


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT — FY 1990



FEBRUARY 1989

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FOR FY 1990



Prepared by

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel)

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(Health Affairs)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Reserve Affairs)

Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

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FY 1990 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1990 in compliance with Section 115(b)(3) of Title 10, United States Code. This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1990 Budget.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT.

This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1990 and FY 1991. The report is organized into seven chapters, three appendices, and four annexes. The annexes are bound separately.

Defense Manpower Program (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1990 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies.

Base Structure Annex. The Base Structure Annex relates our FY 1990 base structure to the force structure and provides estimates of base operating support costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 115 (b)(3)(D) of Title 10, USC, requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

Medical Manpower Annex. Section 115(b)(1) of Title 10, USC, requires the submission of detailed information on medical manpower. This information is contained in the Medical Manpower Annex.

II. THE TOTAL FORCE.

The structure of our armed forces is based on the DoD Total Force Policy which recognizes that all elements of the structure contribute to national defense. Those elements include the Active and Reserve Components, civilian workforce, and retired military, host nation support, and DoD contractors.

A. Active Component Military

The active component military are those men and women who serve in units that engage enemy forces, units that provide support in the combat theater, other support units, and those people who are in special accounts (transients, student, etc.). These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are over 2.1 million active component military people.

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1. I-1

B. Reserve Component Military.

Reserve component military manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has two principal elements: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes three groups: (1) units organized, equipped, and trained to perform wartime missions; (2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), who are highly trained, skilled people designated to provide wartime augmentation on or shortly after M-day and (3) the training pipeline, which is composed of members of the Selected Reserve who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a military skill designation. Training pipeline people may not deploy overseas upon mobilization until minimum training is completed (12 weeks or its equivalent.) Selected Reservists assigned to units, and IMAs, train throughout the year and participate annually in active training. As many as 200,000 Selected Reservists may be involuntarily recalled by the President for up to 90 days, with an option for a 90 day extension, to augment active forces. The Reserve Component manpower requested by the Department of Defense (for the purpose of this report) is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) consist of those Ready Reservists who are not in the Selected Reserve. Members of the IRR and ING have served recently in the active force or the Selected Reserve and have some period of their military service obligation remaining or have volunteered to remain beyond their statutory obligation. The majority of IRR and ING members do not participate regularly in organized training. All members of the IRR and ING are subject to being ordered to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress. An IRR screening program commenced during FY 1987, calls IRR members to active duty for one day during which their personal military records and physical condition are reviewed.

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who maintain their military affiliation, but are unable to remain in a Ready Reserve status, or who are determined to be critical mobilization assets. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned in the interest of national defense. However, standby and retired reservists who have not completed 20 years of active service may not be activated until it has been determined that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve. Retired reservists who have completed 20 or more years of active service may be ordered to active duty at any time.

4-8-1-3
C. Civilian Component

Civilians constitute approximately one-third or 1.1 million of the Department's active manpower. Civilians occupy roles that do not require military incumbents. Our civilian work force repairs airplanes, ships, and tanks; provides research, medical, communications, and logistical support; and operates and maintains military installations. They contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces. Civilian strength is projected to decline by 4,566 end strength (0.4 percent) between FY 1989 and FY 1990.

D. Retirees.

Retired military manpower is a major portion of the Total Force. There are approximately 800,000 physically able retirees under age 50. These individuals are trained, highly motivated, and can be rapidly recalled to perform a wide variety of jobs. There are also large numbers of retirees age 60 and over who can make major contributions to our defense effort.

III. MANPOWER MIX.

The Department's policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit. Our overall military strategy dictates which missions must be performed by military persons. Our policy is to employ civilian employees and contractors wherever possible to free our military forces to perform military functions.

The least costly way we meet overseas peacetime and wartime requirements is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Italy, and the BENELUX countries to provide port operations, surface transportation and many other support functions are examples of this support. The same type of arrangements also exist in Japan and Korea. Increased reliance on HNS makes strategic warning and allied response even more important. It also allows our strategic lift to focus on the transport of reinforcements and sustainment to the theater of operations.

The primary criterion that must be satisfied in determining whether a military unit should be active or reserve is the responsiveness required to perform the mission. Strategic and overseas deployed units that must be immediately ready for combat operations must be manned with active component military manpower. By way of example, most Navy squadrons must be manned by active component military because they routinely deploy and remain at sea. In peacetime, we also authorize active component military manpower for training and military rotational purposes.

The Department has increased its reliance on Reserve Component units. The Army relies heavily on Reserve units to provide essential combat and tactical support to both active and reserve forces. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of most mission areas, including surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift, and medical support. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, high readiness levels increase the cost of maintaining these units because of the additional training and full time support required.

The Department is developing guidelines that will establish the general criteria and methodologies for determining and evaluating force mix options.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER.

Mobilization manpower is the time-phased increase of manpower needed above our current peacetime strength to mobilize and conduct wartime military operations. Additional military and civilian personnel are necessary to bring our current peacetime forces up to their full wartime strengths; to man activated units, ships, and squadrons; and to replace casualties. Chapter II and the individual Service chapters describe the wartime manpower requirements and the overall mobilization manpower situation in more detail.

V. MANPOWER COUNTING.

The discussion of manpower and personnel readiness in this report requires that the reader understand the terms defining manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be kept clear. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit to perform its mission.

During peacetime, it is neither necessary nor desirable to fill all the positions in all the units. Some units may not be staffed at all, because there is inadequate funding or because we can fill them in an expeditious manner following mobilization. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people; as the unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve, or civilian, may be expected to increase.

The Department's work force does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force structure. As the force structure is being established, the programmed manning must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings, etc. The collection of positions authorized to be filled with trained personnel is called the authorized or programmed manning.

The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) entitled "Undistributed" appears in active component DPPC tables throughout this Report. Negative entries project temporary undermanning at the end of a fiscal year; positive entries project temporary overmanning at the end of a fiscal year. Budgeted manpower cannot be completely distributed to DPPC mission categories because of transient phenomena primarily resulting from cyclic variations in the "Individuals" category. The Individuals category is comprised of several dynamic components which vary throughout the year, e.g., the number of trainees and students varies daily because most courses of instruction are less than one year. In consonance with the Congressional practice of authorizing military manpower end strength, all DPPC categories, including Individuals, are portrayed as of September 30th.

VI. DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES.

Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the Department's manpower resources. All three types of defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the eleven Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber program, but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, personnel support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is used in this document. The DPPC structure used in this year's report remains the same as was displayed in the FY 1989 Defense Manpower Requirements Report. Definition of the categories is provided in Appendix C.

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, POLICY, AND DEFENSE MANPOWER.

The Department's basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to deter potential enemies, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To achieve those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American national security policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1990.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military, civilian personnel, contract resources, and host nation support. Manpower requirements are developed based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to deterrence and success in wartime. In structuring our military forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve, whenever feasible, to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Service planning assumes that Selected Reserve units and pretrained military manpower will be made available for any contingency for which they are required to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Active component units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict. To supplement the active component units some reserve component units must be maintained in a combat ready state for immediate call up for limited periods.

Civilians are the third essential component of the Total Force. In addition to managing critical defense resources, Defense civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communications systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analysis; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not specifically require military personnel.

The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its total work force. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in the Department. Work is contracted out when it is appropriate, economical and cost effective to do so. Civilian and military manpower requirements will be adjusted to reflect the most efficient organization, appropriate opportunities for performance by the private sector, and our reliance on host nation support for selected functions.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1990 and FY 1991 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1985 and FY 1988.

Table II-1

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FORCE ELEMENTS

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>		
	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>Strategic</u>					
ICBMs	1,020	996	1,000	1,000	1,000
Bombers (PAA) 1/	298	372	358	315	303
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) 1/					
Active	487	460	460	446	446
Guard/Reserve	128	134	134	145	148
<u>Strategic</u>					
Interceptor Squadrons/PAA					
Active	5/90	2/36	2/36	1/18	1/18
Guard/Reserve	11/192	12/216	12/216	12/216	12/216
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNS)	37	37	36	35	35
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>					
Land Forces					
Army Divisions					
Active	16	18	18	18	18
Guard	8	10	10	10	10
Army Separate Brigades & Regiments					
Active 2/	9	9	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve 3/	28	25	25	25	25
Marine Corps Divisions					
Active	3	3	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces					
Air Force					
Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM)	7/112	19/304	14/224	7/112	0
Flights/Missiles					

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Air Force Squadrons/PAA 4					
Active	110/2221	116/2273	112/2207	110/2148	110/2155
Guard/Reserve	55/1088	55/1061	55/1046	55/1027	54/1009
Navy Squadrons/PAA					
Active	87/886	90/875	91/881	91/881	92/892
Reserve	15/96	14/129	14/138	14/133	14/134
Carriers (active only)	13	14	14	15	15
Marine Corps Squadrons/PAA					
Active	29/435	30/450	30/453	30/454	30/432
Reserve	10/112	10/118	10/118	10/118	11/118
Naval Forces					
Attack Submarines					
(active only)	100	100	100	97	97
Surface Combatants					
Active	200	194	188	187	178
Reserve	12	23	24	26	26
Amphibious Assault Ships					
Active	60	61	64	63	62
Reserve	2	2	2	3	4
Patrol Ships (active only)	6	6	6	6	6
ASW and FAD Squadrons/PAA					
Active	60/508	62/564	63/569	64/576	64/579
Reserve	17/146	19/158	20/163	20/165	20/164
Mobility Forces					
Airlift Squadrons/PAA 5/					
Active	34/588	35/502	35/505	35/491	35/488
Guard/Reserve	54/310	55/335	56/364	56/336	56/337
Sealift Ships					
Nuclear Fleet 6/	151	182	196	206	209
Chartered Fleet (Longterm)	15	16	16	16	16

1/Primary aerospace vehicle authorized (PAA).

2/Includes the Berlin Brigade, three armored cavalry regiments, and one ranger regiment.

3/For FY 1989-FY 1991, this includes six Reserve Component Brigades that round out active divisions, three theater defense brigades, one infantry group, and four armored cavalry regiments (two become armored brigades in FY 1989 and FY 1991).

4/Includes combat coded tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and tactical air control squadrons, combat/combat support coded special operations and tactical electronic warfare squadrons; and combat support coded tactical tanker/cargo (KC-10) and airborne warning and control squadrons.

5/Includes C-17, C-130, C-141, C-5 and C-9s. Excludes rescue and weather.

6/Includes naval fleet auxiliary force, mobility enhancement (includes mobility enhancements, reduced operating status and ready reserve force), nucleus fleet and scientific support vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command.

II. Manpower Request. The Department's request for manpower is summarized in this section.

A. Active Component Military Strength

Active Component Military Personnel
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL			BUDGET	
	FY 1985	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
Army	780.8	771.8	771.8	772.3	772.4
Navy	566.1	592.6	593.2	597.6	598.2
Marine Corps	198.0	197.4	197.2	197.2	197.2
Air Force	601.5	576.4	571.0	571.1	566.8
Total	2,146.4	2,138.2	2,133.2	2,138.2	2,134.6

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

B. Selected Reserve Strength.

The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve, expressed in end strengths. These figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and full-time Active Guard/Reserve members.

Selected Reserve Military Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL			BUDGET	
	FY 1985	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
Army National Guard	440.0	455.2	457.3	458.0	458.8
Army Reserve	292.1	312.8	318.7	322.0	323.7
Naval Reserve	129.8	149.5	152.6	153.2	153.8
Marine Corps Reserve	41.6	43.6	43.6	44.0	44.1
Air National Guard	109.4	115.2	115.0	116.3	116.1
Air Force Reserve	75.2	82.1	83.6	84.8	85.2
DoD Total	1,008.1	1,158.4	1,170.7	1,178.3	1,181.7

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
All years include AGR/TARs and Cat. 'B' IMAS.

The following table shows the number of personnel involved in full time support of the Reserve Components. The Guard and Reserve military technicians, who are also DoD civilians, are included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

Full-Time Support to the Selected Reserve^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Army National Guard				
Active Guard/Reserve	25.7	25.9	26.2	26.5
Military Technicians	24.5	25.5	25.9	25.9
Civilians <u>2/</u>	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Active Component	.7	.7	.7	.7
Total	53.5	54.7	55.4	55.3
Army Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	13.3	13.3	13.7	14.1
Military Technicians	8.1	8.4	8.5	8.6
Civilians <u>2/</u>	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.6
Active Component	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Total	27.5	27.5	27.9	28.5
Naval Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	21.8	22	22.3	22.6
Civilians	2.9	3	2.9	2.8
Active Component	7.7	7	7.4	7.3
Total	32.4	32	32.6	32.7
Marine Corps Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	1.9	1.9	2.3	2.4
Civilians	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Active Component	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.1
Total	7.7	7.4	7.8	7.9
Air National Guard				
Active Guard/Reserve	7.7	7.9	8.5	8.5
Military Technicians <u>3/</u>	24.4	23.6	23.9	24
Civilians <u>2/</u>	1.9	2	1.7	1.7
Active Component	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Total	34.6	34.1	34.7	34.8
Air Force Reserve				
Active Guard/Reserve	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
Military Technicians	9.1	10.1	10.1	10.1
Civilians	5.1	4.5	4.3	4.3
Active Component	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Total	15.4	15.9	15.7	15.7
DoD Total				
Active Guard/Reserve	71	71.7	73.7	74.8
Military Technicians	66.1	67.6	68.4	68.6
Civilians	17.7	17.1	16.4	16.4
Active Component	16.3	15.2	15.6	15.5
Total	171.1	171.6	174.1	175.3

- 1/Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are included in Selected Reserve strength throughout the report.
 2/Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians and Army Reserve and Air National Guard status quo technicians.
 3/Includes reimbursable military technicians.

C. Civilians

Civilian Employment Plan^{1/}

Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions End Fiscal Year Strength in Thousands

	<u>FY 1985</u> ^{2/}	<u>FY 1988</u> ^{3/}	<u>FY 1989</u> ^{3/}	<u>FY 1990</u> ^{3/}	<u>FY 1991</u> ^{3/}
Total DoD	1,129.1	1,090.2	1,108.8	1,104.2	1,101.1

1/Includes Guard and Reserve military technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

2/Source: FYDP Volume II, FY 1980-FY 1987, April 4, 1988, update.

3/Source: FYDP, FY 1990 and FY 1991 Budget, January 9, 1989.

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs.

Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories is approximately 5,200 work years.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions.

Employees performing civil functions administered by DoD include Corps of Engineer Civil Works, cemeterial activities, and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1990 and FY 1991 is expected to be about 30,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1990 and FY 1991 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Employment Plan For FY 1990 and FY 1991
(Full Time Equivalent End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Direct Hire</u>		<u>Indirect Hire</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Army 1/	345.3	345.4	59.6	59.5	404.9	404.8
Navy 2/	328.8	327.2	10.8	10.8	339.6	338.0
Marine Corps 2/	(18.8)	(18.8)	(2.9)	(2.9)	(21.7)	(21.6)
Air Force 1/	249.0	249.0	13.4	12.7	262.4	261.7
Defense Agencies	95.7	94.9	1.7	1.7	97.3	96.6
Total DoD	1,018.8	1,016.5	85.5	84.6	1,104.2	1,101.1

1/Includes military technicians in support of Guard and Reserve programs.

2/Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

III. MANPOWER OVERVIEW

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>BUDGET</u>		
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military ^{1/}							
Active	2,687	3,547	2,151	2,138	2,133	2,138	2,135
Officer	(337)	(415)	(309)	(305)	(304)	(302)	(302)
Enlisted	(2,340)	(3,121)	(1,828)	(1,819)	(1,815)	(1822)	(1819)
Cadets/Midship-							
men	(10)	(11)	(14)	(14)	(14)	(14)	(14)
Selected Reserve	953	922	1,088	1,158	1,171	1,178	1,182
Civilian ^{2/}	1,175	1,406	1,129	1,090	1,109	1,104	1,101

^{1/} For purpose of this table, Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) strengths are included in active strength in FY 1964 and FY 1968; they are included in Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 and thereafter. Also, Category D Selected Reserves are included in Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 and thereafter.

^{2/} Full time equivalent (FTE) direct and indirect hires.

A. Military Manpower.

The FY 1990 authorization request for active component military personnel is 2,138,200. The Selected Reserve authorization request is 1,178,300. Highlights of the military manpower programs by Service follow.

ARMY

The Army program continues emphasis on improved manning of combat forces, modernization, and strategic deployability with modernized unit designs using more effective equipment. Design adjustments continue in the light divisions in both the Active Component and the National Guard.

Force structure plans improve the total Army's deterrent capability by enhancing combat unit readiness, increasing the productivity program, improving the readiness of Reserve components, and expanding Special Operations Forces. The structure for the Active and Reserve Components is designed to provide a balanced mix of more lethal, lighter, and special operations forces. These forces are tailored to global requirement for land forces CINC requirements and to provide an effective combat force capable of employing Air Land Battle doctrine across a broadening spectrum of threat. The Army will continue to enhance the force through transition to more modern designs.

Modernization of unit designs and equipment for heavier forces will continue in the maneuver battalions and support elements of armored and mechanized infantry divisions. Separate infantry and theater defense brigades begin their conversion to modernized designs in FY's 1990 and 1991. Support for these units will be improved through activation/conversion of combat support and service support units to new designs and increased manning levels of early deploying units.

Special Operations Forces enhancements continue with the activation of a fifth Active Component special forces group beginning in FY 1990; improvements in Special Operations command and control; upgrade of intelligence support and sustainment; and enhancement of aviation and communications elements.

NAVY

Growth to Navy's manpower program throughout the budget years reflects expanding force structure, including continued pursuit of the 600 ship Navy. In FY 1990 Battle Force ships increase from 568 to 574, in FY 1993 there will be 581. The end strength requested for FY 1990 and 1991 are 597,600 and 598,200 respectively for a total growth of 5000. The majority of this manpower increase will go to fleet operating forces in the Strategic and Tactical/Mobility areas while Fleet and Other Support Activities remain critically lean. Specific areas of growth are: manning new construction ships, special operations forces, tender repair capabilities and health care professional officers.

Navy's biennial budget places considerable emphasis upon medical manpower support in conjunction with shared Departmental/Congressional concern. Navy's Corps of health care officers grows by 854 over the FYDP. Navy is also applying increased resources to help reverse serious manpower shortages among mid-grade aviators (approx. 1500 short) and nuclear power trained officers (over 500 short). Recruiting manpower and other program resources are also enhanced in recognition of decreasing retention trends in the face of a declining base of potential recruits.

Navy's FY 1990 and FY 1991 manpower request is balanced and continues the trend toward a lean sea-going Navy, while pursuing every economy for adequate shore support within the limited resources available. Navy Reserve end strength increases of 329 in FY 1990 and 275 in FY 1991 are designed primarily to accommodate additional ships being introduced into the Naval Reserve fleet between FY 1989 and FY 1991.

Navy forces will continue to be employed in regional/world conflicts and as instruments of foreign policy throughout the 1990's and into the next century. Sustaining readiness to meet ongoing and emergent operational commitments while preparing battle forces for future requirements by replacing older ships with more economical, efficient, and capable units is the Navy's challenge for FY 1990/1991. Modest MPN growth is required to begin to transition the Navy to the force composition that will take the Navy beyond the year 2000. Congressional support is solicited to prevent end strength erosion.

MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps end strength goal for FY 1990 and FY 1991 is 197,200. As a result of the FY 1988/89 Amended Budget Submission, Marine Corps enlisted end strength was reduced by 3,000 Marines. This reduction resulted in three unmanned infantry battalions (cadre). Simultaneously, a Force Structure Study group developed warfighting enhancement initiatives which reorganized structure and enhanced manning of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The increased manning for the GCE was provided by reducing the supporting establishment by 3,000 enlisted Marines.

The Marine Corps Selected Reserve consists of one Division, one Aircraft Wing, and one Force Service Support Group and provides approximately 22 percent of Marine Total Force manpower. The Selected Reserve manpower increase of 1350 from FY 1987 to FY 1988 provided the manpower to implement the transition of three M198 155mm howitzer battalions (from M101A-1 105mm battalions) and the activation of a light armored infantry battalion, a TOW missile section, one attack helicopter squadron, and one KC-130 aerial refueler squadron.

AIR FORCE

Between FY 1989 and 1990, active manpower end strength remains essentially unchanged. This stability continues to reflect the decline in active end strength begun in FY 1987, bringing the total reduction since FY 1986 to over 37,000. Increases in Special Operations, medical war readiness, and base survivability are offset by reductions to force structure and management headquarters, conversion of military positions to civilian, and by commercial activities actions. In FY 1991, another 4200 military authorizations are eliminated. Increases for force structure modernization are more than offset by reductions associated with elimination of Ground Launched Cruise Missile units resulting from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. The resulting end strengths programmed are 571,100 for FY 1990, and 566,800 for FY 1991.

B. Civilian Manpower

The fiscal year 1990 request for civilian personnel is 1,104,217 full time equivalent (FTE) end strength. This is a decrease of 4,566 end strength from the FY 1989 level of 1,108,783, which represents a reduction of 0.4 percent in DoD's total civilian end strength level. The FY 1990 level represents an end strength increase of 14,042 (or 1.3 percent) compared to the actual FY 1988 year end level. This increase is the result of restrictions on FY 1988 non-readiness related outlays during the latter part of the fiscal year which led to partial hiring freezes, release of temporary employees, and early retirements. What appears as growth is principally the result of filling of positions temporarily vacant at the end of FY 1988 as a result of the mid-year budget adjustments.

Executive Order 12615, Performance of Commercial Activities, requires DoD to include in its annual budget, estimates of savings expected from privatization studies. The DoD FY 1990 budget reflects an anticipated saving of approximately 8,000 civilian positions. This is a departure from previous years, when DoD did not reduce its budgeted manpower levels to reflect the anticipated number of DoD civilian positions that would convert to contract positions as a result of commercial activity cost comparison studies.

The Navy has decided to bring back in-house acquisition support work currently done by contractor personnel. The decision was prompted by an investigation by the Naval Investigative Service and the Navy Inspector General which found the current level of contractor support represents an unacceptable risk to the acquisition process. The cumulative increases in Navy direct hire civilian personnel in support of acquisition functions are: 238 in FY 1989, 975 in FY 1990, and 1,719 in FY 1991.

The FY 1990 and FY 1991 civilian manpower estimates are predicted upon a variety of external and internal measures aimed at reducing the size of DoD's work force, including decreased program fund availability. In the absence of civilian end strength ceilings, DoD has developed procedures to balance the work force to mission requirements and work load. OSD has implemented an internal control system for reviewing civilian manpower execution data (workyears, obligations, and end strength) on a monthly basis. Current data demonstrate that the Department has become more effective in planning for and executing the civilian manpower budget in the absence of statutory employment ceilings. However, Section 8112 of the DoD Appropriations Act of 1989 (P.L. 100-463) legislates, for a third year, a ceiling on overseas civilian workyears. P.L. 100-463 also reduces the initial workyear ceiling (established at 188,496 or the actual FY 1986 execution level) to 182,011 (the actual FY 1987 level).

DoD is opposed to legislatively-imposed civilian employment controls, in general, and selected geographic controls in particular. The civilian work force is a resource that must be managed based on mission requirements and funded work load. The overseas workyear ceiling impedes DoD's ability to hire spouses who accompany service members to locations outside the continental United States. Emphasis should be on good management practices, not on managing to arbitrary ceiling constraints.

C. Total Force Productivity

The Department employs a wide variety of tools and techniques to improve DoD productivity. Productivity improvements apply to both the military and civilian work force, and are reflected in the Department's programmed manpower structure. The focus of our efforts is on raising awareness, recognizing successes, and developing and refining those tools used to enhance individual and organizational performance.

Our Productivity Improvement Plan (PIP) for FY 1990 includes approximately 578,000 military and civilian personnel managing DoD functions and programs resources of approximately \$32 billion. The objective of the program is to improve productivity by an average of 3 percent each year. The Department's plan is built on existing tools and techniques and incorporates innovative and promising approaches.

Total Quality Management (TQM) is evolving as the primary strategy to achieve continuous improvements in productivity and quality. This approach requires top management leadership, a focus on the customer, and the involvement of all employees. Statistical process control is one of the tools used to identify the processes that require management attention and to involve each employee in achieving continuous quality improvement. Application of TQM to DoD operations has been successful. Three DoD activities were recently designated by the Office of Management and Budget as quality improvement prototypes. Additionally, the Naval Aviation Depot Systems Command saved more than \$1.8 million in the first quarter of FY 1988 by applying TQM.

The "Task Force on Productivity in the Support Operations" established in 1986 provided many recommendations that have been incorporated into the FY 1990 PIP. One of these, the Productivity and Quality (P&Q) Team concept, uses existing management structures to create interlocking teams of line managers at all levels. These teams work by taking quick action to remove barriers and impediments to productivity and quality improvement.

The efficiency review process is directed to continue our improvement of work processes and procedures and serves as a method to better define resource requirements. From FY 1982 to the end of FY 1987 over 1,100 Efficiency Reviews have been completed with resource savings of 7,000 manpower spaces and a cost reduction of \$217 million.

Productivity Gain Sharing is a process that rewards employees monetarily (or with administrative leave) for exceeding preestablished quality and productivity standards. Normally, 50 percent of the savings are shared with eligible employees and 50 percent are retained by the activity. Gross savings reported for FY 1988 were over \$9 million.

Investments in productivity enhancing tools and equipment continue to improve the requirements process through capital-labor substitution. OSD-sponsored productivity investments of \$140 million are planned for both FY 1990 and FY 1991 with an expected return of \$36 to \$1.

The Secretary of Defense recognizes significant individual contributions to productivity and quality improvement with two levels of awards: Certificate of Excellence and Letters of Commendation. On January 9, 1989, at the Sixth Annual Productivity Excellence Awards Ceremony, The Secretary personally presented Certificates of Excellence to 65 men and women. The creative efforts of each of these men and women resulted in first year savings of at least one million dollars; together as a group their efforts resulted in first year savings of nearly \$256 million. To date, 275 individuals have received these certificates for their productivity contributions that resulted in combined first-year saving exceeding one billion dollars. An additional 1,020 individuals have received Letters of Commendation signed by the Secretary of Defense for productivity contributions, each of which resulted in first years savings between \$100,000 and \$1 million. Their combined efforts have resulted in over \$400 million in first year savings.

D. Improved Oversight Process

In the FY 1989 Defense Officer Requirements Report the Department of Defense committed itself to improving oversight of manpower management. That commitment is being met. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel) analyzed programmed manpower changes during development of the FY 1990/91 Budget and the FY 1990-94 Five Year Defense Program. This Report provides the foundation for more detailed analysis and oversight of the Department's manpower. The information compiled in this report becomes the basis for analysis which improves our insight into manpower demand and the linkage of manpower budgets, billet-level manpower distribution plans, and personnel inventories. These ongoing oversight efforts will identify potential problems, audit compliance with Congressional directives, and allow aggressive managerial involvement to improve stewardship of the Department's manpower resources.

Several actions are underway to reinforce oversight of manpower plans and operations. During the next few months we will review the execution of the FY 1988 manpower program and how FY 1988 budget execution has been accommodated in FY 1989 to FY 1991. Twenty-five percent of the General and Flag Officer positions are being revalidated, and a similar job factor analysis of Colonel/Captain (pay grade 06) positions will begin this year. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is pursuing initiatives to improve force mix policy, the experience and effectiveness of enlisted manpower and manpower management of critical occupational groups (medical and aviation).

E. DoD Headquarters Adjustments

The Department of Defense has initiated and accommodated a series of reviews and studies of its different headquarters organizations. In compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433), we have implemented manpower ceilings and reductions on all levels of the Department's management headquarters activities. For the Military Services, the Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities, these management headquarters ceilings and reductions are reflected in the Department's FY 1990/FY 1991 President's Budget Submission. The Department

imposed the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act ceilings on the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities during FY 1989, but the Secretary of Defense informed the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that DoD manpower reductions had satisfied the requirement for additional Defense Agency reductions in FY 1989 and beyond. The Department has introduced legislative proposals which would eliminate the FY 1989 ceilings and the permanent ceilings on the Agencies and Field Activities.

In addition to the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act headquarters adjustments, the Secretary of Defense had charged the DoD Deputy Inspector General in December 1987 to conduct an independent review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters organizations. The Deputy Inspector General's report, "Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters," was delivered in February 1988. This report, now called "The Vander Schaaf Report," was reviewed by both the Joint Staff and OSD. As a result of these reviews, the Secretary determined that he could reduce the Unified and Specified Command Headquarters organizations by 3,000 military and civilian spaces as a direct result of the Report recommendations. Most of the military manpower savings resulting from the Vander Schaaf Report recommendations have been reinvested to improve the manning of existing combat forces. Officer manpower has been reduced. Most civilian savings have been reapplied to improve military medical support.

F. Overseas Troop Strength.

The Department of Defense has complied with the congressionally mandated European troop strength ceiling (326,412) in FY 1988. Further, the Department intends to stay beneath the ceiling for FY 1989 and FY 1990. However, the ceiling has outlived its usefulness and will, in fact, be a detriment as the U.S. implements the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. While the Department has no intention of significantly increasing forces (if for no other reason than fiscal constraints), DoD needs the flexibility during the transition years to make appropriate force structure changes.

In addition to the European Theater ceiling, Congress has now established a strength cap for Northeast Asia. Like the strength cap in Europe, the regional Unified Commander (CINCPAC) will administer the mix of Service personnel within the legal limit. The new statutory stricture further constrains the Department's flexibility to make appropriate force structure changes and respond to changing conditions in the region.

G. Field Grade Officers.

Over the past several years, Congress has shown an increased level of interest in various aspects of the military officer structure of DoD. Two major studies, the FY 1988 Defense Officer Requirements Study and the DoD Aviator Retention Study dealt with two specific congressional questions on officers. In the first study, DoD reviewed growth in officer authorizations from 1980 to 1986 and concluded that not all of the growth which occurred during that period could be justified. Working with the services and Congress, new officer authorization levels were established for the Services. In the Aviator Study, DoD reviewed all aviator positions within DoD. Although the review validated most service aviator

requirements, OSD directed follow-on studies to pursue certain aspects of aviator requirements and management that needed further analysis.

The Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989 requires the Office of the Secretary of Defense to "...review critically field grade officer strengths...in all future budget submissions." In tackling this issue, DoD settled on a two pronged approach. To satisfy the immediate requirement to review and certify field grade officer strengths, the following paragraphs and charts are submitted to summarize the Departments efforts to date. We plan a more thorough review of field grade requirements, starting with Service 0-6 pay grade positions. DoD will solicit a private contractor to validate all associated 0-6 positions. The review will begin this summer and take several months to complete. A review of 0-4 and 0-5 positions will be conducted in subsequent years depending on the results of the 0-6 study. Based on the results of this in-depth validation, the Department may request changes in DOPMA grade tables.

In the House Report (HR 96-1462) accompanying the 1980 DOPMA legislation, the committee indicated that the then-new grade tables were largely based on current retention rates that were recognized to be lower than required to achieve existing grade requirements in the mid to long term. To enable continued operation within the DOPMA management parameters (promotion opportunity and timing), the committee acknowledged that the grade tables may need to be revised in the face of improving retention and more definitive grade requirement determinations. Although the committee was generally satisfied with the assessment of grade requirements at the time, they indicated that significant uncertainty existed in justifying the need for some of these requirements.

Displayed below are the requirements versus DOPMA constrained authorization for field grade officer through FY 1991. The 1988 Officer Requirements Report dealt only with funded authorizations--those positions programmed by the Services and funded by Congress. Authorizations are constrained in total to stay within fiscal limitations; they are then further limited by grade in accord with DOPMA. In this chart requirements means the total number of grades needed to fully man all the units in the active component force structure. Total officer requirements are shown in the chapters addressing the individual Service manpower programs. It is noted that officer grade requirements were not validated in the 1988 Officer Requirements Report, which focused on total officers, but they will be reviewed and validated in our proposed 0-6 validation study.

The following chart shows that field grade requirements exceed DOPMA ceilings. By constraining the supply of field grade officers, DOPMA serves to limit the number the positions authorized to be filled in each Service. In some instances the Services have increased the number of officers in lower grades and lowered the number in higher grades while remaining within the DOPMA ceiling (as provided by law).

GRADE REQUIREMENTS VS DOPMA AUTHORIZATIONS

	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
Army				
COL				
Required	4264	4077	4110	4113
Authorized	3634	3427	3371	3500
Assigned	3471	-	-	-
LTC				
Required	12346	12226	12253	12260
Authorized	10219	9611	9428	10049
Assigned	9928	-	-	-
MAJ				
Required	21836	21301	21474	21461
Authorized	15129	15600	15839	15128
Assigned	14811	-	-	-
Navy				
CAPT				
Required	3295	3274	3296	3300
Authorized	3126	3130	3135	3131
Assigned	3146	-	-	-
CDR				
Required	7467	7474	7526	7526
Authorized	7062	7070	7079	7072
Assigned	7057	-	-	-
LCDR				
Required	13376	13335	13404	13539
Authorized	11859	11877	11897	11881
Assigned	11959	-	-	-
Air Force				
COL				
Required	5331	5275	5260	5249*
Authorized	4761	4622	4391	4635
Assigned	4753	-	-	-
LTC				
Required	13489	13388	13305	13269
Authorized	11641	11603	11643	11379
Assigned	11648	-	-	-
MAJ				
Required	21955	21731	21514	21477
Authorized	17887	17937	17398	17372
Assigned	17883	-	-	-
Marines				
COL				
Required	680	674	675	677
Authorized	641	642	642	642
Assigned	640	-	-	-
LTC				
Required	1848	1886	1889	1895
Authorized	1620	1621	1621	1621
Assigned	1619	-	-	-

	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
MAJ				
Required	3662	3761	3783	3795
Authorized	3214	3216	3215	3215
Assigned	3213	-	-	-

* This 244 increase replaces the colonel end strength removed by Congress for FY 1990. The Department will validate the requirement for these 244 positions before they are filled in FY 1991.

IV. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

A. Requirements Determination.

The Department of Defense uses an analytic framework to estimate its wartime military and civilian requirements. The Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System (WARMAPS) compiles all the manpower estimates (demand, supply, and shortfalls) by Service, by theater, and by manpower category over the time frame of the scenario.

The wartime force structure is designed to support our national strategy for mobilizing and prosecuting a war. The size and structure of our forces are developed in a sequential process. The components included in our calculations are:

- o almost 2.2 million military members of the Active force
- o almost 1.2 million military members of the Selected Reserve
- o almost 500 thousand individual members of the Ready Reserve
- o more than 800 thousand military retirees under age 60 and about 600,000 between 60 and 70 years of age
- o about 1.1 million U.S. civilian members of the DoD peacetime work force
- o more than 100 thousand foreign nationals in the work force
- o about 17 million potential draftees

B. Military Manpower Demand.

Trained military manpower demand is the sum of manpower to field the force and the cumulative casualty replacements to sustain the force. Peak demand occurs when the size and configuration of the force has stabilized and when cumulative replacement demand is at its highest point. This may occur at different times in different Services. Military manpower demand peaks for the Coast Guard at M+180, the Air Force at M+90, the Marine Corps at M+120, the Army at M+180, and the Navy at M+180. The peak demand for trained military manpower is shown below.

Wartime Trained Military Manpower: Peak Demand (Strength in Thousand)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
Army	2,051	2,036
Navy	1,066	947
Air Force	858	870
Marine Corps	400	421
Coast Guard	66	66

C. Civilian Manpower Demand.

The civilian manpower demand surges immediately upon mobilization when: active units are being fielded and deployed; reserve units are being mobilized, filled, trained, and deployed; and early logistical demands are straining our resources. We need to increase our US direct hire civilian workforce by about 320 thousand, most within the first 30 days after mobilization.

Wartime U.S. Civilian Manpower (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Wartime Demand</u>	<u>New Hires Required</u>
Army	448	182
Navy	346	50
Air Force	224	62
Marine Corps	20	2
Defense Agencies	90	18

D. Military Manpower Supply

By about M+60, existing active and mobilized reserve forces are brought to required wartime strength by the mobilization of individual reservists and military retirees. By about M+120 a significant number of trained replacements become available to units. Thus, the peak shortfall of trained military manpower usually occurs by M+60: when all available pretrained individual reserves and retirees have been mobilized; when no significant training output has occurred; and, while casualty replacement requirements are increasing.

DoD is moving to overcome the military manpower shortfalls with several initiatives:

- o We have increased the strength of the Selected Reserve.
- o We are increasing the size of the Individual Ready Reserve.
- o We are obtaining the medical resources necessary to: provide better medical treatment in the field; ensure prompt evacuation of casualties to medical facilities in the U.S.; and to enable their rapid return to duty.
- o We are improving the management of pretrained military manpower resources (retirees, IRR): annual reporting, screening, and address updates; peacetime refresher training; peacetime retraining into critical skills; and peacetime preassignment.
- o We are improving our planned use of pretrained manpower to meet skill shortfalls.
- o We are looking into ways to identify inductees with critical skills who would require only minimum military training.

E. Civilian Manpower Supply

Our estimated civilian workforce supply reflects the loss of civilian employees recalled to military duties and the maximum utilization of all available peacetime employees to fill wartime positions.

DoD is moving to overcome potential civilian manpower shortfalls with several initiatives:

- o We have defined our demand for additional wartime civilian manpower by specific occupations, grades and locations.
- o We plan to redistribute available civilian personnel assets from one location to another and from one position to another.
- o We plan to convert part-time personnel to full-time status.
- o We plan to rehire retired civilian personnel who volunteer.
- o We plan to secure additional personnel using multiple employment sources.
- o We are considering the recall of military retirees to fill civilian positions.
- o We have expanded our planning processes to identify foreign national civilian manpower requirements and supplies.
- o We are considering the use of contracts/contractors to meet our civilian manpower requirements.

F. Manpower Sustainability. Military manpower availability and sustainability have been greatly enhanced and actually exceed the estimated sustainability for munitions and spare parts.

Civilian manpower availability and sustainability remain to be resolved: we have some estimates of our requirement; we have identified sources of supply as well as areas of competition; we are testing these resources and conflicts at the local level in a series of mobilization exercises.

V. MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY.

The following tables summarize the FY 89-91 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1988 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE II-2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>		
	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	93.6	95	90.5	91
Offensive Strategic Forces	74.8	76.3	73	73.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	4	3.9	3.2	3.3
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	14.9	14.7	14.3	14.5
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	1035.8	1065.4	1069.1	1072.6
Land Forces	573.3	590	593.7	597.3
Tactical Air Forces	210.1	210.6	208	206.9
Naval Forces	216.4	228.7	232.2	232.8
Mobility Forces	35.6	36.1	35.5	35.5
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	69.9	69.6	68.9	69.1
Intelligence	35.2	36.8	37.1	37.3
Centrally Managed Comms	34.8	32.7	31.8	31.8
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	171.7	168.3	166.8	165.6
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	49.7	49	49.3	49.3
MEDICAL SUPPORT	99.9	99.5	100.7	101.5
JOINT ACTIVITIES	27.6	26.6	26.5	26.2
Int'l Military Org	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Unified Commands	3.9	3.5	3.5	3.4
Federal Agency Support	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.1
Joint Chiefs of Staff	1.2	1	1	1
OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities	16.8	16.1	16.1	16.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	24.5	20.7	20.4	20.4
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	27.1	27.6	27.2	27
Combat Commands	13.5	13.7	13.5	13.3
Support Commands	13.6	13.8	13.7	13.7
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	26.1	27	27.5	27.8
Research and Development	17.2	17.7	18.2	18.9
Geophysical Activities	8.9	9.4	9.3	8.9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	133	131.1	129.8	129.7
Personnel Support	33.5	33.5	33.4	33.3
Individual Training	99.4	97.4	96.3	96.2

TABLE II-2 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	111	107.1	106	105.9
Support Installations	78.1	74.3	71.7	71.8
Centralized Support Act'y	32.8	32.9	34.3	34.2
PROGRAMMED MANNING	1869.5	1887.1	1882.7	1886.1
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	-12.1	-4	-7.6
INDIVIDUALS	268.4	258.2	259.5	256.1
Transients	48	57	57.7	57.4
PPH	12.3	11	11	11
Trainees and Students	194.6	176.5	177.1	174
Cadets and Midshipman	13.7	13.7	13.8	13.8
END-STRENGTH	2138.2	2133.2	2138.2	2134.6

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE II-3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1988	FY 1989	BUDGET FY 1990	FY 1991
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	21.3	20.9	21.4	21.4
Offensive Strategic Forces	10.8	10.7	11.6	11.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.4	9	8.9	8.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.1	1.2	0.9	0.9
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	887.2	900.8	909.8	913.2
Land Forces	673	681.1	688.3	692.0
Tactical Air Forces	81.5	81.9	81.7	81.3
Naval Forces	74	77.8	78.2	78.4
Mobility Forces	58.8	60.1	60.8	61.6
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	18	19.3	19.4	19.4
Intelligence	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4
Centrally Managed Comms	12.6	13.9	14	14
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	25.8	22.9	22.9	22.9
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT	32.8	33.2	34.9	35.8
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Unified Commands	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2
Joint Chiefs of Staff	0	0	0	0
OSD and Defense Agencies/ Activities	0	0	0	0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	8.3	7.4	7.4	7.4
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	4.3	3.9	3.9	3.9
Combat Commands	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.1
Support Commands	2	1.7	1.7	1.7
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.7
Research and Development	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
Geophysical Activities	1	1.2	1.2	1.1
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	71.2	69.8	70	70.2
Personnel Support	3.9	1.5	1.5	1.5
Individual Training	69.7	68.3	68.7	68.9

TABLE II-3 (Continued)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	47.3	48.3	48.4	48.6
Support Installations	37.7	39.1	39.1	39.1
Centralized Support Act'y	11.5	11	11.6	11.4
TOTAL UNIT STRENGTH	1132.6	1140.4	1147.8	1151.3
INDIVIDUALS	77.8	77.9	73.1	73.8
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	25.8	30.3	30.5	30.4
END-STRENGTH	1158.4	1170.7	1178.3	1181.7

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE II-4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>BUDGET</u> <u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES				
STRATEGIC	13	13.4	13.8	13.9
Offensive Strategic Forces	7.6	7.7	8.1	8.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8
Strategic Control Forces	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9
Surveillance Force				
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	57.1	60.4	62.6	61.9
Land Forces	18.5	19.5	20.1	20
Tactical Air Forces	16.2	16.4	16.3	15.9
Naval Forces	1.8	2	3.3	3.3
Mobility Forces	21.1	22.6	23	22.8
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	21.1	22.5	23.2	23.5
Intelligence	10.1	10.7	11.4	11.6
Centrally Managed Comms	11	11.9	11.8	11.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	168.6	169.7	172.8	172
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	6	6	6.3	6.6
MEDICAL SUPPORT	41.5	43.6	44.0	44.2
JOINT ACTIVITIES	17.4	18.1	18.7	18.6
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Unified Commands	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
Federal Agency Support	0	0	0	0
Joint Chiefs of Staff	0	0	0	0
OSD and Defense Activity	16.6	17.1	17.8	17.7
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	374.5	374.9	362.9	361.4
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	27.7	28.6	28.7	28.5
Combat Commands	6.2	6.6	6.5	6.4
Support Commands	21.6	21.9	21.1	22.0
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	75.7	75.1	75.9	75.6
Research and Development	65.3	65.7	66.3	66.2
Geophysical Activities	10.4	10.4	10.5	10.3
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	51.0	54.1	53.9	53.9
Personnel Support	27.1	29.1	28.8	29.0
Individual Training	23.9	24.8	25.0	24.8

TABLE II-4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
 (Direct and Indirect End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>	
	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	236.4	241.6	240.5	240.2
Support Installations	153.7	152.7	149.7	149.3
Centralized Support Act'y	82.8	89.0	90.9	90.9
END-STRENGTH	1090.2	1108.8	1104.2	1001.1

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER III

ARMY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. General.

This chapter describes the Army's manpower program for the active military, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilian components as requested in the Budget Submission for FY 1990 and 1991. It outlines causes for major changes in the manpower program, discusses peacetime manpower readiness, and explains efforts to develop and maintain a highly qualified, efficient, and dedicated military and civilian work force.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

Army wartime forces are designed to defend our national interests and yet remain within available resources. With the advent of the two year budget cycle and Program Objective Memorandum, OSD now requires the Services to submit their wartime manpower requirements on a two year cycle. FY 1990/1994 data was submitted in FY 1988.

1. Military Manpower.

- o The programmed combat force is prescribed annually in conceptual form by the Defense Guidance, which establishes the planning scenario and specifies such parameters as warning time and theaters of operation.
- o Support forces needed to sustain combat units are determined by computer-assisted analysis.

This process results in a wartime force structure of about 1.60 million soldiers in both FY 1990 and FY 1994. Casualty replacements needed to maintain units at fighting strength are then estimated using a warfighting computer simulation. The number of personnel in trainee, transient, prisoner, patient or student status is also estimated.

This establishes a total peak demand for trained military manpower as shown below:

Wartime Military Manpower Peak Demand (Trained Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 94</u>
	<u>(M+150)</u>	<u>(M+120)</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs		
Peak demand	2,211.2	2,198.6

2. Civilian Manpower.

The Army's civilian work force provides overseas and U.S.-based support to sustain deployed and deployable military forces. Civilian manpower is based on the number of people needed to ready, deploy and then sustain these military forces. The majority of civilians would perform logistics activities, such as maintenance, transportation, supply, engineering, and operation of installations.

With the sudden increase in workload that would occur in wartime, the Army's civilian work force must grow immediately in order to provide the support that will enable the military forces to accomplish their mission. Thus, the demand for civilian manpower peaks earlier than the demand for military manpower. The total estimated peak demand for U.S. direct hire civilian manpower is about 448,000 on M-day.

There are projected shortfalls in the supply of both military and civilian manpower. These shortfalls and plans to offset them are discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

C. Strength Request.

Requested strengths for the Active and Reserve Components and the Civilian Employment Plan are shown below:

<u>Army Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan</u>			
<u>(Strength in Thousands)</u>			
	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Military	771.8	772.3	772.4
Selected Reserve			
Army Reserve*	318.7	322.0	323.7
Army National Guard	457.3	458.0	458.8
Civilians**	402.1	404.9	404.8

(*Includes 14,665 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1989 and 14,762 in FY 1990 and 14,723 in FY 1991).

(**Includes Civilian Technicians)

Strengths requested for active forces are based primarily on peacetime missions and budgetary constraints, and do not include the significant increase in manpower which would be needed under full mobilization.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program.

1. Overview.

Force structure/manpower plans for FY 1989 - FY 1991 are designed to improve the Total Army's deterrent capability by enhancing combat unit readiness, continuing the modernization program, improving the equipment posture of the Army, increasing productivity program, improving the readiness of the Reserve Components, and expanding Special Operations Forces. The Army continues to balance its active and reserve

component forces and mission assignments to provide the optimum blend of wartime/crisis capability and cost effectiveness consistent with the projected threat. In addition, the Army continues planning and programming efforts to increase joint warfighting capabilities and ensure support of the CINCs. The following tables display the strength changes which will result, by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), for the active, Selected Reserve, and civilian components. (Note: Due to rounding, detail in the tables may not add to the totals shown.)

Army Active Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	.4	.6	.6	.6	.6
Tactical/Mobility	462.1	475.4	488.0	491.8	495.7
Commum/Intel	18.8	20.1	18.8	17.9	17.9
Combat Installation	27.6	19.4	17.2	16.4	16.4
Force Spt Tng	2.3	5.9	5.2	5.6	5.7
Medical Spt	17.0	35.4	33.6	34.1	34.2
Joint Activities	7.2	11.1	9.9	10.0	9.9
Central Logistics	6.3	6.5	3.3	3.2	3.3
Svc Mgt Hdqtrs	7.3	6.7	6.2	6.2	6.1
Research/Devel	5.6	4.7	4.5	5.1	5.8
Tng/Personnel	53.2	56.8	54.5	55.0	55.0
Spt Activities	51.7	34.7	31.2	31.2	31.1
Force Structure Deviation			4.3	3.9	2.9
Individuals	<u>117.0</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>94.6</u>	<u>91.4</u>	<u>87.8</u>
TOTALS	<u>780.8</u>	<u>771.8</u>	<u>771.8</u>	<u>772.3</u>	<u>772.4</u>

U.S. Army Reserve Manpower Program by DPPC.
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Tactical/Mobility	195.7	220.3	223.3	226.8	229.0
Communications/Intell	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Combat Installations	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Force Support Tng	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Medical Support	8.0	8.5	8.9	8.9	8.9
Joint Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Central Logistics	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Service Mgt Hqtrs	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Research & Dev	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tng & Personnel	65.2	60.2	59.7	59.4	59.0
Spt Activities	10.0	10.5	10.7	10.7	• 10.7
Undistributed Manning	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Individuals	(35.1)	(34.8)	(27.0)	(22.3)	(23.2)
Indiv Mob Aug	<u>11.9</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.8</u>	<u>14.7</u>
TOTALS	<u>292.1</u>	<u>312.8</u>	<u>318.7</u>	<u>322.0</u>	<u>323.7</u>

Army National Guard Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Tactical/Mobility	410.2	423.7	425.7	426.2	426.5
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4
Support Activities	24.0	25.0	25.2	25.2	25.6
Central Supt Act	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.8
Spt Installations	22.9	23.6	23.7	23.8	23.9
Trng & Personnel	6.1	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.4
Undistributed Manning	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Individuals (Trainees)	41.0	36.1	38.1	38.1	38.1
TOTALS	440.7	455.2	457.3	458.0	458.8

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)
Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Tactical/Mobility	26.5	20.3	21.4	22.4	22.2
Commun/Intel	6.9	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.4
Combat Installation	92.1	74.7	73.7	77.9	78.0
Force Spt Tng	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.9
Medical Spt	27.3	25.0	26.5	26.6	26.8
Joint Activities	9.4	9.0	8.9	9.6	9.6
Central Logistics	92.4	83.2	84.7	81.2	81.1
Svc Mgtr Hqtrs	14.1	12.6	12.5	12.6	12.5
Research/Devel	23.1	20.3	20.5	21.2	21.2
Tng/Personnel	23.9	20.7	23.6	23.3	23.2
Spt Activities	101.9	119.4	122.5	121.8	121.7
TOTALS	420.0	392.9	402.1	404.9	404.8

* Numbers may not add due to rounding.

2. The FY 1990 and 1991 Program.

FY 1990 and 1991 changes are designed to continue refining the structure of combat forces, improve manning of the Reserve Component units, continue modernization, and improve strategic deployability. Heavy divisions (armored and mechanized infantry) will continue conversion to a streamlined Army of Excellence (AOE) design as they field modern, more effective equipment. Modernization and structural changes will enhance the combat capability of heavy divisions, while light divisions continue transition to an objective design. The resulting force structure improves the deployability and combat capability of the Army. When more and smaller units were created, there was an increased need for cadre (commissioned and non-commissioned officers). This growth was programmed for officers and NCOs from 1980 to 1988.

Due to Military Pay Appropriation constraints and competing priorities the Army reduced the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps from the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget submission levels to below the FY 1986 end strength of 279,322. Many years will be reduced from 281,000 in FY 1988 to 272,000 in FY 1990.

Budget constraints result in undermining the NCO force by 11,200 manyears in FY 1989 and 14,500 in FY 1990. The Army is currently exploring alternatives within Army TOA to lessen the impact on readiness due to NCO shortfalls.

In 1986, the Congress directed the Department of Defense to absorb an active component officer reduction which, when apportioned by the Secretary of Defense, caused the Army to eliminate 1635 officers in FY 1987 and another 1514 FY 1988. Additionally, the Army has been directed by Congress to eliminate another 1000 officers by the end of FY 1990 (500 each in FY 1989 and FY 1990). Following the DoD IG review of manning of Unified and Specified Commands eliminates a further 17 officers in FY 1989, 30 in FY 1990 and 116 in FY 1991. This equates to a total reduction of 4,312 officers between FY 1987 and FY 1990. The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) has been exempted by the Congress from future reductions of medical officers and ancillary personnel for FY 88 and future reductions. This will allow the AMEDD to meet the Congressional guidance to achieve staffing of all medical facilities at 95 percent of requirements.

Officer reductions for FY 1988 (1514) were accomplished through lower accessions, the force out of officers passed over for promotion and the forced retirement of some senior officers. The Army will apply similar methods, in particular forced retirements in FY 1989 and FY 1990.

The officer positions eliminated in FY 1987 were taken from the Army's non-tactical/support base. This support base is the foundation of the Army's ability to sustain, train, mobilize, and transition to war. The warfighting force, to include active component and reserve components, depends on this core to provide all non-tactical support (e.g., personnel, equipment, logistics, plans and training, engineering, community and family support, resource management, and procurement).

In FY 1988 the reduction was applied to both tactical and non-tactical units. In the tactical arena, 295 officer positions were eliminated due to the inactivation of one infantry maneuver brigade and the deferred activation of two infantry battalions. This structure reduction increases the risk level in our worldwide contingency response capability by increasing the time required to deploy a round-out division.

On the sustaining base side, further reductions were taken from Army garrisons and training centers, to include approximately 450 aviation positions. In addition, reductions were taken in field operating agencies and the Reserve Officers Training Corps.

These reductions have had a serious impact on the sustaining base. Reductions on installation management staffs have eliminated many senior officer positions which provided military expertise and experience. The synergistic effect of the repeated reductions is that upon mobilization,

many garrisons will likely experience a gap in support capabilities between initial mobilization and arrival of reserve component units and mobilization augmentees.

Reserve Components (RC) program to provide ever increasing contributions to the total Army is curtailed significantly with marginal growth reflecting the primary thrust toward improving the readiness of existing RC units. In addition, modernization efforts continue in both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The ARNG is increasing the manning of its combat units and in FY 1991, the 29th Infantry Division (Light) completes its formation.

In all wartime scenarios the reserve components will provide the majority of tactical support for the Total Army.

An integral part of the capability of the reserve component force structure rests with its Full-Time Support (AGR, military technicians, and DA civilians in support of RC units) which provides both wartime and peacetime support.

The FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991 program reflects civilian strength adjustments associated with approved funding levels and force structure actions. The FY 89 civilian strength level has been adjusted to account for FY 1988 program execution. FY 1988 actual civilian employment was nearly 7,000 below the planned level of 399.8 thousand due to constraints and hiring restrictions during the last five months of the fiscal year. Except for some strength adjustments to support high priority mission requirements, civilian reductions reported in the FY 1989 Amended Budget Submission have been accomplished. The impact of the adjustments on accomplishment of mission requirements has not been assessed fully. However, analysis of authorization documents show significant reductions in the Army's ability to provide support to the following: installations, training, logistics, information management, POMCUS, family and community programs, and procurement. Skill and geographic location imbalances have occurred in an effort to achieve as much of the reduction as possible through release of temporary employees, attrition, and hiring freezes.

3. Active Component.

FY 1990/1991 active force structure changes occur in the Continental United States (CONUS), Europe, and the Pacific regions. New Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) will be implemented in the combat structure of many divisions.

a. North America

(1) The 6th Infantry Division (L) in Alaska, activated in FY 1986, did not complete its activation during FY 1989 as programmed previously. The OSD directed active military strength reduction of 8,600 resulted in the division activating with two less active component infantry battalions than had been planned originally. One of these infantry battalions will activate in FY 1989 as part of the Alaska ARNG; the other may be activated in the next program.

(2) CONUS activations in FY 1990 include 2 MI battalions, 2 assault helicopter battalions, 3 patriot air defense batteries, and a headquarters for an aviation group. Conversions in FY 1990 include 12 brigade headquarters, 5 headquarters for COSCOM material management centers, 2 battalion headquarters, 11 infantry battalions (mechanized), 10 field artillery battalions, 4 armor battalions, 4 armored cavalry squadrons, 2 aviation assault battalions, 1 attack helicopter battalion, 2 engineer battalions, 1 MI battalion, 1 hospital (evacuation), 2 forward support battalions, 2 maintenance support battalions, 3 signal battalions, 3 field artillery batteries, 2 aviation companies, 3 engineer companies, 4 chemical companies, 4 chemical detachments, 2 MP companies, 5 supply companies/detachments, 11 light truck companies, 12 non-divisional maintenance companies, and 5 ordnance companies (4 hawk missile maintenance and 1 ammo maintenance). Inactivations in FY 1990 include 4 assault helicopter companies.

(3) Increased readiness and modernization of Special Operation Forces (SOF) units is a high priority. Special Operations Forces enhancements continue with the activation of a fifth Active Component special forces group beginning in FY 1990; improvements in ARSOF Command and Control; upgrade of intelligence support and sustainment; and enhancement of aviation and communications elements.

b. Europe

The Army continues to refine force structure to the modernized configurations inherent in the Army of Excellence (AOE) design. Major force structure initiatives in FY 1990 include activation of 2 corps AH-64 attack helicopter battalions (VII corps and V corps). Conversions in FY 1990 include 4 engineer battalions (Heavy Division), 5 engineer companies, 6 field artillery battalions (155 sp), 1 field artillery battalion (8in sp), 1 field artillery battalion (LANCE), 1 field artillery battalion (MLRS), 3 infantry battalions (mechanized), 1 signal battalion (DIV MSE), 4 armor battalions (TANK), 3 MI battalions (CEWI), 5 combat support battalions (forward support), 2 combat support battalions (maintenance support), and 1 special forces battalion (AIRBORNE). FY 1989 and 1990 inactivations include 5 field artillery batteries (Pershing), 1 air defense headquarters battery (HAWK), and 3 air defense batteries (HAWK). The force structure changes will be accomplished within the end strength constraints prescribed for military personnel in European NATO countries. Host Nation Support will continue to be a vital ingredient for wartime tactical support of Army Forces in Europe.

c. Pacific

In Korea, the 2d Infantry Division will convert the division support command to the modernized Army of Excellence (AOE) design in FY 1990, convert two infantry battalions to air assault configuration in FY 1990 and FY 1991, and inactivate one infantry battalion in FY 1990. The 8 inch/MLRS composite battalion will transfer to echelons above division in FY 1991, and convert to two separate battalions. The two tank battalions will be modernized with ABRAMS tanks. In Hawaii, the 25th Infantry Division remains configured in the light infantry design.

4. Reserve Component.

a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

The Total Army must be prepared for a broad spectrum of conflict. The structure for the Active and Reserve Components is designed to provide a balanced mix of heavier, lighter, and special operations forces. These forces are tailored as much as possible to meet CINC requirements and to provide an effective combat force capable of employing Air Land Battle doctrine across a broadening spectrum of threat. The Army will continue to enhance the total force by continuing the transition to more modern designs. Other factors include the number and type of skills required, recruiting ability, and overall costs. Recruiting is discussed in more detail in later sections. Affordability is achieved by increasing reliance on the ARNG and USAR as essential elements of the national defense. Reserve Component soldiers are an integral part of the Total Army war fighting plan. They provide a cost effective way to meet increasing world-wide contingencies while constraining Active Component manpower demands. Approximately 53 percent of the Total Army Military force structure and 68 percent of the non-divisional combat service support force are in the Reserve Components. This integrated Active/Reserve Component force is essential to success in the Air Land Battle and is being cultivated through a variety of programs:

(1) Modernization/Unit Conversions. In FY 1989, adoption of Army of Excellence (AOE) TOEs will convert additional Reserve Component units to modern force configurations compatible with the Active Component. This enhanced force structure standardization across the AC/RC will ensure further similarity of training techniques, equipment procedures, and readiness reporting. Doctrinal compatibility between the RC and AC will contribute significantly to the Army's success in a warfighting environment.

(2) Equipment modernization. The Army will continue to distribute new and modernized systems to the Reserve Components. The tank modernization effort continues as additional Reserve Component units receive upgraded M60 tanks (M60A3). Four Reserve Component battalions have already been equipped with the M1 tank. Other equipment planned for distribution to the Reserve Components includes communication systems, helicopters, artillery, radar, automatic data processing systems, and trucks. This new equipment, when provided during the mid-1990s, will provide the Reserve Component with modern equipment systems compatible with those in Active Component units.

(3) Training. AC/RC combined training efforts will continue to enhance the readiness of the RC units.

(a) RC units participate in local training exercises as well as field exercises such as BOLD EAGLE, GALLANT EAGLE, REFORGER, and BRIGHT STAR.

(b) In FY 1989 the RC will send 2 ARNG units to the National Training Center (NTC) and 2 ARNG to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In FY90 the RC is programmed to send 3 ARNG units to the NTC and 1 ARNG unit to the JRTC.

(c) Training simulation devices such as the Battle Projection Centers and Battle Simulation Centers continue to be provided to the RC. These devices are designed to provide high quality cost effective training through the use of automation.

(d) Mobilization Army Training Center (MATC) exercises were executed successfully at Ft Bragg and Ft Campbell in FY 1988. These exercises demonstrated the capability of USAR Training Divisions to augment/establish training centers to process AC and RC trainees. In FY 1989 MATC exercises will be conducted at Ft Hood (84th Training Division), Ft Bliss (85th Training Divisions), Ft Polk (95th Training Division), Ft Lewis (104th Training Division), and Ft Jackson (108th Training Division). MATC exercises programmed currently for FY 1990 include: Ft Benning (70th Training Division), Ft Campbell (76th Training Division), Ft Bragg, (80th Training Division), Ft Bliss (85th Training Division), Ft Ord (91st Training Division), Ft Leonard Wood (98th Training Division) and Ft Knox (100th Training Division).

(4) Directed Training Associations (DTA). To improve readiness and warfight capabilities, the majority of RC units (at a minimum, all Battalion size and above) have a DTA with an AC unit. The DTA fall in one of the 3 subcatagories (levels) defined below:

(a) Roundout - These units are given the same Troop Program Sequence Number (TPSN) and priority for resources as their AC sponsor unit. These units are organized to complete an under-structured AC unit. In a roundout relationship the two units merge their identities into one entity. This category is therefore considered the strongest DTA.

(b) Affiliation - This is dedicated training assistance relationship between an AC sponsor and a selected RC unit based on specific unit training needs. High priority RC units are candidates for affiliation.

(c) Partnership - This is an alignment of major combat and Special Forces RC units with similar AC units for the purpose of improving training readiness of the RC units. Included in this category are the Army National Guard (ARNG) attack helicopter units and their DTAs with partnership (counterpart) divisional aviation units. This is strictly a training relationship; the AC unit and the RC unit remain two distinct units.

b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

(1) Improvement of force readiness and force modernization continues to be the USAR goal in FY 1990 and FY 1991. The extent of improvement, however, depends on adequate end strength and equipment procurement programs. USAR units will continue their conversion to modernized structures with equipment compatible to the Active Component or ARNG units they support; participation in joint and combined training exercises; and assumption of responsibility and training for new missions. In addition to training and modernization initiatives, continued readiness gains are also dependent on Full-Time Support growth keeping pace with unit activations.

(2) In FY 1990 and FY 1991 the USAR will activate 206 and convert 378 units. These activations by major functional area will include attack helicopter battalions, chemical companies, military intelligence (CEWI) companies, psychological operations units heavy equipment maintenance companies, and several rear area operations centers. Units that will be reorganizing to a more modern design include: chemical companies, engineer units, military police companies, psychological operations companies, composite service companies, and special forces units.

c. Army National Guard (ARNG).

(1) The ARNG will continue in FY 1989-91 to improve force readiness by increasing combat unit manning, activating new combat units, and modernizing equipment and organizations. The Full-time Support Force, however, is not programmed to increase from FY 1988 to FY 1989. This lack of growth is detrimental to improving the readiness of the ARNG to carry out new missions requiring rapid mobilization, without the necessity of intensive training or equipping prior to deployment. The Full-time Support force, the backbone of efforts being made to achieve readiness objectives, supports the increased tempo of training by providing full-time personnel in units to plan, develop, coordinate, and conduct required training. It also supports the increased tempo in supply management, equipment maintenance and administration by providing full-time trained and qualified personnel to perform and assume these functions that are critical to the achievement of mobilization objectives. ARNG units will also continue conversion to Army of Excellence design as the Total Army standardizes its organizational structure and equipment. Where appropriate, additional missions will be transferred from the Active Component to the ARNG.

(2) In FY88 the ARNG continued Air Defense artillery activations and conversions. Modernization of "DUSTER" units to Chaparral continued with a second battalion being converted. Additional force structure actions begun in FY87 and scheduled for completion in FY 1992 will establish seven chaparral battalions. Several personnel service companies will be established at corps level which will offset the elimination of AG companies within divisions and brigades. The conversion of aviation units to Army of Excellence design will continue into FY 1990. Divisional conversion will be ongoing and corps and theater conversions will be completed in FY 1989. Other FY 1989 actions will continue to program units in the "I" series design particularly in the Divisional aviation structure. Five aviation group headquarters will be established at corps to command and control the attack battalions within those organizations. Chemical companies, chemical battalion headquarters and a chemical brigade headquarters are also programmed for activation. Two armored cavalry regiments will complete conversion to heavy armored brigades. One TDA field hospital will convert to TOE combat support hospital. The rear area operation centers will be expanded and converted to fifty separate units as a part of the Army of excellence design by FY 1992.

5. Civilian Component.

After reducing civilian strength by nearly 12,000, as shown in last year's Amended Budget Submission, the Army's FY 1990 and FY 1991 civilian strength estimates reflect some restoral of these reductions to support critical high priority programs. This is consistent with the Army's goal to maintain civilian force levels and to realign constrained resources to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

E. Key Manpower Issues.

FY 1988-89 Army manpower initiatives seek to improve the quality and stability of the Army's force.

1. Quality:

The quality of manpower has significantly improved in recent years and has resulted in better training, higher quality reenlistments, and improved readiness. The success of modernization programs will depend heavily on maintaining this quality as national economic conditions create an environment less favorable to recruiting and retaining soldiers. Enlistment bonuses, Education Incentives, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, special incentives, competitive compensation, and family quality of life programs will need continued Congressional support as the Army seeks to recruit and retain soldiers with the required skills.

