrated the model defensive positions of one enemy regiment, executed annihilating attacks against the puppet 5th and 8th Divisions, and occupied three enemy regiment positions to a depth of from three to six kilometers along a twelve kilometer front on both sides of the

North Seoul River, thereby expanding our positions' area by fifty-eight square kilometers. In all, more than 41,000 enemy soldiers were killed, captured, or wounded. Our army suffered more than 19,000 casualties.

At dawn on the 16th, before 5:00 a.m., I got up. Getting up early had been a habit with me for many years. Nevertheless, on this day, it seemed that I had to force myself to get up early. Right away, I ran to the peak in back of us. The east was already a sliver of silver. It was very quiet all around. This kind of quiet was very rare. In the past, when combat was fierce, one could hear the thundering of the guns, and even if there were no artillery attacks, one could sense the combat atmosphere of the front-line positions. Even when the combat stopped for a while, with both sides locked in a stalemate, one could still sense a smell of burnt gunpowder in the air. Though it seems a strange thing to say, this time I could not sense it. I was as if the whole area were sweetly and deeply dreaming. Facing in the direction of the fatherland, I stretched out my arms a few times and drew a few deep breaths of air. I stood on the balls of my feet and looked out into the distance. It seemed like I could see the fatherland. I felt like I should say something to the fatherland. Say what? Report to the fatherland our victory or express my feelings of homesickness to the fatherland. It seemed like both existed then.

On that day, the telephone in the operations room at Volunteer Command rang unusually few times. I had the chief of staff call up all the group armies and ask about the situation. All answered that there were no disturbances. In the afternoon, we got a call from Beijing which said that Commander in Chief Peng had recently left to participate in the signing ceremony. This news made the whole day climb to a climax. Everyone of every rank was overflowing with cheerfulness. For dinner, the cook made some special dishes, and he suddenly placed a bottle of Maotai on the table.

Deng Hua said, "Do we really want to celebrate. Isn't it too early?"

Zhimin said, "The cook is in a rush. It's the tendency of the people."

On that day, my spirits were particularly good. I made Guo Changrong get a bottle, saying, "Everyone can drink several glasses. There's no chance that tonight I'll drag you from your nests."

We also invited Vice Commander Cui Yongjian and other comrades over and put together a table. The comrades toasted each other, often lifting their glasses. The comrades left only after thoroughly enjoying themselves. Everyone clearly understood that, although the signing had not taken place yet, victory was imminent. A victory won through nearly three years of life and death struggle is not at all easy!

I had not imagined that on the second and third days infuriating and startling news would arrive: The Rhee clique forcibly made off with more than 27,000 Korean prisoners from our side. It was called "on-site release". In fact, it was forced detention. They were added to the Rhee puppet army.

Through this act, not only was the agreement on repatriation of prisoners of war seriously broken, but also the evil objective of the Rhee clique to destroy the imminent armistice agreement was fully revealed.

The "India Times" said, "The situation requires that we use all our strength to save the armistice. . . . We must do everything in our power to bring back the released prisoners of war. We must deal out punishments, including the threat that Rhee will be removed from office if necessary, to force the South

Korean government to cooperate in this undertaking."

The members of the U.S. Congress discussed this one after another. Some Senators even thought the U.S. should bring back the kidnapped prisoners of war. One senator said, "We must make every effort to bring back the prisoners of war. In this way, we can express our sincerity. Then, we should immediately apply ourselves to bringing about the armistice." Another senator, in referring to Rhee, said he was "an old fogey, a failed and unprincipled dictator."

The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Churchill, on June 22nd, read this message to Rhee's government to the House of Commons: ". . . . As a member of the United Nation's Army and with an army that participated in the Korean war, the Queen's government strongly criticizes this traitorous behavior which disregards the jurisdiction of the United Nations Headquarters. This jurisdiction was agreed upon in Korea in 1950." Churchill said, "The incident is obviously extremely serious and filled with danger". "It is now apparent that to bring back the released prisoners of war, as requested by China and North Korea, would be a very wise act."

The requests made by the Sino-Korean side of which Churchill spoke refers to a letter which Commander in Chief Peng and Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung sent to Supreme Commander of the United Nations Army, General Clark. The letter solemnly chastised the enemy and solemnly stated the the enemy "must accept the heavy responsibility for this incident", "must be responsible for bringing back all 'released' prisoners of war and for guaranteeing that no similar incident will ever occur again", and must "be able to control the South Korean government and army" and guarantee that the armistice agreement will be abided by.

On the afternoon of the 20th, when Deng Hua and I further discussed how to punish Rhee, Yang Fengan hurried over. With a

happy look on his face, he said, "Commander in Chief Peng has arrived!"

"Where?" asked Deng Hua and I, standing up.

"In Pyongyang. Please, both of you, answer the telephone."

Pointing at Yang Fengan, Deng Hua said, "From the way you looked and the way you sounded, I thought that Commander in Chief Peng had already arrived here!"

It turned out that Commander in Chief Peng had left Beijing on the 19th, arriving in Pyongyang on the 20th. Immediately after his arrival, he immediately placed a call to our armistice negotiation team and inquired about the situation. Then he called us. After Deng Hua reported to him that our army already had experience in fighting the puppet army and was right then studying how to attack Rhee again, Commander in Chief Peng said, "This Rhee doesn't know what's bad and what's good. We really ought to put him in his place." Then he told us to redeploy as quickly as possible and enter combat as soon as possible.

That night at 10:00 p.m., Commander in Chief Peng himself composed a telegram and sent it to Chairman Mao. In it, he suggested that we "delay the signing". "In order to intensify internal conflicts within the enemy ranks, I propose that we again attack Rhee" and that we "again wipe out 15,000 soldiers in the puppet army".

Chairman Mao's official reply:

Comrade Peng Dehuai:

Have read telegram of June 20th, 2200 hours. The armistice signing must be delayed, delayed until an appropriate time. Must see how situation unfolds before

decision is made. It is quite necessary to annihilate more than 10,000 puppet army soldiers.

Mao Zedong

June 21st, 1953

In accordance with these instructions of Chairman Mao, we decided to immediately organize the third attack of the summer campaign and fiercely attack the Rhee clique so as to support the armistice negotiations. We instructed each group army and each army that it "should select targets in accordance with the original plan. If already prepared, then take up where you left off and immediately do your best to annihilate the targets. If you select new targets, then quickly carry out preparations. . . . Still do not initiate attacks against the U.S. army and its foreign henchmen army. But you must vigorously attack any aggressor army."

