

# AIR WAR COLLEGE

## RESEARCH REPORT


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NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) AND  
REPATRIATION  
HOW CAN THE PROCESS BE IMPROVED?

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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AND REPATRIATION  
HOW CAN THE PROCESS BE IMPROVED?

by

Colonel Marlene Ausen  
Colonel John M. Franco  
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Beville  
Lieutenant Colonel John Gorski

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH  
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Colonel Francis Hendryx

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1988

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Noncombatant Evacuation and Repatriation: How can the process be improved?

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> This paper considers the problems that could be encountered in the event a decision was made to evacuate noncombatant personnel from the Federal Republic of Germany. There are several government agencies involved in the preparation and execution of plans to evacuate noncombatants from the continent of Europe in the event conditions exist that could threaten noncombatant safety. Since noncombatant evacuation could have a significant political impact on our European allies, we believe, procedures for its implementation have not been given priority or in-depth attention in exercise scenarios. In most cases, execution of any plans has been limited to the highest level of the decision-making process where simulation of required actions has been substituted for the actual movement of personnel. The fact that the successful execution of <sup>Noncombatant Evacuation Operations</sup> (NEO) plans is an interagency effort, dependent on allied as well as commercial transportation support, increases the complexity of operations and the potential mission impairment due to "friction" and "fog" and possible loss of life. The authors present several recommendations to: develop and implement timely decisions leading to a NEO; add simplicity and consistency to the policies and procedures; and to exercise and evaluate the total system for NEO and repatriation.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Colonel Marlene Ausen (B.S. in Nursing, University of Wisconsin; Masters in Nursing, University of Virginia) has been a faculty member with the University of Wisconsin, School of Nursing from 1973-1976 and the University of Virginia from 1976-1981. From 1976-1981, she was assigned to the Virginia Air Guard as a Nurse Practitioner, and from 1981-1987, as the Air National Guard Advisor to the Chief, Air Force Nurse Corps at Bolling AFB.

Colonel John M. Franco (B.S., Florida State University; M.B.A., University of Georgia) has over the last 21 years, served in a variety of capacities including: air weapons controller in Florida, Iceland and Arizona; auditor/resident auditor at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center and Charleston AFB; Commander, 714 ACWS in Cold Bay, Alaska; Comptroller, Lajes Field, Azores; and at HQ MAC, Chief, Airlift Operations Division (Budget); Director, Comptroller Plans and Programs; and Director of Cost. During his assignment at HQ MAC, he played a dominant role in defining the wartime role for the Air Force comptroller function. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces (correspondence) and the Defense Resource Management Course.

Lieutenant Colonel John Gorski (B.S., Duquesne University; M.S., University of Southern California) was commissioned through the ROTC program in 1970. As a manpower management officer, Colonel Gorski has had assignments at Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio; HQ 5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan; HQ TAC, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; HQ USAF and the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Bevill (B.S. in Animal Husbandry, University of Tennessee; Masters, Educational Psychology, University of Tennessee) was commissioned in 1966. Following completion of the Infantry Officers' Basic Course, he deployed to Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division. Following Vietnam, he served in a variety of command and staff positions including Operations Officer, 8th Infantry Division (MECH) and Infantry Battalion Executive Officer in Germany; and, Infantry Brigade Executive Officer, Infantry Battalion Commander, Division IG and G-3 Operations Officer at Fort Lewis, Washington. Colonel Bevill is a graduate of the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course and the Army Command and General Staff College.

## Preface

The early days of World War II will always be associated with sight of British school children marching raggedly to train depots as they left the vulnerable cities of London, Liverpool, Glasgow, or Sheffield in the face of threatened bombing raids....In the four days following 1 September 1939, several hundred thousand children were evacuated to relatively safe provincial towns and rural villages. (17:1)

When German troops invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, the code word "Pied Piper" set in motion the evacuation. Although there were some tears and unhappiness ..., calm and order predominated. Careful planning had no doubt contributed to the holiday mood. (17:28)

Would the above account of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) from West Germany hold true today? How prepared is the United States to execute existing plans in order to insure the safe return of over 500,000 noncombatants in the event such action was deemed necessary by the U.S. national command authorities (NCA)? These questions form the basis for the following research hypothesis: "How can the process to identify, evacuate and repatriate noncombatant personnel be improved?" It is a timely issue, important enough for the Congress to request a detailed study from the Department of Defense on the impact of large numbers of dependents overseas. (See Attachment 6)



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) and repatriation have as their objective the removing of U.S. citizens and other authorized persons from overseas areas where there is imminent or even immediate danger. The total process involves many federal and local state agencies; commercial activities; non-U.S. governmental agencies; decision support systems dependent on a complex array of information and communication networks; limited resources in terms of time, transportation means and supplies to meet individual needs; and political implications that could result from a U.S. decision to invoke an evacuation order. Simply stated, it isn't simple.

NEO and repatriation are not new. NEO was recently accomplished in Haiti. Perhaps more notable evacuations are actions the U.S. took in Grenada in 1983, Iran in 1979 or Saigon in 1972. Notwithstanding the importance of these "life-saving" actions, they were limited compared to what the U.S. would face if a decision were made to evacuate noncombatants from the Federal Republic of Germany.

The purpose of this paper is to: 1) define NEO and repatriation; 2) determine who is affected; 3) examine the organization(s) and their procedures for accomplishing the required tasks; and 4) provide recommendations to improve the overall system. Before proceeding with the specific detail of NEO and repatriation, a few words are necessary regarding the

importance of preparation.

"Plan early, plan thoroughly and practice." These words pertaining to contingency planning were spoken by a guest speaker to the Air War College Class of 88. Although these words sound like "apple pie, motherhood and the American flag," they nevertheless represent a sober exhortation for those crisis planners and decision-makers who are charged with executing plans in response to various crises stemming from natural disasters, civil disturbance or armed conflict.

Planning early for some future event can be a difficult challenge given the many current daily problems facing leaders and managers in the present. As Perry Smith remarks, "many decision-makers may not seriously consider long-range planning requirements until it is too late to provide coherence to the series of day-to-day decisions they have already taken." (41:14) Although Smith was talking about strategic long-range planning, his remarks are germane to issues associated with contingencies. The difficulty in planning early stems in part from not enough time and/or people to devote to the planning task, or not enough reliable information concerning future situations or conditions. Not having enough people or reliable information leads to the second point in the opening quote, "plan thoroughly."

Many factors must be considered in plan development because of the significant effects these factors could have on the accomplishment of a mission. (6:5-2) Two different methods of planning are described in the Joint Operation Planning System:

deliberate planning and time-sensitive planning.

Deliberate planning is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the supported command, the component commands, other supporting commands, the transportation operating agencies (TOAs) the Joint Deployment Agency, and other DoD agencies.

Time-sensitive planning is conducted during times of emergency and uses the Crisis Action System...The overall process of time-sensitive planning parallels that of deliberate planning, but it is a more flexible system because it must be responsive to the demands of unforeseeable events.  
(6:5-2)

Just how thorough can plans be? Undoubtedly, thoroughness is a function of resources committed or involved in the planning task as well as the availability of reliable planning information. The answer to the question sometimes cannot be known until the event for which the plan was developed actually occurs. This is an undesirable method of testing the thoroughness of a plan, especially when peoples' lives are at stake. Other more convenient and less costly methods include modeling and simulation, as well as exercises requiring active participation.

Thus, in the case of NEO and repatriation, the expression, "plan early, plan thoroughly, and practice" is very pertinent. Yet another expression known as the KISS (advocating simplicity) principle warrants similar attention by those charged with the responsibilities to plan and execute NEO and repatriation actions.

## Chapter II

### NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

#### BACKGROUND

As in the British evacuation mentioned in the Preface of this paper, certain threats may require the evacuation of noncombatants from the areas of immediate danger to safer overseas locations (termed safehavens) or back to the continental United States (CONUS). It is a dual phase process involving first the evacuation and second, the repatriation of noncombatant personnel. (19:5-1) This brief description of the process is where simplicity ends for the entire process involved in evacuating hundreds of thousands of people, through various modes of transportation, from different locations overseas to different locations in the CONUS or safehavens. It is a complex effort of monumental proportions. Such actions would be difficult even under ideal conditions with unlimited resources. However, given the circumstances that would necessitate an evacuation order being executed, the authors have assumed other military operations would be underway.

#### OBJECTIVES

Before we consider the objective of NEO, we will define what it is and what it is not. DoD Directive 5100.51, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad," currently being revised within the Department of Defense (DoD), talks about the ordered movement or

authorized departure of noncombatants from a special area by the Department of State (DoS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), or the appropriate U.S. military commander. Who is a noncombatant? In some respects, they are whoever some competent authority designates. Some noncombatants may be ordered to evacuate such as civilian employees of the various agencies of the U.S. government, and those U.S. military personnel designated by competent authority, along with all dependents of the above. Additionally, some U.S. citizens may be authorized or assisted in evacuation, but not ordered to evacuate, such as U.S. government employees who reside in the affected area of their own volition, private U.S. citizens, and dependents of the above. And finally, some third country nationals (TCNs) may be authorized or assisted, in accordance with DoS regulations. (18:1) In Europe, an evacuation could require the removal of as many as 1.3 million people. The 1.3 million figure refers to DoD dependents, overseas employees of U.S. firms, students, tourists, and other Americans who are typically traveling in Europe at the peak of the tourist season. A major evacuation from Europe could take weeks or months to complete. Current plans assume that evacuees from Europe will be airlifted to the U.S. on backhaul (returning aircraft) as initial elements of the U.S. military forces are deployed to Europe. However, the evacuation of Europe is a worst-case example. More typical of evacuations planned by the DoS was the evacuation of about 700 Americans and foreign nationals from Grenada in 1983. (42:2)

How do we propose moving these noncombatants from the affected area? By ship, plane, bus, car? It is obvious the numbers being considered in a European NEO cannot be moved in a matter of days without massive support by the military with its transportation assets. Will the U.S. be receiving any help from its allies or will this be an independent action? Has the military programmed or planned to perform this mission? Has the U.S. exercised or tested its capability to mount such a massive task? The following excerpt from the book, Team Yankee by Harold Coyle, realistically portrays a portion of what one might expect. "When the decision to evacuate military dependents from Europe was finally made after countless delays and hesitations, there was a rush of frantic and seemingly uncoordinated activity to get it done before hostilities broke out. The drive to Rhein-Mein, which normally took one hour on that evening took four." (15:57)

The above questions, which represent only the "tip of the iceberg", are not meant to point fingers or establish blame, but to emphasize the magnitude of a NEO. It is a massive, humanitarian effort to relocate significant numbers of men, women, and children from a potentially hostile environment to safe locations. Strictly speaking, it is not a military operation. But, considering the magnitude of the effort, only with the full support and assistance of the military will such an endeavor succeed. It is an undertaking which must be planned, resourced, tested, and formalized, for without this commitment, success is virtually impossible.

In order to appreciate the enormity of the problem, the reader should consider the following hypothetical scenario:

a. The number of noncombatants in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is estimated at over 500,000. Approximately half are associated with the Department of Defense (DoD). (33:10)

b. The following tables show the equivalent number of seats that could be generated given the type of aircraft, number of seats for each type and the airfield capability pertaining to passenger processing. With the exception of the seats per aircraft, all figures are hypothetical.

