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
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
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**PERestroika, THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES:
A REPORT PACKAGE TO ENHANCE MILITARY POWER**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LARRY D. AARON, PA

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historical development of Soviet strategic culture and how that culture affects the Soviet leadership's use of the non-military instruments of power for national security. Historical and cultural influences have engrained into the Soviet leadership and population the belief that a significant weakening of the military will increase the risks of an armed attack on their country. Such an attack could result in devastation similar to that of World War II. History and culture have taught the Soviet citizen to endure adversity for the sake of a strong military and hence national security. The paper makes the case that the military is the instrument which has made the Soviet Union a global power. Without the continued advancement of the military instrument, the Soviet Union is still a developing country. Perestroika as a reform package is not an attempt to strengthen the non-military instruments of power to change the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, it is an attempt to bring about domestic reform which will enhance the military instrument of power as the Soviet Union looks toward foreign policy challenges in the twenty-first century.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

PERESTROIKA, THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES: A REFORM
PACKAGE TO ENHANCE MILITARY POWER

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Larry D. Aaron, FA

Colonel David Twining
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
6 April 1988



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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Larry D. Aaron, LTC, FA

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The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev, is leading an effort to reform the Soviet economy and increase efficiencies throughout the society, the government, and the military. At the same time, he is actively conducting talks with the United States to reduce nuclear forces while making overtures of possible conventional force reductions. This paper seeks to examine the motivation for his conduct in both domestic affairs and foreign policy. It offers a brief glance at the historical development of Soviet strategic culture and how that culture affects the Soviet leadership's use of the non-military instruments of power for national security. Historical and cultural influences have engrained into the Soviet leadership and population the belief that a significant weakening of the military will increase the risks of an armed attack on their country. Such an attack could result in devastation similar to that of World War II. History and culture have taught the Soviet citizen to endure adversity for the sake of a strong military and hence national security. The paper makes the case that the military is the instrument which has made the Soviet Union a global power. Without the continued advancement of the military instrument, the Soviet Union is still a developing country. Perestroika as a reform package is not an attempt to strengthen the non-military instruments of power to change the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, it is an attempt to bring about domestic reform which will enhance the military instrument of power as the Soviet Union looks toward foreign policy challenges in the twenty-first century.

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PERESTROIKA, THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES: A REFORM
PACKAGE TO ENHANCE MILITARY POWER

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

PLACE: Moscow

TIME: Future

The mood inside the auditorium showed the usual restraint of a meeting of the Council of Defense.¹ The situation in Poland was the topic of conversation as the members awaited the arrival of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. This would be the first time all of the members would officially hear what they most certainly had discussed or had suspected as the decision-making process followed its sequential course. The threat to the security of the Soviet Republics had reached an intolerable level and military action was necessary. The Council members anticipated that the General Secretary would explain the concept for the upcoming military operations that could result in another World War but, even as possibly devastating as it could be, it was a war that the Soviet peoples would inevitably win. Victory would guarantee the security of the nation and enhance the cause of the Revolution.

Mikhail Gorbachev entered the room with his written remarks carried loosely by his side. He was followed immediately by Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov. As Gorbachev placed his prepared remarks on the podium and exchanged greetings with the members near him, the mood of the Council changed to one of quiet resolution. Although some of those present had argued against

this anticipated action, the decision was made and no further argument or disagreement was prudent.

Mikhail Gorbachev looked intense as he moved deliberately to arrange his papers. As he finished a sip of water from the glass placed by the podium, the attention of the room focused on him.

"Dear Comrades," he began resolutely, "In the years since the unforgettable days of October 1917, we have continued on the course of the new epoch of social progress, of the real history of humankind. The October Revolution is truly the shining hour of humanity, its radiant dawn. There is no greater honor than to be pioneers, devoting our strength, energy, knowledge, and ability to the triumph of the October Revolution's ideals and goals."²

"Comrades, our road has been long and difficult and one to remember; to remember those millions of people who have each contributed to our common socialist gains; to remember those who smelted steel, grew crops, taught children, and moved our economy, science, and technology forward since the early days of perestroika; and to remember those who defended the country, fell in battle and enabled our society to advance at the price of their lives. Today is a moment of unfading recollection of what we have lived through, of the path we have travelled, because it was all this that created the present day. Everyone must know that their labor and their selfless dedication were not in vain. They endured everything that fell to their lot and made a grand contribution to the consolidation of the gains of the October