2. Stability:

Stability will continue to be emphasized in FY 1988-89, as the Army force structure adjusts to the recent light division initiatives and other extensive changes due to modernization and restructuring of heavy divisions. A fair and competitive level of compensation will help support the personnel stability the Army needs, as will the Unit Manning System, which enables soldiers to train, deploy and remain with the same units under the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (CORT) system. While the continued absence of statutory civilian end strength helps to enhance stability, it does not compensate for the impact of dollar reductions on civilian hiring levels. Beginning in FY 1988, Operations & Maintenance Army (OMA) dollar reductions and directed force structure reductions necessitated the identification of an 11,690 civilian strength decrement. Reductions of this magnitude offset any flexibility gained by the elimination of end strength ceilings. Hire freezes, reduction in temporary employees and reductions in force caused skill and location imbalances and disrupted functions currently being performed by military.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

The active Army entered FY 1988 with an authorized strength of 780,900 and finished with an actual end strength of 771,847. The reduction in end strength is the result of budgeting constraints in FY 1989.

Active Army military end strength is programmed for 771,800 in FY 1989, rising to 772,300 in FY 1990, then leveling at 772,400 in FY 1991-92.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table III-I shows that planned force structure manning increases by nearly 9,000 between FY 1988 and FY 1991. Further, between 1985 and 1991 force structure manning increases 19,300 in tactical/mobility forces, more than twice the total force structure increase during this time period.

Table III-I shows that in FY 1990 the Army plans to man 677,100 of the total 736,000 programmed manpower structure, leaving nearly 60,000 spaces unmanned. In FY 1991 the Army plans to man 681,700 of the total 736,100 programmed manpower structure, leaving 54,400 spaces unmanned. Even with these unmanned requirements in FY 1990-1991, the Army has maintained its tactical and mobility forces at 90 percent of its total force structure requirement.

Section III of this chapter explains in detail Tables III-1, III-1A, and III-1B.

TABLE III-1
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
TOTAL AC MILITARY															
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
STRATEGIC	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.6		0.6	0.6	95.3	0.7	0.6	81.4	0.7	0.6	81.4
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0	
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0	
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0	
	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.6		0.6	0.6	95.3	0.7	0.6	81.4	0.7	0.6	81.4
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	474.5	476.4		479.4	475.4		510.6	488.0	95.6	505.1	491.8	97.4	503.9	495.7	98.4
Land Forces	474.2	476.2		479.2	475.2		510.3	487.7	95.6	504.6	491.4	97.4	503.5	495.4	98.4
Division Forces	439.5	443.1		439.3	437.5		448.4	427.9	95.4	442.4	429.2	97.0	444.2	435.2	98.0
Theater Forces	34.7	33.2		39.9	37.7		61.9	59.8	96.6	64.2	62.2	96.9	62.6	60.3	96.3
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.2		0.3	0.2		0.4	0.3	93.7	0.5	0.4	72.2	0.4	0.3	68.3
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	24.9	25.3		21.0	20.1		20.2	18.8	93.0	21.6	17.9	83.1	21.6	17.9	83.0
Intelligence	9.4	9.4		9.8	9.2		10.7	9.9	92.8	12.0	10.0	83.4	12.0	10.0	83.4
Centrally Managed Comm	15.6	16.0		11.2	10.9		9.5	8.8	93.1	9.6	7.9	82.7	9.6	7.9	82.5
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	22.3	23.8		17.2	19.4		18.6	17.2	92.4	19.7	16.4	83.3	19.7	16.4	83.3
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	4.6	4.1		4.4	5.9		5.6	5.2	93.0	6.7	5.6	83.0	6.8	5.7	84.5
MEDICAL SUPPORT	33.2	33.6		33.6	35.4		36.3	33.6	92.5	42.3	34.1	80.6	41.0	34.2	83.3
JOINT ACTIVITIES	10.2	10.3		9.8	11.1		10.6	9.9	93.5	12.8	10.0	77.8	11.9	9.9	83.4
Int'l Military Org	1.4	1.4		1.3	1.3		1.4	1.3	92.1	1.6	1.3	80.6	1.6	1.3	80.6
Unified Commands	0.9	0.9		1.0	1.2		1.1	1.0	93.5	1.2	1.0	83.5	1.2	1.0	80.3
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.1		0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
JCS Support	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.4		0.3	0.3	100.0	0.4	0.3	86.0	0.4	0.3	85.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	7.4	7.5		7.0	8.0		7.6	7.0	92.6	8.5	7.1	83.6	8.5	7.1	83.7
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	8.4	8.1		6.9	6.5		3.6	3.3	91.8	3.8	3.2	85.5	4.0	3.3	81.8
Supply Operations	1.5	1.5		1.3	1.0		1.0	0.9	87.3	1.1	0.9	78.9	1.1	0.9	78.7
Maintenance Operations	2.2	2.1		1.3	1.1		1.3	1.2	92.2	1.2	1.0	86.5	1.2	1.0	86.3
Logistics Support Operations	4.7	4.5		4.4	4.4		1.3	1.2	94.8	1.6	1.3	83.9	1.7	1.4	80.5

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TOTAL AC MILITARY		FY 85		FY 88		FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS		7.1	7.5	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.2	93.8	7.3	6.2	84.7
Combat Commands		2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	1.9	92.6	2.3	1.9	84.4
Support Commands		5.0	5.4	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.2	94.4	5.0	4.2	84.8
RED/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES		5.3	4.9	4.6	4.7	4.9	4.5	92.1	6.1	5.1	83.1
Research and Development		5.3	4.9	4.6	4.7	4.9	4.5	92.1	6.1	5.1	83.1
Geophysical Activities		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			0.0	
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL		57.9	57.6	55.1	56.8	58.7	54.5	92.8	68.8	55.0	79.9
Personnel Support		12.9	12.7	12.7	13.5	13.7	12.7	92.9	17.4	12.9	74.4
Individual Training		45.0	44.0	42.4	43.3	45.0	41.7	92.8	49.4	42.0	85.1
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES		28.7	28.3	33.1	34.7	33.7	31.2	92.7	41.0	31.2	76.2
Support Installations		14.0	14.6	16.3	18.8	16.2	15.0	92.8	20.0	13.5	67.5
Centralized Support Act'y		13.9	13.7	16.8	15.9	17.5	16.2	92.6	21.0	17.7	84.4
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING		677.7	680.5	672.4	677.4	709.5	672.9	94.8	736.0	677.1	92.0
Undistributed Manning		5.3		9.6			4.3			2.9	
INDIVIDUALS		97.9	100.3	90.4	94.5		94.6			91.4	
Transients			21.2	17.0	16.1		17.6			17.5	
Holders			6.6	4.6	5.5		4.9			4.9	
Trainees/Students			68.0	64.3	68.4		67.7			60.9	
Cadets			4.5	4.5	4.4		4.5			4.6	
TOTAL END STRENGTH		780.8	780.8	772.3	771.8		771.8			772.4	

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

TABLE III-1A
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	V	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
STRATEGIC	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0										
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0										
Strategic Control and Surveillance forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0										
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.1	0.1	100.0	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	43.2	42.2	43.9	44.7	43.9	50.3	46.3	92.1	51.3	46.7	91.0	51.3	46.9	91.4	
Land Forces	43.0	42.2	43.8	44.6	43.8	50.2	46.2	92.0	51.0	46.5	91.3	51.1	46.8	91.5	
Division Forces	39.0	38.6	39.5	39.9	39.5	43.6	40.2	92.2	43.6	40.4	92.6	43.7	40.8	93.4	
Theater Forces	4.0	3.6	4.3	4.7	4.3	6.6	6.0	90.7	7.4	6.2	83.4	7.4	6.0	80.9	
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100.0	0.2	0.2	79.0	0.2	0.1	66.0	
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	3.4	3.1	2.6	3.0	2.6	3.4	3.1	91.5	3.6	3.0	84.1	3.6	3.0	84.0	
Intelligence	2.0	1.7	1.8	2.1	1.8	2.4	2.2	90.7	2.5	2.1	85.5	2.5	2.1	85.6	
Centrally Managed Comm	1.4	1.4	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9	93.5	1.1	0.9	80.8	1.1	0.9	80.4	
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	3.1	3.2	2.5	1.5	2.5	1.9	1.7	90.5	2.0	1.7	87.0	2.0	1.7	86.7	
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.8	0.6	1.1	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.0	93.9	1.4	1.2	82.7	1.5	1.2	80.2	
MEDICAL SUPPORT	11.8	12.1	12.4	12.1	12.4	13.1	11.9	91.0	14.5	12.0	83.0	14.5	12.1	83.4	
JOINT ACTIVITIES	4.6	5.0	4.9	4.4	4.9	5.1	4.5	87.8	5.5	4.5	81.9	5.4	4.5	83.1	
Int'l Military Org	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	82.3	0.6	0.5	82.3	0.6	0.5	82.3	
Unified Commands	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.7	85.3	0.8	0.7	84.3	0.8	0.7	82.0	
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	76.5	0.2	0.2	77.0	0.2	0.2	77.0	
JCS Support	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	87.3	0.4	0.3	65.3	0.3	0.3	86.3	
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	3.1	3.5	3.2	2.8	3.2	3.2	2.9	90.3	3.5	2.9	83.5	3.5	2.9	83.5	
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.9	1.5	1.8	1.6	88.4	1.8	1.6	86.3	2.0	1.6	78.1	
Supply Operations	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	100.0	0.5	0.4	82.6	0.6	0.4	68.2	
Maintenance Operations	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.5	80.3	0.4	0.3	83.5	0.4	0.3	83.0	
Logistics Support Operations	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	87.9	1.0	0.8	80.7	1.0	0.8	82.1	
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AC OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH		INV	AUTH		INV	RQMT		AUTH	RQMT		AUTH	RQMT		AUTH
															% MNG
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>															
Combat Commands	5.0	5.2	4.6	4.8	4.6	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.5	5.4	89.4	4.5	5.4	82.6	81.3
Support Commands	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.6	92.1	1.3	1.6	80.4	76.0
	3.7	3.9	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.8	90.8	3.2	3.8	83.6	83.6
<u>RED/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES</u>															
Research and Development	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.0	91.2	1.7	2.0	85.6	91.7
Geophysical Activities	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.0	91.2	1.7	2.0	85.6	91.7
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>															
Personnel Support	11.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	11.4	11.4	10.2	10.2	12.8	89.6	10.4	12.9	81.2	80.6
Individual Training	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.4	82.9	1.1	1.4	76.8	76.8
	10.3	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.4	10.1	10.1	9.1	9.1	11.4	90.5	9.3	11.5	81.6	81.1
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>															
Support Installations	8.6	8.4	7.7	7.9	7.7	8.5	8.5	7.7	7.7	10.0	91.1	7.6	9.8	76.2	77.6
Centralized Support Act'y	2.6	2.6	2.2	1.4	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.9	88.3	1.3	1.9	68.4	68.2
	6.0	5.8	5.5	6.5	5.5	6.3	6.3	6.2	6.2	7.9	91.8	6.3	7.9	80.0	79.9
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	95.8	93.8	93.0	93.2	93.0	103.4	103.4	94.3	94.3	110.5	91.2	95.0	110.5	86.0	86.3
Undistributed Manning	-3.6			-1.6				-1.0				-2.1			-2.6
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>															
Transients	17.2	15.9	13.9	15.5	13.9	15.7	15.7	13.7	13.7	13.4		13.4	13.6		13.6
Holdees	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9		1.9
Trainees/Students	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.6		0.6
	14.2	13.6	11.5	13.6	11.5	11.3	11.3	11.3	11.3	11.0		11.0	11.1		11.1
<u>TOTAL END STRENGTH</u>	109.4	109.7	107.0	107.1	107.0			106.9	106.9	106.4		106.4	106.3		106.3

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

TABLE III-1B
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	INV	AUTH	INV	INV	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
STRATEGIC	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	90.8	0.6	0.5	75.2	0.6	0.5	75.2
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0									
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0									
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	90.8	0.6	0.5	75.2	0.6	0.5	75.2
TACTICAL/MOBILITY															
Land Forces	431.4	434.1	434.1	434.7	431.5	431.5	460.3	441.7	96.0	453.8	445.1	98.1	452.6	448.8	99.2
Division Forces	431.3	434.1	434.1	434.5	431.4	431.4	460.1	441.5	96.0	453.6	444.9	98.1	452.5	448.7	99.2
Theater Forces	400.5	404.5	404.5	399.4	398.0	398.0	404.8	387.7	95.8	398.8	388.8	97.5	400.3	394.4	98.5
Mobility Forces	30.7	29.6	29.6	35.1	33.4	33.4	55.3	53.8	97.3	56.8	56.1	98.7	55.2	54.3	98.3
	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	79.0	0.3	0.2	67.7	0.1	0.1	99.9
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL															
Intelligence	21.6	22.2	22.2	18.0	17.6	17.6	16.7	15.7	93.8	17.9	14.9	83.3	18.0	14.9	82.8
Centrally Managed Comm	7.4	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.5	7.5	8.4	7.8	92.3	9.5	7.9	82.8	9.3	7.9	84.6
	14.1	14.6	14.6	10.2	10.1	10.1	8.3	7.9	95.3	8.4	7.1	83.9	9.4	7.0	74.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	19.2	20.6	20.6	15.7	16.8	16.8	16.7	15.5	92.6	17.7	14.7	82.9	17.7	14.7	82.9
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.4	4.2	94.9	5.3	4.4	83.1	5.3	4.5	85.7
MEDICAL SUPPORT	21.4	21.5	21.5	21.5	23.0	23.0	23.2	21.6	93.3	27.8	22.1	79.4	26.5	22.1	83.3
JOINT ACTIVITIES															
Int'l Military Org	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.4	6.2	6.2	5.5	5.4	98.8	7.3	5.5	74.7	6.5	5.4	83.6
Unified Commands	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	113.7	1.0	0.8	79.6	1.0	0.8	79.6
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	173.5	0.4	0.3	82.0	0.4	0.3	76.8
JCS Support	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	63.0	0.1	0.1	63.0	0.1	0.1	63.0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	83.0	0.1	0.1	83.0	0.1	0.1	81.0
	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.8	4.8	4.4	4.1	94.3	5.7	4.2	73.4	5.5	4.2	76.2
CENTRAL LOGISTICS															
Supply Operations	6.3	6.2	6.2	5.0	5.0	5.0	1.7	1.7	100.0	2.0	1.7	84.8	1.9	1.7	89.9
Maintenance Operations	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	93.2	0.6	0.5	75.8	0.9	0.5	50.8
Logistics Support Operations	1.6	1.6	1.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	100.0	0.8	0.7	88.0	1.0	0.7	70.4
	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	0.5	0.5	100.0	0.6	0.5	89.3	0.8	0.5	68.4

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AC ENLISTED

DEFENSE PLANNING AND
PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQ'S

Combat Commands
Support Commands

RED/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES

Research and Development
Geophysical Activities

TRAINING AND PERSONNEL

Personnel Support
Individual Training

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Support Installations
Centralized Support Act'y

TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING

Undistributed Manning

INDIVIDUALS

Transients
Holdees
Trainees/Students

TOTAL END STRENGTH

	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
2.1	2.1	2.3		1.9	2.1		1.7	1.7	100.0	1.9	1.7	90.4	1.8	1.7	93.6
0.8	0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8		0.7	0.7	93.7	0.7	0.7	93.6	0.7	0.6	88.7
1.3	1.3	1.5		1.1	1.3		1.1	1.1	97.1	1.2	1.1	88.6	1.1	1.1	96.6
3.5	3.4	3.4		3.0	3.4		3.2	3.0	92.6	4.1	3.4	81.9	5.6	4.0	71.1
3.5	3.4	3.4		3.0	3.4		3.2	3.0	92.6	4.1	3.4	81.9	5.6	4.0	71.1
0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0			0.0			0.0			0.0	
46.5	47.2	47.2		44.7	46.4		47.2	44.2	93.7	56.0	44.6	79.6	56.1	44.6	79.5
11.8	11.6	11.6		11.7	12.5		12.4	11.6	93.9	14.0	11.9	84.8	13.3	11.9	89.3
34.8	35.6	35.6		33.1	33.9		34.8	32.6	93.7	40.0	32.7	81.8	39.4	32.7	83.0
20.1	19.9	19.9		25.2	27.0		25.2	23.5	93.2	31.0	23.6	76.1	32.9	23.5	71.5
12.3	12.1	12.1		14.8	16.6		14.6	13.5	92.6	17.5	12.2	69.7	17.9	12.2	68.1
7.9	7.9	7.9		10.3	10.4		10.6	10.0	93.9	13.5	11.4	84.5	15.0	11.3	75.5
581.9	586.7	586.7		579.2	584.4		606.3	578.6	95.4	625.4	582.0	93.1	625.5	586.3	93.7
8.9				11.1				5.3			5.9			5.5	
76.2	79.8	79.8		70.4	76.1			76.5			73.4			69.7	
16.2	19.5	19.5		15.5	14.2			15.7			15.7			15.6	
4.9	6.0	6.0		4.1	4.9			4.4			4.3			4.3	
55.1	54.3	54.3		50.7	57.0			56.4			53.4			49.8	
666.9	666.6	666.6		660.7	660.4			660.4			661.4			661.5	

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

3. Skill and Grade.

The data in Table III-2 outlines the alignment of the Army by skill and grade.

a. Enlisted.

An integrated Enlisted Force Alignment Plan implemented in January 1985 continues to significantly improve the balance of the enlisted force, particularly grades E5-E9, by reducing overages and shortages. NCO critical imbalances (the number of personnel by skill and grade who are less than 80% or greater than 120% of Programmed Manning plus individuals) have decreased from 26,300 at FY 1988. Continuous progress has been made and will continue to be made in aligning critical imbalances. However, due to NCO strength reductions and resulting promotion policies, moderately imbalanced short personnel (the number of personnel by skill and grade who are greater than 80% but less than 95% of Programmed Manning Plus Individual) has grown dramatically. A low of 3,100 was achieved in FY 1986 but the number had grown to 10,300 by FY 1988. This alignment problem will continue to worsen as NCO strength is reduced from FY 1988 level of 274,668 to 271,836 at FY 1990.

Each enlisted grade group experienced reduced critical overages and shortages (i.e., imbalances), both in absolute numbers of imbalances and as a percent of the Programmed Manning plus Individuals (PMI). The Army has focused at the MOS and grade level to satisfy authorizations by better synchronizing and integrating the major force alignment tools: recruiting procures soldiers in the right skills at the right time; promotion motivates them to more productive service based on potential and past performance; reclassification encourages soldiers to move to understrength MOS from overstrength MOS following retraining; and, reenlistment ensures career force needs are met.

While some small reductions to the critical imbalances may still be possible, fiscal constraints placed on the Military Personnel Army, appropriation caused reductions in planned NCO inventory of 11,500 man-years in FY 1989 and 14,500 man-years in FY 1990 will make it unlikely. Additionally, these shortages will make it more difficult to align E5-E9 moderately imbalanced shortages in the enlisted force. Currently, the Army is exploring alternatives to correct NCO shortfalls within Army TOA limits.

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSLS ALT M880910P

	ACTUAL FY 85				ACTUAL FY 88				PROGRAMMED FY 89			
	OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills												
PMI	122	98	87	308	111	88	63	262	110	115	36	261
Inventory	132.5	167.1	81.3	380.9	180,354	153,514	32,856	366,724	166,871	186,756	16,086	369,713
Over/Short	163.8	167.6	58.7	390.1	202,785	154,272	28,204	385,261	186,363	185,266	13,834	385,463
	31.2	0.5	-22.5	9.2	22,431	758	-4,652	18,537	19,492	-1,490	-2,252	15,750
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills												
PMI	88	169	105	362	70	179	83	332	36	221	80	337
Inventory	37.7	186.6	55.0	27.9	22,072	164,422	96,448	282,942	10,403	192,132	82,654	284,989
Over/Short	45.9	185.8	44.8	27.6	25,756	161,093	87,602	274,451	12,472	188,131	72,749	273,352
	8.2	-0.8	-10.2	-2.8	3,684	-3,329	-8,846	-8,491	2,069	-4,001	-9,705	-11,637
Total E1 - E9												
Number of Skills												
PMI	110	133	121	364	79	187	67	333	75	204	58	377
Inventory	150.9	369.3	140.0	660.2	185,296	377,749	86,621	649,666	98,704	492,552	63,446	654,702
Over/Short	184.4	371.7	110.4	666.6	203,463	378,391	77,858	659,712	111,170	491,478	56,167	658,815
	33.6	2.5	-29.6	6.4	18,167	642	-8,763	10,046	12,466	-1,074	-7,279	4,113

	PROGRAMMED FY 90				PROGRAMMED FY 91			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4								
Number of Skills	115	125	18	258	111	121	26	258
PMI	122,356	235,575	11,111	369,042	110,972	235,421	18,421	364,814
Inventory	141,065	237,317	9,453	387,835	130,667	234,722	16,225	381,614
Over/Short	18,709	1,742	-1,658	18,793	19,695	-699	-2,196	16,800
E5 - E9								
Number of Skills	31	209	95	335	33	231	71	335
PMI	13,602	166,651	103,879	284,132	15,305	228,625	41,361	285,291
Inventory	15,717	163,944	92,742	272,403	18,610	226,102	34,684	279,396
Over/Short	2,115	-2,707	-11,137	-11,729	3,305	-2,523	-6,677	-5,895
Total E1 - E9								
Number of Skills	81	205	49	335	93	190	52	335
PMI	143,835	457,623	51,716	653,174	134,831	436,367	78,907	650,105
Inventory	160,227	454,662	45,349	660,238	153,834	436,155	71,021	661,010
Over/Short	16,392	-2,961	-6,367	7,064	19,003	-212	-7,886	10,905

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Versus Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSLS ALT M945002X

FY 85					
Warrant Officer	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	
Number of Skills	3	51	18	72	
PMI	600	10,100	5,300	16,000	
Inventory	700	10,500	4,400	15,700	
Over/Short	100	400	800	300	
01 - 03					
Number of Skills	7	17	22	46	
PMI	11,300	41,400	8,900	61,500	
Inventory	12,600	41,500	6,800	60,900	
Over/Short	1,400	100	2,100	600	
04 - 06					
Number of Skills	1	22	25	48	
PMI	1,100	19,200	15,200	35,600	
Inventory	1,300	19,200	12,600	33,100	
Over/Short	200	100	600	500	
TOTAL 01 - 06					
Number of Skills	4	20	24	48	
PMI	9,100	64,000	27,900	24,000	
Inventory	10,200	64,000	19,800	94,000	
Over/Short	1,200	***	-4,300	-3,100	

* See definitions in appendix B.

** Excludes cadets

*** Less than 50

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Versus Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSLS ALT M945002X

	ACTUAL FY 1988				PROGRAMMED FY 1989			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
Warrant Officer								
Number of Skills								
PMI	0	26	32	58	4	36	9	49
Inventory	0	2,525	15,376	17,901	1,136	13,484	1,571	16,191
Over/Short	0	2,420	12,629	15,049	1,363	12,707	1,260	15,330
	0	-105	-2,747	-2,852	+227	-777	-311	-861
01-03								
Number of Skills								
PMI	16	24	5	45	13	26	6	45
Inventory	17,525	32,837	6,751	57,113	19,785	30,415	6,511	56,711
Over/Short	19,996	33,075	6,341	59,412	21,372	30,823	5,902	58,097
	2,471	238	-410	2,299	1,587	408	-609	1,386
04-06								
Number of Skills								
PMI	0	15	30	45	1	17	27	45
Inventory	0	10,372	25,323	35,695	251	12,010	24,421	36,682
Over/Short	0	10,450	21,628	32,078	747	12,137	20,203	33,087
	0	78	-3,695	-3,627	496	127	-4,218	-3,595
TOTAL 01-06								
Number of Skills								
PMI	2	30	13	45	1	31	13	45
Inventory	526	76,547	15,735	92,808	320	76,952	16,121	93,393
Over/Short	1,003	77,232	13,255	91,490	830	75,118	15,236	91,184
	477	685	-2,480	-1,318	510	-1,834	-885	-2,209

TABLE III-2
Active Army Skill and Grade
Actual and Projected Inventory Versus Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
MOSLS ALT M945002X

	ACTUAL FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991		
	OVER	BAL	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	TOTAL
<u>Warrant Officer</u>						
<u>Number of Skills</u>						
PMI	2	41	49	1	44	49
Inventory	477	13,886	16,376	5	15,540	16,590
Over/Short	570	13,067	15,330	7	14,433	15,330
	+93	-819	-1,046	+2	1,170	-1,260
<u>01-03</u>						
<u>Number of Skills</u>						
PMI	10	28	45	11	26	45
Inventory	13,957	36,119	56,757	9,857	39,858	56,954
Over/Short	15,458	36,304	57,811	11,100	40,110	57,769
	1,501	185	1,054	1,243	252	815
<u>04-06</u>						
<u>Number of Skills</u>						
PMI	0	22	45	0	22	45
Inventory	0	14,717	35,874	0	15,078	35,828
Over/Short	0	14,790	32,843	0	15,039	32,834
	0	73	-3,104	0	-39	-2,994
<u>TOTAL 01-06</u>						
<u>Number of Skills</u>						
PMI	0	35	45	0	34	45
Inventory	0	78,266	92,631	0	73,061	92,782
Over/Short	0	77,036	90,654	0	72,003	90,611
	0	-1,230	-1,977	0	-1,058	-2,171

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

Actions and programs now in effect or planned to provide improved officer grade balances include:

(1) Accessing to meet all lieutenant requirements plus combat arms company grade requirements. These inventories are aligned at the 3-4 years of service (YOS) by reassigning combat arms officers to combat support and combat service support branches.

(2) Officer and warrant officer authorization scrub of MTOE and TDA units to better align authorizations with inventory and accommodate congressionally mandated reductions.

4. Experience.

The data in table III-3 shows that the Army is attracting and retaining quality personnel. The need for experienced personnel is essential to the operation and maintenance of our weapon systems and the training of our junior personnel.

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: M881011P

	ACTUAL FY 1985			ACTUAL FY 1988			PROGRAMMED FY 1989		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	AVG YOS
E1-E4									
PMI**	380.9			366,724		369,042			
Inventory	390.1	41.6	2.3	385,261	51,490	385,463	62,975	2.4	
E5-E9									
PMI	279.1			282,942		284,989			
Inventory	276.4	257.1	10.6	274,451	261,872	272,403	261,745	11.5	
TOTAL E1-E9									
PMI	660.2			649,666		654,702			
Inventory	666.6	298.8	5.6	659,712	319,362	658,815	324,720	6.2	

	PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4						
PMI**	369,042			364,814		
Inventory	387,835	68,920	2.4	381,614	66,698	2.4
E5-E9						
PMI	284,132			285,291		
Inventory	272,403	261,429	11.8	279,396	266,473	11.9
TOTAL E1-E9						
PMI	653,174			650,105		
Inventory	660,238	330,349	6.2	661,010	333,171	6.4

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE M945002X

		ACTUAL FY 1985	AVG YOS
		<u>PEOPLE 4 YOS</u>	
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>			
PMI		16.0	
Inventory		15.7	13.5
<u>01 - 03</u>			
PMI		61.5	
Inventory		60.9	7.6
<u>04 - 06</u>			
PMI		35.6	
Inventory		33.1	15.3
<u>TOTAL 01 - 06</u>			
PMI		97.1	
Inventory		94.0	10.3

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding. Excludes US Military Academy Cadets.

**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: M945002X

	ACTUAL FY 1988		AVG YOS	PROGRAMMED FY 1989		AVG YOS
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS		TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>						
PMI	17.9	13.8	15.0	16.2	13.9	15.1
Inventory	15.0			15.3		
<u>01-03</u>						
PMI	57.1	32.1	4.7	56.7	32.8	5.0
Inventory	59.4			58.1		
<u>04-06</u>						
PMI	35.7	32.1	17.0	36.7	33.1	17.2
Inventory	32.1			33.1		
<u>TOTAL 01-06</u>						
PMI	92.8	64.2	10.0	93.4	65.9	10.1
Inventory	91.5			91.2		

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
MOSLS ALTERNATIVE: M945002X

	PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>						
PMI	16.4	13.9	15.2	16.6	13.8	15.1
Inventory	15.3			15.3		
<u>01-03</u>						
PMI	56.8	33.5	5.1	57.0	33.6	5.1
Inventory	57.8			57.8		
<u>04-06</u>						
PMI	35.9	32.8	17.3	35.8	32.8	17.3
Inventory	32.8			32.8		
<u>TOTAL 01-06</u>						
PMI	92.6	66.3	10.2	92.8	66.4	10.3
Inventory	90.7			90.6		

* Detail may not add to totals due to rounding. Excludes US Military Academy Cadets.

** Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management.

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting.

(a) Overview. The Army maintained its end strength and met its overall recruiting objective in FY 1988 and again improved the overall quality of its accessions. The active Army recruited 92.7 percent high school graduates and 4.4 percent AFQT Test Category IV personnel. Test Category I-III A recruits were 65.7% of FY1988 accessions compared to 66.7% for FY1987. Force modernization requires that the Army continue to emphasize the need for high quality enlistees. In order to achieve this goal in an increasingly competitive recruiting environment (declining youth labor pool, improving economy, decreased unemployment), the Army must rely on such incentives as fair and competitive compensation, educational incentives and Army College Fund Programs, and enlistment cash bonuses.

Enlisted Accession Plan (In thousands)

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 85 1/</u>	<u>FY 88 2/</u>	<u>FY 89 3/</u>	<u>FY 90 3/</u>	<u>FY 91 3/</u>
Prior Service	10.4	11.6	10.0	9.0	8.0
Non-Prior Service	114.9	103.1	118.1	124.0	110.0
Male	100.0	89.2	102.7	102.8	94.6
(Male I-III A)	51.1	60.0	65.9	68.6	59.8
(HSDG)	80.4	73.5	91.3	96.1	84.4
(HSDG I-III A)	40.8	49.6	53.8	56.0	49.0
Female	14.8	13.9	15.4	15.4	15.4
(Female I-III A)	8.4	8.9	9.7	9.8	9.9
(HSDG)	13.9	13.1	15.2	15.2	15.2
(HSDG I-III A)	8.4	8.9	9.7	9.8	9.9

1/ FY 1985 actuals, Final Fiscal Year 1985 (AAMMP ALT D6780, 21 Jan 86)

2/ FY 1988 actuals, Final Sep 88 Update (AAMMP ALT E880950P, 2 Nov 88)

3/ Goals FY 1989-1990, Oct 88 PB Submit (AAMMPE 881081, 12 Dec 88)

(b) Quality. In FY 1989 and beyond, the Army will continue its objective of recruiting the number of high school graduate and Test Category I-III A people required to build a more capable force. The Army accession goal is to recruit 61 +/- two percent Test Category I-III A soldiers each year, to recruit at least 90 percent High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG), and to limit Test Category IV accessions to less than 10 percent each year. These goals are well within the Congressional floor of 65 percent high school graduates and the ceiling of 20 percent Test Score Category IV. Failure to achieve the Army recruiting goals for quality would adversely affect force readiness and modernization since non-high school graduates tend to have higher attrition rates and recruits

from lower test categories tend to be more difficult to train. Failure to achieve quality goals therefore would result in decreased unit stability and cohesion, increased training requirements, added expense, and lower combat readiness.

(2) Retention. The Army achieved its aggregate reenlistment objective and continued to improve enlisted force alignment in FY 1988. Due to the improved quality of Army accessions over the last four years, the three year attrition of first term soldiers has declined. However, adequate compensation and Selective Reenlistment Bonus funding will be essential if we are to be successful in retaining these and other high quality soldiers in FY 1989, FY 1990, and beyond. Educational incentives which can be utilized while on active duty also assist in the retention of our career soldiers.

Reenlistments
(In thousands)

	<u>FY 87</u>		<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Initial Term	34.4	35.6	34.4	36.0	34.4	34.4
Mid Term	20.4	20.8	18.5	27.1	20.0	20.0
Career	21.4	21.9	22.0	30.5	22.0	22.0
Total	76.2	78.3	74.9	93.6	76.4	76.4

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions.

(a) Accession Program. In FY 1987, the Army met its accession goal (with the exception of doctors and nurses) and achieved a budgeted officer end strength of 107,964. In FY 1988, the Army planned to access 9,359 commissioned and warrant officers into the active component to maintain a budgeted end strength objective of 107,427. The continued Congressionally mandated officer strength reduction caused the Army to decrease its FY 1988 active component accessions to achieve budget officer end strength. The revised accession goals and achievements by fiscal year are shown below:

Active Component Officer/Warrant Officer Accession Goals

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Programmed	8,675	9,434	9,400
Actual	8,595	--	--

(b) Accession Trends.

[1] The primary source of officer accessions continues to be ROTC units located in over 300 colleges across the Nation. The Army expects to graduate approximately 8,000 commissioned officers annually from ROTC in FY 1989, and beyond. This will satisfy active and reserve component requirements from this accessing source.

[2] ROTC will increase the number of officer graduates in academic disciplines which meet Army skill needs. The 10,000 Army ROTC scholarships (covering 2, 3, or 4 years) currently in effect will continue to be used to attract high-quality students majoring in the fields of science and engineering, and nursing.

[3] Despite increased effort and resources directed toward physician recruiting, the Army has been able to attract only a modest number of qualified, unobligated physicians into the active force for the past several years. To overcome this recruiting shortfall, the Army plans to increase accessions from the Health Professional Scholarship Program - Medical (HPSP). In addition to a more predictable and continuous flow of physicians into the service, HPSP will allow the Army to adjust for specialty imbalances. HPSP is critical to the staffing of an all-volunteer Medical Corps.

[4] Recruitment of Army nurses has become especially difficult, in part because of the national nurse shortage. Several strategies to increase nurse recruitment have been or are being implemented; e.g., more nurse recruiters, expanded ROTC scholarship market for student nurses, relaxed age restrictions for new officers, and educational guarantees for nurse specialties.

[5] In addition to the physician and nurse shortages, the Army anticipates a shortage of dental and ancillary health care support officers. Recruitment for these specialties is receiving increased emphasis. However, the Army is recruiting in a labor market in which the demand for these skills is escalating. To be successful the Army must remain competitive in pay and benefits.

(2) Retention. The Army's retention policy for FY 1989 and beyond is described as follows:

(a) The retention of a maximum number of new officer accessions, consistent with quality standards, will be emphasized.

(b) Retirement with immediate recall to active duty for commissioned officers in critical specialties will be considered; special consideration will be given to officers with expertise in procurement and acquisition management. Recall of retired Regular Army (RA) warrant officers in shortage military occupational specialties on a case-by-case basis will also be considered.

(c) The selective continuation program for captains twice nonselected for promotion will be continued on an extremely limited basis (restricted to officers in medical and other professional branches) in FY 1989 and beyond. Regular and Reserve Majors twice nonselected for promotion who are within six years of retirement, normally will be selected for continuation until completion of 20 years of service. Except for any extraordinary, "loss management" programs required to accomplish Congressionally mandated end strength cuts, it is anticipated that officer retention (except for AMEDD officers) in FY 1989 and FY 1990 will continue to be high.

(d) The difficulty in recruiting health professionals has underscored the importance of retaining AMEDD officers. The Army has been an active participant in a Tri-Service study of retention and compensation for health professionals. In addition to Army initiatives to improve retention, Congressional action is necessary; specifically - increased/expanded incentive bonus programs for professionals and review of DOPMA field grade constraints for the Army Nurse Corps.

(e) A fair and competitive personnel management system coupled with reasonably stable levels of compensation for both active and retired personnel are, and will continue to be, important factors in the retention of experienced and high quality officers.

6. Stability

a. Aggregate Population Stability

This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year. Lower attrition, higher overall personnel quality, and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1985 to FY 1988.

Aggregate Population Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	95.3	91.9	91.0	91.2
Enlisted	82.5	80.8	82.0	82.9

b. Unit Personnel Stability

This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year. Unit stability for officers and enlisted personnel has increased for officer enlisted personnel in FY 1985 and FY 1988 due to both an expansion of the Army's Unit Manning System and extension of tour lengths. The increased stability also highly correlates to the drop in manyears in the Individuals Account form FY 1985 through FY 1988 -- 97.9 down to 94.5K (Table III-I). The largest share of change points to the enlisted force sub-account as shown in Table III-IA.

Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	40.3	42.6	42.1	44.0
Enlisted	39.4	40.4	42.2	44.8

7. Readiness Assessment

a. During recent years, the Army has charted a steady path in developing and retaining a strong, combat ready force. Successful recruiting efforts have enabled us to meet our force structure requirements in terms of quality and quantity for both enlisted and officer personnel. The Army continually seeks to realign and balance the force by developing new methodologies to address skill requirements and support strength needs. However, programmed noncommissioned officer shortages (E5-9) over the next five years will adversely impact personnel readiness more than any other budgetary constraint. Based on historical data, these projected NCO levels are expected to result in five to seven percent of all reporting units dropping at least one personnel C-rating below FY 1986-88 levels. When coupled with delayed accession ramps resulting in lower operating strengths in the first quarter of each fiscal year, these NCO shortages will result in the lowest personnel readiness levels in the last four fiscal years. The recovery of funds to increase NCO promotions will result in a positive impact on personnel readiness far exceeding any alternative measure.

b. A banner effort is being made to ensure an organizational culture of attracting and preserving a quality force. Educational and enlistment incentives provided by the New GI Bill, the Army College Fund, and the Enlistment Cash Bonus are highly effective and need continued support. The Army recognizes the important link between education, recruiting, retention, and readiness. Soldiers are encouraged to make education a life-long pursuit, however, current reductions in the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) funding will have a harmful impact on soldiers who try to follow this advice.

c. Although enlisted recruiting and officer accession programs have met quantity and quality goals, future needs offer an even greater challenge. Because of an improved economy, continued demand for quality youth in the private and public sectors, to include the other Services, and a decline in the youth population, the Army must continue to offer bonuses for selected skills and educational incentives for both the accession and retention programs. Restrictions on the use of proven market expansion incentives, such as the two year Army College Fund, are detrimental to these efforts.

d. With the continued support of Congress, the Army will succeed in its recruiting and retention efforts to sustain a quality force today for tomorrow's missions throughout the world.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve:

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR).

(a) General. The USAR Selected Reserve grew to an end strength of 312,825 in FY 1988. This end strength includes Drill

Strength of 287,604 Active Guard Reserve of 13,341 and Individual Mobilization Augmentees of 11,880 High school graduates comprised 95 percent of the non-prior service accessions in FY 1988. This achievement was a result of continued congressional support of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program and a lot of hard work by our recruiters.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. The Army Reserve structure shown in Table III-4 increases by 5,356 FY 1990, and 3,100 in FY 1991 to a total of 331,347. The number of positions authorized for fill in this structure increases 6,992 in FY 1990 and 3,443 in FY 1991 (excluding Individual Mobilization Augmentees, which do not man USAR structure), to a total of 317,229. The percentage of structure which is authorized for fill remains about 95 percent through the budget years.

(Strengths in thousands)

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Wartime Required	311.8	322.9	328.2	331.3
Programmed Force	294.8	306.8	313.8	317.2
Structure Allowance (FSA) ^{1/}				
Difference (Percent Authorized vs Wartime requirement)	17.0(94.6%)	16.1(95.0%)	14.4(95.6%)	14.1(95.%)

^{1/}Excludes IMAs

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Trained in unit strength, shown in Table III-5, will improve in the current year and the budget years. These improvements translate to increased readiness and the ability to execute wartime missions.

TABLE III-4
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV	
STRATEGIC	0.2	0.2		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	
Offensive Strategic Forces															
Defensive Strategic Forces															
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.2	0.2		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	204.4	195.7		215.2	220.3		226.8	242.0		247.3	233.7		237.1	250.4	
Land Forces	202.6	194.2		213.3	218.5		224.9	240.1		245.4	231.9		235.3	248.5	
Division Forces	181.6	175.0		194.4	199.2		211.7	225.7		230.3	218.0		220.4	232.2	
(Divisional Increment)	2.3	3.6		6.4	6.6		6.9	7.4		7.4	7.2		7.4	7.4	
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	30.1	33.6		42.2	42.8		44.3	47.4		47.2	46.2		46.4	47.0	
(Tactical Spt Increment)	149.3	137.9		145.8	149.8		160.5	170.9		175.7	164.6		166.6	177.7	
Theater Forces	20.9	19.1		18.9	19.3		13.2	14.4		15.2	13.9		14.9	16.3	
Mobility Forces	1.9	1.6		1.9	1.8		1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9	
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.6	0.7		0.6			0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	
Intelligence	0.6	0.7		0.6			0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS															
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING															
MEDICAL SUPPORT	8.9	8.0		8.9	8.9		8.9	8.9		8.9	8.9		8.9	8.9	
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.3	0.2		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	
Int'l Military Org															
Unified Commands															
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.2		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3	
CENTRAL LOGISTICS															

	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
TOTAL ARMY RESERVE MILITARY															
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Combat Commands															
Support Commands															
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT															
Research and Development															
Geophysical Activities															
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	55.8	65.2		59.1	60.2		59.1	59.0	100	59.0	58.9	99.8	59.0	58.9	99.8
Personnel Support	0.0	0.2		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	
Individual Training	55.8	63.1		59.1	60.2		59.1	59.0	99.8	59.0	58.9	99.8	59.0	58.9	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	8.6	10.0		10.3	10.5		11.6	10.8	93.1	11.6	10.9	93.4	11.7	10.9	93.5
Support Installations	5.0	5.4		5.3	5.4		5.6	5.6	100	5.7	5.6	98.7	5.7	5.6	98.7
Centralized Support Act'y	3.7	4.6		5.0	5.1		6.0	5.2	86.9	5.9	5.3	88.4	6.0	5.3	88.6
UNIT MANNING	279.3	280.2		294.8			322.9	306.8	95.0	328.2	313.8	95.6	331.3	317.2	95.7
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)	35.1			34.8				27.0			22.3			23.2	
INDIVIDUALS MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	11.9			11.9				14.7			14.8			14.7	
END STRENGTH	292.1			312.8				318.7			322.0			323.7	

NOTES:

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Force Structure Allowance
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required

TABLE III-4A
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH
DPPC															
STRATEGIC	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	29.8	26.6	32.6	34.9	34.6	34.3	99.0	34.5	34.2	99.2	35	35	98.9	35	98.9
Land Forces	29.2	26.1	32.0	34.6	34.0	33.7	99.0	33.9	33.6	99.2	34.4	34.4	98.9	34.4	98.9
Division Forces	27.4	24.4	28.1	30.6	32.2	31.9	99.1	32.1	31.8	99.3	32	32	99.0	32	99.0
(Divisional Increment)	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.3	0.7	0.7	100.0	0.7	0.7	100.0	0.7	0.7	100.0	0.7	100.0
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	2.0	2.5	0.2	4.1	3.5	3.5	100.0	3.5	3.5	100.0	3.5	3.5	100.0	3.5	100.0
(Tactical Spt Increment)	25.2	21.5	24.2	25.2	28.1	27.8	99.0	27.9	27.7	99.2	28.2	27.9	98.8	28.2	98.8
Theater Forces	1.8	1.7	3.9	4.0	1.8	1.7	97.0	1.8	1.8	97.1	1.9	1.9	97.2	1.9	97.2
Mobility Forces	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.6	100.0	0.6	0.6	100.0	0.6	0.6	100.0	0.6	100.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.3	0.2	0	0.1	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	100.0
Intelligence	0.3	0.2	0.3		0.3	0	100.0	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	100.0
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	0.0	0.0													
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.0	0.0													
MEDICAL SUPPORT	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.0	2.5	3	100.0	2.5	3	100.0	2.5	3	100.0	2.5	100.0
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	100.0
Int'l Military Org	0.0	0.6													
Unified Commands	0.0	0.0													
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	0	100.0	0.3	100.0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.0	0.0													
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS	0.0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0	100.0	0	0	100.0	0	0	100.0	0	100.0
Combat Commands	0.0	0.0													
Support Commands	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0	100.0	0.1	0	100.0	0.1	0	100.0	0.1	100.0

OFFICERS	FY 85		FY 88		FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DPPC										
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.0	0.0								
Research and Development	0.0	0.0								
Geophysical Activities	0.0	0.0								
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	12.1	12.6	12.7	11.0	12.7	12.6	99.3	12.6	12.6	99.3
Personnel Support	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Individual Training	12.1	12.4	12.7	11.0	12.7	12.6	99.3	12.6	13	99.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	2.9	3.5	3.5	2.1	4	4	93.2	4	4	93.2
Support Installations	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.3	100.0	1.3	1	100.0
Centralized Support Act'y	1.8	2.3	2.3	1.0	2.6	2.6	89.8	2.6	2	89.8
UNIT MANNING	47.9	45.3	51.9	50.5	54.3	53.6	98.7	54.2	53.9	98.6
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)		0.0		0.0		0.0			0.0	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES		8.5		3.9		11.4			11.3	
END STRENGTH		53.9		59.4		62.0			63.9	

NOTES:

- o The term Authorization is synonymous with Force Structure Allowance
- o The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required

TABLE III-4B
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 85		FY 88		FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
DPPC										
STRATEGIC	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	174.6	169.1	182.6	186.1	207.4	192.5	212.8	199.5	215.5	202.6
Land Forces	173.3	168	181.3	184.7	206.1	191.2	211.5	198.2	214.2	201.3
Division Forces	154.3	150.6	166.3	169.4	193.4	179.8	198.2	186.2	199.7	188.3
(Division Increment)	2.1	3.1	5.8	5.3	6.8	6.3	6.8	6.5	6.8	6.8
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	28.1	31.1	38.9	39.5	43.9	40.8	43.7	42.7	43.5	42.8
(Tactical Spt Increment)	124.1	116.4	121.6	124.6	142.8	132.7	147.8	136.9	149.5	138.7
Theater Forces	19.0	17.4	15.0	15.3	12.6	11.4	13.3	12.1	14.4	13.0
Mobility Forces	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Intelligence	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS										
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING										
MEDICAL SUPPORT	6.4	5.8	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.4
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Int'l Military Org										
Unified Commands										
Federal Agency Support	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS										
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Combat Commands										
Support Commands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

ENLISTED	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>DPCC</u>															
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>															
Research and Development															
Geophysical Activities															
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>															
Personnel Support	43.7	52.7	46.4	49.2	46.4	46.4	46.4	46.4	100.0	46.4	46.4	100.0	46.4	46.4	100.0
Individual Training	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	43.7	50.7	46.4	49.2	46.4	46.4	46.4	46.4	100.0	46.4	46.4	100.0	46.4	46.4	100.0
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>															
Support Installations	5.7	6.5	6.8	8.4	7.1	7.7	7.7	7.1	93.1	7.7	7.2	93.6	7.7	7.3	93.7
Centralized Support Act'y	3.8	4.3	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	99.6	4.4	4.3	98.4	4.4	4.3	98.4
	1.9	2.3	2.7	4.0	2.8	3.3	3.3	2.8	84.6	3.3	2.9	87.3	3.4	2.9	87.6
<u>UNIT MANNING</u>	231.0	234.8	243.0	250.5	253.2	268.6	274.1	253.2	94.3	274.1	260.3	95.0	276.8	263.4	95.2
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>	35.1	34.8		34.8	27.0			27.0			22.3			22.9	
<u>INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES</u>	3.4	3.4		3.0							3.4			3.4	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	238.2	238.2	243.0	253.5	256.7			256.7			259.0			259.8	

NOTES:

- Numbers may not add due to Rounding
- The term Authorization is synonymous with Force Structure Allowance
- The term Requirement is synonymous with Wartime Required

TABLE III-5

US ARMY RESERVE
(THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End Strength	312.8	318.7	322.0	323.7	326.7
- Training Pipeline	34.8	27.0	22.3	22.9	23.8
- IMA	<u>11.9</u>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.8</u>	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.8</u>
Operating Strength	266.1	277.0	284.9	286.1	288.1
Non Unit AGR	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8
+ Unit AC Personnel	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>
Trained Unit Strength	262.5	273.3	281.2	282.3	284.3
Structure Requirements (Wartime)(Programmed Structure)	311.8	322.9	328.2	331.3	332.8
% Trained/Requirements	84.2%	84.7%	85.7%	85.2%	85.5%

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

(d) Skill and Grade. The USAR skill and grade, actual and projected inventories are displayed in Table III-6. The principal shortages of trained non-commissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers continue in the medical, aviation, maintenance, and transportation specialties. Approval of requested increase in FY 1990 and FY 1991 of Active Guard/Reserve recruiter for health care professionals along with existing incentive programs should serve to reduce some of the critical shortages of doctors and nurses in units and the Individual Ready Reserve. The requested increases are expected to provide 600 more health care professionals in units in FY 1990 and FY 1991 and about 1350 more in the IRR. Resolution of shortages in the enlisted force continues through the use of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, continued recruitment of prior service soldiers who have critical skills needed in USAR units, and retention of prior service individuals. The shortage of NCOs, remains an area that adversely affects readiness. Warrant officers will be recruited from the reserve enlisted force and trained in the WO Pre-commissioning and Basic Course. A WO enlistment option for aviator in USAR units has been implemented.

TABLE III-6
U.S. ARMY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in 000s)***

	FY 88				FY 89				FY 90				FY 91			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4																
Number of Skills	183	111	143	437	183	111	143	437	183	111	143	437	183	111	143	437
PMI	104.2	18.6	35.5	158.3	104.5	18.7	35.6	158.8	105.2	18.8	35.9	159.9	107.2	18.5	36.1	161.9
Inventory	82.7	18.6	28.5	129.8	83.8	18.9	28.9	131.6	84.7	19.0	29.2	132.9	85.9	18.1	29.5	133.5
Over/Short	-21.5	0.0	7.0	-28.5	-20.7	0.2	-6.7	-27.2	-20.6	0.2	-6.7	-27.0	-21.3	-0.3	-6.6	-28.3
E5 - E9																
Number of Skills	80	111	197	388	80	111	197	388	80	111	197	388	80	111	197	388
PMI	12.1	33.5	74.7	120.3	12.2	33.7	74.9	120.7	12.3	33.9	75.4	121.6	12.5	34.6	76.0	123.0
Inventory	17.2	32.6	60.0	109.8	17.4	33.1	60.8	111.3	17.6	33.4	61.4	112.4	17.9	33.1	62.0	113.0
Over/Short	5.0	-0.9	-14.7	-10.6	5.2	-0.6	-14.1	-9.4	-5.3	-0.5	-14.0	-9.1	5.4	-1.5	14.0	-10.1
TOTAL E1 - E9																
Number of Skills	263	222	340	825	263	222	340	825	263	222	340	825	263	222	340	825
PMI	116.3	52.2	110.2	278.7	116.7	52.4	110.5	279.6	117.5	52.7	111.3	281.5	119.7	53.1	112.1	284.9
Inventory	99.8	51.2	88.5	239.6	101.3	52.0	89.8	243.0	102.3	52.5	90.6	245.4	103.8	51.2	91.5	246.5
Over/Short	-16.5	-1.0	-21.7	-39.1	-15.4	-0.4	-20.8	-36.6	-15.2	-0.3	-20.7	-36.2	-16.0	-1.8	-20.6	-38.4
Warrant Officer																
Number of Skills	39	40	52	131	39	40	52	131	39	40	52	131	39	40	52	131
PMI	0.7	0.2	4.2	5.1	0.7	0.2	4.2	5.1	0.7	0.2	4.2	5.2	0.7	0.3	4.2	5.2
Inventory	1.2	0.3	2.4	3.8	1.2	0.3	2.4	3.9	1.2	0.3	2.5	3.9	1.2	0.2	2.5	3.9
Over/Short	0.4	0.0	-1.8	-1.3	0.5	0.0	-1.7	-1.3	0.5	0.0	-1.7	-1.3	0.5	0.0	-1.7	-1.3
O1 - O3																
Number of Skills	25	18	20	63	25	18	20	63	25	18	20	63	25	18	20	63
PMI	7.7	3.0	16.4	27.0	7.7	3.0	16.5	27.0	7.7	3.0	16.5	27.1	7.7	3.1	16.5	27.1
Inventory	9.8	3.1	12.3	25.2	10.0	3.1	12.5	25.6	10.1	3.1	12.6	25.8	10.2	3.0	12.8	26.0
Over/Short	2.2	0.1	-4.1	1.8	2.3	0.1	4.0	-1.5	2.4	0.1	-4.0	-1.5	2.4	-0.1	-3.9	-1.7

(e) Experience. The data in Table III-7 indicate that the USAR will continue to experience shortages of senior enlisted soldiers through the budget years even though the total number of senior soldiers continues to increase.

TABLE III-7
USAR EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Strength in thousands)

	ACTUAL			PROGRAMMED			PROGRAMMED			PROGRAMMED		
	FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
<u>E1-F4</u>												
PMI**	159.1	NA	NA	151.9	NA	NA	152.7	NA	NA	154.4	NA	NA
Inventory	146.7	58.9	2.5	148.4	59.6	2.5	149.7	60.1	2.5	150.2	60.3	2.5
<u>E5-E9</u>												
PMI	122.0	NA	NA	126.3	NA	NA	129.9	NA	NA	131.1	NA	NA
Inventory	103.7	99.6	17.1	104.9	100.7	17.1	105.9	101.6	17.1	106.2	101.9	17.1
<u>TOTAL E1-E9</u>												
PMI	281.1	NA	NA	278.2	NA	NA	282.6	NA	NA	285.8	NA	NA
Inventory	250.5	158.5	7.4	253.3	160.3	7.4	255.6	161.7	7.4	256.4	162.2	7.4
<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>												
PMI	5.4	NA	NA	5.6	NA	NA	5.6	NA	NA	5.6	NA	NA
Inventory	4.4	4.3	19.2	4.4	4.3	19.2	4.4	4.3	19.2	4.5	4.3	19.2
<u>01 - 03</u>												
PMI	27.5	NA	NA	28.4	NA	NA	28.7	NA	NA	28.7	NA	NA
Inventory	26.4	19.9	7.1	26.5	20.0	7.1	26.6	20.1	7.1	26.8	20.3	7.1
<u>04 - 06</u>												
PMI	18.9	NA	NA	19.3	NA	NA	19.2	NA	NA	19.4	NA	NA
Inventory	19.7	19.4	21.5	19.8	19.5	21.5	19.8	19.6	21.5	20.0	19.7	21.5
<u>TOTAL 01 - 06</u>												
PMI	46.4	NA	NA	47.7	NA	NA	47.8	NA	NA	48.0	NA	NA
Inventory	46.1	39.4	13.6	46.3	39.5	13.6	46.4	39.7	13.6	46.8	40.0	13.6

*Detail may not add to totals due to
**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accessions.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the following table:

USAR Enlisted Accessions

	<u>FY 85</u>		<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service (PS)	44,336	48,649	48,224	45,740	49,316	39,812	37,180
Non Prior Service (NPS)	33,360	30,213	29,350	30,249	30,167	36,613	37,128
Male	25,600	24,256	22,159	22,314	22,045	25,349	25,683
(HSDG)	20,200	20,910*	19,224	20,832	19,029	22,814	23,115
Female	7,760	5,957	7,191	7,935	8,122	11,264	11,445
(HSDG)	7,760	5,957*	7,191	7,935	8,122	11,264	11,445
TOTAL	77,696	78,862	77,574	75,989	79,483	76,425	74,308

*NOTE: HSDG, Does not include GED

[b] Officer. Officer accessions for the USAR come primarily from ROTC, direct appointments, and transfers from the Active Component. For FY 1989 and FY 1990, and FY 1991 annual ROTC production is projected to be 1482, 1186 and 1389. USAR officer accession performance and goals from all sources are shown in the following table:

USAR Officer Accessions

<u>FY 85</u>		<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
10,774	10,162	11,783	12,214	12,087	10,601	10,692

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table:

USAR Reenlistments

	<u>FY 85</u>		<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	7,227	4,000	9,057	9,750	10,677	10,677	10,677
Career	21,525	20,898	18,350	20,061	17,279	17,279	17,279
TOTAL	28,752	24,898	27,407	29,811	27,956	27,956	27,956

[2] Losses.

[a] Enlisted

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Troop Program Enlisted Losses	56,563	74,718	75,225	74,343	73,756
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted troop program strength	26.1	30.1	31.2	31.1	30.2
Non-ETS Losses	44,826	58,882	57,870	57,167	57,257
Losses as a percentage of average enlisted strength	20.7	24.4	23.8	23.9	23.5

[b] Officer. Losses from the USAR may not be losses to the Army overall, as some USAR officers transfer to the active component or Army National Guard. However, these losses do create USAR vacancies which must be filled to maintain readiness. The actual and projected overall losses for the USAR are shown below. Achieving projections for both accessions and losses should assist in reducing personnel shortages.

USAR Officer Losses

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	9,642	8,190	8,321	8,368

[3] Inventory Stability. Both USAR aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability were evaluated in the same manner as for the active force. Aggregate officer stability increased slightly while enlisted aggregate stability slightly declined.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officers	87.7	87.2	86.9	90.6
Enlisted	79.4	76.0	75.9	77.1

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officers	69.6	69.4	67.7	68.1
Enlisted	68.7	64.7	62.2	60.3

(g) Readiness Assessment.

The personnel readiness of the USAR improved in FY 1988 even though paid drill strength dropped by 481 to 287,604. The decline in paid drill strength was more than offset by an increase in

Active Guard/Reserve full time unit support and a decrease of about 4,600 soldiers in the training pipeline. Efforts will continue in FY1989 and the budget years to acquire and retain quality personnel with critical skills through the use of incentives such as bonuses, loan repayment and other special programs. Soldier quality will remain high thereby increasing the capability of the USAR to meet its contingency and wartime missions.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program.

[1] The purpose of the IMA program is to pre-assign individual selected reservists in peacetime to active component units, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to train for their wartime duties. The Army adopted the program in October 1981 by transferring members of the Mobilization Designation (MORDES) program from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the Selected Reserve. These soldiers fill active Army wartime required force structure and provide the resources for rapid expansion of the Army prior to and during mobilization.

[2] This change in the IMA program gave the active Army the necessary manpower resources to expand rapidly in periods of national emergency. Since its inception, approximately 17,000 positions have been identified in response to increased requirements to support the Active Army. Funding is required to support two weeks of annual training by each soldier assigned to the IMA program and those soldiers designated for drilling positions (24 paid drills per year).

[3] Actual and projected strength is shown below:

	<u>IMAs</u>			
<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>	
(Actual)				
11,880	14,665	14,762	14,723	

(i) Full Time Support Program.

[1] The Full Time Support Program assists Reserve Component units in achieving higher levels of readiness by providing drilling reservists the maximum available training time to prepare for the wartime mission. Full-time support personnel (Active Guard/Reserve personnel, civil service personnel, active Army members, and Military Technicians) improve readiness by assisting in training, supply, maintenance, administration, and mobilization planning.

[2] As shown in the following chart, the USAR is requesting modest increases in the number of AGR personnel assigned to the Full-time Support Program. While more growth is needed, sufficient funds are not available to pay for required increases. Today, many Reserve Component units will deploy with or before active component units in case of war. These units must receive additional full time support to be capable of employing modernized equipment, conducting proper training

and maintenance, planning for more complex missions, and reacting to shorter deployment times. Full time support personnel help Reserve Component commanders to improve unit readiness and prepare for mobilization by training the drilling reservist in go-to-war skills and by performing many daily military tasks which previously detracted from mission accomplishment. AGR personnel are also assigned above the unit level in the functional areas of training, logistics, maintenance, mobilization planning, recruiting, retention, and management. Army Reserve Technicians are concentrated in the functional areas of maintenance and logistics, and administrative support. Legislation requiring all Army Reserve Technicians hired after 8 December 1983 to maintain membership in the troop program unit (TPU) in which employed, or, if other than a TPU, be a member of the Selected Reserve, also contributes to readiness. The Reserve Component is now assured of these individuals' expertise in the event of mobilization. The decrease in DA civilians is a result of reduced funding levels for FY 1989 and FY 1990. It should also be noted that the Army Reserve Technician strength for all fiscal years has been decreased to accommodate a strength accounting procedure change by Department of Defense. Only those civilians who are also members of USAR units are counted as Technicians. The remainder, who were called "status quo" technicians or who were waiting completion of administrative processing to become members of units, are now included in the Department of the Army civilian numbers. For FY 1989, the Army Reserve plans to meet the Congressional floor of 8429 technicians. This includes 7529 dual-status technicians, an estimated 900 status quo personnel, and those waiting unit membership.

USAR Full-time Support

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
AGR	13,341	13,344	13,707	14,081
Army Reserve Techs	8,107	8,429	8,529	8,629
Active Army with				
USAR	1,299	1,191	1,191	1,191
DA Civilians	4,798	4,636	4,538	4,577

(2) Army National Guard.

(a) General. The aggregate ARNG FY 1988 Selected Reserve strength increased 3,224 from 451,858 to 455,182 or 1.3%. This fell short of the FY 1988 end strength objective of 457,270. The ARNG strength growth trend is expected to continue into the future and should achieve the FY 1989 end strength objective of 457,300.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength. The ARNG structure increases 6,886 in FY 1989, and 8,878 in FY 1990, for a total of 15,764. Manning increased by 4,619 in FY 1988. Programmed manning increases by 30 in FY 1989, and 750 in FY 1990, for a total of 780 nearly all manning increases are allocated to combat units.

Programmed manning is expected to be 94.0 percent of programmed structure by end of FY 1989 and hold steady through FY 1991 as shown in Table III-8. The programmed manning will largely depend on influences of the economy, population availability, propensity to enlist/reenlist, and resource funding.

TABLE III-8
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH		INV	AUTH		INV	AUTH		%	AUTH		%	AUTH		%
									MNG			MNG			MNG
TOTAL ARNG MILITARY	409.3	410.2	410.2	434.8	423.7	423.7	453.2	425.7	94	449.7	426.2	95	454.2	426.5	94
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	409.3	410.2	410.2	434.8	423.7	423.7	453.2	425.7	94	449.7	426.2	95	454.2	426.5	94
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	389.5	396.4	396.4	413.8	403.2	403.2	431.2	405.1	94	428.1	405.6	95	432.2	405.8	94
Land Forces	167.6	168.4	168.4	178.1	174.6	174.6	185.6	174.4	94	184.3	174.6	95	186.0	174.7	94
Division Forces	120.3	114.6	114.6	127.8	124.5	124.5	133.2	125.1	94	132.3	125.3	95	133.5	125.4	94
(Divisional Increment)	101.5	101.8	101.8	107.9	105.1	105.1	112.4	105.6	94	111.6	105.7	95	112.7	105.8	94
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	19.8	16.4	16.4	21.0	19.5	19.5	21.9	20.6	94	21.8	20.6	95	22.0	20.6	94
(Tactical Spt Increment)															
Theater Forces															
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.6	0.4	66.6	0.6	0.4	66.6
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	24.3	24.2	24.2	25.6	25.0	25.0	26.8	25.2	94	26.6	25.2	95	27.2	25.6	94
Support Installations	22.9	22.9	22.9	24.2	23.6	23.6	25.3	23.7	94	25.1	23.8	95	25.3	23.8	94
Centralized Support Act'y	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	93	1.5	1.4	93	1.9	1.8	94
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	6.0	6.1	6.1	6.4	6.2	6.2	6.6	6.2	94	6.6	6.2	94	6.8	6.4	94
Individual Training															
UNIT MANNING	437.7	440.7	440.7	467.1	455.2	455.2	486.8	457.3	94	483.5	458.0	95	488.8	458.8	94
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)															
		39.6	39.6		36.1	36.1		38.1			38.1			38.1	
END-STRENGTH		440.7	440.7		455.2	455.2		457.3			458			458.8	

TABLE III-8A
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
OFFICERS															
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
TACTICAL/MOBILITY															
Land Forces	41.1	39.4		45.1	44.8		45.7	42.8	94	46.8	45.0	96	47.1	45.3	96
Division Forces	41.1	39.4		45.1	44.8		45.7	42.8	94	46.8	45.0	96	47.1	45.3	96
(Divisional Increment)	39.1	37.5		43.0	42.6		43.5	40.7	94	44.6	42.9	96	44.8	43.1	96
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	16.8	16.2		18.5	18.4		18.7	17.5	94	19.2	18.5	96	19.4	18.6	96
(Tactical Spt Increment)	12.1	11.6		13.3	13.2		13.4	12.6	94	13.8	13.2	96	13.9	13.3	96
Theater Forces	10.1	9.8		11.2	11.1		11.3	10.6	94	11.6	11.2	96	11.8	11.2	96
	2.0	1.6		2.2	2.2		2.2	2.1	94	2.3	2.2	96	2.3	2.2	96
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.2	0.1		0.3	0.2		0.3	0.2	66	0.3	0.2	66	0.3	0.2	66
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	2.4	2.3		2.7	2.7		2.6	2.5	96	2.8	2.7	96	2.8	2.7	96
Support Installations	2.3	2.2		2.6	2.5		2.6	2.4	92	2.7	2.6	96	2.6	2.5	96
Centralized Support Act'y	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.2	0.2	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL															
Individual Training	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6		0.7	0.6	82	0.7	0.7	89	0.7	0.7	96
UNIT MANNING	44.1	42.3		48.6	48.2		49.8	48.3	97	50.5	48.5	96	50.9	48.7	96
INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)	0	0		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
END-STRENGTH	42.3	42.3		48.2	48.2		49.8	48.3	97	50.5	48.5	96	50.9	48.7	96

TABLE III-8B
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG) PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
 (Thousands)

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 85		FY 88		FY 89		FY 90		FY 91	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>										
Land Forces	368.3	370.9	389.6	379.0	406.8	380.7	403.0	381.2	407.1	381.4
Division Forces	368.3	370.9	389.6	379.0	406.8	380.7	403.0	381.2	407.1	381.4
(Divisional Increment)	350.4	358.9	370.7	360.6	387.1	362.3	383.5	362.7	387.4	362.9
(Non-Div Cbt Increment)	150.8	152.2	159.6	155.2	166.6	155.9	165.1	156.1	166.8	156.2
(Tactical Spt Increment)	108.2	103.0	114.5	111.4	111.9	112.5	118.4	112.0	119.7	112.1
Theater Forces	91.4	92.0	96.6	94.0	94.5	95.0	100.0	94.6	101.0	94.6
	17.8	14.8	18.9	17.3	18.4	18.5	19.5	18.5	19.7	18.5
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>										
Support Installations	21.8	21.1	22.9	22.3	22.5	22.6	23.8	22.5	24.4	22.9
Centralized Support Act'y	20.6	20.7	21.7	21.1	21.3	21.4	22.5	21.3	22.6	21.3
	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.7	1.6
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>										
Individual Training	5.4	5.5	5.7	5.4	5.6	5.2	5.9	5.6	6.1	5.7
<u>UNIT MANNING</u>	395.6	398.4	418.5	406.9	437.0	409.0	432.9	409.5	437.9	410.1
<u>INDIVIDUALS (TRAINEES)</u>										
		41.0		36.1		38.1		38.1		38.1
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>		398.4		406.9		409		409.5		410.1

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table III-8C reflects the trained personnel assigned to units compared to the wartime unit structure. The percent trained units lowers as budget end strength does not grow in relationship with structure. This table also reflects a positive ratio of operating strength to trained personnel.