Table 1

Airlift Resources (assumed)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Passenger Seats(d)</u>	<u>Floorload capacity(d)</u>	<u>Total Seats</u>
C141	234	(b)	288	69,120 ( 33%)
C5	80	(b)	600	45,000 ( 22%)
CRAF(a)	227(pax)	300	(c)	<u>92,730 ( 45%)</u>
				206,850 (100%)

- (a) average maximum seats on wide-bodied aircraft
- (b) floorload capacity greater
- (c) CRAF aircraft configured for passengers
- (d) per GAO report on CRAF

Assume:

Terminal X = 60 missions in a 24-hour period  
 " Y = 48 " " " "  
 " Z = 36 " " " "



Table 2

Equivalent Passenger Processing Capability

<u>Terminal</u>	<u>Equivalent Missions</u>		<u>Seats</u>	<u>Total Passengers Processed/24-hours</u>	
X	60(.33) = 20	x	288	5,760	
	60(.22) = 13	x	600	7,800	
	60(.45) = 27	x	300	<u>8,100</u>	21,660
Y	48(.33) = 16	x	288	4,608	
	48(.22) = 11	x	600	6,600	
	48(.45) = 21	x	300	<u>6,300</u>	17,500
Z	36(.33) = 12	x	288	3,456	
	36(.22) = 8	x	600	4,800	
	36(.45) = 16	x	300	<u>4,800</u>	<u>13,056</u>
					52,216

Given the information in this hypothetical scenario, it would take over nine days to process approximately 500,000 noncombatants from three different airfields assuming: commitment of every airlift aircraft possessed; no saturation of terminal air traffic control systems; maximum effective use of available ramp space; round-the-clock operations with no interruptions; no underutilization of seating capacity; and the precise flow of the massive number of peoples to the right aerial port. Truly, these are ideal conditions. For airfield X, over two passenger airlift missions averaging over 900 passengers per hour would be processed. This is indeed optimistic! As a matter of reference to the "real world," Rhein-Main Air Base, the busiest air passenger terminal in the United States Air Force, processes approximately 31,000 passengers, not in one day, but an entire month. (34: )

The point we wish to make is that, even under the most ideal of circumstances, a NEO will be a tremendous task! Earlier, it was mentioned that many of the noncombatants would not be DoD-sponsored, which is very significant. What this means is there would be an enormous number of people, many of them tourists receiving either late notification or none at all having little or no inkling of what to expect. This would most likely increase the amount of confusion, and perhaps panic, which would impair the efficient processing of people.

NEO exercises are required and accomplished periodically in accordance with established policy and procedures. Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the crisis action system in effect to carry out NEO activities, in spite of the evacuation experiences of Saigon, Iran and Grenada, has never had to cope with the Clausewitzian "friction" and "fog" that is sure to accompany any major evacuation effort that would be needed for an area such as the FRG. One might ask, "Why should the crisis action system be a different kind of stress situation in Europe than in Saigon, Iran or Grenada?" Namely, in a potential conflict in Western Europe, the stakes are higher, the numbers are greater and the resources available to accomplish the objective are limited. In addition, its possible a different group of decision-makers will be directly involved in the decision-making process. In their article, "Crisis Management-Gaming: Preparing Decision-Makers for Crisis," Browning, Dellerman and Hoffman stated:

"Although procedures have been developed for gathering and presenting information for the Special Situation Group (SSG) and the President, these procedures were developed by staff personnel in a non-crisis environment. Despite the considerable knowledge and specialized expertise of subordinates (agencies/staff), they seldom view a specific crisis in the same manner as the President or other key decision-makers.

"Currently, senior decision-makers have identified neither their information requirements nor the form and style desired for presenting information. Information presented is often based on what the subordinate believes the decision-maker wants rather than what the decision-maker personally requires....all too often the decision-maker himself does not have a clear idea of what he wants simply because he has not yet been forced to confront the problem." (13:32)

One needs to remember that the illustration mentioned earlier in this chapter only points out the logistical aspects of NEO. One must not forget that it is an effort resulting from a political decision, most likely made at the highest executive levels of our government, the same people implied in the above quoted text. As such, the U.S. could be talking about a decision that may not be timely, militarily feasible, or even supported by its allies. These considerations will make the task even more formidable.

Therefore, what is the objective of NEO? It is the execution of a political decision to evacuate noncombatants from a potentially hostile area so that military operations can be prepared for and conducted should the need arise. It can be achieved but, not easily. It will be a resource demanding, emotional and traumatic experience, and unless the U.S. recognizes and prepares to execute this task, it could

conceivably hinder allied military operations.

### INFRASTRUCTURE

The infrastructure or foundation established to plan for and execute NEO consists of major components of our federal government. They are then linked by a system of interagency committees and groups designed to coordinate and implement NEO anywhere in the world in response to natural disasters, civil disturbances, or armed conflict. For purposes of analysis, Figure 11-1 provides the departure point for describing the infrastructure, explaining the role of each of the components, and recommending improvements in the overall process to support NEO.

### THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The infrastructure around which NEO revolves stems from statutory requirements, namely Executive Order 11490, "Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to Federal Departments and Agencies," and the Foreign Services Act of 1980. Executive Order 11490, Section 210, states that "the Secretary of State shall develop policies, plans, and procedures for carrying out his responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States under conditions of national emergency, including, but not limited to. . . protection or evacuation of American citizens and nationals abroad and safeguarding their property." (21:17569) The Foreign Service Act further states that

"under the direction of the President, the Chief of Diplomatic Mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION




Figure 11-1

employees in that country except for employees under the command of a United States military commander." (23:4442) The DoS, therefore, has overall responsibility for insuring that emergency evacuation plans are prepared and coordinated with other appropriate agencies, while the specific U.S. Chief of Diplomatic Mission prepares and maintains emergency evacuation plans for all noncombatants. The Secretary of State decides what plans or portions of evacuation plans should be implemented, except in situations where timely communications are lacking. In those cases, the Chief of Diplomatic Mission or responsible military commander may declare a NEO. In situations where there are large number of evacuees or important international implications, such as in Europe and specifically the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), one can assume the decision will be made by the President upon recommendation of the National Security Council (42:3).

To assist the Secretary of State in coordinating NEO actions with other federal agencies, the Washington Liaison Group (WLG) has been established. (See Attachment 8) Chaired by a representative from the DoS, the WLG brings together representatives of the DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Military Services, and observers of other U.S. government agencies to ensure that NEO is fully coordinated and executable. Flowing from the WLG are regional liaison groups to coordinate NEO activities at the local level. These liaison groups therefore provide conduits by which information flows between and among the primary agencies and departments responsible for

planning, organizing, exercising, and executing NEO.

#### THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DoD participation in NEO involves major contributions by various activities within the Department of Defense (DoD) including the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the unified and specified commands and the Military Services. DoD policies and procedures are outlined in DoD Directive 5100.51, 11 October 1966, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad" currently under revision. In discussing the role of the DoD, we will start with that activity which interfaces most directly with the Chief of Diplomatic Mission, the commander-in-chief (CINC) of the unified command and then move to the base level activities associated more closely with actual execution of NEO.

#### COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNIFIED COMMAND

Planning for the protection and evacuation of DoD employees and dependents is the responsibility of the unified commander who, in conjunction with the various component commands, forwards plans to the U.S. Chief of Diplomatic Mission who, in turn, incorporates them into the overall mission plan. Using the scenario of an evacuation in the FRG, the Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) has designated the Army component commander, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), as the office of primary responsibility. USAREUR Regulation 525-27, 12 June 1986, "The



Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Systems," sets up the system to rehearse and execute NEO in the FRG. From this document flows the U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR) plans to conduct NEO for assigned units. Regional and local NEO plans are established to provide detailed guidance at the community level which cover a myriad of details such as modes of transportation, priority of evacuation, disposition of household goods, pets and automobiles, preparation of NEO kits and information pamphlets, and reporting requirements on the status of NEO activities.

In addition to providing the planning guidance for evacuation for DoD personnel within an assigned area of responsibility, the CINC provides a link between the Chief of Diplomatic Mission and the national command authorities in assessing the ability of using military forces to assist in NEO, and to ensure there is no conflict with military operations. It seems obvious that if we consider evacuating over 500,000 noncombatants from the FRG, the DoS will need the assistance and capability of the U.S. Military Services early on to carry out its responsibilities. This is in fact assumed in the USAFE NEO Plan. (7:C-3) Before the CINC can provide the required forces to implement a NEO decision, the JCS must provide authorization to do so. This decision falls then squarely in the lap of the OSD, the Joint Staff, and Military Services who are major players in the WLG which we have previously described.

#### OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Within OSD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)/ Force Management and Personnel designates the OSD member of the WLG to oversee DoD responsibilities for NEO. In conjunction with the ASD/International Security Affairs and the ASD/Comptroller, the Secretary of Defense works with the Secretary of State to ensure all decisions and considerations concerning NEO are fully coordinated, both in regard to the political consequences of such a decision, and the obvious military support which will be required to make a NEO successful. All this will be in conjunction with ongoing and planned military operations within the theater. A State-Defense Joint Statement, an attachment (see Attachment 7) to DOD Directive 5100.51, provides the framework for establishing policy objectives between the DoS and the DoD. From this policy statement comes the specific military support which would most likely be required in event of NEO from Europe.

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The OJCS, under direction and control of the Chairman, JCS, would be the primary military organization responsible for providing direction to the CINCs of the unified and specified commands, in coordination with the Military Services, on DoD participation in NEO activities. It is obvious that once the political decision is made to implement NEO, the execution of such a decision to move massive numbers of noncombatants from a theater easily outstrips the capability of the DoS. At that

point, one can assume that the DoD would be asked to bring forth all available transportation assets to move combatants from the threatened area. The JCS would direct the theater CINC to use whatever available forces to assist in NEO operations without impairing the overall military mission. Airlift and sealift forces would be made available--although numbers and capabilities would preclude any quick and painless way to move the staggering numbers one envisions. One would hope that, as indicated in our Introduction (Chapter I), we have "prepared and planned" for such a contingency.

The method the OJCS and Military Services use to determine and test U.S. abilities to conduct military operation is through the use of JCS-sponsored worldwide military exercises. These exercises also permit us to test the system, use operational procedures, and simulate real-world conditions to determine deficiencies, identify areas for improvement, and develop corrective actions.

We must look at NEO in previous JCS exercises. "Play" in this regard has focused on the procedures for obtaining a NEO decision, with little emphasis on testing the capability of the system to handle such a decision in terms of the resources required to move the tremendous numbers involved, interservice coordination within countries involved in NEO, and specific procedures and guidelines at the local level to ensure the system will work in peacetime as it would in wartime. It appears that once a NEO decision is made, we have "assumed" away all the

problems! The Director of Operations on the Joint Staff states that "as a result of the recent JCS-sponsored exercise PROUD SCOUT 88, many NEO issues have surfaced..."(14: ). The PROUD SCOUT 88 after action report should provide alternative solutions to any problems identified relating to these issues. The results of this exercise would appear to support NEO as a recurring objective to be included in future JCS-sponsored exercises.