At this time, after we attacked twice in succession, the enemy's defensive system on both sides of the North Seoul River had already been destroyed by us. Now the defensive positions of four puppet divisions, located south of Geumsung, west of Geum Hwa, and east and north of the Seoul River, were more exposed than ever. The situation was very favorable to us. At the same time, we had already assembled four armies and nearly 400 mountain, field, and howitzer artillery pieces in the Geumsong area. Moreover, we knew about the situations of the in depth enemy fortifications and positions in this area and had experience in attacking solid positions of enemy battalions and regiments. We had mastered the defensive features of the puppet army. Therefore, with respect to this attack, we were filled with confidence in victory. Our morale was exceptionally high. Without a doubt, all of these these factors were advantageous with respect to our carrying out a large-scale attack.

It was also at this time that the chief of staff, Jie Fang,

received orders to return to China to the General Staff to take over responsibility for army training work. He was replaced by Li Dajie. Because we were busy organizing this counterattack operation, not only did we not have enough time to give him a proper send off--neither were we able to sit down and have a chat. Even to this day, when I think about it, I feel it was a great pity.

On June 24th, we received the 20th Group Army report, "Counterattack Strategy of the Third Phase of the Summer Campaign". The 20th Group Army planned to employ the 67th, the 68th, the 60th, and the 54th Armies, which were currently under its command, and the 21st Army, which was temporarily reinforced by Volunteer Command, in executing an attack in a twenty-five kilometer belt to the south of Geum Sung and between the North Seoul River and Shangsuoli [transliteration]. Moreover, the 20th planned, as its campaign objective, to straighten out the battle lines south of Geum Sung, wipe out the puppet capital division and eight regiments and one battalion of the puppet 6th, 8th, and 3rd Divisions. Campaign preparations were set to be completed by early July and the attack was to be launched around July 10th. Everything from supporting firepower to logistical support to transferring a certain number of infantry units for the special purpose of carrying out road repair and construction to guaranteeing that transportation lines would remain open, every aspect of these and other problems were given careful consideration and thoroughly planned before implementation.

I exchanged opinions with Deng Hua and approved this report. In addition, I clearly instructed them to begin combat, saying that after successful counterattacks limited expansion into enemy lines could be continued if the conditions were favorable. At the same time, I instructed the other front-line armies at this time to prepare for attack only. Basically, they were to maintain the situation. If the enemy attacked, they were to vigorously annihilate him.

In order to guarantee victory in this operation, we reinforced the 20th Group Army with one rocket regiment and one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, two field howitzer battalions, three anti-tank artillery companies, and four engineer battalions. After reinforcing the Geum Song front, our army had 1094 mortar and better artillery pieces, an average of 44.8 pieces every kilometer. The commander of the first command post of the armored forces, Zhao Jie, dispatched twenty tanks. The ration between us and the enemy with respect to troop strength was 1 : 3. For firepower, it was 1 : 1.7.

In considering the fact that the rainy season was soon to arrive and we were going to cross the river to fight, the Volunteer Army especially provided the combat units with forty-seven pieces of river-crossing equipment and various types of bridges, thirty-six folding boat and rubber rafts, and two sets of floating bridges.

The logistical headquarters of the Volunteer Army gathered together ten regiments of gas-powered vehicles, a total of 2000 vehicles. These quickly transported 15,000 metric tons of combat materials, including 700,000 artillery shells and 124 metric tons of explosives.

During this period of time, each unit that was to participate in the operation, in addition to thoroughly carrying out reconnaissance on the enemy and the terrain, establishing combat schemes, and organizing coordination, employed more than 10,000 men to secretly construct a great number of "troop-storing holes" in the zone between ours and the enemy's positions in accordance with the missions assigned to them. At the same time, several tens of thousands of men were used to build transportation roads.

"During war, do not disdain trickery." In order to perplex the enemy and exhaust him, the 60th and 67th Armies, in keeping

with the instructions of the group army, continued to execute small-scale attacks in the direction of a predetermined enemy battalion during the preparation period. One should not regard as unimportant these small attacks and disturbances. They paralyzed the enemy's spirit and absorbed his concentration, thereby creating conditions favorable for the large-scale attack which was to come.

At dusk on July 13th, the clouds were heavy and the sky was low. It was exceptionally hot. It seemed very much as though a storm were coming. At 2100 hours, five armies subordinate to our 20th Group Army and 9th Group Army were organized into three strike forces--east, central, and west. Taking advantage of the enemy's not expecting us, we launched a fierce and sudden attack along separate routes with the support of more than 1000 artillery pieces. This was the third attack of the 1953 summer counterattack campaign. It was also called the Geum Song campaign.

After one hour of fierce combat, enemy positions along the entire line were penetrated, one after another. Within the following twenty-four hours, four divisions--the puppet capital division and the puppet 6th, 8th, and 3rd divisions--were all entirely routed. The unit which advanced the furthest pushed eighteen kilometers southward.

Seeing as the first part of the campaign developed smoothly, in order to implement the instructive policy of "steadily progressing and attacking fiercely" and to consolidate the positions, we immediately ordered the 20th Group Army by telephone to employ a main force to control the currently occupied line and to quickly construct fortifications, repair and open up roads, quickly transport materials and ammunition, push forward the artillery positions, and prepare to smash an enemy counterattack. At the same time, the 20th Group Army was ordered to employ a certain number of strong detachments to take advantage of the

chaotic situation of the enemy and separately push south.

On the 16th, the Supreme Commander of the aggressor army, Clark, and the commander of the U.S. 8th Army, Tyler, flew to the front line and held a high-level army officer conference, which announced that a very large counterattack would be launched to recapture the ground lost to the south of Geum Song. Moreover, beginning on that day, the enemy gathered together, one after another, the puppet 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Divisions, the U.S. 3rd Division, and remnants of the puppet 3rd, 6th, and 8th Divisions and launched a full-strength counterattack supported by a large number of aircraft and artillery units.

In order to smash the enemy's counterattack and win a campaign victory, at 1800 hours on the 17th, I sent out instructions to the attack units urging them to quickly mobilize, quickly build fortifications in the newly occupied positions, organize artillery fire, and strengthen traffic, communication, and transportation. I also instructed them to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy and execute annihilating attacks. At the same time, I ordered the other front-line armies to employ aggressive actions to suppress the opposing enemy forces.

After the enemy's counterattack, our attack units switched to vigorous blocking actions. By July 26th, when the counterattack ended, our units repulsed 1371 large and small counterattacks carried out by forces ranging from one company to two regiments in size. The positions we had seized were consolidated, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The number of heroes who fought alone courageously, cleverly wiped out the enemy, fought as one against one hundred, or made many victories out of a few was greater than in the past.

Private Lai Yongze, after fighting his way south of Heiyuntuling [transliteration], defended the frontmost positions for three days and nights. He used rocks and bullets which the

enemy had dropped to repel many enemy counterattacks. By himself, he killed or wounded more than 100 enemy soldiers. Private Xia Jicheng inserted himself into the midst of the fighting and by himself climbed onto an enemy vehicle and grabbed an enemy soldier. He then commandeered the enemy vehicle and attacked and pursued the fleeing enemy. He killed more than fifty enemy soldiers and captured five enemy soldiers alive. While a certain unit of the 6th Company was attacking and pursuing the enemy, the 2nd Squad crossed over eight hills in succession. This one squad routed one enemy company, winning a victory and capturing more than forty soldiers.