TABLE III-8C
ARNG Trained In Unit Strength

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
End Strength	439.9	455.2	457.3	458.0	458.8
-Training Pipeline	41.0	34.0	38.0	38.0	38.0
Operating Strength	398.9	421.2	419.3	420.0	420.7
-Non Unit AGR	4.1	6.0	6.6	6.6	6.6
+Unit AC Personnel	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Trained Unit Strength	394.5	415.1	412.6	413.3	413.0
Structure Requirements (Wartime)	465.5	485.6	490.5	496.2	500.1
Wartime Unit Structure	465.5	485.7	490.5	496.2	500.1
% Trained in Units	84.7%	85.5%	84.1	83.3	82.7

(d) Skill and Grade.

[1] The data on actual and projected inventory by skill and grade in Table III-9 show that the mismatch of NCO skill improves through FY 1990. A key contributor to this continuing mismatch is the location of existing ARNG structure compared with availability of personnel. Unlike the active Army, reassignment of ARNG personnel between units in different locations to fill structure is not practical because of the community orientation of the ARNG units. Enlistment bonuses under the Selected Reserve Incentive Program are targeted toward improving the ARNG fill in shortage skills and units. A promotion and reduction plan combined with application of revised tenure, maximum age, Service, and grade constraint criteria is also being evaluated as a partial solution.

[2] Critical shortages in the current fiscal year include Captains in all basic branches as well as the traditional shortages of medical doctors, nurses, and chaplains. Structure modernization continues to aggravate this problem. The greatest impact will be felt in aviator positions as Vietnam era aviators approach retirement and the requirement to replace them increases. Efforts for improving all shortages include the following: (1) continued screening (to be accomplished by the recently established Army National Guard Lieutenants Management Team) of the US Army Reserve (USAR) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to fill all basic branch company grade officer vacancies; and (2) selective retention of and special recruiting programs for critical warrant officers skills and professional branch officers through FY 1987.

(e) Experience. The average years of service of ARNG enlisted personnel shown in Table III-10 are projected to decrease

TABLE III-9
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in 000s)

	FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	112	21	162	295	110	17	158	285	110	17	158	285
PMI	14693	105372	131149	251215	14811	106216	132199	253226	15119	108426	134950	258496
Inventory	27715	102848	94963	225528	27712	102836	94952	225502	27951	103723	95771	227447
Over/Short	13022	-2525	-36186	-25687	12901	-3380	-37247	-27724	12832	-4703	-39179	-31049
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	142	38	179	359	115	68	174	357	115	68	174	357
PMI	26509	70157	70594	167260	27095	71706	72152	170953	10206	73192	91097	174495
Inventory	82211	53934	45289	181438	73970	63721	45803	183498	74362	64059	46046	184470
Over/Short	55702	-16223	-25305	14178	46875	-7985	-26350	12545	64155	-9133	-45051	9975
TOTAL E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	127	30	171	328	101	42	167	310	101	42	167	310
PMI	24474	175532	218469	418475	24808	177925	221447	424179	25323	181621	226047	432991
Inventory	109927	156782	140252	406966	101682	166557	140755	409000	102313	167782	141817	411917
C	85452	-18751	-78217	-11509	76874	-11368	-80692	-15179	76989	-13839	-84231	-21074
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	1	26	18	45	1	22	12	35	1	22	12	35
PMI	5	10040	1177	11222	5	10272	1204	11481	6	10438	1224	11667
Inventory	2	8917	933	9893	2	9235	966	10245	2	9273	970	10288
Over/Short	-3	-1123	-244	-1329	-3	-1037	-238	-1236	-3	-1165	-254	-1379
01 - 03												
Number of Skills	4	30	7	41	4	30	7	41	4	30	7	41
PMI	2411	13147	10723	26281	2470	13469	10986	26294	2502	13640	11125	27266
Inventory	3113	14183	10220	27516	3022	13768	9920	26710	3034	13825	9961	26820
Over/Short	702	1036	-503	1235	551	299	-1065	-214	533	185	-1164	-446

Number of Skills

PMI

0988

953

50
10835

1057
6

6916
40

4
987

50
12131070
6

07 40

666
7

50
1352

Number of Skills

9

37

6

54

9

42

9

54

9

27

6

5/5

Inventory

7654
5432

2007
2922

0806
0107

38323
37116

3521
4577

2638
2943

1971
0536

8137
8056

3572
4506

22923
23039

12123
10570

8618
8212

as a result of the projected increase in the ratio of non-prior to prior service accessions during FY 1989 and FY 1990. However, this trend should enable the ARNG to correct enlisted grade imbalances as shown in Table III-9. Currently, a disproportionate number of E5-E6 positions are filled by accession of prior service personnel, as opposed to progression of non-prior service members through the ranks. The ARNG is working to improve recruitment and retention of both officers and enlisted personnel.

TABLE III-10

ARNG EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY* (Strength in thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u> <u>FY 1988</u>			<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>FY 1989</u>			<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>FY 1990</u>		
	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>
E1-E4									
PMI**	251.2	NA	NA	253.2	NA	NA	258.5	NA	NA
Inventory	225.2	93.5	3.6	225.5	91.3	3.6	227.1	92.0	3.5
E5-E9									
PMI	167.2	NA	NA	171.0	NA	NA	165.9	NA	NA
Inventory	181.2	172.2	12.9	183.5	178.0	13.1	184.8	179.2	13.2
TOTAL E1-E9									
PMI	418.4	NA	NA	435.5	NA	NA	439.1	NA	NA
Inventory	406.7	270.6	7.8	409.0	269.3	7.9	411.9	271.2	18.6
WARRANT OFFICER									
PMI	11.2	NA	NA	11.5	NA	NA	11.7	NA	NA
Inventory	9.9	9.2	18.6	10.2	10.1	18.5	10.3	10.2	18.6
01 - 03									
PMI	26.3	NA	NA	26.9	NA	NA	27.3	NA	NA
Inventory	27.5	20.1	8.7	26.6	21.2	8.8	26.7	21.3	8.8
04 - 06									
PMI	10.8	NA	NA	11.2	NA	NA	11.6	NA	NA
Inventory	10.8	10.3	20.3	11.4	10.8	20.3	11.4	10.8	20.3
TOTAL 01 - 06									
PMI	37.1	NA	NA	38.1	NA	NA	38.6	NA	NA
Inventory	38.3	30.4	12.4	38.0	31.0	12.4	38.2	32.1	12.4

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding

**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Accession.

[a] Enlisted. ARNG recruiting performance and projected goals are shown in the table below:

ARNG Enlisted Accessions (Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	37.3	38.2	35.0	34.7
Non-Prior Service	(44.3)	(37.4)	(42.8)	(42.4)
Male	41.0	34.3	39.3	38.9
(HSDG)	35.7	29.7	34.6	34.7
Female	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.5
(HSDG)	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.5
TOTAL	81.6	75.6	77.8	77.1

[b] Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions

Total FY 1988 Officers strength represents a 4.3 percent net growth from FY 1987 and was the best results since FY 1983 (when performance was 99.7 percent of objective). This growth can be attributed to several factors such as enhanced officer recruiting; improved retention efforts; excellent performance by the ARNG Lieutenants Management Team (ALMT) (approximately 40 percent of total FY 1988 accessions, and record production from the state Officer Candidate School (OCS) Program. The above efforts were aided by enhanced over-strength policies which resulted in a 104 percent of programmed officer gains compared to 96 percent achievement in FY 1987 gains. Total losses were 82 percent of programmed. These gains and losses resulted in an overall officer loss rate of 7.7 percent.

Shortages of medical corps officers and combat arms captains continue. Achievement of the FY 1989 objective of 5,575, will require continued emphasis on accession goals from all sources.

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Accessions

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
Commissioned				
Officers	4,950	5,454	4,350	4,500
Warrant				
Officers	<u>1,225</u>	<u>911</u>	<u>1,225</u>	<u>1,225</u>
Total	6,175	6,365	5,575	5,725

2. Retention

Total officer losses were 3,520 and was 82 percent of loss program (4,372). The resulting 7.7 percent officer loss rate was a significant improvement in officer retention efforts. During the period FY 1989 through FY 1990 emphasis will continue to focus on specific tailored recruiting and retention programs including support of the Full-time Recruiting Force for AMEDD shortages; waivers of age, overstrength, and alternate training requirements for doctors; establishment of temporary positions for Army Nurse Corps officers in States without large medical units; and enrollment of full-time seminary or theological graduate students in the ARNG Chaplain Candidates Program to alleviate chaplain shortages. Actual and projected loss goals for total officers follow:

ARNG Officer/Warrant Officer Losses

<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
4,372	3,520	4,433	4,300

3. Officer Strength Initiatives.

Several initiatives have been implemented that will significantly impact future ARNG officer accessions. These include approval for the Reserve Component Individuals Account for Officers, development of an enrollment enhancement program for State OCS ("Warrior 2000 AD"), refinement of the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS), and continued success of the ALMT.

HQDA approved the establishment of the RC Officers Individuals Account in mid-FY 1986. When fully implemented this initiative will provide the Reserve Component an officers trainee account to manage the assignment of both untrained officers as well as officers who are attending extended professional military education courses. The net benefit of this program is better appreciation of personnel and unit readiness. Officers in the RC Individuals account are carried overstrength and do not count against unit readiness. Currently, only ARNG soldiers participating in the ROTC Simultaneous Membership Program are assigned to this account. Program development for full implementation is ongoing.

New life was breathed into the State OCS Programs by the ARNG "Warrior 2000 AD" initiative. A result of this initiative was the Recruiting Incentive Program which was developed by the Army Personnel Division to increase OCS enrollment with quality candidates. It employs a four hour motivational seminar that includes participation by the chain of command. The Recruiting Incentives Program targets the college market and seeks to enroll over 50 percent of seminar participants. Warrior 2000 A.D.: A Leadership Seminar", successfully increased State OCS enrollment. Of the 32 States that invited WARRIOR 1 for the presentation, 7,943 soldiers attended. 5,094 applied for OCS. 3,310 were accepted for OCS (65% apply-to-acceptance rate). In the developmental stages of the program, WARRIOR 1 promised 50% of the attending eligible soldiers would enroll in OCS. In fact, WARRIOR class of FY 1988, graduation rates varied from a high in Kentucky (78%) to an average of 41%.

The ALMT, which became operational on 1 July 85, was again successful this year. With a three-man team located at St. Louis, MO, the ALMT serves as the centralized referral and distribution agency for assignment of RFD officers to the States. The ALMT also screens the ROTC RFD and USAR Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) markets for qualified officers to fill Guard unit vacancies. During FY 1988 the ALMT was responsible for over 2,100 appointments which represented approximately 40 percent of total FY 1988 accessions.

The Total Warrant Officer System was approved by the Chief of Staff, Army to meet current and future warrant officer needs of the Total Army. The ARNG began implementation of the new TWOS effective 1 October 1985. This program requires warrant officer candidate training and military occupational specialty (MOS) technical certification prior to initial appointment. The ARNG major concern with TWOS implementation is the extended technical certification requirements. Following completion of entry and mid-level training courses, candidates must complete resident technical certification courses which are provided by MOS proponent centers/schools. In most cases these courses are too long for RC participation. However, alternative methods for technical certification are currently under development, such as certification by review boards and diagnostic examinations.

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. ARNG retention performance and projected requirements shown in the following table reflect steady requirements through FY 1989. Reenlistments did not exceed the goal in FY 1988. The overall ARNG extension of enlistments (reenlistments) decreased. The overall ARNG strength fell short the FY 1988 objective of 452,270 by only 2,088. As the economy continues to improve, meeting strength goals will be more difficult.

In February of 1988, WARRIOR 1 was directed to assist in developing a recruiting program to assist recruiters in meeting FY88 end strength. WARRIOR 1 created "Strength Strategies" to motivate fulltime recruiters and retention NCOs, set individual and team goals, and consolidate future team goals. The program was directed at States that had enlisted strength below 95% of their authorized strength. WARRIOR 1 conducted the seminar in 17 States from March through June 1988.

ARNG Reenlistments (Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	15.4	15.2	17.3	17.3
Career	50.1	49.5	55.7	55.7
TOTAL	65.6	64.6	73.0	73.0

[b] Officer. Officer retention problems continue to exist at the rank of Captain in the basic branches, in all ranks of the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and chaplains. Increased emphasis in State retention programs will be developed with recruiting efforts in these officer specialties.

[3] Inventory Stability. Lower attrition, higher personnel quality and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1981 to FY 1987. The decrease in unit personnel stability from FY 1984 to FY 1987 is attributed to force structure turbulence (activations, inactivations, and reorganizations).

ARNG Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Enlisted	82.2	84.1	82.9	83.5	85.7	88.5
Officer	90.8	90.7	89.2	91.0	94.2	95.4

ARNG Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Enlisted	72.3	75.6	71.5	72.2	69.1	72.5
Officer	66.1	69.4	66.6	68.0	64.3	68.2

[4] Success Factors.

[a] Enlisted. The successful strength growth of the ARNG was due to programs such as enlistment, extension of enlistment (reenlistment), educational financial assistance programs, and the non-prior service split option training program. (The non-prior service split option training program allows the ARNG to recruit high school students -- a market not otherwise available.)

To begin FY 89, WARRIOR 1 announced a Young Leaders Program. A program introduced to New Canaan High School, New Canaan, Connecticut. The intent of the program is to provide a 3-day motivational skills seminar to transfer basic leadership skills to student leaders which can be conducted by battalion COs nation-wide. It in which students apply the skills being taught. A test of the new program will be from 3-7 November 1988 at Camp O'Niel, Connecticut. This program will open the door for new prospects into the Army National Guard.

[b] Officer. Thirty percent of new ARNG officers in FY 1988 were accessed from ROTC and 29 percent from State OCS. The remaining 41 percent were direct appointments into the ARNG, Reserve Component OCS production, and individuals who previously held commissions in other components. To meet the future end strengths, the ARNG will continue to rely on these sources. Total accession requirements of new lieutenants will be over 3,000 officers per year by FY 1994. In light of anticipated shortfalls in ROTC production through FY 1989 or 1990, State OCS will play a greater role in the ARNG Accessions Program with State OCS equaling or exceeding appointments for ROTC. By continuing to serve as the Reserve Forces Duty Management harness, the ALMT is expected to sustain its vital role in ARNG officer procurement.

(g) Readiness Assessment. ARNG personnel readiness is affected by available strength and MOS qualification. Ongoing recruiting and retention programs are dealing effectively with the available strength shortfall. MOS qualification (MOSQ) remains the primary readiness inhibitor. To address this problem, the ARNG is involved in an effort to improve MOSQ through command emphasis and increased management of available school seats to ensure best use of training resources. However, recent ARNG force modernization has had a significantly negative impact on MOSQ. As MOSs are changed to match new equipment, personnel first undergo new equipment training and become MOS-qualified to support the new modernized equipment. During the transition period from old to new requirements, personnel are not MOS-qualified according to new document requirements. Highly technical and professional skill areas (e.g. medical, chemical) requiring lengthy schooling are also a major problem. M-day soldiers frequently experience difficulty obtaining leave from their civilian jobs commensurate with school seat availability.

(h) Full-time Support Program.

[1] The goal of the Full-time support program is to provide the Army with operationally ready units prior to mobilization. In order to accomplish this, sufficient full time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, recruit and manage the force. There is not sufficient time between mobilization and deployment to correct significant deficiencies. The units must be ready before mobilization. Full time support for ARNG units consists primarily of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program and the military technician program. Active component soldiers and civil service personnel are also involved.

[2] The AGR program provides unit commanders with the Full-time personnel necessary to improve training, logistics and mobilization planning and readiness. In the event of mobilization, AGR soldiers mobilize and deploy with the unit to which they are assigned.

[3] The ARNG Technician program provides Full-time support to units and other activities. Although Technicians are civilian employees, they are required to be members of the National Guard and must be available to enter military active duty when their units are mobilized. The largest number of Technicians are concentrated in maintenance and logistics.

[4] National Guard Bureau Headquarters and Field Operating Activities (FOA) are staffed with civilian employees. Unlike ARNG Technicians, these employees do not mobilize.

ARNG Full-time Support

	<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
AGR	25,659	25,914	26,164	26,514
Dual Status Military Technicians	24,549	25,500	25,920	25,920
Non Dual Status ARNG Civilians	2,175	2,200	2,200	2,200
Active Army with ARNG	739	745	745	745
Army Civilians	394	406	406	406
* Congressional floor total	26,629			

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

(1) With a current strength of approximately 293,000 the IRR is the largest pool of pretrained individual manpower available during mobilization. It will provide filler personnel for both active component and reserve component units.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
292.9	295.1	328.1	429.3

(2) The Army plans on approximately 70 percent of the enlisted IRR and 90 percent of the officer IRR being available for use during mobilization.

(3) In FY 1988, the Army IRR Screening program was conducted at over 2,000 recruiting stations nationwide. Approximately 100,000 members of the IRR participated in the one day recall during their month to check personnel data, medical fitness, and some basic military skills knowledge in selected MOSs. A significant number of corrections were made to the personnel records and mobilization data base. Further, a number of leads were developed for recruiting. This screening process is planned to continue into FY 1989. The Army screening program has been funded in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

(4) The Army study of IRR skill retention and decay is scheduled for completion by mid FY 1989. IRR mobilization training is based upon mobilization requirements. The IRR will continue to be a vital mobilization manpower pool throughout the program years.

c. Inactive National Guard (ING).

The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who wish to retain their Guard affiliation. They will join and deploy with their units when called to active duty. The ING are not members of the Selected Reserve; therefore, they are not available for mobilization unless a national emergency or a war is declared. ING members muster for one training session each year and are qualified in a military skill. Actual and projected strengths for the ING are shown below:

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
(Actual) 9.0	10.3	10.5	10.5

2. Standby Reserve.

The Standby Reserve consists of reserve personnel who have a remaining military service obligation, or a desire for a voluntary commitment, but who, because of a temporary conflict such as being an elected official, cannot be readily available for immediate mobilization. The Standby Reserve is screened regularly to ensure all eligible members are transferred to the Ready Reserve. Actual and projected strengths of the Standby Reserve are shown below:

<u>Standby Reserve</u> (Strength in Thousands)			
<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
.425	.5	.5	.5

3. Retirees. Regular Army and Reserve retirees with 20 years or more of active duty, who are receiving retirement pay, can be recalled to active duty at any time in the interest of national defense. The Army's retiree recall program preassigns retirees to appropriate mobilization positions throughout the CONUS support base. Exercise "Certain Sage 88" was conducted at twenty installations in October-November 1987. The exercise recalled almost 500 volunteer retirees to active duty to test mobilization procedures at the installation level, test skill retention, and evaluate medical fitness of retirees. "CERTAIN SAGE 89" to be conducted February through April 1989, will involve 14 State Area Commands and three installations to test policy changes and family assistance planning. The number of preassignees is expected to remain relatively high because of program enhancements to be implemented in the next five years. These include improvement of preassignment procedures, expansion of retiree positions, and provisions for retiree program managers at the installation level. The total number of retirees is shown below:

Retirees (Strengths in Thousands)

Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees (AC/RC):

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Categories I and II	205.0	204.5	204.2	203.9
Categories III	215.9	221.4	225.8	229.6
Other Retiree Reserves				
Categories I and II	31.5	32.1	32.6	33.0
Categories III	119.7	120.2	120.6	120.7

4. RC Personnel on Active Duty

The FY 1988 (Actual) figures are for those individuals serving on active duty as of the last day of FY 1988 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days.

USAR Personnel on
Active Duty for Training and Special work in
Excess of 180 Days

	<u>FY 88</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	11	653
Flight Training	33	49
Professional Training at Military Institutions	16	1
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	0	82
Officer Acquisition Training	0	0
Active Duty Special Work	40	55
Total	100	840

ARNG Personnel on
Active Duty for Training in
Excess of 180 Days

	<u>FY 88</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	18	1937
Flight Training	120	163
Professional Training at Military Institutions	17	14
Professional Training at Civilian Institutions	2	160
Officer Acquisition Training		
Other Training	275	995
Total	432	3,269

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General.

a. Role of Civilians.

Army civilians provide a major contribution in support of the Army's mission. Army civilians, which comprise nearly 18 percent of the Army's work force, including the Reserves and National Guard, manage and operate most bases, depots and laboratories. They support the Army mission by performing a full range of logistics functions, including depot maintenance, supply and acquisition management, and transportation management. Civilians also provide essential support in training, medical care, research and development, engineering, and facilities management. Nearly 25 percent of the Army's appropriated fund civilian force are stationed overseas and provide a critical mobilization base needed for transition to wartime operations.

(1) Recruiting: The Army has experienced increasing difficulty in recruiting civilian employees with required skills in a number of areas. Noticeable shortages or unusual difficulty have occurred with nurses, occupational health physicians, pharmacists, physical therapists, optometrists, radiological technicians, etc. The difficulty is the result of shortages in general supply of these skills in the economy, and of the ability of private employers to offer significantly greater compensation, professional growth, and other benefits. The Army also faces stiff competition from the superior compensation and career growth opportunities available through the Veteran's Administration and the Public Health Service. It is expected that in some occupations such as nurses where there is a projected reduction in the introduction of new employees (fewer nursing school graduates) and an increasing demand, and such as pharmacists where there is a fairly stable entry rate of new employees but a surging demand for the skill, Army will become less competitive.

(2) Retention: While we have no Army-wide data to portray actual turnover, data from selected locations indicates that in shortage occupations, employees are resigning to accept more favorable positions in the private sector. Career growth and financial incentives are the main factors. Portability of retirement benefits under the recent Federal Employees Retirement Systems (FERS) has removed a retention hold included in the previous civil service retirement system. Without competitive compensation and career incentives, the Army will be less competitive in the future for critical health care skills. At the minimum Army should have available a financial package which competes with the provisions of Title 38, United States Code (38USC)(VA) so that federal employers compete on an even basis. Additional options, such as the ability to rehire military members in shortage category occupations without a reduction in retired military pay, or expand education and training programs, to include the payment of fees for certifications and licensers, would be beneficial of the workforce.

c. Civilian End Strength Ceilings

(1) Since FY 1985, annual authorization and appropriations legislation have prohibited the management of civilian employees on the basis of end strength ceilings. The FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act has continued the prohibition into FY 1989 and FY 1990. This allows the Army to match employment level to funded workloads without the requirement to release employees at the end of the fiscal year to meet an end strength ceiling. However, beginning in FY 1987, annual appropriations legislation has limited civilian workyears expended outside the 50 United States at the FY 1987 level. The Act also requires (a) submission of a plan, by month, of strength and workyears by Service, broken of by U.S. direct hire, foreign direct hire, and foreign indirect hire (b) Monthly report on the execution of civilian employment levels by end strength and workyears, comparing budgeted to actual employment of civilian employment levels and funding obligations by appropriation.

(2) Army strongly favors continuing the end strength ceiling prohibition, but without the overseas workyear limitation. Experience from FY 1986 to FY 1988 shows that commanders are able to manage civilian employment levels responsibly, without arbitrary limitations on the number of civilians employed. Some of the benefits of operating without ceilings include avoidance of administrative costs associated with hiring and releasing employees to meet ceiling levels; greater ability to respond to emergency or unplanned workload; more cost effective use of civilian appointment categories; and enhanced ability to recruit civilians in light of the difficult recruiting environment discussed previously.

2. Major Program Changes. The FY 1990 and FY 1991 civilian strength requests reflect, to a great extent, the impact of the reduction of 12,000 to the FY 1988 and FY 1989 programs reported in last year's Operation and Maintenance Amended Budget Submission. Army's FY 1989 strength estimate of 402,054 contained in the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget is an increase of 9,100 from the actual employment level experienced in FY 1988. This increase results from underexecution of the FY 1988 program mostly due to the imposition of a partial hiring freeze during the last five months of the fiscal year to reduce outlays. Without these constraints, FY 1988 civilian employment would have been close to the planned level of 400,000. Changes to the FY 1989-FY 1991 civilian manpower program include restoral of some of the reductions assessed last year through realignment of available funding; additional manpower for high priority missions to include the Army food service program, community and family support programs, environmental management, and force modernization; and transfer of the San Antonio Real Property Management Activity from the Air Force to the Army. Also included in this year's submission are civilians reprogrammed from Unified and Specified Command Headquarters functions to fill medical program shortfalls and program adjustments to reflect anticipated manpower savings from commercial activities reviews. The following table shows the civilian employment estimate by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

TABLE III-11
ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING & END STRENGTH
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in thousands)

CIVILIANS	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES			DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	MNG		RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	0.2	0.1		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.2	0.1		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	27.0	26.5		20.9	20.3		25.5	21.4	84.1	27.6	22.4	81.3	27.6	22.2	80.5
Land Forces	24.9	24.5		19.0	18.5		23.1	19.5	84.3	25.2	20.1	79.9	25.2	20.6	79.4
Division Forces	23.4	23.2		13.8	13.4		16.2	12.7	78.5	17.2	12.8	74.2	17.2	12.7	74.1
Theater Forces	1.5	1.3		5.3	5.1		6.9	6.8	97.9	8.0	7.4	92.3	8.0	7.3	90.8
Mobility Forces	2.1	2.0		1.9	1.8		2.4	2.0	82.5	2.4	2.3	95.8	2.4	2.2	92.3
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	6.5	6.9		5.0	5.0		6.3	5.2	82.4	6.3	5.4	85.4	6.3	5.4	85.3
Intelligence	1.7	1.6		2.5	2.5		3.1	2.6	84.1	3.1	2.8	89.4	3.1	2.8	89.6
Centrally Managed Comm	4.8	5.4		2.5	2.5		3.2	2.6	80.8	3.2	2.6	81.6	3.2	2.6	81.2
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	86.4	92.1		77.5	74.7		93.5	73.7	78.9	91.5	77.9	85.2	91.5	78.0	85.2
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	2.1	2.2		2.3	2.5		2.9	2.3	80.7	3.5	2.6	74.7	3.5	2.9	83.7
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	27.1	27.3		25.7	25.0		31.7	26.5	83.5	31.9	26.6	83.3	31.9	26.8	84.0
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	9.4	9.4		8.4	9.0		12.7	8.9	70.2	13.1	9.6	73.5	13.1	9.6	73.5
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
Unified Commands	0.1	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0	0.2	0.2	100.0
Federal Agency Support	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0
Spt to JCS	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0
OSD/Def Agcy/Acty	9.0	9.0		8.0	8.6		12.3	8.5	69.3	12.7	9.3	72.9	12.7	9.3	72.9
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	90.6	92.4		85.1	83.2		98.7	84.7	85.8	98.9	81.2	82.1	98.9	81.1	82.0
Supply Operations	30.1	30.7		29.4	27.8		39.6	28.2	71.1	39.9	29.6	74.1	39.9	29.4	73.6
Maintenance Operations	38.1	39.6		34.9	35.5		36.2	36.0	99.4	34.7	31.5	90.7	34.7	31.5	90.8
Logistics Support Opns	22.4	22.2		20.7	19.9		22.9	20.6	89.9	24.3	20.1	82.8	24.3	20.3	83.4

CIVILIANS	FY 85			FY 88			FY 89			FY 90			FY 91		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	MNG		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	13.9	14.1		13.7	12.6		13.4	12.5	93.3	14.0	12.6	89.7	14.0	12.5	89.2
Combat Commands	2.6	3.0		2.8	2.8		2.8	2.8	100.0	2.8	2.8	100.0	2.8	2.7	96.9
Support Commands	11.3	11.1		10.9	9.9		10.6	9.7	91.4	11.2	9.8	87.3	11.2	9.8	87.3
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	21.7	23.1		18.4	20.3		24.1	20.5	85.1	24.3	21.2	87.4	24.3	21.2	87.4
Research and Development	21.7	23.1		18.4	20.3		24.1	20.5	85.1	24.3	21.2	87.4	24.3	21.2	87.4
Geophysical Activities	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	23.4	23.9		23.1	20.7		28.9	23.6	81.5	28.7	23.3	81.1	28.7	23.2	80.7
Personnel Support	9.2	9.3		9.0	7.5		10.5	9.5	90.5	10.5	9.1	87.1	10.5	9.2	87.2
Individual Training	14.2	14.6		14.2	13.2		18.4	14.0	76.4	18.2	14.1	77.7	18.2	14.0	76.9
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	93.3	101.9		123.5	119.4		146.2	122.5	83.8	144.9	121.8	84.1	144.9	121.7	84.0
Support Installations	66.1	72.8		63.7	63.1		74.2	62.0	83.6	74.2	59.9	80.7	74.2	59.8	80.6
Centralized Support Act'y	27.2	29.1		59.8	56.3		72.0	60.5	84.0	70.7	62.0	87.6	70.7	61.9	87.5
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	401.4	420.0		403.7	392.9		484.1	402.1	83.0	484.9	404.9	83.5	484.9	404.8	83.5
(Military Technicians)				36.5	36.4			36.6			37.0			37.3	

NOTE: Detail may not add due to rounding.
 *Fewer than 50 spaces. **Includes Military Technicians

3. Civilian Fitness

The Army supports health promotion programs designed to promote fitness and to reduce factors associated with employee illness and absenteeism. These programs include medical screening, physical exercise, classes on weight control, nutrition, stress management, smoking cessation, and substance abuse control.

4. Position Management

a. The Army allows commanders maximum flexibility in managing the civilian work force to support readiness, force modernization, civilian substitution, and improved resource management initiatives. Commanders are expected to manage the civilian work force prudently through effective position management (PM), accurate job grading, and organizational efficiency reviews.

b. During FY 1988, Army published a new regulation (AR 690-300, Chapter 312, Position Management) which emphasized the supervisor's responsibilities for developing economical and effective position structures (PM). In support of that emphasis, a pamphlet for supervisors is being developed on "How To Design Positions". The pamphlet will, for example, aid supervisors in identifying specific problems which can be solved by redesigning jobs; provide a variety of specific design changes; show the relationship between job classification policies and position design; provide information on effectively implementing the changes, and provide worksheets that will aid the supervisor in the redesign process.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower.

The peak trained military manpower demand occurs late in the scenario (near M+150) when the expanded size and composition of the force has stabilized and the cumulative demand for casualty replacements is near its peak. The peak trained manpower shortfalls normally occur in the middle of the scenario (at about M+90) when shortages of combat arms and medical personnel peak. This occurs because early battle losses are high; sizable returns to duty of wounded personnel previously evacuated have not yet occurred; and newly trained personnel are not yet available in significant quantities from the mobilized training base (not until M+113).

Early military manpower demand can only be filled, therefore, from manpower assets already under military control (mobilized early in the scenario). Such resources include:

o Non-Unit Trained Individuals: Transients, holdces (primarily prisoners and patients), and students. These manpower assets (known as the THS Account) will be used to fill as much as possible the manpower shortfall caused by peacetime manning limitations versus full wartime manning requirements.

o Pretrained individual manpower: Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), Inactive National Guardsmen (ING), Standby Reservists, and retirees. We estimate these resources will be fully mobilized by M+50.

o Training Output: Accelerated output of active and reserve personnel already in the training base on M-Day.

Although increased manning of the Selected Reserve and the IRR has eliminated the aggregate shortfalls beyond M+20, this masks significant shortfalls that exist in a number of essential skills. Critical skill shortfalls are expected in the enlisted combat arms and medical areas through M+180. There will also be shortages of enlisted engineering, intelligence, chemical, petroleum, ammunition and some types of maintenance personnel as well as aviation, communications electronic equipment maintenance, intelligence, and vehicle maintenance warrant officers. Key commissioned officer shortfalls are expected in the infantry and medical specialties, with shortages also in aviation, chemical, legal, and chaplains.

It should be noted that the major factor determining shortfalls and overages, especially after M+40, is the estimate of casualty replacements required to maintain the fighting force in wartime. Army casualty estimates are derived from models of dynamic conventional combat simulations and historical attrition factors. This modeling effort provides planning estimates, but cannot be expected to predict actual conflict casualties. Therefore, in a future war, Army personnel shortfalls may be significantly different from the estimates. In addition, the demand is limited to requirements to fill and sustain the existing force structure. It does not include personnel requirements that would be needed if the force structure is expanded, as is likely for a war that extends beyond 180 days.

If our manpower demand does not change significantly, further increases in Active and Selected Reserve manning or additional pretrained manpower will be needed to reduce or eliminate the by-skill shortfalls at M+90. The success of our efforts beyond M+90 will depend largely on current Army efforts to increase our training base capabilities to meet our mobilization needs.

2. Civilian Manpower.

Before M-Day, the requirement for U.S. direct hire Full-time civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime authorized civilian work force (314,000). On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. A total of about 267,000 additional civilian requirements are created at that time. Concurrently, about 183,000 peacetime positions that are not required in wartime will be terminated (including virtually all the support positions for the USAR and ARNG). This causes a net peak demand of about 448,000 positions at M-Day.

Prior to M-Day, the primary component of the civilian manpower supply is the peacetime U.S. direct hire Full-time permanent work force of about 303,000. At M-Day, this number is reduced to about 233,000 by the loss of 70,000 civilian employees called up for military duty (ready reservists and retirees). The combination of new positions, terminated positions and losses to military duties causes an M-Day shortfall of about 215,000 civilians (448,000 required compared with 233,000 available).

The Army plans to offset this shortfall by converting about 33,000 civilian employees from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time status and reassigning all available personnel from terminated positions. After M-Day, the new hire requirement for 182,000 civilians will be drawn from other manpower sources, including civil funded manpower, new hires provided by the U.S. Employment Service offices and the Office of Personnel Management, and the rehiring of retired Federal employees. However, competition with private industry and other federal agencies will impact on these resources.

Significant skill shortages in transportation management, engineering, logistics management, procurement, and data processing make such critical occupations prime targets for recruitment of civilian employees.

E. Manpower Management Improvements.

The Army has implemented many programs to improve both personnel and manpower management as part of its concerted effort to become more efficient using available resources. Some of these programs are described below.

1. Organizational Efficiency Review Program (OERP)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requires the Service Secretaries to review functions under their purview with the primary goal of increasing productivity. The Department of the Army accomplishes this goal through the Organizational Efficiency Review Program (OERP). The objective is to assure that assigned missions of non-deployable activities are accomplished in the most efficient and cost effective manner. Efficiency reviews are conducted on both contractible and non-contractible functions.

For contractible functions, the results of the efficiency review are tested by using the procurement process to select competitively a contractor whose costs are compared to Government costs. Then, the most economical source (commercial firm or Government) is selected to perform the contractible functions in the future. This process results in increased efficiency and cost reduction regardless of whether the final decision is to contract for the work or to perform it with Government employees. In FY 1988, the Army completed studies on over 4,500 civilian and military spaces. Study results have been incorporated into our manpower estimates. The Army plans to study about 12,000 additional positions in FY 1989.

In the case of non-contractible functions, the Army began the first Army-wide Efficiency Review (ER) in FY 1986, using the installation Directorate of Resource Management (DRM) as the test bed. This study combined efficiency review techniques with the manpower requirements determination procedures of the Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3) discussed in paragraph II.E.9. The DRM pilot study has served as the model for subsequent joint ER/MS-3 studies of Army-wide functions. In FY 1988, the Army completed 55 efficiency review studies, and began FY 1989 with 294 on-going studies covering 74,000 civilian and military spaces.

Every commander, project manager, and resource manager must foster an environment that encourages innovative cost savings. That environment is characterized by positive leadership, openness, and a willingness to listen. Innovators champion new ideas, encourage horizontal and vertical communications, allow subordinates the "freedom to fail," and encourage creative problem solving. The Army VE program provides a framework by which to accomplish the above.

2. The Army's Integrated Productivity Efforts.

The Army has quite successfully applied the tools of productivity and efficiency (e.g., Productivity Capital Investment Programs, Value Engineering, Organizational Efficiency Reviews, Quality Circles, Productivity Gain Sharing), fostering an environment where innovative management on the part of individuals, organizations, and contractors can flourish. Reinforced by Executive Order 12637, 27 April 1988, which directs that federal agencies improve productivity by an average three percent annually, Army will promote even broader application of the existing tools to ensure that maximum productivity is achieved at all organizational levels. In order to achieve the President's goal, it is necessary, first, to identify those areas that are susceptible to improvement and broad input/output measurement. Fourteen areas have been selected for measurement since the program began. They are: depot supply operations, military pay, recruiting for the Regular Army, Army Reserve and National Guard, Depot Maintenance, Army Family Housing, Real Property Maintenance, Medical Care, Military Personnel Management, Commissary Operations, Army-wide communications, retired pay, commercial accounts, disbursing and travel, non-tactical vehicles, and injury/illness compensation. All other functions are to be covered by 1992. Dedicated leadership, an aware and motivated workforce, and use of already-proven tools and techniques will help achieve the President's goal while meeting the ongoing challenge to produce a better Army.

3. LOGISTICS FORCE STRUCTURE ENHANCEMENTS

During FY 1990, the Army will continue actions to reduce major U.S. logistical structure shortfalls. Over the program years, labor-intensive units will be modernized to be equipment-intensive, provide better utilization of available manpower, and enhance readiness/sustainability. Shortfall reductions will also be achieved by increased reliance on external support (e.g., Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program) and through improved productivity of logistics units. WHNS has resulted in 120,527 U.S. logistics space offsets worldwide. These offsets fill U.S. Army combat support and

combat service support critical shortfalls. For example, the U.S. - German WHNS military agreement results in 35,000 spaces saved and equates to 206 logistics units. In addition, productivity in supply units will be improved through increased automation and the Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) Variant, the High Mobility Materials Handling Equipment. In petroleum units, the Army will use commercially available 20,000 gallon collapsible storage tanks instead of 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks. Transportation units will use the 7,500 gallon petroleum tanker and the 65 ton crane. Ammunition units will use the 6,000 pounds Variable Reach Rough Terrain Forklift. In FY 1990, 12,000 of the programmed 30,000 logistic structure spaces will be deleted from the force structure while the capability increases.

4. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3).

The Manpower Staffing Standards System is a program designed to provide credible manpower requirements for the Army's TDA organizations through the application of workload-based staffing standards. Approximately 450,000 of the Army's 620,000 peacetime TDA requirements are workload-driven and, as such, will be determined through the application of staffing standards developed by performing detailed work measurement studies or by using statistical analyses of historical data. By end FY 1988 standards were approved or applied for 130,195 spaces, studies were in progress on an additional 179,807 spaces, and 142,225 spaces were formally scheduled for study.

The Manpower Staffing Standards System is based upon the principle that manpower requirements for work centers performing similar functions should be applied in a uniform manner. The AFD was developed as a management tool to identify locations and organizations where a particular work center exists across the Army. By using AFD, management has the capability to compare organizations and functions by retrieving manpower, financial and other information from various management information systems. The AFD provides definitions for all Army functions and work centers. Standard Work Center Codes associated with the AFD have been applied to Army manning documents to provide a link between Army functional manpower requirements determination and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES).

5. Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) Program.

MARC is the Army's process for determining wartime manpower requirements for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) functions in all TOE/MTOE units. Approximately 500,000 of the Army's TOE manpower requirements in the Active Army and Reserve Components are determined by this process. MARC is designed to reflect more accurately the minimum essential CS/CSS requirements for sustained operations. Accuracy of the criteria developed for maintenance functions is assured by firmly anchoring the determination process to sample data collection and other equipment and maintenance data reporting programs presently ongoing within the Army. Many of the 500,000 requirements are being determined through a systematic method which uses computer modeling in conjunction with scenario-oriented data to enhance the process. To complete the process, another element of information must be determined.

This information deals with the amount of time that a soldier is not available (non-productive time) to perform duties directly related to his/her military occupational specialty (MOS). These elements of information were determined independently by a private contractor (TOE non-availability factors study, August 1986) and were made available for Army use in the April 1987 documentation process. Work on functional studies already underway continues. Progress on the computer modeling of MARC studies has been slow. Aviation maintenance was approved in FY 1988. Track/Automotive is scheduled for completion in FY 1989. Emphasis will be placed on interim procedures to update manpower requirements in these specific functional areas during FY 1989 until the modeling process can be completed.

III. PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC): Since March 1988, the Army's manpower accounting, force structure, and Planning/Programming/Budgeting systems have been subjected to a massive review/restructure under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). This effort identified many cases of DPPC misclassifications of existing Army tactical units, as well as difference in information for the units contained in the three major Army manpower information systems. This report contains DPPC structure adjustments necessary to correct the classification of existing tactical units, with battlefield missions, as well as the adjustments to strength levels for Active Army units reflecting the approved budget position in all management systems. Additional work in this area remains to be done. The displays that follow identify existing classification errors that will be corrected at the earliest opportunity.

In addition, the report reflects the reductions in civilian manning levels that have resulted from the fiscal reductions to the operating accounts that began with the amendment to the FY 1989 budget and have been continued through this budget period. These reductions have affected all civilian management accounts to some degree, but are particularly visible in those non-tactical activities that have the higher percentage of civilian employment: installation operations and central logistics support. OSD directed changes concerning the Commercial Activities Program also are reflected in the reduction of civilian personnel in FY 1990 and FY 1991; the FY 1990/1991 budget reflects the reduction of anticipated savings from on-going studies from the manpower program.

A. Strategic Forces.

1. Defense Strategic Forces.
2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Reserve Component				
USAR	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this subcategory is for support of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), including airborne command posts and an alternate National Military Command Center.

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces.

a. Division Forces.

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	437.5	427.9	429.2	435.2
Reserve Component				
USAR	199.2	211.7	218.0	220.4
ARNG	403.2	405.1	405.6	405.8
<u>Civilian</u>	13.4	12.7	12.8	12.7

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to, or in support of, the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

The decrease (-9,614) in active military manpower in FY 1989 results from realignment of Pershing missile manpower reduced as a result of INF Treaty implementation (-4,664), reductions in support units in Europe and the US as part of Army's initiative to correct DPPC misclassifications (-10,178), partially offset by undermanning (+1,808) in FY 1988 and realignment of existing tactical units including the 4th Transportation Command in Europe from Central Logistics category (+3,420).

The increase (+1,323) in active military manpower in FY 1990 corrects DPPC misclassification in troop units in Europe (+476), the Pacific (+345), and the US (+418), plus additional manpower realigned from elements supporting joint and defense activities as part of the DoD Inspector General review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters (+84).

The increase (+5,967) in active military manpower in FY 1991 results from enlisted increases to reduce manning shortfalls in combat support and combat service support activities (+3,000), increases to field artillery units to back fill missile units removed as a result of INF implementation (+1,450), and increase to correct DPPC misclassifications (+1,517).

The increase (+9,845) in USAR manpower for FY 1989 reflects programmed increases in manning of the USAR force structure and increased authorizations in new aviation, medical, combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI), and other combat support/combat service support units.

The increase (+6,263) in USAR manpower for FY 1990 reflects continued activation of aviation, CEWI, engineer, rear area operations centers, and other combat support/combat service support units.

The increase (+2,377) in USAR manpower for FY 1991 reflects activation of military police, transportation, medical, and chemical units plus conversions and minor strength changes to existing units.

The decrease (-726) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 reflects undermanning in divisional forces (+320), tactical forces-Pacific (+917), intelligence tactical support (+101), Army reserve division support (-754), tactical logistical support-Europe (-1230), Unified and Specified Command reduction (-7), joint tactical fusion program (-76), tactical support-FORSCOM (-156), research and development activities (+106), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+53). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1983 to the endyear FY 1988.

b. Theater Forces.

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	37.7	59.8	62.2	60.3
Reserve Component				
USAR	19.3	13.2	13.9	14.9
ARNG	19.5	20.6	20.6	20.6
<u>Civilian</u>	5.1	6.8	7.4	7.3

Manpower in this subcategory provides theater-wide tactical support to include maintenance to tactical equipment, air defense forces, tactical

support to other services, Berlin defense forces, intelligence support, electronic warfare technology and development, and special operation forces.

The increase (+22,101) in active military manpower in FY 1989 results from realignment of existing tactical units into Theater Forces (+10,057) primarily from Support Installations, Centralized Support and Centralized Communications, realignment of manpower supporting INF Treaty implementation from Division Forces to fill manning shortfalls (+3,274), increases in US based units to correct a DPPC misclassification (+5,834), special operations forces (+512), support elements in the pacific (+252), plus undermanning (+2,172).

The increase (+2,443) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of tactical units in Korea (+1,000), US based special operations forces (+389), support units in Europe (+571) and Korea (+146), authorized classified programs (+245), and light infantry divisions (+92).

The decrease (-1,970) in active military manpower in FY 1991 results from completion of INF Treaty implementation (-3,274), partially offset by increases for support units in Europe (+622), support units in Korea (+620), and manpower realigned from support to Joint Activities as directed by the DoD IG review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters (+62).

The decrease (-6,100) for USAR manpower in FY 1989 reflects changes in the DPPC reporting and is offset by increases in other DPPC categories.

The increase (+691) for USAR manpower in FY 1990 reflects the activities of additional military intelligence units plus an engineer combat support equipment company.

The increase (+1,018) for USAR manpower in FY 1991 reflects the planned activation of a chemical company, three military intelligence companies, and other force structure changes.

The increase (+1,677) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects undermanning (+180), special forces operations (+188), tactical equipment maintenance-FORSCOM (+381), tactical equipment maintenance-Europe (+1355), tactical equipment maintenance-Pacific (+258), tactical equipment maintenance-Other (-289), electronic warfare technology/development (-343), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-53). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The increase (+631) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects tactical equipment maintenance support (+689), special operation forces (+102), special mission forces (Army Reserve) (-75), electronic warfare technology (-47), and other miscellaneous manning adjustments (-38).

The decrease (-124) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects the reduction to Unified and Specified Commands (-98), tactical equipment maintenance support (-24), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-2).

2. Mobility Forces.

Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.2	.3	.4	.3
Reserve Component				
USAR	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.2

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The decrease (-88) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is in transportation units and strategic deployment activities.

The increase (+320) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects CONUS port terminal operation (industrial fund) (+307), traffic management (+36), and port terminal operation (Army Reserve) (-23).

The decrease (-85) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects a reduction to CONUS port terminal operations (industrial fund) (-81) and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-4).

C. Communications/Intelligence.

1. Intelligence.

Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.2	9.9	10.0	10.0
Reserve Component				
USAR	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	2.5	2.5	2.8	2.8

Manpower in this category supports both the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Missile Intelligence Agency, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, as well as service support to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the National Security Agency.

The increase (+707) in active military manpower in FY 1989 is in authorized intelligence programs (+99) plus undermanning in FY 1988 (+608).

The increase (+74) in active military manpower for FY 1990 is in classified intelligence and cryptologic activities.

The increase (+165) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 supports increases in classified intelligence programs.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	10.9	8.8	7.9	7.9
<u>Civilian</u>	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6

Manpower in this category supports nontactical defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control system to include strategic Army communications, long-haul communication, communication security, inter-Service/Agency automated message processing, SATCOM ground environment, and the National Science Center for Communications and Electronics. This category excludes support to tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in support activities).

The decrease (-2,072) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of signal unit to Theater Forces (-2,873), partially offset by increases to strategic programs (+558) and undermanning (+243).

The decrease (-907) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from signal unit realignment to Theater Forces.

D. Combat Installations.

Combat Installations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	19.4	17.2	16.4	16.4
<u>Civilian</u>	74.7	73.7	77.9	78.0

Manpower in this category supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Forces Command, US Western Command and US Army South.

The decrease (-2,175) in active military manpower for FY 1989 results overmanning in FY 1988. Overmanning is caused in part by additional manpower required to support the 1988 Olympics.

The decrease (-776) in active military manpower for FY 1990 results from realignments of military manpower from installation support activities in Europe (-661) and the US (-115).

The decrease (-975) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 is due to undermanning (+2,748), real property maintenance activity-Europe (+256), real property maintenance activity-Pacific (-731), real property maintenance activity-FORSCOM (+859), base operations support-Pacific (-479), base operations support-FORSCOM (-3,543), base operations-Panama (-133), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+48). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The increase (+4,207) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 is due to Army food service program (-101), community support (+510), installation level maintenance (+522), laundry and dry cleaning (+129), personnel support (+185), plans/operations/training support (+635), supply operations (+163), transportation services (+141), installation support activities-other (+582), special activities (-40), air traffic control (-5), visual information activities-tactical (-83), communication support (-12), officer/warrant officer substitution (+230), TDA linkage/MTOE support (+729), and real property maintenance activities (+622). The above distribution includes directed reductions in anticipation Commercial Activity review savings in FORSCOM (-950).

E. Force Support Training.

Force Support Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	5.9	5.2	5.6	5.7
<u>Civilian</u>	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.9

Manpower in the category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Battle Command Training Program, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany and JCS directed/coordinated exercises.

The decrease (-684) in active military manpower during FY 1989 results from overmanning (-1,529) partially offset by an increase (+845) in training programs at the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and the Battle Command Training Program. Overmanning

in FY 1988 results primarily from early activation of the Joint Readiness Training Center, for which resources have been included in the FY 1990 program.

The increase (+357) in active military manpower in FY 1990 is for the Joint Readiness Training Center (+209) and other joint training support (+148).

The increase (+182) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is for joint tactical training.

The increase (+276) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects training support to units (+301), force related training-Europe (-317), force related training-Pacific (-13), force related training-South (-3), and special activities-FORSCOM (+308).

The increase (+315) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 represents training support to units (-61), force related training-Pacific (-8), and special activities-FORSCOM (+384).

F. Medical Support.

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	35.4	33.6	34.1	34.2
Reserve Component				
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4
USAR	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9
<u>Civilian</u>	25.0	26.5	26.6	26.8

Manpower in this category supports health care activities, to include health care research and development, care in regional defense facilities, CHAMPUS support, dental care activities, and station hospitals/medical clinics.

The decrease (-1,828) in active military manpower in FY 1989 results from overmanning in FY 1988.

The increase (+546) in active military manpower for FY 1990 corrects DPPC misclassifications in health care activities in Europe (+511) and Korea (+35).

The increase (+48) in active military manpower in FY 1991 is in family practice clinics.

The increase (+1,504) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects undermanning (+716), other health activities (+172), care in regional defense facilities (-34), dental activities (-255), station hospital/medical clinics (+926), medical support units (Army Reserve) (+9), and chemical warfare research and development (-30). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The increase (+72) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects a service reprogramming from Dental activities (-162), other health activities (-222), care in regional defense facilities (-20), OB/GYN services (+164), family practice clinics (-54), station hospitals/medical clinics (+375), and medical support units (Army Reserve) (-9).

The increase (+248) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 (reflects programmed increases to support family practice clinics (+235), other health activities (+8), and medical support units (Army Reserve) (+5).

G. Joint Activities.

1. International Activities.

International Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this category is assigned to management headquarters activities in international military organizations.

2. Unified Commands.

Unified Commands Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	.2	.2	.2	.2

Manpower in this category is assigned to management headquarters in unified commands.

3. Federal Agency Support.

Federal Agency Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.1	.2	.2	.2
Reserve Component				
USAR	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

Civilian

Manpower in this category is assigned to non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis, unless they support a DoD mission.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.4	.3	.3	.3

Manpower in this category represents service support to the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities.

OSD/Defense Agencies & Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	8.0	7.0	7.1	7.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.6	8.5	9.3	9.3

Manpower in this category represents service support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, foreign counterintelligence activities, security and investigative activities, foreign military sales, miscellaneous support to other nations, military assistance program and various other Defense support agencies such as Defense Nuclear Agency and Defense Logistics Agency.

The decrease (-962) in active military manpower in FY 1989 results from overmanning in FY 1988 (-1,014) partially offset by an increase (+52) for contract litigation activities and classified programs.

The increase (+73) in active military manpower for FY 1990 is in defense agencies (+50) and defense security assistance programs (+23).

The increase (+727) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects foreign military sales support (+663), growth in security and investigative activities (+35), military assistance program (+2), service wide support (-21), Unified and Specified Command reduction (-2), and foreign military sales (construction) (+50).

H. Central Logistics.

1. Supply Operations

Supply Operations Manpower (End strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.0	.9	.9	.9
<u>Civilian</u>	27.8	28.2	29.6	29.4

Manpower in this category serve in the operation of supply depots for both industrially funded and direct funded activities, inventory control point operations and procurement operations worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Material command and US Army Europe.

The increase (+1,420) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects supply depot operations (+30), inventory control points (+196), procurement operations (+1,116), and supply depots (industrial fund) (+78).

The decrease (-200) in civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects inventory control points (-36), procurement operations (-78), and supply depots (industrial fund) (-86).

2. Maintenance Operations

Maintenance Operations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	35.5	36.0	31.5	31.5

Manpower in this category serves in support of industrial and non-industrial funded depot maintenance facilities, munitions facilities, missile facilities, and other maintenance support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the US Army Material command and US Army Europe.

The decrease (-161) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of missile maintenance activities to Logistics Support.

The increase (+508) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 reflects over-manning (-554), munitions facilities (industrial fund) (+132), depot maintenance (industrial fund) (-627), missile facilities (industrial fund) (+1,132), depot maintenance (direct fund) (+62), and maintenance support activities (+363).

The decrease (-4,518) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects depot maintenance (industrial fund) (+49), munition facilities (industrial fund) (-85), missile facilities (industrial fund) (-7,089), maintenance support activities (+1,486), and depot maintenance (direct funded) (+1,121).

3. Logistics Support Operations

Logistics Support Operations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.4	1.2	1.3	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	19.9	20.6	20.1	20.3

Manpower in this category provide worldwide logistics support for the following activities: construction (planning and design), overseas port units, transportation related activities, RDTE for nondevelopmental items, administration, industrial preparedness, and general logistics support. The largest strength concentration is in the US Army Corps of Engineers, US Army Material command, and US Army Europe.

The decrease (-3,128) in active military manpower in FY 1989 results from realignment of the 4th Transportation Command to Division Forces.

The increase (+111) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of missile maintenance activities from Maintenance Operations (+161), offset by a decrease in transportation support (-50).

The increase (+699) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 reflects under-manning (+873), maintenance activities (Army Reserve) (+400), logistics administrative support (+138), industrial (-48), logistics support activities (-544), overseas port operations (-4), RDTE support for

nondevelopmental items (+11), and construction (planning and design) (-127). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The decrease (-433) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects industrial preparedness (+12), transportation management and overseas port operation (-338), logistics administrative support (+242), construction (planning and design) (-536), logistics support activities (+656), and maintenance activities (Army Reserve) (-369).

The increase (+135) in civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects industrial preparedness (-1), logistics administrative support (-8), logistics support activities (+14), construction (planning and design) (+77), and maintenance activities (Army Reserve) (+53).

I. Service Management Headquarters.

1. Combat Commands Management Headquarters

Combat Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7

Manpower in this category is assigned to service support in combat commands.

The decrease (-105) in active military manpower for FY 1991 results from realignment of military manpower from Army management headquarters activities.

2. Support Commands Management Headquarters

Support Commands Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.6	4.2	4.2	2
Reserve Component				
USAR	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	9.9	9.7	9.8	9.8

Manpower in this category is assigned to service support in support commands to include Department of the Army (Office of the Secretary and Office of the Chief of Staff).

J. Research and Development.

Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.7	4.5	5.1	5.8
<u>Civilian</u>	20.3	20.5	21.2	21.2

Manpower in this category performs in-house efforts and directs contractor efforts for basic and applied research; exploratory, advanced, and engineering development; and test and evaluation for the Army's weapon systems and other equipment items. In addition, it provides administrative and logistical support for other RDTE installations and activities.

The increase (+555) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from a DPPC misclassification that will be corrected at the earliest opportunity (+455) and test and evaluation activities (+100).

The increase (+746) in active military manpower in FY 1991 a DPPC misclassification error that will be corrected at the earliest opportunity.

The increase (+736) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects materials technology (-11), nuclear weapons effects (-8), aviation technology (+3), missile technology (+1,170), joint services small arms program (-89), test and evaluation support (-470), program wide activities (+104), chemical and smoke munitions (-22), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-11).

K. Training and Personnel.

1. Personnel Support.

Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	13.5	12.7	12.9	12.9
<u>Civilian</u>	7.5	9.5	9.1	9.2

Manpower in this category is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, Army personnel processing activities, off

duty education programs, other recruiting and examining activities, civilian training and education and development, and education and training system development.

The decrease (-793) in active military manpower in FY 1989 results from overmanning in FY 1988.

The increase (+219) in active military manpower in FY 1990 is for Army recruiting activities.

The increase (+2,002) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 represents undermanning (+1,459), civilian education and training (+323), off duty voluntary education (+155), manpower/personnel/training technology (+80), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-15). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The decrease (-365) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects medical recruiting and examining (-162), civilian education and training (+21), transition management (-4), examining activities (-39), off duty voluntary education (-4), American forces information service (+6), recruiting activities (Army Reserve) (+68), recruiting activities (ARNG) (+47), human factors engineering (-1), and special activities-logistics support (-297).

2. Individual Training.

Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	43.3	41.7	42.0	42.0
Reserve Component				
ARNG	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.4
USAR	60.2	59.1	59.0	59.0
<u>Civilian</u>	13.2	14.0	14.1	14.0

Manpower in this category supports the conduct of individual training to include recruit training units, service academies, officer candidate/training schools, Senior ROTC, general skill training, general intelligence skill training, flight training, professional military education, health care education and training, and training development. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals Account.

The decrease (-1,568) in active military manpower for FY 1989 is in professional development training, as a result of consolidation of Headquarters elements of the Engineer School (-308), reduction in training center operations due to reduced training loads due to military end strength reductions in the FY 1989 Amended Budget Submission (-797),

overmanning in FY 1988 (-938), partially offset by realignment of Air Traffic Control training to reflect correct DPPC classification (+475). Overmanning results from training course scheduling.

The increase (+292) in active military manpower in FY 1990 is in general skills training, primarily at the Noncommissioned Officers Academy where doctrinal changes required additional instructors and support personnel.

The decrease (-300) in USAR manpower in FY 1989 and (-100) FY 1990 reflects minor strength changes due to reorganizations within the training structure.

The increase (+818) in civilian manpower in FY 1989 represents undermanning (+920), special operation forces training (+95), general skill training (-362), professional military education (+61), support of training establishments (+111), training developments (-376), aviation flight training (+394), other flight training (-40), medical education and training (-14), recruit training (Army Reserve) (+20), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+9). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The increase (+97) in civilian manpower in FY 1990 reflects flight training (+133), officer acquisition (+26), one station training (-315), professional education (+20), recruit training, (+7), senior ROTC (+28), specialized training (+626), training support (-443), medical education and training (-54), recruit training (Army Reserve) (+27), professional/skill training (Army Reserve) (+13), non-system training devices (+21), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+8).

The decrease (-148) in civilian manpower in FY 1991 reflects flight training (-3), professional education (+24), recruit training (-5), senior ROTC (-1), specialized training (-135), training support (-14), one station training (-18), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+4).

L. Support Activities

1. Support Installations.

Support Installations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	18.8	15.0	13.5	13.5
Reserve Component				
ARNG	23.6	23.7	23.8	23.8
USAR	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.6
<u>Civilian</u>	63.1	62.0	59.9	59.8

Manpower in this category provides support for base operations, real property maintenance activity, base communications, visual information activities, commissary retail sales, troop issue subsistence, Defense Environment Restoration Program, and family housing operations for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Command, US Army Information Systems Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, and US Army Health Services Command.

The decrease (-3,734) in active military manpower for FY 1989 results from implementation of an Army review to determine minimum essential military levels in base operations activities (-1,225), and overmanning in FY 1988 due to increased seasonal workload in the military District of Washington (-2,509).

The decrease (-1,529) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of installation personnel in Military District of Washington activities to Centralized Support Activities.

The increase (+280) in USAR manpower for FY 1989 reflects activation of a US garrison unit and minor increases in authorized manning of existing force structure.

The decrease (-1,033) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 reflects undermanning (+598), base communications (-326), visual information activities (+256), family housing operations (-30), commissaries (-60), troop issue subsistence (+200), BASOPS-logistics (+671), BASOPS-training (-925), BASOPS-administration (MDW) (-932), BASOPS-RDTE (-323), BASOPS-industrial fund (-168), BASOPS-other activities (+96), RPMA-industrial fund (-169), RPMA-RDTE (-105), RPMA-other activities (+19), BASOPS-Army Reserve (+79), defense environmental restoration program (+29), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+57). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The decrease (-2,157) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects troop issue subsistence (-274), commissaries (-29), military construction support (+48), BASOPS-medical (-41), BASOPS-administrative (-26), BASOPS-communications (-90), BASOPS-LOGISTICS (+429), BASOPS-training (-640), BASOPS-intelligence (-80), BASOPS-RDTE (-41), BASOPS-Army Reserve (-160), BASOPS-industrial fund (-469), plans/operations/training operations (-47), transportation services (-165), supply operations (-221), personnel support (-151), community services (+118), installation level maintenance (-79), Army food service program (-45), air traffic control (+21), RPMA-logistics (+88), RPMA-medical (+3), RPMA-training (-197), RPMA-service academies (-72), RPMA-intelligence (-6), RPMA-Army Reserve (+35), RPMA-RDTE (-2), RPMA-industrial fund (-145), visual information activities (-5), family housing (+15), base communications (+37), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (+34). The following reductions are included above and were imposed in anticipation of Commercial Activity savings: Army Materiel Command (-278), Health Services Command (-87), Training and Doctrine Command (-1,220), and information Systems Command (-51).

2. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>FY90</u>	<u>FY91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	15.9	16.2	17.7	17.6
Reserve Component				
ARNG	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
USAR	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.3
<u>Civilian</u>	56.3	60.5	62.0	61.9

Manpower in this category supports combat development activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigation activities, information management-automation, and base operations/real property maintenance support for the US Army Military District of Washington.

The increase (+1,530) in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from realignment of military manpower with transfer of Military District of Washington from the support installations category to Centralized Support Activities (+1,609), partially offset by a decrease (-79) resulting from the DoD Inspector General review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters.

The decrease (-81) in active military manpower for FY 1991 also results from the above Inspector General review.

The increase (+163) in USAR manpower in FY 1989 reflects activation of a signal unit and miscellaneous strength changes in various Army Reserve Commands.

The increase (+83) in USAR manpower for FY 1990 reflects minor organizational changes in a number of USAR units.

The increase (+4,111) in civilian manpower for FY 1989 represents undermanning (+3,453), administrative support (-167), BASOPS-MDW (+1,430), RPMA-MDW (+33), combat developments (-48), military technicians-ARNG (+24), reserve readiness support (-808), information management (P2) (+22), information management (P3) (+204), information management (P7) (+14), information management (P8) (+51), information management (P9) (-88), miscellaneous manning adjustments (-9). Undermanning is attributed to FY 1988 funding reductions and the implementation of a DoD-wide hiring freeze from May 1988 to the endyear FY 1988.

The increase (+1510) in civilian manpower for FY 1990 reflects criminal investigation (+3), public affairs (-4), personnel administration (+8), service wide support (-21), base information management (+110), combat development activities (+567), administrative support-Europe (+320), administrative support-Pacific (+18), administrative

support-combat commands (+6), BASOPS-MDW (+187), information management (P2) (-210), information management (P3) (+87), information management (P5) (+14), information management (P7) (+267), information management (P8) (-16), information management (P9) (-102), reserve readiness support-NGB (+290), reserve readiness support (Army Reserve) (-23), personnel administration (Army Reserve) (+17), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-8).

The decrease (-107) in civilian manpower for FY 1991 reflects criminal investigation (-2), public affairs (+1), service wide support (-1), base information management (-9), and combat development activities (-41), administrative support-combat commands (-19), information management (P3) (-11), information management (P7) (-4), and miscellaneous manning adjustments (-21).

M. Undistributed Manning.

Undistributed Manning
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active (End Year)	5.4	4.3	3.9	2.9
(Many years)	(4.1)	(4.4)	(0.7)	(1.5)
Reserve Component				
ARNG	0	0	0	0
USAR	0	0	0	0

Undistributing manning is the number of spaces in the force structure (units) that are not filled (undermanning) or are over filled (overmanning), because of the seasonal nature of gains and losses, fluctuations in the force structure, and changes in the Individuals subaccounts. End year deviations reflect a snapshot situation as of 30 September and are usually not representative of the average deviation throughout the year.

N. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Reserve Component				
USAR	11.9	14.7	14.8	14.7

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization. Increases are the result of projected growth in the program.

0. Individuals.

The Individuals subaccounts include manpower in transient, holdee (patient, prisoner, separatee), trainee, student, and US Military Academy cadet status. All of these subaccounts are affected by seasonal or other factors. As a consequence, manpower numbers should be used to accurately gauge the average size of these subaccounts. End year numbers are not ordinarily useful in this regard and are seldom a basis for meaningful comparisons.

(1) Transients.

Transient Manpower (Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military				
Active (End year)	16.1	17.6	17.6	17.5
(Manyyears)	(18.0)	(18.7)	(19.1)	(18.5)

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves. The changes in transient strengths are a result of changes in volume timing, and duration of PCS moves. Moves are seasonally influenced and manpower figures are more reflective of average transient strength than are end year numbers which are often a typical.

(2) Holdees, (Patients, Prisoners, PCF's, and Pending Separations).

Holdee Manpower (Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military				
Active (End year)	5.5	4.9	4.9	4.9
(Manyyears)	(4.8)	(5.0)	(4.8)	(4.8)

Holdee numbers generally remain fairly stable over time. Many year numbers reflect average holdee strength. End year values have no particular significance.