#### Military Departments, Major Commands and Units

The Secretaries of the Military Services and the major commands within the Services are responsible for organizing, coordinating, and executing service plans associated with NEO operations. Each of the Military Services independently builds its own reporting system, pinpoints the functional areas responsible for NEO, and establishes directives in conjunction with the area unified command. This interface between the Military Services and CINCS of the unified commands is the link which bridges the gap between the planning and the execution of NEO operations. Major command guidance is the basis for creating plans at base or community level to ensure that proper NEO procedures are developed, tested, and disseminated to personnel involved in NEO, to include the evacuees themselves. Awareness of the procedures and the NEO program itself, and the testing of those procedures, is therefore extremely important.

To determine whether this awareness exist, we conducted a limited survey of recent overseas returnees. (Attachment 10)

Although valid predictions about the overseas population as a whole from this limited survey cannot be made, the results nevertheless indicate that maybe not enough attention is being placed at the point when NEO would be executed. In our sample in which all respondents were active duty military officers, over 70% of the respondents and their families were aware of NEO procedures at their assignment location or had been briefed on NEO procedures. But, on the other hand, and maybe more importantly, 70% had never participated in NEO training exercises! In addition, they indicated they had a very low degree of confidence in the NEO program and its objectives.

Although these statistics only represented the experience of a small sample of people, this factor, along with the inconsistencies noted in operational plans and information brochures (see Chapter 4) indicates more emphasis is needed regarding procedures to be followed during a NEO. The fact that there is a very low confidence level that NEO will work might be indicative of a self-fulfilling prophecy from which we may never recover unless we focus on developing and planning for NEO in a realistic and practical manner.

#### EXECUTION

Now that we have outlined NEO objectives and infrastructure, the question becomes "Can NEO Work?" For discussion purposes, let us assume the objectives are clear and the decision-making process has been fully established. Creating

concern is the execution of the NEO effort starting from the planning phase, to the decision itself, to the real world logistics problems at the overseas locations. In the planning phase, one can sense that the problem is too tough to work, thereby relegating NEO to the "backburner." The fact that it has taken almost three years to coordinate a new draft DoD Directive 5100.51, which was originally published in 1966, 22 years ago, indicates that the bureaucratic process has put NEO in limbo, unable to move in any direction. This directive, and follow-up implementation regulations, must be put on track so that NEO moves to the "front burner." Related to this planning aspect is the vital role that the newly created U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) must take on with some priority along with its other missions. The logistical problems associated with noncombatant movements must be addressed along with the other related mobility and transportation problems. The creation of this new unified command provides a perfect opportunity to "size" the problems and develop alternative solutions. Establishing NEO as a priority initiative will cause the allocation of the necessary manpower resources to work the NEO logistical problems.

The next aspect in dealing with the question, "Can NEO Work?" is the reality of the authorities that make the decision itself. The decision to declare NEO must be based on the U.S. government's responsibility to ensure the safety of noncombatants, rather than on the political consequences of such a decision. That attitude must be fostered at all levels so that a

timely decision to declare NEO helps, rather than hinders, successful execution. That is not to say political factors will not influence such a decision. It is just that the decision-makers should not lose sight of the real objective established in public law and executive orders--the protection and safety of noncombatants abroad. (21:17569)

And finally, can we expect NEO to work at the point where it needs to work, the overseas locations where the noncombatants reside? In JCS-sponsored exercises, although the JCS Crisis Action Team followed procedures to obtain a decision to declare a NEO, the remainder of the scenarios usually assumed successful implementation of the decision at the lower levels, i.e., at the community or base. (26: ) The declaration and the successful implementation of a NEO seem to occur simultaneously. Although the recently JCS-sponsored "PROUD SCOUT 88" exercise tested NEO procedures, one exercise is not enough. As indicated in the Chapter I of this study, planning and preparation and testing must be done early on so that when execution takes place, problem areas have been already highlighted and solutions recommended. More exercise play at the local level must be implemented, not just on paper but in actuality. Actual movement of noncombatants, from residences through processing lines to aircraft to safe locations must be practiced to ensure all aspects of processing are considered. Realistic testing cannot be underestimated.

The question remains, "Can NEO Work?" Specifically, for

those noncombatants in the Federal Republic of Germany, another way of asking this question is, "Will all noncombatants be evacuated?" The answer is in our opinion, "no." There are too many people to move, not enough transportation resources and not enough time. However, we should do everything within our capabilities to maximize the number of noncombatants evacuated. It is going to take a commitment by all parties to recognize that it is an area where resources must be committed, attention given to detail and coordination, and planning and practice performed on a routine basis. NEO needs more than superficial attention because, in the long run, superficial attention most likely will result in unsuccessful execution.



## CHAPTER III

### REPATRIATION

"Repatriation is the final critical link in evacuation planning and involves the sequence of actions required to receive U.S. noncombatant evacuees at CONUS points of entry, process them, and assist them in their onward movement to final destination." (19:5-10)

As already established in a previous chapter, large numbers of U.S. citizens in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) may require assistance in the event they are ordered home. These evacuees would be returned to several commercial and military debarkation points in CONUS where the repatriation process would begin.

The repatriation program is designed to provide whatever assistance these personnel may require. This tremendous logistical problem requires simple, yet complete plans, and thorough preparation on the part of numerous federal, state, and local agencies. A review of several of these plans reveals that considerable effort has been directed toward this area. Plans have been published at the federal level, and 26 of the 50 states have plans, although differing somewhat in detail, that generally appear to be focused correctly. For example, the Joint Plan for DoD Noncombatant Repatriation prepared by the Department of the Army, DCS/Personnel provides a comprehensive working document for the planning and coordination for repatriation of DoD noncombatants returning to the CONUS under non-emergency

conditions. In fact, the various state organizations which would execute the repatriation program are routinely exercised during local emergencies such as severe weather, plane crashes, train wrecks, chemical spills, etc.


Under a declared national emergency, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has the total national responsibility for the repatriation (Presidential Executive Order 11490) of all noncombatants including those sponsored by DoD. (32:1) However, non-emergency conditions may occur requiring the return of DoD noncombatants. In this event, overall planning and coordination for repatriation is the responsibility of the Department of the Army. Within the Department of the Army the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel is the DoD executive agent to coordinate with the federal and local agencies in planning for repatriation in CONUS. Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Command is the Army's executive agent for execution of repatriation operations. Other federal agencies and their responsibilities are:

1. DoS will initiate notifications of possible repatriation orders and actual orders to include number of evacuees and places, dates and times of arrival and completion dates.
2. DHHS will:
  - a. Serve as federal coordinator of repatriation activities;
  - b. Review state plans;
  - c. Provide funding for repatriation activities; and,
  - d. Notify states of numbers of evacuees, ports of entry and times of arrival.
  - e. Have lead responsibility of public affairs at national and regional levels.

3. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
  - a. Serves as overall coordinator of all federal agencies to ensure that the required support is provided;
  - b. Serves as coordination point between the General Services Administration (GSA) Regional Emergency Communications Coordinator and the state.
  - c. Provides communications services for notifying the state about implementation of Emergency Repatriation Plans.
4. The DoD may not be able to support Emergency Repatriation Plans due to military commitments. Available DoD resources will be used to the maximum extent possible.
5. The U.S. Public Health Service screens dependents of U.S. citizens and U.S. citizens who appear to have quarantinable disease.
6. The U.S. Customs Service perform required clearances at points of entry.
7. The U.S. Department of Customs:
  - a. Provides Immigration and Naturalization Service clearances for U.S. citizens and their alien dependents.
  - b. Provides Federal Bureau of Investigation clearances at points of entry.
8. The GSA will provide emergency communications services upon request from the FEMA.
9. The U.S. Department of Transportation will provide for priority of evacuee movement on commercial transportation and allocation of equipment when essential to expedite movement.
10. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) identifies available HUD-assisted housing at or nearby the point of entry which may be used for shelter for those evacuees who cannot be moved to final destination for some reason.
11. The U.S. Department of Agriculture:
  - a. Food and Nutrition Service authorizes state agencies to release foods for group feeding.
  - b. Performs plant protection and quarantine clearances at the point of entry. (43:4-5)

Note: Figure III-1 depicts organization relationships of these federal agencies.

\_\_\_\_\_



**Figure 111-1**

State agencies will be coordinated in the various states. by an organization called by a variety of names in the different states, e.g. Emergency Management or Emergency Preparedness Division, etc. They carry out the operational responsibilities for the reception, temporary care and onward transportation of U.S. citizens and dependents returned to the U.S. States are encouraged to incorporate repatriation into their overall emergency operations plan which is used to respond to any local emergency situation. In some states, repatriation plans are included as an annex to the emergency operations plan while in other states they have completely separate repatriation plans.

In states that have ports of entry (see Exhibit III-1), coordination with counties, cities, and military installations is much more detailed. Figure III-2 is an example of a county organization. As shown, action to be executed by each of these organizations and federal and state agencies which may assist are identified. Again, these are the same agencies, in most cases, that will provide assistance to people involved in a natural disaster or emergency. Therefore, the people required to execute the function of these agencies are known and are accustomed to working with one another in short-notice emergency situations.

Each state plan reviewed demonstrated continuing efforts to keep the plan current and complete. The plans included diagrams of facilities to be used, lists of telephone numbers of responsible agencies and individuals, and agreements of support between cities, counties, and military installations where

AIRFIELDSPRIMARY PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITYBACKUP AND ASSIST

JFK International, NY  
Charleston International, SC  
Dulles International, VA  
San Antonio International, TX  
San Francisco/Oakland Int. CA  
Los Angeles International, CA  
Seattle/Tacoma Int. WA  
Honolulu International, HI  
Anchorage International, AK  
Dover AFB, Del  
McGuire AFB, NJ  
Charleston, AFB, SC  
Andrews AFB, MD  
Kelly AFB, TX  
Travis AFB, CA  
Norton AFB, CA  
McChord AFB, WA  
Hickam AFB, HI  
Elmendorf AFB, AK  
Baltimore Washington Int. MD

Ft. Dix, NJ  
Charleston AFB, SC  
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
Ft. Sam Houston, TX  
Presidio, SF, CA  
LA Navy Complex, CA  
Ft. Lewis, WA  
Ft. Shafter, HI  
Ft. Richardson, AK  
Dover, Del  
McGuire AFB, NJ  
Charleston AFB, SC  
Andrews AFB, MD  
Kelly AFB, TX  
Travis AFB, CA  
Norton AFB, CA  
McChord AFB, WA  
Hickam AFB, HI  
Elmendorf, AK  
Ft. Meade, MD

Dover AFB, Del  
Ft. Jackson, SC  
Andrews AFB  
Kelly AFB  
Travis AFB  
Ft. Ord, CA  
McCord AFB, WA  
Pearl Harbor, HI  
Elmendorf AFB, AK  
Ft. Dix, NJ  
Ft. Monmouth, NJ  
Ft. Jackson, SC  
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
Ft. Sam Houston, TX  
Presidio SF, CA  
Ft. Ord, CA  
Ft. Lewis, WA  
Ft. Shafter, HI  
Ft. Richardson, AK  
Andrews AFB, MD