The Beijing opera "Miraculous Raid on the White Tiger Regiment" which everyone knows is based on this counterattack operation. After the western group army, which was organized from the 68th Army (less the 202nd Division) and the 130th Division of the 54th Army, penetrated the enemy's front-line positions, the 203rd Division on its right wing quickly annihilated an enemy battalion on Height 522.1. Then the main force of the division launched an attack in the direction of Fangtongli [transliteration]. This division infiltrated an outflanking detachment, namely a reinforced battalion of the 609th Regiment. Its advance squad disguised itself as a puppet army unit. Led by Platoon Commander Yang Yucai, it rapidly penetrated into enemy territory along a road east of Height 522.1. At 0200 hours on the 14th, it had penetrated to an area near Erqingdong. The advance squad led by Yang Yucai, drawing from information taken from among prisoners of war who had been captured before the counterattack, skillfully used the enemy verbal commands to deceive the enemy and rushed into the regimental headquarters of the 1st Regiment (also known as the White Tiger Regiment) of the puppet capital division and wiped out the enemy commanding officers who were right then dreaming beautiful dreams. Once the enemy lost its command, panic occurred. This detachment immediately took advantage of the night to cut off, encircle, and wipe out the fleeing enemy. . . .

The 204th Division, which was on the left wing of the same western group army, captured the vice commander of the puppet capital division, Lin Yichun in the course of combat.

During the fighting, our logistical workers had to work very hard. Each of the drivers of the 6th Vehicle Regiment, which was responsible for transporting provisions and ammunition during the third phase, lost an average of 4.4 pounds or more in body weight. So as to speed things up, they generally had only one meal a day. Many drivers, so as to conquer fatigue, used electric shocks to stimulate their spirits. Some opened up the windows and used the wind and snow to drive away their fatigue. Throughout the entire summer counterattack operation, the transportation workers of the 60th Army were able to rest a mere three or four hours a day. The legs and feet of many comrades became swollen. They could only use their heel to step on the accelerator, but their heels began to get sore and some oozed pus. And the backs of many comrades, because they again and again carried things on their backs and were unable to rest, became covered with blisters as a result of all the friction.

Feats such as these are unequalled.

It was precisely because of the combined effort of the rear and the front, the united combat of the commanders and the combat soldiers, and of course the support of the fatherland, the support of the Korean people, and many other important factors that we were able to win the glorious victory of the 1953 counterattack campaign.

In the course of the entire campaign, we killed, captured, or wounded a total of more than 123,000 men (78,000 men captured, killed, or wounded in the third phase alone. This was more than five times the number we had set.) We expanded the area of our positions by more than 220 square kilometers and straightened the battle lines south of Geum Song. We destroyed more than 770 enemy

aircraft, captured or destroyed thirty-six enemy tanks, captured one enemy airplane, 301 gas-powered vehicles, 607 artillery pieces, 1538 machine guns (light and heavy), 11,098 guns (long and short), and 1120 pieces of important communication equipment. We needed more than 4000 trips by heavy transportation trucks to move all of the captured ammunition and equipment. Our counterattack had seriously hurt the enemy. It forced the enemy to guarantee to us that the armistice agreement would be implemented. This campaign was the campaign in which the name "The Last Battle" matched the reality.

Under the circumstances of our swift and fierce offensive and of our successive victories, the head of the U.S. delegation, Harrison, guaranteed to our side on July 11th: "When the nation of Korea carries out any aggressive action to break the armistice, the United Nations Army will not provide support."¹

When our side brought up the issue of whether the "United Nations" Army would preserve the armistice if the South Korean army broke the armistice agreement after the armistice by acting aggressively, and the Sino-Korean side took the necessary actions to resist the aggression while supporting the armistice. Harrison on July 13th said, "The answer is yes."

When our side brought up the issue of whether the "United Nations" Army would not provide South Korea with any support, including support in the form of equipment or supplies, if the South Korean army broke the armistice agreement after the armistice by acting aggressively, and the Sino-Korean side took the necessary actions to resist the aggression while supporting the armistice. On July 13th, Harrison said, "The answer is yes."

On July 16th, Harrison again promised us: "I again promise you. We have exacted a promise from the government of greater Korea. It is: It will not employ any means to disrupt the implementation of the draft of the armistice agreement."²

This man, who was selected by Clark himself to replace the previous head of the U.S. negotiating delegation and who was a descendant of the ninth U.S. president, William Henry Harrison, was quite arrogant. How is it possible that he had become so humble? Our Chairman Mao explained it all in a few words: "The U.S. aggressor is now in a disadvantageous position, in which he is suffering attacks. If he is not compliant, then his entire front will be broken and Seoul may just fall into the hands of the Korean people."

For the sake of world peace, we agreed to the U.S. request to quickly sign.

On July 24th, both sides in the negotiations agreed to the military boundaries for the third time.

The first time both sides in the negotiations reached an agreement on the military boundaries was on November 27th, 1951. Eighteen months and twenty days after this, both sides, on June 17th, 1953, approved a revised military boundary because changes had occurred in the line where both sides met. The revised military boundary is explained thus: During the eighteen months and twenty days, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's

1,2 See The Great Movement to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, p. 343, "Statement of the head of the Sino-Korean delegation to the Korean armistice negotiations, Nan Ri, concerning the problem of guaranteeing implementation of the armistice agreement."

3 The Selected Works of Chairman Mao, vol. 5, p. 101

Volunteer Army, in nine different locations along the entire line, progressed to varying extents southward. The total area gained by the southward push was 140 square kilometers.

After the military boundary was set for a second time, the Syngam Rhee clique broke the agreement and opposed the armistice, and this delayed the signing of the armistice by over one month. During this period of time, more modifications occurred in the line of contact between the two sides. Therefore, a third correction was made. This correction shows that in this period of time (more than a month) our army added 192.6 square kilometers in area in pushing to the south in eight regions. Since the first military boundary 332.6 square kilometers were added in our push to the south. The original battle line, which went from a point fourteen kilometers to the southeast of Geum Song through a point half a kilometer to the south of Geum Song to a point sixteen kilometers to the southwest, was straightened out, and 169.2 square kilometers were added to our side.

After we received a report from our negotiating delegation concerning the final corrected military boundary and the signing which was going to take place on July 27th, we sent out an order in the name of "United Command" to the Korean People's Army and the Volunteer Army that the attack would be halted at 0600 hours on the 26th. We also clearly indicated that, outside of the military boundary which had already been fixed, all newly occupied positions would have to be surrendered and we would have to return to the original positions.