(3) Trainees, Students and Cadets.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active (TOTAL) (End year)	72.9	72.1	68.9	65.4
(Manyyears)	(64.9)	(69.0)	(72.6)	(67.0)
Trainees/Students (EY)	68.4	67.7	64.4	60.9
(Manyyears)	(60.6)	(64.8)	(68.4)	(62.7)
Cadets	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.6
	(4.3)	(4.2)	(4.2)	(4.3)
<u>Reserve Component</u>				
Trainees/Students (Pay categories F, P, Q, T and X)				
ARNG	34.0	38.1	38.1	38.1
USAR	34.8	27.0	22.3	22.9

The active component trainee data largely mirror the flow of non-prior service accessions. Manyear values are much more meaningful than end year positions, particularly in view of the seasonal nature of accessions which directly impact on the numbers of trainees and officer accession students.

The Reserve Component Individuals Account consists of Troop Program Unit junior enlisted personnel who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are not deployable. The USAR decreases in FY 1988 and FY 1989 correspond to programmed increases in the number of soldiers who are trained and serving in units.

CHAPTER IV

NAVY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION:

A. General

This chapter describes the Navy's manpower program for FY 1990 and FY 1991 in terms of its active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower components. It also depicts manpower trends, initiatives, and improvements, reflects changes implemented by the President's Budget submission for FY 1990/1991, and describes the changes from FY 1988 to FY 1991. In addition, it discusses the programs and initiatives that provide the Naval Reserve with new missions and greater integration with the active forces, in keeping with Congressional guidance on Active/Reserve Mix. The Navy manpower program is based on the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the scope of national political and military strategy.

Achievement of a 600 ship Navy continues to be our ultimate goal. In FY 1989, programmed ship growth will be three for a total of 568. In FY 1990, Navy will have a total of 574 ships and in FY 1991 the count will drop to 571.

In FY 1989, the Navy is authorized an active end strength of 593,200, (72,610 officers, 520,590 enlisted). From FY 1989 to FY 1990, there will be a modest increase of 4400 (423 officers, 3977 enlisted) to 597,600. End strength will grow to 598,200 in FY 1991 with a reduction of four officers and growth of 604 enlisted.

Believing that Navy had budgeted insufficient manpower to accomplish its health care mission requirements, Congress, in the FY 1989 Authorization Act, is requiring that a portion of the Navy's officer end strength in fiscal years 1989, 1990, and 1991 be designated specifically for medical personnel. Congressionally mandated end strength targets for Medical Department Officers are 11,940 by 30 September 1989, 12,240 by 30 September 1990, and 12,510 by 30 September 1991. The Authorization Act also requires that the DMRR delineate medical requirements and the end strength necessary to meet those requirements.

Recruiting and retention of high caliber officer and enlisted personnel are top Navy priorities. Declining numbers of potential recruits and the lowest projected civilian unemployment rate in the history of the all-volunteer force will make our retention efforts, which are inextricably tied to pay, benefits, and quality of life programs, the most important single aspect of manning our Navy. The Navy continues to face critical problems retaining nuclear trained surface and submarine officers and aviation officers. There is a current shortage of over 500 midgrade nuclear trained officers and over 1500 midgrade pilots. The Navy also has significant shortfalls in many medical specialties, making it difficult to provide quality medical care to our Navy personnel. At the end of FY 1988, the Navy was short nearly 300 physicians, dentists, nurses, and physicians' assistants. We are also experiencing shortages in certain

critical technical specialties among our enlisted forces. Fiscal year 1988 overall reenlistment rates were the lowest they have been in five years. In each of the above cases, the problem could be measurably reduced with judiciously applied bonuses funded by Congress. To recruit and retain quality officers and enlisted personnel, we must offer an attractive package of programs including fair and prudent pay raises, efficient and appropriate bonus payments to retain personnel with critical skills, reasonable levels of VHA, adequate medical benefits, and an acceptable quality of life.

To maintain the extremely high quality force that we currently have, the military must be able to offer fair compensation that is competitive with civilian employment wages. Continuation of pay caps will seriously damage our ability to attract and retain quality manpower. Pay caps from FY 1983-1988 resulted in a disparity between military pay and private sector wage growth of eleven percent, as measured by the Employment Cost Index. In FY 1989, a 4.3 percent pay raise for military members became one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. The Congress supported the Department of Defense with a 4.1 percent increase and ended a consecutive six year trend in which the military pay raise was less than civilian wage growth. This narrowed the gap to 10.1 percent. The disparity between military and private sector wages must continue to decrease. History clearly shows that without reasonable comparability between civilian and military pay, military personnel will leave the Navy, returning the Service to the unhealthy retention climate of the 1970's, as our best and brightest seek civilian employment.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The military Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) is a DoD directed manpower data analysis which is based upon the wartime scenario in the Defense Guidance. It identifies the wartime manpower requirements and compares them against the resources available. Casualty replacements are estimated as well as number of personnel in trainee, transient, holdee, patient, or student status. The military and civilian data in the table that follows indicate times that peak demand for military and civilian personnel occurs.

Wartime Peak Demand For Trained Manpower (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	M+180	M+150	M+180
Peak Demand	1065.8	947.0	345.6

C. Strength Request

The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991 as follows:

Navy Manpower Program
(Strength in Thousands)

Military	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Active	593.2	597.6	598.2
Selected Reserve	152.6	153.2	153.8
Civilian	323.7	317.9	316.4

The Navy manpower program reflects only the authorized end strength required to effectively operate the Navy during peacetime, while wartime requirements reflect the end strength which would be needed during mobilization.

To ensure the most effective and efficient military/civilian mix, the Navy continually reviews all military billet requirements in the shore establishment with a view toward substituting civilians or contractors to the maximum degree possible for all non-military essential billets.

The civilian manpower estimates represent the manpower levels required to execute program funding levels and reflect a concerted effort to contain personnel costs through pursuit of economy and efficiency programs.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program

1. Manpower Program by Major DPPC

The distribution of military manpower from FY 1989 to FY 1991 reflects growth supporting an increase in the number of ships, squadrons, and auxiliary activities but decreases to certain support elements of the force, within a modest end strength growth. The following tables depict the growth profiles as currently programmed. They reflect programmed end strength for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) between FY 1988 and FY 1991. Figures for FY 1985 have been included to establish a baseline for tracking historical migration of manpower among DPPCs. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1985*</u>	<u>FY 1988*</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Strategic	20.7	21.7	23.3	24.1	24.4
Tactical/Mobility	273.9	287.7	306.5	310.6	311.0

Communications/					
Intelligence	16.2	15.6	16.6	16.6	16.6
Combat Installations	25.7	24.7	26.0	26.3	26.4
Force Support Training	14.4	15.8	15.7	15.3	15.4
Medical Support	25.5	25.1	26.1	26.4	26.4
Joint Activities	4.3	4.7	5.2	5.1	5.0
Central Logistics	6.0	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.6
Service Management					
Headquarters	6.6	5.5	5.9	5.8	5.7
Research and Development	7.4	6.9	7.7	7.7	7.7
Training and Personnel	36.2	36.2	37.1	37.3	37.3
Support Activities	31.9	29.3	29.3	28.8	28.9
Operating Strength					
Deviation	0	0	-7.0	-7.0	-7.0
Individuals**	97.4	112.4	94.1	93.9	93.8
TOTALS***	<u>566.1</u>	<u>592.6</u>	<u>593.2</u>	<u>597.6</u>	<u>598.2</u>

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	<u>FY 1985*</u>	<u>FY 1988*</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Strategic	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
Tactical/Mobility	77.4	85.2	90.5	90.9	91.2
Communications/					
Intelligence	5.8	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.3
Combat Installations	9.4	10.8	9.4	9.3	9.3
Force Support Training	1.0	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.7
Medical Support	9.4	15.9	16.1	16.5	16.8
Joint Activities	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8
Central Logistics	7.2	8.3	7.4	7.4	7.4
Service Management					
Headquarters	3.6	4.1	3.7	3.7	3.7
Research and Development	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Training and Personnel	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.4
Support Activities	6.9	8.7	9.8	9.7	9.7
Operating Strength					
Deviation	0	0	0	0	0
Individual Mobilization					
Augmentee	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.6	0.6
Individuals**	5.5	5.0	4.3	4.3	4.3
TOTALS***	<u>130.0</u>	<u>149.5</u>	<u>152.6</u>	<u>153.2</u>	<u>153.8</u>

Navy Civilian Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 1985*</u>	<u>FY 1988*</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Strategic	3.0	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.5
Tactical/Mobility	6.8	7.5	8.4	9.7	9.4
Communications/ Intelligence	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6
Combat Installations	34.6	33.4	33.2	33.2	32.7
Force Support Training	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7
Medical Support	7.1	7.1	7.6	7.8	7.8
Joint Activities	5.5	5.9	6.6	6.6	6.5
Central Logistics	174.3	167.2	163.1	156.2	156.0
Service Management Headquarters	8.1	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.7
Research and Development	37.1	36.9	36.8	37.0	36.8
Training and Personnel	5.2	6.0	5.9	6.0	6.1
Support Activities	43.8	46.8	45.9	45.1	44.6
TOTALS***	<u>330.5</u>	<u>326.5</u>	<u>323.7</u>	<u>317.9</u>	<u>316.4</u>

* End Year Actuals

** Individuals includes students, transients, and trainees.

*** Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

Major force structure consists of total ship battle forces (strategic forces, major surface combatants and attack submarines, support ships and mobilization forces), local defense (auxiliaries and sealift forces), miscellaneous support forces, and naval aviation forces.

a. Total Battle Forces

In FY 1989 the total ship battle forces will increase by three to a total of 568 ships. In FY 1990 the total ship battle forces will increase by six to a total of 574 ships. In FY 1991 this number will drop to 571. Changes in each of the four categories comprising total ship battle forces follows:

(1) Strategic Forces

In FY 1989 strategic forces will decrease by one to total 42 ships. The total number of Fleet Ballistic Missile System Submarines will decrease by one as a result of two Lafayette and one Madison class submarines being decommissioned and two Ohio class Tridents being commissioned. Strategic forces decrease to 41 in FY 1990 with one Ohio class Trident being commissioned and two Lafayette class being decommissioned. In FY 1991 total strategic forces remain at 41 with one Ohio class Trident commissioning and one Lafayette class decommissioning.

(2) Battle Forces

In FY 1989 battle forces will drop from 437 to 434. In FY 1990 battle forces will increase by one and in FY 1991 decrease by ten to total 425. There are 14 aircraft carriers in FY 1989, increasing to 15 in FY 1990 with the commissioning of CVN-72 Abraham Lincoln. In FY 1991 CV-63 Kitty Hawk returns to the active force from the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and CV-64 Constellation goes into SLEP.

Surface combatants decrease by six to 188 in FY 1989, decrease by one in FY 1990, and decrease by nine more in FY 1991 to total 178. Battleships will grow from three to four in FY 1989 with the conversion of one Iowa class battleship, BB-64 Wisconsin. Cruisers will grow from 38 to 40 in FY 1989, to 43 in FY 1990, and to 46 in FY 1991 with the commissionings of eight Ticonderoga class AEGIS cruisers. Destroyers will drop from 68 in FY 1989 to 66 in FY 1990 with two Adams class decommissionings, and from 66 to 54 in FY 1991 with one Farragut class and twelve Adams class decommissionings and one Burke class commissioning. Frigates decrease from 85 to 76 in FY 1989. The decommissionings of one Brooke and seven Garcia class frigates will complete the phase-out of these two classes from the active force. One Perry class and one Knox class frigate will also be transferred to the NRF and one Perry class commissioned in FY 1989. In FY 1990 two more Perry class frigates will transfer to the NRF, leaving 74 frigates in the active force in FY 1990 and 1991.

Attack submarines will remain at 100 in FY 1989 with the commissioning of three Los Angeles class submarines and the decommissioning of two Permit class and one Skate class submarines. The FY 1990 decommissionings of one Darter and two Barbels class SSs complete the phasing out of Navy's diesel-powered submarines. Two Skipjack class and two Permit class submarines will also be decommissioned and four Los Angeles class commissioned for a total reduction of three fast attack submarines in FY 1990, for a total of 97. FY 1991 remains at 97 with five Los Angeles class commissionings, and one Skipjack, three Permit, and one Glenard Lipscomb class decommissionings.

There will be six Pegasus class patrol combatants through FY 1991. The commissioning of one Wasp class LHD and two Whidbey Island class LSD's in FY 1989 brings the total of amphibious warfare ships to 64. In FY 1990 they drop to 63 with the decommissioning of three Thomaston class LSD's, the transfer of one Newport class LST to the NRF, and the commissioning of three Whidbey Island class LSDs. FY 1991's figure drops to 62 with the transfer of one Anchorage class LSD to the NRF.

Mine warfare forces decrease from four to two in FY 1989 with the decommissioning of one Aggressive class minesweeper and the transfer to the NRF of one Avenger class mine countermeasure ship. FY 1990 will see a total increase of five with the commissioning of five Avenger class ships. In FY 1991 two Avenger class and one MHC-51 (Osprey) class mine countermeasure ships will be commissioned and four Avenger class will transfer to the NRF, leaving six mine warfare ships in the active fleet.

Combat logistics ships will grow from 58 to 60 in FY 1989 with the commissioning of two Kaiser class oilers. This number remains through FY 1990 with three Kaiser class being commissioned, and two Ashtabula class AOs and one Mispillion class TAO being decommissioned. Three more Kaiser class TAOs and one AOE-6 class will be commissioned in FY-91 and three Mispillion class TAOs will be decommissioned, to result in a total of 61 combat logistics ships.

(3) Support Forces

In FY 1989 the number of support forces will increase by five to a total of 65, and in FY 1990 the number will increase by three to a total of 68. FY 1991 will increase to 70 support force ships. There will be a total of 19 mobile logistic ships through FY 1991. Support ships grow by five TAGOS ocean surveillance ships in FY 1989, by three in FY 1990, and by two more in FY 1991.

(4) Mobilization Forces Category "A"

In FY 1989 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will increase by two ships to a total of 27 with the addition of two frigates and one mine countermeasure ship and the loss of one destroyer. In FY 1990 Mobilization Forces Category "A" will increase by three ships to a total of 30 with the addition of two frigates and one amphibious warfare ship (LST). FY 1991 Mobilization Forces Category "A" increase by five to total 35 with the addition of one LSD amphibious warfare ship and four mine countermeasure ships.

b. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces

(1) Auxiliaries and Sealift Forces

In FY 1989 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase by six to a total of 139 with the addition of two TACs, four TAKRs, and one TAP, and the decommissioning of one TAK. In FY 1990 auxiliaries and sealift forces will increase by four to a total of 143 with the addition of two TACs and three TAKRs, and the decrease of one TARC. There is an increase of one TAC in FY 1991 to total 144.

(2) Mobilization Forces Category "B"

In FY 1989 and FY 1990 Mobilization Forces Category "B" will remain at 21 ships. Mobilization Forces Category "B" decrease by four MSO mine warfare ships in FY 1991, for a total of 17.

c. Naval Aviation Forces

A total of 91 Navy deployable active and 14 reserve tactical squadrons will be operating during FY 1989 and FY 1990. In FY 1991, the active tactical squadrons increase to 92. A total of 63 active and 20 reserve fixed-wing and rotary-wing anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense squadrons will be operating in FY 1989, changing to 64 and 20, respectively, in FY 1990 and 1991. There are 19 active and 19 reserve direct-support squadrons from FY 1989 through FY 1991.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Medical Department Officer Shortfall and Planned Growth

It is the position of Congress that the Navy is not providing an adequate level of access of care to military beneficiaries. Therefore, Congress has mandated that, of the total Navy officer end strength authorized for FY 1989 (72,610), 11,940 must be health care professionals. This will require a growth of 492 over the end FY 1988 total of 11,448. The following are FY 1988 planned and actual end strengths and Congressionally mandated Medical Department officer end strength targets for FY 1989 through FY 1991.

FY 88(Planned)	FY-88(Actual)	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
11,710	11,448	11,940	12,240	12,510

The Navy is committed to providing an adequate level of health care. However, attaining end strength targets is complicated by a national nursing shortage and an inability to recruit and retain the correct physician specialty mix. In light of this the Navy has undertaken significant initiatives to increase medical officer end strength in FY 1989 and beyond:

- Increase in medical department officer recruiters
- Increase of health professional scholarships
- Institution of education accession programs for nurses
- Increased retention bonuses for physicians
- Strengthened graduate medical education programs
- Renewed emphasis and expansion of Physician's Assistant program

If the benefits of these recruiting/retention initiatives can't be realized in time to achieve FY 1989 mandated growth, the delta will have to be made up in FY 1990 and out years.

Shortages in medical end strength during any given year may not be compensated for with overages in end strength in other communities. Therefore, to prevent this, the Navy must closely manage these initiatives and achieve the Congressionally mandated minimum end strength totals.

2. Shortage of Experienced Nuclear Trained Surface and Submarine Officers.

The shortage of experienced nuclear-trained officers in the grades of lieutenant commander through captain continues to be a critical manning problem. These officers are required as commanding officers, executive officers, and department heads at sea as well as for key fleet support billets ashore.

Enhancements to Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay (NOIP) enacted in FY 1986 enable the Navy to optimize accession and maximize retention of nuclear trained junior officers. The Continuation Pay (COPAY) provision

of enhanced NOIP allows us to pay up to \$12,000 per year to those nuclear trained officers agreeing to remain on active duty for a period of three, four, or five years beyond their minimum service obligation. Those nuclear officers beyond service obligation who do not opt for COPAY are paid an Annual Incentive Bonus (AIB) of \$7,200 (authorized ceiling is \$10,000). Initially, Navy employed a COPAY rate of \$9,000 per year. However, only 33 percent of the nuclear-qualified lieutenants with five to nine years of commissioned service signed up for COPAY agreements. Additionally, nuclear submarine officer retention declined from 35 percent in FY 1985 to 26 percent in FY 1986. Because of this, Navy took action to increase the value of COPAY to \$10,000 per year for FY 1988, making the agreement more attractive and committing more officers to long-term service. This action, in conjunction with a 35 percent raise in submarine pay enacted with the FY 1988 Authorization Act, resulted in retention of Lieutenants at the MSR window increasing to 45 percent in FY 1988. NOIP is an invaluable personnel management tool for the nuclear trained officer communities. Authority for this program expires 30 September 1990. Navy is seeking a 5 year extension of the current authority as part of the FY 1990/1991 Authorization Bill.

The long-term nature of the nuclear trained officer shortage requires the temporary promotion (SPOT Promotion) of some exceptional lieutenants to fill certain essential lieutenant commander engineering billets. SPOT promotion is a no cost management tool - all promotions occur within statutory grade ceilings - that is used only when needed. Authority for this important personnel program expires on 30 September 1989. Navy is seeking permanent SPOT promotion authority as part of the FY 1990/1991 Authorization Bill.

3. Declining Aviation Officer Retention

The current Navy mid-grade pilot shortage of approximately 1,500 pilots, considered a most critical manpower issue, could become even worse in the future because of a significant decline in retention in the last four years. Overall pilot retention has fallen from 54 percent in FY 1984 to 34 percent in FY 1988. This is measured against a sustaining rate requirement of 45 percent. The problem becomes more pronounced when retention is measured within the jet and propeller pilot communities. Retention rates in these communities fell from 54/47 percent, respectively, in FY 1984 to 27/25 percent in FY 1988. In February 1988, a Navy study of active duty service obligation also found that the unprecedented increase in airline hiring, which began in 1984, has been the principal cause of the decline in retention. Traditionally cyclic in nature, airline hiring has been above 6,000 per year since 1985 and is predicted to remain at that level throughout the century.

The Navy has taken numerous personnel management actions to help arrest the decline in pilot retention. These initiatives include 1) increasing the Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) from six to seven years, 2) improving family stability, 3) supporting and assisting working spouses, and 4) reducing operational/personnel tempos. While helpful, these measures have not been sufficient to stop the exodus of experienced pilots.

Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) is the Navy's newest and potentially most effective means of retaining the right quality and quantity of pilot. ACP replaced the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) program on 1 January 1989 and is effective through 30 September 1989. When compared to AOCP, the ACP program offers significant enhancements. Chief among these is a doubling of the maximum Congressional authorization levels from \$6,000 to \$12,000 in the case of those officers who choose to obligate themselves to remain in the active aviation component until the completion of fourteen years of commissioned service. The ACP program also allows the payment of lump sums as well as incremental annual payments. The Navy will target ACP bonuses only to Pilots and Naval Flight Officers in aviation communities with critical shortages. Payment rates will be variable (maximum of \$12,000) with the highest rates paid to officers in communities with the most serious shortages. Although ACP will not eliminate the Navy's pilot retention problem, it will significantly reduce the loss rates.

As long as airline hiring continues to be high, the general economy remains strong, and other factors remain relatively stable, pilot retention will continue to be a serious problem. We will need to monitor this issue closely and apply a mixture of monetary and non-monetary incentives to retain adequate numbers of aviators.

4. Implementation of Title IV of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986

The provisions of Title IV set tour lengths in joint assignments at 3 years for field grade officers and at 2 years for flag officers. Title IV further requires that an officer complete a full joint tour before promotion to O-7 and that a specific percentage of joint duty assignments be filled with Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) or JSO nominees. These provisions are complex and restrict officer assignment flexibility. Joint Specialty Officer designation after the Title IV transition period, which ends on 1 October 1989, requires joint professional military education (JPME) and a full joint duty assignment. Half the JPME graduates must be assigned directly to a joint duty assignment which means these officers may spend up to 4 years away from their primary speciality. The result of these provisions forces the Navy to make officer assignment decisions which may in some cases adversely affect the individual's warfighting skills.

Navy will have to assign some very talented officers to joint tours that will not develop their potential as warfighters. This will be necessary to establish joint duty credit for these officers. Additionally, officers in some senior year groups, who do not already have joint service credit, do not have sufficient time in their career to serve in a joint duty tour, before they are considered for flag. This situation, even under ideal assignment practices, will persist through 1994 for all Unrestricted Line (URL) (less Gen. URL) officers, and beyond for Nuclear Propulsion officers. Although a sincere and concerted effort is being made to fulfill the requirements of Title IV, there are competing requirements in the law as well as congressionally expressed wishes which limit JPME production to the output of National Defense University (NDU), while at the same time requiring a specific population level of JSO's or

JSO nominees in joint duty assignment list billets. These requirements, and the difficulties they present, must be monitored closely to ensure timely legislative changes, if they are warranted.

For nuclear-trained officers, Title IV joint service prerequisite for flag promotion is particularly problematic due to shortages of officers, extremely sea-intensive career paths, and the unique responsibility to ensure nuclear safety. The Navy has provided Congress a plan for doubling the proportion of nuclear trained officers eligible for promotion to flag rank who have joint duty experience by 1992. Among the remainder, however, will be some of our most exceptionally professional and technically proficient officers who had to be assigned to key nuclear safety and readiness jobs in lieu of joint duty. Recognizing this dilemma, Congress has extended the temporary waiver allowing promotion for today's Captains (06) to Rear Admiral without a joint tour through FY 94. Qualification for promotion to flag rank for nuclear trained officers below the rank of Captain is still at risk.

Other unrestricted line officers may face similar conflicts between joint duty and the operational tours needed to hone war fighting skills, as well. Congressional conference committee language clearly emphasizes that the best qualified should be selected for promotion. If these officers have not had an opportunity for a joint duty tour, the provisions of Title IV which allow a SECDEF waiver will be exercised.

Although the full impact of Title IV on our officer communities is under continued review, the Navy is committed to fully supporting the intent of Title IV with increased participation in the joint arena.

5. TAR End Strength Shortfall

In the 1986 Report to the Congress on Navy's Total Force, Navy addressed SECNAV's policy to man FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships with approximately a 30%/70% active/TAR crew mix. Between FY 1987 and FY 1989, programmed TAR growth has been reduced by 4,987 because of Congressional actions. One thousand of these billets were originally programmed for Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships. To cover these unplanned TAR short-falls, Navy has had to provide offsets from the active MPN component. To cover FY 1987/1988 requirements, 832 MPN enlisted personnel were assigned to augment NRF ships and Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA). Even with this Augmentation, the Navy currently projects an additional shortfall of 392 TAR billets by the end of FY 1989 to meet the 70 percent TAR manning goal of FF/FFGs. The assignment of additional MPN assets to ensure proper manning of NRF ships places an even greater demand on the constrained active duty manpower.

II. Significant Program Highlights

A. Active Component Military Manpower

1. General

Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and retention of manpower in the necessary quantity and quality to meet

operational requirements. People are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, Navy continues to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply. End strength authorizations, critical skill retention, and a quality of life for service members and their families that encourages retention will determine our ability to man the modern Navy.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

Navy's program in FY 1990 and FY 1991 is oriented toward supporting growth in operating forces. The active manpower shown in Table IV-1 reflects the increasing demands being placed upon our fleet operating forces.

3. Skill and Grade

Navy is still experiencing a skill imbalance. The hardware (ships and aircraft) of the modern Navy requires trained petty officers because of the highly sophisticated, technical equipment which necessitates more involvement in the decision-making process than was required by the less technical 1960-1970 Navy. In addition, increased emphasis on improving sea/shore rotation for petty officers in sea intensive ratings has increased the authorized billets for senior petty officers. The petty officers are "late" in arriving. Continuing reductions in requested end strength growth and Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) funding restrict the size of the accession base and limit petty officer growth. Navy is managing these imbalances by using lateral conversions and maximum accession and reenlistment bonuses for critical ratings.

TABLE IV-1
ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC	20.5	20.7	21.8	21.7	23.6	23.3	99	24.4	24.1	99
Offensive Strategic Forces	18.5	18.8	19.5	19.6	21.0	21.0	100	21.6	21.6	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	2.0	1.9	2.3	2.1	2.6	2.3	90	2.8	2.5	91
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	283.5	273.9	305.0	287.7	314.4	306.5	97	317.4	310.6	98
Land Forces	4.2	4.4	5.0	4.2	5.2	5.1	99	5.2	5.2	99
Tactical Air Forces	66.0	61.3	72.0	67.3	74.3	73.0	98	74.4	73.6	99
Naval Forces	212.9	207.8	227.7	215.6	234.3	227.9	97	237.1	231.4	98
Warships and ASW Forces	(128.5)	(125.7)	(115.9)	(111.9)	(115.1)	(113.6)	(99)	(116.8)	(115.7)	(99)
Amphibious Forces	(32.7)	(30.9)	(36.1)	(33.5)	(38.3)	(37.9)	(99)	(37.7)	(37.7)	(100)
Naval Support Forces	(51.6)	(51.2)	(75.6)	(70.3)	(80.9)	(76.4)	(94)	(82.6)	(78.0)	(94)
Mobility Forces	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	80	0.7	0.5	80
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	16.3	16.2	16.6	15.6	18.2	16.6	91	18.0	16.6	92
Intelligence	8.6	8.5	9.0	8.5	10.7	9.2	86	10.6	9.2	87
Centrally Managed Com.	7.6	7.7	7.5	7.1	7.5	7.4	99	7.4	7.4	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	23.2	25.7	25.6	24.7	36.9	26.0	70	38.1	26.3	69
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	15.8	14.4	16.0	15.8	16.8	15.7	94	16.5	15.3	93
MEDICAL SUPPORT**	23.9	25.5	26.0	25.1	31.5	26.1	83	31.5	26.4	84
JOINT ACTIVITIES	4.7	4.3	5.0	4.7	5.3	5.2	98	5.2	5.1	97
Int'l Military Org	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100
Unified Commands	0.8	0.7	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	89	1.0	0.9	89
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.5	2.0	2.0	100	2.0	2.0	100
Joint Staff	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	95	0.3	0.3	91

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%	RQMT	AUTH	%
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	6.1	6.0		6.1	6.8		8.8	6.6	75	8.9	6.6	75	8.9	6.6	74
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	6.6	6.6		5.8	5.5		6.2	5.9	94	6.2	5.8	93	6.2	5.7	92
Combat Commands	3.1	3.1		2.8	2.7		3.0	2.8	95	3.0	2.8	93	3.0	2.7	91
Support Commands	3.6	3.5		3.0	2.8		3.2	3.0	94	3.2	3.0	92	3.2	3.0	92
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>	7.8	7.4		7.7	6.2		9.3	7.7	83	9.5	7.7	81	9.5	7.7	81
Research and Development	5.9	5.5		5.8	5.1		6.8	5.8	85	6.9	5.8	84	7.0	5.8	83
Geophysical Activities	1.8	1.9		1.9	1.8		2.6	2.0	77	2.6	1.9	73	2.6	1.9	75
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	36.6	36.1		37.6	36.2		40.8	37.1	91	41.0	37.3	91	40.9	37.3	91
Personnel Support	7.8	7.7		8.6	8.3		9.3	9.2	99	9.4	9.3	99	9.3	9.2	94
Individual Training	28.8	28.5		29.0	27.8		31.6	27.9	88	31.6	28.0	89	31.6	28.0	89
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	30.8	31.9		30.4	29.3		38.8	29.3	76	39.8	28.8	72	40.1	28.9	72
Support Installations	25.3	26.5		25.6	24.0		33.0	24.3	73	34.0	23.7	70	34.2	23.9	70
Centralized Support Act'y	5.4	5.4		4.8	5.2		5.8	5.1	88	5.8	5.1	87	5.9	5.1	80
<u>TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING</u>	475.6	468.7		504.2	480.2		550.6	506.1	92	556.4	510.7	92	559.9	511.4	91
<u>UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/</u> (Many years)	-7.2			-7.0				-7.0			-7.0			-7.0	
<u>INDIVIDUALS c/</u>	102.7	102.0		95.9	112.4		95.9	94.1	98	95.2	93.9	99	95.2	93.8	98
Transients	26.5	21.1		25.3	24.4		25.7	24.3	94	25.7	24.7	96	25.7	24.5	96
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	4.2	3.8		4.5	5.1		4.4	4.4	100	4.4	4.4	100	4.4	4.4	100
Students/Trainees	67.6	72.4		61.5	78.1		61.0	60.6	99	60.4	60.0	99	60.4	60.1	99
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.5	4.6		4.8	4.8		4.8	4.8	100	4.8	4.8	100	4.8	4.8	100
<u>END STRENGTH*</u>	566.7	570.7		593.2	592.6		646.5	593.2	92	651.7	597.6	92	655.2	598.2	91

ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

AC OFFICERS	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES</u>																				
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.5.1	23.2	25.0	25.1	25.3	25.0	99	99	25.7	25.5	99	99	25.6	25.4	99	99
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	100	100	0.7	0.7	100	100	0.7	0.7	100	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	5.9	5.5	6.1	5.9	6.3	6.2	98	98	6.3	6.2	99	98	6.3	6.2	98	98
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	16.4	17.1	18.0	18.4	18.4	17.1	18.0	18.4	18.1	17.9	99	99	18.5	18.4	99	99	18.6	18.5	100	100
Land Forces	(11.2)	(11.8)	(11.4)	(11.8)	(11.8)	(11.8)	(11.4)	(11.8)	(11.2)	(11.1)	(99)	(99)	(11.6)	(11.6)	(100)	(100)	(11.6)	(11.6)	(100)	(100)
Tactical Air Forces	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.3)	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(100)	(100)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(100)	(100)	(2.8)	(2.8)	(100)	(100)
Naval Forces	(3.0)	(3.0)	(4.0)	(3.9)	(3.9)	(3.0)	(4.0)	(3.9)	(4.1)	(4.1)	(99)	(99)	(4.1)	(4.0)	(98)	(98)	(4.2)	(4.1)	(99)	(99)
Warships and ASW Forces	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	83	83	0.2	0.2	83	83	0.2	0.2	81	81
Amphibious Forces	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.6	86	86	1.8	1.6	89	89	1.8	1.6	90	90
Naval Support Forces	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.5	1.2	84	84	1.4	1.2	87	87	1.4	1.2	88	88
Mobility Forces	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	93	93	0.4	0.4	96	96	0.4	0.4	97	97
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>																				
Intelligence	1.9	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.3	2.0	87	87	2.5	2.1	85	85	2.5	2.1	85	85
Centrally Managed Com.	2.0	1.5	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.5	2.2	1.7	2.3	2.2	96	96	2.3	2.2	95	95	2.3	2.2	95	95
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	8.1	7.9	8.9	7.9	7.9	7.9	8.9	7.9	11.7	8.9	76	76	11.7	8.9	76	76	11.7	8.9	76	76
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>																				
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT**</u>																				
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	2.0	1.7	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.7	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.3	97	97	2.3	2.2	97	97	2.9	2.7	96	96
Int'l Military Org	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	100	0.2	0.2	100	100	0.2	0.2	100	100
Unified Commands	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	89	89	0.6	0.5	88	88	0.6	0.5	86	86
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	100	0.2	0.2	100	100	0.2	0.2	100	100
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.0	100	100	1.1	1.1	100	100	1.1	1.1	100	100
JCS	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	100	0.2	0.2	98	98	0.2	0.2	97	97

AC OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	3.0	2.7	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.1	2.9	93	3.1	2.9	93	3.2	2.8	90	3.2	2.8	90
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.3	99	3.4	3.3	99	3.4	3.3	98	3.4	3.3	97
Combat Commands	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.3	98	1.3	1.3	98	1.3	1.3	97
Support Commands	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.0	98	2.1	2.0	97	2.1	2.0	97	2.1	2.0	97
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.5	86	1.7	1.5	86	1.8	1.5	85	1.8	1.5	86
Research and Development	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.2	91	1.3	1.2	89	1.3	1.2	89	1.3	1.2	89
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	72	0.4	0.3	74	0.4	0.3	74	0.4	0.3	76
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	5.2	4.6	5.3	4.9	5.3	4.9	5.3	4.9	6.0	5.2	87	6.0	5.2	87	6.0	5.2	87	6.0	5.2	87
Personnel Support	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	97	0.9	0.8	97	0.9	0.8	97	0.9	0.8	97
Individual Training	4.3	3.8	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.1	5.1	4.3	85	5.1	4.3	85	5.1	4.4	85	5.1	4.4	85
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	5.5	5.4	4.9	5.4	4.9	5.4	4.9	5.4	5.8	5.0	86	5.8	5.0	86	5.9	4.9	82	6.0	4.9	82
Support Installations	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.0	3.2	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.0	89	3.4	2.9	85	3.4	2.9	83	3.4	2.9	83
Centralized Support Act'y	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.2	1.9	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.5	2.1	83	2.5	2.0	81	2.5	2.0	81	2.5	2.0	81
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	59.5	57.4	62.2	59.8	62.2	59.8	62.2	59.8	68.3	62.3	91	68.3	62.7	91	69.0	62.7	91	69.0	62.7	91
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/ (Many years)	-1.7		-1.4		-1.4		-1.4			-1.4			-1.4			-1.4			-1.4	
INDIVIDUALS c/	12.8	13.3	11.8	12.7	11.8	12.7	11.8	12.7	11.8	11.7	99	11.8	11.7	99	11.8	11.7	99	11.8	11.7	99
Transients	5.0	4.0	4.1	3.1	4.1	3.1	4.1	3.1	4.1	4.0	97	4.1	4.0	98	4.1	4.0	97	4.1	4.0	97
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Students/Trainees	7.7	9.1	7.6	9.4	7.6	9.4	7.6	9.4	7.6	7.6	100	7.6	7.6	100	7.6	7.6	100	7.6	7.6	100
Midshipmen/NAVCADS																				
END STRENGTH*	69.3	70.7	72.8	72.4	72.8	72.4	72.8	72.4	80.1	72.6	91	80.8	73.0	90	80.9	73.0	90	80.9	73.0	90

* Totals may not add due to rounding.
 ** Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics are included in Medical Support
 vice Support Installations (as in the FY 1989 DMR).

ACTIVE NAVY MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

AC ENLISTED	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
STRATEGIC															
Offensive Strategic Forces	18.5	18.6		19.6	19.5		21.2	21.0	99	22.0	21.8	99	22.2	22.0	99
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	16.9	17.1		17.7	17.8		19.1	19.1	100	19.7	19.7	100	19.9	19.9	100
	1.6	1.5		1.9	1.7		2.1	1.9	89	2.3	2.1	90	2.4	2.1	90
TACTICAL/MOBILITY															
Land Forces	260.7	250.7		279.9	262.6		289.1	281.5	97	291.7	285.7	98	293.9	285.4	97
Tactical Air Forces	3.7	3.9		4.3	3.6		4.5	4.4	99	4.5	4.5	99	4.6	4.5	99
Naval Forces	60.3	55.8		65.6	61.4		68.0	66.8	98	68.1	67.3	99	69.3	67.0	97
Warships and ASW Forces	196.4	190.8		209.6	197.2		216.2	209.9	97	218.7	213.0	97	219.7	213.5	97
Amphibious Forces	(117.3)	(114.0)		(104.6)	(100.1)		(103.9)	(102.5)	(99)	(105.2)	(104.2)	(99)	(102.5)	(101.3)	(99)
Naval Support Forces	(30.5)	(28.6)		(33.4)	(30.8)		(35.5)	(35.1)	(99)	(34.9)	(34.9)	(100)	(35.0)	(34.9)	(100)
Mobility Forces	(48.6)	(48.2)		(71.7)	(66.3)		(76.8)	(72.3)	(94)	(78.5)	(74.0)	(94)	(82.1)	(77.3)	(94)
	0.2	0.2		0.3	0.3		0.4	0.3	78	0.4	0.3	79	0.4	0.3	79
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL															
Intelligence	14.6	14.7		14.9	14.1		16.3	15.1	92	16.2	15.0	93	16.1	14.9	93
Centrally Managed Com.	7.5	7.5		7.8	7.4		9.2	8.0	86	9.2	8.0	87	10.5	8.1	87
	7.1	7.2		7.1	6.7		7.1	7.1	100	7.0	7.0	100	6.9	6.9	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS															
	21.3	23.7		23.6	22.8		34.6	24.0	69	35.6	24.2	68	36.4	24.3	67
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING															
	13.8	13.0		13.8	14.1		14.5	13.5	93	14.2	13.2	93	14.2	13.2	93
MEDICAL SUPPORT**															
	15.5	17.6		17.2	17.4		19.7	17.2	87	19.7	17.5	89	19.7	17.5	89
JOINT ACTIVITIES															
Int'l Military Org	2.7	2.6		2.9	2.7		3.0	2.9	98	2.9	2.9	98	2.9	2.8	97
Unified Commands	0.6	0.6		0.7	0.6		0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
Federal Agency Support	0.4	0.3		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	90	0.4	0.4	90	0.4	0.3	85
OSD/Defense Agencies	0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100
Joint Staff	0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100	0.9	0.9	100
	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	84	0.1	0.1	74	0.1	0.1	74

AC ENLISTED	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH	RQMT	AUTH
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES										
CENTRAL LOGISTICS										
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.0	5.7	3.7	5.7	3.8	5.7	3.8
Combat Commands	2.9	3.0	2.5	2.4	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.4	2.8	2.4
Support Commands	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.5
	1.2	1.3	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT										
Research and Development	6.3	6.2	6.2	5.6	7.6	6.2	7.7	6.2	7.6	6.2
Geophysical Activities	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.1	5.5	4.6	5.5	4.6	5.6	4.6
	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	2.1	1.6	2.1	1.6	2.1	1.6
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL										
Personnel Support	31.4	31.5	32.3	31.3	34.9	23.6	35.0	32.1	34.9	32.1
Individual Training	6.9	6.9	7.8	7.5	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.4	8.4	8.4
	24.5	24.6	24.6	23.8	26.5	23.6	26.5	23.6	26.5	23.7
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES										
Support Installations	25.3	26.5	25.5	24.0	33.0	24.3	33.9	23.8	34.1	24.0
Centralized Support Act'y	22.0	23.2	22.6	20.9	29.7	21.3	30.6	20.8	30.8	21.0
	3.3	3.3	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.3	3.0
TOTAL PROGRAMMED	416.1	411.3	442.1	420.5	482.3	443.8	487.5	448.1	490.9	448.7
MANNING										
UNDISTRIBUTED MANNING b/	-5.4		-5.6			-5.6		-5.6		-5.6
(Many years)										
INDIVIDUALS c/	88.9	88.7	84.1	99.7	84.0	82.4	83.4	82.1	83.4	82.1
Transients	21.4	17.4	21.2	21.2	21.6	20.3	21.6	20.7	21.6	20.6
Patients/Prisoners/Holdecs	4.1	3.7	4.4	5.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Students/Trainees	59.9	63.3	53.9	68.7	53.4	53.0	52.7	52.4	52.8	52.4
Midshipmen/NAVCAD	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
END STRENGTH*	496.0	500.0	520.6	520.1	566.4	520.6	570.9	524.6	574.3	525.2

* Totals may not add due to rounding.

** Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics are included in Medical Support vice Support Installations (as in the FY 1989 DMRR).

Notes:

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (RQMT) reflects Active Duty military resources and is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full active manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (AUTH) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "Programmed manning" recognizes that 100% staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

b/ Undistributed Manning shows the difference between distributable strength and distributable billets as of the end of the fiscal year.

c/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees (for the Reserve Components, the training pipeline), patients, prisoners, cadets and students in "overhead" and not available for staffing programmed manning spaces.

TABLE IV-2
Active Navy Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals (PMI)
(Strength in Thousands)
FY 1988

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	42	29	19	90
Pgmng & Ind	130.0	74.8	63.8	268.6
Inventory	150.5	74.0	55.4	280.0
Over/Short	+20.5	-0.7	-8.5	+11.3
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	5	89	8	102
Pgmng & Ind	4.2	221.6	20.2	246.0
Inventory	4.7	211.9	18.1	234.7
Over/Short	+0.5	-9.8	-2.0	-11.1
<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	23	60	23	106
Pgmng & Ind	140.6	247.4	126.7	514.7
Inventory	154.3	245.3	115.0	514.7
Over/Short	+13.7	-2.0	-11.7	0
<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
Pgmng & Ind	**	2.9	0.3	3.2
Inventory	**	2.7	0.2	3.0
Over/Short	**	-0.2	**	-0.2
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	3	11	11	25
Pgmng & Ind	12.3	24.0	6.8	43.1
Inventory	15.0	23.1	5.7	43.8
Over/Short	+2.8	-0.9	-1.1	+0.7
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	5	16	3	24
Pgmng & Ind	3.1	18.3	4.5	25.9
Inventory	3.5	18.8	3.2	25.4
Over/Short	+0.4	+0.5	-1.4	-0.5

<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	2	20	3	25
Pgmng & Ind	17.0	47.9	4.1	69.0
Inventory	19.5	46.2	3.5	69.2
Over/Short	+2.5	-1.7	-0.6	+0.2

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
Versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

FY 1989

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	61	19	10	90
Pgmng & Ind	157.7	46.6	63.9	268.2
Inventory	184.7	46.7	49.1	280.5
Over/Short	+27.0	+0.1	-14.8	+12.3

<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	3	73	26	102
Pgmng & Ind	1.6	180.1	64.9	246.6
Inventory	1.8	171.6	60.9	234.3
Over/Short	+0.2	-8.6	-4.0	-12.3

<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	28	65	13	106
Pgmng & Ind	154.4	267.2	93.2	514.8
Inventory	170.7	267.6	76.5	514.8
Over/Short	+16.3	+0.4	-16.7	0

<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
Pgmng & Ind	**	2.9	0.3	3.2
Inventory	**	2.6	0.2	2.8
Over/Short	**	-0.3	-0.1	-0.3

<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	3	10	12	25
Pgmng & Ind	12.2	23.2	7.7	43.1
Inventory	14.7	22.7	6.7	44.1
Over/Short	+2.5	-0.5	-1.0	+1.0

<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	6	16	2	24
Pgmng & Ind	3.5	18.9	3.5	25.9
Inventory	3.9	19.2	2.2	25.4
Over/Short	+0.4	+0.3	-1.2	-0.5

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	1	22	2	25
Pgmng & Ind	10.9	57.6	0.5	69.0
Inventory	12.5	56.5	0.5	69.5
Over/Short	+1.6	-1.1	**	+0.5

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

FY 1990

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	63	19	8	90
Pgmng & Ind	164.7	47.7	57.3	269.7
Inventory	197.4	47.9	37.1	282.4
Over/Short	+32.7	+0.3	-20.1	+12.8
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	2	41	59	102
Pgmng & Ind	1.1	37.1	210.7	248.9
Inventory	1.3	35.7	199.0	236.0
Over/Short	+0.2	-1.4	-11.7	-12.9
<u>Total E1-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	39	56	11	106
Pgmng & Ind	189.3	249.7	79.6	518.6
Inventory	210.6	250.4	57.5	518.5
Over/Short	+21.3	+0.7	-22.1	0
<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
Pgmng & Ind	**	2.9	0.2	3.1
Inventory	**	2.8	0.2	3.0
Over/Short	**	-0.1	**	-0.1
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	3	11	11	25
Pgmng & Ind	12.5	23.5	7.6	43.6
Inventory	14.6	22.9	6.7	44.1
Over/Short	+2.0	-0.6	-0.9	+0.5
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	6	14	4	24
Pgmng & Ind	4.9	16.9	4.1	25.9
Inventory	5.5	17.3	2.9	25.7
Over/Short	+0.6	+0.4	-1.2	-0.2

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	1	21	3	25
Pgmng & Ind	11.2	57.3	1.1	69.6
Inventory	12.5	56.3	1.0	69.8
Over/Short	+1.3	-1.0	-0.1	+0.3

Skill and Grade
Actual & Projected Inventory
versus
Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

FY 1991

<u>E1-E4</u>	<u>Over*</u>	<u>Balanced*</u>	<u>Short*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Skills	67	13	10	90
Pgmng & Ind	183.9	28.9	56.8	269.6
Inventory	221.8	29.2	31.8	282.8
Over/Short	+37.9	+0.3	25.0	13.2

E5-E9

Number of Skills	2	87	13	102
Pgmng & Ind	1.1	225.4	23.1	249.6
Inventory	1.3	214.6	20.4	236.3
Over/Short	+0.2	-10.8	-2.7	-13.3

Total E1-E9

Number of Skills	49	44	13	106
Pgmng & Ind	254.6	180.7	83.9	519.2
Inventory	281.3	181.5	56.3	519.1
Over/Short	+26.7	+0.8	-27.6	0

WO

Number of Skills	0	1	1	2
Pgmng & Ind	**	2.9	0.1	3.0
Inventory	**	2.8	0.1	2.9
Over/Short	**	-0.1	**	-0.1

01-03

Number of Skills	3	11	11	25
Pgmng & Ind	12.5	23.5	7.6	43.6
Inventory	14.4	22.8	6.8	44.1
Over/Short	+1.9	-0.7	-0.8	+0.4

04-06

Number of Skills	7	11	6	24
Pgmng & Ind	5.8	15.4	4.8	26.0
Inventory	6.6	15.7	3.5	25.8
Over/Short	+0.8	+0.3	-1.2	-0.1

Total 01-06

Number of Skills	1	20	4	25
Pgmng & Ind	11.1	56.6	1.8	69.6
Inventory	12.5	55.7	1.7	69.9
Over/Short	+1.3	-0.9	-0.1	+0.3

* Status is based on programmed manning + individuals (PMI) for each skill

Skills with PMI of 500 or more people (over if fill is 105% or more of PMI, balanced if between 95% and 105%, short if fill is less than 95%).

Skills with PMI of 100-499 people (over if fill is 110% of PMI balanced if 90% or greater and 110% or less, short is fill less than 90%).

Skills with PMI of 100 people (over if fill is 115% of PMI, balanced if 85% or greater and 115% or less, short if fill is less than 85%).

** Less than 50 people

4. Experience

Table IV-3 shows programmed versus actual experience level. The need for experienced personnel (people with greater than 4 years of service (YOS) continues to increase. Experienced manpower is essential to operate and maintain our sophisticated and highly technical weapon systems and to provide the training and supervision necessary to effectively develop similar skill levels in our junior personnel. Navy's objective is to continue retaining personnel at the first and second term reenlistment points and to grow the experience in the force structure through advancements and training. However, even with these initiatives, Navy will continue to have petty officer shortages in many of the sea intensive ratings. To correct this situation, Navy requires the requested bonuses and recruiting resources.

TABLE IV-3
ACTIVE NAVY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Thousands)

	FY 1988		
	<u>Total Billets/ People</u>	<u>People with greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	268.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	277.5	34.7	3.1

E5-E9

EPA	246.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	236.7	221.7	8.1

E1-E9

EPA	514.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	514.2	256.4	6.3

WO

OPA	3.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.0	3.0	21.8

01-03

OPA	43.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	43.8	20.4	4.7

04-06

OPA	25.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.4	25.2	16.1

01-06

OPA	69.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.2	45.6	8.9

FY 1989		
<u>Total Billets/</u>	<u>People with</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>People</u>	<u>greater than</u>	
	<u>4 YOS</u>	

E1-E4

EPA	268.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	280.4	39.7	3.2

E5-E9

EPA	246.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	234.4	220.3	8.3

E1-E9

EPA	514.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	514.8	259.9	6.3

WO

OPA	3.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.8	2.8	21.9

01-03

OPA	43.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	44.1	20.6	4.7

04-06

OPA	25.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.4	25.2	16.1

01-06

OPA	69.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.5	45.8	8.9

FY 1990		
<u>Total Billets/</u>	<u>People with</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
<u>People</u>	<u>greater than</u>	
	<u>4 YOS</u>	

E1-E4

EPA	269.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	282.6	42.5	3.3

E5-E9

EPA	248.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	236.2	219.6	8.3

E1-E9

EPA	518.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	518.8	262.1	6.3

WO

OPA	3.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.0	3.0	22.1

01-03

OPA	43.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	44.1	21.2	4.8

04-06

OPA	25.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.7	25.5	16.1

01-06

OPA	69.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.8	46.7	8.9

		FY 1991	
	<u>Total Billets/</u>	<u>People with</u>	<u>AVG YOS</u>
	<u>People</u>	<u>greater than</u>	
		<u>4 YOS</u>	
<u>E1-E4</u>			
EPA	269.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	283.0	45.3	3.4
<u>E5-E9</u>			
EPA	249.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	236.4	219.6	8.4
<u>E1-E9</u>			
EPA	519.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	519.4	265.0	6.4
<u>WO</u>			
OPA	3.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.9	2.9	21.8
<u>01-03</u>			
OPA	43.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	44.1	20.9	4.8
<u>04-06</u>			
OPA	26.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	25.8	25.6	16.1
<u>01-06</u>			
OPA	69.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	69.9	46.5	8.9

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The Navy attained 100 percent of its FY 1988 accession goal of 90,231 Non-Prior Service (NPS) men and women compared to 87,973 in FY 1987, and exceeded its quality goals in the upper AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test)(IIIUA) and High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG) with the attainment of 61.0 percent upper AFQT (57.5 percent goal) and 90.6 percent HSDG (90 percent goal), the same quality as in FY 1987. The Navy's total lower AFQT (IV) attainment of 8573 recruits (9.9 percent) is well under the Congressional ceiling of 20 percent and the Navy's own limit of 12 percent, but accounts for almost two-thirds of all lower mental group personnel recruited. The Navy missed its New Contract Objectives (NCO) with 90,060 new contracts in FY 1988 (4428

below plan) compared to 98,533 in FY 1987. The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) at the end of FY 1988 had 31,911 compared to 35,792 for FY 1987. In addition to being smaller, the DEP quality composition is lower than planned and the distribution of contracts is more skewed toward the summer months. Recruiting Command will be entering the more difficult recruiting months of the winter/spring with a very high requirement for "direct shippers" (recruits with no time in DEP). This situation normally leads to high attrition (the "filtering" aspects of DEP are not available) and lower quality.

In the FY 1988 Appropriations Act, Congress reduced the FY 1989 Navy Recruiting and Advertising Budget by 10.6 million dollars. Because Navy opted to apply the full reduction against its advertising budget, this translated into a forty-three percent reduction from the benchmark FY 1986 advertising level. This will significantly decrease Navy's ability to advertise in an increasingly competitive recruiting market. Past reductions in Navy advertising levels have resulted in a downward trend in both youth awareness of Navy Programs and youth propensity to enlist in the Navy. An adequate advertising budget is necessary for the Navy to meet its accession requirements, in quality and quantity, in the next few years.

The Navy continued to have success in the prior service market, achieving its FY 1988 goal of 3,703 compared to 5,116 in FY 1987. Recruitment of prior service personnel is targeted to specific shortage skills. Upon enlistment, these personnel are available for immediate assignment to fleet units, thus improving personnel readiness.

Despite end strength constraints, accession requirements remain high. The attainment of both quantity and quality goals will be very difficult under existing market conditions with keen competition for a shrinking recruitable population (dropping by 6.3 percent in FY 1990), high youth employment, and constrained recruiting resources (particularly advertising). Also, the 9000 billets now open to women as a result of the recent Navy study group will require additional effort to attract women to more non-traditional sea-intensive jobs. Navy must be provided the required resources to access the high quality recruits needed for an increasingly technical Navy.

To supply Navy's quality and quantity manpower needs, the goals identified in the following table must be met. A target is established for the percentage of male high school diploma graduates as these individuals have a higher probability of completing their first term of enlistment, thereby reducing training costs, lowering attrition, and increasing readiness. During FY 1988, Navy achieved the same percentage of accessions with high school diplomas as in 1987. However, Navy also regards AFQT as a measure of recruit quality. AFQT category is indicative of an individual's likelihood of successfully completing the technical training necessary to operate and maintain the equipment in the modern Navy.

Active Navy Enlisted Strength Plan

	FY 1988		FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
	Actual	Goal	Goal	Goal	Goal
End Strength	515,326	515,815	515,815	519,792	520,396
Accessions	93,939	94,594	94,892	93,703	92,163
Prior Service	3,708	4,547	7,100	4,862	5,147
Non-Prior Service					
Male	80,358	80,547	78,042	78,999	77,495
AFQT I-III	48,456	46,315	44,874	45,424	44,560
HSDG	71,920	72,492	69,848	70,704	69,358
Female	9,873	9,500	9,750	9,842	9,521
(%)	(10.94)	(10.55)	(10.28)	(10.50)	(10.33)
AFQT I-III	6,526	5,463	5,606	5,659	5,475
HSDG	9,863	8,550	8,775	8,858	8,569

Navy's force management initiatives continue to focus on balancing the skill inventory for proper distribution of personnel necessary to sustain the force. Navy must be resourced to obtain qualified recruits, train them, and ensure they are retained in sufficient numbers. Skilled technicians required in 1992 must be recruited and trained now.

(2) Retention. FY 1988 retention remained high during the first half of the year, but dropped slightly toward the end. Targeting stable retention rates will aid in reducing the number of under-manned ratings and improving the balance of Navy's force structure. Retention results and goals are as follows:

	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
	Actual	Actual	Actual	Goal	Goal	Goal
1st Term	57.4	55.2	54.2	53.3	53.4	53.4
2nd Term	64.1	61.2	61.1	61.3	61.3	61.2
3rd Term	93.6	92.4	92.0	91.4	91.4	91.4
and beyond						

Balancing Navy's force structure in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991 will require compensation and quality of life initiatives to continue a favorable retention climate. Measures to combat the anticipated retention decline must include competitive compensation, selective reenlistment bonus funding, continued educational opportunities, and command sponsored leadership programs. The FY 1989-91 goals reflect Navy's best estimate of projected enlisted retention behavior.

(3) Aggregate population stability. As shown, the Navy has experienced fluctuations but shows a relatively level aggregate population stability (see stability definition in Appendix B).

Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
Officer	92.7	92.6	91.9	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.7
Enlisted	84.1	85.9	84.8	84.8	85.1	85.4	83.6

(4) Unit personnel stability. The Navy also shows a relatively level unit personnel stability (defined in Appendix B).

Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
Officer	51.0	50.8	47.9	51.5	50.0	51.0	53.8
Enlisted	47.3	50.2	49.7	49.4	50.5	52.1	53.5

(a) Enlisted Attrition. First-term enlisted attrition for FY 1988 was 12.5 percent, a 0.6 percent increase from the FY 1987 level of 11.9 percent.

(b) Enlisted Desertion and Unauthorized Absence (UA). The FY 1988 desertion rate decreased slightly to 9.39 per 1000 (4916 incidents) from the FY 1987 rate of 9.8 per 1000, representing a 4.1 percent improvement over FY 1987. The unauthorized absence rate declined from 30.4 per 1000 in FY 1987 to 24.18 per 1000 (12,656 incidents) in FY 1988.

b. Officer/Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1990 and FY 1991 budget period are as follows:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
6,516	6,859	6,851	7,026	6,569

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from both regular and reserve officer commissioning sources. Of the 6,516 officers commissioned in FY 1988, 3,317 (51 percent) received regular commissions and 3,199 (49 percent) received reserve commissions. Of the 3,317 regular officers, 2,473 came from the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship program.

The recruiting command met or exceeded recruiting goals for warfare officer designators, including surface, submarine, and aviation programs, and attained 95 percent (2,205) of its overall FY 1988 reserve officer recruiting goal. Navy experienced shortfalls in recruiting reserve officers in medical field designators and in engineering specialties.

Navy also continues to experience some shortfalls in attainment of nuclear power officer requirements from regular officer commissioning programs. Navy met 92 percent (715 of 775) of FY 1988 requirements for nuclear power officer accessions compared to 87 percent (688 of 795) in FY 1987.

The Navy has made a commitment to increase the number of Physician's Assistants (PAs) to 375 (300 military, 75 civilian) by the end of FY 1994. This increase of 137 PAs over the end FY 1988 inventory is intended to improve access to quality medical care for all beneficiaries.

(2) Officer Retention. URL designators experienced a slight downward trend in aviation and surface designators. Nuclear submarine retention remained constant with Fiscal Year 1987 rates and General URL retention showed modest improvements. Fiscal Year 1988 initiatives to reduce Manpower Personnel, Navy (MPN) expenses (e.g., delayed promotions) contributed to a difficult retention environment. The retention climate for Fiscal Year 1989 is predicted to be stable and without the personnel turbulence experienced in 1988. However, with a good civilian economy and no substantial overall increases in compensation anticipated, we forecast stable retention with few improvements. Medical Corps and Pilot retention should show improvements towards the later half of 1989 as Aviation Continuation Pay and Medical Officer Retention Bonus programs take effect. To meet the retention challenges of the 1990s we must continue to focus on pay comparability with the civilian sector and address quality of life impacting on our military members and their families.

OFFICER RETENTION

CUMULATIVE CONTINUATION RATES (Note 1)

3 to 12 Years of Service

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>Goal FY 1989</u>
Surface	32%	26%	32%	30%	41%
Pilot	29%	28%	31%	29%	41%
NFO	54%	51%	56%	55%	43%
Nuclear Submarine	35%	26%	29%	29%	37%
General URL	26%	25%	25%	29%	31%
Medical Corps	33%	46%	38%	36%	48%
Nurse Corps	34%	20%	21%	19%	26%

Note 1: CCR retention rates are a probability statement that personnel in year groups 3 through 12 will remain in the service. The Table above reflects the percent of expected retention of those officer year groups during each fiscal year.

c. Women in the Navy

During FY 1988 we continued to increase the number of women in the Navy, achieving a total of 9.2 percent of enlisted end strength. This percentage will increase to 9.6 percent by the end of FY 1991. The percentage of officers will grow from 10.1 percent in FY 1988 to 10.6 percent by the end of FY 1991.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent possible, assigning them to positions commensurate with their skills and pay grades. Title 10, U.S.C., Section 6015, prohibits permanent assignment of women to ships or aircraft engaged in combat missions. The Navy revised its Combat Mission Definition in FY 1988, and re-evaluated those units previously closed to women. This resulted in the opening of 24 Combat Logistics Force ships, two Shore Based Air Reconnaissance Squadrons, and two Underwater Construction Teams for the permanent assignment of women.

Currently, 18 of 102 enlisted ratings are closed to women because billets in these ratings are almost exclusively in combat ships and squadrons, or because they do not provide a viable career path for women. For the same reasons, two officer communities, Submarine Warfare and Special Warfare, are also closed to women. Both officer and enlisted women are assigned to non-combat ships and to aviation support and training squadrons. Additionally, women are assigned to non-deploying support billets in sea duty aviation squadrons, such as land based anti-submarine patrol squadrons.

There were 5,469 enlisted women and 269 female officers serving on 65 ships and afloat staffs at the end of FY 1988. The end of FY 1988 also reflected the number of female pilots (including trainees) as 183 and Naval Flight Officers (including trainees) as 81. In September 1988, CNO increased FY 1989 accessions of women pilots and NFOs to fill 46 pilot and 11 NFO billets. This represents a 53 percent increase in billets available to women pilots and a 10 percent increase available to women NFOs.

Career enhancement for women in the Navy continues to increase. The implementation of the recommendations of the Navy Study Group on Progress of Women in the Navy provides improved opportunities for professional and personal development for women in the Navy, as well as the mechanisms to promote women's careers.

6. Readiness Assessment

Navy personnel readiness declined overall during FY 1989 as compared to the upward trend which has existed since 1982. Total number of submarine units reporting C1 for personnel decreased and overall surface ship readiness declined. Aviation personnel readiness improved due to an increase in first tour pilots and the stand down of Carrier Air Wing TEN.

Primary factors associated with this decline were the fiscal constraints that forced enactment of The Early Release Programs.

The Voluntary Early Release Program, allowing up to 90 days early separation, started 15 December 1987 to provide Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) account savings to anticipated Congressional funding cuts. The Early Reenlistment/Selective Involuntary Early Release Program allowed up to 180 days early separation to meet final Congressional funding levels for MPN. Over 14,700 enlisted personnel who were eligible for these programs separated early.

Most deployed units have maintained C1/C2 due to the Fleet Commanders' implementation of personnel cross-decking, TEMADD assistance, and personnel divert policies. The majority of affected units experienced a drop from C1 to C2 or from solid C2 to marginal C2. No deployed fleet units reported below the "safe to operate - ready for deployment" limit of C3.

Continued fiscal constraints levied by Congress during a period when newer and more sophisticated ships and squadrons come on line will further compound the problem of our already stretched manpower resources by forcing the enactment of additional early release programs.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Reserve Manpower

The Navy has programmed Selected Reserve manpower for FY 1988 through FY 1991 as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Manpower Program (Strength in 000s)

	(Actuals) FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
Total Selected Reserve	149.5	152.6	153.2	153.8
Unit Reservists and Trainees	124.1	126.5	126.8	126.8
SAM 1/	3.2	2.6	2.6	2.6
OSAM 2/	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6
Full Time Support	21.8	22.0	22.3	22.6
TARs	20.0	20.3	20.6	20.9
Canvasser/Recruiters (TEMACS)	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5

10 USC 265	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
IMAs 3/	0.1	0.8	0.6	0.6

1/ Sea and Air Mariner Program

2/ Officer Sea and Air Mariner Program

3/ Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) perform up to 48 paid drills per year, plus two weeks of active duty.

(1) General. A major component of Navy's growth toward the goal of 600 ships is occurring in the Naval Reserve, now well underway in the most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. Navy endeavors to use limited resources with optimum efficiency, while remaining prepared to respond rapidly to crises, accomplish heavy training requirements, and maintain Fleet readiness.

The gap between peacetime capability and wartime requirements must be filled with qualified reserve units and trained individuals. The major function of the Naval Reserve in peacetime is to man, equip, and train for a high state of readiness upon mobilization. In training to fill this gap and ensure effective integration upon mobilization, the Naval Reserve provides active forces with direct support that is mutually beneficial to Selected Reserve mobilization and training requirements. The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions that simultaneously provide direct assistance to active duty units in performing their missions. Examples are air logistics support for the Continental U.S. (CONUS), air tanker services, predeployment air combat refresher training, fleet intelligence production, fleet exercise support, ship intermediate level maintenance, cargo handling support, construction support, chaplain and medical support, and security group signal analysis.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning and Operating Strength. Expansion of the Naval Reserve has been integral to expansion of the Total Force. Past increases in Selected Reserve manpower were distributed among the Defense Planning and Programming Categories as shown in Table IV-5. The following breakdown represents the Reserve trained strength in units.

TABLE IV-4

Naval Reserve Trained in Unit Strength
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End Strength	149.5	152.6	153.2	153.8	160.1
- Training Pipeline/ Transients*	6.8	4.3	4.3	4.3	5.2
- IMAs	0.1	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8
Operating Strength	142.6	147.4	148.3	148.9	154.1
- NON Unit AGR	11.0	11.7	11.7	11.7	12.6
- Unit AC Personnel	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.4	4.7

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Trained Unit Strength	136.8	140.9	141.8	142.6
Wartime Unit Structure	147.1	153.1	147.1	149.1
%Trained in Units	93.0	92.0	96.4	95.6

* FY 1988 Training Pipeline includes 1,814 TAR enlisted personnel (TEP) currently reported in RCCPDS as category 'X'. For FY 1989 and later, TEPs will be reported as category 'S' in Training Pipeline numbers.

Between FY 1988 and FY 1991, the percent of unit manning will increase from 93.0 to 95.6 percent of requirements.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) increase from 64 in FY 1988 to 847 in FY 1989 due to the Sea College Program. The number of TARs increases from 20,282 in FY 1988 to 20,514 in FY 1989. TARs increase to 20,843 in FY 1990 and 21,118 in FY 1991 to meet required NRF ship manning (TARs include TAR officers, TAR enlisted, and 10 USC 265s). The Selected Reserve (Categories A,B,F) increases from 130,609 in FY 1989 to 130,880 in FY 1990 and 131,205 in FY 1991. Medical manpower will expand from 15,856 in FY 1988 to 16,149 (FY 1989), 16,495 (FY 1990), and 16,795 in FY 1991. Programmed manpower for ships, squadrons, SIMAs, construction forces, and operational staffs increases from 89,781 to 90,498 in FY 1989, 90,935 in FY 1990, and 91,188 in FY 1991. The remaining manpower is distributed throughout the DPPC structure, as shown in Table IV-5.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program was inaugurated in FY 1984, to help the Naval Reserve meet its junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements (E-3 and below). The SAM program employs a variety of methods to access and train junior reservists--increased use of "A" schools for specialized skill training, non-traditional accession means (vocational-technical education, or VOTECH), and other command-sponsored training. Once trained, the SAMs transition into Category A pay status to fill mobilization requirements for ships, squadrons, SIMAs, mobile construction battalions, and medical units. The SAM program delivers approximately 5,800 non-prior service enlisted accessions per year.

The program also concept includes junior officers (OSAMs). The OSAM program is scheduled to increase from 367 in FY 1988 to 602 in FY 1989. It remains at 602 through FY 1991.