NAVAL PORTS OF ENTRYPRIMARY PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITYBACKUP AND ASSIST

New York Complex, NY  
Philadelphia, PA  
Charleston Navy Base, SC  
Baltimore, MD  
San Francisco, CA  
LA Navy Complex, CA  
Seattle, WA  
Pearl Harbor, HI

Ft. Dix, NJ  
Ft. Dix, NJ  
Charleston Navy Bs, SC  
Ft. Meade, MD  
Presidio SF, CA  
LA Navy Complex, CA  
Ft. Lewis, WA  
Ft. Shafter, HI

McGuire AFB, NJ  
McGuire AFB, NJ  
Charleston AFB, SC  
Andrews AFB, MD  
Travis AFB, CA  
Ft. Ord, CA  
McChord AFB, WA  
Hickam AFB, HI

Exhibit III-1



appropriate. Some even include detailed flow charts of the repatriation process (see Figure III-3). Certainly, there can always be improvements made to any plan, but there is no lack of effort, on the part of the states reviewed, to be prepared for repatriation. This is not to say that there will not be problems in the process. Assumptions made in the planning for repatriation appear to put the "best face" on the conditions that would exist at the time of a major repatriation effort. These assumptions include: adequate civilian and military transportation will be available in the overseas command involved; adequate financial support arrangement will be made by DoD with appropriate fund cites provided at time of execution; military reinforcement operations will not be underway nor will mobilization activities be in progress; and sufficient civilian and military aerial and water ports of entry will be able to support execution. (22: )

Some of these assumptions run counter to real world experiences. In the repatriation for evacuees from Grenada in 1983, not everything went according to plan. Limited terminal facilities at Charleston AFB during the first phase of the operation was a potentially critical problem which severely impacted the beginning phase of the operation. Planning had neither anticipated the massive media attention, the need for clothing by the evacuees, nor the difficulty of the DoS to provide timely, accurate information on arrival numbers and times. (39:4) These problems would be minuscule compared to





those associated with a massive repatriation effort brought about by a NEO from the FRG. This indicates that the repatriation system must be realistically exercised to ensure that we have anticipated all the problems that one could expect with getting our noncombatants home to their final destination safely.

Unfortunately the exercises that have been designed to test the system are inadequate. For example, a full scale State emergency repatriation exercise, "TAR HEEL 1," was conducted at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina on October 29, 1987. Planning assumptions in this exercise left much to be desired. For example, the exercise commenced on 0800, lasted during normal duty hours, and concluded at 1600. Each group of evacuees was scheduled to arrive at specific times of the day, with checked baggage, and in what appears to be pretty good spirits. A nurse would be available for handling minor cuts, and the Salvation Army would provide only two persons to assist with emotional and spiritual counseling of distraught individuals (22: ). It does not appear that these planning assumptions were realistic or consistent with past experiences. In the TAR HEEL 1 exercise, although the aircraft were C-141s, it does not appear they were floor-loaded. If this had been the case, close to three times the number of evacuees would have had to have been processed. Also, the realism of an 11+ hour flight in a cold and noisy aircraft was missed in the exercise scenario. Finally, assuming these aircraft would have been configured for cargo on their missions to Europe, only one crew latrine would have been

available for over 250 passengers. Again, this realism was missed.

Yet in the report on this emergency repatriation exercise, it was said that "The exercise successfully demonstrated the capabilities of the participating federal, state, and local agencies to handle the processing of evacuees according to the State's plan. Problems that occurred during the course of the exercise were quickly identified and resolved..."(12:2).

Although the exercise did a good job of outlining the duties and responsibilities of various agencies participating in a repatriation effort, it cannot be said that the scenario portrayed an accurate picture of what would be involved in a major repatriation effort. Since repatriation is the final link in the overall process of bringing our noncombatants home, it must not be the weak link which breaks the commitment of our government to provide for their safety and well-being.

## CHAPTER IV

### PERSONAL PROPERTY, PETS, POVs AND PAYMENTS

After personal safety, among the things which have great significance to people are their homes and personal property, their car(s) (POVs), financial security and, last but not least, the family pet(s). Over the period of one's lifetime, or for the purpose of this discussion, one's military career, it is not uncommon to have acquired a significant inventory of valuable (financial and sentimental) possessions. When one thinks of an assignment in Europe, notions of Czechoslovakian crystal, German furniture, fine linen, embroidery and English china come to mind. Indeed, when the exchange rate is in the U.S. shopper's favor, American households in West Germany are bound to have a good variety and quantity of consumer goods. Also, while the exchange rate is favorable to the American buyer, the temptation to buy that Mercedes, Porsche or Audi might seem to be stronger than the ability to resist it. Why are these material possessions mentioned as likely concerns? To Americans, material possessions are a source of pleasure and pride, and an indicator of status and wealth; they are important.

Similarly, though not usually expressed in monetary terms, the family pet holds a position of prominence in a family sometimes equal to that of family members. The loss (never mind the giving away or delivering to some authority for disposition) of the family pet(s) is something most pet owners do not even want to think about. Pets are part of the family; they are

important.

Certainly a major concern, especially to people having to travel, is knowing they have financial security in the form of adequate funds. In spite of the "plastic" money so many travelers use, the need for "real" money is still there and many may depend on cash or travelers checks in order to cover the necessary expenses.

This chapter is devoted to the "things" that matter a great deal to a typical American family, and specifically the families stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), facing the possibility of being evacuated to the CONUS or a safehaven. We will address the major concerns with each item mentioned in the title of this chapter, what the directives prescribe, and the information provided to DoD-sponsored noncombatants concerning these items.

### Personal Property

Personal property consists of a wide variety of items ranging from inexpensive household supplies to very expensive art, furniture, electronic equipment, jewelry, clothing, among other things. Many of these items could be replaced in the event of a loss. However, many are considered to be heirlooms or antiques possessing sentimental value that no amount of money can replace. In speaking of money to replace lost goods, the U.S. government's liability is limited to \$25,000 with any remaining claim being covered with personal property insurance. With regard

to the latter, there could be insurance policies in force having war riders that limit the amount of damages an insurance company will pay on a claim. (49:24)

The point we wish to make regarding personal property is that, in the event of an emergency evacuation, personal property will be abandoned and, even though individuals have completed the necessary claim forms and have purchased personal property insurance, they may never recover the full value of the losses incurred. V Corps Pamphlet 525-27, in the section dealing with personal property, states:

Some background on Iran evacuation experiences should also be helpful in your planning. As tensions mounted many insurance firms either cancelled or refused to renew automobile and personal property insurance policies. What is important is for you to assess your individual situation and the advice of storing heirlooms and high value or nonreplaceable items in the United States. (49:25)

Facing this personal property risk, it appears the "smart" thing to do with valuable property is to leave it in non-temporary storage in the CONUS prior to PCSing overseas, or shipping/mailling from overseas to a CONUS destination after the property is acquired. Considering the higher priority, mission essential actions that transportation and port personnel will have to accomplish during an emergency, it seems unreasonable to expect arrangements to be made for the shipment of personal property and household goods. Nevertheless, one installation brochure reviewed implied the opposite by stating, "an effort

will be made to return items left behind (household goods; POVs; etc.) to their rightful owners in the United States. However, there is always the possibility that these items may be lost, damaged or destroyed." (38:2) For anyone who has had the experience of moving the family from one location to another, the former statement in the above quote, in light of a major evacuation for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), would seem impossible and, at least, highly improbable. Why is this sort of disinformation provided sponsors and their dependents? For one reason, it is authorized in the basic directives governing entitlements. Attachments 1 through 5 contain excerpts of these directives that illustrate this.

#### Pets

Having to abandon, give away, or arrange the extermination of the family pet(s) is probably one of the most traumatic experiences an individual or family can face. It is a morale issue of the highest order. For some pet owners, the pet has probably been around to watch the children grow from infancy to adolescence. Compounding the complexity of the issue is the fact that pets consist of a variety of types and species, various quantities, and ranging values depending on the pedigree. In other words, a pet is not necessarily just an ordinary dog or cat!

It is the responsibility of the owner to arrange the shipment of pets via commercial means in the event an evacuation

is ordered. (49:25) Directives are basically straightforward regarding the policy of shipping pets aboard military aircraft; it is not authorized. (49:26) However, as is the case with many other directive policies, waivers can be obtained. Pets have been shipped from Lajes Air Base, Azores, Portugal to McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey via an Air Force C-141 transport and military chartered commercial aircraft. DoD-owned or chartered aircraft are the only means of PCSing to/from the Azores. (25: ) Though shipping pets commercially is not free of rules, the process is generally less restrictive. Still, health certificates, showing current vaccinations (less than 12 months old) are required for international shipments. In addition, most commercial airlines require the owner to provide adequate shipping containers. (40:7)

Unfortunately, as in the case of personal property mentioned earlier, information provided noncombatants regarding the shipment of pets has been inconsistent and misleading. The most misleading is one information brochure that states waivers will be requested to ship pets through NEO channels via military aircraft. (49:26) The inconsistency of information is borne out in the different manner in which authorities tell owners what to do with their pets. Some are very straightforward, while others are, euphemistically speaking, "wishy-washy" perhaps to avoid the matter becoming a serious morale issue. The following statements are quoted from various brochures and directives reviewed:

"...owners probably will not have an opportunity to ship their pets....HQ V Corps plans to request



waivers of these regulations to allow for pet evacuation." (38:2; 49:26)

"Should you elect not to ship your pet, or time does not permit you to make the necessary arrangements, you will be directed to take your pet to a collection area where they will be placed under the control of NEO personnel. The pets shall be turned over to the local tierheim or exterminated by military police (depending on the evacuation conditions/situation)." (40:7)

"Transportation of household pets, regardless of species, normally is not authorized on DoD-owned and controlled aircraft. Exceptions to policy may be requested by the United States Commander in Chief, Europe, for a specific country, once NEO is executed." (48:A-1)

"Private arrangements should be made for shipment or the disposition of pets." (9:E-1-3)

"NEO officials will help in whatever way possible to ensure that your pet arrives in the United States as safely as you do." (49:26)

Considering the factors associated with an emergency evacuation, it would seem irresponsible to even think about the evacuation of pets. Regardless of what is done for and to pets during a NEO there are still other concerns worth pondering:

- Although it is assumed that NEO officials maintain estimates of noncombatants to be evacuated, we found no requirement to estimate the number of pets to be evacuated. Yet, if pets were to be evacuated on a floor-loaded transport aircraft, approved containers would be required. Such containers would use up floor space that could be used by noncombatants. The limited space available to evacuate people should overrule the shipment of pets.

- Lavatory facilities are extremely limited on

aircraft, especially cargo aircraft that have been floor-loaded. (Floor-loading assumes the aircraft was configured originally for cargo and does not contain a comfort pallet having two extra lavatories.) A 10-plus hour, floor-loaded C-141 flight from Frankfurt to the CONUS east coast will be one that severely strains the available lavatory (one crew latrine) capacity. Sanitation and hygiene will be enough of a problem for human beings, let alone pets.

- Confusion, fright, uncertainty, and children crying will undoubtedly add to any chaos associated with a NEO "freedom bird." One need only remember the "wonderful" experience of waiting in a veterinarian's office with dogs barking and cats yowling to appreciate what the noise would be like in a noisy military aircraft cargo compartment with frightened animals. The added noise would only serve to increase the high level of stress that would accompany an emergency evacuation.