Revolution. They laid the foundation of the strength that enabled them to safeguard the Motherland from a deadly peril, and to save socialism for the future for all of us. Comrades, let us honor their memory!"³

"In the West, there is now much talk about the current situation in Poland where we rightfully restored the security of the socialist movement and the workers who were innocent victims of lawless and arbitrary actions perpetrated by the imperialistic and reckless meddling of the United States and their NATO conspirators. Our actions were lawful. Meanwhile, the United States and the NATO nations continue to threaten the security of the Soviet Republics by intervention into the sovereign affairs of Poland. We repeatedly warned them of the severity of their subversive actions."⁴

"Ever since the United States deployed its so-called Star Wars system, in direct violation of the recent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, they are trying once again to subvert the inevitable socialist course of history and once again to threaten our homeland. They want to achieve superiority over us with their nuclear weapons so that they can continue their expansionist policies. It is an aggression which mercilessly tests the viability of the socialist system, the strength of the multinational Soviet state, and the patriotic spirit of the Soviet men and women."⁵

"We can no longer tolerate their actions. It is now time that everyone rally to the defense of the country--young and old, men and women, all the nations and nationalities of our great

country and those of our socialist allies. The moving spirit of the millions of veterans of the Great Patriotic War will be behind all our efforts on the battlefield. Today we must follow the spirit of those noble veterans and move to stop the aggressive actions of the United States and we must neutralize the nuclear threat to our nation. It is my duty to brief you on the military actions we have begun so that we can ensure the security and survival of our peoples and the socialist system."6

"As you know, the United States possesses sufficient nuclear strength in their intercontinental missiles to cause mass destruction of our peoples and the Motherland. We, too, have sufficient strength to ensure mass destruction within the United States should they initiate an intercontinental nuclear exchange. It is not in the interest of our peoples to allow such devastation; therefore, we must act with ferocity and speed to avoid this kind of war. What we must do is neutralize the military forces of NATO in Europe and deny America a future bridgehead on the Continent."7

"Our objectives in Europe are crucial to the final outcome of the war. We must rapidly destroy all of NATO's nuclear weapons and means of delivery. When we have achieved success and the governments of the NATO nations acknowledge our victory, we will ensure a non-destructive policy toward the remaining NATO forces and negotiate a peace treaty. We will give prominence to preventing a world war by avoiding the unilateral destruction of the United States. As we achieve success in this alternative and

the United States does not escalate to nuclear war, it is most unlikely that Britain or France would escalate. It would make little sense to compound their military defeat by acting to ensure the nuclear devastation of their homeland."8

"We will move to maintain political control of the situation without permanent occupation of the territory by Soviet forces if possible. Our universal socialist philosophy already gives us in-roads into most governments in Europe. The existence of substantial Communist parties in most West European countries provides us with sufficient influence on the established state structures to allow those nations to continue to govern their own peoples, should the American government decide to reach a peace agreement. Should the Americans decide to continue the struggle after our successes, we will deny them a bridgehead back into Europe. We will use our military and our political force to ensure that we deny the United States the use of the British Isles in the north and the Mediterranean in the south. In the east, the boundary will meet the Indian Ocean at the Horn of Africa. From the Horn, the defense perimeter will run along the Arabian Peninsula, past the Gulf of Hormuz, and then up through Baluchistan to Afghanistan. From Afghanistan, the perimeter will follow the border to the Pacific."9

"This is an overview of what we have undertaken to continue the cause of Communism and ensure the security of our socialist states. In October 1917, we parted with the old world, rejecting it once and for all. We are moving toward a new world, the world of Communism. We shall never turn off that road. As Lenin

taught us so many years ago, conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems are inevitable and in this struggle, we will win."10

As the General Secretary concluded his remarks and left the room, the quiet continued as each member realized that a world war had started.....