TABLE IV-5
NAVY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

TOTAL NAVY RES MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	%	AUTH	INV	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
STRATEGIC	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.6		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.6		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	77.2	77.4		89.8	85.2		94.0	90.5	96	94.0	90.9	97	93.3	91.2	97
Land Forces	2.1	1.5		2.3	2.3		2.4	2.3	97	2.3	2.3	100	2.3	2.3	100
Division Force	2.1	1.5		2.3	2.3		2.4	2.3	97	2.3	2.3	100	2.3	2.3	100
(Divisional Increment)	(2.1)	(1.5)		(2.3)	(2.3)		(2.4)	(2.3)	(97)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(100)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(100)
(Non-divisional Combat Increment)	(0.0)	(0.0)		(0.0)	(0.0)		(0.0)	(0.0)	-	(0.0)	(0.0)	-	(0.0)	(0.0)	-
(Tactical Support Increment)	(0.0)	(0.0)		(0.0)	(0.0)		(0.0)	(0.0)	-	(0.0)	(0.0)	-	(0.0)	(0.0)	-
Theater Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
Tactical Air Forces	6.3	6.1		8.3	7.5		9.2	8.4	92	9.2	8.5	92	9.3	8.5	91
Naval Forces	66.5	68.3		77.1	74.0		80.2	77.8	97	80.4	78.2	97	80.3	78.4	98
Warships and ASW	(29.0)	(31.2)		(29.6)	(27.2)		(30.9)	(30.0)	(97)	(30.5)	(29.8)	(98)	(30.2)	(29.6)	(98)
Amphibious Forces	(6.3)	(5.7)		(8.4)	(7.0)		(9.1)	(8.8)	(97)	(9.1)	(9.0)	(98)	(9.3)	(9.2)	(98)
Naval Support Forces	(31.2)	(31.4)		(39.1)	(39.9)		(40.2)	(39.0)	(97)	(40.8)	(39.4)	(97)	(40.8)	(39.7)	(97)
Mobility Forces	2.3	1.5		2.1	1.5		2.2	2.0	89	2.0	2.0	98	2.0	2.0	97
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	5.6	5.8		6.2	6.4		6.3	6.3	99	6.3	6.3	99	6.3	6.3	99
Intelligence	4.4	4.4		4.7	4.8		4.8	4.7	98	4.7	4.7	100	4.7	4.7	100
Centrally Managed Comms	1.2	1.4		1.5	1.6		1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	97	1.6	1.6	96
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	7.5	9.4		9.6	10.8		10.2	9.4	92	9.7	9.3	96	9.7	9.3	96
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.7	1.0		0.7	1.2		0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	100
MEDICAL SUPPORT	12.9	9.4		15.9	15.9		18.6	16.1	87	19.4	16.5	85	21.3	16.8	79

TOTAL NAVY RES MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	100	0.8	0.8	100
Int'l Military Org	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Unified Commands	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
Federal Agency Support	0.1	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	7.0	7.2	7.5	8.3	7.6	7.4	98	7.5	7.4	98
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	3.1	3.6	3.6	4.1	3.8	3.7	96	3.8	3.7	98
Combat Commands	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.0	100	2.0	2.0	100
Support Commands	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.7	92	1.7	1.7	97
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.1	97	1.1	1.1	98
Research and Development	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	96
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	92	0.5	0.5	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2	100	1.4	1.4	100
Personnel Support	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	100	1.0	1.0	100
Individual Training	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100	0.4	0.4	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	7.5	6.9	9.7	8.7	10.2	9.8	96	10.0	9.7	97
Support Installations	6.1	5.1	8.0	6.9	8.5	7.9	92	7.8	7.8	100
Centralized Support Act's	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.9	106	2.2	1.9	86
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	124.6	124.4	146.8	144.4	155.0	147.5	95	155.2	148.4	96
INDIVIDUALS b/	3.8	5.5	5.4	5.0	4.3	4.3		4.3	4.3	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTES	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.8	0.8		0.6	0.6	
END-STRENGTH	128.7	129.8	152.6	149.5	160.2	152.6	95	160.1	153.2	96
								162.0	153.8	95

*Less than 50

NAVY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

OFFICERS	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH		INV		AUTH		INV		RQMT		AUTH		RQMT		AUTH		RQMT		AUTH	
	%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES																				
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Strategic Cont and Surv	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	10.4	9.9	11.2	12.9	13.1	12.9	13.1	12.9	13.2	13.2	12.9	12.9	13.2	13.2	12.9	12.9	13.2	13.2	12.9	12.9
Land Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Division Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
(Divisional Increment)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
(Non-divisional Combat Increment)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Theater Forces	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tactical Air Force	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Naval Forces	8.2	8.1	9.2	10.5	10.6	10.5	9.2	10.5	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.5	10.7	10.7	10.5	10.5	10.7	10.7	10.5	10.5
Warships and ASW	(5.2)	(5.0)	(5.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(5.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.0)	(6.0)	(6.1)	(6.1)	(6.0)	(6.0)
Amphibious Forces	(0.9)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.0)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)
Naval Support Forces	(2.1)	(2.3)	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.1)	(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)	(3.2)
Mobility Forces	0.8	0.5	0.5	(0.7)	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Intelligence	1.7	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Centrally Managed Comm	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	0.8	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	3.0	2.7	4.0	3.9	5.1	3.8	4.0	5.1	5.1	5.1	3.8	4.3	5.4	5.4	4.3	4.6	5.9	5.9	4.6	78
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Unified Commands	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH		INV	AUTH		INV	RQMT		AUTH	RQMT		AUTH	RQMT		AUTH
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Joint Staff	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2	99
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	1.8	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	98
Combat Commands	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	100
Support Commands	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	96
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	93
Research and Development	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	91
Geophysical Activities	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	100
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100
Individual Training	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.3	89
Support Installations	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	100
Centralized Support Act's	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.1	80
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	22.6	23.2	23.2	28.2	27.2	27.2	29.6	28.0	28.7	30.2	30.9	29.0	30.9	29.0	94
INDIVIDUALS b/	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	-
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION															
AUGMENTEES	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-
END-STRENGTH	22.8	23.5	23.5	29.1	27.8	27.8	30.6	29.1	29.4	31.0	31.7	29.7	31.7	29.7	94

* Less than 50

NAVY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, & END STRENGTH
(Thousands) a/

ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance Force	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	66.7	67.5		76.8	74.0		80.9	77.6	96	80.9	78.1	97	80.8	78.3	97
Land Forces	1.7	1.1		1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100
Division Forces	1.7	1.1		1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100
(Divisional Increment)	(1.7)	(1.1)		(1.9)	(1.9)		(1.9)	(1.9)	(100)	(1.9)	(1.9)	(100)	(1.9)	(1.9)	(100)
(Non-divisional Combat Increment)	(0.0)	(0.0)		(0.0)	(0.0)		(0.0)	(0.0)	-	(0.0)	(0.0)	-	(0.0)	(0.0)	-
Theater Forces	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-
Tactical Air Forces	5.2	5.2		7.1	6.3		8.0	7.2	90	8.0	7.2	90	8.0	7.2	90
Naval Forces	58.3	60.2		66.6	64.8		69.5	67.2	97	69.7	67.7	97	69.6	67.9	98
Warships and ASW	(23.8)	(26.1)		(23.6)	(22.1)		(24.8)	(23.9)	(96)	(24.3)	(23.7)	(97)	(24.1)	(23.5)	(98)
Amphibious Forces	(5.4)	(5.0)		(7.1)	(6.0)		(7.7)	(7.5)	(98)	(7.8)	(7.7)	(99)	(8.0)	(7.9)	(99)
Naval Support Forces	(29.2)	(29.1)		(35.9)	(36.8)		(37.0)	(35.8)	(97)	(37.6)	(36.3)	(96)	(37.6)	(36.5)	(97)
Mobility Forces	1.5	1.0		1.3	1.3		1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.3	100
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	3.9	3.9		4.3	4.2		4.3	4.3	100	4.4	4.3	99	4.4	4.3	98
Intelligence	2.7	2.6		2.9	2.7		2.9	2.9	100	2.9	2.9	100	2.9	2.9	100
Centrally Managed Comms	1.2	1.3		1.4	1.5		1.4	1.4	100	1.5	1.4	97	1.5	1.4	95
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	6.6	8.3		8.4	9.5		8.9	8.2	92	8.5	8.1	95	8.5	8.1	96
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	0.5	0.8		0.5	0.9		0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	9.9	6.7		11.9	11.9		13.5	12.2	91	14.2	12.2	86	15.4	12.2	79
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Unified Commands	0.2	0.3		0.3	0.2		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100

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ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH		INV	AUTH		INV	RQMT		AUTH	RQMT		AUTH	RQMT		AUTH
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Joint Staff	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	*	0.0	0.0	*	*	*	*	*	*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.3	6.1	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.2	98
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	98
Combat Commands	0.9	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	100
Support Commands	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	94
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	100
Research and Development	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	100
Personnel Support	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	100
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	5.7	4.9	4.9	7.4	7.4	6.6	7.9	7.9	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.4	7.4	100
Support Installations	5.2	4.3	4.3	6.8	6.8	6.0	7.2	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	100
Centralized Support Act's	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	99
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	102.0	101.3	101.3	118.6	117.2	117.2	125.2	119.4	119.7	125.2	126.2	119.9	126.2	119.9	95
INDIVIDUALS b/	3.8	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.5	4.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	95
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION															
AUGMENTEES	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	95
END-STRENGTH	105.9	106.5	106.5	123.5	121.7	121.7	129.3	123.5	123.8	129.3	130.4	124.1	130.4	124.1	95

* Less than 50

NOTE: Programmed Requirement reflects the presence of Full-Time Support personnel (TARs) in addition to NAMMOS requirements. FY 1989 Programmed Requirement figures are based on NAMMOS requirements used for POM 88. FY 1990 and later Programmed Requirements are based on POM 88 NAMMOS requirements adjusted for known program changes (e.g., delays in ship transfers to NRF).

a/ Programmed Manpower Structure (RQMT) is defined as the aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirements for all units and organizations in the program force, which is the table of organization structure (or its equivalent) for operational units, and the structure associated with full peacetime workload requirements for non-operational units. Operational units are those combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations with operational readiness reporting requirements under UNITREP.

Programmed Manning (AUTH) is defined as those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be staffed. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% staffing of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. Programmed manning is a statement of distribution policy; the term is synonymous with Distributable Billets.

End strength (ES) is the sum of programmed manning or individual mobilization augmentees, and the individuals account at the end of the fiscal year.

b/ Individuals refers to the transients, trainees, patients, prisoners, students in "overhead" not available for staffing programmed manning spaces, and individual mobilization augmentees.

(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-6 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1988 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below and junior officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program is meeting some of these junior enlisted mobilization requirements. Targeted bonuses for enlisted personnel in critical rates will also alleviate this imbalance.

The term "skills" as used in Table IV-6 is synonymous with enlisted ratings and the logical grouping of officer designators (i.e., surface, intelligence, etc.) used in inventory planning.

(4) Reserve Experience. Although the Naval Reserve is composed of senior enlisted personnel, it does not yet have the necessary data processing resources to determine the average years of service or to separate those personnel with greater than four years of service for PMI. In addition, only current year data are available; data on full-time support personnel are not maintained in the Naval Reserve data base.

The FY 1988 data in Table IV-7 show a continuing imbalance of junior officer inventory to requirements. The OSAM program is reducing that imbalance over time.

TABLE IV-6
NAVY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL & PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS
PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS (PMI)*** (Note 1)
(Strength in thousands)

	Over**	Balanced**	FY 1988 Short**	Total	
<u>E1-E4</u>					
Number of Skills	24	17	45	86	
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	13,870	6,399	33,687	53,956	(Note 2)
Inventory (Onboard)	17,343	6,574	24,997	48,914	
Over/Short	+3,473	+175	-8,690	-5,042	
<u>E5-E9</u>					
Number of Skills	32	41	25	97	(Note 2)
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	14,302	14,117	21,266	49,685	
Inventory (Onboard)	6,830	14,095	18,200	49,125	
Over/Short	+2,528	-22	-3,066	-560	
<u>Total E1-E9</u>					
Number of Skills	33	29	39	101	
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	25,202	23,161	55,425	103,788	(Note 2)
Inventory (Onboard)	30,367	23,040	44,685	98,092	
Over/Short	+5,165	-121	-10,740	-5,696	
<u>WO</u>					
Number of Skills (Desig's)	5	7	17	29	
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	31	62	359	452	
Inventory (Onboard)	46	53	188	287	
Over/Short	15	-9	-177	-165	
<u>01-03</u>					
Number of Skills (Desig's)	30	24	74	128	
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	1,755	1,217	11,752	14,724	
Inventory (Onboard)	2,639	1,241	3,353	7,233	
Over/Short	+844	+24	-8,399	-7,491	
<u>04-06</u>					
Number of Skills (Desig's)	45	5	52	102	
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	5,284	825	5,537	11,646	
Inventory (Onboard)	11,142	757	1,706	13,605	
Over/Short	+5,858	-68	-3,831	+1,959	
<u>Total 01-06</u>					
Number of Skills (Desig's)	14	13	32	59	
Pgmng & Ind (Billets)	6,706	7,224	12,223	26,153	
Inventory (Onboard)	9,388	7,431	4,464	21,283	
Over/Short	+2,682	+207	-7,759	-4,870	

*Less than 50.

**See definitions in Appendix B under "Balanced".

***Navy's terms for PMI include Enlisted Personnel Authorizations (EPA) and Officer Personnel Authorizations (OPA).

Note 1 - Total billets taken from FY 1988 OPA/EPA.
 NRPC reports 4080-1050-7 and 4080-1020-7
 DTD 30 Sep 88 source for inventory. SELRES
 end strength not funded to the total 4080-XXX-7
 billet file.

Note 2 - Ratings not included: MU, TD, NC, GMT, FTG.

Note 3 - Onboard numbers do not include 3,695
 CAT "F" in training pipeline.

TABLE IV-7
 NAVY RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
 (Strength in thousands)

	FY 1988		
	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>PEOPLE</u>	<u>PEOPLE WITH</u> <u>GREATER THAN</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG</u> <u>YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI	54,108	*	*
Inventory	60,060	27,883	3.8
<u>E5-E9</u>			
PMI	49,685	*	*
Inventory	62,855	61,186	13.4
<u>E1-E9</u>			
PMI	103,793	*	*
Inventory	122,915	89,069	11.7
<u>WO</u>			
PMI	600	*	*
Inventory	499	477	23.9
<u>01-03</u>			
PMI	14,504	*	*
Inventory	10,569	8,933	8.4
<u>04-06</u>			
PMI	11,649	*	*
Inventory	16,396	16,306	18.3
<u>01-06</u>			
PMI	26,153	*	*
Inventory	26,965	25,237	14.5

* Data not available

** Programmed manning plus individuals

Sources:

1. PMI - SELRES EPA/OPA (Jun 88) (Does not include TAR/TEMAC)
2. Inventory - RCCPDS (Jun 88) (Includes TAR/TEMAC)

(5) Reserve Personnel Management

(a) Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The actual number of Selected Reserve Personnel recruited in FY 1988 and the accession goals for FY 1989 through FY 1991 are shown below:

Enlisted Reserve Accession Plans*

	<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
NAVETS	21,183	24,022	20,826	19,041	19,095
SAM	5,808	5,775	5,120	5,120	5,120
OSVETS	1,022	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080
APG	1,561	2,985	1,594	1,594	1,594
TAR	2,364	2,411	2,277	2,524	2,489

*Actual accessions do not include gains from IRR for members temporarily transferred to the IRR for 90 days or less due to being not physically qualified or due to unavailability of pay billets.

(2) Retention. To more realistically analyze retention within the Selected Reserve, enlisted retention is now measured at significant career points, e.g. at the end of first, second, or subsequent enlistment. Since many Selected Reservists are non-obligors who may cease to participate at any time, an analysis by enlistment allows reserve unit managers to direct special retention efforts toward newer affiliates who are 1st and 2nd term enlistees.

Enlisted Reserve Retention
(Percent)

<u>Affiliated</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Enlistment	80.2	*	*	*	*
2nd Enlistment	81.2	*	*	*	*
3rd or more Enlistment	89.4	*	*	*	*
Overall Naval Reserve	83.1	*	*	*	*

*Retain sufficient number of trained quality personnel to maintain at R-2 or better readiness.

(b) Officers. The Naval Reserve continues to invest significant efforts in new junior officer recruiting areas, while continuing to expand and publicize those ongoing specific accession programs which include direct commissions into the Naval Reserve. The Officer Sea and Air Mariner (OSAM) Recruiting Program provides direct accessions of junior Selected Reserve Officer Personnel with no prior naval experience. One option of the OSAM College Program provides \$100 per month stipend for qualified college students during their junior and senior years. The associated service obligation may require up to two years of active duty to attain a qualification in a designator specialty. The remaining military service obligation is served on inactive duty in the Selected Reserve. FY 1988 provided 327 quotas for the College Program and similar execution is expected in FY 1989. In addition, 300 OSAM quotas were provided to the Navy Recruiting Command for officer candidate school accessions. The OSAM option is open to unrestricted line and certain restricted line and staff corps designators.

Officer Reserve Accession Plans*

	<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
VETERAN AFFILIATIONS	3,909	4,373	3,726	3,580	3,410
DIRECT APPOINTMENTS	1,006	1,189	789	720	630
OSAM	308	327	300	300	312
OFFICER RECRUITERS	174	174	174	174	174
TARS	195	248	238	**	**

* Actual accessions do not include gains from IRR for members temporarily transferred to the IRR for 90 days or less due to being not physically qualified or due to unavailability of pay billets.

** Not available

(6) Reserve Readiness Assessment. The personnel readiness posture of the Naval Reserve will improve through FY 1989, as we continue to fill all mobilization billet requirements with qualified personnel. Improvements in personnel stability, closer skill matches, and attainment of training requirements will contribute to this increased readiness assessment.

(a) Reserve Aggregate Population Stability

Reserve Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
Officer	85.0	86.2	88.6	86.6	87.8	83.4	87.4
Enlisted	76.7	75.4	81.6	70.3	79.3	76.1*	78.1

*Corrected from FY 1987 report.

(b) Reserve Unit Personnel Stability.

Reserve Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>
Officer	*	58.5	59.7	*	*	*	47.0
Enlisted	*	47.2	54.5	*	*	*	47.9

*Data not available.

(7) Individual Mobilization Augmentee Programs. An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Selected Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the Active Force upon mobilization. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force, training in that billet during peacetime. The increases in IMAs from FY 1987 through FY 1989 will be applied to Medical Support and Navy Sea College requirements.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 1988</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Total IMAs	64	847	555	580

(8) Full Time Support Programs. In addition to no growth in our Selected Reserve end strength, there is no increase in the number of full time active duty Reservists in FY 1989. Full time Reservists are, for the most part, Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) personnel, but also include Reserve Recruiters on temporary active duty (TEMAC) and a small number of Selected Reserve officers recalled for duty at headquarters and the seat of government in accordance with 10 U.S. Code, section 265. Our full time Reservists are vital to the attainment of the Naval Reserve Mission; they man Naval Reserve Force ships, Reserve Aircraft Squadrons (RESFORNS), and other programs in increasing numbers and with increased dependency. Our full time personnel provide the training, maintenance, and support functions associated with modern state-of-the-art equipment being utilized and provided by the Naval Reserve today. These same personnel provide the necessary day-to-day administrative and logistic support functions which enable us to properly utilize the very limited time we have available to train our Reservists.

Reserve Full Time Support Programs
(End Strength in Thousands) ^{1/}

	<u>FY 1988</u> (ACT)	<u>FY 1989</u> (PROJ)	<u>FY 1990</u> (PROJ)	<u>FY 1991</u> (PROJ)
Sect. 265 ^{2/}	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
TAR Officer	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9
TAR Enlisted	18.4	18.4	18.7	19.0
Reserve Recruiters	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Reserve Subtotal	21.8	22.0	22.3	22.6
Active Navy	7.7	7.0	7.4	7.3
Navy Civilians	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.8</u>
TOTAL	32.5	32.0	32.6	32.7

1/ Totals may not add due to rounding.

2/ Reserve Officers in headquarters billets in accordance with Section 265, of Title 10, U.S. Code.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)

Navy IRR is composed of, in large part, personnel with recent active duty experience who still have a remaining military service obligation (MSO). The FY 1986 increase in IRR end strength marked the reversal of declining IRR strength that began in 1981.

In June 1984, the eight year MSO began, and in August 1984 the \$900 bonus for a three year IRR reenlistment was instituted. The extension of the MSO from six to eight years and the IRR bonus implementation is resulting in continued IRR growth through FY 1991. With the FY 1984 transfer of IRR personnel with a reenlistment code of RE-4 to standby, the IRR will show a slight decrease in FY 1989 with an increase in standby Reservists.

	<u>FY 1988</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1989</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1990</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)
<u>Drilling Without Pay (Volunteer Training Unit)</u>				
Officers	2,693	2,752	2,810	2,600
Enlisted	<u>1,064</u>	<u>848</u>	<u>775</u>	<u>750</u>
Total	3,757	3,600	3,585	3,350

Decreases in enlisted strength of VTUs due to implementation of high year tenure (HYT) rules for drilling Reservists. HYT will increase IRR (not drilling) as will eight year MSO.

Not Drilling				
Officers	13,172	12,360	12,712	13,150
Enlisted	<u>67,040</u>	<u>74,040</u>	<u>94,703</u>	<u>118,500</u>
Total	80,212	86,400	110,415	131,650
Total	83,969	90,000	113,600	135,000

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve is composed of personnel who maintain their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve and who are liable for active duty in accordance with 10 USC 672 and 674. The Standby Reserve Active Status List (S1) includes members transferred from the Ready Reserve as a result of temporary hardship, key employees in Federal and non-Federal employment, and theological/medical/dental students. The Standby Reserve Inactive Status List (S2) includes those volunteers who are no longer required to remain in an active status. Starting in FY 1989, all members entering the IRR with an RE-4 reenlistment code will be transferred to S2 status. This will initially increase the S2 population in FY 1989, but it will level out in FY 1990 and out.

Standby Reserve Strength

<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
(Actual)	(Projected)	(Projected)	(Projected)

A breakout of the FY 1988 Standby Reserve actuals follows:

Active (S1)

Officers	61	223	227	232
Enlisted	<u>847</u>	<u>828</u>	<u>845</u>	<u>862</u>
Total	908	1,051	1,072	1,094

Inactive (S2)

Officers	9,872	10,100	10,201	10,303
Enlisted	<u>19</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	9,891	10,110	10,213	10,317
Total	10,799	11,161	11,284	11,411

3. Retirees

This program includes regular and reserve retirees who have completed 20 years or more of active duty and, separately, reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. Twenty year active duty retirees are liable for recall to active duty at any time by the Secretary of the Navy in the interest of national defense. The latter category are liable for recall only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. Eighty percent of the Fleet Reserve, 70 percent of the Retired USN/USNR Class I and II (includes those non-disabled, under age 60, retired) and 10 percent of the retired USN/USNR Class III (includes over age 60 or disabled) are expected to respond to a call up.

Retired Strength

	<u>FY 1988</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1989</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1990</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 1991</u> (Projected)
Twenty-year Active Duty Retirees (USN/USNR)*				
CAT I/II (20 yr + active duty retiree)	179,850	181,241	183,053	184,884
CAT III	170,378	171,674	172,991	174,321
Other Retiree Reserves (Excluding Honorary Retirees)*				
*CAT I/II	25,394	72,023	72,743	73,470
*CAT III	94,146	63,984	64,624	65,270

*Statistics changes since last report are due to changes in data collection methods and sort criteria to more closely align with DoD retirement categories.

4. Active Duty For Training

Officers and Enlisted Members Serving on Active Duty for Training

<u>Category</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
<u>Enlisted</u>		
Recruit and Specialized Training (Including SAM Trainees)	5,679	5,120
<u>Officer</u>		
Flight Training (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	34	10
Professional (Includes OSAM acquisition training)	293	290
TOTAL	6,006	5,420

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of Navy's overall resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees directly support our fleet readiness posture. Approximately half of them work in industrial

activities, performing depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E, printing, public works, and transportation functions essential to the readiness of the fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in supply centers, air stations, and ship and aircraft repair and maintenance facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential support in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development, and acquisition, all of which have an indirect but important impact on readiness.

The civilian estimates represent the manpower levels required to execute program funding levels and reflect a concerted effort to contain personnel costs. To manage civilian costs effectively, the DON implemented in FY 1987 a new policy called "Manage to Payroll". Under this program, greater authority, incentive, and flexibility for the position classification and position management programs are placed on appropriate management levels. Military and civilian line managers are provided authority for establishing and classifying civilian positions, subject to the civilian payroll resources available to their organizations. The concurrent allocation of authorized payroll funding levels to line managers is part of the emphasis on managing civilian employment as an element of costs. Civilian estimates are balanced and structured to reflect declining end strength levels between FY 1988 and FY 1991 consistent with reduced program funding levels. The Navy civilian manpower request also demonstrates a continued strong commitment to manpower economies and efficiencies.

The FY 1990/1991 request is for 317.9/316.4 civilians, respectively. This request is shown by DPPC in Table IV-8.

TABLE IV-8
NAVY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Direct and Indirect Hires in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989 AUTHORIZED	FY 1990 AUTHORIZED	FY 1991 AUTHORIZED
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV			
<u>STRATEGIC</u>							
Offensive Strategic Forces	3.0	3.0	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	2.8	2.9	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.3
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>							
Tactical Air Force	7.3	6.8	7.8	7.1	8.4	9.7	9.4
Naval Forces	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Warships and ASW	1.6	1.0	1.7	1.8	2.0	3.3	3.3
Amphibious Forces	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7
Naval Support Forces	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.1	0.1
Mobility Forces	5.4	5.4	5.9	5.4	6.0	2.5	2.5
						6.0	5.8
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>							
Intelligence	3.2	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6
Centrally Managed Comm	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	33.8	34.6	34.4	33.4	33.2	33.2	32.7
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	7.1	7.1	7.5	7.1	7.6	7.8	7.8
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>							
Int'l Military Org	5.6	5.5	6.5	5.9	6.6	6.6	6.5
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities	5.3	5.2	6.3	5.7	6.3	6.3	6.2
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	165.4	174.3	164.5	167.2	163.1	156.2	156.0

<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>									
Combat Commands	8.4	8.1	8.3	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.7
	1.3	1.4	2.4	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Support Commands	7.1	6.7	5.9	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>									
Research and Development	33.2	37.1	36.4	36.9	36.8	37.0	36.8	36.8	36.8
Geophysical Activities	32.2	36.1	35.3	35.7	35.7	35.7	35.7	35.5	35.5
	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>									
Personnel Support	5.1	5.2	6.2	6.0	5.9	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.1
Individual Training	1.7	1.8	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5
	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>									
Support Installations	43.5	43.8	44.7	46.8	45.9	45.1	45.1	44.6	44.6
Centralized Support Act'y	41.5	41.8	42.9	45.1	44.2	43.4	43.4	43.0	43.0
	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	317.3	330.5	325.7	326.5	323.7	317.9	317.9	316.4	316.4
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	317.3	330.5	325.7	326.5	323.7	317.9	317.9	316.4	316.4

2. Major Program Changes

The FY 1988 through FY 1991 estimates reflect decreases consistent with the reduced overall funding levels. Major decreases in FY 1990 and FY 1991 include adjustments for Congressionally directed resource reductions for savings to be achieved as a result of efficiency and productivity studies, organizational analyses, and other cost containment activities. The FY 1989 estimates carry forward the impact of the Congressionally directed FY 1988 reductions for streamlined staffing of acquisition management and project additional savings to be achieved as the result of economy and efficiency initiatives. The estimates also include a reprogramming of end strength from Unified and Specified Command Headquarters and Headquarters support activities to validated requirements in combat and medical units. The reduction is the result of a special review conducted by the DoD Deputy Inspector General which identified opportunities for saving manpower in those areas.

Reductions in funded depot level maintenance will result in a corresponding reduction at the Naval Shipyards. Naval Ordnance Activities draw slightly down from their FY 1988 levels, while Naval Aviation Depots remain relatively stable in FY 1990 and decline in FY 1991, consistent with funded program levels. The end strength estimates for industrial fund activities continue to reflect the benefits of improved efficiency and productivity. These savings are being achieved through improved scheduling to realize the most efficient working tempo, optimum use of overtime, reductions in overhead, and other measures.

This budget submission also reflects a change in the way we support our program management and execution process by moving effort out of contracted advisory and assistance services and into the acquisition commands. This action was deemed necessary as a result of examinations by the Naval Investigative Service and the Navy Inspector General which showed that the level of contract support in acquisition organizations represented an unacceptable risk to the integrity of the acquisition process. Manpower to perform basic governmental functions, including activities of a policymaking or managerial nature, must be maintained in-house. Particularly sensitive functions are acquisition planning, preparation of justification and approvals, procurement requests, source selection plans, requests for proposals, and the source selection process itself. Our estimates reflect a realignment of funding and personnel increments of 238 end strength in FY 1989, 975 end strength in FY 1990, 1719 end strength in FY 1991. This conversion to in-house performance will be made at no net increase in cost.

3. Improvements and Efficiencies

The Navy estimate of civilian manpower requirements reflects a continuing commitment to increase the efficiency of the civilian work force. The majority of the Navy's efforts in this area are concentrated in the Commercial Activities (CA) and in the Navy Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP).

Under the CA program, we are conducting cost studies using OMB Circular A-76 procedures to determine whether performance of CA functions are more cost effective when performed under contract or by using in-house resources. In FY 1988, Navy completed CA Program studies on over 2,400 civilian positions, saving about 1,000 positions. The Navy has approximately 15,000 positions remaining to be studied. Budgeted savings related to studies are reflected in the fiscal year following the year in which each study is completed. FY 1990 and FY 1991 savings are based on studies of 8,865 civilian positions in FY 1989 and the remainder in FY 1990. Projected savings, which total 3,640 in FY 1990 and 1,751 in FY 1991, have been calculated by applying recent actual conversion factors to the announced study population and are based on studies of three percent of the total civilian population, pending study of all identified potential commercial activities. These results have been incorporated into our civilian estimates in compliance with the Executive Order of 19 Nov 1987 which requires, among other things, that budget estimates include expected yearly budget savings from the privatization of commercial activities.

The Naval Industrial Improvement Program (NIIP) is designed to implement a series of cost-avoidance management improvements within the Navy's industrial base. These efforts do not constitute a sweeping reform, but rather represent the implementation of the basics of management and control which in turn facilitate significant efficiencies of operations. With respect to civilian manpower considerations, we are drawing upon private sector experience and expertise in managing workforce levels in a more orderly manner commensurate with workload requirements. At each major industrial activity (including Naval shipyards, Naval Aviation Depots, Ordnance Facilities, and Public Works Centers) we are conducting detailed reviews of overhead staffing and workload requirements in order to better align resources. Additionally, various initiatives are directed at issues which limit Navy's flexibility to pursue productivity improvements, including:

- Fostering changes to rules which limit the quality of personnel resources and cause the retention of larger than necessary numbers of people.
- Refocusing personnel rules to more closely align with industrial activity needs through the concept of competition and reinforcement of cost consciousness in the workplace.
- Pursuing the realignment of the compensation system to relate productivity and compensation, thereby providing workers the opportunity to have more of a stake in the process and be evaluated for the bottom line results of their efforts.

Finally, we are attempting to remove a number of obstacles which preclude the maintenance of a lean, flexible workforce, including the streamlining of internal reduction-in-force procedures and the use of Transition Staffing Pools to lessen the adverse impact on employees while transitioning to new workforce configurations.

1

Navy also participates in a number of programs designed to enhance productivity and achieve economies of operation. The Productivity Investment Fund and the Navy Industrial Fund Asset Capitalization programs invest in modern equipment, methods, and labor saving devices to replace labor-intensive, costly operations and bring activities to a state-of-the-art position. The Defense Retail Interservice Support Program and Productivity Enhancing Investment Fund provide local commanders with a means to achieve cost effectiveness and economies of operation through interservice consolidations and acquisition of capital investments in areas of fast payback potential.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

Immediately upon mobilization, Navy will experience a manpower shortfall due to casualties, peacetime active duty manning, and mobilization delays. The shortfall will be eliminated quickly with the mobilization surge and the commencement of casualties returning to duty.

Manpower shortages will persist, however, in certain designators and ratings. The pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) will not be able to meet all of the requirements because of similar needs in other services as well as the civilian sector. Only after "ramping up" the military training schools to a wartime level will any substantial progress be made, and that progress will begin only after the training facilities graduate their first classes.

2. Civilian Manpower

The peacetime civilian authorizations from the baseline for civilian mobilization manpower planning. On M-Day and after, the peacetime numbers increase to reflect the growth in support required to build toward and sustain full mobilization. During mobilization, civilian positions will be created to support the buildup, and concurrently, positions will be terminated in activities that do not directly support the war effort.

Wartime manpower requirements include 19,053 additional people needed on M-Day and 51,365 new positions. Therefore, Navy needs to procure more than 70,418 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenario. These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, such as depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well as associated equipment and supply support.

Navy plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day include substantive recruitment efforts using the Emergency-Indefinite appointing authority for the rapid acquisition of new personnel. Other efforts include recall of recently retired civilian personnel and cross training of on-board staff.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

1. Navy Total Force

A Total Force Advocate flag officer billet within the Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations assesses the optimum mix of Active and Reserve Component manpower and units in the Navy. With analytical support from the Center for Naval Analyses, potential changes in Total Force composition are evaluated to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger share of peacetime naval operations and is able to train and be equipped to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.

By the mid-1990's, the US Naval Reserve (measured in manpower, ships, and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful naval force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the Active Navy, this Total Force will ensure that the United States will prevail in any conflict at sea. In some cases, most or all of the Navy's mission capability resides in the Reserve Component (e.g., U.S. based logistic air transport (VR), helicopter, light attack (HAL), combat search and rescue squadrons (HC), and naval control of shipping (NCS) units). In others, from one-third to more than three-quarters of the assets available for traditional Navy missions are provided by the Reserve (cargo handling, mine countermeasures, Military Sealift Command personnel, composite aircraft squadrons, SEABEES, special boat operations, maritime air patrol, and personnel for medical support). It is significant that those warfighting areas which exhibit relatively small Reserve participation (less than 15 percent) are essentially surface or subsurface missions supporting the maritime strategy through extended, forward deployments.

The Naval Reserve provides a wide range of capabilities within Navy's Total Force. Significant Naval Reserve contributions include the following (data as of the end of FY 88):

- 100 percent of Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HAL)
- 100 percent of Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
- 100 percent of Navy Combat Search and Rescue (SAR) Capability (HC-9)
- 99 percent of Naval Control of Shipping Organization
- 93 percent of Navy Cargo Handling Battalions
- 86 percent of Naval U.S. Based Logistic Airlift Squadrons (VR)
- 85 percent of Military Sealift Command (MSC) Military Personnel
- 82 percent of Naval Ocean Minesweepers
- 65 percent of Navy Mobile Construction Battalions
- 57 percent of Navy Special Boat Forces
- 48 percent of Naval Intelligence Personnel
- 35 percent of Naval Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons (VP)
- 34 percent of Navy Medical Support Personnel
- 33 percent of Naval Composite (service) Squadrons (VC)
- 25 percent of Navy Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons (HM)
- 19 percent of Navy Base Operating Support Personnel
- 24 percent of Navy Surface Combatants (Frigates)
- 14 percent of Navy Carrier Air Wings (CVW)
- 3 percent of Navy Amphibious Warfare Ships

The Navy has continued to increase the Reserve participation, as indicated in FY 1988, including further increased participation in aviation, surface combatant, mine countermeasures, and Fleet support.

The Navy's Total Force was tested in several significant ways during FY 1987. For example, following the decision to provide protection to the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, five Naval Reserve and one Active component ocean minesweepers (MSOs) deployed to the area to augment airborne mine countermeasures and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units already on-scene. Additionally, increased force requirements in the Persian Gulf prompted deployment of USS JOHN A. MOORE, a Pacific Fleet Naval Reserve guided missile frigate, to the Gulf to assist in maintaining the increased operational tempo. This marked the first extended peacetime deployment of a Naval Reserve frigate and resulted in 22 Selected Reserve (SELRES) volunteers with specific skills accepting voluntary recall for the duration of the deployment.

However, past decisions to assign significant combat and combat support capabilities to the Naval Reserve were not supported by the Congress when authorizing Naval Reserve end strength growth - both TAR full time support billets and the associated drilling SELRES billets. Further, despite several years of requests for legislative authority for incentives for hard-to-man units to help attract the quality and skill mix needed to man the programmed growth in the Naval Reserve, such authority was not granted. Together, these decisions constrain the ability of the Navy to recruit and retain key sailors for Naval Reserve frigates and other important units. Finally, the Navy conducted a test of its portion of the 200K Presidential call-up authority, recalling a sample of Selected Reserve units earmarked by fleet commanders for early activation at time of crisis or conflict. The results of the test were overwhelmingly favorable, reinforcing the commitment of the Naval Reserve to the Navy's Total Force.

III. NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustment in overall Navy strength.

Current projections are for 568 battle force ships and 229 aviation squadrons by the end of FY 1989, 574 and 230 in FY 1990, and 571 and 232 in FY 1991.

A. Strategic

The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category is associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The Trident program, strategic operational headquarters, and communications and automated data processing support are also included.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces

The increase in active spaces in FY 1989 results primarily from an increase in overall manning of FBMS Support Ships (+804), and of the Trident Program (+753), partially offset by a -160 decrease to the Fleet Ballistic Missile System (FBMS). In FY 1990, Offensive Strategic Forces increase by +601 with increases of +252 to Support Ships (FBMS) and + 966 to the Trident Program, partially offset by a decrease of -614 to Fleet Ballistic Missile System. FY 1991 active forces in this category increase by +151, which includes an increase of +310 to the Trident Program and a -202 decrease to Fleet Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. Active Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

The +230 increase in FY 1989 is due, in part, to an increase of +113 to FBM Control System-Comm and a +91 increase to Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR). The increase in active spaces in FY 1990 is due, in part, to an increase of +141 to Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR). The FY 1991 increase includes a +171 increase to ROTHR and a -99 decrease to FBM Control System-Comm.

There are no significant changes in Naval Reserve spaces in FY 1989 through FY 1991.

3. Civilian Strategic Forces

The increase in civilian spaces through FY 1990 largely results from completion of staffing of the Trident facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia. In FY 1991 civilian resources for Trident Refit Facility and Trident Training Facility transition from the special project office to the fleet and Naval Education and Training Command.

B. Tactical and Mobility

The Tactical and Mobility manpower is associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units. The active military growth in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the increase in the number of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements. The Naval Reserve growth in Tactical/Mobility forces supports specific increases in ship and squadron manning requirements.

1. Land Forces

Navy Land Forces include physicians, dentists, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to the Fleet Marine Forces and Marine Corps bases.

The increase of +876 in active spaces in FY 1989 is due primarily to increases of +462 to Marine Divisions and +407 to Force Service Support Group (FSSG). There is an increase of +119 in FY 1990 to FSSG, partially offset by minor decreases to Divisions (Marine) and reserve FSSG. There are no major changes in FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases in Naval Reserve spaces for FY 1989 through FY 1991.

2. Tactical Air Forces

The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, strike fighter, airborne early warning and electronic warfare squadrons; attack, multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

The increase in active spaces in FY 1989 results primarily from increases of +4616 in Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carriers (pre-commissioning build-up on the USS Abraham Lincoln), +174 in A-6 squadrons, and +961 in F/A-18 squadrons, +129 in F-14 squadrons, +259 in Sea-Based EW squadrons, and +111 in Shore Based EW squadrons, partially offset by a decrease of -783 to A-7 squadrons. In FY 1990 Tactical Air Forces increase by +580 with increases of +837 to Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carriers, +160 to F/A-18 squadrons, and +138 to Sea-Based EW squadrons, partially offset by decreases of -245 to A-7 squadrons and -101 to F-14 squadrons. FY 1991 active spaces decrease by -368 with decreases of -315 to Multi-Purpose Aircraft Carriers and -760 to A-7 squadrons, partially offset by an increase of +722 to F/A-18 squadrons.

The increases in Naval Reserve personnel in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991 are primarily due to manning units dedicated to new aircraft carriers (USS Abraham Lincoln, CVN 72; USS George Washington, CVN 73) and to increased manning needs for transitioning squadrons from A-7 to A-6 aircraft.

There are no major changes in civilian manpower.

3. Naval Forces

The Naval Forces subcategory includes manpower for anti-surface warfare forces, anti-submarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

FY 1989 active spaces increase by +1710 in the area of ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces with increases of +997 to Battleships (commissioning of Wisconsin), +2561 to Cruisers, +614 to Guided Missile Destroyers, +255 to Non-Missile Destroyers, +152 to Guided Missile Frigates, +322 to Air Mine Countermeasure Squadrons, and +157 to Operational Headquarters (Sea Control-Air). These increases are partially offset by decreases of -1504 to Non-Missile Frigates (with the decommissionings or transfers to the NRF of nine ships), -172 to ASW Patrol Squadrons, -591 to Attack Submarines, -205 to Mine Countermeasure Forces, -565 to Reserve Guided Missile Frigates, and -170 to Reserve Non-Missile Frigates.

In the area of Amphibious Forces, there are increases of +3703 to Amphibious Assault Ships (with the commissionings of one LHD and two LSDs), +245 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units, +314 to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces, and +374 to Ongoing Operational Activities - Active, partially offset by a -139 decrease to Reserve Amphibious Assault Ships.

The +6120 increase in the area of Naval Support Forces is primarily due to increases of +1051 to Support Forces (ADs), +2048 to Support Forces (AFDMS, ARDs, ARDMs, ASs, etc.), +1768 to Underway Replenishment Ships, +107 to Major Fleet Support Ships, +342 to Direct Support Squadrons - Aircraft, +559 to Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), +119 to Fleet Logistics Support, and +297 to Reserve SIMAs, partially offset by a decrease of -326 to Naval Construction Forces.

In FY 1990, active spaces in ASW and Fleet Air Defense increase by +2136 with increases of +1180 to Cruisers, +396 to Non-Missile Destroyers, +148 to LAMPS, +723 to attack Submarines, +281 to Mine Countermeasure Forces, +152 to Air Mine Countermeasure Squadrons, and +204 to Reserve Guided Missile Frigates. These increases are partially offset by decreases of -591 to Guided Missile Destroyers, -354 to Guided Missile Frigates, and -162 to Reserve Non-Missile Destroyers.

FY 1990 active spaces decrease by -199 in Amphibious Forces with a decrease of -876 to Amphibious Assault Ships, partially offset by increases of +155 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units, +111 to Reserve Amphibious Assault Ships, +280 to Ongoing Operational Activities - Active, and +106 to Ongoing Operational Activities - Reserve.

In FY 1990, there is a total increase of +1593 in Naval Support Forces due to increases of +754 to Support Forces (ADs), +667 to Support Forces (AFDMS, ARDs, ARDMs, ASs, etc.), +105 to Major Fleet Support Ships, +531 to SIMAs, and +110 to Reserve SIMAs, and a reduction of -593 to Underway Replenishment Ships.

FY 1991 ASW and Fleet Air Defense active spaces decrease by -2835 with decreases of -4060 to Guided Missile Destroyers (due to the decommissioning of 13 ships), -236 to Mine Countermeasure Forces, and -234 to Reserve Mine Countermeasure Forces, partially offset by increases of +1262 to Cruisers, +163 to Non-Missile Destroyers, +126 to S-3 Squadrons, and +153 to LAMPS.

FY 1991 Amphibious Forces active spaces increase by a total of +105 with increases of +132 to Amphibious Tactical Support Units and +324 to Reserve Amphibious Assault Ships, partially offset by a decrease of -343 to Amphibious Assault Ships.

In FY 1991, active Naval Support Forces increase by +3379 due, in part, to increases of +1604 to Support Forces (ADs), +181 to Support Forces (AFDMS, ARDs, ARDMs, ASs, etc.), +594 to Underway Replenishment Ships, +351 to Major Fleet Support Ships, and +587 to SIMAs.

Annual Reserve personnel increases support the continuing modernization of the Naval Surface Reserve, pursued vigorously since the early 1980s. In FY 1988, three additional frigates (FFs and FFGs) joined

the Naval Reserve, with two more scheduled to arrive in FY 1989. The Reserve Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare program added three units in FY 1988 and will add three in FY 1989, two in FY 1990, and no additional units in FY 1991, for a total of 28. The Craft of Opportunity Program (COOP) increased by three units in FY 1988 and will increase by four units in FY 1989, with four additional units in FY 1990, and no additional units in FY 1991, for a total of 22.

The civilian increase in FY 1989 will provide adequate staffing levels at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities. The civilian increase in FY 1990 is due to the realignment of some planning and engineering functions and of some civilian technical aviation specialists from program 7 to provide for increased effective and efficient use of resources (+1,300). Minor decreases are associated with commercial activities study conversions.

4. Mobility Forces

The Mobility Forces subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

There are no major increases or decreases of active duty spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

There are no significant changes to Naval Reserve forces in FY 1989 through FY 1991.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1989 is essentially at the Military Sealift Command (MSC) for civilian mariner manning of the Tanner and various AGOS/AOs (+553). Additional manning (+75) is provided for expanding support for the MSC fleet. The decrease in FY 1991 (-169) reflects the inactivation of Pawcatuck and Navasoto and the contractor operation of various AGOS'. These decreases are partially offset by civilian mariner manning of AGS-52, AGOS-20, AO-194, 196, and for revised manning of the Hayes. An additional increase (+34) provides ashore support required to support the expanding MSC fleet.

C. Communications/Intelligence

This category includes Manpower associated with Intelligence and Centrally Managed Communications.

1. Intelligence.

This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense.

The +749 growth in active spaces in FY 1989 is due primarily to a +138 increase to Cryptologic Activities and a +129 increase to Ocean Surveillance Information Center. There are no significant changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Naval Reserve spaces for FY 1989 through FY 1991.

The civilian increase in FY 1990 is primarily for Cryptologic Activities and HUMINT.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communication System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications system, communications security, and other related communications units.

The increase in FY 1989 active spaces is due primarily to a +321 increase to Navy Communications. There are no major increases or decreases to active spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no significant increases or decreases to Reserve spaces.

There are no significant changes in civilian manpower levels.

D. Combat Installations

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support for Combat Installations. Manpower in this category provides operation and maintenance of strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands including base communications and air traffic control.

There is a +1292 increase to active spaces in FY 1989 due, in part, to increases of +1225 to Base Ops - Naval Air Bases and +124 to Base Ops - Fleet Support Subsurface, partially offset by a -232 decrease to Base Ops - Fleet Support Surface. The increase in FY 1990 is due primarily to a +208 increase to Base Ops - Fleet Support Surface. There are no significant changes in FY 1991.

There are no major changes to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989, FY 1990, or FY 1991.

The decreases in civilian spaces in FY 1989 are the result of fleet shore reductions, reductions for brigs, physical security, efficiencies to be realized through the Efficiency Review Program, projected Commercial Activity and Most Efficient Organization (MEO) savings, and reduced support for WESTPAC ship maintenance.

Partially offsetting increases in civilian strength occur in support of strategic homeporting, Mayport public works, functional transfers, and support for fleet internal review. Additional decreases in FY 1991 reflect projected Commercial Activity and MEO savings and additional shore reductions in the the fleets. An increase for ship maintenance support (+53) slightly offsets the overall decrease.

E. Force Support Training

Force Support Training manpower supports units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

There are no major increases or decreases to active spaces in FY 1989 and FY 1991. The -397 decrease in FY 1990 is due primarily to decreases of -290 to Readiness Squadrons and -120 to Readiness Squadrons (ASW).

There are no significant increases or decreases to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989, FY 1990, or FY 1991.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1989 is programmed in support of the V22, the F14D, engineering, logistics and analysis, program management personnel in support of SQQ-89, and the improvement program for mine countermeasures.

F. Medical Support

Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities.

The FY 1989 increase to active Medical Support spaces is due primarily to increases of +444 to Care in Regional Defense Facilities, +122 to Other Health Activities, and +476 to Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics. The FY 1990 increase is mostly due to a +264 increase to Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics. There are no major changes in FY 1991.

The increases in Selected Reserve manpower support the rapidly expanding mobilization medical requirements, particularly for deployable medical systems, such as fleet hospitals. Increases of +293 spaces in FY 1989 over FY 1988 as well as increases of +346 in FY 1990 and +300 in FY 1991 are mainly due to Naval fleet hospital requirements, which are manned one year before initial operating capability. In FY 1988 there were 7 Naval Reserve fleet hospital units. This will increase to 8 in FY 1989, increase to 9 in FY 1990, increase to 10 in FY 1991, and increase by one unit each year until 1996, when a planned total of 15 units is achieved.

Civilian increases between FY 1988 and FY 1990 reflect Congressional guidance and support of Navy medical treatment facilities. Increases include inspection-directed help to overseas hospitals and clinics, increased civilian technician positions, administrative and clerical support, and rebuilding the physician assistant program. Increases are slightly offset with projected savings from the Commercial Activities Program.

G. Joint Activities

This category includes International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Federal Agency Support, Joint Staff, and OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities.

1. International Military Organizations

There are no major increases or decreases to active duty or Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no changes to civilian manpower levels.

2. Unified Commands

There are no major increases or decreases to active duty or Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major changes to civilian manpower levels through FY 1991.

3. Federal Agency Support

There are no major increases or decreases to active or Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

There are no changes to civilian manpower levels.

4. Joint Staff

There are no major increases or decreases to active or Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

5. OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities

The increase in FY 1989 OSD/Defense Agencies and Activities active spaces is due primarily to a +141 increase to Foreign Military Sales Support (reimbursable). There are no major changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989 through FY 1991.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1989 is due, in part, to increased support to foreign countries through the foreign military sales effort. The majority of effort will be performed for Japan, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. The majority of the increase (+302), however, staffs the Naval Investigative Service to reduce backlog in processing security clearances and in technical surveillance countermeasures. It will also support anti-fraud initiatives, allow for more active pursuit of general criminal and non-violent crimes, as well as to provide support for studies associated with contractor support for training and implementation of programs.

H. Central Logistics

Manpower in this subcategory is associated with Supply, Maintenance, and Logistics Support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

The -355 decrease to active Maintenance Operations is due, in part, to decreases of -233 to Ship Maintenance Activities (IF) and -552 to Naval Ordnance Activities (IF), partially offset by increases of +118 to Ship Maintenance Activities (Non-IF) and +215 to Maintenance Support Activities. There are no significant changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

Civilian changes for FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991 are discussed separately by type of operation as summarized below:

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
Supply Operations	24.8	25.2	25.6	26.0
Maintenance Operations	122.3	117.6	109.6	108.5
Logistic Support Operations	6.6	6.3	6.4	6.4

1. Supply Operations

Included are supply depots, inventory control points and procurement operations activities that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition.

The increases in civilian manpower between FY 1988 and FY 1991 are programmed to convert some Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) support to in-house personnel in acquisition organizations. This action was deemed necessary as a result of examinations by the Naval Investigative Service and Navy Inspector General which showed that the level of contract support in acquisition organizations represented an unacceptable risk to the integrity of the acquisition process.

2. Maintenance Operations

The decreases in civilian manpower between FY 1988 and FY 1991 are predominantly in the naval shipyards (-4,029 in FY 1989, -7,000 in FY 1990, and -500 in FY 1991). The manpower levels reflect the requirements base on shipyard workload phasing. Additionally, while funding levels influence the manning levels, other factors also impact the civilian manpower requirements. These include improved productivity, transition from overhauls to selected restricted availabilities, phased maintenance availabilities and intermediate maintenance, and influence of strategic homeporting on intermediate maintenance workload.

Another significant decrease occurs in the ordnance activities in FY 1989. A portion of this decrease results from efficiencies and productivity that will be realized by properly defined work packages

and improved manpower requirement determination based on workload. The Commercial Activities Program and MEO savings contribute to the decline, as does a reduction in the Buy Our Spares Smart program. Other ordnance reductions include engineering workload decrease and Receipt Segregation Storage and Issue (RSSI) decrease.

Other increases in FY 1989 include civilian resources programmed for the F-14 SDLM and P-3C update III Avionics Suites programs as a result of competition award, which is offset slightly by a decrease for the conversion of some in-house functions to contractor based on CA study. Other decreases in FY 1990 are the result of the transfer of some planning and engineering functions and some technical aviation specialists to another budget activity. FY 1991 civilian decreases reflect projected CA program savings and a decrease in resources for the Depot Maintenance Modifications program.

3. Logistics Support Operations

The reduction in civilians in FY 1989 results primarily from funding constraints levied in accordance with the Deficit Reduction Summit Agreement. Additional reductions are associated with savings projected to result from Efficiency Review studies, decreased program management effort in Commercial Activities, and realignment of priorities as performed at the Engineering Field Divisions which fund logistics, maintenance of real property, and military construction efforts. These decreases are slightly offset by an increase based on the realignment of Communications Security (COMSEC) from communications.

The slight increase in FY 1990 will provide support to execute planning studies, facilities support, real estate administration, and transportation workload.

I. Service Management Headquarters

This category includes management headquarters manpower required to support Combat and Support Commands.

1. Combat Commands

There are no major increases or decreases to active or Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

2. Support Commands

There are no major increases or decreases to active or Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1989 reflects the underexecution in Support Commands during FY 1988 due to the imposition of a hiring freeze to control outlays. These increases are partially offset by reductions that are the result of a special review conducted by the DoD Deputy Inspector General which identified opportunities for manpower savings.

J. Research and Development

Within this category fall Research and Development and Geophysical Activities.

1. Research and Development

The Navy's Research and Development (R&D) community comprises headquarters, laboratories, Research and Development, Test and Evaluation project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. A large portion of the manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

The increase to active spaces in FY 1989 is due, in part, to an increase of +828 to Facilities/Installation Support, partially offset by a decrease of -234 to Industrially-funded R&D Labs. There are no significant increases or decreases to active spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Reserve spaces in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

The decrease in FY 1991 reflects Commercial Activities anticipated savings, reduced support for electro-optical technology for electronic warfare applications, non-support of increased program in advanced system platforms and EWSI engineering support for the ALE-47 joint program, and reduced support of test and evaluation for security facilities at the air training center.

2. Geophysical Activities

The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities throughout the world. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

The increase to active spaces in FY 1989 is due, in part, to an increase of +133 to Weather Service. There are no significant changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989 through FY 1991.

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1990 is associated with the Weather Service, and reflects a civilian substitution of shore intensive ratings.

K. Training and Personnel

This category includes manpower associated with Personnel Support and Individual Training.

1. Personnel Support

This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

In FY 1989 the increase to active spaces is due primarily to increases of +686 in Recruiting Activities and +228 to Other Personnel Activities. There is an increase of +125 in FY 1990 to Other Personnel Activities. There are no significant changes in FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989, FY 1990, or FY 1991.

The decrease in civilian personnel between FY 1988 and FY 1989 is the result of the phasing of workload at the Antilles Consolidated School System. The nature of work requires that a level of effort be provided by intermittent employees. Due to phasing of the workload, some employees were on board at the end of FY 1988 that are not planned to be on board at the end of the subsequent years. The same level of effort will be performed, however, during the course of the year. The increases in FY 1991 are for the contracting, logistics, and personnel intern programs.

2. Individual Training

This category includes manpower for formal military and are technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

The +133 increase to active spaces in FY 1989 is due primarily to increases of +196 to General Skill Training and +110 to Other Flight Training, partially offset by a -437 decrease to Undergraduate Pilot Training - Strike. There are no major changes in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no significant increases or decreases in Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989 through FY 1991.

The decrease in FY 1989 civilian manpower is attributable to projected savings generated by the Commercial Activities program at the training center. These same projected savings are offset in FY 1990 by an increase for continuing education, the professional development program, and for academic excellence.

L. Support Activities

This category includes strength associated with Base Operating Support (BOS) for Support Installations and for Centralized Support Activities.

1. Support Installations

Support forces (BOS) includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

In Support Installations, the increased active duty manning in FY 1989 can be attributed to increases of +104 to Base Ops - Fleet Logistics Support, +440 to Base Ops - Logistics - Navy, +202 to Base Ops - Health Care, and +112 to Base Ops - Other General Personnel Accounts, partially offset by decreases of -434 to Base Ops - Other Base Support, -103 to Base Ops - Other Naval Reserve, and -234 to Commissary Retail Sales. The -547 decrease in FY 1990 is attributed primarily to a -427 decrease to Base Ops - Training - Navy. There are no significant increases or decreases in FY 1991.

There are no major increases or decreases to Naval Reserve manpower in FY 1989 through FY 1991.

Civilian manpower decreases between FY 1988 and FY 1989 are due primarily to economies and efficiencies expected to be achieved as a result of public works management initiatives being implemented at all Public Works Centers, for replacement by non-medical military in support of the hospital ship's reduced operations status, and the fleet hospital program; and for various functional transfers. Further economies in FY 1990 and FY 1991 will be realized through the Commercial Activities Program, the Efficiency Review Program and other Navy initiatives to improve efficiency and productivity.

2. Centralized Support Activities

This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

The FY 1989 decrease to active spaces is due primarily to a decrease of -114 to Personnel Administration. There are no major increases or decreases to active spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

There are no major changes to Reserve manning in FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991.

There are no significant changes in civilian manpower.

M. Undistributed

The Navy's internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force structure manning. Average strength for the force differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning, usually related to permanent change of station moves and accessions. These seasonal fluctuations may result in undermanning (fewer people than spaces) or overmanning (more people than spaces) in both the active and reserve force. Through proper management of the distributable force, Navy endeavors to maintain a steady active force deviation.

N. Individuals

The Individuals account represents spaces to accommodate Navy's manpower not in the Force Structure due to a specific type of status described in the following subcategories.

1. Transients

Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during permanent change of station moves and include travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute (except those on temporary duty for training).

There are no significant changes to Transients in FY 1989. In FY 1990 they increase by +348 and in FY 1991 they decrease by -123.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

In FY 1989 there is a decrease of -708 to Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. There are no major increases or decreases in active spaces in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

3. Trainees, Students, Midshipmen, and NAVCADS

Spaces for manpower completing initial entry training (trainees), manpower attending noninitial entry courses of instruction in

a permanent change of station status or in a temporary duty status while executing a permanent change of station move (students), students (Midshipmen) attending the United States Naval Academy, and Naval Aviation Cadets (NAVCADS).

In FY 1989, there is a decrease of 17,118 active spaces in Individual Training due to the following decreases: -5969 to Recruit Training Units, -117 to Officer Candidate/Training Schools, -338 to Other College Commissioning Programs, -9889 to General Skill Training, -269 to Undergraduate Navigator/NFO Training (UNT), -206 to Undergraduate Pilot Training - Strike, -164 to Undergraduate Pilot Training - Maritime, -111 to Undergraduate Pilot Training - Rotary, and -234 to Education and Training - Health Care - DoD Inst. There is one significant increase of +182 to Service Academies. In FY 1990, the -554 decrease to Individual Training is mostly a result of a -118 decrease to General Skill Training and a -464 decrease to Education and Training - Health Care - DoD Institutions. There are no significant increases or decreases in FY 1991.

In FY 1989, there is a decrease of -365 in Force Support Training due primarily to a -270 decrease to Readiness Squadrons and -169 to Fleet Support Training. There are no major changes in FY 1990 or FY 1991.

There are no significant increases or decreases to Midshipmen or NAVCADS through FY 1991.

The fluctuations in Selected Reserve manpower result primarily from a restructuring of the Sea and Air Mariner program, to reduce the throughput of the program from approximately 10,000 new recruits annually to less than 6,000. The number of skill training billets ("A" school seats) have been increased for both officer and enlisted Sea and Air Mariners who have completed initial training.

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROGRAMI. INTRODUCTIONA. General

This chapter describes the Marine Corps active military, Reserve military, and civilian manpower program; presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1990; depicts manpower trends; discusses initiatives; and explains the changes from year to year. It also describes changes to provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment, and greater integration with the Active Forces, in keeping with the Total Force concept.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 requires the submission of a two year budget beginning in FY 1988. Specifically, the Act stated: "In order to more coherently establish National Defense priorities, last year the Congress directed in law that the President submit a two year budget for the Department of Defense beginning in FY 1988." Consequently, this chapter addresses the first year of the biennial budget, i.e., FY 1990.

The Marine Corps has a unique mission as established by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which provides that the Marine Corps will consist of and shall provide:

- "Three combat divisions, air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services.. organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet."
- "Detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy."
- "Security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases."
- "Marines to perform such other duties as the President may direct."
- "Guards for U.S. embassies...as a result of a Memorandum of Agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended."

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability.

To support its missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains an FMF posture as follows: a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on each Coast composed of a Command Element, a Marine Division, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and a Force Service Support Group (FSSG). In addition, one MEF is forward deployed in the Pacific area.

The roles of the Marine Corps Reserve Forces on mobilization are to selectively augment the Active Forces in order to field three active Marine Expeditionary Forces at full wartime structure, selectively reinforce the active MEF's with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units, and provide the capability to field a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (with reduced aviation and limited combat service support capability) to reinforce an active MEF. If augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, to provide the capability to field a Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group with reduced capability. The Marine Corps Reserve Forces can provide a nucleus to reconstitute a Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group if augmentation/reinforcement is ordered. As a general rule, individual Reserve units are mirror images of their active counterparts in order to facilitate their integration into the Total Force. The structure and equipment found in the Marine Corps Reserve are similar to that found in the Active Component, thus enhancing the Marine Corps Reserve's augmentation and reinforcement capabilities.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements

The Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data prepared in accordance with the Defense Guidance Illustrated Planning Scenario is one of the tools available for the Marine Corps to determine military and civilian manpower requirements.

Wartime Peak Demand for Trained Manpower (M+180) (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 94</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Peak Demand	399.7	420.5	*22.0

*Excludes Foreign National Indirect Hire

C. Marine Corps Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan

Although the National Security Act of 1947 mandates that the Marine Corps maintain a minimum of three wings and divisions with supporting units, it does not specify the size, composition, or percent of manning of these units. These factors, as well as the nature, size, and composition of the supporting establishment, are left to the discretion of the President and Secretary of Defense.

The Marine Corps selectively mans its authorized force structure to maximize combat capability, placing top priority on manning combat forces. Support forces are kept to a minimum. Except in time of emergency e.g., during wartime, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements and are scheduled to be augmented by reassigning active component or pretrained manpower (Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Retirees). Fiscal realities preclude manning of certain units in peacetime.

If the Marine Corps were to fully man all active authorized Marine Corps units and organizations 219,714 Marines would be needed in FY 1990 and 220,573 in FY 1991.

The Marine Corps request for Active and Reserve military and civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991 is as follows:

<u>Marine Corps Manpower Program</u> <u>(Strength in Thousands)</u>		
	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Military	197.2	197.2
Marine Corps Reserve	44.0	44.1
Civilian Personnel	21.6	21.6

The difference between the peacetime manpower program and wartime demand for manpower is the requirement to man vacant FMF billets, supporting establishment (non-FMF) billet increases, and provide for casualty replacements. To meet the demand for wartime manpower, the Marine Corps will use all available assets: Active Component personnel, Selected Marine Corps Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, Retirees, and non prior service accessions.

D. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' long term program includes a carefully planned restructuring to modernize and standardize the force. This program provides for improved Active and Reserve Force capabilities, retaining in the Active Component only those forces and functions essential for the timely response to contingencies and maintenance of the nation's force in readiness. All other forces and functions are placed in the Reserves.

The structure changes planned from FY 1990 to FY 1994 are designed to meet the most likely low-to-mid intensity conflicts of the future.

1. Active Structure Changes

Significant changes to the Command Element (CE) and the Ground Combat Element (GCE) are in progress as a result of the FY 1988 Force Structure Study Board. These recommendations, are designed to enhance the warfighting capability of the Marine Expeditionary Forces. Implementation began in FY 1988 and will continue through FY 1995. The most substantial change to the GCE is the cadreing of three infantry battalions. This action, however, is offset by substantial enhancements to the 24 remaining infantry battalions available to all contingency plans. These enhancements include adding 41 Marines to each infantry battalion and all battalions being manned at 94 percent of their Table of Organization (T/O), representing a four percent increase over current manning; and adding a fourth rifle company to each of the battalions designated special operations capable. The Light Armored Infantry Battalions will be enhanced with the addition of 168 scout infantrymen and the headquarters company of each infantry regiment will be enhanced by the addition of a scout platoon of 22

Marines. During 3D Quarter, FY 1989, a fourth reconnaissance company will be added to each reconnaissance battalion in all three of the active divisions and a fourth direct support combat engineer company will be added to the Combat Engineer Battalion in each Division. The plans to activate a second general support artillery battalion for I and III MEF in FY 1989 have been cancelled and the second general support artillery battalion for II MEF will be deactivated in FY 1990. These three general support battalions are planned to be reactivated in the Marine Corps Reserve in FY 1992.

Finally, a Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence (SRI) Group will be activated in each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) thereby consolidating a large portion of the intelligence gathering and analysis capability available to the MEF Commander. The enhancements, deactivations and activations discussed above result in a net manning increase of 3005 Marines in the Ground Combat and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command Elements. The manning increase caused concurrent manning decreases in the Aviation and Combat Service Support Elements of each MEF.

The aviation combat forces are transitioning to improved models of aircraft including the F/A-18 and the AV-8B fixed wing aircraft. Also, an additional Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battery is being added. The fielding of these weapons systems drives the increased requirement for tactical and helicopter combat support.

The combat service support forces are in a dynamic transition. The programmed Force Service Support Group reorganization will ensure that the combat service support forces are efficiently organized to provide the required support. New or improved items of equipment currently being introduced or programmed are the Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) and the Medium Lift Motor Transport Item/Container Handling Equipment (MHE). The new weapons and equipment being fielded impact directly on the supporting establishment, to meet the sophisticated training requirement of the modern Marine Corps.

2. Reserve Structure Changes

The Marine Corps' continuous review of requirements within the Total Force has identified needs to increase the Reserve structure. In FY 1989, we will activate 3 bulk fuel companies, 2 bridge platoons, and one TOW platoon. We continue to enhance the Reserve artillery organization as the direct support artillery battalions continue to reorganize for and receive the M198, 155mm towed howitzer, thus acquiring a substantial increase in firepower. Aviation planners are being challenged by the complexities presented by future fixed wing aircraft transitions in the Reserves.