- Another factor that must be considered concerning the pet issue is the turning in of pet(s) to authorities for disposition. While there will probably be no choice other than having the security police dispose of the animal(s) in the most humane method possible, all this would be unnecessary if pet owners fulfilled their responsibilities in advance. It is our opinion that security police personnel will have more mission-critical functions to perform rather than disposing of animals.

- Finally, assuming pets were evacuated through NEO channels to the CONUS, we found no plans having provisions to

receive and process them to final destinations. The potential accountability problems associated with noncombatants could only be exceeded by those involving the evacuation of pets.

We have devoted considerable space in this study to the morale-impacting issue of pets. But, we believe the position that states pets should not be allowed to travel as part of a NEO evacuation needs to be accepted, published as policy, and implemented without apology.

#### Privately-owned Vehicles(POVs)

What will happen to POVs? The V Corps Pamphlet 525-27 states, "...private automobiles will not be evacuated during an emergency is a real-world fact." (49:20) Nevertheless, in the same paragraph it also mentions the fact that, following the evacuation of Iran, some automobiles were later returned to owners. We believe that, in a NEO based on a hostile threat in the FRG, POVs will be left behind to be requisitioned and used by the government or just abandoned.

There are many types of POVs including sports models, luxury sedans, compacts, 4-wheel drive, trucks, and campers, to mention only a few. In the preceding paragraph, we suggested that POVs could be requisitioned for government use. Such action would authorize a reimbursement to the owner. (49:20) It is doubtful that sports cars would have much military utility. However, in the case of trucks and other terrain vehicles, military units many have a readily available, serviceable inventory of vehicles.

In this regard, both the government and the POV owner have an opportunity that we believe should be explored.

For example, transportation officials could establish the criteria to determine the military usefulness of POVs. Individual owners could voluntarily participate by having their vehicle(s) appraised and registered in a type of "civil reserve vehicle fleet." In the event there is no evacuation during an individual owner's tour, POV disposition can proceed normally. However, in the event NEO is ordered, a backup vehicle reserve will have been predetermined, and the owner will possess the necessary documents to obtain a reimbursement based on a value agreed to at the time of registration. We admit the preceding discussion is "food for thought" that would have to be evaluated for its technical and legal sufficiency.

#### Payments

Having analyzed the plans, regulations, pamphlets, and brochures regarding NEO operations, there were considerable inconsistencies as to how much money noncombatants would receive at the time of evacuation. AFR 35-27, Report On Evacuation of Air Force Family Members and Other US Noncombatants, RCS: HAF-MPX(AR)7110, specifies the financial assistance that can be given to Air Force family member evacuees, U.S. citizen employees and third country national (TCN) civilians and their family members. (Attachment 1 contains the contents of the pertinent paragraphs.) However, information brochures and operating plans either were

silent on the subject altogether (38: ), specified a flat amount of \$100 per noncombatant (8:E-8-1), or provided a detailed listing of allowances and payments based on the military sponsor's pay grade (40:6). These inconsistencies however, are not trivial matters, neither to the individual noncombatants who would be depending on such payments, nor to the government organizations that would be responsible for making such payments available. In this study, payments or evacuation allowances will reflect those incident to the time of evacuation, i.e., money for travel.

A brief anecdote will be used to illustrate the need for preparation regarding money and travel. Several years ago, one of us found himself traveling on leave from Iceland to England with nothing more than a checkbook. This happened so he could take advantage of a soon departing military flight. However, on that day, the base bank in Iceland was not yet open for business. The military flight stopped in Scotland necessitating a transfer to commercial air. Through the good graces of the airline personnel, he was able to pay for the airline ticket, and receive an additional amount of British pounds by using a bank check good only in American dollars or Icelandic krona. The point to be made is the problems and insecurity involved in traveling with little or no money, and the need for adequate preparation when it comes to financial matters. (24: )

In researching the issue related to money (specifically, will noncombatants be getting any at the time of evacuation?),

one must understand that this matter has been the subject of concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government, namely the Executive Branch (DoS and DoD) and the U.S. House of Representatives.

In the Fall of 1985, the DoS and DoD coordinated a draft proposal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, containing an amendment to Title 37, U.S. Code, "to authorize the permissive evacuation of military dependents in politically sensitive situations." (35: ) According to Title 5, U.S. Code, Sections 5522 and 5523 contain evacuation allowances for civilian employees, including DoD employees. However, according to Title 37, military dependents must be ordered to evacuate to receive compensation; a permissive evacuation of civilian employees is fully compensated. (29: ) The intent of the proposed amendment was to treat military dependents identically with civilian dependents. The revised (proposed) legislation would "allow the Chief of Diplomatic Mission to 'authorize' dependents of members of the Uniformed Services to voluntarily evacuate with full advanced pay and travel transportation allowances." (10: ) Prior to the proposed amendment going to the House of Representatives, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)/Military Manpower and Personnel Policy determined, with the DoS' and General Counsel's concurrence, that the proposed change could be accomplished with a revision to DoD Directive 5100.51. As of 31 March 1988, DoD Directive 5100.51 has not been revised. Coordination notes to the proposal package contained comments

such as, "it doesn't [sic] appear controversial, but the money involved, although not very big, could be difficult to estimate." (36: ) While we agree with the comment that payments "could be difficult to estimate," we do not agree that the subject "doesn't appear controversial" and "not very big."

There are several factors which must be taken into consideration concerning evacuation allowances. The above 1985 OSD memo mentioned difficulties in determining estimates as one of these factors. Respective travel regulations contain volumes of rules to determine the myriad of entitlements based in part on locality, rank/grade, members' eligibility, destination, need for travel, and such. (31:1) The point we wish to make is that estimates take time to compute, time that may not be available when an evacuation order is given. However, even if there were time to compute the thousands of estimates, there are other factors that make the issuance of evacuation allowance payments a serious management problem.

One factor is the availability of cash. According to the USAFE NEO Plan, noncombatants would receive a flat \$100 per evacuee. (8:E-8-1) An assumption is made that the necessary cash can be obtained within 48 hours. (27: ) If one considers the estimated number of 250,000 DoD noncombatants, the amount needed would be \$25 million. Raising the allowance to \$500 per evacuee, an amount well within the entitlements advocated in the discussion on Title 37, U.S. Code, above, the amount needed would be \$125 million! Yet, even if that amount of money could be

secured within 48 hours, there are still more concerns.

USAFE and its bases intend to provide an evacuation allowance. Rhein-Main Air Base, although included in the USAFE NEO Plan 4310 with other USAFE installations, is a Military Airlift Command (MAC) installation serving as the main aerial port for Europe, and does not have plans to provide an evacuation allowance. Thus, the problem immediately apparent is which bases will have cash to distribute in the form of evacuation allowances. NEO being flexible and probably somewhat unpredictable due to the uncertainty of transportation availability makes the logistical problem of having the cash at the right place at the right time almost impossible. Furthermore, along with the large quantities of cash, is the requirement to provide adequate safeguards and physical security. (5:70-77) We believe security police will have more mission-critical functions to perform than providing escort service to disbursing agents.

Another concern is the local accounting and finance office's (AFO's) ability to support the issuance of evacuation allowances or payments. In the Air Force Ready Program, most of the AFO personnel, according to a previous Rhein-Main comptroller, assume other wartime duties in order to augment mission-critical functions such as security police, civil engineering, supply, transportation. (37: ) In the CONUS, it is not unusual to find the entire office supporting the mobility function. At one base, only the Accounting and Finance Officer is left. (11:4-5) Thus,



the AFO work force has been considerably reduced to perform even its own functions. Furthermore, with the inconsistency that now prevails regarding the planning for and the amount of allowances, the AFO may have insufficient supplies of blank forms needed to issue and account for the allowances.

Thus far, we have assumed evacuation allowances would be issued in the form of currency, such as U.S. dollars. The preceding discussion has presented some of the difficulties associated with obtaining, accounting, and distributing cash. However, even if other forms of payments were used, similar problems would exist even if the form of payment consisted of either chits (script), travelers' checks, or U.S. Treasury checks.

Finally, one other observation we made regarding AFO preparation was the inconsistency between policy and procedure. According to the USAFE NEO Plan, noncombatants would receive a \$100 evacuation allowance. However, the recently updated NEO checklist states in the comptroller (AC) function's portion that "Finance is not a mandatory station in the processing line [in the NEO Processing Center]; however, units should have the capability to provide payments when applicable." (28:9 of 12) To compound the confusion even further, the reader should review the attached excerpts (Attachments 1 through 5) of directives specifying entitlements to evacuees. One is left with the questions, "What is the real policy concerning evacuation allowances?" "Will evacuees get any?" "If so, how much and from

whom?"

What we have attempted to present in the preceding discussion regarding evacuation payments to noncombatants is that there are several serious problems to be overcome if the plan is to provide DoD noncombatants with traveling money. Officials responsible for policy need to consider the following questions:

Can a good estimate of allowances/payments be established for all DoD noncombatants?

How can the estimate of allowances/payments be reliably maintained?

What is the availability of cash in terms of quantities, denominations, sources, and timeliness?

Are there sufficient physical safeguards in effect to protect cash reserves?

How much manpower is required to administer evacuation allowances/payments?

How effective are procedures to establish and maintain accountability for allowances/payments advanced to noncombatants?

How can the accounting and finance network assure the cash will be at the right place and at the right time?

Is \$100 per noncombatant according to USAFE guidance enough?

What time delay factor is added to the NEO processing queue by requiring the issuance of evacuation allowances/payments?

Why not suggest people store in NEO kits travelers'

checks in amounts they feel would be needed for emergency traveling money in their NEO kits?

What processes can be automated to expedite the movement of people through the NEO processing centers?

#### POSTSCRIPT

Personal property, pets, POVs and payments represent the four P's impacting heavily on noncombatants. Other "P" words that have relevance to these NEO issues are "policy," "procedure," "practicality," and "preparation." Have the institutions charged with responsibilities followed the exhortation quoted in an earlier chapter, "plan early, plan thoroughly and practice"? There is an opportunity for progress.

## Chapter V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As stated in Chapter I, Introduction, we elected to focus on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for our study, considering the magnitude of the noncombatant population and the current high-level interest surrounding noncombatants' safety in Europe. However, based on our findings, we believe many of our conclusions and recommendations for action or further study in this chapter could apply to any theatre of operation where NEO may be ordered.

Attention is needed at each management level of all agencies involved to improve the current system to ensure an early declaration of NEO and subsequently, the timely evacuation and repatriation of noncombatant personnel from the FRG. Without top management attention, the ability to move noncombatants during a time of crisis would be severely impaired.

Our study revealed that the system to plan and execute noncombatant evacuation and repatriation operations is a highly complex, political process susceptible to normal communication and coordination difficulties that would exist in large bureaucratic organizations.

We stated in previous chapters that careful attention at all levels of management is needed to effectively deal with NEO and repatriation issues/concerns. To reiterate, they included:

- accuracy, completeness, integration and consistency of policies and procedures;

- awareness of policies and procedures;
- frequency and scope of exercises and evaluations;
- and the command and control decision processes and decision support systems.