On July 27th, all the comrades of the Volunteer Command offices got up very early. Everyone had a big smile on his face, and everyone displayed exceptional calm. The usual loud voices today seemed to have quieted down a lot. Everything was tranquil, peaceful, and ordered. However, everyone felt that in the midst of this tranquility there was a kind of nervousness and that this peace cloaked an excitement. It was as though everyone were

awaiting the arrival of an important moment. This waiting was mixed with happiness, anxiety, and a certain amount of discomfort.

It seemed that everyone sitting in the operations room had nothing to do and yet had much to do. From time to time, they would gaze at the five telephones in a row. Everyone knew that one telephone, black and covered with leather, was connected to the negotiating team at Panmunjeon. However, no one could help first looking at this one and then at that one, as though each telephone was connected now to that place about which everyone cared and each telephone was able to bring the news about which everyone was concerned. Everyone was well aware that yesterday the Sino-Korea delegation had reported publicly that it had been made very clear that today at 1000 hours Korean time, the signing would begin. Yet everyone still, without any reason, worried whether it might happen earlier or later or whether something else would happen. It seemed as though on this day the signing could have taken place at any hour or any moment.

The telephone finally rang. A few young guys left off their chairs. The air in the operations room seemed to be pulled tight by the ringing of the phone. Moreover, it was on everyone's heart. The black leather telephone brought the news which everyone had been waiting for: at ten o'clock in the morning, the head of our delegation, General Nan Ri [transliteration] together with the head of the opposing side's delegation, Lieutenant General Harrison had already completed the signing. Moreover, it was being sent to the supreme commander of the Korean people, Kim Il Sung, and to the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, Peng Dehuai and to the supreme commander of the "United Nations Army", Clark, for signing. I looked at my watch: it was 10:13 Korean time. The signing ceremony had ended at 10:10.

On the same day, Supreme Commander of the "United Nations Army" Clark formally signed the armistice agreement at Wenshan

[transliteration].

On the same day, Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung formally signed the armistice agreement at Pyongyang.

On the following day, Commander Peng Dehuai formally signed the armistice agreement at Gaesong.

On the same day, Commander Peng Dehua and Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung dispatched an order to the Sino-Korean armies:

"Beginning at 2200 hours on July 27th, 1953, twelve hours after the signing of the armistice agreement, the entire line is to completely cease fire."

By then, after two years and nine months of the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, the war ended victoriously for the Chinese and Korean peoples.

This great victory did not come about easily.

It is true of many historical incidents that the people can only understand them more clearly by placing them in the context of the particular background and conditions which they developed. The War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea was also like this. When the Korean war broke out and the fires of war burned all the way to China's border, the People's Republic of China had been founded only nine months earlier. When the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government decided to dispatch the Volunteer Army to fight the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, the People's Republic of China was barely one year old. For a nation with a very weak military and economy that had suffered year after year of war to receive a military challenge from a nation with a 173 year history and a strong economy and military is, one must say, very difficult and not at all easy. Those who lived through the period of time in which we resisted the U.S. and aided Korea

certainly cannot forget that the struggle and contradictory feelings over whether we dared to fight, whether we would be able to fight, whether we would be able to win, and whether we would be able to attain a final victory were very sharp.

More than two years of war provides the proof. We dared to fight. We were able to fight. We attained the final victory. If one says that the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1st, 1949 caused the people of the world to take notice of the awakening of a great people, then the victory of the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea caused the people of the world to see even more clearly the great power of this people. This proved the saying of Chairman Mao Zedong: "Our people will no longer be a humiliated people. We have already stood up."¹

The U.S. general, Clark, wrote a very long memoir after the Korean armistice. The title was "From the Danube River to the Yalu River". On the first page of this memoir, he wrote: "In carrying out the instructions of my government, I gained the unenviable distinction of being the first United States Army commander in history to sign an armistice without victory." "I suffered a sense of frustration that was shared, I imagine, by my two predecessors, Generals Douglas MacArthur and Matthew Ridgway."

This "sense of frustration" was not felt only by Clark and his two predecessors. Before the Korean armistice, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley said, after the victory of our fourth campaign, that the U.S., in fighting China, "was fighting the wrong war at the wrong time and at the wrong place."

The "pain" [Translator's Note: General Mark Clark uses the word "frustration" in his memoir. Yang Dezhi makes use of an inaccurate translation, in which "pain of disappointment"

1 The Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, p. 5

is substituted for "sense of frustration".] ¹ and "wrongs" ² of the U.S. prove again our victory. This proof is perhaps even more convincing.

Our victory was great. Just as was stated in the telegram of appreciation from the Central Committee of the People's Government: the victory of the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea "demonstrated a truth to the peace-loving people of the world--the plots and wars of aggression by imperialists must be defeated and can be defeated. All that is needed is for all the peace-loving people of the world to cooperate and oppose intervention in the affairs of other governments, oppose wars of aggression, and persist in using the method of peaceful negotiations to solve disputes in international matters. In this way, peace can be made secure."

1 See Clark's memoir, From the Danube to the Yalu
2 See Truman's memoir, vol. 2, p. 533

Chapter Eleven. Victory Belongs to the People and the Party.

The War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea was entirely forced upon the Chinese people by the aggressor. It went on for a period of nearly three years, beginning in the middle of October in 1950, when the Chinese People's Volunteer Army went to Korea to take part in the war, to July of 1953 when U.S. General Clark signed the Korean armistice agreement. In the long flow of historical time, one could say that three years is a very short period of time. But these three years gave us and gave the people of the world, including the U.S., so many things. In recent years, I have paid friendly visits to the U.S. and some other nations which had joined the "United Nations Army". I met some military people. Most of them had not taken part in the Korean War, but they gave me the impression that they had not at all forgotten this war. This is to say that this war had stayed in their memory. Of course, memories differ. But I think that historical facts themselves cannot differ. Because it is objective, it is just. Moreover, objective and just history, with the passage of time, will reveal to an even greater extent its strength.

I remember that, after Commander in Chief Peng completed his part in the signing of the armistice agreement, he returned to China very quickly. On August 11th, the Chinese People's Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea General Conference held a large gathering in Beijing to welcome Commander in Chief Peng in his victorious

return to China. Comrade Guo Moruo served as the chairman of the Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea conference. Representing all the people of the nation, he praised the Volunteer Army: "During two years and nine months of the righteous war to resist the U.S. and aid Korea, they won a great victory. They secured the independence of our neighbour, the safety of our fatherland, peace for Asia, and peace for the world." He said that this victory "is a victory for the people of the world, is a victory for peace, is a victory for democracy, a victory for righteousness." Comrade Guo Moruo called out loudly, "Glory belongs to the high-level practitioners of patriotism and internationalism!" "Glory belongs to the people's heroes who were victorious over the imperialist aggressors!" Commander in Chief Peng, representing all of the officers and men of the Volunteer Army, made a speech. He said, "For three years, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army carried out the will of the fatherland, together with the brave Korean people, in resisting the U.S. aggressors. After a very grave struggle, we finally achieved a glorious victory. This glory and this victory should be attributed to the courageous Korean people and Korean People's Army! It should be attributed to the people of our great fatherland!"