3. Manpower Plan

The Marine Corps Manpower Plan is given in the following tables:

Marine Corps Active Manpower Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>BUDGET</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
*STRATEGIC	*	*	*	*	*
TACTICAL MOBILITY	120.2	120.4	122.5	122.1	122.0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELLIGENCE	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.4	10.0	9.4	9.2	9.0
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.7	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	14.3	14.5	14.4	14.2	14.1
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	13.5	13.3	13.1	13.0	12.9
UNDISTRIBUTED	NA	NA	0.8	0.5	0.5
INDIVIDUALS	30.1	30.5	28.2	29.4	29.9
Transients	8.0	5.7	5.3	5.4	5.5
Holdees	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Students	21.2	23.7	21.7	22.8	23.2
TOTAL	198.0	197.3	197.2	197.2	197.2

* LESS THAN 50

Marine Corps Reserve Manpower Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Tactical/Mobility*	35.6	37.8	37.4	37.7	37.8
Support Activities	.7	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.6
Individuals	4.1	3.5	4.0	4.3	4.3
IMA	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4
TOTALS	41.6	43.6	43.6	44.0	44.1

* Includes Reserve Full Time Support assigned to tactical mobility forces.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Plan (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Support Activities	22.4	21.3	21.8	21.6	21.6
TOTALS	22.4	21.3	21.8	21.6	21.6

E. Key Manpower Issues

In FY 1990 and FY 1991 the Marine Corps will complete manpower initiatives to enhance warfighting capability. Marine Corps manpower initiatives will enhance the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command Elements and infantry battalions. Within the constraints of current end strength ceilings the Marine Corps cadres three infantry battalions to meet a 3,000 end strength reduction resulting from the FY 1989 Presidents Amended Budget Submission. The artillery restructure resulted in two general support battalions not standing up as previously planned and two batteries being deactivated in FY 1989. In FY 1990, one general support battalion and three batteries will be deactivated. The missions of these units will be assumed by existing artillery battalions and batteries in the reserves until FY 1992 when they will be reestablished as reserve units.

Also, changes in the Marine Corps Aviation Combat Element and Combat Service Support Element structure were made to support warfighting enhancements by transferring selected units to the reserves. These changes provided for increased manning to Infantry Battalions, Force Reconnaissance Companies, Radio Battalions, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies and allowed for the stand up of one Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Military Manpower

1. General

Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1989 end strength of 197,200. An end-strength of 197,200 is requested for FY 1990 and FY 1991.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength

a. Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning

Following the Marine Corps force structure reorganization to enhance warfighting capability to meet the most likely low-to-mid intensity conflicts of the future Total Active Force structure changes from 186,962 in FY 1989 to 186,981 in FY 1990, an increase of 19 and remains constant from FY 1990 to FY 1991. Programmed manning decreases in relation to force structure growth and the Total Active Force Structure is manned at 90%.

Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 provide an overview of the changing relationship between programmed manpower structure, programmed manning, and end strength, by officer, enlisted, and total manpower.

TABLE V-1
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
AC TOTAL MILITARY															
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
* STRATEGIC	*	*		*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*		*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
TACTICAL MOBILITY	134.3	120.3		139.5	120.4		139.6	122.5	88	139.5	122.1	88	139.5	122.0	87
Land Forces	102.6	89.5		109.7	93.9		110.9	97.2	88	110.8	97.1	88	110.4	96.7	88
Tactical Air Forces	31.0	30.2		28.9	25.7		27.8	24.5	87	27.9	24.3	87	28.3	24.5	87
Naval Forces	0.7	0.6		0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8	100	0.8	0.8	99	0.8	0.8	99
Warships and ASW	0.4	0.4		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	99	0.6	0.6	99	0.6	0.6	99
Amphibious Forces	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	99	0.2	0.2	99
Naval Support Forces	0.1	0.1		*	*		*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.8	0.8		0.9	0.8		0.9	0.9	97	0.9	0.9	97	0.9	0.9	97
Intelligence	0.8	0.7		0.8	0.7		0.8	0.8	97	0.8	0.8	97	0.8	0.8	97
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	98	0.1	0.1	98	0.1	0.1	98
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	9.4	9.4		10.5	10.0		10.4	9.4	90	10.4	9.2	88	10.4	9.0	86
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.7	3.7		3.0	3.1		3.1	3.0	99	3.1	3.1	99	3.1	3.1	98
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.8	1.8		2.1	2.0		2.1	2.1	100	2.1	2.1	100	2.1	2.1	100
Joint Military Org	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.3		0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	100
Federal Agency Support	1.4	1.4		1.5	1.4		1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Joint Chiefs of Staff	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
OSD/Defense															
Agencies/Activities	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.8	0.8		1.0	1.0		0.9	0.9	94	0.9	0.9	93	0.9	0.8	92
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	1.9	1.9		1.8	1.6		1.8	1.7	96	1.8	1.7	96	1.8	1.7	95
Combat Commands	0.9	0.9		0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7	97	0.7	0.7	96	0.7	0.7	94
Support Commands	1.0	1.0		1.1	0.9		1.1	1.1	96	1.1	1.1	96	1.1	1.1	95

AC TOTAL MILITARY	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Research and Development	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	14.3	14.3		14.5	14.5		14.6	14.4	99	14.6	14.2	98	14.5	14.1	97
Personnel Support	5.3	5.3		5.4	5.4		5.4	5.3	99	5.4	5.3	98	5.4	5.3	98
Individual Training	8.9	8.9		9.1	9.1		9.1	9.0	99	9.1	8.9	97	9.1	8.8	96
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	13.8	13.5		13.3	13.3		13.4	13.1	98	13.4	13.0	97	13.4	12.9	96
Support Installations	11.4	11.4		11.0	11.0		11.1	10.9	99	11.1	10.8	98	11.1	10.7	97
Centralized Support Act'y	2.5	2.5		2.3	2.3		2.3	2.2	93	2.3	2.2	93	2.3	2.1	92
TOTAL PROGRAMMED	181.0	167.9		186.9	166.9		187.0	168.2	90	187.0	167.4	90	187.0	166.8	90
MANNING															
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0		0	0		NA	0.8	NA	NA	0.5	NA	NA	0.5	NA
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES	1.2	1.2		1.3	1.4		NA	1.3	NA	NA	1.3	NA	NA	1.4	NA
INDIVIDUALS	30.1	30.1		30.5	30.5		NA	28.2	NA	NA	29.4	NA	NA	29.9	NA
Transients	8.0	8.0		5.7	5.7		NA	5.3	NA	NA	5.4	NA	NA	5.5	NA
Holdees	1.0	1.0		1.2	1.2		NA	1.2	NA	NA	1.2	NA	NA	1.2	NA
Students	21.2	21.2		23.7	23.7		NA	21.7	NA	NA	22.8	NA	NA	23.2	NA
END-STRENGTH	211.1	198.0		217.4	197.3		NA	197.2	NA	NA	197.2	NA	NA	197.2	NA

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

TABLE V-2
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC OFFICERS	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991					
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES																		
* STRATEGIC	*	*		*	*		*	*		100	*	*		100	*	*		100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*		*	*		*	*		100	*	*		100	*	*		100
TACTICAL MOBILITY	10.7	10.1		10.6	9.9		10.9	9.8		90	10.9	10.0		92	10.9	10.0		92
Land Forces	7.5	7.0		7.6	7.3		8.0	7.2		91	8.0	7.3		92	7.8	7.2		92
Tactical Air Forces	3.0	2.9		2.9	2.5		2.8	2.5		90	2.8	2.5		92	2.8	2.6		92
Naval Forces	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		99	0.1	0.1		99	0.1	0.1		99
Warships and ASW	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		97	0.1	0.1		97	0.1	0.1		97
Amphibious Force	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100
Naval Support Forces	*	*		*	*		*	*		100	*	*		100	*	*		100
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		96	0.2	0.2		96	0.2	0.2		96
Intelligence	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		96	0.1	0.1		96	0.1	0.1		96
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*		*	*		*	*		97	*	*		97	*	*		97
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	1.0	1.3		1.0	1.1		1.0	1.0		100	1.0	1.0		100	1.0	1.0		100
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		0.4	0.4		100	0.5	0.5		100	0.5	0.5		100
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0.4	0.4		0.5	0.4		0.5	0.5		99	0.5	0.5		98	0.5	0.5		98
Int'l Military Org	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100
Unified Commands	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		100	0.1	0.1		100	0.2	0.2		100
Federal Agency Support	*	*		0.1	*		0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100
Defense Agencies	*	*		*	*		*	*		100	*	*		100	*	*		100
Joint Chiefs of Staff	*	*		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		100	*	*		100	0.1	0.1		100
Office of the Secretary of Defense	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100	0.1	0.1		100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2		96	0.2	0.2		96	0.2	0.2		96
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	1.0	1.0		1.0	0.9		1.0	1.0		96	1.0	1.0		96	1.0	1.0		96
Combat Commands	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3		96	0.3	0.3		96	0.3	0.3		96
Support Commands	0.7	0.7		0.7	0.6		0.7	0.6		96	0.7	0.7		96	0.7	0.7		96

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AC OFFICERS	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	%
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES																				
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT																				
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	100	0.1	0.1	100	100	0.1	0.1	100	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL																				
Personnel Support	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.2	98	98	2.3	2.2	98	98	2.3	2.2	98	98
Individual Training	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	98	98	0.8	0.8	98	98	0.8	0.8	98	98
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES																				
Support Installations	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	97	97	1.5	1.4	97	97	1.5	1.4	97	97
Centralized Support Act'y	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	97	97	1.3	1.3	97	97	1.3	1.3	97	97
TOTAL PROGRAMMED	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	98	98	0.7	0.7	98	98	0.7	0.7	98	98
MANNING	17.5	16.7	17.8	16.6	17.8	16.6	17.8	16.6	17.9	16.7	94	94	17.8	16.9	95	95	17.8	16.9	95	95
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NA	-0.3	NA	NA	NA	-0.5	NA	NA	NA	-0.5	NA	NA
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES																				
AUGMENTEES	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	NA	0.8	NA	NA	NA	0.8	NA	NA	NA	0.8	NA	NA
INDIVIDUALS																				
Transients	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	NA	3.7	NA	NA	NA	3.7	NA	NA	NA	3.7	NA	NA
Holdees	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	NA	0.6	NA	NA	NA	0.5	NA	NA	NA	0.5	NA	NA
Students	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	NA	0.1	NA	NA	NA	0.1	NA	NA	NA	0.1	NA	NA
END-STRENGTH	2.6	2.6	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	NA	3.0	NA	NA	NA	3.1	NA	NA	NA	3.1	NA	NA
	20.9	20.1	21.3	20.1	21.3	20.1	21.3	20.1	NA	20.1	NA	NA	NA	20.1	NA	NA	NA	20.1	NA	NA

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

TABLE V-3
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING, AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
* STRATEGIC	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
TACTICAL MOBILITY	123.6	115.3	128.8	110.6	128.7	112.7	128.7	112.7	88	128.7	112.2	87	128.7	112.0	87
Land Forces	95.1	82.5	102.1	86.6	102.9	90.0	102.9	90.0	87	102.8	89.8	87	102.5	89.5	88
Tactical Air Forces	28.0	27.3	26.0	23.2	25.1	22.1	25.1	22.1	88	25.2	21.7	86	25.4	21.9	87
Naval Forces	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	100	0.7	0.7	99	0.7	0.7	99
Warships and ASW	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	100	0.5	0.5	99
Amphibious Forces	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	98	0.1	0.1	98
Naval Support Forces	0.1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	97	0.7	0.7	97	0.7	0.7	97
Intelligence	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	97	0.7	0.7	97	0.7	0.7	97
Centrally Managed Comms	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	8.4	8.4	9.5	9.0	9.5	8.4	9.5	8.4	88	9.5	8.1	86	9.5	7.9	84
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.3	3.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	98	2.7	2.7	99	2.7	2.6	97
JOINT ACTIVITIES	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	100
Int'l Military Org	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Unified Commands	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	100
Federal Agency Support	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100
Defense Agencies	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Joint Chiefs of Staff	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
Office of the Secretary of Defense	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	100	*	*	100	*	*	100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	94	0.7	0.6	92	0.7	0.6	90
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	96	0.8	0.8	95	0.8	0.8	93
Combat Commands	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	98	0.4	0.4	95	0.4	0.4	93
Support Commands	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	95	0.4	0.4	94	0.4	0.4	93

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AC ENLISTED	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH		INV		AUTH		INV		RQMT	AUTH		% MNG	RQMT	AUTH		% MNG	RQMT	AUTH		% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES																				
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	0.1	100	0.1	0.1	0.1	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	12.1	12.5	12.5	12.4	12.2	12.2	12.4	12.3	12.3	12.2	12.2	99	12.3	12.0	12.0	98	12.3	11.9	11.9	97
Personnel Support	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	99	4.6	4.5	4.5	98	4.6	4.5	4.5	98
Individual Training	7.5	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.6	99	7.7	7.5	7.5	97	7.7	7.3	7.3	96
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	12.4	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.0	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.1	11.8	11.8	98	12.1	11.7	11.7	97	12.1	11.6	11.6	96
Support Installations	10.7	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.3	99	10.4	10.2	10.2	98	10.4	10.1	10.1	97
Centralized Support Act'y	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	92	1.7	1.5	1.5	91	1.7	1.5	1.5	90
TOTAL PROGRAMMED	163.5	151.2	151.2	150.3	169.1	151.5	150.3	169.1	169.1	151.5	151.5	90	169.1	150.5	150.5	89	169.1	150.1	150.1	89
MANNING																				
UNDISTRIBUTED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.1	1.1	NA	0	0.9	0.9	NA	0	0.9	0.9	NA
** INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION																				
AUGMENTEES	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	NA	0.5	0.6	0.6	NA	0.5	0.6	0.6	NA
INDIVIDUALS	26.7	26.7	26.7	27.0	27.0	27.0	27.0	27.0	27.0	24.5	24.5	NA	27.0	25.7	25.7	NA	27.0	26.2	26.2	NA
Transients	7.2	7.2	7.2	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.7	4.7	NA	5.1	4.8	4.8	NA	5.1	4.9	4.9	NA
Holders	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	NA	1.1	1.1	1.1	NA	1.1	1.1	1.1	NA
Students	18.6	18.6	18.6	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8	18.7	18.7	NA	20.8	19.7	19.7	NA	20.8	20.2	20.2	NA
END-STRENGTH	190.2	177.9	177.9	177.3	196.1	177.1	177.3	196.1	196.1	177.1	177.1	NA	196.1	177.1	177.1	NA	196.1	177.2	177.2	NA

* Less Than 50.

** Non-additive.

b. Operating Strength

For FY 1990 and FY 1991 the Marine Corps has programmed operating strength supply equal to programmed manning demand, forming a balanced manpower plan in the sense that if all elements of the program are executed (recruiting, training, staffing, etc.), the average operating strength population will be sufficient to staff the billets programmed for manning. Actual execution of the plan in FY 1990 and FY 1991 may deviate somewhat from the program, but these deviations have historically been minimal.

3. Skill and Grade

Table V-4 summarizes the existing and projected inventories as they compare to programmed manning and individuals. In the aggregate, the enlisted population is believed to be sufficient to meet the programmed manning demand through FY 1989/90/91. However, there will continue to be both overages and shortages in specific military occupational specialties (MOSs). The total number of enlisted skills which remain unbalanced is projected to decrease by FY 1990. This decrease will be reflected primarily in the E5-E9 population, as the new Marine Corps policy of selecting career force Marines for promotion by MOS requirements better shapes the career force inventory. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) continues to be the most important tool for reducing career force skill imbalances in the Fleet. The overall trend is favorable.

4. Experience

Table V-5 displays the average years of service (YOS) by grade for officer and enlisted. The enlisted force is becoming more experienced. The career force is expected to approach 76,000 by the end of FY 1990. This reflects a more mature and experienced career force, providing a stable leadership cadre in the Corps. However, this careerist growth has not been matched by grade growth, and the resulting promotion stagnation is now affecting retention, especially at the first term reenlistment point. Programs are being examined which may relieve this problem.

TABLE V-4
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED Manning AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in thousands)

	FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 90			FY 91		
	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL	OVER**	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL
E1-E4												
Number of Skills	56	56	164	278	NA	NA	NA	278	NA	NA	NA	278
PMI	24.3	24.3	72	120.6	NA	NA	NA	105.1	NA	NA	NA	105.1
Inventory	35.1	23.4	61.4	119.9	NA	NA	NA	104.3	NA	NA	NA	104.3
Over/Short	+10.8	-0.9	-10.6	-7	+8.6	-0.9	-9.2	-1.5	+8.6	-0.9	-9.2	-1.5
E5-E9												
Number of Skills	139	86	123	348	121	114	113	348	121	114	113	348
PMI	22.6	13.9	19.9	56.4	NA	NA	NA	54.6	NA	NA	NA	54.6
Inventory	26.2	13.8	15.9	55.9	NA	NA	NA	53.4	NA	NA	NA	53.4
Over/Short	+3.6	-0.1	-4.0	-5	+3.3	-0.1	-3.6	-1.2	+3.3	-0.1	-3.6	-1.2
Total E1-E9	102	94	158	354	95	171	148	354	95	171	148	354
PMI	51.0	47.0	79.1	177.1	NA	NA	NA	177.1	NA	NA	NA	177.1
Inventory	63.1	46.9	66.6	176.1	NA	NA	NA	176.1	NA	NA	NA	176.1
Over/Short	+12.1	-0.6	-12.4	-1.0	+9.3	-0.6	-11.2	-1.0	+9.3	-0.6	-11.2	-1.0
W1-W6												
Number of Skills	19	26	10	55	17	28	10	54	17	28	10	54
PMI	0.2	0.6	0.5	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.4	1.5
Inventory	0.3	0.9	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.3	1.5	0.2	0.9	0.3	1.5
Over/Short	+0.1	*	-0.1	*	+0.1	*	*	*	+0.1	*	*	*
01-03												
Number of Skills	17	33	23	73	16	34	23	73	16	34	23	73
PMI	3.2	7.3	2.6	13.1	3.1	7.4	2.6	13.1	3.1	7.4	2.6	13.1
Inventory	4.3	7.2	1.7	13.2	4.2	7.3	7.7	13.1	4.2	7.3	7.7	13.1
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-0.9	+0.1	1.1	*	0.9	*	1.1	*	0.9	*
04-06												
Number of Skills	23	14	39	76	20	23	31	74	20	23	31	74
PMI	1.4	1.4	2.7	5.5	1.2	1.8	2.5	5.4	1.2	1.8	2.5	5.4
Inventory	2.5	1.4	1.5	5.4	2.3	1.8	1.3	5.4	2.3	1.8	1.3	5.4
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-1.2	-0.1	1.1	*	-1.2	*	1.1	*	-1.2	*

TABLE V-5
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	TOTAL		PEOPLE		TOTAL		PEOPLE		TOTAL		PEOPLE		TOTAL		PEOPLE	
	AVE.	WITH >	4	YOS	AVE.	WITH >	4	YOS	AVE.	WITH >	4	YOS	AVE.	WITH >	4	YOS
E1-E4 PMI*																
Inventry	120.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	120.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	120.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	120.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
	120.7	17.6	2.9	2.9	120.7	18.3	2.9	2.9	120.6	20.1	3.1	3.1	120.6	20.1	3.1	3.1
E5-E9 PMI																
Inventry	56.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	56.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	56.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	56.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
	55.2	55.3	11.6	11.6	56.4	55.3	11.9	11.9	56.5	55.9	12.2	12.2	56.5	55.9	12.2	12.2
E1-E9 PMI																
Inventry	177.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	177.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	177.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	177.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
	177.2	72.9	5.6	5.6	177.1	73.6	5.8	5.8	177.1	75.9	6.0	6.0	177.1	75.9	6.0	6.0
W1-W4 PMI																
Inventry	1.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A	N/A
	1.5	1.5	13.0	13.0	1.5	1.5	13.0	13.0	1.5	1.5	13.0	13.0	1.5	1.5	13.0	13.0
01-03 PMI																
Inventry	13.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	13.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	13.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	13.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
	13.1	7.4	6.8	6.8	13.0	7.2	7.0	7.0	13.0	7.3	7.1	7.1	13.0	7.3	7.1	7.1
04-06 PMI																
Inventry	5.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
	5.5	5.5	17.9	17.9	5.5	5.5	18.0	18.0	5.5	5.5	18.0	18.0	5.5	5.5	18.0	18.0
01-06 PMI																
Inventry	18.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	18.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	18.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	18.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
	18.6	12.9	11.9	11.9	18.6	12.9	12.0	12.0	18.6	12.9	12.0	12.0	18.6	12.9	12.0	12.0

*Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted

(1) Recruiting. The Marine Corps achieved 100.2 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals in FY 1988. The Marine Corps recruited 151 two and three-year, 27,966 four-year, and 7,440 five and six-year enlistees. In FY 1989, enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 90 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1988, 95.1 percent of non-prior service enlistees were Tier I high school graduates under the new DoD educational credential system. High school graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, and amenability to discipline. We have set a recruiting goal for FY 1989 for 90 percent of all male and female non-prior service recruits to be Tier I high school graduates.

The Enlisted Bonus Program (EBP) decreased from a budgeted amount of \$7.7 million with 2,400 bonuses in FY 1980 to \$5.8 million with 1,655 bonus allocations in FY 1989. The FY 1990 EBP is budgeted for \$8.4 million with approximately 1,855 allocations. The decrease in FY 1989 is due to budget constraints in the previous year. The increase in FY 1990 will help substantially in ensuring accession of quality recruits in key skills.

The Marine Corps has adopted a "level load" accession policy, i.e., modifying the flow of recruits so that Marines are accessed more evenly throughout the year. The expected benefits are more efficient entry level training, more even separation patterns, and increased readiness.

Enlisted Accession Plans

	<u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 88</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 89</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 90</u> <u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>				
Prior Service	409	600	600	720
Non-Prior Service	35,556	35,311	31,801	32,383
Male	33,418	33,211	29,701	30,283
(HSG)	(31,687)	(29,889)	(26,731)	(27,255)
Female	2,138	2,100	2,100	2,100
(HSDG)	(2,138)	(2,100)	(1,890)	(1,890)

(2) Retention. The overall FY 1988 Retention Goal was met. Although the Marine Corps fell short of or careerist goals in FY 1988, we exceeded our FY 1988 expiration of active service (EAS) first term and intermediate retention goals, which offset the shortfall in careerist reenlistments. Marines who are authorized to reenlist 12 months prior to their EAS are more frequently delaying their decision to reenlist than in the past. As a result, early reenlistments in FY 1988 of Marines with a FY 1989 EAS were down. Shortfalls in this category, however, do not

affect end strength or readiness. By retaining well-qualified and proven Marines, the leadership and experience levels of the force were raised substantially. Additionally, better retention proved cost-effective in that the Marine Corps did not need to recruit and train replacements for those Marines who decided to stay on active duty. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) is still essential as the most significant factor in retaining skilled and experienced career force Marines. It is a key reason why the Marine Corps is experiencing a continuation of the quality recruiting and retention trends realized in both FY 1987 and FY 1988.

Enlisted Retention Plans

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 88 Actual</u>	<u>FY 89 Goal</u>	<u>FY 90 Goal</u>
<u>RETENTION</u>				
First Term	6,911	5,402	2,725	3,230
Career	10,481	9,990	14,409	12,014

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. Since 1980, the Marine Corps has kept a consistent population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Enlisted	80.2	79.3	79.2	82.0	82.8	82.7	82.7

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The improvement in retention and the population stability has translated into greater unit stability. This unit stability provides the commander with the ability to maintain a trained, cohesive unit throughout the year. Consequently, FMF readiness increases and deployment preparation improves.

Unit Personnel Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Enlisted	38.0	38.0	41.9	39.9	43.7	46.5	46.5

(5) Other. The degree of difficulty in meeting the FY 1989 enlisted accession plan will depend in part on the youth unemployment rate, competition with educational institutions, and the competitiveness of military pay with civilian pay.

b. Officer and Warrant Officer

(1) Accessions. Officer end strength is programmed to be 20,110 in FY 1990 and 20,108 in FY 1991. The officer strength affords the Marine Corps necessary leadership both for combat forces and support functions, while continuing to retain the most promising officers and maintain a normal promotion flow. Yet it still provides the base for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1,766	1,767	1,854	1,766	1,766

(2) Retention. Overall officer retention in FY 1988 exceeded the historic averages. Current retention rates are expected to remain stable during FY 1989. As yet, we have not experienced either total officer community or special community (i.e., aviation) shortfalls.

Active Marine Corps Officer Retention (Percent)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Ground Unrestricted	91	91	91	91
Aviation Unrestricted	93	93	93	93

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. High officer retention contributes to high population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	92.3	93.3	92.6	91.3	91.3	92.1	92.1

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The officer community shows a steady trend in unit stability.

Unit Personnel Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	42.4	42.4	44.4	44.8	46.8	46.5	46.8

c. Women in the Marine Corps

The Marine Corps assigns women Marines to billets commensurate with their individual abilities and in keeping with their potential to contribute to the fulfillment of the Marine Corps' roles and missions. The Marine Corps' classification, assignment, and deployment policy for women Marines takes into consideration physical risk and turbulence. Combat exclusion rules prohibit women from being assigned to units with the greatest physical risk, such as infantry regiments and their sub-elements, while including women in those units with acceptable levels of physical risk (Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, fixed-wing aircraft squadrons, etc.). Women Marines may be classified within any noncombatant occupational field for which qualified.

The total goal for enlisted women Marines is about 10,700 by FY 1989. This goal continues the growth of women Marines which began over a decade ago.

Female Marine Strength
Total (Officer/Enlisted)

	<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
Active	9,613 (653/8,960)	9,613 (653/8,960)	11,199 (699/10,500)	11,214 (714/10,500)
Reserve	1,802 (159/1,643)	1,894 (161/1,733)	1,910 (58/1,742)	1,913 (170/1,743)

Marine Enlisted Women in
Traditional/Nontraditional DoD Occupational Groups

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Infantry/Gun Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0
Electronic Equipment Repair	349	492	270	268	273	366
*Communication/Intelligence	779	1,014	844	961	961	935
Other Technical	223	289	264	254	246	245
*Support & Admin	3,788	4,386	3,912	4,197	4,093	3,716
Mechanic Equipment Repair	552	669	844	845	806	792
Craftsmen	159	167	201	222	229	204
*Service Supply	1,149	1,238	1,479	1,579	1,480	1,484

Remainder are in individuals category.

* Considered traditional fields by USMC

6. Readiness Assessment

The Marine Corps FY 1990 end strength request is for 197,200. Necessary structure improvements continue to reflect modest growth, based upon previous programmed structure decisions although the overall manning decreases. Readiness improvements can be seen resulting from improving trends in occupational imbalances and personnel stability through continued quality accessions and retention bonus programs. As the Marine Corps returns to level accessions in FY 1990, improvements will be made in readiness, training pipeline flow, and separation patterns.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Marine Corps Reserve is divided into two categories: the Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve. The primary source of both units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve, which consists of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve.

1. Ready Reserve

a. Selected Marine Corps Reserve

(1) General. The SMCR units taken together form a Division, Aircraft Wing, and Force Service Support Group. These units present a balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces similar to their Active Force counterparts.

(2) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

(a) Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Tables V-6, V-7, and V-8 provide an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

(b) Trained in Unit Strength. Table V-9 reflects trained in unit strength for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.

(3) Skill and Grade. Table V-10 summarizes the existing and projected Reserve inventory as compared to programmed manning.

(4) Experience. Table V-11 reflects the SMCR experience and grade mix.

TABLE V-6
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

TOTAL MILITARY	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG	RQMT	AUTH	MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	35.4	35.6		37.4	37.8		41.5	37.6	91	41.6	37.7	91	41.8	37.8	90
Land Forces	28.4	28.4		27.7	28.5		31.5	28.2	90	31.5	28.0	89	31.5	28.0	89
Tactical Air Forces	7.0	7.2		9.7	9.3		10.0	9.4	94	10.1	9.7	96	10.3	9.8	95
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	35.4	35.6		37.4	37.8		41.5	37.6	91	41.6	37.7	91	41.8	37.8	90
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>															
Central Support Activi	1.1	0.7		0.9	0.9		0.6	0.5	83	0.6	0.6	100	0.6	0.6	100
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	36.5	36.3		38.3	38.7		42.1	38.1	90	42.2	38.3	91	42.4	38.4	91
<u>IHA's</u>	1.2	1.2		1.3	1.4		1.4	1.3		1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	4.1	4.1		4.0	3.5		4.2	4.2		4.3	4.3		4.3	4.3	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	41.8	41.6		43.6	43.6		47.7	43.6		47.9	44.0		48.1	44.1	

NOTE: Tactical air forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

TABLE V-7
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

OFFICER	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	2.5	2.5		2.8	2.6		3.1	2.8	90	3.2	2.9	91	3.2	2.9	91
Land Forces	1.4	1.4		1.6	1.5		1.8	1.6	89	1.9	1.7	89	2.9	1.7	89
Tactical Air Forces	1.1	1.1		1.2	1.1		1.3	1.2	92	1.3	1.2	92	1.3	1.2	92
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	2.5	2.5		2.8	2.6		3.1	2.8	90	3.2	2.9	91	3.2	2.9	91
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>															
Central Support Activi	0.2	0.2		0.1	0.2		0.1	0.1	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	2.7	2.7		2.9	2.8		3.2	2.9	91	3.4	3.1	91	3.4	3.1	91
IMA's	0.7	0.7		0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	3.4	3.4		3.7	3.6		4.0	3.7		4.2	3.9		4.2	3.9	

NOTE: Tactical air forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect active component personnel.

TABLE V-8
MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(Thousands)

ENLISTED	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV		AUTH	INV		RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG	RQMT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>															
Land Forces	32.9	33.1		34.6	35.2		38.4	34.8	91	38.4	34.8	91	38.6	34.9	90
Tactical Air Forces	27.0	27.0		26.1	27.0		29.7	26.6	90	29.6	26.3	89	29.6	26.3	89
	5.9	6.1		8.5	8.2		8.7	8.2	94	8.8	8.5	97	9.0	8.6	96
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	32.9	33.1		34.6	35.2		38.4	34.8	91	38.4	34.8	91	38.6	34.9	90
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>															
Central Support Activi	0.9	0.5		0.8	0.7		0.5	0.4	80	0.4	0.4	100	0.4	0.4	100
<u>TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	33.8	33.6		35.4	35.9		38.9	35.2	90	38.8	35.2	91	39.0	35.3	91
<u>IMA's</u>	0.5	0.5		0.5	0.6		0.6	0.5		0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6	
<u>INDIVIDUALS</u>	4.1	4.1		4.0	3.5		4.2	4.2		4.3	4.3		4.3	4.3	
<u>END-STRENGTH</u>	38.4	38.2		39.9	40.0		43.7	39.9		43.7	40.1		43.9	40.2	

NOTE: Tactical air forces requirements and programmed authorized do not reflect component personnel.

Table V-9
TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>
End Strength	43.6	43.6	44.0	44.1	44.1
-Training Pipeline	3.5	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.3
-IMAs	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
Operating Strength	38.7	38.2	38.3	38.4	38.4
-Non Unit Personnel	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
+Unit AC Personnel	2.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Trained Unit Strength	40.7	42.7	.7	42.8	42.8
Structure Requirement (Wartime)	42.		45.3	45.5	47.9
-Non-Unit Structure	0.6		0.6	0.6	0.6
Wartime Unit Structure	42.0	44.5	44.7	44.9	47.3
% Trained in Units	96.9%	96.0%	95.5%	95.3%	90.5%

NOTE: Structure requirement (wartime) and wartime unit structure numbers include active component structure in the tactical air forces.

TABLE V-10
RESERVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANING AND INDIVIDUALS
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL	OVER	BAL	SHORT	TOTAL
E1-E4																
Number of Skills	40	63	143	246	38	78	130	246	36	90	120	246	35	96	115	246
PHI	4.8	7.6	17.1	29.5	4.5	9.3	15.5	29.4	4.3	10.8	14.3	29.4	4.2	11.5	13.7	29.4
Inventory	7.6	7.6	15.8	31.0	6.6	9.3	14.8	30.8	6.2	10.8	13.9	30.8	5.8	11.5	13.6	30.8
Over/Short	2.8	0.0	-1.3	1.5	2.1	0.0	-0.7	1.4	1.9	0.0	-0.5	1.4	1.6	0.0	-0.2	1.4
E5-E9																
Number of Skills	42	67	194	303	40	83	180	303	38	90	175	303	36	97	170	303
PHI	1.5	2.3	6.7	10.5	1.4	2.9	6.2	10.5	1.3	3.2	6.2	10.7	1.3	3.5	6.1	10.8
Inventory	1.9	2.3	4.8	9.0	1.6	2.9	4.7	9.1	1.5	3.2	4.6	9.3	1.6	3.5	4.4	9.4
Over/Short	0.4	0.0	-1.9	-1.5	0.2	0.0	-1.6	-1.4	0.2	0.0	-1.6	-1.4	0.3	0.0	-1.7	-1.4
Total E1-E9																
Number of Skills	45	69	208	322	42	90	190	322	40	97	185	322	38	99	185	322
PHI	5.6	8.6	25.8	40.0	5.2	11.2	23.5	39.9	5.0	12.1	23.0	40.1	4.7	12.4	23.1	40.2
Inventory	8.8	8.6	22.6	40.0	6.7	11.2	22.0	39.9	6.3	12.1	21.8	40.1	5.9	12.4	21.9	40.2
Over/Short	3.2	0.0	-3.2	0.0	1.5	0.0	-1.5	0.0	1.3	0.0	-1.3	0.0	1.2	0.0	-1.2	0.0
W1-W4																
Number of Skills	9	24	10	43	8	27	8	43	7	28	8	43	6	29	8	43
PHI	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.5
Inventory	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.5
Over/Short	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0
01-03																
Number of Skills	4	11	44	59	4	15	40	59	4	18	37	59	4	21	34	59
PHI	0.2	0.4	1.7	2.3	0.2	0.6	1.6	2.4	0.2	0.8	1.6	2.5	0.2	0.9	1.4	2.5
Inventory	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.5	0.2	0.6	0.8	1.6	0.2	0.8	0.8	1.8	0.2	0.9	0.7	1.8
Over/Short	0.0	0.0	-0.8	-0.8	0.0	0.0	-0.8	-0.8	0.0	0.0	-0.7	-0.7	0.0	0.0	-0.7	-0.7
04-06																
Number of Skills	26	6	18	50	24	9	17	50	21	13	16	50	19	16	15	50
PHI	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.9
Inventory	1.4	0.1	0.1	1.6	1.3	0.1	0.2	1.6	1.1	0.2	0.2	1.6	1.1	0.3	0.2	1.6
Over/Short	1.0	0.0	-0.2	0.8	0.9	0.0	-0.1	0.8	0.8	0.0	-0.1	0.7	0.8	0.0	-0.1	0.7
Total 01-06																
Number of Skills	12	14	35	61	10	19	32	61	10	22	29	61	9	25	27	61
PHI	0.6	0.7	1.8	3.1	0.5	1.0	1.7	3.2	0.6	1.2	1.6	3.4	0.5	1.4	1.5	3.4
Inventory	0.8	0.7	1.5	3.1	0.7	1.0	1.6	3.2	0.6	1.2	1.5	3.4	0.6	1.4	1.4	3.4
Over/Short	0.2	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0

TABLE V-11
RESERVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH in THOUSANDS)

	FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >		TOTAL PEOPLE AVE. WITH >	
	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE
E1-E4																
PMI	29.5			29.4			29.4			29.4			29.4			
INVENTORY	31.0	6.4	2.7	30.8	6.8	2.8	30.8	7.0	2.9	30.8	7.0	2.9	30.8	7.0	2.9	
E5-E9																
PMI	10.5			10.5			10.7			10.7			10.8			
INVENTORY	9.0	9.0	11.7	9.1	9.1	11.8	9.3	9.3	11.5	9.4	9.4	11.2	9.4	9.4	11.2	
Total E1-E9																
PMI	40.0			39.9			40.1			40.1			40.2			
INVENTORY	40.0	15.4	4.7	39.9	15.9	4.8	40.1	16.3	4.9	40.2	16.4	4.7	40.2	16.4	4.7	
W1-W4																
PMI	0.5			0.5			0.5			0.5			0.5			
INVENTORY	0.5	0.5	21.6	0.5	0.5	21.8	0.5	0.5	21.2	0.5	0.5	21.0	0.5	0.5	21.0	
01-03																
PMI	2.3			2.4			2.5			2.5			2.5			
INVENTORY	1.5	1.5	10.5	1.6	1.6	10.8	1.8	1.8	10.5	1.8	1.8	10.2	1.8	1.8	10.2	
04-06																
PMI	0.8			0.8			0.9			0.9			0.9			
INVENTORY	1.6	1.6	19.9	1.6	1.6	20.0	1.6	1.6	19.7	1.6	1.6	19.4	1.6	1.6	19.4	
Total 01-06																
PMI	3.1			3.1			3.1			3.1			3.1			
INVENTORY	3.1	3.1	15.4	3.2	3.2	15.7	3.4	3.4	15.5	3.4	3.4	15.1	3.4	3.4	15.1	

* Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

(a) Recruiting. Recruiting goals and actuals for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Non-prior Service	8,200	8,263	8,200	8,200	8,200
Prior Service	4,600	4,632	5,000	5,000	5,000

For FY 1988, the SMCR attained its prior service enlistment goal. In FY 1988, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve achieved a total paid end strength of 43,556.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are essentially the same as for the Active Force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes primarily from officers leaving active duty who have not yet completed their mandatory obligated service, recently extended from six to eight years.

(b) Retention. Attrition in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve was down nearly 10% in FY 1988 from the FY 1987 levels. This dramatic change is attributed to unit leadership, command attention, and the development of an automated loss analysis program that allowed for the establishment of measurable, meaningful attrition reduction goals.

(c) Inventory Stability. Both aggregate enlisted population stability and unit personnel stability increased in FY 1988. This is in spite of the fact that nearly 35 percent of the personnel are non-mandatory participants who can leave the SMCR at will.

Enlisted Population Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Aggregate Stability	74.6	77.8	73.1	68.4	71.9	74.8	75.8
Unit Stability	66.1	59.0	57.2	57.7	52.0	57.9	59.3

(d) Officer Recruiting. We are attempting to attract more company grade officers leaving active duty by contacting them 90 days prior to expiration of service, through better advertising of available officer billets, and assignment of officer recruitment quotas to prior service recruiters.

(6) USMCR Readiness Assessment. From a manpower perspective, the combat capability of the SMCR has been consistently improving since 1980. As the SMCR end strength rises, there has been a corresponding increase in MOS match within the units. Recruitment by MOS within each unit by the recruiting service will continue to reduce the enlisted MOS imbalances and increase overall readiness.

(7) Other. SMCR end strength requirements are 43,600 for FY 1989, 44,000 in FY 1990 and 44,100 in FY 1991. These requirements provide sufficient personnel to ensure SMCR units report to Station of Initial Assignment with a minimum of 95% of their wartime manning through FY 1991, maintain a training pipeline, and maintain ancillary mobilization manpower requirements.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY's 1989/90 and 91 are 42,600, 43,374 and 43,640 respectively. This strength supports the force structure and personnel support requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on initial active duty, individual mobilization augmentees and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

(8) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The IMA Program assigns pre-trained Marines to wartime billets in order to ensure the designated Marine is prepared to function in a critical duty effectively on or shortly after mobilization. Typical assignments for IMA's include Joint Staffs; Headquarters, Marine Corps; FMF staffs; Marine Corps Mobilization Stations; the Naval Readiness Command; Selective Service System offices; recruit depots; and Marine Corps Bases and Stations.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(In Thousands)

<u>Drills</u> ^{1/}	<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
(48)	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1
(24)	*	.3	.3	.3
(32)	*	*	*	*
TOTAL	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4

*Less than 50.

^{1/} IMAs listed in this Table serve two weeks of active duty a year plus the number of drills shown in parentheses. They are paid for all active duty and for all drills.

(9) Full Time Support Program (FTS). FTS Reservists contribute to mobilization readiness and the accomplishment of the Reserve mission in two ways. First, they are qualified Marine reservists on active duty for periods of one to four years to support the Marine Corps Reserve. Their knowledge and efforts assist the active forces with

administration and understanding of reserve programs. Secondly, knowledge and expertise gained by FTS reservists on active duty are taken back to SMCR units, thereby enhancing their effectiveness. FTS personnel can be found in administrative, recruiting, and instructor training billets throughout the SMCR and at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

Full-Time Support Personnel
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
Reserve (AGR)	1.9	1.9	2.3	2.4
Civilian	.4	.4	.4	.4
Active Duty	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.1
Total	7.4	7.4	7.8	7.9

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

The IRR consists of members of the Ready Reserve who have no mandatory training requirement. The IRR provides pre-trained Marines to fill shortfalls in Active Operating Forces and Reserve units, and also provide for the expansion of the supporting base, as necessary, to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
	42.4	49.0	54.0	74.0

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of members of the Reserve Component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment Active and Reserve Forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

Standby Reserve
(In Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 89</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 90</u> (Goal)	<u>FY 91</u> (Goal)
	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4

3. Retirees

The retired military population is composed primarily of (1) retirees, both regular and reserve, who have completed 20 years active duty; these retirees are liable for recall at any time by the Service Secretary in the interest of national defense; (2) reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. The second category may only be recalled in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law.

Retirees (Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees				
Categories I and II	37.3	38.0	38.0	38.0
Category III	44.3	44.1	44.0	39.8
Other Retiree Reserves				
Categories I and II	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0
Category III	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.0

4. Marine Corps Reserve Personnel on Active Duty for Training in Excess of 180 Days

The Marine Corps did not have any Reserve personnel on Active Duty in excess of 180 days in FY 1988, nor are any programmed for FY 1989.

C. Civilian Manpower

1. General

Marine Corps military and civilian manpower resources are integrated to maximize efficiency and avoid duplication of effort. Civilian personnel are used to meet the requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable and to permit more effective manning of operational forces with Marines, thereby enhancing training, readiness, and sustainability. It also ensures continuity in operations. Marine Corps civilian personnel are employed in a wide variety of professional, technical, trade, and administrative functions.

The Marine Corps actively seeks means to use civilian manpower more economically and efficiently. Through the Efficiency Review program and the Manpower Requirements Determination Program the Marine Corps has been able to satisfy the DoD requirement in determining the most effective and efficient mix of number of staff and appropriate grade levels during the two processes.

The FY 1991 request for 21,624 civilians is essential to continue mission responsibilities while minimizing the requirement for military personnel. This request, displayed by DPPC, is shown in Table V-12.

TABLE V-12
MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(DIRECT AND INDIRECT HIRE END) STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 85</u>		<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>INV</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>AUTH</u>
	10.9	11.1	11.0	10.9	10.9	10.7	10.7
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS							
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	.05
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.9
SERVICE MANAGEMENT	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6
HEADQUARTERS							
Combat Commands	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Support Commands	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	6.3	6.3	6.3	5.5	5.7	5.8	5.8
Support Installations	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1
Centralized Support	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7
Act'y							
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE	21.7	22.4	22.2	21.3	21.8	21.6	21.6
STRUCTURE							

2. Major Program Changes

There are no major program changes from last year's DMRR. The FY 1990 strength of 21,659 requested reflects a net decrease of 105 from the strength of 21,764 planned for FY 1989. The FY 1991 strength of 21,624 reflects a net decrease of 35 from the planned FY 1990 strength.

3. Efficiency Review

The Marine Corps has implemented an effective Position Management Program that works within the "Managing-To-Payroll" concept. Also, the Marine Corps, as directed by DoD, has combined the Efficiency Review, Position Management, and Manpower Requirements Determination Program. The Position Management Review process will assist in determining the most effective and efficient mix of number of staff and appropriate grade levels developed during the Efficiency Review process.

4. Civilian End Strength Management

Removal of statutory civilian personnel end of year number constraints for FY 1988 permitted Marine Corps activities to adjust their work force to workload fluctuations. That flexibility allowed management to increase productive output for urgent, high priority requirements while maintaining scheduled production on routine workload.

Without an end of year constraint, limited civilian personnel resources can be used more effectively. Temporary employees can be hired to support short-term requirements, and to support workload requirements that do not warrant full time permanent employees.

5. Recruiting

The Marine Corps has been able to fill the majority of its civilian positions without undue difficulties. Problems continue to exist, however, in recruiting personnel to fill clerical positions in some labor market and professional engineering positions in almost all labor markets. Positions are filled at each Marine Corps activity through the local civilian personnel office.

6. Commercial Activities (CA) Program

Executive Order 12615 dated 19 November 1987 requires each executive agency to reflect savings in their budget in anticipation of complete CA studies. This order also requires each agency to complete CA studies annually which represent a minimum of 3 percent of their total civilian positions. In compliance with this Order, the Marine Corps will complete CA studies in FY 1990 which affect 950 civilian positions and 129 military positions.

The following information reflects the results of the CA studies completed during FY88:

<u>Number of Studies Completed</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Studies Completed Civ Mil Total</u>	<u>Number of Activities Converted to Contract</u>	<u>End Strength Involved in Func- tions Converted Civ Mil Total</u>
8	257 *76 333	7	256 *76 332

* An additional 32 Fleet Assistance Program personnel who were assigned to duties in the food services functions as an additional duty were returned to their parent unit.

D. Mobilization Manpower

1. Military Manpower

The Marine Corps enjoys an acceptable amount of pre-trained manpower for mobilization. Modest overages early in FY 1988 increase somewhat in FY 1992. The increased Active Component and Selected Reserve end strengths are sufficient to meet initial deployment requirements. In most manpower categories the supply is adequate for the demand. Of course, the Marine Corps is seriously affected by medical manpower shortages in the Navy. The decrease in the total shortfall for FY 1991 is attributed to an assumed improved medical evacuation policy and the change in the Military Service Obligation from 6 to 8 years.

A more significant concern is meeting mobilization requirements with adequate numbers of trained personnel by skill category. Major emphasis is being placed upon enhancements in the mobilization and training process to reduce mobilization time for Pretrained Individual Manpower and to quickly provide refresher training or cross-training. As a result, the Marine Corps will be able to meet its wartime shortfalls with pretrained and current service personnel more rapidly. By establishing a better match between peacetime skills and wartime requirements, the Marine Corps will ensure the availability of mobilization manpower for the needed skills.

2. Civilian Manpower

In peacetime, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the authorized civilian work force. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment. Civilian positions are created to support the military buildup; concurrently, positions are terminated where not required to support wartime requirements. At M-Day, the peacetime civilian source is reduced because some civilian employees are subject to call-up as reservists or military retirees. To avoid the loss of civilians in essential government positions, the Marine Corps continuously identifies those individuals who hold key positions in the Federal government and who are also either members of the Ready Reserve or retired military personnel eligible for recall.

The Marine Corps would need to recruit at least 2,200 new direct-hire civilian personnel to fill wartime position requirements. Although these requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, our needs are concentrated in logistics support personnel.

The Marine Corps will use civilian employees who may be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status to help meet the requirements for civilian new hires after M-day. Additional manpower sources include new hires arranged by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management, as well as retired Federal civilian employees. Retired civilian employees are ideal sources to support skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, clerical, and materiel handling.

E. Manpower Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. These initiatives include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets, the Unit Deployment Program, and development of automated systems and models which improve the planning and assignment process.

1. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets

The Marine Corps expansion of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific improves tour stability and promotes unit integrity.

Many one year unaccompanied tours are being converted to three year accompanied tours. During FY 1990, the Marine Corps plans to change over 400 billets from one year unaccompanied tours to three year accompanied tours. Over 300 additional billets are scheduled to be similarly converted during FY 1991. About 4,800 billets are planned for conversion to accompanied tours by FY 1996, with the continued support of the government of Japan. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station (PCS) moves will be reduced as a result of this action.

2. Unit Deployment Program

The Marine Corps unit deployment program is designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence. It permits Marines assigned to infantry battalions and tactical aviation squadrons to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours. There is a net annual budget savings associated with this program. Many year savings are also realized from the reduction of the transient pipeline in comparison with 12 month PCS moves.

As a result of the program's success, a plan to expand the program has been largely completed. This initiative will incorporate several combat support units into the established Unit Deployment Program. The expansion will further decrease PCS moves to the Western Pacific while strengthening uniform readiness and reducing personnel turbulence.

3. Military Manpower Management Initiatives

To best use our manpower assets, the Marine Corps is continuing development of a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term Marines among all units in the active structure. The goal is to provide improved readiness through the use of automated systems that best fill requirements with first-term Marines consistent with approved manning policies.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management. The Marine Corps has begun work on other models that will support the same goals for the officer force and would extend our capabilities in the management of the mobilization force.

One of the most important Manpower initiatives is the phase-in of Enlisted Career Force Controls during FY 1989. Enlisted Career Force Controls is a comprehensive Manpower Management Program designed to provide equitable promotion opportunity and tempo across all Marine Corps skills. The program involves the shaping of the grade structure in order to provide structural equitability and to control the flow of Marines into the Career Force Grade Structure. By controlling the demand (Grade Structure) and the supply (Marines with greater than 4 YOS), promotion equitability will result.

In early FY 1989, the Marine Corps will undertake Enlisted Grade Structure Review II to ensure promotion equitability in the structure. On the supply side, during FY 1988 we extended promotion by MOS to the grade of Sergeant and limited retirement-eligible SNCO reenlistment to 3 years. During FY 1989, the Marine Corps will control the overall number of first term reenlistments within each MOS in order to prevent career force overages/shortages and their associated promotion problems. In addition, directed lateral movement of first termers from over skills to short skills will help balance the force, particularly the career force. Retirement eligible staff non-commissioned officers in over grades/MOS will be denied further service at reenlistment in order to create upper grade vacancies, thereby preventing promotion stagnation. Finally, the Marine Corps will seek additional resources to increase our top 5 authorizations in order to meet our requirements.

In summary, Enlisted Career Force Controls will provide the right Marine in terms of Grade and Skill to the units, the appropriate level of experience for each grade and career equitability.

Classification and assignment of enlisted Marines is currently supported by sophisticated models providing optimal recommendations to decision makers. The system is becoming even better as testing has started to integrate all the separate models into the Precise Personnel Assignment System (PREPAS). PREPAS integrates both planning and execution of the manpower plan for the first term enlisted force. The models make the best use of this portion of the force through the reduction of turbulence, improvement in tour stability, and uniform staffing. Recommended assignments will support the total plan over time, rather than merely making the best use of manpower resources to solve the short term assignment problem. The implementation of the complete PREPAS started with the testing of the first model in FY 1987 and will be completed in FY 1989.

Level load recruiting, first implemented in FY 1984, was designed to correct both manpower and training plan imbalances that resulted from the past cyclic nature of accessions, which were disproportionately higher in the summer months. The goal of level load policy has been the stabilization of readiness, reduction in the number of missed school seats, and more evenly distributed separation patterns.

III. MARINE CORPS MANPOWER BY DPPC

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces

Marine Corps tactical and mobility forces include land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces. About 124,000 Marines (63 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1990. Tactical and mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

With the exception of Reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to tactical and mobility forces.

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces

1. Land Forces

Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting force service support groups. Additionally, this category includes land force aviation units which are the helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays land forces for FY 1985 and FY 1988-FY 1991.

<u>Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower</u> <u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>					
<u>Military</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active	89.5	93.9	97.2	97.1	96.7
Reserve	28.4	28.5	28.2	28.0	28.0

The FY 1990 Land Forces end strength decreased from the FY 1989 level by 155, as a result of program manning changes. The changes which have occurred within the combat service support, land force aviation, and Marine Divisions sub-categories of land forces are discussed below.

The structure requirement for the force service support group decreases from FY 1989 to FY 1990. The structure is being transferred to support warfighting enhancements in the ground combat element.

In land force aviation, structure and manning decreases to support warfighting enhancements. One HAWK battery is being transferred to the reserves. Execution of the warfighting enhancements will result in reducing the active force structure by 1 MAG headquarters, 1 Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 1 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron and two Light Anti-Aircraft Missile batteries when directed.

Within the Marine Divisions, three infantry battalions are cadred in FY 1989. However, there are activations, deactivations, enhancements, and reductions in manning levels of selected units which occur in FY 1989, FY 1990 and FY 1991.

The activations and enhancements which occur in FY 1989, FY 1990 and FY 1991 are as follows. Enhance infantry battalions and add fourth rifle companies to infantry battalions in the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) rotation base. Add a TOW platoon with associated maintenance and supply personnel and a scout platoon to the infantry regimental headquarters. The Marine Air Ground Task Force Command Elements will increase due to programmed structure and manning increase. Reorganization of the Tank Battalion will occur. The 1 tank is fielded. Changes to the artillery regiment proposed concept provides for consolidation of the Target Acquisition Battery and Meteorological Section in the regimental headquarters battery. Two general support battalions will not stand up as previously planned. One general support battalion and five

general support batteries will be deactivated. The general support missions of these units will be assumed by similar units in the reserves until FY 1992 when deactivated units will be reestablished in the reserves.

The activations and enhancements discussed above are offset by decreases in the structure of the Aviation Combat Element and Combat Service Support Element and internal restructuring of the Ground Combat Element.

2. Tactical Air Forces

Tactical air forces manpower includes air crews, and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with Reserve Component support and various command, control, and support functions.

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower

	(End-Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	30.2	25.7	24.5	24.3	24.5
Reserve	7.2	9.3	9.4	9.7	9.8

Overall manning decrease from FY 1989 to FY 1990 and increase from FY 1990 to FY 1991 as a result of program manning changes.

Several types of units will receive changes to their manning level from the FY 1989 level. The transition from the A-4 to the AV-8B squadrons will result in increased manning in FY 1990 and FY 1991. A reconfiguration from the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron to the Marine Air Group Headquarters and Marine Aviation Logistics squadrons will reduce manning in tactical air combat support. Tactical air control systems decrease manning from FY 1989 as a result of equipment changes for the Tactical Air Operations Center to the Tactical Air Operations Module. The RF-4 squadrons will begin transitioning to the F-18D squadrons in FY 1991 resulting in increased manning.

3. Naval Forces

The Marine Corps request for naval forces includes Marines assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in tactical air forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships. In FY 1989 a ship's detachment for the USS Abraham Lincoln will be activated (+68), however, the manning is provided from within existing Naval Forces manpower assets.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>

Military

Active	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8

B. Communications and Intelligence

1. Intelligence

The manpower in the intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and at Unified and Specified Commands. The manpower program also provides for a small number of Marines who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>

Military

Active	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9

The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining experience through actual national signal intelligence collection activities. Marine general intelligence specialists assigned to the DIA and the Unified and Specified Commands also gain valuable training and experience while supporting the national intelligence effort. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Expeditionary Force.

2. Centrally Managed Communications

In FY 1990 and FY 1991, 64 Marines will be in the Centrally Managed Communications category. Marines in this category support the Naval Communications Activities and the Defense Communications Agency. Marines in this category also support the Military Affiliate Radio System.

Centrally Managed Communications
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>

Military

Active	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

C. Combat Installations

Marines in this category are assigned to bases and stations which provide support to the Fleet Marine Force Units assigned. The type of support provided includes maintenance, communications audiovisual, and administrative support. Civilians in this category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and support safety and quality of life functions.

	<u>Combat Installations</u> <u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>				
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	9.4	10.0	9.4	9.2	9.0
<u>Civilian</u>	11.1	10.9	10.9	10.7	10.7

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for base operating support-combat installations using a fixed and variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the base operating support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the tactical and mobility forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to base operating support-combat installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for base operating support manpower at all combat installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to determine manpower staffing requirements. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. These manpower requirements determination reviews will improve support organizations by consolidating duplicate functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

D. Force Support Training

Force support training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps combat readiness training group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission. This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower profile for the force support training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	3.7	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*	*	*

E. Joint Activities

Marines assigned to Joint Activities provide Marine Corps representation in the joint arena and provide fair share manning of joint billets. This ensures Marine Corps knowledge and participation in joint matters which involve the Marine Corps. Marines provide support or augmentation to four types of joint activities: international military organizations, unified commands, federal agencies, and other activities. Marines assigned to the International Military Organizations and the Unified Commands provide two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. A summary of the manpower assigned to joint activities is provided below.

1. International Military Organizations

Marines assigned to International Military Organizations are assigned to international activities such as the United Nations Truce Observer Team, Military Advisory and Assistance Groups in Venezuela and Spain and the U.S. Military Observation Group, Palestine. Marines in this category are also assigned to the management headquarters of International Commands and the Northern Air Defense Command. Finally, this category includes Marines assigned to foreign military sales activities. The following table displays the manpower assigned to the International Military Organizations.

International Military Organizations
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

2. Unified Commands

Marines assigned to the Unified Commands are Marines assigned to the management headquarters of the U.S. Space Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Readiness Command, and U.S. Central Command. A summary of the manpower assigned to the Unified Commands is provided.

Unified Commands
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

3. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support refers primarily to those Marines who are assigned to the Marine Corps Security Guard program which provides security for the foreign posts of the Department of State. The number of Marines assigned to this program is based upon a signed memorandum of understanding between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of State. The last memorandum of understanding was signed on 15 December 1986. Marines in this category are also assigned to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Selective Service System.

Federal Agency Support
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5

4. Defense Agencies

The Marines assigned to the Defense Agencies in this category are Marines assigned to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Mapping Agency.

Defense Agencies
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	*	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

6. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

F. Central Logistics

The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services for Marine Corps units. Marines in this category also provide support to Navy Logistics Operations such as the Naval Ships Ports Control Center and the U.S. Naval Magazine in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9

G. Service Management Headquarters

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) imposed manpower ceilings to management headquarters activities.

1. Combat Commands

Manpower in this category are assigned to major Navy operational commands and Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

	<u>Combat Commands</u> <u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>			<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>		
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Civilian	*	*	*	*	*

2. Support Commands

Service support commands include Navy and Marine Corps departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters.

	<u>Support Commands</u> <u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>			<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>		
<u>Military</u>					
Active	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Civilian	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5

H. Research and Development

1. Research and Development

Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

Marines assigned to research and development activities manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Marines in this category are assigned to industrially funded research and development

labs, Marine Corps Operations, Test, and Evaluation Activities and the Pacific Missile Test Range.

I. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support

Marine Corps activities in this category include recruiting and examining and the Marines assigned to the Marine Corps Districts and the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. It also includes the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command which performs research and development for human factors and personnel development research. A subordinate organization of the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command is the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, and it is a tenant activity at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts in this category include the development of the equipment and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force during amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other Services to avoid duplication. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to development activities of the other Services to avoid duplicate efforts. Also, Marine Corps Research and Development includes an active evaluation of foreign developments for possible adoption.

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.3
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

2. Individual Training

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other Service and Marine Corps schools. The following provides a summary of the manpower assigned to this category.

Marine Corps Individual Training (End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	8.9	9.1	9.0	9.1	8.8
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

J. Support Activities

1. Support Installations

Marines assigned to support installations are primarily assigned to Marine Corps Security Forces (which provide security to naval installations); Marine Corps Logistics Bases; Real Property Maintenance Activities; Recruit Depots; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; and the Marine Helicopter Squadron, Quantico Virginia which provides support to the President.

Personnel are provided to the Marine Corps Security Forces based upon the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and other assigned responsibilities. Also, the determination of manpower in the support installations category is based upon analysis of the functional and work load requirements. The manpower determination process mirrors the process for determining the manpower requirements for combat installations (previously discussed in paragraph IIIC) except that the input action of the variable support element is excluded, as the bases in this category do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units.

<u>Marine Corps Support Installations</u>					
<u>(End-Strength in Thousands)</u>					
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	11.1	11.0	10.9	10.8	10.7
<u>Civilian</u>	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1

2. Centralized Support Activities

The Marines in this category provide service wide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations Truce Teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, the Joint Postal Service Agency, and the Far East Network. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Administration Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records; the Marine Corps Automated Service Centers, which maintain the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System; and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the Joint Uniform Manpower Pay System for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and full manning of the centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End-Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1
Reserve Components	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>		1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8

K. Undistributed

The Marine Corps internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning or overmanning for September 30 is expressed as undistributed.

	<u>Undistributed</u> (End-Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active	NA	NA	0.8	0.5	0.5

L. Individuals

The estimates for the individuals accounts are based on historical data modified by current and projected manpower plans and policies. The individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, because shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

	<u>Marine Corps Individuals Manpower</u> (End-Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>					
Active					
Transients	8.0	5.7	5.3	5.4	5.5
Patients/Prisoners/ Holdees	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Trainees/Students	21.2	23.7	21.7	22.8	23.2
Total	30.1	30.5	28.2	29.4	29.9
Reserve					
Trainees/Students (Category F)	3.5	3.5	4.1	4.3	4.3

From FY 1989 to FY 1990, the Individuals account increased by 1,193. From FY 1990 to FY 1991, the Individuals account increased by 509. This was due to several factors.

Transients increased by 58 from FY 1989 to FY 1990 and by 94 from FY 1990 to FY 1991, as a result of increased operational, accession, and separation moves.

The implementation of Marine Battle Skill Training represents a comprehensive overhaul of the way we currently train individual Marines and will directly improve our aggregate combat capability. This training program which will significantly enhance the battle skills of all Marines will result in increased students/trainees in FY 1989 to FY 1990. In addition, there is an increased non-prior service accession requirement in FY 1990 to FY 1991.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General.

This chapter describes the Air Force manpower requirement in terms of active military, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian manpower components. The manpower need derives from the force structure required to accomplish Air Force missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy. In that light, the chapter identifies wartime manpower requirements, requested manpower strengths for the budget years and major changes by component.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements.

The Air Force's total wartime manpower requirement flows from the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP), the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), and the Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance (DG). The DG establishes a warfighting scenario which serves as a baseline against which we compare our aggregate capability, and thus influences planning and programming activities. Each Air Force major command, under the guidance of the appropriate theater commander, identifies its total wartime requirements, and these are compared against the total active component and Selected Reserve manpower resources. Consideration is also made for casualties and the availability of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Standby Reserve and retired personnel. Finally, the supply and demand data are broken out by occupation and time phased over the DG scenario. Peak demand for trained military manpower occurs at M+90. The demand is 857.5 thousand in FY 1990 and increases to 870.2 thousand in FY 1994.

The end strength requested in the President's Budget still falls short of peak wartime demand. In fact, the wartime demand for trained Air Force manpower exceeds our supply for 20 days after mobilization (M-Day) begins. Our peak shortfall of 15,000 (FY 1990) occurs at about M+20. Continuing analysis of manpower requirements to ensure the most economical force required to meet wartime taskings led to a reduction in the Air Force's wartime shortfall from FY 1988. The Air Force plans to further reduce the shortfall in a variety of ways, one of which is a change to acceptance criteria applied to Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM). For example, medical disabilities that previously disqualified people from service are being reevaluated against job requirements. The Air Force is also reviewing degradation of skills of IRR and retired personnel to better address their ability to immediately contribute to meeting wartime requirements. Further, the Air Force will continue to review the use of contractor and Host Nation Support to satisfy mission requirements, as well as advances in technology to reduce manpower intensive requirements.

C. Strength Request.

The FY 1990 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1990 and FY 1991 is as follows:

Air Force Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Military	571.1	566.8
Selected Reserve		
ANG	116.3	116.1
USAFR	84.8	85.2
Civilian	262.4	261.7
(Technicians)	(34.1)	(34.0)

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Requirements.

The tables below display manpower requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), showing inventory for FY 1985 and FY 1988 and the FY 1989 - 1991 totals in the FY 1990/1991 request. (End strength in thousands).

Active Military

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	71.0	71.3	71.1	65.8	66.0
Tactical/Mobility	147.1	152.0	148.4	144.6	143.9
Communications/					
Intelligence	32.5	33.4	33.3	33.5	33.7
Combat Installations	117.2	117.6	115.7	114.9	113.8
Force Support Training	26.4	24.9	25.1	25.3	25.1
Medical Support	36.4	39.4	39.8	40.2	40.9
Joint Activities	8.8	9.8	9.4	9.3	9.2
Support Activities	103.7	97.0	97.1	94.1	93.6
Undistributed	-	-	-10.2	-1.4	-4.0
Individuals	58.4	31.0	41.3	44.8	44.6
Totals	601.5	576.4	571.0	571.1	566.8

Air National Guard

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	22.5	18.4	18.1	18.4	18.3
Tactical/Mobility	63.9	70.2	70.0	70.1	70.0
Communications/					
Intelligence	12.0	10.9	12.3	12.4	12.4
Combat Installations	3.5	4.3	2.5	2.5	2.5
Medical Support	-	4.2	4.2	5.0	5.0
Support Activities	5.3	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.7
Individuals	2.2	1.4	2.2	2.2	2.2
Totals	109.4	115.2	115.0	116.3	116.1

US Air Force Reserve

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.2
Tactical/Mobility	47.1	50.0	50.1	50.4	50.6
Communications/ Intelligence	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Combat Installations	7.6	10.7	11.0	11.1	11.1
Medical Support	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.1	4.7
Support Activities	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2
Individuals	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.7
Individual Mobilization Augmentees	11.7	12.5	13.5	13.8	13.7
Totals	75.2	82.1	83.6	84.8	85.2

Civilian

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Strategic	8.0	8.7	8.8	9.0	9.1
Tactical/Mobility	28.8	29.7	30.6	30.5	30.3
Communications/ Intelligence	6.5	6.6	7.5	7.6	7.7
Combat Installations	52.2	49.2	51.9	51.0	50.6
Force Support Training	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
Medical Support	7.6	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.3
Joint Activities	1.9	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5
Support Activities	157.1	145.5	150.4	150.6	150.3
Totals	263.9	253.2	262.9	262.4	261.7

The following sections highlight Air Force major force structure areas and include a brief rationale for participation by either the active or Reserve component. Specific changes in force structure are detailed in Section II, Manpower Requirements by DPPC.

1. Strategic Offensive Forces.

These forces consist of strategic bomber and tanker aircraft and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Participation by the ANG/USAFR in the strategic offensive mission is limited to tanker operations because of the highly time sensitive nature of bomber and missile operations and the intensive peacetime training. ANG/USAFR tanker units are operationally capable, and availability is manageable because of the reduced alert commitment.