The impetus for any significant improvement in the U.S.' ability to effectively execute NEO and repatriation plans of the magnitude envisioned for the FRG must continue to be initiated at the top management level of each agency involved. It is impossible and unreasonable to have a coordinated effort of this magnitude occur autonomously at the "grass roots" level at the base or community.

As a minimum, we conclude that a nine-part plan be initiated to improve the U.S.' ability to accomplish NEO and repatriation activities.

- First, a complete, integrated review and assessment should be accomplished of all (all theatres) applicable regulations, manuals, and plans. This review would pertain to not only those directives issued at department and agency level, but also those extending down to and including community/base level. The aim in this review is a quantitative analysis which would produce directive guidance that is clear, simple, consistent, and concise.

- Second, morale issues stemming from policies impacting on pets and personal property need to be addressed in a simple, forthright manner. To imply "all will be done" to ensure a safe return of pets to the CONUS is not only misleading, but

could inhibit owners from taking more appropriate measures to ensure their pets are accommodated.

- Third, more effort needs to be made to simplify the enormous task of processing noncombatants through ports of debarkation (POD). For example, regarding evacuation allowances, we suggest none be given at the POD. The aim should be to provide evacuees with the minimum essential funds upon arrival in the CONUS or safe havens.

- Fourth, standard forms and record formats should be used, where possible. This would obviate the need for each theatre to develop its own set of forms and communication formats.

- Fifth, directives and other basic guidance used by program managers should describe and depict the interagency relationships that exists. The understanding and appreciation of the basic decision process involved in conducting NEO and repatriation operations would prove useful especially at the program management level.

- Sixth, greater emphasis needs to be placed on exercising the civil and military procedures for NEO and repatriation. Such emphasis needs to ensure the active, interdepartmental involvement of top leadership and management, both in federal and state sectors, in order to incorporate and address the political sensitivities affecting decisions pertaining to NEO and repatriation operations. As a minimum, at least one major exercise per year should occur, including

involvement of state and other community agencies. Further, an effort needs to be made to involve as much "live play" as practical.

- Seventh, within the Military Services, an assessment and determination should be made regarding which functional area should be the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for establishing policy and developing basic procedural guidance; i.e., should the OPR be the personnel, logistics, plans or operations function.

- Eighth, an opportunity exists to use current and future automation and information technologies that could be useful in the management of NEO and repatriation. For example, "expert systems" could be developed to assist decision makers evaluating personnel processing and terminal capabilities, availability of airlift, and base support capability, and tracking the noncombatant DoD returnees.

- Ninth, the Department of State and Department of Health and Human Services, in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, should co-sponsor a worldwide NEO and Repatriation Planning Conference. Attendees should include as a minimum representatives from federal and state action agencies involved with NEO and repatriation. The objective of the conference should focus on ways to improve the U.S.' ability to achieve NEO and repatriation operational goals. Areas to be addressed should include: policy and decision-making processes; communication and information flows; capabilities and

limitations; interagency coordination; and exercise participation.

- Finally, a plan or strategy should be developed for exercising NEO and repatriation procedures. This plan should address: exercise objectives, evaluation criteria, participation and schedule. This plan or strategy should serve as the basis for other command and local subordinate plans.



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**Excerpts From Air Force Regulation 35-27**  
**Report On Evacuation of Air Force Family Members and Other**  
**US Noncombatants, RCS: HAF-MPX(AR)7110**

**Paragraph 4. Help for Air Force Family Member Evacuees.** The following entitlements are authorized for immediate use when Air Force family members are being evacuated from one overseas area to another overseas area, or from one overseas area to the CONUS.

a. **Advanced Pay to Family Members Evacuated.** When a general evacuation of all military family members in an overseas area is directed by competent authority. Air Force accounting and finance officers may make payments to the family members of any Air Force service member. Follow the instructions in DOD Pay Manual (DODPM), part 4, chapter 1, paragraph 40104; and JTR, chapter 12, volume 1.

b. **Advanced Payment of Dislocation Allowance (DLA).** When the evacuation of family members of Air Force personnel is directed, and they are moved to a designated place, an advanced payment of DLA is authorized. (See JTR, volume 1, chapter 12.)

c. **Station and Per Diem Allowances.** When an Air Force member's family is ordered to evacuate from one overseas area to another overseas area or to the CONUS, payment of a station and per diem allowances is authorized. (See JTR, volume 1, chapter 12.)

d. **Class X Emergency Allotment.** The Class X allotment

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gives emergency payments directly to Air Force family members.  
(See DODPM, part 6, chapter 2, paragraph 60201.)

e. Transportation. Transportation is authorized by the JTR, volume 1, chapter 12.

f. Other Help. Commanders overseas, at ports of entry, and at other CONUS locations should be ready to respond to requests from evacuees for help. They should tell the Air Force Aid Society, appropriate Family Services, Family Support Centers (if established), and the American Red Cross to be ready to give help. Commanders will also work with other government agencies (such as the Departments of State (DOS) and Health and Human Services (HHS) to coordinate evacuation problems.

5. Help for US Citizen Civilian and Third Country National (TCN) Employees and Family Member Evacuees. Employee entitlements apply only to US citizens and TCN employees paid from appropriated funds who meet the criteria established in the DOS Standardized Regulations, chapter 600(103). An employee who is also a civilian or Air Force family member (dependent) is not an employee for purposes of evacuation travel allowances. They will be moved as dependents.

a. Advanced Payments. US citizens employees stationed in foreign areas (including Trust Territory for the Pacific) may be authorized advance payments per DOS Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians and Foreign Areas), section 600 (110).

b. Evacuation Payments. Evacuation payments may be paid as

outlined in DOS Standardized Regulations, section 600 (120). Both advance payments (a above) and evacuation payments may be paid to the employee, an adult family member, (dependent) or a designated representative.

c. **Special Allowances.** Special allowances, as outlined in the DOS Standardized Regulations, section 600 (131)(a) and (b), may be paid to evacuated employees to offset direct expenses which are a result of an evacuation. These allowances cover travel and subsistence expenses.

d. **Transportation.** Transportation is authorized by the JTR volume 2, chapter 12.

6. **Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) and Family Members.** Financial help is outlined DOS Standardized Regulations, chapter 600. NAF employees are federal employees for purposes of 5 United States Code, 55225527, which authorizes evacuation

Excerpts From Air Force Regulation 170-18, 31 August 1987

Comptroller Operations Under Emergency Conditions

Note: Portions underlined by author for emphasis.

Paragraph 4-6. Emergency Evacuation of Noncombatants. (Overseas).

Since financial matters will be of paramount importance to the evacuees, accounting and finance officers (AFOs) in overseas theatres, except those AFOs in Alaska and Hawaii, are responsible for ensuring payment documents (DD Form 1337, Authorization/Designation for Emergency Pay and Allowances; AF Form 1143, Authorization and Record-Emergency Payments to Dependents; and AF Form 1144, Civilian Employee Emergency Pay Data are properly prepared for use. AFOs should periodically disseminate information advising the potential noncombatant and/or sponsor of their role to ensure updated and accurate financial data is readily available when evacuation is directed.

a. Not excerpted.

b. Not excerpted.

c. Overseas AFOs/disbursing agents should establish emergency evacuation processing teams and maintain an evacuation kit(s) containing forms, supplies, and instructions that may be required during evacuations. Personnel must be designated and trained to support evacuation processing. This kit should be kept in a secure place outside the AFO/disbursing agent office but readily accessible. The evacuation kit should contain, but

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is not limited to:

- (1) DD Form 114, Military Pay Order.
  - (2) AF Form 1143, Authorization and Record-Emergency Payments to Dependents.
  - (3) AF Forms 1144, Civilian Employee Emergency Pay Form.
  - (4) AF Form 1548, Authorization to Start, Stop, or Change an Allotment for Active Duty or Retired Personnel.
  - (5) DD Forms 115, Military Payroll Money List.
  - (6) DD Forms 117, Military Pay Voucher.
  - (7) DD Forms 1337, Authorization/Designation for Emergency Pay and Allowances.
  - (8) DD Forms 1351, Travel Voucher.
  - (9) DD Forms, 1351-2, Travel Voucher or Subvoucher.
  - (10) DD Forms, 1351-6, Multiple Travel Payment List.
  - (11) DD Forms 1588, Record of Travel Payments, or ATRAS equivalent.
  - (12) Other forms or items that may be required, such as currency conversion records (AF Forms 1128).
  - (13) Extracts from manuals or regulations required for processing various types of evacuation payments.
- d. All AFOs/disbursing agents at evacuation sites are authorized to cash checks, provide accommodation exchange, and convert foreign currency (generally 1 month's pay (see AFR 177-108, paragraph 17-2), for evacuees. A waiver to provide these services is not required during declared emergency situations.

Excerpts From AFM 173-373, 31 August 1987

Chapter 64

Cross Disbursing

Note: portions underlined by author for emphasis.

64-5. Emergency Payments to Dependents. Dependents ordered to evacuate may obtain emergency payments by presenting original DD Form 1337, Authorization/Designation for Emergency Pay and Allowances, and proper identification to any AFO. Total amounts designated in authorization are payable in a lump sum or in installments at option of dependent. Where maximum amount of final installment is paid, attach form to duplicate voucher and submit to parent service central site.

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Excerpts from  
Joint Federal Travel Regulations  
Chapter 6, Evacuation Allowances

U6010 Transportation of Household Goods

a. General. Transportation of household goods (HHG) is authorized incident to an evacuation. In determining the transportation to be provided under this paragraph, the authority directing such transportation will consider the following:

1. the needs of the member and the dependents;
2. the purpose of the evacuation;
3. the anticipated length of the prohibition against entry or reentry of dependents;
4. the rights of the member to further transportation
5. the contemplated length of the member's tour;
6. the general prohibition against returning dependents to an area outside CONUS from CONUS if the member has less than 1 year to serve on the date dependents would arrive at the member's permanent duty station; and
7. extenuating circumstances other than those in items 1 through 6.

U6015 Transportation of Privately Owned Vehicles

A. Transportation to Designated Place. Competent authority may authorize the transportation, including any overland transportation required, of one privately owned vehicle (POV)

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(owned by the member or a dependent of the member and for the member's personal use or for the use of the dependents) to a designated place for the dependents' use.

U6040 Advance of Pay

The advance payment furnishes evacuated dependents with funds to cover the cost of travel, food, and other needs. The amount of the advance may be designated by the member, not to exceed 2 month's basic pay. It is payable in advance to the dependents in one or more installments. The Service Secretaries may waive recovery of not more than 1 month's basic pay advanced thereunder when such recovery would be against equity and good conscience or against the public interest....

Excerpts from  
Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2, Chapter 12  
Evacuation and Adverse Conditions Travel

C12000 General

1. Emergency Evacuation

a. Legal Basis. Title 5 U.S. Code 5725 provides authority for transportation at Government expense for members of family and household goods when a official determination by proper authority (see subpar. b) is made that emergency evacuation movement is required. Title 5 U.S. 5522 provides additional authority relating to emergency evacuation movements of employees and payments in connection with emergency evacuation movements. Authority for emergency storage of privately owned motor vehicles is provided in par. C11007...

b. Responsibility for Determination. The Commander in Chief or the Senior Commander, as applicable, having jurisdiction in an area where an emergency occurs, or higher authority, will determine the need for emergency evacuation and will issue such emergency evacuation order as is considered necessary.