While this conference was being held in Beijing, I was on my way back to China.

On July 28th, in Gaesong, after Commander in Chief Peng had signed the Korean armistice agreement and a temporary additional agreement, he told me that October 1st of this year would be the third anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It would also be the first holiday following the Korean armistice. The Central Committee decided that the Volunteer Army would organize a celebratory delegation to return to China and celebrate and make reports. Commander in Chief Peng hoped that this delegation would return to China soon and visit a number of places and familiarize itself with a number of aspects of national construction. Commander in Chief Peng said, "After coming to

Korea, you never returned to China. More than two years have passed, and the changes at home are very great! You get to know the situation, and then when you come back here you can tell the troops about it. Introduce them to the situation and educate them! At the same time, you should make mass reports on all domestic fronts and let the people know more about the situation of the Volunteer Army. The feeling of the masses of people in China for the Volunteer Army is very deep! You will also have to prepare to make a report to the government and make a report to the Military Commission. You should also study post-armistice army work."

I said, "You know the situation of the entire army. It would be better if you reported to the Central Committee and to the Military Commission."

Commander in Chief Peng said, "If I make a speech, you too will have to make a speech. Before National Day, the Central Committee of the People's Government will hold a conference. The Chairman and the Premier will give speeches on the situation of the Volunteer Army since it entered Korea. It's work of the reporting type. As for you, my suggestion is that you make a speech emphasizing the most recent situation. You can speak about the summer counterattack which preceded the armistice. This campaign was well executed and produced many heroes. You could speak of the feats of the heroes, say a lot about the soldiers, the low-ranking officers and men."

I told Commander in Chief Peng that before the signing of the armistice I had had a discussion with comrades of the Korean People's Army, and we had agreed to hold a large conference together with two meetings, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the August 1st holiday. One would be to commemorate the August 1st founding of the army holiday. The Korean government has decided to send a people's delegation to provide us with a gift of a flag. At this meeting, Comrade Deng Hua would

give a speech. The other meeting would be a large meeting which we would hold together to celebrate the Korean armistice victory. I would give a speech.

Commander in Chief Peng said, "Very good! Both these meeting should be held. In the speeches you and Deng Hua give, you should both make a point of thanking the tremendous support that the Korean party, government, and people gave us under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung. You should tell everyone that the armistice agreementy has been signed and distributed. We must strictly carry it out. What about the other side and whether or not they carry it out? Well, we'll have to see about that. We welcome their execution of it, and we are also prepared if they don't execute it. In conclusion, we can't be too lax now that the Panmunjeon signing has taken place."

I told Commander in Chief Peng that as soon as the two large meetings were held here, I would return to China as quickly as possible.

"Good." Commander in Chief finished speaking and began laughing. "Oh, right! They told me that your wife just bore you a son. They, too, are hoping that you hurry up and return to China!"

Shen Gejun had given birth to our son, Jianhua, a month earlier. The fact that Commander in Chief Peng, who was so busy with his work, would suddenly know this so clearly and would mention this as a problem which required me to return to China quickly is something that I had not expected and which caused me to think of many. . . .

After Commander in Chief Peng left, in accordance with the plans which had been originally set, we held two large meetings one on July 30th and one on August 1st. The meeting on July 30th was presided over by the deputy director of the political

department, Zhang Nansheng. Comrade Deng Hua and the leader of the Korean People's delegation gave separate speeches. The Korean People's delegation gave us a gift of an embroidered banner. The meeting gave approval to the Volunteer Army to send congratulatory telegrams to the Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea General Committee and to the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, Kim Il Sung. The meeting of August 1st was held at the athletic field of the Huechang High School, which was surrounded on all sides by hills. The hills were covered with dense pine forests. Below the hills, there were mature crops. Everything, on the hills and below the hills, was green. The colorful banners and colorful signs surrounding the meeting site reflected the exceptional beauty of the countryside. Above the chairman's platform, a huge picture was hung. The picture was of a dove of peace, its wings unfolding as if it were about to fly. It was quite life-like. On the platform were huge portraits of Chairman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Kim Il Sung, around which were clustered flags from both Korea and China. On both sides of the chairman's platform, there were twenty colorful flags flapping in the wind. The entire meeting site was solemn and grand, beautiful and majestic.

At the meeting site, people dressed neatly. The officers and men of the Volunteer Army, in full battle dress, displayed on their chests Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea medals and various other medals as well. The Korean workers held up colorful signs and colorful banners. Farmers carried models of grain and high-yield crops. Women wore long white skirts, and children wore red scarves. Their faces were all filled with joy. Three years earlier, I had participated in a large gathering in the city of Yinchuan in the greater northwest area to celebrate the founding of the People's Republic of China. Since then, I had not participated in any such gathering where military and civilian personnel celebrated together. To have this kind of large gathering in Korea, where artillery fire was heard day after day, was even more novel. In my heart, I felt very excited and moved.

After Comrade Zhimin finished his short introductory speech, the representative of the Korean People's Army gave a speech brimming with warm feeling.

After I finished giving my speech, two Korean mothers, who wore long white skirts, led two five or six year old girls onto the chairman's platform. Each of the two cute girls held a bunch of fresh flowers. One gave her flowers to Zhimin and the other gave hers to me. Without having agreed upon it, both Zhimin and I lifted up the two little girls. The meeting site broke out in applause which was like a storm. Thanks to our movie cameraman, this scene, symbolizing friendship between the Korean and Chinese peoples, was filmed. Now, thirty-odd years later, I am able to print this at the front of this memoir. Those two little girls in the photograph must be middle-aged women forty or more years old now. How are they doing? Are their parents healthy? I think that they, like the Korean people and like us, will not forget the militant friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples forged with blood!

On August 10th, serving as the head of the Volunteer Army's National Day Celebratory Delegation, I lead the delegation away from Volunteer Command.

The Chinese border city of Dandong welcomed its own children, a welcome warm like the August mid-summer heat. Gongs and drums and firecrackers shook heaven and earth. Colorful banners and fresh flowers covered the sky and the sun. Poster after poster of blazing color, slogan after slogan shouted from the heart, face after excited laughing face made it so that we comrades of the delegation could not keep our eyes from filling with hot tears. It was truly the case the mountains of the fatherland were friends to us; the water of the fatherland was a friend to us; and the people of the fatherland were even greater friends.

Wherever the delegation went, it was welcomed by crowds.