2. Strategic Defensive Forces.

These forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and defense. The air defense fighter mission is well suited to the Air Reserve Forces because of its in-place wartime role. For over 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States, and now provide 86 percent of the CONUS air defense force.

3. Tactical Air Forces.

To meet current tactical commitments, the Air Force must have strong, flexible, in-place forces to support a forward defense. Overseas basing represents roughly one-third of our total tactical fighter forces, with another third providing stateside rotational and training units. The final third is made up of Air Reserve Forces units able to provide a responsive surge of military capability during a national crisis. The ANG/USAFR tactical fighter force is being modernized simultaneously with the active force with F-15 and F-16 aircraft. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base supports overseas tactical force commitments. In addition, the Air National Guard provides half of the tactical reconnaissance forces and the Air Force Reserve contributes KC-10 associated aircrew and maintenance support.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total tactical force structure. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges, to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the Air Reserve Forces and physical location of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

4. Mobility Forces.

The proper mix of active and reserve force units is necessary to maintain a non-mobilized surge and contingency support capability in addition to performing day-to-day airlift missions. Peacetime airlift augmentation and wartime surge missions are well suited to the Air Reserve Forces. We have completed transfer of additional C-5 aircraft to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to provide measured, nearly simultaneous active/Air Reserve Forces expansion as the Air Force took delivery of C-5B aircraft. In addition to providing strategic and tactical airlift aircraft units and associate C-5, C-9, and C-141 units, the Air Reserve Forces provide substantial capabilities in aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port, and weather reconnaissance.

5. Other Forces.

There are several missions which are full-time functions required for support of the combat forces, such as centralized logistics, and research and development. Because of their full-time requirement, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer to the Air Reserve Forces would not diminish the required level of support, but it would increase the number of ANG/USAFR full-time personnel, offsetting some of the intended cost savings. Other types of activities have been and will continue to be established in the Air Reserve Forces when the active peacetime requirements are satisfied, but the wartime requirements are not. Some examples of units of this type include Guard and Reserve communications and civil engineering units, and Guard weather units.

E. Key Manpower Issues

Officer Reduction. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 required a 5% reduction to the number of active duty officers serving as of September 30, 1986, by the end of FY 1989. The Act for FY 1988/1989 delayed final implementation until the end of FY 1990. The FY 1989 Act repealed the remaining officer reductions mandated for FY 1989 and FY 1990. The repeal was based on the Defense Officer Requirements Study presented to Congress in March of 1988. This study indicated that of the 11,235 Air Force officers added between FY 1980 and FY 1986, 3,472 were considered not validated, that is, the positions could have been filled by civilian or enlisted personnel.

Through 1988, the Air Force had reduced 3,510 officers from the FY 1986 baseline. (Additionally, in order to posture ourselves for future reductions, we ended FY 1988 412 officers below the targeted end strength of 105,538.) The Officer Requirements Study generated an officer reduction plan wherein the Air Force identified another 1,000 spaces for conversion to civilian and enlisted personnel--500 in FY 1989 and 500 in FY 1990. This plan was developed based on an intensive review of all officer positions for potential conversion to civilian or enlisted positions. Recommendations were developed by the commands and staffed with HQ USAF functional managers for an overall Service perspective. The final position was approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in July 1988 and the commands have implemented the conversions. This procedure allowed the Air Force to focus actions in those career areas with the greatest potential for conversion. As a result, the conversions are concentrated in support career areas identified in the Officer Requirements Study, such as financial and developmental engineers, minimizing adverse impact to Air Force combat capability.

As a second part of the officer reduction plan, the Air Force will remove approximately 2,300 more officers in FY 1989 and FY 1990 resulting from force structure and other programmatic reductions. The net loss of officers for the Air Force from FY 1986 to FY 1990 will be 6,791 positions, or 6.2% from the FY 1986 baseline. This will bring the Air Force officer total for FY 1990 to 102,257, below the 102,438 specified in the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act. While these actions will complete the officer reductions required by law, the Air Force will continue to critically evaluate the need for officer personnel.

It should be noted that there will be long lasting implications from the officer reduction experience. The Air Force uses a combination of qualitative criteria and force management actions to determine those individuals that will be separated from the Service. Although authorizations have been removed in certain skills to minimize capability impacts while reducing officer end strength to prescribed levels, the individuals separated from the Air Force will often not be in those skills. As a result, we will have shortages in some skills and overages in others, a mismatch that will be with us well into the next decade.

Overseas Troop Strength Ceilings. Overseas troop strength ceilings are a Congressional strategy to encourage our allies to increase their share of the total defense burden. In FY 1983 and FY 1984, Congress

established a ceiling in NATO European countries. A similar ceiling was established by the DoD Appropriations Act, 1989, for forces assigned to Japan and South Korea.

Theater ceilings have severe flaws. Defense manpower levels and locations should be determined based on the need to counter threats to U.S. security interests, within the limits of a politically acceptable defense budget, rather than by a Congressionally imposed arbitrary ceiling. Ceilings are established outside the context of warfighting capability and ignore the necessary military balance to counter the threat. If the Air Force is required to limit its military posture, support capabilities and certain growing programs must be decremented to allow continued force modernization and expansion in theater, but at a price -- readiness and sustainability.

Forces are deployed to potential combat theaters to preserve the peace and defend our national interest in response to a threat. When force structure is based on an artificial ceiling in lieu of that required to counter the threat, readiness and sustainability suffer. Ceilings force the Air Force to trade off current combat capability or essential support base to fund additional needed programs. Priority programs must be offset through efforts such as force structure deletion, contract support, returning functions to CONUS, and undermanning. In Europe, USCINCEUR emphasizes that the INF agreement, ongoing basing options, and budget constraints may require that European Troop Strength (ETS) decrements be modified during the execution phase to minimize negative impact on fighting capability.

In Europe, the Air Force is responding to capabilities requested and supported by the theater commander. Examples of these critical growth programs include Air Base Ground Defense, Air Base Operability, Rescue and Recovery, Special Operations Forces (SOF), equipment prepositioning, and enhanced intelligence capabilities. The theater commander must have the flexibility, within overall political and fiscal realities, to structure the force mix based on the threat.

The ability to accommodate any future required military growth in Europe resulting from bilateral consultations for follow-on use of GLCM facilities is further hampered by the Congressionally imposed ceiling on civilian workyears overseas at the FY 1986 levels.* This leaves only two options to accommodate vital military growth: contracting and host nation support. Both these options require long lead times, are politically sensitive, and therefore are extremely difficult to work.

*In November 1985, the Committee praised the Army's successful efforts at civilianization in Europe and criticized the Air Force's lack of effort in this area. In September 1986, the Committee cited excessive DoD civilian growth in Europe. Most of the "growth" was in fact due to reporting errors which overstated Army strength. However, the FY 1987 and FY 1988 Omnibus Continuing Resolutions and the FY 1989 DoD Appropriations Act impose an overseas civilian workyear cap which further hampers our ability to accommodate vital growth.

The Air Force strongly supports the DoD position that the force structure in overseas areas must be based on the threat, and that artificial, arbitrary ceilings detrimentally affect our ability to deter conflict and support national security objectives. In addition, ceilings unnecessarily divert the attention of U.S. commanders and their personnel away from their primary mission. For these reasons the Air Force strongly believes that troop strength ceilings and civilian workyear ceilings should be eliminated.

Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters. In December 1987 the SECDEF directed the DoD IG to review the organization of unified and specified command headquarters, their service component headquarters and other supporting units with a view toward reducing manpower costs, overhead costs, and overlapping responsibilities. The DoD IG's study report, issued 26 February 1988, recommended a 7386 space manpower reduction based on the following generalized study findings:

1. There is no need for a Military Department supporting command for each unified and subunified command in the structure; therefore, service component commands for each unified commander not having geographical areas of responsibility should be eliminated.
2. Policy and oversight functions for base operations management should be substantially reduced at both the component headquarters and subordinate headquarters level.
3. There is a tendency, particularly in staffing the policy and plans, operations, and logistics directorates of the major headquarters, to attempt to resolve management problems and policy issues by adding more staff.

The SECDEF and JCS review of the DoD IG report resulted in a directed 3005 authorization reduction of base operations support management and headquarters staffs of the unified, specified, and supporting component command headquarters staff. The Joint Staff and the Services developed a methodology which allocated the reduction among the Services and the joint commands and agencies.

The Air Force's total reduction share was 1173 authorizations, 1037 from Air Force component commands and 136 from joint commands and agencies. The 1037 authorization Air Force component command reduction was met using ongoing Air Force actions that fully supported the spirit and intent of the DoD IG study recommendations. The Air Force took an end strength reduction of 747 from its component commands, joint commands, and agencies, and realigned 426 positions to its component commands to valid combat shortages.

Field Grade Officers. Conference Report language accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1989 called for a critical review of field grade officer strengths in all future budget submissions to ensure that the strengths requested support valid requirements and are not merely a reflection of the numbers allowed by the grade tables in section 523 of title 10, United States Code.

Manpower requirements are quantified and aligned by Air Force Specialty which are categorized as either officer or enlisted based on job factors such as specific duty, leadership, decision making, management, legal, and academic requirements. Engineering techniques are used to determine the appropriate skill level for each Air Force Specialty. Grades are based on the category and skill level of a position. The final skill and grade requirement results from the integration of statistical analysis and the judgment of management engineering personnel and functional representatives. The resulting grades reflect the unconstrained requirements to accomplish specific workloads. It is later, during the grade allocation process, that the realities of fiscal constraints and personnel policies affect the grade a position will actually be allocated. For example, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) specifies the number of Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, and Major grades the Air Force is allowed based on funded officer end strength. For FY 1989 -1991, Air Force field grade officer authorizations are less than required, but meet DOPMA and other limitations imposed by Congress.

II. SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General.

In the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget, the Air Force programmed a reduction to military end strength of 8,150 in FY 1988. Significant budgetary reductions in FY 1988 resulted in a further decrease of over 23,000 military authorizations, for a total reduction of more than 31,000. The monetary cutbacks were effective for FY 1988 through FY 1994, or through the current Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The lateness of the budget decisions required most of the FY 1988 and 1989 reduction to be absorbed through actions such as undermanning the force and accession reductions rather than through cuts to programs. In FY 1990 and FY 1991, reductions are largely identified with the appropriate programs and accessions are scheduled to return to levels necessary to support programmed end strength. With accessions returning to their required level to fully man the force, the accession dependent accounts, i.e. Trainees and Students, show increases to support the increased accession levels. The increases are not real growth but a return to a fully manned force.

Active end strength remains essentially constant in FY 1990. Ground Launched Cruise Missile reductions account for most of a drawdown in end strength of 4,300 authorizations in FY 1991. Total programmed active military end strength is 571,100 for FY 1990 and 566,800 for FY 1991, the lowest Air Force military end strength since FY 1980.

2. Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning, and Operating Strength.

Table VI-1 reflects Air Force Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. Budget reduction decisions taken well into FY 1988 eliminated more than 23,000 authorizations in FY 1988 and 25,000 in FY 1989 below the end strength originally programmed in the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget. Where possible, these reductions were related to specific programs and reductions were reflected in appropriate DPPCs.

However, the lateness of the budget decisions made a complete allocation of reductions to specific programs impossible for FY 1988 and FY 1989. The balance of the reductions were therefore reflected as Undistributed. As seen in the table, the inventory column for FY 1988 is lower for many DPPCs than the authorized, or programmed level. This reflects the implementation of the reduction through personnel management actions, or undermanning of units, rather than through a reduction in programs. A similar situation is evident in the FY 1989 programmed authorization column. Again, budgetary timing precluded identification of personnel reductions with the proper program. Therefore, the table reflects a high programmed manning level in all DPPCs, with a large Undistributed total. This Undistributed total will be identified with specific DPPCs during the year of execution, and represents a further 2% undermanning of the force.

3. Skill and Grade.

a. Enlisted.

As shown in Table VI-2, inventory excesses and shortages existed in 49 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1988 (154 of 317 skills, E1-E9). In grades E5-E7, which are a convenient gauge of mid-grade NCO manning, inventory imbalances existed in 56 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1988 (133 of 238 skills).

b. Officer.

The Congressionally mandated officer reduction continues to impact the number of unbalanced officer skills depicted in Table VI-2. The lead time required for personnel management actions causes individuals to be separated before knowledge of which manpower authorizations will be deleted is available. We are striving to minimize this problem area and anticipate a reduction in the number of unbalanced skills in the near future. However, as noted in a previous section of this chapter, the skill imbalance implications of the officer reduction will be with us for many years.

4. Experience.

As shown in table VI-3, experience levels, as measured by average years of service, both overall and within each grade, have shown relatively little change over the past several years. This results from the combined effect of improved retention of experienced personnel, and decreased accessions to support the lower end strength.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

TOTAL AC MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*	%	AUTH	INV*	%	REQT	AUTH	MNG	REQT	AUTH	MNG	REQT	AUTH	MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	72.4	71.0		71.4	71.3		71.4	71.1	100	66.1	65.8	100	66.3	66.0	100
Offensive Strat Forces	53.5	52.9		55.2	55.2		55.5	55.3	100	51.6	51.4	100	51.7	51.5	100
Defensive Strat Forces	6.5	5.9		4.0	4.0		4.0	3.9	98	3.2	3.2	100	3.3	3.3	100
Surveillance Forces	12.4	12.2		12.2	12.2		11.9	11.8	99	11.3	11.2	99	11.4	11.3	99
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	148.2	147.1		152.6	152.0		150.6	148.4	99	146.9	144.6	98	146.1	143.9	98
Tactical Air Forces	109.1	107.9		117.6	117.1		114.8	113.1	99	111.8	110.1	98	110.9	109.2	98
Mobility Forces	39.1	39.2		35.0	34.9		35.8	35.3	99	35.1	34.6	99	35.2	34.7	99
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	32.9	32.5		33.7	33.4		33.4	33.3	100	33.6	33.5	100	33.7	33.7	100
Centrally Managed Comm	16.8	16.4		16.6	16.7		16.4	16.4	100	16.4	16.4	100	16.5	16.5	100
Intelligence	16.1	16.1		17.1	16.8		17.0	16.9	99	17.2	17.1	99	17.2	17.2	99
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	119.1	117.2		117.1	117.6		118.6	115.7	98	117.7	114.9	98	116.6	113.8	98
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	26.5	26.4		24.9	24.9		25.2	25.1	100	25.4	25.3	100	25.2	25.1	100
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	26.5	36.4		39.4	39.4		40.9	39.8	97	41.4	40.2	97	42.0	40.9	97
<u>JOINT ACITIVITIES</u>	9.0	8.8		9.5	9.8		9.5	9.4	99	9.4	9.3	99	9.3	9.2	99
Int'l Military Org	.6	.6		.4	.5		.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
Unified Commands	1.1	1.1		1.2	1.5		1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.3	100	1.3	1.3	100
Federal Support Actys	.3	.3		.3	.3		.3	.3	100	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	100
Joint Staff	.3	.4		.4	.4		.3	.3	100	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	100
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	6.7	6.5		7.1	7.1		7.0	6.9	99	6.9	6.8	99	6.9	6.8	99
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	4.7	4.4		10.2	10.2		9.9	9.9	100	9.8	9.7	99	9.8	9.7	99
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>	15.6	15.7		14.1	13.3		13.9	13.8	99	13.6	13.5	99	13.6	13.5	99
Combat Commands	9.1	9.2		8.3	8.0		8.4	8.3	99	8.2	8.1	99	8.2	8.1	99
Support Commands	6.5	6.5		5.8	5.3		5.5	5.5	100	5.4	5.4	100	5.4	5.4	100
<u>R&D GEOPHYSCAL ACTYS</u>	20.6	20.7		14.3	14.3		14.6	14.6	100	14.5	14.5	100	14.1	14.1	100
Research and Development	12.5	12.8		7.1	7.2		7.2	7.2	100	7.1	7.1	100	7.1	7.1	100
Geophysical Activities	8.1	7.9		7.2	7.1		7.4	7.4	100	7.4	7.4	100	7.0	7.0	100

TOTAL AC MILITARY	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	28.8	28.8	26.0	25.5	25.2	25.1	23.5	23.3	23.4	23.3
Personnel Support	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.0	5.9	6.0	5.9
Individual Training	22.3	22.3	19.6	19.2	18.8	18.8	17.5	17.4	17.4	17.4
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	34.1	34.1	33.7	33.7	34.3	33.5	33.8	33.0	33.8	33.0
Support Installations	24.5	24.4	24.3	24.3	24.8	24.1	24.4	23.7	24.4	23.7
Centralized Support Act.	9.6	9.7	9.4	9.4	9.5	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.5	9.4
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	548.4	543.1	546.9	545.4	547.8	539.9	535.6	527.7	534.0	526.2
UNDISTRIBUTED	-8.5	-	-12.2	-	-	-10.2	-	-1.4	-	-4.0
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES**										
INDIVIDUALS	62.2	58.4	40.9	31.0		41.3		44.8		44.6
Transients	14.0	20.2	9.2	1.8		9.8		10.0		9.9
Patients, Prisoners & Holders	.5	.5	.5	.5		.5		.5		.5
Trainees & Students	43.3	33.2	26.8	24.3		26.5		29.9		29.8
Cadets	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.5		4.4		4.4		4.4
END STRENGTH	602.1	601.5	575.6	576.4		571.0		571.1		566.8

Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Actuals

** Not included in AC end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

OFFICERS	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
DPPC										
STRATEGIC	12.8	12.7	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	12.3	13.0	12.3	12.3
Offensive Strat Forces	9.4	9.4	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.1	9.1	9.2	9.2
Defensive Strat Forces	.9	.9	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Surveillance Forces	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
TACTICAL/MOBILITY										
Tactical Air Forces	19.5	19.1	19.8	18.6	18.3	18.1	18.0	17.8	17.7	17.5
Mobility Forces	13.5	13.0	14.0	13.9	13.5	13.4	13.1	13.0	12.8	12.7
	6.0	6.1	5.8	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.8
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL										
Centrally Managed Comms	4.5	4.2	5.1	5.1	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.7
Intelligence	1.7	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8
	2.8	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	7.7	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.3	7.2	7.0	7.1	6.9
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
MEDICAL SUPPORT	11.2	11.2	12.0	11.9	12.7	12.2	12.9	12.4	13.1	12.6
JOINT ACTIVITIES										
Int'l Military Org	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Unified Commands	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
Federal Support Actys	.6	.7	.7	.9	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8
Joint Staff	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	2.1	1.8	6.9	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQS										
Combat Commands	9.2	9.2	9.2	7.6	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.9	7.9
Support Commands	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5

OFFICERS	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
DPPC										
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTVS	9.0	9.0	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9
Research and Development	7.0	7.0	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Geophysical Activities	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	7.0	7.0	6.4	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.8	6.7
Personnel Support	.9	.9	.7	.7	.7	.7	.6	.6	.6	.6
Individual Training	6.1	6.1	5.7	6.2	6.0	5.9	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.1
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	6.3	6.5	5.9	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.1
Support Installations	2.1	2.2	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1
Centralized Support Act.	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	96.6	95.6	97.3	95.2	95.5	94.4	94.0	93.0	93.8	92.7
UNDISTRIBUTED	-2	-	-1	-		-1		-5		-6
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION										
AUGMENTEES***										
INDIVIDUALS	11.8	12.8	8.2	10.0	10.3	10.3	9.8	9.8	10.0	10.0
Transients	2.0	2.2	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
Patients, Prisoners, & Holdees	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Trainees & Students	9.8	10.6	6.6	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.2
END STRENGTH	108.2	108.4	105.5	105.1	104.6	104.6	102.3	102.3	102.1	102.1

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actuals

** Less than 50.

*** Not included in AC end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

TABLE VI-1
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

AC ENLISTED	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	%		%		%	
					REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
<u>DPPC</u>										
<u>STRATEGIC</u>										
Offensive Strat Forces	59.6	58.3	58.4	58.4	58.3	58.0	53.7	53.4	54.0	53.7
Defensive Strat Forces	44.1	43.4	45.5	45.5	45.8	45.6	42.4	42.2	42.5	42.3
Surveillance Forces	5.6	5.0	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
	9.9	9.9	9.6	9.6	9.3	9.2	8.8	8.7	8.9	8.8
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>										
Tactical Air Forces	128.6	128.1	132.8	133.4	132.3	130.3	128.9	126.9	128.4	126.4
Mobility Forces	95.5	94.9	103.6	103.2	101.3	99.7	98.7	97.1	98.1	96.5
	33.1	33.2	29.2	30.2	31.0	30.6	30.2	29.8	30.3	29.9
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>										
Centrally Managed Comm	28.5	28.3	28.6	28.6	28.7	28.6	29.0	28.9	29.0	28.9
Intelligence	15.2	14.9	14.6	14.7	14.7	14.7	14.7	14.7	14.7	14.7
	13.3	13.4	14.0	13.9	14.0	13.9	14.3	14.2	14.3	14.2
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	111.4	109.6	109.6	110.1	111.2	108.4	110.6	107.9	109.6	106.9
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>	23.4	23.2	21.6	21.8	22.1	22.0	22.2	22.1	22.0	21.9
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	25.2	25.1	27.4	27.4	28.2	27.6	28.4	27.8	28.9	28.3
<u>JOINT ACITIVITIES</u>										
Int'l Military Org	5.0	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.8
Unified Commands	.4	.4	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
Federal Support Actys	.4	.4	.5	.6	.5	.5	.5	.5	.4	.4
Joint Staff	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
	4.0	3.8	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.9
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>	2.6	2.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS</u>										
Combat Commands	6.4	6.4	4.9	5.7	5.8	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Support Commands	4.2	4.2	3.4	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
	2.2	2.2	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8

AC ENLISTED	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH		AUTH		AUTH		AUTH		AUTH	
	DPCC	INV*	INV*	REQT	%	REQT	%	REQT	%	REQT
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS										
Research and Development	11.6	11.7	10.1	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.5	10.3	10.3	10.3
Geophysical Activities	5.5	5.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
	6.1	6.0	5.3	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.4	5.4
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL										
Personnel Support	21.8	21.8	19.6	18.6	18.5	16.8	16.7	16.7	16.6	16.6
Individual Training	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.3
	16.2	16.2	13.9	12.9	12.9	11.4	11.4	11.3	11.3	11.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES										
Support Installations	27.8	27.6	27.8	28.1	27.4	27.6	26.9	27.7	27.0	27.0
Centralized Support Act.	22.4	22.2	22.5	22.6	22.0	22.2	21.6	22.2	21.6	21.6
	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.4
TOTAL PROGRAMMED MANNING	451.9	447.5	449.5	452.3	445.5	441.4	434.7	440.2	433.5	433.5
UNDISTRIBUTED	-8.3	-	-12.1	-	-10.1	-	-9	-	-3.4	-
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION										
AUGMENTEES**										
INDIVIDUALS										
Transients	50.3	45.6	32.7	31.0	31.0	35.0	35.0	34.6	34.6	34.6
Patients, Prisoners, & Holders	11.9	18.0	7.6	7.9	7.9	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.1
Trainees & Students	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5
Cadets	33.5	22.6	20.2	18.1	18.1	21.9	21.9	21.6	21.6	21.6
	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
END STRENGTH	493.9	493.1	470.1	466.4	466.4	468.8	468.8	464.7	464.7	464.7

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actuals

** Not included in AC end strength. IMAs are counted as Selected Reserve end strength, but will man active component billets upon mobilization.

TABLE VI-2
ACTIVE AIR FORCE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	FY 1988			
	OVER*	BALANCED*	SHORT*	TOTAL
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	65	73	85	223.0
PMI**	39.2	103.4	108.8	243.3
Inventory	45.9	108.8	88.0	242.7
Over/Short	+6.7	+5.4	-12.7	-0.6
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	48	105	85	238.0
PMI**	32.2	95.6	85.4	213.2
Inventory	36.3	97.8	75.5	209.6
Over/Short	+4.1	+2.2	-9.9	-3.6
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	50	76	66	192.0
PMI**	2.3	6.6	5.9	14.8
Inventory	3.2	6.0	4.7	14.5
Over/Short	+0.9	0.0	-1.2	-0.3
<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	56	163	98	317.0
PMI**	42.7	260.0	167.6	471.3
Inventory	47.5	260.0	153.7	466.9
Over/Short	+4.8	+4.0	-13.9	-4.4
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	20	19	7	46
PMI**	20.1	24.4	21.6	66.0
Inventory	22.9	24.3	20.0	67.2
Over/Short	2.8	-0.0	-1.6	1.2
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	9	16	27	52
PMI**	13.7	7.1	17.7	38.5
Inventory	15.9	7.1	14.6	37.6
Over/Short	2.1	-0.0	-3.1	-1.0
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	0	49	3	52
PMI**	0.0	94.9	9.6	104.5
Inventory	0.0	95.8	9.0	104.8
Over/Short	0.0	0.9	-0.6	0.3

*For definitions see Appendix B

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

TABLE VI-3
ACTIVE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORIES *
(in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1988			PROGRAMMED FY 1989			PROGRAMMED FY 1990			PROGRAMMED FY 1991		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS	PEOPLE	4 YOS	YOS
E1-E4												
PMI**	243.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	241.5	N/A	N/A	239.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	242.7	67.7	3.6	240.2	71.8	3.5	241.5	77.9	3.5	239.3	77.8	3.5
E5-E7												
PMI	213.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	209.0	N/A	N/A	207.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	209.6	209.0	12.9	207.9	208.4	12.8	209.0	208.5	12.8	207.1	206.6	12.8
E1-E9												
PMI	471.3	N/A	N/A	462.0	N/A	N/A	464.4	N/A	N/A	460.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	466.9	291.2	8.4	462.0	294.8	8.4	464.4	300.6	8.3	460.3	298.3	8.2
01-03												
PMI	66.0	N/A	N/A	66.7	N/A	N/A	65.2	N/A	N/A	65.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	67.2	44.3	6.8	66.7	44.0	6.8	65.2	42.4	6.8	65.2	40.3	6.6
04-06												
PMI	38.5	N/A	N/A	37.6	N/A	N/A	36.8	N/A	N/A	36.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	37.6	37.1	17.3	37.6	37.1	17.3	36.8	36.4	17.3	36.6	36.4	17.4
01-06												
PMI	104.5	N/A	N/A	104.2	N/A	N/A	101.9	N/A	N/A	101.8	N/A	N/A
Inventory	104.8	81.4	10.6	104.2	81.1	10.6	101.9	78.8	10.6	101.8	76.7	10.5

*Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Air Force attained its non-prior service (NPS) and prior service (PS) objectives for FY 1988. The Air Force measures NPS accession quality using a combination of high school diploma graduate (HSDG) rates, upper AFQT category (CAT I&II) and lowest acceptable AFQT category (CAT IV) scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). In FY 1988, 99.1 percent of our NPS accessions were HSDGs and 50.9 percent were in the top two AFQT categories. Conversely, only 0.1 percent were CAT IVs. However, the 41,200 accessions in FY 1988 were the lowest in Air Force history, a decrease due largely to late budget reduction decisions. We must avoid a false sense of security based solely on high accession quality indicators. Our sister Services had a downward turn in quality and had difficulty making their objectives even with reduced accession levels. The combined impacts of low unemployment, civilian competition (both industry and post-secondary schools), declining youth population, and budgetary restraints paint a bleak picture for success in FY 1990 and FY 1991. A return to required accession levels to fully man the force combined with the other external factors indicate a potential decrease in our standard quality indicators. We are cautiously optimistic about our ability to meet the FY 1990-91 requirements if the funding levels remain constant. Should the environment deteriorate, we do not have the resource flexibility to respond with the authority needed to be successful.

Recruiting Results

	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
HSDG	99.0%	99.1%
CAT I&II	48.6%	50.9%
CAT IV	0.2%	0.1%
Objective	55,000	41,200
Attained	55,000	41,200

(2) Retention. Excellent retention continued as a result of increased emphasis on leadership and military values, efforts to protect institutional programs, improved professional education, adequate recognition, and a reasonable quality of life for the Air Force member and his or her family.

Enlisted Retention (Percent)

	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>
First-term	62	54	58	65	55
Second-term	80	78	77	79	79
Career	96	96	96	97	97

Retention successes this decade rebuilt experience levels and brought about a significant shift in the enlisted force structure. In FY 1980, our first-term airmen comprised 52 percent of the enlisted force;

today that figure is 39 percent. Excellent retention and end strength limitations forced lower non-prior service accessions and reduced the first-term airmen reenlistment eligible population. Larger year group populations are starting to build in the career force as a result of good second-term airmen retention and light retirement activity. As we move into a limited or no-growth strength environment, this shift in structure will require new approaches for working retention.

In the past, our challenge, during periods of conflict and force expansion, was to influence retention as much as possible. Large numbers were brought in, served one term, and most separated. Now, first-termers are more inclined to enter the career force and career airmen are not retiring as early in their career. But without force expansion to accompany this increase in retention, factors such as diminished promotion opportunities, quality losses through early release programs and the filling of a lower grade manning position with a more senior member could have a negative effect on career decisions.

Managing retention, which includes many influencing factors both internal and external, presents a unique challenge. The Air Force's reputation for first-class technical training in highly marketable skills is recognized by the private sector, especially in the airline maintenance and electronics/communications career fields. Current airline expansion and an aging civilian maintenance force will place a large demand for highly skilled and qualified aircraft mechanics. Airlines require Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) licenses prior to being hired. Our mechanics under Rivet Work Force will become valuable resources to both the Air Force and the airlines. Growing demand from the private sector for educated, trained, and motivated young people could seriously challenge our ability to retain the best airmen, especially first-termers, in the coming years. While we could sustain losses for the short-term in our career force, any significant loss of our first-term airmen would impact our readiness in the 1990s. This competition requires us to continue to target retention efforts and emphasizes the need for a viable selective reenlistment bonus program.

Future concerns include the effects of continued promotion slowdowns and reduced promotion opportunities. Additionally, fewer bonus dollars, out-of-pocket PCS expenses, dwindling morale, welfare and recreation funds, and the widening pay gap, make the potential for increased losses a reality.

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. This personnel retention factor continues at a very high level.

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	93.9	92.6	93.5	93.5	92.3	91.7
Enlisted	88.6	88.8	87.6	88.7	89.6	86.4

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. This indicator combines retention with a personnel stability factor. The indicator is a measure of how many personnel assigned to a unit at the beginning of a fiscal year are still there at the end of that fiscal year.

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	55.0	52.9	55.1	55.3	57.9	55.8
Enlisted	55.6	52.8	58.9	57.9	59.9	59.0

b. Officer.

(1) Accessions. The officer recruiting program supports line officer requirements for flight training (pilot and navigator), scientific, engineering, and a range of other skills necessary to sustain Air Force capabilities. The broad spectrum of Health Professionals, including physicians, nurses, etc., is also recruited under this program.

The major challenge in our FY 1989 officer recruiting program will be continuing requirements for physician and nursing specialists. Our physician requirement will increase and remain limited to specific critically required skills. Physician and nurse specialist shortages affect our ability to treat combat casualties, as well as the overall health and well-being of our members and their families. Referring those who need specialized treatment to CHAMPUS causes increased cost.

(2) Retention. Officer retention is reported as a Cumulative Continuation Rate (CCR). CCR is the percent of officers ending their initial service obligation who would complete their eleventh year of service if current retention rates continue, computed yearly. For pilots and navigators the 6-11 year group's rate is reported, while the 4-11 year group's rate is used for engineers, nonrated operations officers (NRO) and mission support officers (Msn Spt). After reaching a critically low point in FY 1979, officer retention climbed steadily to record levels in FY 1983. Today, navigator rates are healthy and while NRO, Msn Spt, and engineer rates are down, they're not critical. Pilot retention, on the other hand, has been on a steady decline. Pilot rates decreased from a high of 78 percent in FY 1983 to 43 percent in FY 1988. Minimum force sustainment rate is 63%. Below is a summary of officer CCR trends.

OFFICER RETENTION
(CCR)

	<u>FY79</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>
PILOT	26	78	72	59	56	48	43
NAVIGATOR	44	76	75	78	74	75	71
NONRATED OPS	59	69	68	68	72	62	60
MISSION SPT	48	62	61	61	57	55	54
ENGINEER	34	58	65	62	54	47	46

There are several factors contributing to our pilot retention problem. The strength of the economy, expansion of the airline industry, and the mandatory retirements of large numbers of pilots, have combined to create

the highest sustained pilot hiring levels in industry history. Since 1984, 27,000 hirings occurred. Of the 6,683 hires for 1988, 65% had military experience. This trend is projected to continue well into the 1990s with anywhere from 6,000 to 7,000 hires per year. The Air Force pilot force has been susceptible to recruitment. Voluntary separation requests for pilots in FY 1988 were 33% higher than for the same period in FY 1987. Also, over half of the pilots in the 6-11 year group who were eligible to separate after their initial commitment for flying training, did. Not only are our young pilots leaving at increasing rates, a large number of retired military pilots have also found airline jobs. For example, American Airlines reports that 15% of its total hires for the next five years will be retired military pilots. This compares to an average of 5% for the previous five year period. The bottom line: the national pool of qualified pilot applicants is shrinking and experienced, well-trained military pilots are in high demand by the industry. This vanishing pool translates into an Air Force shortfall of 910 pilots by FY 1993. Although the airlines provide a ready alternative for pilots, there are other internal factors which have caused pilots dissatisfaction with their military careers.

Through numerous information gathering tools, we've been able to identify some of these retention related problems. Sources include surveys of both career and separating pilots, conferences and symposiums, and Major Air Command feedback. From our efforts, we've found that pilots have concerns about assignment policies, pay and entitlements, leadership and communications, additional duties, family issues, and job security.

The Air Force has instituted a number of initiatives to address pilot concerns. These initiatives are receiving attention at all levels of the Air Force, particularly in each major command since they each have unique problems. At the forefront of the Air Force's plan is Officer Professional Development (OPD) -a comprehensive shift in emphasis from careerism to job performance as the basis for maturing the officer corps. In conjunction with OPD, the Air Force has changed its officer evaluation system to highlight performance. Efforts to deal with perceived communication and leadership problems were evident as well. Direct chain of command involvement in assignments and performance evaluation should help. Also, through increased use of policy letters, news releases, briefing, seminars, symposiums and surveys, the "word" is getting out to field units. Furthermore, in July 1988, a Pilot Retention Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) was created to keep pilots informed in a timely manner about personnel issues which affect them. The response to the EBB has been outstanding.

The Air Force has also instituted policy changes to address family concerns. A Blue Ribbon Panel was established to address the policy of the working spouse. We've also attempted to use our Family Support Centers in spouse referrals and PCS counseling for family members. In addition, the Air Force, after several unsuccessful attempts to affect a flight pay (ACIP) increase for aviators, turned to Aviator Continuation pay (ACP) --a pilot bonus. Eventually receiving a Congressional appropriation of \$36.2M for FY 1989, the Air Force has targeted pilots in fixed wing weapon systems for bonus payment. Two reports were given to Congress outlining

1

Air Force bonus implementation procedures (15 Nov 88) and DoD aviation retention (1 Dec 88). These reports were accepted and payments began on January 3, 1989.

The bonus is a key program to stem the loss of our pilot force. Its effect as well as the other initiatives remains to be seen. Unless we are successful in reversing the trend, pilot retention will remain below sustainment level.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Air Force Reserve (USAFR).

(a) General. The U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR) programmed end strength increases by 1,185 (1,171 drill and 14 full-time active duty Guard and Reserve) between FY 1989 and 1990. These increases are for force structure growth and modernization, including support for increased numbers of USAFR equipped C-5 units, and another increment of KC-10 maintenance and support personnel. Civil engineering and medical service authorizations increase to redress wartime shortfalls. Finally, the small increase in full-time personnel was made to support Air Force Recruiting requirements, primarily in the medical services.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning & Operating Strength. Table VI-4 displays by DPFC category the USAFR programmed manpower structure, its programmed manning and operating strength. The USAFR structure increases by 702 spaces, while the programmed manning of that structure increases by 863 people (does not include IMAs and active duty Guard/Reserve who do not man the structure).

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-5 displays Air Force Reserve end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units. The results show the Air Force Reserve is growing, yet maintaining a high percentage of trained personnel.

(d) Skill and Grade. Table VI-6 compares actual inventory to programmed manning plus individuals for USAFR personnel.

(e) Experience. Table VI-7 compares programmed manning plus individuals to actual inventory. Trends show that the average enlisted grade was relatively constant while the level of experience increased. The average grade and experience of the USAFR officer corps remained stable.

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

TOTAL AFR MILITARY	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV**	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		AUTH	INV**	DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC	2.0	2.0			1.9	1.9			1.9	1.9	100	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	100
Offensive Strat Forces	2.0	2.0			1.9	1.9			1.9	1.9	100	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	100	2.2	2.2	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	47.2	47.1			51.0	50.0			51.2	50.1	98	51.1	50.4	99	51.3	50.6	99	51.3	50.6	99
Tactical Air Forces	11.2	10.9			12.9	12.4			12.5	12.7	102	12.3	12.3	100	11.9	12.0	101	11.9	12.0	101
Mobility Forces	36.1	36.3			38.2	37.6			38.8	37.5	97	38.8	38.0	98	39.3	38.7	98	39.3	38.7	98
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	.1	.1			.1	.1			.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Centrally Managed Comm	.1	.1			.1	.1			.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	7.3	7.6			10.9	10.7			11.1	11.0	99	11.2	11.1	99	11.4	11.1	97	11.4	11.1	97
MEDICAL SUPPORT	3.9	3.5			4.7	3.6			3.7	3.8	103	4.0	4.1	102	4.6	4.7	102	4.6	4.7	102
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES	.5	.6			.1	.1			.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	.5	.6			.1	.1			.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	.1	.2			.1	.1			-	-	-	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Individual Training	.1	.2			.1	.1			-	-	-	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	.5	.5			.5	.5			.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
Centralized Support Act.	.5	.5			.5	.5			.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	61.7	61.4			69.4	67.0			68.6	67.3	98	69.3	68.4	99	70.1	69.2	99	70.1	69.2	99
AGR		.6				.6				.7			.7			.7			.7	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES		11.7				12.5				13.5			13.8			13.7			13.7	
INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)		1.6				2.0				2.1			1.9			1.7			1.7	
END STRENGTH		75.2				82.1				83.6			84.8			85.2			85.2	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding
** Actuals

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

AFR OFFICERS	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**		AUTH	INV**		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
STRATEGIC	.3	.3		.3	.3		.3	.3	100	.4	.3	75	.4	.3	75
Offensive Strat Forces									100			75			75
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	6.6	6.4		7.1	6.9		7.1	6.7	94	7.1	6.8	96	7.1	6.9	97
Tactical Air Forces	1.4	1.3		1.6	1.5		1.6	1.5	91	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100
Mobility Forces	5.2	5.1		5.5	5.4		5.5	5.1	93	5.5	5.3	96	5.6	5.4	96
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	*	*		*	*		*	*	-	*	*	-	*	*	-
Centrally Managed Comm	*	*		*	*		*	*	-	*	*	-	*	*	-
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	.3	.3		.5	.5		.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
METICAL SUPPORT	1.0	.8		1.2	.9		.9	.9	100	1.0	1.0	100	1.1	1.2	109
RED/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES	.1	.1		*	*		*	*	-	*	*	-	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1		*	*		*	*	-	*	*	-	-	-	-
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	*	*		*	*		*	*	-	*	*	-	*	*	-
Individual Training	*	*		*	*		*	*	-	*	*	-	*	*	-
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	.2	.2		.2	.2		.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100
Centralized Support Act.	.2	.2		.2	.2		.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100	.2	.2	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	8.5	8.1		9.4	8.8		9.1	8.7	96	9.3	9.0	97	9.4	9.1	97
AGR		.2			.2			.2			.2			.2	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION		7.3			7.6			7.7			7.9			7.8	
AUGMENTES															
END STRENGTH		15.6			16.5			16.5			17.0			17.1	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding
** Actuals

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)*

AFR ENLISTED	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**		AUTH	INV**		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES															
STRATEGIC	1.7	1.7		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	100
Offensive Strat Forces	1.7	1.7		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	100	1.6	1.6	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	40.7	40.7		44.0	43.1		44.1	43.4	98	44.0	43.5	99	44.2	43.7	99
Tactical Air Forces	9.7	9.5		11.2	10.9		10.9	11.1	102	10.8	10.8	100	10.5	10.5	100
Mobility Forces	30.9	31.2		32.7	32.2		33.2	32.3	97	33.2	32.7	98	33.7	33.2	99
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	.1	.1		.1	.1		.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Centrally Managed Comm	.1	.1		.1	.1		.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	7.0	7.3		10.4	10.2		10.5	10.4	99	10.7	10.6	99	10.8	10.6	98
MEDICAL SUPPORT	2.9	2.7		3.6	2.8		2.8	2.9	104	3.1	3.1	100	3.4	3.5	103
RED/GEOPHYSICAL ACTIVITIES	.4	.5		.1	.1		.1	*	-	.1	.1	100	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	.4	.5		.1	.1		.1	*	-	.1	.1	100	-	-	-
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	.1	*		.1	.1		-	-	-	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Individual Training	.1	*		.1	.1		-	-	-	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	.3	.2		.3	.3		.3	.2	67	.3	.2	67	.3	.2	67
Centralized Support Act.	.3	.2		.3	.3		.3	.2	67	.3	.2	67	.3	.2	67
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	53.1	53.2		60.0	58.2		59.5	58.7	99	60.0	59.5	99	60.7	60.0	99
AGR		.4			.4			.5			.5			.5	
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION															
AUGMENTEES		4.4			4.9			5.8			5.9			5.9	
INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)		1.6			2.0			2.1			1.9			1.7	
END STRENGTH		59.6			65.6			67.1			67.8			68.1	

* Numbers may not total due to rounding
** Actuals

TABLE VI-5

TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH - USAFR
(in thousands)

USAFR	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	82,116	83,615	84,800	85,200
-Training Pipeline*	2,023	2,125	1,914	1,693
-IMAs	12,475	13,482	13,790	13,655
Operating Strength				
-Non Unit AGR	626	672	686	700
+Unit AC Personnel				
Trained Unit Strength	66,992	67,336	68,410	69,152
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	69,415	68,600	69,302	70,098
% Trained in Units	96.5%	98.1%	98.7%	98.7%

* Includes categories F and P

TABLE VI-6
US AIR FORCE RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FY 1988				
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	45	13	30	88.0
PMI**	2.3	1.6	18.0	21.9
Inventory	3.8	1.5	9.7	15.0
Over/Short	+1.5	-a	-8.3	-6.9
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	36	32	26	94.0
PMI**	21.6	7.9	7.8	37.2
Inventory	28.5	8.0	6.3	42.8
Over/Short	+6.9	+1.1	-1.4	+5.6
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	11	20	45	76.0
PMI**	.1	1.0	1.8	2.9
Inventory	.1	1.0	1.2	2.3
Over/Short	+a	-a	-.6	-.6
<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	92	65	101	258.0
PMI**	24.0	10.5	27.6	62.0
Inventory	32.4	10.5	17.2	60.1
Over/Short	+8.4	+a	-10.4	-1.9
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	47	4	52	103.0
PMI**	.2	.1	5.0	5.3
Inventory	.7	.1	3.2	4.0
Over/Short	+1.5	a	+1.8	-1.3
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	41	34	49	124.0
PMI**	1.0	1.2	1.9	4.1
Inventory	2.5	1.1	1.2	4.8
Over/Short	+1.4	-a	-.7	+.7
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	88	38	101	227.0
PMI**	1.3	1.3	6.9	9.4
Inventory	3.2	1.2	4.4	8.8
Over/Short	+1.9	-.1	-2.5	-.6

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals
a Less than 50

TABLE VI-7

US AIR FORCE RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED vs ACTUAL INVENTORY
(in thousands)
FY 1988

	<u>Total</u> <u>People</u>	<u>People with</u> <u>Greater than</u> <u>4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>	<u>FY 89**</u> <u>Total</u> <u>People</u>	<u>FY 90**</u> <u>Total</u> <u>People</u>	<u>FY 91**</u> <u>Total</u> <u>People</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>						
PMI*	21.9	NA	NA	21.0	21.2	21.4
Inventory	15.1	4.4	3.3	15.2	15.4	15.5
<u>E5-E7</u>						
PMI	37.2	NA	NA	35.7	36.0	36.4
Inventory	42.8	41.0	12.7	43.2	43.6	43.9
<u>E8-E9</u>						
PMI	2.9	NA	NA	2.8	2.8	2.8
Inventory	2.3	2.3	25.4	2.3	2.4	2.4
<u>E1-E9</u>						
PMI	62.0	NA	NA	59.5	60.0	60.7
Inventory	60.2	47.2	10.8	60.8	61.4	61.7
<u>01-03</u>						
PMI*	5.3	NA	NA	5.1	5.2	5.3
Inventory	4.0	3.1	9.3	3.9	4.1	4.2
<u>04-06</u>						
PMI*	4.1	NA	NA	4.0	4.0	4.1
Inventory	4.8	4.7	18.9	4.7	4.9	5.0
<u>01-06</u>						
PMI*	9.4	NA	NA	9.1	9.2	9.4
Inventory	8.8	7.8	14.5	8.6	8.9	9.1

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

**Estimates

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The US Air Force Reserve placed emphasis on matching accessions to critical skills and programmed structure requirements. The US Air Force Reserve exceeded its FY 1988 adjusted goals for both prior and non-prior service personnel. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1988 and the accession goals for FY 1989 through FY 1991 are shown below:

USAFR Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Accessions</u>					
Prior Service	10,513	10,391	11,271	10,900	9,849
HSDG		9,936			
Non-Prior Service	3,541	2,898	3,358	3,129	3,034
Male		1,976			
Female		922			
HSDG		2,768			

The above data shows that 96 percent of both the prior and non-prior service accessions were high school diploma graduates. In addition, 92 percent of prior service accessions and over 99 percent of non-prior service accessions were in the top three AFQT categories. This data shows the continued high quality of USAFR accessions.

[b] Retention. Retention rates for the US Air Force Reserve enlisted force for FY 1988 and goals for FY 1989 through FY 1991 are shown below:

USAFR Retention Rates (percent)

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
<u>Retention</u>					
First Term	80	87.3	80	80	80
Career	85	92.1	85	85	85

The FY 1988 enlisted retention rates continued to show favorable results.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. Since aggregate population stability is a measure of retention, it is logical that this factor should remain at a very high level.

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Enlisted	83.6	86.8	87.7	84.8	92.2	86.1

[d] Unit Personnel stability. This category is also impacted by the strong retention statistics.

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Enlisted	74.9	78.6	77.0	76.2	73.0	76.9

[2] Officer.

[a] Accessions. The U.S. Air Force Reserve receives officers separated from the active force, other reserve status components, and from the non-extended active duty commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1988 and the estimated requirement for FY 1989 through FY 1991 are shown below:

USAFR Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>	<u>Est Req</u>
Accessions	2,160	1,742	1,730	1,850	1,830

[b] Retention. Retention has not been a problem in the US Air Force Reserve. The FY 1988 aggregate population rate was 91.5 percent and unit population stability was 77.3 percent. Manning levels historically exceed the 90 percent level; therefore, no specific goals have been established.

(g) Readiness Assessment. The readiness of the U.S. Air Force Reserve is a function of unit staffing, stability, occupational imbalances, and the level of experience. Improvement can be documented in three of these four areas. If the existing skill imbalances do not worsen substantially, the personnel readiness posture should remain unchanged or improve slightly through FY 1991.

(h) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Programs. The purpose of the IMA program is to provide highly skilled individuals who augment active units during wartime or emergency situations. All IMA positions are reviewed annually as part of the Wartime Manpower Planning Exercise (MANREQ) and justified solely on the basis of wartime or contingency requirements for which the active forces are insufficient. An IMA is not authorized based on peacetime tasks or peacetime manning shortages. U.S. Air Force Reserve IMA program growth is approximately 8% from FY 1988 through FY 1991.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	12,700	12,475	13,482	13,790	13,655
48 Drill	651	639	773	750	750
24 Drill	11,659	11,590	12,309	12,640	12,505
Other	400	246	400	400	400

(i) Full-Time Support Programs. Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty for periods in excess of 179 days who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components and are paid from Reserve personnel appropriations. They assist members of the Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee; advise and assist in developing and implementing Reserve Forces policies, procedures, and programs; and assist in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the Reserve components.

Air Reserve Technicians serve in dual status. As civilians they provide full-time support to an Air Force Reserve unit. They are also members of the Air Force Reserve who perform all military training and duty in their unit, and must be available to enter active duty should their unit be mobilized.

	<u>USAFR Full Time Support</u>			
	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Active Duty Guard/Reserve	626	672	686	700
Air Reserve Technicians	9,111	10,061	10,124	10,071
Civilians	5,083	4,526	4,313	4,286
Active Air Force with AFR	633	605	592	603
Total	15,453	15,864	15,715	15,660

(2) Air National Guard.

(a) General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has a programmed increase of 1,325 between FY 1989 and FY 1990. Of this increase 742 are drilling Guardsmen, and 583 are full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. The increases are required to support medical growth, increased security requirements, operational support aircraft, communications equipment, a further build at the ANG Electronic Security Squadron, and other miscellaneous force and mission changes.

(b) Programmed Manpower Structure, Programmed Manning & Operating Strength. Table VI-8 displays ANG programmed manning and operating strength by DPPC category. The Air National Guard programmed end strength of 116,300 in FY 1990 will allow for an overall manning level of 96.4% when compared to the total requirements line.

(c) Trained in Unit Strength. Table VI-9 displays Air National Guard end strength, then adds or subtracts appropriate personnel to show the trained in unit strength. This strength is compared to the wartime unit structure to compute the percent trained in units.

(d) Skill and Grade. ANG skill and grade imbalances are depicted in tables VI-10 and VI-11.

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The overall enlisted skill and grade overages in the ANG are caused by several factors: low number of authorizations for grades E-1 to E-4, unit conversions/new missions, the required time lag to realign or attrit resources, and filling some projected authorizations up to one year in advance. Overall enlisted shortages are mainly caused by the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassign overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical area.

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

TOTAL AND MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*		AUTH	INV*		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
STRATEGIC	22.1	22.5		18.0	18.4		18.4	18.1	99	18.8	18.3	98	18.7	18.3	98
Offensive Strat Forces	10.6	11.0		8.2	8.3		8.3	8.3	100	9.0	8.9	99	9.0	8.9	99
Defensive Strat Forces	10.8	10.7		9.0	9.4		9.3	9.0	97	9.3	8.9	96	9.2	8.8	96
Surveillance Forces	0.8	0.8		0.7	.7		.8	.8	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	62.4	63.9		69.6	70.2		71.4	70.1	98	72.6	70.1	97	72.6	70.0	96
Tactical Air Forces	44.0	44.0		51.6	52.3		52.8	51.4	97	53.2	51.2	96	53.0	51.0	96
Mcility Forces	18.4	19.9		18.0	17.9		18.6	18.7	101	19.4	18.9	98	19.5	19.0	97
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL	12.1	11.5		11.7	10.9		12.9	12.3	95	13.0	12.4	96	13.0	12.4	96
Intelligence	0	0		0	.1		.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
Centrally Managed Comm	12.1	11.5		11.6	10.9		12.8	12.2	95	12.9	12.3	96	12.9	12.3	96
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	2.9	3.5		3.6	4.3		3.7	2.5	68	3.6	2.5	68	3.6	2.5	69
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0	0		4.2	4.2		5.7	4.2	75	6.3	5.0	79	6.3	5.0	79
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTS	.1	.1		.1	.1		.2	.1	91	.2	.1	86	.2	.1	86
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS	.5	.5		.6	.5		.6	.6	100	.6	.6	100	.6	.6	100
Geophysical Activities	.5	.5		.6	.5		.6	.6	100	.6	.6	100	.6	.6	100
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL	3.0	4.0		3.4	3.4		3.7	3.4	91	3.7	3.4	92	3.7	3.4	92
Personnel Support	.5	.5		.5	.5		.5	.5	100	.6	.5	96	.6	.5	96
Individual Training	2.5	3.5		2.9	3.0		3.2	2.9	91	3.2	3.1	97	3.2	3.1	97
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	2.1	1.7		1.5	1.7		1.8	1.5	83	1.8	1.3	71	1.8	1.3	71
Centralized Support Act.	2.1	1.7		1.5	1.7		1.8	1.5	83	1.8	1.3	71	1.8	1.3	71

TOTAL ANG MILITARY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	105.3	107.2	112.7	113.8	118.2	112.7	95	120.7	113.9	94	120.6	113.7	94
INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)	2.4	2.2	3.2	1.4		2.2			2.2			2.2	
END STRENGTH	107.7	109.4	115.9	115.2	118.2	115.0	97	120.7	116.3	96	120.6	116.1	96

* Less than 50

** Numbers may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

ANG OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*		AUTH	INV*		REQT	AUTH	MNG	REQT	AUTH	MNG	REQT	AUTH	MNG
<u>STRATEGIC</u>															
Offensive Strat Forces	2.8	2.9		2.4	2.5		2.4	2.4	97	2.4	2.3	97	2.4	2.3	98
Defensive Strat Forces	1.4	1.5		1.2	1.2		1.2	1.2	98	1.3	1.3	99	1.3	1.3	99
Surveillance Forces	1.3	1.3		1.1	1.2		1.2	1.1	95	1.0	1.0	95	1.0	1.0	95
	.1	.1		.1	.1		.1	.1	118	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>															
Tactical Air Forces	8.3	8.0		8.3	7.9		8.2	8.1	99	8.3	8.1	97	8.3	8.0	97
Mobility Forces	5.5	5.2		5.3	5.2		5.3	5.2	98	5.3	5.1	97	5.2	5.0	96
	2.8	2.8		2.9	2.7		2.9	2.9	100	3.1	3.0	97	3.1	3.0	97
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>															
Intelligence	.7	.6		.7	.7		.8	.8	95	.8	.8	96	.8	.8	96
Centrally Managed Comm	.7	.6		.7	.7		.8	.8	95	.8	.8	96	.8	.8	96
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>															
	.2	.2		.3	.2		.3	.2	71	.3	.2	71	.3	.2	71
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>															
	-	-		1.4	1.3		1.8	1.4	75	2.0	1.6	79	2.0	1.6	79
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HOTS</u>															
	.1	.1		.1	.1		.1	.1	92	.1	.1	86	.1	.1	86
<u>R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS</u>															
Geophysical Activities	.1	.1		.1	.1		.1	.1	101	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
	.1	.1		.1	.1		.1	.1	101	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>															
Personnel Support	.3	.3		.4	.3		.4	.4	89	.4	.4	92	.4	.4	91
Individual Training	.3	.3		.4	.3		.4	.4	89	.4	.4	92	.4	.4	91
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>															
Centralized Support Act.	.9	.8		.9	.9		1.1	.9	80	1.1	.8	71	1.1	.8	71
	.9	.8		.9	.9		1.1	.9	80	1.1	.8	71	1.1	.8	71

ANG OFFICERS DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV**	AUTH	INV**	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>15.3</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>15.3</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>13.0</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>15.3</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>15.3</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>93</u>

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Less than 50

** Actuals

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

ANG ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985				FY 1988				FY 1989				FY 1990				FY 1991			
	AUTH	INV%	AUTH	INV%	AUTH	INV%	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG		
<u>STRATEGIC</u>	19.3	19.6	15.6	15.9	15.9	15.7	15.9	15.7	99	16.4	16.0	98	16.4	16.0	98	16.4	16.0	98		
Offensive Strat Forces	9.1	9.5	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.1	7.2	101	7.7	7.7	99	7.7	7.7	99	7.7	7.7	99		
Defensive Strat Forces	9.5	9.4	7.9	8.2	8.2	7.9	8.2	7.9	97	8.2	7.9	96	8.2	7.9	96	8.2	7.9	96		
Surveillance Forces	.7	.7	.7	.6	.6	.7	.7	.7	103	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100		
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>	54.2	55.9	51.3	62.2	62.2	62.0	63.2	62.0	98	64.5	62.1	96	64.5	62.1	96	64.3	61.9	96		
Tactical Air Forces	38.6	38.8	46.3	47.1	47.1	46.2	47.5	46.2	97	48.1	46.1	96	48.1	46.1	96	47.8	46.0	96		
Mobility Forces	15.6	17.1	15.0	15.1	15.1	15.8	15.7	15.8	100	16.4	15.9	97	16.4	15.9	97	16.4	15.9	97		
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>	11.4	10.9	10.9	10.3	10.3	11.5	12.1	11.5	95	12.2	11.6	96	12.2	11.6	96	12.2	11.6	96		
Intelligence	-	-	-	-	-	.1	.1	.1	71	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100	.1	.1	100		
Centrally Managed Comm	11.4	10.9	10.9	10.3	10.3	11.4	12.0	11.4	95	12.1	11.6	96	12.1	11.6	96	12.1	11.6	96		
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>	2.7	3.3	3.3	4.1	4.1	2.2	3.3	2.2	67	3.3	2.3	68	3.3	2.3	68	3.3	2.3	68		
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>	-	-	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.8	2.8	75	4.4	3.5	79	4.4	3.5	79	4.4	3.5	79		
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HOTS</u>	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
<u>R&D GEOPHYSICAL ACTVS</u>	.4	.4	.5	.4	.4	.5	.5	.5	102	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100		
Geophysical Activities	.4	.4	.5	.4	.4	.5	.5	.5	102	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100	.5	.5	100		
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>	2.7	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.3	3.0	91	3.3	3.1	93	3.3	3.1	93	3.3	3.1	92		
Personnel Support	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	100	.6	.5	96	.6	.5	96	.6	.5	96		
Individual Training	2.2	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.5	89	2.7	2.5	92	2.7	2.5	92	2.8	2.5	92		
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>	1.2	.9	.6	.8	.8	.6	.8	.6	76	.8	.5	71	.8	.5	71	.8	.5	71		
Centralized Support Act.	1.2	.9	.6	.8	.8	.6	.8	.6	78	.8	.5	71	.8	.5	71	.8	.5	71		

ANG ENLISTED DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	<u>91.9</u>	<u>94.2</u>	<u>98.2</u>	<u>99.9</u>	<u>102.9</u>	<u>98.4</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>105.3</u>	<u>99.6</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>105.1</u>	<u>99.4</u>	<u>95</u>
<u>INDIVIDUALS (Trainees & Students)</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>1.4</u>		<u>2.3</u>			<u>2.4</u>			<u>2.4</u>	
<u>END STRENGTH</u>	<u>94.3</u>	<u>96.4</u>	<u>101.4</u>	<u>101.2</u>	<u>102.9</u>	<u>100.7</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>105.3</u>	<u>102.0</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>105.1</u>	<u>101.8</u>	<u>97</u>

* Less than 50

** Actuals

Total may not total due to rounding

TABLE VI-9

TRAINED IN UNIT STRENGTH - ANG
(in thousands)

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>FY 1991</u>
End Strength	115.2	115.0	116.3	116.1
-Training Pipeline*	2.3	3.4	3.4	3.4
Operating Strength	112.9	111.6	112.9	112.7
-Non Unit AGR	.5	.5	.5	.5
+Unit AC Personnel	.6	.6	.6	.6
Trained Unit Strength	113.0	111.7	113.0	112.8
Structure Requirements (WARTIME)	118.7	119.4	120.6	120.4
-Non-Unit Structure**	.5	.5	.5	.5
Wartime Unit Structure	118.2	118.9	120.1	119.9
% Trained in Units	95.6%	93.9%	94.1%	94.1%

* Includes categories F and P.

** AGR in Management Headquarters, ANG Support Center, and ANG State Headquarters.

TABLE VI-10
AIR NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in thousands)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>FY 1988</u> <u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>E1 - E4</u>				
Number of Skills	30	10	61	101.0
PMI**	4.5	3.3	24.1	31.9
Inventory	6.8	3.4	18.0	28.2
Over/Short	2.4	0.0	-6.1	-3.7
<u>E5 - E7</u>				
Number of Skills	17	34	55	106.0
PMI	16.4	25.6	28.2	70.2
Inventory	18.1	25.1	22.4	65.6
Over/Short	1.7	-0.4	-5.8	-4.5
<u>E8 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	4	20	62	86.0
PMI	0.0	0.9	6.3	7.3
Inventory	0.0	0.9	3.6	4.5
Over/Short	0.0	0.0	-2.7	-2.8
<u>Total E1 - E9</u>				
Number of Skills	22	18	68	108.0
PMI	20.8	26.3	61.2	108.4
Inventory	24.7	26.1	47.6	98.4
Over/Short	3.8	-0.2	-13.6	-10.0
<u>WO (Total Numbers)</u>				
Number of Skills	1	0	0	1.0
PMI	.001	0.0	0.0	.001
Inventory	.001	0.0	0.0	.001
Over/Short	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>01-03</u>				
Number of Skills	16	3	15	34.0
PMI	1.4	1.3	2.6	5.4
Inventory	2.2	1.3	2.5	6.0
Over/Short	0.8	0.0	-0.1	0.7
<u>04-06</u>				
Number of Skills	7	4	25	36.0
PMI	2.1	1.0	6.0	9.1
Inventory	2.5	1.0	4.0	7.5
Over/Short	0.4	0.0	-2.0	-1.6
<u>Total 01-06</u>				
Number of Skills	3	13	20	36
PMI	3.0	4.8	6.7	14.5
Inventory	3.5	4.7	5.3	13.5
Over/Short	0.5	0.0	-1.4	-0.9

*See definitions at Appendix B.
 **Programmed Manning Plus Individuals.

(e) Experience.

TABLE VI-11

AIR NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE
ACTUAL/PROGRAMMED INVENTORY
(in thousands)

FY 1988

	<u>Total People</u>	<u>People with Greater than 4 YOS</u>	<u>AVG-YOS</u>
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI*	31.9	NA	NA
Inventory	30.8	13.3	3.6
<u>E5-E7</u>			
PMI	70.2	NA	NA
Inventory	65.8	65.4	14.4
<u>E8-E9</u>			
PMI	6.3	NA	NA
Inventory	4.5	4.5	27.9
<u>E1-E9</u>			
PMI	108.4	NA	NA
Inventory	101.1	83.3	11.7
<u>WO (Total Number)</u>			
PMI	0.0	NA	NA
Inventory	.001	0.0	37
<u>01-03</u>			
PMI	5.3	NA	NA
Inventory	6.1	5.2	9.5
<u>04-06</u>			
PMI	9.1	NA	NA
Inventory	7.5	7.5	20.4
<u>01-06</u>			
PMI	14.5	NA	NA
Inventory	13.6	12.6	15.7

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(f) Personnel Management.

[1] Enlisted.

[a] Recruiting. The actual number of ANG enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1988 and the accession goals for FY 1989 through FY 1991 are shown below:

	<u>ANG Enlisted Plan</u>			<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>FY 88</u>					
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual*</u>	<u>HSDG</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Non-Prior Service (NPS)	3881	3832	3516	5535	5340	5340
Male	2875	2808	2567	4070	3900	3900
Female	1006	1024	949	1465	1440	1440
Prior-Service (PS)	7327	7400	7378	5748	7019	5734
Male	6374	6317	6298	4885	5965	4875
Female	953	1083	1080	863	1054	859

*ANG attained 101.0 percent of its funded end strength. This can be attributed to increased retention and a successful recruiting program.

[b] Retention. Retention rates for the ANG Enlisted forces for FY 1988 are shown below:

	<u>ANG Reenlistment Rates</u> (percent)				
	<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	75%	78%	75%	75%	75%
Mid Career	80%	76%	80%	80%	80%
Career	85%	96%	85%	85%	85%
Overall	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%

First Term, Career and Overall Retention Effectiveness Rates met or exceeded established goals for FY 1988.

[c] Aggregate Population Stability. The Air National Guard continues to maintain a stable force as reflected below:

Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Officer	93.2	94.5	94.6	94.3	95.5	93.9
Enlisted	84.5	90.0	91.3	90.7	92.7	91.1

[d] Unit Personnel Stability. The Air National Guard unit personnel stability remains fairly stable since FY 1983.

Unit Personnel Stability (Percent)

	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>	<u>FY85</u>	<u>FY86</u>	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>
Enlisted	90.5	91.0	91.0	80.8	79.5	81.5

[2] Officer Accessions. The actual number of ANG officers recruited in FY 1988 and accession goals for FY 1989 through FY 1991 are shown below:

ANG Officer Accession Plan

<u>FY 88</u>		<u>FY 89</u>		<u>FY 90</u>		<u>FY 91</u>	
<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>		<u>Goal</u>		<u>Goal</u>	
1267	1176	1356		1121		996	

(g) Readiness Assessment. A continued high level of programmed manning, greater stability (particularly at the unit level), and an increasing level of experience will maintain and improve further the Air National Guard's overall readiness posture.

(h) Full-Time Support Program. Full-time support manpower represents an essential element for mission accomplishment and readiness of Air National Guard units. Full-time manpower consisting of military technicians, active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Active Component and civil service personnel perform the day-to-day duties necessary for mission accomplishment and readiness objectives. Specifically, the full-time force performs maintenance, training and support duties associated with unit equippage and mission objectives. Adequate full-time manning is a key factor in mission readiness. Half of the full-time manpower available to the ANG is dedicated to equipment maintenance. The remainder is dedicated to training, logistics, administration and other support functions. The elements of full-time manpower programmed for the ANG are as follows:

	ANG Full-Time Support			
	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military Technicians*	24,409	23,644	23,948	23,954
Civilians	1,874	1,997	1,698	1,694
Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR)	7,709	7,948	8,531	8,481
Active Air Force with ANG	625	612	599	600
Total	33,617	34,201	34,776	34,729

*Includes non-dual status National Guard civilian technicians.

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).

The IRR consists of people who have recently served in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have remaining a period of obligated service or who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship or disability. They are subject to being called to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

Individual Ready Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
55.9*	43.9**	43.9**	43.9**

* Includes training categories J and K.

** Does not include categories J and K.

2. Standby Reserve.

The standby reserve consists of people who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to maintain a reserve status. They are not in a pay status and do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs, but are liable for active duty in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress.