2. Not excerpted.

C12001 Movement

1. Emergency Evacuation. Employees and/or members of their family may be evacuated from one overseas duty station to another...Movement of members of family and household goods may be authorized later from the place designated at the time of

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evacuation to a duty station to which the employee is subsequently assigned or transferred....For emergency storage of privately owned motor vehicle in the event of evacuation, see par. C11007.

**Excerpts from the Congressional Record-House**

**H 12538**

**Overseas Dependents**

The conferees agree with the Senate language regarding overseas dependents. The conferees are concerned with the large number of both command- and non-command-sponsored dependents in overseas locations, especially in Europe. The concern of the conferees centers on the level of support available, the ability to evacuate in a timely manner and the financial consequences for both the family and the Government.

The Department should submit the detailed plan as required by the Senate report, on reducing both command- and non-command-sponsored dependents. This plan should be submitted to the Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate by June 1, 1988.

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STATE-DEFENSE STATEMENT ON PROTECTION AND  
EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS AND CERTAIN  
DESIGNATED ALIENS ABROAD

JULY 8, 1980

(SHORT TITLE: JOINT STATEMENT

I. POLICY OBJECTIVES

In the event of imminent or actual hostilities or civil disturbances:

- A. To protect U.S. citizens including, if necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.
- B. To reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens subject to the risk of death, injury and capture as hostages.
- C. To reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in probable or actual combat areas in order not to impair the combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied military commanders.

II. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE

In furtherance of the foregoing policy objectives, the Secretaries of State and Defense shall:

- A. Conduct a continuing review of conditions abroad with respect to:

- 1. Imminence of general or localized hostilities or civil

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disturbances which may involve U.S. citizens.

2. The capability and willingness of local authorities to provide adequate protection.

3. The numbers and locations of U.S. citizens.

4. The evacuation and protection capability, including availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas.

B. Maintain plans for:

1. Evacuation of U.S. citizens to the United States or their movement to and welfare in other relatively safe areas; and,

2. Standfast and welfare of U.S. citizens in the countries where appropriate.

C. The Secretary of State will exercise overall responsibility for attaining the objectives set forth in Section I above, and except as noted in Section II, D-1 and D-2 below, will:

1. Be responsible for preparing plans for the protection of all noncombatant U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens abroad, including Department of Defense-sponsored noncombatants. Such plans shall provide for: (a) their evacuation to an area of greater safety, including evacuation to the U.S. when desirable and feasible; (b) their protection and welfare in safe havens abroad, and (c) their protection and welfare in situ/

2. Be responsible for integrating into his plans for the Federal Republic of Germany military plans for the evacuation of Department of Defense-sponsored noncombatants from that country. The integration of these plans shall not impair the military

command's capability to clear, as militarily necessary and feasible and by the most expeditious means, an area of probable conflict of all noncombatants for whom the U.S. Government is responsible.

3. Determine which part of plan is to implemented except (a) where the situation is so serious that the question should be referred to the President, (b) that where the Department of Defense has a substantial interest, i.e., where the U.S. Government maybe required to provide military assistance, or where military installations or a large number of Defense noncombatants are involved, such decision, including the designation of safe havens, shall be in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, and (c) under the circumstances noted in Section III.

4. Be responsible for implementing the appropriate plan.

5. Request the Secretary of Defense, when necessary in an emergency, make available military forces and equipment for evacuation assistance.

D. The Secretary of Defense, subject to the overall responsibility of the Secretary of State, will:

1. Exercise primary responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens in West Berlin and U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

2. Be responsible for preparing and implementing plans for the protection of all noncombatant U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens in West Berlin and U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo,



such planning to provide for: (a) their evacuation to an area of greater safety and (b) their protection and welfare in situ.

3. Be responsible for preparing and implementing plans for the protection and evacuation of Department of Defense-sponsored noncombatants in the Federal Republic of Germany and for cooperating with the Secretary of State in integrating such plans in State Department plans for that country.

4. Be responsible for cooperating and, to the extent that he deems militarily feasible, for assisting the Secretary of State in carrying out his responsibilities set forth in Section II, C. above.

5. Be responsible for ensuring that authorization is obtained from the Department of State for any expenses incurred in the evacuation of non-Defense personnel and that proper documentation for reimbursement by the Department of State to the Military Department for such costs. In those cases where the Department of State incurs expenses for the evacuation of Defense personnel, the Secretary of Defense shall make arrangements for reimbursement of such costs to the Department of State.

E. Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions and Principal Officers will:

1. Prepare and maintain the plans required by Section II, C-1 and C-2 above for their areas of responsibility, and implement the plans when required.

2. Provide timely information to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appropriate commanders of Unified Commands, and other commanders as

necessary, regarding the number of potential evacuees and the post's capability to provide evacuation resources when imminent or actual hostilities or civil disturbances may require evacuation.

3. When evacuation appears imminent, inform the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the appropriate commanders of Unified Commands, and other commanders as necessary, of each emergency phase, as described in the Department of State Emergency Action Manual, as it is declared.

F. Commanders of Unified Commands will:

1. Prepare and maintain plans for the area of responsibility of the Secretary of Defense as set forth in Section II, D-1, D-2, and D-3 above.

2. Cooperate with the chiefs of diplomatic missions and principal officers in carrying out their responsibilities set forth in Section II, E-1 above.

3. Upon request, assist as militarily feasible in the evacuation or the protection in situ of those persons for whom the Secretary of State is responsible.

4. Prepare and maintain such plans as necessary to meet the responsibilities outlined in Section II, F-2 and F-3 above.

5. Implement military plans for protection and evacuation of noncombatants when required.

III. AUTHORITY TO INVOKE PLANS

A. Normally, the principal diplomatic or consular representative

in an area where an emergency is anticipated, or has developed, will inform the Department of State of the intention to invoke an emergency and evacuation plan. When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or appear imminent, the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative will invoke such action as the situation warrants, including requesting assistance from the appropriate military command without prior notification to the Department of State. The authority of the principal diplomatic or consular representative to order evacuation does not extend to uniformed personnel of the United States Armed Forces, certain essential civilians operating in support of combat units as determined by the Unified Commander, or U.S. citizens in West Berlin and the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

B. Normally, the principal military commander in an area must receive authorization from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before using any of his forces and facilities in foreign country for protection and evacuation purposes. However, where the commander is requested by the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative to assist in protecting or evacuation of U.S. citizens, and any delay in obtaining authorization from the Joint Chiefs of Staff would jeopardize these citizens, the commander to the extent he deems militarily feasible. Where U.S. citizens are in danger but timely communications cannot be established between the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative in the area and the appropriate U.S. military commander, and time and communications do not permit the commander to receive

authorization from the Joint Chiefs of Staff without jeopardizing the U.S. citizens, the military commander will initiate such action as he deems necessary, appropriate and militarily feasible.

C. In determining what military forces and equipment are necessary and appropriate, the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative and the appropriate military commander shall give due consideration to the probability of grave international repercussions that might follow the use of U.S. military forces and equipment in the area, bearing in mind that the appearance of armed forces and equipment may cause stronger repercussions than the appearance of unarmed forces and equipment.

#### IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency and evacuation plans is the sole responsibility of the military commander, who will, where time and communications permit, act in coordination with and under the policies established by the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative.

#### V. ORGANIZATION FOR EMERGENCY AND EVACUATION PLANNING

Administration of the inter-departmental responsibilities set forth above requires continuous exchange of information and views

and continuous coordination between the Departments of State and Defense. In fulfillment of this requirement a liaison organization has been established comprising:

A. The Washington Liaison Group (WLG), an organization consisting of members of the Departments of State and Defense chaired by a representative of the Department of State. Its basic responsibility is to assure the coordination of planning and implementation of plans for the protection and/or evacuation in emergencies of noncombatants abroad for who the Secretaries of State and Defense are responsible, as set forth above.

The representatives on the WLG will constitute the points of contact for their departments on all matters pertaining to emergency and evacuation planning and to the implementation of such plans.

B. Regional liaison groups, which are established as necessary on the recommendation of the WLG, to assure coordination of emergency and evacuation planning between Departments of State and Defense for areas outside the United States.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)  
AND REPATRIATION BROCHURE

"THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW"

Atch 8

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This proposed sample brochure was compiled using data and information contained in the USAFE NEO Plan 4310, Rhein-Main Pamphlet 28-1 and Schinnen Community Pamphlet 525-1.

### PURPOSE

The purpose of this brochure is to inform you about noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) and repatriation. Its intent is to provide clear and consistent factual information you need to know in order to make a major evacuation and resettlement operation succeed. The information presented should be read and understood by each sponsor and adult noncombatant. DODDs school administrators and teachers should ensure the basics are appropriately present to their respective students depending on the students' ages and ability to understand.

### WHY NEO?

In the service of the United States, you have been assigned to duty in the Federal Republic of Germany. Individuals who do not have a wartime task are classified as noncombatants.

Typically these include:

- a) non-military spouses and children.
- b) U.S. civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DoD) or a dependent of such employees.
- c) U.S. technical representatives sponsored by the DoD.
- d) U.S. citizens employed by the American Red Cross,

the USO or the dependent of any of the above.

- e) Individuals possessing invitational travel orders issued by the DoD.
- f) dependents of U.S. personnel assigned to U.S. elements of a NATO military headquarters or agency where common facilities are utilized.
- g) U.S. nongovernmental, nonmilitary individuals in the overseas area for whom logistical support by the military department is authorized by military regulations.
- h) alien dependents of U.S. citizens who are actually or potentially nonquota immigrants to the U.S.
- i) U.S. citizens with valid U.S. passports
- j) if items 1), 2), 3) or 4) above apply, then any member of the household who may be visiting from the U.S.

As you can see, the classification of noncombatant applies to many categories of individuals. Unfortunately, some will not have had the opportunity to become acquainted with NEO. Therefore, it is important that DoD-sponsored noncombatants receive indoctrination and periodic training regarding NEO responsibilities and procedures.

#### WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

The U.S. Department of State has overall responsibility for the welfare of U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad. An



evacuation can be directed for any of the following reasons: natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes or epidemics; civil disturbances; or worst of all, in anticipation of armed conflict or war. Based on the severity of a situation and the threat to lives, the Department of State, with National Command Authority (NCA) approval, may order an evacuation. In the military, NEO is a command responsibility and each commander/supervisor is charged with the state of preparedness of the noncombatants affiliated with his/her agency. In turn, each is responsible to the immediate commander for the state of preparedness of his/her family. Sponsors include military and civilian heads of households and single parents. Single and unaccompanied civilian employees are responsible to their supervisors for their individual preparedness.

#### SCOPE OF OPERATIONS

Over 500,000 noncombatant evacuees! At the height of the tourist season, there can be close to 100,000 tourists in West Germany at any given time. These large numbers should impress you with the point that everybody cannot be moved quickly and safely unless a plan and basic instructions are followed. This is not the time "to do your own thing."