ENDNOTES

1. There are three major bodies in the Soviet command structure, the Council of Defense, the Main Military Council, and the General Staff. These staffs and agencies function quite differently from any military or military-political body in the United States. They are not constrained by a division of powers, such as exists among the American executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. As a group, these bodies, especially the Council of Defense, have virtually complete control over the military-economic direction of the Soviet Union. It ensures that there are standby plans for mobilizing industry, transport, and manpower to meet the requirements for possible war at various levels of intensity. Although the Soviet Union has never announced the membership of the Council of Defense, it is probably composed of the appropriate members of the Politburo i.e., the General Secretary, Ministers of Defense, State Security, and Internal Affairs, plus senior officers such as the Chief of General Staff, and the heads of the military defense industries.

2. Mikhail Gorbachev, "October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues," Soviet Life, January 1988, pp. II-XVI.

3. Ibid.

4. This is a fictionalized addition to the above source to enhance the dramatization of the chapter.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. The strategic operation offered here as approved Soviet policy for the conquest of West Europe is a summary of contemporary considerations offered by Michael MccGwire in his

book, Military Objectives In Soviet Foreign Policy. pp. 83-89.
The author has used MccGwire's concept and fictionalized it as if
it were a quote by Mikhail Gorbachev.

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

PURPOSE

Certainly, the scenario as described is hypothetical and arguable. If one were to ask if the events are likely, then the answer is probably no. However, if one researches the Soviet culture and the influence history has made on that culture and the perceived paranoia of the Soviets regarding their security, then one could argue that similar developments are indeed possible. As Donald M. Snow writes,

"To understand the nature of the Soviet challenge requires looking at two related notions. The first is the Soviet strategic culture, that collection of influences that make the Soviets view military force and defense problems in the way they do. The second is the nature of Soviet foreign policy, which is embedded in the concept of peaceful coexistence. Throughout the discussions on both points we will see the inordinate importance of military force in Soviet calculations about the world."¹

The Soviet strategic culture is founded on the need for a strong military presence. The invasion of the Soviet Union by the Germans in World War II and the subsequent massive destruction sowed upon the Soviet people strongly reinforced that need for a strong military.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a look at the effects of history on the development of the Soviet culture. It will then offer some analysis on the Soviet use of all of the instruments of national power in the process of determining Soviet foreign policy. The study will address Mikhail Gorbachev's reform package--perestroika--and his efforts to achieve agreements through the use of the instruments of power.

It will offer the argument that the somewhat euphoric trance, which appears to be developing in some elements of the American society because of the current intermediate range nuclear force (INF) agreement and because of an enthrallment with perestroika and the amorphic glasnost, is founded on misperceptions and lack of understanding. It will argue that the INF agreement, any future strategic arms reduction agreement, or perestroika and glasnost do not represent any substantive change in Soviet foreign policy. These developments are wrapped in the unchanged need for national security while the leaders of the Soviet Union prepare their nation to pursue Marxist-Leninist precepts into the twenty-first century.

ENDNOTES

1. Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy, p. 77.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY

A discussion of Soviet motives in the formulation and execution of foreign policy should begin with a look at the historical influences on the development of Soviet culture and how that culture provided a convenient path for the eventual philosophical direction provided by V. I. Lenin. A look at those influences will also provide some insight into the importance of the role of the military in the Soviet state and how the military in some form is intertwined into all aspects of the security of the nation.

Russia, as an entity, dates from the middle of the ninth century when the local Slavic tribes, troubled by internal strife and foreign raids, called in Viking rulers from Scandinavia. That Russia has been invaded many times and is, as a result, afraid of future invasion is well known in the West, but the impact is not easy to appreciate. During the formative early years of the Russian state, between 1055 and 1452, Russia was attacked 245 times. The most disastrous invasion took place in 1240 when what was then a loose federation of principalities was overrun by the Mongol armies under Batu Khan, (grandson of Genghis Khan), and became part of the Mongol empire. For over 200 years the Mongol army ruled Russia, appointing local Russian princes to govern and to collect taxes on their behalf and suppressing insurgency with ruthless military reprisals. Mongol rule did not, however, change the lifestyle of the average

Russian, and it did not interfere with or replace Russian cultural life. The Mongol conquest "threw Russia off" from West European culture, and isolated Russia from the Renaissance and Reformation which invigorated Western civilization. Russia became introverted and the situation established and strengthened the tradition of unquestioned authority of the state. With the overthrow of Mongol rule, the new Russian empire under the military might of a strong state lead by the princes of Moscow spread east, west, and south. It was again primarily by military might that the ruler's achieved their political objectives.