Wherever it went, it was given a hero's welcome. Wherever it went, it was given great glory. There were several old comrades within the delegation. They said that during the war of resistance against Japan and during the War of Liberation, we had lived in the homes of the masses, slept on the heated beds of our fellow villagers, stirred the same pots with them, and were in every respect one family. That feeling was truly quite deep. But this feeling of returning to China was completely different from the past circumstances. Why? Younger comrades said that it was because we had fought in a foreign country. It was apparent that if one left one's old village, one could find a new home. But if one left one's fatherland, one could not find a new fatherland. There is only one fatherland! I said that the people of the fatherland were giving us this kind of welcome because they had sent us out of the country to fight, to represent them in fighting for the sake of peace and security. We had fought well, so they were happy and took us to be heroes!

Yes, during the great struggle to resist the U.S. and aid Korea of the last three years, our Volunteer Army commanders, combat soldiers, and workers, with the encouragement and support of the people of the fatherland, had carried forward patriotism, internationalism, and the spirit of revolutionary heroes. In battle after battle and in every area of work, a great number of heroes, models, outstanding individuals, and units which established collective merits. According to statistics for the period from October 1950 to August of 1953, more than 30,000 outstanding individuals (class three or higher) appeared throughout the army, and more than 6100 units established collective merits (class three or higher). 217 of them were special-class outstanding individuals. 154 were first-class individuals, and there were 16 units with special-class merits. In addition, 282 outstanding individuals earned the glorious title of hero or model.

Of the more than 30,000 heroes, models, and outstanding

persons, there were more than 23,190 who received various decorations and medals from the standing committee of the Supreme People's Committee of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. Of these, Yang Gensi, Huang Jiguang, Wu Guanghua, Qiu Shaoyun, Sun Zhanyuan, Yang Liandi, Yang Chunzeng, Hu Xiudao, and other heroes received from Korea the glorious titles of "Hero of the Republic", as well as one "First Class National Flag Decoration" and one "Old Star Medal".

Whenever I receive the welcome of the people of the fatherland, I always think of those nearly countless comrades without the titles of hero, model, or outstanding individual who have not won any medals though they spent a long time in Korea. Perhaps their feats are just as moving and amazing as those of the heroes, models, and outstanding individuals. Perhaps their faithfulness to the fatherland and faithfulness to the people were not yet revealed when they fell. However, the people have not forgotten them. All comrades who fall for the sake of the establishment of peace will not be forgotten by the Chinese people, the Korean people, and all peace-loving people of the world.

In the Korean cemetery of Volunteer Army martyrs, there are many blank stones. The people do not know their names. They only know that they were martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. The people especially cherish and respect them. One ought to say that their names have already been written on the hearts of the people. They have been written on the high and towering pagoda of Sino-Korean friendship, which faces China from the western side of Mok Danbong. It has been written on the 10,000-li border between China and Korea. One could almost say that all the comrades who participated in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, including those who, as a part of the Movement to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, worked diligently and conscientiously on every front in the rear and enthusiastically supported the men at the front line, all of these comrades, whether or not they

received medals, own a medal in the form of the Sino-Korean Friendship Pagoda.

I remember that during the three years when the Korean people resisted the U.S. aggressor, the great leader of the Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung, gave Commander in Chief Peng a telegram which said, "Representing all of the Korean people, all of the officers and men of the Korean People's Army, and myself, I solemnly express sincere gratitude to yourself and all the commanders and combat soldiers of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, who are now opposing the imperialist aggression and preserving peace and freedom with arduous labor and high achievements!" The day before I left the Volunteer Army, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung, at a conference for welcoming a delegation of the Chinese government led by Zhou Enlai, said, "The support and expressions of support which the Chinese people have given the righteous struggle of the Korean people from beginning to end ensures the enormous strength of the peaceful joining together of our fatherlands."¹ In another speech, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung said, "With your blood, you have defended the heights and forests of Korea. The Korean streams, mountains, shrubs, and trees are all permeated with your precious blood and covered with marks of your heroic struggle. In the Korean War, the many merits and the great record of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army will, together with the beautiful rivers and mountains of Korea, last for ten thousand years."¹ At the 35th anniversary in commemoration of the arrival in Korea of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, when Chairman Kim Il Sung welcomed the Chinese government delegation led by Deputy Premier of the State Council Li Peng, he said to Comrade Li Peng, "Young people do not know too much about something which happened thirty-five years ago. The people must

¹ See The Selected Works of Kim Il Sung, Chinese edition, vol. 5, p. 326, p. 327

be educated and told. They must be made to know that the Chinese People's Volunteer Army left much blood and sweat on Korean soil and that there are many Volunteer Army martyrs buried in Korean soil. The friendship between China and Korea must go on from generation to generation." "We must inform the world of this matter, which is deserving of our pride. This is an example of internationalism which can be found nowhere else in the world."¹ I think that Comrade Kim Il Sung, by expressing again and again his heart-felt emotions, is himself faithfully spreading praise of our Chinese People's Volunteer Army and of all those who took part in resisting the U.S. and aiding Korea.

On October 1st, all the comrades of the Volunteer Army delegation participated in a solemn and somber ceremony to mark the fourth anniversary of the founding of the nation.

When Chairman Mao Zedong, Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Commander in Chief Zhu De, Premier Zhou Enlai, and other leading comrades walked onto the rostrum of Tiananmen, everyone in the square stood up. Everyone in the square erupted into applause that sounded like thunder.

After the huge mass parade began, a comrade came to me and said that Premier Zhou Enlai wanted me to go over and be with him.

I walked onto the Tiananmen rostrum. Premier Zhou walked over to me. I quickly saluted. The Premier accepted it and came

¹ On October 6th, 1985, from a speech to all members given by Comrade Kim Il Sung at a conference in Pyongyang where he met with members of the Political Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the secretary of the secretariat, and the Chinese government delegation headed by Deputy Premier of the State Council Li Peng.

over. He shook my hand and said, "You've been gone for more than two years. That's rough. How's your health?"

I said, "Very good. No problems."

The Premier said, "I knew a while ago that you had returned-- Commander in Chief Peng told me. But I couldn't find any time to have a talk with you. Today the Chairman asked for you. He wants to meet with you."

The Premier led me over to beside Chairman Mao.

It had been a long time since I had seen Chairman Mao. I remember that in the spring of 1944, not long after arriving in Shanbei--having come from the Hebei-Shandong-Henan area--, Chairman Mao called me over to the jujube garden in Yanan where he lived. We talked for a long time. To this day, I can remember clearly that the Chairman suggested that if I "had the chance I should go to the Anti-Japanese College or to the Party Academy and spend some time there." "You only in your thirties. You've got many days to come!" That day, the Chairman had me stay and eat a meal.