#### WHAT TO EXPECT

Depending on the situation, an emergency evacuation make take several different forms. These range from a gradual and

deliberate speedup of normal rotation processing to the U.S. to a more urgent situation where evacuees are moved as rapidly as possible by air to survival areas elsewhere and eventually to the U.S. The instructions in this brochure pertain to movement by air under urgent evacuation circumstances. If evacuation is by other means, adequate instructions will be issued at the appropriate time. Under an urgent evacuation, only a few hours may be available to get ready.

Not everyone can evacuate at the same time. The terminal from which you will embark will gather no more evacuees at one time than can be placed on available aircraft. If you have to travel to a departure base or port, you will use group type transportation (buses, railroad, trucks).

Families will remain together as circumstances permit. Non-dormitory children in schools will be brought to their homes immediately by school bus or release immediately if within walking distance. Children living in school dormitories away from home will be evacuated as a group under the direction of DoDDS. You should ensure DoDDS has the necessary power of attorney. Hospitalized dependents that can be discharged will be released from medical facility in order to be evacuated with the family.

Evacuation actions will be accomplished without the aid of the military members of the family. In an emergency, all military personnel will be required at their duty station. Each evacuee should be prepared for an arduous trip which may have to

be made under adverse conditions. DoD noncombatants can help by being prepared to comply with any requests given along the way. With everyone's cooperation, hardships involved can be minimized.

### PREPARATION

The key to a successful evacuation is being prepared. First of all, you must be mentally prepared for what is store. The worst thing that could happen is for panic to set it thereby destroying our ability to maintain control over a very tense situation. Preparing mentally involves acquainting yourself with the necessary actions involved, understanding the basic plan, especially individual responsibilities once the plan has been executed, and discussing NEO with members of your family. The following paragraphs discuss those things you need to do to prepare for an evacuation.

#### Emergency Checklist of Required Items (sample provide below)

Upon notification of a NEO alert you should:

- \_\_\_ Assemble your family
- \_\_\_ Make family members of reasonable age aware of the information you have received
- \_\_\_ Inventory your NEO kit
- \_\_\_ Gather as much food as practical
- \_\_\_ Pack luggage (not to exceed 65 lbs/person)
- \_\_\_ Remain in quarters until directed to move
- \_\_\_ Prepare to accomplish the move to your NEO

**processing center or NEO assembly area**

When a NEO recall is ordered:

- ☐ Disconnect all appliances (except refrigerator)
- ☐ Turn radiators down to no less than one-quarter turn
- ☐ Lock all doors and windows
- ☐ Proceed to you assigned NEO processing center or assembly area as directed

**NEO Kit**

There are five items each family is **REQUIRED** to maintain in its NEO Kit. If they are not in your kit, take immediate action to obtain them.

- A passport for each family member
- An emergency pay form (DD For 1337)
- Both copies of your vehicle registration
- Family Care Plan
- AE Form 3653, NEO Processing Form

The following items are **OPTIONAL**; however, you should make an effort to include them as they may facilitate later evacuation and repatriation processing.

- Identification cards for all noncombatants over the age of ten
- DD Form 1644, Schedule of Property and Claims Analysis Chart

- Power of Attorney
- Immunization records
- Insurance policies and wills
- Small transistor radio with extra batteries
- Flashlight and extra batteries
- Blankets (at least one per individual)
- First Aid kit
- Toilet tissue and other toilet articles
- Road maps
- Thermos jug full of non-alcoholic beverage
- Food (lightweight and nonperishable) - at least three days per person
- This brochure
- Medical records - if you are being seen for a serious or chronic medical condition, pick up your records, time permitting. Evacuees requiring daily medication should have a 15-day supply on hand.

#### Clothing

Take adequate, warm clothing. Slacks and low-heeled shoes are recommended.

Pets - It is impossible for ANY pet to be evacuated with you unless it is a seeing-eye dog. You have the following options:

- During a non-emergency NEO evacuation such as a

deterioration of political relations would be a good time to arrange transportation back to the United States via commercial means.

- Leave the pet(s) with a local national
- If you do elect to bring them to the NEO Processing Center, they will be destroyed as humanely as possible.
- ABOVE ALL, DO NOT TURN YOUR PET LOOSE--OR LEAVE IT LOCKED UP IN YOUR QUARTERS WHEN YOU LEAVE!

Personal Property - In the event of an evacuation, all personal property (except hand-carried items such as jewelry) will have to be left behind. For insurance purposes and compensation from the government, you should have a detailed inventory of personal property to include household furnishings, clothing, etc. Documents such as car registration, insurance policies, stocks and bonds should be collected together and taken with you. As in the case of pets, you should be sensitive to deteriorating political conditions. If you want to minimize your risk of loss, you should consider sending items back to the United States through the mail.

Privately-owned vehicles (POVs) - During an emergency evacuation, do not expect your POV to be evacuated. Although in previous evacuations such as Iran some vehicles were returned to their owners in the U.S., this cannot be assured. When you turn

your vehicle in, it will be placed in a vehicle holding area. It may even be requisitioned for government use. If this occurs, you will be reimbursed. The important thing to remember is to have two copies of the registration to be completed by a NEO official when you turn in your vehicle.

#### AERIAL EVACUATION

The final stage of an evacuation is aerial movement. If you think passenger processing was hectic on your trip to Germany, it will seem even more hectic during the evacuation. The key is to follow instructions and stay calm.

Normally, you will arrive at the airfield just in time to board the aircraft. There will not be anyone to assist you with your luggage, except children will be aided as much as possible. Another thing you should expect is a lot of engine noise, not only from your aircraft, but others in the vicinity.

Both military and civilian aircraft will be used. If the aircraft was used to transport cargo, it will not be reconfigured for passengers. Therefore, you will have to sit on the deck. This is where the two blankets are necessary; for cushioning and for warmth. You will use your luggage as a back rest and will be secured to the floor with restraining straps. For your information, a C141 aircraft can carry twice as many passengers in a cargo configuration than if airline seats were installed.

## REPATRIATION - ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.

Just as there is a plan to get you out of Germany, so too there is a plan to receive you in the States. Another federal agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, has the overall responsibility for repatriating noncombatants. They coordinate with other federal and state agencies to see that your basic needs are met upon your arrival. The assistance will include such things as follow-on transportation to your intended state address, temporary lodging, immigration and customs processing, and the very important service of accounting for all evacuees and notifying sponsor's of their families' safe arrival. Again, the key to making all this work is following instructions and remaining calm. You will be cold, tired and hungry and every effort will be made to minimize the "hassle."

Although your follow-on transportation will be paid for by the government, you will incurring some personal expenses. This is why the DD Form 1337 emergency pay form is so important.

## SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

### Family unity

If a family member is hospitalized and a doctor decides that medical evacuation is required, the entire family will normally be evacuated through medical channels.

If a hospitalized family member is released by a doctor, that individual will be evacuated through normal channels with the family.



In the case of a large number of patients where aircraft capabilities cannot accommodate healthy family members, the patients receive priority and this could cause family separations.

#### Elderly

If feasible, senior citizens (65 or older) will be considered for early evacuation; however, this cannot be assured.

#### Pregnancy

Noncombatants in their ninth month of pregnancy or within seven days after birth will be medically evacuated.

#### Handicapped

Every effort will be made to evacuate handicapped noncombatants with their families in the early part of an evacuation.

#### Single parents or both parents military

It is your responsibility to designate a guardian for your dependents. This is the purpose of the Family Care Plan. Those individuals in uniform, whether parents or not, have a wartime function. Mission accomplishment cannot be impaired for the purpose of evacuating family members who are noncombatants. The Family Care Plan is a very serious matter, one that you need to consider very critically and responsibly.

#### SUMMARY

Be prepared at all times. Follow your unit NEO representative's instructions quickly and thoroughly. Help each

other and remain calm.

If you have any questions concerning the NEO program,  
contact your NEO representative, or the Base NEO Office.

Remember, NEO was prepared for you; you prepare for NEO.

## Glossary of Terms and Definitions

### Terms

APOD	Airlift Port of Debarkation
APOE	Airlift Port of Embarkation
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(A&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics)
ASD(HA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASD(ISP)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
CDC	Civil Defense Committee
DEP	Civil Emergency Planning
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DA	Department of the Army
DCSPER/DCS, Personnel	Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DoT	Department of Transportation
EAM	Emergency Action Manual
ELG	European Liaison Group
EUCOM	European Command
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	Noncombatant Emergency Operations
OASD(A&L)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of of Defense(Acquisition and Logistics)
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
POD	Port of Debarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE	Sea Port of Embarkation
TOA	Transportation Operating Agency
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WLG	Washington Liaison Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

## Definitions

### 1. Noncombatants:

a. Those U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority including:

(1) Civilian employees of all agencies of the United States government except as noted in paragraph b.(1) below.

(2) Those U.S. military personnel designated by competent authority to be evacuated as noncombatants. Normally the military member(s) of the local Emergency and Evacuation Committee will provide the consulate/embassy with required planning data in accordance with the guidance of the commander of the appropriate Unified Command.

(3) All dependents of personnel in paragraphs (1) and (2) above.

(4) All dependents of members of the United States armed forces.

b. Those U.S. citizens who may be authorized or assisted in evacuation (but not ordered to evacuate) by competent authority including:

(1) Civilian employees of U.S. Government agencies who reside in the country concerned of their own volition and express willingness to be evacuated.

(2) Private U.S. citizens.

(3) Dependents of members of the uniformed services designated by competent authority to be evacuated as

noncombatants.

(4) Dependents of persons in (1) and (2) above.

c. Those aliens who may be authorized or assisted in evacuation by competent authority, in accordance with applicable Department of State regulations, including dependents of those persons in paragraphs a. and b. above and as prescribed by the Department of State.

d. The authority of the chief of Diplomatic Mission or Principal Officer to order evacuation does not extend to:

(1) Uniformed personnel of the United States combat forces except as mutually agreed to under paragraph 1.a.(2) above.

(2) Certain civilians operating in support of combat units as determined by the Unified Command.

(3) U.S. citizens in West Berlin and U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

(4) U.S. citizens attached to international organizations.

2. Evacuation: The ordered movement or authorized departure of noncombatants for a special area by the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the appropriate U.S. military commander. Refers to the movement from one area to another in the same or different countries. The evacuation must be caused by unusual or emergency circumstances, and applies equally to command or noncommand-sponsored dependents.

3. **Safe Havens:** A location within or outside the United States, designated by the Department of State in coordination with the Department of Defense, to which noncombatants are authorized to travel for the purpose of temporarily remaining there until they are authorized to return to the location from which evacuated, or until they are authorized to travel to a designated place.

4. **Joint Reception Coordination Center (JRCC):**  
Established by the Department of the Army, as designated DoD executive agent for repatriation of noncombatants, with the assistance of other Military Departments and DoD agencies. Ensures that DoD noncombatants receive adequate assistance and support for an orderly and expedient debarkation, movement to final destination in CONUS, and appropriate follow-on assistance at final destination.

5. **Emergency and Evacuation Committee:** Consists of consular representative of other local U.S. government agencies. Unless otherwise designated by the Unified Commander, the senior military officer in the consular district will designate the military member(s).

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