Standby Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
21.8	26.2	26.2	26.2

3. Retirees.

Retirees
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Twenty Year Active Duty Retirees (AC/RC)				
Categories I and II	271.1	271.1	271.1	271.1
Category III	236.1*	236.1**	236.1**	236.1**
Other Retiree Reserves				
Categories I and II	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0
Category III	42.8	42.8	42.8	42.8

*Includes 55,614 Disability Retirees.
 **Includes estimated 55,600 Disability Retirees.
 (Honorary Retirees not included)

4. Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty

The following charts depict the numbers of officers and enlisted members serving on active duty for training as of the last day of FY 1988 under orders specifying an aggregate period in excess of 180 days and an estimate for FY 1989 of the number that will be ordered to such duty.

Air National Guard

	<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	320	-	320
Flight Training	323	-	315	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	13	-	13	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-	-	-	-

Air Force Reserve

	<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Recruit and Specialized Training	-	1,459	-	3,062
Flight Training	59	-	65	-
Professional Training in Military and Civilian Institutions	33	-	33	-
Officer Acquisition Training	-	-	-	-

C. Civilian Force Management

1. General

Air Force civilians comprise approximately one third of the Total Force. Civilian end strengths include Air Force Reserve military technicians, who serve their units as civilians during peacetime, and as uniformed members upon mobilization. The civilian work force supports the Air Force mission in numerous capacities. Their largest concentrations are in Air Force Logistics Command, where they perform depot level maintenance on major weapons systems, as well as materiel management and

TABLE VI-12
ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(In Thousands)

CIVILIAN	FY 1985			FY 1988			FY 1989			FY 1990			FY 1991		
	AUTH	INV*		AUTH	INV*		REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG	REQT	AUTH	% MNG
DPPC															
STRATEGIC															
Offensive Strat Forces	7.9	8.0		8.8	8.7		8.8	8.8	100	9.0	9.0	100	9.1	9.1	100
Defensive Strat Forces	3.4	3.4		3.6	3.6		3.6	3.6	100	3.8	3.8	100	3.8	3.8	100
Surveillance Forces	3.4	3.5		3.6	3.6		3.6	3.6	100	3.7	3.7	100	3.8	3.8	100
	1.1	1.1		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6	100	1.4	1.4	100	1.4	1.4	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY															
Tactical Air Forces	28.5	28.8		30.1	29.7		30.7	30.6	100	30.6	30.5	100	30.4	30.3	100
Mobility Forces	15.4	15.5		16.0	15.9		16.1	16.0	99	16.0	15.9	99	15.7	15.6	99
	13.1	13.3		14.1	13.9		14.6	14.6	100	14.7	14.7	100	14.8	14.8	100
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL															
Centrally Managed Comm	6.6	6.5		7.7	6.7		7.5	7.5	100	7.6	7.6	100	7.7	7.7	100
Intelligence	4.6	4.6		5.5	4.5		5.3	5.3	100	5.2	5.2	100	5.3	5.3	100
	2.0	1.9		2.2	2.1		2.3	2.3	100	2.4	2.4	100	2.4	2.4	100
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	50.7	52.2		52.7	49.2		52.5	51.9	99	51.6	51.0	99	51.2	50.6	99
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	1.8	1.8		1.9	1.9		1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100	1.9	1.9	100
MEDICAL SUPPORT	7.6	7.6		9.2	9.1		9.3	9.2	99	9.4	9.3	99	9.4	9.3	99
JOINT ACITIVITIES															
Int'l Military Org	1.9	1.9		2.5	2.5		2.7	2.6	96	2.6	2.5	96	2.5	2.5	100
Unified Commands	.1	.1		.2	.2		.3	.3	100	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	100
Federal Support Actys	**	**		**	**		**	**	100	**	**	100	**	**	100
Joint Staff	0	0		0	0		0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	-
OSD/Def Actys & Agencies	1.8	1.8		2.3	2.3		2.4	2.3	96	2.3	2.2	96	2.2	2.2	100
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	77.9	81.5		85.0	79.7		86.9	83.0	96	87.5	83.1	95	87.3	82.9	95
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HOTS															
Combat Commands	8.3	8.3		8.0	7.1		8.1	8.0	99	8.1	8.0	99	8.1	8.0	99
Support Commands	2.7	2.7		2.7	2.4		2.8	2.8	100	2.7	2.7	100	2.7	2.7	100
	5.6	5.6		5.3	4.7		5.3	5.2	98	5.4	5.3	98	5.4	5.3	98

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CIVILIAN	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990		FY 1991	
	AUTH	INV*	AUTH	INV*	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH	REQT	AUTH
DPPC										
R&D/GEOPHYSICAL ACTYS	15.8	15.9	9.6	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4
Research and Development	14.6	14.7	8.5	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.5	8.5
Geophysical Activities	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	.9	.9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL										
Personnel Support	8.5	8.7	9.4	9.2	9.9	9.3	9.7	9.1	9.7	9.1
Individual Training	2.6	2.5	2.9	2.9	3.5	2.9	3.4	2.8	3.4	2.8
	5.9	6.2	6.5	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.2
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	41.0	42.7	40.5	39.8	42.8	40.7	43.0	40.9	43.0	40.9
Support Installations	32.9	34.7	32.6	31.4	34.6	32.6	34.5	32.5	34.4	32.4
Centralized Support Act.	8.1	8.0	7.9	8.4	8.2	8.1	8.6	8.5	8.6	8.5
END STRENGTH	256.5	263.9	265.4	253.2	270.6	262.9	270.5	262.4	269.8	261.7

Totals may not add due to rounding.

* Actual

** Less than 50

1
distribution; and in Air Force Systems Command, where they perform basic scientific research, technology development, and contract management functions. However, all of our major commands and organizations depend on the contributions of civilian employees to accomplish their mission, with civilians assigned to virtually every Air Force installation worldwide.

2. Major Program Changes

Air Force civilian manpower strength for FY 1988 reflects actual civilian employment that was approximately 11,400 below the programmed level as of the FY 1989 President's Budget (Amended (PB(A))). The vast majority of this decrease was due to the hiring freezes that resulted from Operations and Maintenance dollar limitations and the control on outlays during the latter part of FY 1988. FY 1989 programmed civilian end strength decreased approximately 800 from the FY 1989 PB(A) position. Various Commercial Activities (A-76) decisions caused 600 of this decrease. The beginning of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) drawdown resulted in a 400 position decrease, and the disestablishment of the San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Activity/San Antonio Contracting Center reduced another 400 positions. These losses were partially offset by a 400 space growth due to officer to civilian conversions, congressional addback of 160 Air Reserve Force technician positions, and additional positions to support Interservice Support Agreements. Programmed civilian strength decreases by 500 positions between FY 1989 and FY 1990. Increases due to military to civilian conversions (1300), Space Activities (400), and special access programs (200) are offset by a decrease due to projected savings resulting from Commercial Activities (A-76) actions (-2000), as well as decreases in the competition advocacy program (-200) and social actions (-150). The continuation of the GLCM drawdown reduces civilian strength by approximately 650 positions between FY 1990 and FY 1991. The net effect of numerous other actions account for the remaining decreases.

3. Management Improvements

Improvements in utilization of civilian human resources center around the Air Force strategic plan for civilian personnel management. Known as PALACE AGENDA, and designed to be linked with DoD and Air Force policies, the plan directly ties into overall personnel goals. The first iteration, finalized in 1987, has three overarching goals: to manage human resources to budget, to streamline and simplify procedures, and to enhance Air Force civilians' institutional identity.

In continuing our efforts to manage human resources to budget, the Air Force is expanding a demonstration project begun at Edwards AFB; that project tests the use of fiscal constraints as the principal basis for civilian personnel management determinations. The project, known as PALACE Compete, allocates personnel budgets to supervisors, who are permitted management flexibility to make employment and classification decisions, but must remain within budget. This has been aided by computer software developed by HQ USAF which provides detailed work force and payroll information.

Another major personnel management initiative began at McClellan AFB in February 1988; it tests the ability to expand and contract the work force as funds, work load, and skill imbalances require. Known as PACER SHARE, the project seeks to create a larger "on-call" work force, with procedures for personnel reductions which are simpler and less costly than in the past.

Increasing the institutional identity of our civilians has been furthered by the increased use of centrally managed career programs, and increasing civilian access to Professional Military Education in order to impart organization values and commitment.

4. Civilian Employment

The absence of statutory ceilings on our stateside work force has provided the Air Force a welcome opportunity to manage its work force requirements from a resource perspective in recent years. However, civilian workyear ceilings on overseas employment were imposed in FYs 1987, 1988, and 1989. We continue to press for the elimination of these ceilings because they reduce flexibility for programmatic manpower adjustments. The civilian workyear ceiling, coupled with congressionally-imposed overseas troop strength ceilings, continues to impact on the readiness and sustainability of Air Force units overseas.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military.

In section B we noted that the peak demand for military manpower occurs mid-way in the scenario, when force strength has stabilized and casualty replacement requirements peak. The peak manpower shortages occur earlier in the scenario. Peak shortfalls of approximately 15,000 in FY 1990 at M+20 and 14,000 in FY 1994 are the result of shortfalls in the active/guard/reserve force structure to meet initial deployment requirements, early casualty losses not yet offset by returns to duty, and the lag in the mobilization and training process.

Reduction in the shortfall between FY 1990 and FY 1994 is primarily due to additional Wartime Host Nation Support made available through agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, and through efforts to reduce the lag time in mobilization and training. Significant shortfalls in civil engineering, and lesser shortfalls in such areas as food services and transportation, will persist.

2. Civilian.

On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower changes to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment/employment. Civilian positions are created to support the buildup and concurrently, positions are terminated in activities that are not required in wartime. The net result is that the total requirement declines from 239,000 in peacetime to 224,000 in wartime.

At M-Day, the civilian work force is reduced by the loss of civilian employees subject to call-up as guardsmen, reservists, and retired military. Approximately 44,000 Guard and Reserve dual status technician positions are terminated reflecting their mobilized military status. In addition, approximately 16,800 civilian employees are recalled to active duty. To insure the availability of civilians in essential federal positions, the Air Force continually screens employees who are also members of the Ready Reserve or are retired personnel eligible for recall.

The Air Force plans to offset a shortfall of approximately 62,000 civilian employees at M-Day by converting employees who are currently in other than full time permanent civilian status, i.e. they will be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status. Additional manpower sources include available new-hires provided by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management, and retired Federal civilian employees. Skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, and materiel handling make such positions prime targets for the utilization of retired Federal civilian employees. Also, civilians who are reassigned from areas of conflict or other terminated positions are, where possible, retained and assigned to wartime positions in safer areas, thus reducing the shortfall by approximately one half. Finally, we are reviewing military retirees for potential filling of remaining civilian wartime vacancies.

III. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC).

A. Strategic.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
<u>Bombers</u>				
B-52	234	220	201	185
FB-111	48	48	24	24
B-1B	90	90	90	90
B-2	0	0	0	4
<u>Tankers</u>				
KC-135	460	460	446	446
<u>Missiles</u>				
Minuteman	950	950	950	950
Peacekeeper	46	50	50	50
<u>Reserve Forces</u>				
<u>Tankers</u>				
ANG KC-135	110	110	115	118
AFR KC-135	24	24	30	30

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1990, we have 13 B-52 squadrons, three FB-111 squadrons, six B-1 squadrons, 31 active force and 16 smaller Air Reserve Force KC-135 tanker squadrons, 19 Minuteman squadrons, and one Peacekeeper squadron with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	55.2	55.3	51.4	51.5
Selected Reserve				
ANG	8.3	8.3	8.9	8.9
AFR	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8

The significant reduction in active military manpower in FY 1990 results from the retirement of 33 B-52G aircraft (-2645), the transfer of 24 FB-111 aircraft to the Tactical Air Forces (-1338), the transfer of 14 KC-135A aircraft to the Guard and Reserve (-256), adjustment of the B-1 crew ratio (-82), and a command-initiated realignment of manpower from Combat Operations Staff to Management Headquarters (-150). These reductions were partially offset by KC-135 wing and maintenance supervision manpower (+220) added to create a stand alone air refueling wing following B-52 retirement actions, and additional manpower for the B-2 (+376) in preparation for activation of the first squadron in FY 1991.

FY 1991 shows a small growth in active military manpower resulting from deployment of four B-2 aircraft (+695), manpower to support an additional stand alone KC-135 wing (+220), and manpower in preparation for activation of the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison squadron in FY 1992 (+205). These increases are offset by the retirement of an additional 14 B-52G aircraft (-1061).

The increased strength for the Air National Guard in FY 1990 supports robusting one 4 PAA KC-135 unit to 8 PAA and two 8 PAA units to 10 PAA.

Air Force Reserve increases between FY 1989 and FY 1990 (261 drill and 138 civilians) result from the robusting of its three KC-135 units from 8 to 10 PAA each and the assumption of a second line of alert.

Civilian increases in FY 1990 result from transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Guard and Reserve (+338) offset by reductions associated with the retirement of B-52G aircraft (-60).

2. Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
F-15	36	36	0	0
F-16	0	0	18	18
<u>Reserve Forces</u>				
ANG F-4	126	108	18	0
ANG F-16	72	90	144	162
ANG F-15	18	18	54	54

Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Alaskan Air Command for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment, airspace control and limited defense.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.0	3.9	3.2	3.3
Selected Reserve				
ANG	9.4	9.0	8.9	8.8
AFR(IMAs)	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower

The FY 1990 decrease in active military manpower is attributed to the inactivation of one fighter interceptor squadron (-828). This decrease is partially offset by an increase for the Over-the Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar (+97).

The increase in active military manpower in FY 1991 is due to OTH-B radar rephasing (+80).

The FY 1990 decrease in the Air National Guard reflects the modernization of air defense forces through conversion of five F-4 units (-3844). Two units will receive F-15 aircraft (+1518) and three units will receive F-16s (+2185). In FY 1991 one more F-4 unit (-763) will convert to F-16 aircraft (+709).

The civilian increase in FY 1990 reflects efforts to modernize Air National Guard air defense forces by converting five F-4 units (-1324) to F-16 (+814) and F-15 (+621) aircraft.

The FY 1991 increase in civilian manpower reflects the rephasing of the OTH-B radar (+4) and Air National Guard air defense modernization of one F-4 unit (-258) to F-16 aircraft (+347).

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

In FY 1990, Control and Surveillance Forces include 27 PAA EC-135 Post Attack Command and Control System aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers, and three PAA E-4B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; the Consolidated Space Operations Center at Falcon AFB, CO, for command and control of selected military satellites; three ballistic missile early warning sites; six Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and surveillance forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	12.2	11.8	11.2	11.3
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.7	.8	.5	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4

The active military decrease in FY 1989 results from the phased drawdown of the SR-71 program and reduction of four PAA (-501). The decrease is partially offset by increases for the Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) (+31), Space Surveillance Center (+21), Mobile Command Center (+45), and an increase due to improved manning levels (+15).

The active military decrease for FY 1990 is due to the cancellation of the SR-71 program and inactivation of one strategic reconnaissance squadron (-619).

The FY 1990 reduction for the Air National Guard (-264) reflects equipment modernization.

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1990 is also due to the cancellation of the SR-71 program (-162).

B. Tactical/Mobility.

1. Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	25.9	24.9	24.2	24.2
Tactical Fighter Aircraft	1866	1793	1740	1740
Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C and TR-1) <u>1/</u>	120	120	101	101
Special Operations Force Aircraft	71	72	82	85
Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft	29	29	29	29
Airborne TACS Aircraft (OV-10, OA-37, OA-10)	82	88	91	91
Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (KC-10)	57	57	57	57
Electronic Combat Aircraft <u>2/</u>	48	48	48	48
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles	304	224	112	0
<u>Reserve Forces</u>				
ARF TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	12.2	12.3	11.7	11.5
ANG Fighter Aircraft	657	666	630	618
AFR Fighter Aircraft	222	216	216	210
ANG Reconnaissance Aircraft (RF-4C)	108	90	90	90
AFR Special Operations Aircraft	14	14	13	13
ANG Airborne TACS Aircraft (OA-37, OV-10, OA-10)	54	54	72	72
ANG Special Operations Aircraft (EC-130)	6	6	6	6
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (AFR-Assoc) <u>3/</u>	3	3	3	3

1/ Includes TR-1/U-2 Training and Augmentation Squadrons

2/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130H (Compass Call) squadrons.

3/ Associate squadrons currently provide one-half of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, GLCM missile operations crews, weapon systems security, and GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) squadrons and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	117.1	113.1	110.1	109.2
Selected Reserve				
ANG	52.3	51.4	51.2	51.0
AFR (Includes IMAs)	12.6	12.7	12.3	12.0
<u>Civilian</u>	15.9	16.0	15.9	15.6

The active military decrease in FY 1989 results from Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) force structure drawdown (-2052), tactical force structure decreases (-2404), and improvements in both combat ready mobile communications (-203) and tactical cryptological programs (-181). These decreases are partially offset by Special Operations Forces (SOF) force structure transferring to Major Force Program 11 (+660), a follow-on crew ratio increase in KC-10s (+146), and Air Base Ground Defense growth (+86).

The active military decrease in FY 1990 results from the transfer of manpower from this DPPC to other categories caused by the declassification of the F-117 program (-719), other tactical force structure changes (-1735), the continued drawdown of the GLCM force structure (-662), classified program changes (-229), and restructure of the Tactical Air Control System (-71). These decreases are partially offset by initial growth in the Air Base Operability program (+369).

The active military decrease in FY 1991 is due to the final drawdown of GLCM force structure (-1817), and inactivation of the Kirtland underground munitions storage complex (-379). This decrease is partially offset by tactical force structure growth (+685), SOF force structure growth (+525), and continued growth in the Air Base Operability program (+104).

The strength decrease between FY 1988 and FY 1989 for the Air National Guard reflects force structure changes in the general purpose, tactical air support, and reconnaissance forces and by fiscal constraints which will require some validated manpower requirements to go unfunded.

The FY 1990 Guard decrease is caused by several changes. Manpower is provided to support the six A-7 aircraft restored in FY 1989 (+168). Although civilian manpower was provided in FY 1989 to maintain these aircraft through Congressional direction, the required military manpower was not provided, causing the increase in FY 1990. Two 24 PAA F-4D units and one 18 PAA F-4E unit convert (-2632) to 18 PAA F-16 units (+2306). A further decrease in F-4 manpower is caused by a 24 PAA F-4E tactical fighter unit converting (-856) to an 18 PAA OA-10 tactical air support mission (+750). An increase in tactical control manpower is the result of restoration of a reduction in FY 1989. These positions are programmed for the Air Support Operations Center and Air Liaison Officers required for operation of this mission (+61). Finally, increases in civil engineering RED HORSE units reflect the restoration of an FY 1989 reduction (+53).

In FY 1991 the Air National Guard converts two 24 PAA F-4E units (-1846) to 18 PAA F-16 units (+1518). Also, the last of the gradual programmed increase of A-7 Logistics Composite (LCOM) maintenance and munitions manpower is completed (+120 drill positions).

Air Force Reserve decreases in FY 1990 (-306 drill, -56 civilian) and FY 1991 (-376 drill, -114 civilian) result from conversion of Reserve fighter units from F-4 to F-16 aircraft and subsequent reductions of F-16 fighter unit sizing from 24 to 18 PAA.

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 results from final GLCM drawdown (-26), tactical force restructuring (-37), and Guard and Reserve force structure modernization (-230).

2. Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Active Force</u>				
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	200	200	186	186
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	285	288	288	285
Aeromedical Aircraft*	17	17	17	17
<u>Reserve Forces</u>				
Tactical Airlift Aircraft	288	308	280	276
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1	1
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	21	37	37	42
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	16	19	19	19

*Manpower to support Aeromedical activities is counted in the Medical DPPC.

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces includes crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations, Air Force special airlift missions, administrative airlift, and special operations forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	34.9	35.3	34.6	34.7
Selected Reserve				
ANG	17.9	18.7	18.9	19.0
AFR (Includes IMAs)	37.9	37.5	38.0	38.7
<u>Civilian</u>	13.9	14.6	14.7	14.8

The decrease in active military in FY 1990 results from the elimination of 30 PAA C-130 aircraft (-1034), 15 PAA CH/HH-3 helicopters (-292), an increase of 8 PAA MH-60 helicopters (+192), and initial manpower for the C-17 (+82). In addition, OSD directed the transfer of headquarters manpower from the industrially funded (IF) to non-IF, which drives an increase in airlift mission activities for C-130, C-141, and C-5 overhead (+320).

The increase in active military in FY 1991 results from implementation of a DoD IG review of unified and specified commands (+65), a reduction of five C-141 aircraft (-176), delivery of the first two C-17 aircraft and initial maintenance manpower for the C-17 (+227).

The Air National Guard increase in FY 1989 supports the increase of the C-5 unit from 8 to 11 PAA, as well as increased manning for aero-medical evacuation, aerial port, and rescue units. These increases are offset by a decrease in the C-130 program tied to a reduction of part time aircrews in nine units.

In FY 1990, Air National Guard strength increases to support a new rescue unit in Alaska (+247), improved manning levels in the C-5 unit (+47), additional aerial port advisors and restoration of drill officer positions (+23), and newly assigned operational support aircraft. These increases are partially offset by decreases resulting from modernization of three 8 PAA C-130A/B units to C-130Es, coupled with a drawdown of 12 C-130 aircraft (one 16 PAA unit going to 12 PAA and one 16 PAA unit going to 8 PAA) (-180). The FY 1991 increase supports improved manning levels in the C-130 units.

Air Force Reserve losses due to force structure drawdown in USAFR equipped C-130s and Associate unit conversion from C-141 to C-17 aircraft, together with increases attributed to conversion of USAF equipped C-130 units to C-141 aircraft define the overall decreases between FY 1988 and FY 1989 and the increases from FY 1989 through FY 1991. Also included is the completion of the Air Force Reserve's second C-5 equipped wing.

Civilian increases in FY 1989 (+713) result primarily from Guard and Reserve force structure changes in C-130s, C-5s, C-141s, and Air Rescue and Recovery Squadrons. Increases in FY 1990 result largely from the

transfer of active headquarters manpower from the IF to the non-IF, as noted above (+111). The civilian increase in FY 1991 is due mostly to the conversion of Air Force Reserve C-130s to C-141Es (+82).

C. Communications/Intelligence

1. Centrally Managed Communications.

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	16.7	16.4	16.4	16.5
Selected Reserve				
ANG	10.9	12.2	12.3	12.3
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.1	.1	.1	.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.6	5.3	5.2	5.3

The active military increase in FY 1991 results from MILSTAR operations and data automation support (+48) plus interim support for the Defense Switching Network (+36) to prepare for 490L Autovon in Europe and the Pacific.

In FY 1989 the Air National Guard realigned approximately 1800 manpower spaces from the Combat Installations DPPC to Centrally Managed Communications to more accurately identify the appropriate category. This was offset by a decrease of approximately 500 authorizations as a result of a reduction in the number of units scheduled to receive TRI-TAC equipment. The FY 1990 growth completes programmed NATO Air Base Satellite manpower increases for three newly established units (+116).

The civilian increase in FY 1989 (+718) reflects improved manning levels. The civilian decrease in FY 1990 is caused by reductions in communications operations activities (-89), partially offset by increases for communications security (+26) and engineering and installation workload requirements (+20).

2. Intelligence.

This category includes manpower for selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs and other Air Force intelligence related activities. The Air Force Intelligence Agency and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	16.8	16.9	17.1	17.2
Selected Reserve				
ANG	*	.1	.1	.1
AFR (IMAs)	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4

* Less than 50

The active military increase in FY 1990 results from increases in selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs (NFIP) (+133) and special analysis activities (+103).

The active military increase in FY 1991 is due to growth in special analysis activities (+59).

The civilian increase in FY 1990 results from increases in selected NFIP (+99).

D. Combat Installations.

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as air traffic control operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Air Force - Combat Installations Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	117.6	115.7	114.9	113.8
Selected Reserve				
ANG	4.3	2.5	2.5	2.5
AFR (Includes IMAs and AGR)	13.7	14.3	14.4	14.4
<u>Civilian</u>	49.2	51.9	51.0	50.6

The active military decrease in FY 1989 is a result of decreases in force structure support (-461), Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) support (-1209), potential Commercial Activities (A-76) savings (-127), and a reduction in audiovisual support (-60).

The decrease in active military in FY 1990 is due to decreases in force structure support (-776), GLCM support (-80), potential Commercial Activities (A-76) savings (-64), an OSD directed end strength reduction (-320), a military to civilian conversion (-140), and programmed savings through data automation initiatives (-140). These decreases are partially offset by the transfer of support spaces from the Tactical DPPC for the F-117 (+689).

The active military decrease in FY 1991 results from the continued GLCM drawdown (-1963). This is partially offset by an increase in force structure support (+88), and by reversal of some previously identified Commercial Activities (A-76) actions (+815).

The decrease in the Air National Guard in FY 1989 reflects the realignment of approximately 1800 authorizations to the Centrally Managed Communications DPPC.

The Air Force Reserve increases in FY 1989 (+555) and FY 1990 (+131) primarily offset civil engineering and IMA shortfalls.

The increase in civilians in FY 1989 is due to improved manning levels (+3018). It is partially offset by the GLCM drawdown (-323), and a decrease in force structure support (-40).

The decrease in civilians in FY 1990 is the result of potential Commercial Activities (A-76) savings (-791), an OSD-directed reduction (-185), continued GLCM drawdown (-20), and a decrease in force structure support (-56). It is partially offset by a military to civilian conversion (+140).

The decrease in civilians in FY 1991 is due to the continued impact of the OSD-directed reduction (-148) and the completion of the GLCM drawdown (-383). It is partially offset by an increase in force structure support (+89).

E. Force Support Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct strategic, tactical, and mobility support training. Also included are tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	24.9	25.1	25.3	25.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9

This increase in active military in FY 1990 results primarily from a force structure conversion in Aggressor training (+555). This increase is partially offset by decreases in tactical air forces training force structure (-292) and decreases in formal training for airlift forces (-76).

The decrease in active military in FY 1991 is due to a decrease in tactical air forces training force structure (-312), which is partially offset by the continued force structure conversion for Aggressor training (+149).

F. Medical Support

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	39.4	39.8	40.2	40.9
Selected Reserve				
ANG	4.2	4.2	5.0	5.0
AFR (Includes IMAs)	5.2	5.5	6.0	6.5
<u>Civilian</u>	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.3

Active military increases in the Medical DPPC are due to improvements in Medical Readiness (FY 1989: +436, FY 1990: +511, FY 1991: +679). In FY 1990 the increase also includes support transferred from the Tactical DPPC due to declassification of the F-117 program (+30), and is partially offset by a military to civilian conversion (-102) and Commercial Activities actions (-33). The military to civilian conversion accounts for the civilian increase in FY 1990.

The Air National Guard increase in FY 1990 reduces active Air Force wartime medical shortages (+842) by providing a second echelon of care in ANG medical units.

The Air Force Reserve increases in FY 1989 (+300), FY 1991 (+500), and FY 1991 (+500) serve to reduce a continuing medical shortfall.

G. Joint Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support of activities outside the Air Force. It includes support to international military organizations, unified commands, and other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. Manpower supporting OSD, JCS, foreign military sales and counterintelligence activities is also included.

Air Force Joint Activities Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.8	9.4	9.3	9.2
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.3	.5	.5	.5
<u>Civilian</u>	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5

H. Central Logistics

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily in the Air Force Logistics Command.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	10.2	9.9	9.7	9.7
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	79.7	83.0	83.1	82.9

The decrease in active military in FY 1990 reflects the officer reduction/conversion (-134) and changes to classified projects (-48).

The increase in civilians in FY 1989 reflects improved manning levels (+5018). This growth is partially offset by savings associated with the Logistics Modernization System (-1021) and a reduction due to Operations and Maintenance dollar limitations (-727).

The civilian increase in FY 1990 is due to the officer reduction/conversion (+134). The civilian reduction in FY 1991 reflects a reduction for competition advocacy (-200).

I. Service Management Headquarters.

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters, including the Departmental Headquarters, Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Systems Command's product divisions.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	13.3	13.8	13.5	13.5
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.1	.1	.1	.1
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	7.1	8.0	8.0	8.0

The active military and civilian increase in FY 1989 reflects improved manning levels. The active military decrease in FY 1990 is due to Strategic Air Command and Air Force Communications Command reductions in their management headquarters organizational staffs and military to civilian conversions attributed to actions such as the officer reduction/conversion.

The Air Force Reserve increases in FY 1989 and FY 1990 and the decrease in FY 1991 are due to adjustments in Air Force System Command IMA funding levels.

Over the period from 1968 to 1988 the Air Force has reduced management headquarters by approximately 33,000 authorizations. The effect of those actions has been a cumulative reduction of 62 percent in management headquarters manning as compared to a total Air Force end strength reduction during the same period of 34 percent.

J. Research and Development/Geophysical Activities

1. Research and Development.

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

Air Force Research and Development Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.2	7.2	7.1	7.1
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.4	8.5	8.4	8.5

2. Geophysical Activities.

The manpower in this category supports active and Reserve weather service activities, meteorological, navigational satellite, and space programs.

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	7.1	7.4	7.4	7.0
Selected Reserve				
ANG	.5	.6	.6	.6
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.2	.1	.1	0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.1	1.0	.9

The active military decrease in FY 1991 is primarily due to the inactivation of one weather squadron (-321).

The Air Force Reserve's weather reconnaissance responsibilities (4 PAA WC-130 unit) is also programmed to be inactivated in FY 1991.

The civilian decrease in FY 1990 is attributed to reductions in Space Shuttle operations (-46), and in Air Force Satellite Control Facilities (-16).

The civilian reduction in FY 1991 is due to the inactivation of the active and Reserve weather squadrons (-81) and Space Shuttle operations reductions (-15).

K. Training and Personnel

1. Personnel Support.

Included in this category is manpower to support all recruiting activities (recruiting, examining, and personnel processing), American Forces Information Service, honor guards, and other activities such as drug and alcohol training, equal opportunity race relations training, and civilian education/training development.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	6.3	6.3	5.9	5.9

Selected Reserve				
ANG	.5	.5	.5	.5
AFR (IMAs and AGR)	.4	.4	.4	.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8

The active military decrease in FY 1990 reflects a reduction in social actions programs (-270) and a military to civilian conversion in American Forces Radio and Television Services (+37).

The civilian decrease in FY 1990 is due to the social actions reduction (-135), partially offset by the military to civilian conversion noted above (+37).

2. Individual Training.

Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	19.2	18.8	17.4	17.4
Selected Reserve				
ANG	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.1
AFR (Includes IMAs)	.7	.7	.7	.7
<u>Civilian</u>	6.2	6.3	6.2	6.2

The active military decrease in FY 1989 is primarily due to accession changes and Commercial Activities (A-76) actions. These changes increased general skill training (+426) and officer training school faculty (+48). These increases are partially offset by Commercial Activities (A-76) actions in Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) aircraft maintenance (-826).

Active military and civilian decreases in FY 1990 are due to accession changes, Commercial Activities (A-76) actions, and technical training adjustments. These changes increased general skill training (+209 military), while contracting aircraft maintenance decreased both UPT (-1532 military, -78 civilian) and Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT) (-121 military).

Air National Guard increases in FY 1990 include additional authorizations for the Professional Military Education Center (+21) and restores previous reductions to Replacement Training Units (+153).

L. Support Activities.

Support Activities are subdivided into Support Installations and Centralized Support Activities.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. The Air Force also includes all manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services in the BOS category and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These accounting differences between Services preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Support Installations.

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as laundries and commissaries.

Air Force Support Installations Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	24.3	24.1	23.7	23.7
Selected Reserve				
AFR (IMAs)	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	31.4	32.6	32.5	32.4

The active military decrease in FY 1990 is due to reduced officer accessions (-186), a military to civilian conversion (-122), and the officer reduction/conversion (-92).

The civilian increase in FY 1989 reflects improved manning levels (+1748) offset by a civilian reduction (-394) and the centralized civilian pay initiative (-134).

The civilian decrease in FY 1990 is due to potential Commercial Activities (A-76) actions (-212), offset by the impact of the officer reduction/conversion (+92).

The civilian decrease in FY 1991 is caused by Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) inactivation (-38) and an Air Training Command civilian reduction (-64).

2. Centralized Support Activities.

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. It includes manpower supporting readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.4
Selected Reserve				
ANG	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.3
AFR (Includes IMAs)	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	8.4	8.1	8.5	8.5

The active military decrease in FY 1990 reflects an Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) intermediate headquarters reduction (-167). The military increase in FY 1991 is due to force structures changes (+91).

The Air National Guard decrease in FY 1990 reflects reduced manning at ANG State Headquarters due to fiscal constraints (-155).

The civilian increase in FY 1990 is primarily a result of the centralized civilian pay initiative (+222) and an increase in reimbursable civilians for NASA and Commercial Launch Vehicles (+161).

M. Undistributed.

The manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Historically, the number of transients tend to be higher in the summer than on average due to seasonal variations in PCS moves; hence there are fewer numbers of people in operating units at the end of the fiscal year. The Air Force accounts for this by projecting year end vacancies in field units in a separate, undistributed manpower program element or account.

Fiscal constraints implemented in the FY 1989 President's Budget (Amended) resulted in significant arbitrary budget reductions being imposed in addition to those programmed in the FY 1988/1989 President's Budget. These reductions resulted in decisions to eliminate more than 23,000 authorizations in FY 1988, and 25,000 in FY 1989, below those originally programmed. The specific programming actions that would be taken to implement these reductions were still being adjusted well into FY 1988. The lateness of these decisions made an orderly allocation to the manpower file impossible for both FY 1988 and FY 1989. As a result the Undistributed account was decremented to maintain the proper end strength level. Actual allocation of the reduction to the appropriate DPPCs occurred during execution in FY 1988 and will occur during execution for FY 1989.

Additionally, in response in fiscals guide during preparation of the FY 1990-1991 President's Budget, a decision was made to eliminate approximately 3200 authorizations in FY 1991 in order to save dollars. The specific programming actions that will specify the appropriate DPPC in which the reduction will occur will be identified prior to the year of execution.

Undistributed
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	-	-10.2	-1.4	-4.0

N. Individuals.

The Individuals account contains manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets. The manpower in the Individuals account is based primarily on end strengths required for training military people and moving them to and between duty assignments. Many years are also included to cover unit personnel losses due to prolonged sickness, criminal confinement, and holding while processing out for disciplinary separation.

1. Transients.

Air Force manpower in this category accounts for personnel in travel, leave, or proceed status while under PCS orders.

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	1.8	9.8	10.0	9.9

Active military increases in FY 1989 reflect improved manning levels (+8356) offset by training adjustments (-375).

Military decreases in FY 1990 and FY 1991 are due to training adjustments in response to the changes in accession levels as well as implementation of updated transient account factors.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees.

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining, patients in a hospital for over 90 days, and personnel awaiting discharge for disciplinary reasons.

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	.5	.5	.5	.5

3. Trainees and Students.

This category accounts for people undergoing basic military and initial skills training, and all other formal training in courses at least 20 weeks long.

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	24.3	26.5	29.9	29.8
Selected Reserve				
ANG	1.4	2.2	2.2	2.2
AFR	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.7

As noted earlier in this report, significant budget reduction decisions made late in FY 1988 required substantial decreases to Air Force end strength below previously programmed levels. The lateness of these decisions precluded allocation of the reductions to appropriate programs in FY 1988 and FY 1989. Rather, force management decisions such as sharply reduced accessions were necessary to meet lower budget totals. The Trainee and Student total above for FY 1988 and FY 1989 are indicative of the reduced accession levels. The active military increase in FY 1990 reflects a return to required accession levels to fully man the force and the ensuing increases to Basic Military Training (BMT) (+1405) and General Skill Training (GST) (+2224). These increases are partially offset by small decreases in general intelligence skills training (-184) and graduate education adjustments (-75).

Smaller adjustments for FY 1991 include BMT (-159), Officer Training School (OTS) (+123), GST (-121), general intelligence skills training (+102), and operational student pipeline (-38).

The Air National Guard did not achieve the programmed numbers of basic military training entries in FY 1988. The increase in FY 1989 reflects additional programmed entries to maintain a proper force mix of non-prior/prior service individuals.

The FY 1989 increase for the Air Force Reserve results from the alignment of Category "P" airmen into this category. FY 1990 and FY 1991 decreases are as directed by OSD.

4. Cadets.

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

<u>Air Force Cadet Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)				
	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
<u>Military</u>				
Active	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate as a separate organizational entity, "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority several times to create the 13 Defense Agencies and 7 DoD Field Activities that currently exist. The missions of these organizations vary widely, ranging from communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics and other support to the Military Services and other parts of the federal government. Consolidations increase organizational efficiency, while at the same time permit the Services to devote a greater portion of their resources to their primary military missions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), assisted by the Joint Staff (JS), oversees, assigns responsibilities, and periodically evaluates the organizational effectiveness of Defense Agencies and related organizations.

II. MISSIONS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The missions and associated manpower requirements of the following organizations are contained within this chapter:

- A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD);
- B. The Joint Staff (JS);
- C. 12 Defense Agencies (NSA excluded);
- D. 7 DoD Field Activities;
- E. Inspector General (IG, DoD);
- F. The Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS); and
- G. The US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA).

The manpower data depicted reflects actual full-time equivalent (FTE) end strength for FY 1985 and FY 1988, programmed manpower levels for FY 1989, and requested manpower levels for FY 1990 and FY 1991. The military strength figures represents active component manpower and are also included in the active component strength levels of the Military Departments. The manpower data, displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC), is portrayed at the end of this chapter.

DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
CONSOLIDATED MANPOWER

(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	8,649	9,417	9,827	9,930	9,908
Officer	(5,515)	(5,969)	(6,314)	(6,405)	(6,393)
Enlisted	(3,134)	(3,448)	(3,513)	(3,525)	(3,515)
Civilian	<u>92,449</u>	<u>96,255</u>	<u>98,353</u>	<u>97,326</u>	<u>96,593</u>
Total	101,098	105,672	108,180	107,256	106,501

The manpower levels projected for Defense-related organizations, as a whole, in FY 1990 and FY 1991 reflect a gradual decline in agency strength of 1.5 percent from the current year (FY 1989) operating level of 108,180 end strength. The overall decline in manpower between FY 1989 and FY 1991 is primarily the result of A) Projected manning decreases at the Defense Logistics Agency of 5 percent offset by B) Requested end strength increases in the manpower levels of the following organizations:

1. Defense Investigative Service (of 5 percent);
2. Defense Intelligence Agency (of 5 percent);
3. On-Site Inspection Agency (of 17 percent);
4. Defense Technology Security Administration (of 18 percent);
5. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (of 33 percent).

The changes in manpower levels for each organization are explained below.

A. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)

OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary, responsible for overall policy development, planning, resources management, and program evaluation.

OSD Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	497	556	556	555	555
Officer	(434)	(483)	(485)	(485)	(485)
Enlisted	(63)	(73)	(71)	(70)	(70)
Civilian	<u>1,194</u>	<u>1,377</u>	<u>1,479</u>	<u>1,477</u>	<u>1,477</u>
Total	1,691	1,933	2,035	2,032	2,032

B. THE JOINT STAFF (JS)

The Joint Chiefs are the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Members of the staff, other than the Chairman, include senior military officers from each Service.

JS Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	1,272	1,295	1,314	1,311	1,301
Officer	(875)	(907)	(924)	(921)	(915)
Enlisted	(397)	(388)	(390)	(390)	(386)
Civilian	311	284	310	308	306
Total	1,583	1,579	1,624	1,619	1,607

C. DEFENSE AGENCIES:

There are currently 12 Defense Agencies, excluding the National Security Agency, which is exempted from this publication in accordance with Public Law 98-36. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), established in FY 1988, represents DoD's most recent Defense Agency creation.

1. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages and directs advanced basic research and development projects which employ high risk and high payoff technologies.

DARPA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	23	23	28	28	28
Officer	(20)	(19)	(24)	(24)	(24)
Enlisted	(3)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)
Civilian	105	119	145	145	145
Total	128	142	173	173	173

2. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA provides operational direction and management control over the Defense Communications System (DCS) and engineering and technical support to the National Military Command, Minimum Essential Communications Network, and Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems. DCA also supports the Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) Systems and provides ADP support to OSD, JS, and other DoD Components.³ The Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC³A) was consolidated under DCA in FY 1988 to ensure the interoperability of "tactical" communications systems for joint operations.

DCA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	1,711	2,049	2,175	2,203	2,203
Officer	(558)	(663)	(790)	(818)	(818)
Enlisted	(1,153)	(1,386)	(1,385)	(1,385)	(1,385)
Civilian	<u>1,895</u>	<u>2,251</u>	<u>2,410</u>	<u>2,414</u>	<u>2,414</u>
Total	<u>3,606</u>	<u>4,300</u>	<u>4,585</u>	<u>4,617</u>	<u>4,617</u>

3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The mission of DIA is to satisfy the military foreign intelligence requirements of DoD and other authorized recipients, and to provide the military intelligence contribution to national intelligence. DIA's manpower requirements are not specifically identified in this submission.

4. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA is the Department's "contract" auditor, responsible for providing audit and financial advisory services to DoD Components involved in procurement and contract administration operations.

DCAA Manpower
(End Strength Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Civilian	4,641	5,759	7,007	7,007	7,007

5. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS is DoD's law enforcement, personnel investigative, and industrial security arm. DIS also provides industrial security services to over twenty Federal civilian agencies.

DIS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	---	---	---	---	---
Officer	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	<u>3,520</u>	<u>3,952</u>	<u>4,379</u>	<u>4,517</u>	<u>4,616</u>
Total	<u>3,520</u>	<u>3,952</u>	<u>4,379</u>	<u>4,517</u>	<u>4,616</u>

The manpower increase for DIS in FY 1990 will provide for the new Defense National Agency Checks with Inquiries (DNACIs) initiative, provide for an "interim" security clearance process for industrial employees, and implement new security adjudication courses at the Defense Security Institute. Subsequent increases requested for FY 1991 are designed to improve the quality of DoD's Industrial Security Program by eliminating the current backlog of industrial facility inspections.

6. Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)

DLSA provides centralized legal advice, services, and support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to the Defense Agencies and related organizations.

DLSA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	---	11	9	9	9
Officer	(---)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Enlisted	(---)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(8)
Civilian	70	81	90	90	90
Total	70	92	99	99	99

7. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common support supplies and worldwide logistic services across DoD and to other federal agencies and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence, medical goods, industrial and construction material, general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services include contract administration, surplus personal property reutilization and disposal, documentation services to the Research and Development (R&D) community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	961	964	982	982	982
Officer	(800)	(795)	(806)	(806)	(806)
Enlisted	(161)	(169)	(176)	(176)	(176)
Civilian	51,568	50,995	50,060	48,386	47,496
Total	52,529	51,959	51,042	49,368	48,478

DLA's manpower forecasts include an anticipated 3 percent productivity improvement in both FY 1990 and FY 1991 due to equipment and real property maintenance investments and agency management initiatives. Also, projected in FY 1990, is a 2 percent decline in DLA's work load which is expected to stabilize in FY 1991.

8. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) services in support of the Department's strategic and tactical military operations and weapon systems. DMA also compiles general aeronautical and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower (End Strength Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	452	449	480	470	470
Officer	(189)	(204)	(212)	(209)	(209)
Enlisted	(263)	(245)	(268)	(261)	(261)
Civilian	9,078	8,475	8,475	8,488	8,488
Total	9,530	8,924	8,955	8,958	8,958

9. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA acts as the principal staff advisor on all matters concerning nuclear weapons.

DNA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	520	555	560	560	560
Officer	(316)	(346)	(359)	(359)	(359)
Enlisted	(204)	(209)	(201)	(201)	(201)
Civilian	748	855	912	918	918
Total	1,268	1,410	1,472	1,478	1,478

10. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	24	28	28	28	28
Officer	(18)	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)
Enlisted	(6)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Civilian	102	105	112	112	112
Total	126	133	140	140	140

11. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)

SDIO was organized in FY 1984 as a research activity designed to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles, and to increase the contribution of defense systems to U.S. and Allied security.

SDIO Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 99</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	52	126	129	164	164
Officer	(47)	(113)	(116)	(112)	(152)
Enlisted	(5)	(13)	(13)	(12)	(12)
Civilian	49	109	134	186	186
Total	<u>101</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>263</u>	<u>350</u>	<u>350</u>

The manpower increase projected for SDIO represents this Agency's transitioning from the research/concept stage on several projects to the demonstration stage in FY 1990 and FY 1991.

12. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

OSIA was created in 1988 as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the President on December 8, 1987 and ratified by the Congress on June 1, 1988. OSIA is responsible for all on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, all escort duties for Soviet teams visiting the United States, and operation of the Portal Monitoring facility in the Soviet Union.

OSIA Manpower (End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	---	116	122	150	150
Officer	(---)	(67)	(66)	(94)	(94)
Enlisted	(---)	(49)	(56)	(56)	(56)
Civilian	---	16	41	41	41
Total	<u>---</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>163</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>191</u>

The manpower increases for OSIA in FY 1990 and FY 1991 will provide for this Agency to carry out its new and expanding mission responsibilities.

13. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

DAVA was established in 1979 to centrally manage the acquisition and production of motion picture films, video and audio tapes, still photographs, and audiovisual media products. The agency was disestablished in FY 1986 with the functions and manpower returned primarily to the Military Services.

DAVA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	ACTUAL		ESTIMATED		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	6	---	---	---	---
Officer	(6)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Enlisted	(0)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	234	---	---	---	---
Total	<u>240</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>

DAVA is included within this chapter merely to substantiate the FY 1985 base year level.

D. DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES:

DoD Field Activities perform designated DoD-wide services which are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. Seven of these organizations currently exist, including the following:

1. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support (including space management, budget and accounting, personnel, and security) to OSD and to various other DoD Components, as assigned.

WHS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	ACTUAL		ESTIMATED		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	110	154	141	141	141
Officer	(46)	(70)	(68)	(68)	(68)
Enlisted	(64)	(84)	(73)	(73)	(73)
Civilian	454	1,576	1,803	1,803	1,803
Total	<u>564</u>	<u>1,730</u>	<u>1,944</u>	<u>1,944</u>	<u>1,944</u>

2. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

AFIS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	ACTUAL		ESTIMATED		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	68	64	68	68	62
Officer	(17)	(15)	(18)	(18)	(18)
Enlisted	(51)	(49)	(50)	(50)	(44)
Civilian	138	140	165	165	165
Total	<u>206</u>	<u>204</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>227</u>

3. The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) administers civilian health and medical care programs for retirees, dependents, and survivors of active duty, retired, and deceased Service members. OCHAMPUS also administers a similar program for selected beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration.

OCHAMPUS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	7	10	11	11	11
Officer	(6)	(9)	(9)	(9)	(9)
Enlisted	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian	<u>224</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>222</u>
Total	<u>231</u>	<u>219</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>233</u>

4. The Defense Medical Support Activity (DMSA) is responsible for all aspects of DoD information systems used to support military health care and medical facility construction projects.

DMSA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	30	52	53	53	53
Officer	(27)	(48)	(49)	(49)	(49)
Enlisted	(3)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)
Civilian	<u>47</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Total	<u>77</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>153</u>	<u>153</u>

5. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides economic advice and assistance to communities significantly affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial Defense-oriented growth.

OEA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	3	7	7	7	7
Officer	(3)	(5)	(5)	(5)	(5)
Enlisted	(---)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Civilian	<u>26</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	<u>29</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>39</u>

6. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas. DoDDS also operates a junior college in Panama.

DoDDS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Civilian	12,887	13,811	13,979	14,174	14,198

7. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) administers the DoD technology security program, and is responsible for processing export license applications.

DTSA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	13	48	48	62	63
Officer	(9)	(22)	(22)	(32)	(33)
Enlisted	(4)	(26)	(26)	(30)	(30)
Civilian	35	77	87	96	96
Total	<u>48</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>159</u>

The manpower increases for DTSA in FY 1990 and FY 1991 are requested to support the High Technology Export License Review System (HI-TRAC 90). HI-TRAC 90 is designed to automate the export license processing community within DoD with other federal agencies involved in the international transfer of defense-related technology.

8. The Defense Information Services Activity (DISA) implements assigned DoD policies and programs related to the provision of information to the media and the public.

DISA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>ACTUAL</u>		<u>ESTIMATED</u>		
	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 91</u>
Military	22	---	---	---	---
Officer	(19)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Enlisted	(3)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	30	---	---	---	---
Total	<u>52</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>

DISA was disestablished as a DoD Field Activity in FY 1988. The function and all personnel were transferred to OSD's Public Affairs organization.

E. INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (IG, DoD)

The Inspector General serves as an independent and objective official within the Department of Defense responsible for the prevention and detection of DoD fraud, waste and abuse.

DoD Inspector General Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	ACTUAL		ESTIMATED		
	FY 85	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
Military	32	31	36	36	36
Officer	(32)	(31)	(36)	(36)	36
Enlisted	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)	(---)
Civilian	1,002	1,316	1,531	1,531	1,531
Total	1,034	1,347	1,567	1,567	1,567

F. THE UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES (USUHS)

USUHS is a fully accredited four year School of Medicine whose primary mission is to select, educate, and train qualified applicants to become "military" physicians. The University is also authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees in basic medical sciences and public health.

USUHS Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	ACTUAL		ESTIMATED		
	FY 85	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
Military	787	816	819	814	807
Officer	(728)	(740)	(741)	(736)	(729)
Enlisted	(59)	(76)	(78)	(78)	(78)
Civilian	795	835	810	810	810
Total	1,582	1,651	1,629	1,624	1,617

G. THE US COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS (USCMA)

The Court serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	ACTUAL		ESTIMATED		
	FY 85	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91
Civilian	38	39	49	49	49

III. PROGRAMMED MANPOWER BY DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY
(DPPC)

The following tables portray military and civilian manpower of the Defense-related organizations by DPPC.

TABLE VII-1
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

TOTAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED			
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH		AUTH	
STRATEGIC								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL								
Intelligence	5.3	5.4	6.5	6	6.4		6.7	6.8
Centrally Managed Comm.	3.6	3.6	4.5	4.3	4.6		4.6	4.6
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4		0.4	0.4
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	43.3	44.2	42.9	41.8	41.2		39.5	38.5
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS								
Support Commands	0.9	0.9	1	0.9	1		1	0.9
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT								
Research and Development	0.8	0.8	1.1	1	1.1		1.2	1.2
Geophysical Activities	9.3	9.3	8.7	8.7	8.7		8.8	8.7
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL								
Personnel Support	12.6	12.9	13.4	13.8	14		14.2	14.2
Individual Training	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5		1.5	1.5

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED	
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989	FY 1990
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	AUTH
<u>SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>						
Support Installations	8.4	8.5	11	10.3	10	10.2
Centralized Support Act'y	13.1	13.4	17.4	16.6	18.9	19.1
Headquarters Management	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	99.4	101.1	108.7	105.6	108.2	106.5
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.3	0.3

TABLE VII-2
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

TOTAL CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Estimated Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED			
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH		AUTH	
STRATEGIC Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL Intelligence	3.3	3.3	4.2	3.8	4		4.3	4.4
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.9	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.4		2.4	2.4
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	42.3	43.2	41.8	40.8	40.2		38.5	37.5
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HQTTRS Support Commands	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8		0.8	0.7
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Research and Development Geophysical Activities	0.7	0.7	1	0.9	1		1	1
	8.7	8.7	8.1	8.1	8.1		8.2	8.1
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL Personnel Support	12.6	12.9	13.4	13.8	14		14.2	14.2
Individual Training	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED			
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH		AUTH	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES								
Support Installations	8.2	8.3	10.8	10.1	9.8		9.8	10
Centralized Support Act'y	11.2	11.4	15.2	14.5	16.7		16.8	16.9
Headquarters Management	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	90.9	92.4	98.9	96.3	98.4		97.4	96.6

TABLE VII-3
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

TOTAL MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED			
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH		AUTH	
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPCC)								
STRATEGIC								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
TACTICAL/MOBILITY								
COMUNICATIONS/INTELL								
Intelligence	2	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.4		2.4	2.4
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.7	1.7	2.2	2.1	2.2		2.2	2.2
COMBAT INSTALLATIONS	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1
JOINT ACTIVITIES	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
CENTRAL LOGISTICS	1	1	1.1	1	1		1	1
SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS								
Support Commands	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT								
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6		0.6	0.6
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL								
Personnel Support	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
Individual Training	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8		0.8	0.8

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED			
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	AUTH	AUTH	AUTH
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES								
Support Installations	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2
Centralized Support Act'y	1.9	2	2.2	2.1	2.2		2.2	2.2
Headquarters Management	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	8.5	8.7	9.8	9.4	9.8		9.9	9.9
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.3		0.3	0.3

TABLE VII-4
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

MILITARY MANPOWER-OFFICER ONLY
(End Strength in Thousands)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED	
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	AUTH
<u>STRATEGIC</u>						
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>						
	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>						
Intelligence	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6
Centrally Managed Comm.	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>						
	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>						
	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>						
	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>						
	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>						
	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>						
Support Commands	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>						
Research and Development	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>						
Personnel Support	0	0	0	0	0	0
Individual Training	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED	
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH	AUTH
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES						
Support Installations	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Centralized Support Act'y	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6
Headquarters Management	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE	5.3	5.5	6.3	6	6.4	6.4
INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES	0.2	0	0.1	0	0.2	0.2

TAB. J11
DEFENSE AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

MILITARY MANPOWER-ENLISTED ONLY
(End Strength in Thousands)

	ACTUAL				ESTIMATED			
	FY 1985		FY 1988		FY 1989		FY 1990	
	AUTH	INV	AUTH	INV	AUTH		AUTH	
<u>DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES (DPPC)</u>								
<u>STRATEGIC</u>								
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
<u>TACTICAL/MOBILITY</u>								
	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/INTELL</u>								
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8		0.8	0.8
Centrally Managed Comm.	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4		1.4	1.4
<u>COMBAT INSTALLATIONS</u>								
	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
<u>FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING</u>								
	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
<u>MEDICAL SUPPORT</u>								
	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
<u>JOINT ACTIVITIES</u>								
	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
<u>CENTRAL LOGISTICS</u>								
	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		0.2	0.2
<u>SERVICE MANAGEMENT HDQTRS</u>								
Support Commands	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1
<u>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</u>								
Research and Development	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
Geophysical Activities	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3
<u>TRAINING AND PERSONNEL</u>								
Personnel Support	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
Individual Training	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.1	0.1

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Support Installations	0	0	0	0	0	0
Centralized Support Act'y	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6
Headquarters Management	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

TOTAL MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE

3.1 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5

INDIVIDUAL MOBIL. AUGMENTEES

0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1

APPENDIX A

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This appendix provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1989.

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower, but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1989 DMRR, by component, are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM (DPCC)	TO (DPCC)	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
ARMY								
IMA Transfer	Centralized Support Activities	Combat Installation	0	0	0	0	*	*
IMA Transfer	Combat Installations	Strategic Control & Surveillance	0	0	0	*	*	*
IMA Transfer	Combat Installations	Centralized Support Activities	0	0	0	*	*	*
IMA Transfer	Support Installations	Service Support-Support Commands	*	*	*	*	*	*
IMA Transfer	Service Support Combat Commands	Centralized Support Commands	0	.4	.4	.1	.1	.1
IMA Transfer	Individual Training	Service Support-Support Commands	0	0	0	*	*	*
IMA Transfer	Centralized Support Activities	Strategic Control And Surveillance Forces	0	0	0	0	*	*
IMA Transfer	Individual Training	Centralized Support Activities	*	*	*	*	*	*
IMA Transfer	Service Support-Support Commands	Centralized Support Activities	*	*	*	.1	.1	.1
IMA Transfer	Centralized Support Activities	Support Installations	0	0	0	.3	.3	.3
Cemetery Net	Theater Force	Strategic Communications	0	.4	.4	0	0	0
Logistics	Logistics Spt Oper (Europe)	Theater Forces	3	3.1	3.1	0	0	0
USA Spacom	Unified Commands	Service Support-Combat Cmds	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1

ACTIVITY	FROM (DPPC)	TO (DPPC)	AUDIT TRAIL (End Strength in Thousands)					
			MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
Support to OSD	TNG & PERS - Personnel Support	OSD/Defense Agencies & Act	.1	*	.1	.1	.1	.1
Support to USUHS	TNG & PERS - Individual TNG	OSD/Defense Agencies & Act	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Tactical Communication Maint	Support Act-Support Instal	Combat Installations	*	*	*	*	*	*
Service Wide Support	Centralized Support Activities	OSD/Defense Agencies & Act	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4

*less than 50

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>NAVY</u> Station Hospitals & Medical Clinics	Support Installations	Medical Support	14.7	15.0	15.1	3.2	3.3	3.3

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>								
HUMINT	Support Activities	Communications & Intel Intelligence	*	*	*			
	Central Support Activities							
Support to LANTCOM	Support Activities	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*			
	Central Support Activities							
Support to EUCOM	Support Activities	Joint Activities Unified Commands	*	*	*			
	Central Support Activities							

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
Support to OSIA	Support Activities Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Defense Agencies	*	*	*			
Support to DSPO	Support Activities Central Support Activities	Joint Activities Defense Agencies	*	*	*			

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991
<u>AIR FORCE</u>								
F-117 Support	Tactical	Combat Installations	.7	.7	.7			
		Medical Support	*	*	*			
ANG Base Communication	Combat Installations	Centrally Managed Commo	1.8	1.8	1.8			

*less than 50

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<u>AC:</u>	Active Component								
<u>AFR:</u>	Air Force Reserve of the Air Force								
<u>ARF:</u>	Air Reserve Forces of the Air Force. Includes Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.								
<u>Authorized (Manpower):</u>	Synonymous with programmed manning.								
<u>Authorized Strength Report:</u>	A Marine Corps term synonymous with programmed manning.								
<u>Balanced Occupation:</u>	An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meets the following criteria: (See overage and shortage occupations also)								
	<table><tr><th><u>Skills with PMI of</u></th><th><u>% of PMI filled</u></th></tr><tr><td>500 or more people</td><td>> 95% and < 105%</td></tr><tr><td>100-499 people</td><td>> 90% and < 110%</td></tr><tr><td>less than 100 people</td><td>> 85% and < 115%</td></tr></table>	<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>	500 or more people	> 95% and < 105%	100-499 people	> 90% and < 110%	less than 100 people	> 85% and < 115%
<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>								
500 or more people	> 95% and < 105%								
100-499 people	> 90% and < 110%								
less than 100 people	> 85% and < 115%								
<u>Billet:</u>	A programmed manpower structure space that defines by grade and occupation a job to be performed which is associated with a specific unit or organization (see position).								
<u>Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM):</u>	Military personnel assigned to tactical units who are actually employed in civilian positions in support activities. BMM usually occurs when civilian position requirements have been identified, but no civilian personnel are authorized due to budget or end strength ceiling constraints.								
<u>Careerist:</u>	A service member with more than four years of completed Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see First-Termer)								
<u>Critical Occupation:</u>	An occupation in which the inventory is equal to or less than 85% of the desired population for the fiscal year.								
<u>Distributable Billets:</u>	A Navy term synonymous with programmed manning.								

End-Strength: Manpower strength as of the last day of the fiscal year. The term may be further defined in combination with other terms but always indicates manpower strength as of September 30th, e.g.,

Actual end strength: Prior fiscal year(s) personnel inventory.

Budgeted end strength: As contained in a Service or DoD budget.

Programmed end strength: As contained within the DoD Six Year Defense Plan.

First-Termer: An enlisted service member who has completed four years or less Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS). (see Careerist)

Force Structure: The numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings.

Force Structure Allowance: An Army term synonymous with active component programmed manning.

Force Structure Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with active component programmed manning.

Force Structure Deviation: A manpower accounting convention which allows Programmed Manning for the Programmed Force Structure and the Individuals accounts to be depicted within programmed and budgeted end strength. Force Structure Deviation appears as "Undistributed" in Active Component Defense Planning and Programming Category tables. Positive values indicate temporary overmanning; negative values indicate temporary undermanning projected for the last day of a fiscal year (DoD Handbook 7045.7-H and DoDI 1120.11).

Funded Peacetime Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.

Grade: The pay grade requirement of a billet or the pay grade possessed by a service member.

Individuals: Transients, trainees (includes Reserve Component training pipeline for the Reserve Component), patients, prisoners, holdees, cadets and students --

personnel not filling programmed manpower structure spaces. This "overhead" is required to maintain the programmed structure at one hundred percent of programmed manning.

Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA):

Individuals carried in the Selected Reserve programmed manning who fill Active Component billets upon mobilization. IMA billets are not included in Active Component Programmed Manpower Structure in the DMRR.

Inventory

Synonymous with Actual End Strength. The Actual personnel strength for a prior year.

Lateral Movement:

A reclassification action resulting in a change of a service member's primary occupation.

Manning Level:

Synonymous with programmed manning.

Occupation:

The specialty skill requirement of a billet, and the skill qualifications of personnel. Occupations are defined according to the following coding systems.

Army: SSI (officer), MOS (Enlisted)
Navy: NOBC (officer), Rating/NEC (enlisted)
USAF: AFSC (officer & enlisted)
USMC: MOS (officer & enlisted)

Occupational Field:

An aggregation of discrete occupations.

Operating Strength:

An Army personnel management term identifying the number of people (or projected strengths for future periods) in units. The term is synonymous with the following:

Navy: distributable strength
USAF: assigned strength
USMC: chargeable strength

Overage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meet the following criteria: (see balanced and shortage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 105%
100-499 people	> 110%
less than 100 people	> 115%

Position:

Same as Billet above,

Programmed Force Structure:

The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year, and which is planned to exist in each future year of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Programmed Manpower Structure:

The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for units and organizations in the programmed force structure. This does not include IMAs or Individuals.

Programmed Manning:

Those billets in the programmed manpower structure planned to be filled. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% fill of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. For the active components the term "programmed manning" is synonymous with:

Army: Force Structure Allowance
Navy: Distributable billets
USAF: Force Structure Authorizations, and
Funded Peacetime Authorizations
USMC: Authorized Strength Report

RC:

Reserve Component; the Air Force also uses the term Air Reserve Forces (ARF).

Required (Manpower):

Synonymous with programmed manpower structure.

Round out:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to make up the difference between the number of Active Component units required in a standard division configuration and the number of Active Component units actually assigned. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with the Active Component division, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Round Up:

An Army term wherein Reserve Component units are assigned to Active Component divisions to augment the division structure. These Reserve Component units are scheduled to deploy with Active Component divisions, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Shortage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory, when compared to Programmed Manning plus Individuals (PMI), meets the following criteria: (see balanced and overage occupations also)

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	< 95%
100-499 people	< 90%
less than 100 people	< 85%

<u>Skill:</u>	Same as occupation
<u>Stability:</u>	Aggregate: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the Service continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated. Unit: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the same unit continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.
<u>Staffing:</u>	The process of distributing personnel to fill programmed manning targets in accordance with assignment policies, tour length constraints, and projections of the trained operating strength population.
<u>Training and Administration of Reserves (TARS):</u>	A Navy term referring to full-time manpower support to the Navy Reserve. This manpower is budgeted and accounted for within the Selected Reserve.
<u>Training Pipeline:</u>	Reserve component military personnel in training status, including training/pay categories F, Q, U, P, and X.
<u>Trained Strength in Units:</u>	The number of personnel in Selected Reserve unit(s) who have completed 12 weeks of basic military training (or its equivalent) and are eligible for deployment overseas, on land, when mobilized under proper authorities. Excludes personnel in non-deployable accounts. The reserve component manpower category functionally equivalent to active component programmed manning.

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. STRATEGIC. The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

a. Offensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships, long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, and operational headquarters for these forces.

b. Defensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance. This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY. The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

a. Land Forces. This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

(1) Division Forces. This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel, for Army resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC), and for the Army and Marine Components of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force are also included in this category.

(2) Theater Forces. This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Berlin and Panama; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other Services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Army Forces Command.

b. Tactical Air Forces. This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multi-purpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force command control facilities and systems in Europe and the Pacific, Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC), war reserve materiel, and the Air Force Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

c. Naval Forces. The DPFCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

(1) Warships and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Forces. This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, battleships, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and tactically supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

(2) Amphibious Forces. This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, the Navy component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

(3) Naval Support Forces. This category contains program elements for forward logistical supporting forces, carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, intermediate maintenance activities, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the Navy component of the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) program.

d. Mobility Forces. This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. This category contains program elements for the centrally managed communications and intelligence gathering activities.

a. Centrally Managed Communications. This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications Systems, the military Service's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions, and management headquarters.

b. Intelligence. This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

4. COMBAT INSTALLATIONS. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Programs 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

5. FORCE SUPPORT TRAINING. This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps unit and force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air Force combat crew training squadrons.

6. MEDICAL SUPPORT. This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD regional medical facilities, including medical centers and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research, medical equipment and systems, and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics.

7. JOINT ACTIVITIES. This category contains program elements for those source manpower billets which are outside of service control. They include manning requirements of such organization as the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the like.

a. International Military Organizations. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

b. Unified Commands. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, US Pacific Command, etc.

c. Federal Agency Support. This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This category contains the program element codes for the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. OSD/Defense Agencies/Activities. This category contains the program element codes for the Staffs of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Agencies and Activities.

8. CENTRAL LOGISTICS. This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

a. Supply Operations. This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, centralized procurement offices, and for military personnel support to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). It also includes resources for POL pipeline and storage operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

b. Maintenance Operations. This category contains elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities and logistic centers.

c. Logistics Support Operations. This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness.

9. SERVICE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS. This category contains the program elements for the service combat and support commands.

a. Combat Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the military Service combat commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

b. Support Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of military Service support commands, i.e., those in Major Defense Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. This category also includes program elements for geophysical activities.

a. Research and Development Activities. This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6, but containing research and development resources.

b. Geophysical Activities. This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

11. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL.

a. Individual Training. This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

b. Personnel Support. This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, Section 6 schools, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the American Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs, and the VEAP program. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

12. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for support installations and centralized activities.

a. Support Installations. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, and administrative commands (Programs 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

b. Centralized Support Activities. This category contains miscellaneous Service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for combat

developments, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, claims, service-wide support, and other miscellaneous support.

13. INDIVIDUALS. The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets/midshipmen.

a. Transients. This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element that consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets/Midshipmen. This category contains active service officer students, active enlisted students, active enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, active officer accession students, and the Reserve Components training pipeline personnel.

14. UNDISTRIBUTED. Manpower not attributable to other DPPC categories.