It seemed that the Chairman was somewhat fatter now, and his spirits were very good. When he saw that I had arrived, he stretched out his hands and, with a big smile on his face, said, "Welcome, Comrade Dezhi." He grasped my hand and shook it a few times.

Then, Deputy Chairman Shaoqi, Commander in Chief Zhu, Deputy Chairman Dong Biwu, and other leading comrades all came over and shook my hand.

The Chairman said humorously, "You should all get to know each other. This man is called by the great name of Yang Dezhi. In those years, he was a regiment commander in the Red Army who

forced his way across rivers. Now, he is a vice commander of the Volunteer Army, an assistant to Dehuai. He's from Hunan, where my hometown is!"

The Premier said, "Dezhi is the head of the Return to China Volunteer Army Delegation."

The Chairman, laughing, said, "This person has always been a Volunteer Army soldier. When he went up Jingang Mountain, it was because he volunteered. He was just a Volunteer Army soldier!"

Comrade Shaoqi said, "I, too, only learned of this name, Yang Dezhi, during the time of the river crossings."

Commander in Chief Zhu said, "A good man does not mention the bravery of those years. Let him speak about Korea."

Chairman Mao said to me, "The reason we asked you to come back was so that you would tell us about Korea!"

Premier Zhou said, "They've already visited a few places since returning to China. They've made some reports to the masses. After National Day, they are to make a report in Beijing. All the National Consultative Conference wants Comrade Dezhi to go and give a speech."

"Good", said Chairman Mao. "Then go and speak and let our friends get to know us better."

I nodded in agreement.

In accordance with the instructions of Premier Zhou, I made a report in the report conference to the National Committee of the Consultative Conference. The title of the report was "Thanks for the Support and Encouragement of the People of the Fatherland". In accordance with the suggestion of Commander in Chief Peng, this

report was mainly concerned with the summer counterattack which preceded the armistice talks. After reporting on the course of the campaign and on the feats of model soldiers and heroes, I said that the reason the Volunteer Army was able to win this kind of victory was because, in addition to the accurate leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the vigorous support of the Korean, the support and encouragement of the people of the fatherland were our source of strength in overcoming the enemy and establishing a victory. I said that the people of the fatherland call the soldiers of the Volunteer Army the most loveable people and that the soldiers say "the most loved people will certainly have to carry out the most loved deeds." "If our combat work is not good, then we do not meet the requirements for being most loved persons." In peace time and wartime, especially when difficulties and dangers are encountered, the words of encouragement said among the soldiers to each other are: "Don't forget that you are a most loved person!" This simple sentence is a spiritual strength, which is without form and which is unequalled in power! I said that the leadership of the party and the support of the people ensured our victory. The victory belongs to the party and the people.

On October 19th, I left Beijing and went back to Korea. On the 25th, I arrived at "Volunteer Command". Before this, the third appreciation group from the people of the fatherland to go to Korea had already arrived in Korea. This group was led by Comrade He Long. On the 26th, He Long, leading all the comrades of the main appreciation delegation and of the first subdelegation, took a train from Pyongyang to where Volunteer Command was located.

The third appreciation group had a total of eight sub or main delegations. There were more than 5000 members in the appreciation group. In the history of appreciation groups, this one was the largest and had the most people.

Acting Commander Deng Hua, Chief of Staff Li Da, and Deputy Director Zhang Nansheng had already completed all the preparation work for receiving the friends from the fatherland. And Comrade Hong Xuezhi made a special trip to Volunteer Command.

Too bad that on the day that Old Group Leader He and the comrades of the appreciation group arrived it rained heavily. Deng Hua and a few others accompanied Leader He and each deputy group leader in the heavy rain and reviewed a guard of honor. The column which we welcomed that day was more than 500 meters long (there were many Korean civilians in the column). While watching the soldiers, who were wearing cotton uniforms, standing in the autumn rain, Group Leader He said to us with concern, "The comrades should go back. The comrades should go back!"

Deng Hua said, "Everyone has waited a long time. They've been looking forward to welcoming you and the comrades. Even if ordered, they would not go."

It was truly like this. On that day, Group Leader He was welcomed in the rain. The welcoming conference, too, took place in the rain. The soldiers' clothes were soaked. Group Leader He's clothes were soaked too. But it seemed as though everyone had forgotten it all. The flowery bits of ribbons that blazed with color were as though they had fallen from heaven. They fluttered about endlessly in the crowd. Group Leader He's speech was interrupted from time to time by enthusiastic clapping. This was especially true when he said "all the people and our great leader Chairman Mao Zedong were at every single moment caring about you". When he said this, the crowd erupted with the loud and vehement sounds of slogans.

I made a speech representing all the officers and men of the Volunteer Army. I said that our victory found its source in the great fatherland. The people of the great fatherland nourished and supported us. For the sake of the holy task of resisting the

U.S., aiding Korea, protecting our homes, and defending the nation, the fatherland sent us out of the country to fight a war. During the three years of the war, the people of the fatherland, under the slogan of our great leader Chairman Mao--"increase production and economize so as to support the Chinese People's Volunteer Army"--used all their strength to support us, providing us with abundant supplies of materials and enormous spiritual encouragement. We knew that without the people of the father land giving their all to support us we would not have won.

The meeting that day went on for more than an hour in the rain.

The Korean armistice agreement had been signed, but this was just the first step in the peaceful solution of the Korean problem. The facts at that time proved that it was worth being very suspicious about whether the opposing side would be able to completely abide by and implement all the requirements of the agreement. On July 27th, the day on which the armistice agreement was signed, a total of fifty-three groups of U.S. military aircraft flew 324 sorties, invading our airspace over Tonghua, Jilin, Changchun, Gongzhuling, Shenyang, Liaoyang, and other places in the northeastern part of our nation. These aircraft carried out reconnaissance actions. Since the beginning of the Korean War, never was there a day on which so many violations of our airspace occurred. These incidents occurred on the day on which the armistice agreement was signed. Of course, it was no coincidence. Once again it proved the great truth of what Chairman Mao had said earlier: "The agreement which has been reached is now only something on paper. Something on paper is not at all the equivalent of a real thing. The facts prove that in ¹

¹ See Mao Zedong: "Concerning the Celebration of the Armistice".

order to make it become a real thing one must make a great effort."

In accordance with the requirement made by Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung and Commander Peng Dehuai in their armistice orders-- "maintain a high-level of readiness, guard your positions, prevent any raid or destructive actions that come from the opposing side"--, we arranged work for the entire army.

A few days after I accompanied Group Leader He in leading the appreciation group activities, we took a minority of the comrades to the front line to look out on the troops. We began walking at Wonsan on the east coast. We first went to Cross Hill, then to Qiaoyan [transliteration] Hill, to Old Bald Mountain, Sang-gam Liang, Maliang Hill, Dade [transliteration] Hill, and other locations. At these positions, where countless battles had taken place and where countless heroes had appeared, everyone was extremely excited to see our soldier comrades.

In the middle of November, I received a call from Comrade Deng Hua in Gaesong. He wanted me to hurry up and return to Volunteer Command. He said that there was an important matter about which he wished to discuss. I remember that I left Gaesong and by way of Shaliyuan [transliteration], Pyongyang, and Seongcheon spent eight hours rushing to get back to Volunteer Command. Comrade Denghua told me that the Military Commission had sent him an order to return to China to take over the position of commander of the Shenyang Military Region.

The order had come very suddenly, and Deng Hua and I had not prepared, especially I. After Commander in Chief Peng had returned to China, Deng Hua had served as acting commander and commissar of the Volunteer Army. Most of the Volunteer Army work had been presided over by him. As soon as he left, the burden of work naturally would fall upon my shoulders. I felt a very heavy sense of responsibility. Besides, Comrade Deng Hua and I had

known each other for a long time. He, too, was from Hunan. He, too, participated in the ascent of Jinggang Mountain after the Xiangnan uprising. After the Long March arrived victoriously in Yanan. I went to the Red Army 2nd Division to be a division commander. He was the director of our political department. Both of us participated in the famous Battle of Shanchengbao. Since arriving in Korea, especially since coming to Volunteer Command, I got a lot of help from him. Now he was about to go. Personally and professionally, I did not wish to let him go.

I said to Deng Hua, "Since the Military Commission gave an order, we must of course absolutely obey. However, "

Deng Hua said, "When I return to China, we will be separated by only a river. In Shenyang, I will be your Hong Xuezhì---your logistical department commander!"

On November 18th, we gave Comrade Deng Hua a send off.

In accordance with the demands of the Military Commission, we, on the one hand, strictly implemented the armistice agreement and stuck to our positions, while, on the other hand, we aggressively launched a medical war against injuries together with the Korean people, as arranged by Comrade Kim Il Sung and the Korean government. There was much of this kind of work to do. But when compared to fierce combat, the conditions were far better.

In November of 1954, the Central Committee assigned me to the position of commander of the Volunteer Army.

During this period of time, although there was no serious war, incidents by the opposing side which broke the armistice agreement kept on arising. After the armistice, we were still fighting on two fronts. On one front, we were helping the Korean people to rebuild their homes and gardens. On another front, we

were protecting the establishment of peace for the Korean people. The missions were still very large and arduous.

During the three years since we entered Korea, we had been endlessly situated in a tense war. Now the environment, compared to war, was much more settled. I felt that there were many problems to think about. The Korean War, whether one considers the opposing force and the war conditions or the scale of the war, was different from the Civil War. There were many lessons from this experience which needed to be diligently synthesized.

During the early phase of the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, the enemy had not calculated that we would be able to so quickly organize the Volunteer Army and send it out of the country to fight a war. Nor had they calculated that the Chinese and Korean people would be able to defeat them so quickly. There are of course many factors involved here. But that the enemy overestimated his own strength and underestimated our strength can not be discounted as an important factor. At the time there was a strong sense of anxiety among our comrades and our friends. Though we won this war, the war was not at all easy to win.

After the Korean armistice agreement was signed, on September 12th, 1953, Chairman Mao, in a speech at the 24th meeting of the Central Committee of the People's Government, said that the victory in resisting the U.S. and aiding Korea was due to "proper leadership. Leadership was a factor. Without correct leadership, it would not have been done well. However, the main factor was that our war was a people's war. All the people of the nation supported it. The peoples of China and Korea fought shoulder-to-shoulder."

Chairman Mao used very simple and very vernacular language to synthesize this experience. I think that it not only applies to the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, but its application also completely includes the Four Modernizations construction which is

going on today.

The correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the active effort, selfless sacrifices, and heroic struggle of the vast masses of people were the most reliable guarantee of the victory of our undertaking.

June 1st, 1987, Beijing

POSTSCRIPT

After my first memoir, Henghua Mashang, was published, a number of old war comrades, other old comrades, relatives of old war comrades and other old comrades who had passed away, and some young comrades visited me or wrote me. They all hoped that I would write a history of the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea.

I was somewhat motivated. But I was also somewhat hesitant.

The War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea was a great, righteous war. It very much deserves a large book. The great internationalist friendship between the peoples and armies of China and Korea and the heroic feats which the vast numbers of officers and men of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army accomplished under the correct and wise leadership of Chairman Mao and Commander Peng Dehuai and under the concern and full-strength support of the Korean Labor Party and the Korean people which Comrade Kim Il Sung led are very deserving of a song of praise. A commander who has participated in a war has a duty to record the heroic feats of soldiers and the people, to provide a comforting farewell to those comrades gloriously martyred in this great war, and to make young comrades comprehend, be familiar with, take on the tradition of, and carry forward the the patriotism and spirit of proletarian internationalism of the previous generation,

thereby promoting the socialist Four Modernizations construction of our fatherland. However, when more than thirty years ago, as part of the 19th Group Army, I entered Korea, Commander in Chief Peng had already directly commanded the first, second, and third campaigns, which had turned around the Korean war situation, and these campaigns had already ended victoriously. The fourth campaign was also already in the grasp of victory. Afterwards, although I went to the Volunteer Army headquarters, I was not very familiar with the main war duties and with other aspects of the situation. Old war comrades and other old comrades say of the responsible comrades at Volunteer Command of those years that Commander in Chief Peng has passed away, Comrade Deng Hua is no longer with us, and Chen Geng, Gan Qiuqi, Yang Yong, Han Xianchu, Jie Fang, and other comrades have all left us, one after another. Relatively speaking, I knew less of the war situation. They still hoped that I would write.

I understood the feelings of the old war comrades and other old comrades. I also had a feeling of responsibility. I agreed to give it a try.

Old battle companions and old comrades enthusiastically helped me write this memoir. When possible, I referred to certain materials. Yet, after all, it was something that happened nearly forty years ago. It is hard now to gather together the time and energy to carry out a systematic review and consideration. Fortunately, Comrades He Maozhi, Li Dianren, and others helped me find more materials and helped me put my writing in order. Comrade Zhao Ao made additions and deletions in my paragraphs and chapters and polished my writing. I should express my gratitude for all the hard work done by those old war comrades and other old comrades who supplied data and by those comrades who arranged and ordered my writings. But even with all this, this memoir, being of a single individual, is very limited. I am afraid that places in the book which are not comprehensive and even not accurate were hard to avoid. I hope that the reader, especially comrades who

are familiar with the history of the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea, will supply many suggestions and criticisms. I am awaiting the opportunity to make revisions.

I should especially mention the deputy chairman of the military commission, Commander Xu Xiangqian, whom I respect. He selected the title for this book. This moved me very much. I can only express here my loyal gratitude.

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