Out of the 525 years up to 1893, Russia was at war on what was or became her territory for 305 of those years. This is not to say that European empires have not survived or grown through military might. In these other cases the role of military force has often been to augment diplomatic tactics or dynastic alliances. In Russia its role was pre-eminent. The early Russian emperors, with the title "Caesar" or "Czar" (tsar), established and maintained their authority by force and further reinforced the tradition of despotic rule at a time when many West European nations were developing more pluralistic forms of government.

The despotic tradition continued through the 17th and 18th centuries by a succession of tsars, who gradually expanded the borders of the Russian state outwards from Moscow. Certain historical themes constant throughout this period were very important in shaping the Russian national character. These include the establishment of despotic rule, backed up by force of

ness; the acceptance of this rule by the people as being necessary to their national survival; the spiritual reinforcement of this authority by the established religion; the need to expand the state outwards to seek natural frontiers and to prevent incursions by nations and tribes on the borders; the recognition of Russian scientific and cultural backwardness compared to the West; the consequent fear that Western political ideas would jeopardize Russian culture and the existing social structure; and the need for a large army to maintain control of the state, to repel foreign enemies, and to seize and hold territory necessary for economic development.¹

As the tsars expanded the Russian state through the years, successive tsars came under greater influence from the West. Western influence caused a split in Russian culture, which polarized into two attitudes. On the one hand there was the admiration of things Western and the growth of a distinct Russian inferiority complex in certain areas. This is especially pronounced in Russian attitudes even today concerning Western technology, industrial efficiency, and fashion and style. The average Soviet citizen still regards Western technology with awe, still fears Western efficiency, and still imitates Western styles and fashions. On the other hand, as a reaction to Western influence, the attitude grew that, while Russia had a lot to learn from Western science, she had nothing to learn from Western philosophy and values. The West was and still is regarded as decadent, immoral, and corrupt. The modern Russian, because of this strong cultural heritage, looks upon the West with a

combination of awe and loathing. Both attitudes co-exist in his mind, and color his appreciation of everything Western.²

As the tsars continued to expand the empire, the military came to play a role that is discernible today. Initial penetration of an area would be by Russian merchants and traders seeking to establish links with the local rulers. Following their interest would come a military survey team to take maps and offer their services to local rulers. They would on occasion be followed by military road makers or engineers with offers to dig wells and so on. The Russian leadership might establish initial military presence by a treaty designed to help one small nation against its neighbor. Ultimately the area, tribe, or state would be taken under Russian "protection". Only then would the local faction find themselves depending on Russian support for their survival. It is significant to recognize that this strategy developed under the rule of the tsars and long before the arrival of Lenin. As a result, it is a policy that is indelible in the culture of the nation and not necessarily an idea contrived to justify the spread of Leninist philosophy.

As the empire expanded and the tsars attempted to extend their rule, they established provincial governors who became almost independent local despots with the power of life or death over their subjects. As they delegated the authority even further, leaders of individual geographic areas had enormous power, virtually independent of superior supervision. As long as they collected and paid taxes, provided conscripts for the army,

and allowed no insurrection, the tsars allowed them to govern as they wished.

The military system became the central authority's most reliable means of control and communication. The people had no say in how they were ruled. It was virtually impossible to go to a higher authority to redress a grievance. The common people simply could not get to the local or provincial capital either because of cost or weather or because the local governors controlled access to the few roads. People were able to travel from town to town with the permission of the governor--in effect, an internal passport system.³

This near absolute power eventually led to excesses and to popular discontent. Russia experienced increased activity by extremist political groupings throughout the 19th century and although uprisings occurred, they failed to overthrow the existing social order. The losses caused by the wars of 1804-05 and 1814-17 brought Russia to economic ruin and brought the tsar's government to its knees.⁴ As the Russian empire disintegrated, the country slid into anarchy culminating in the seizure of power in October 1917 by the best organized political party, the Bolsheviks, led by V.I. Lenin.

The period from 1917-1920 saw the Russian Civil War where the Bolsheviks eventually were victorious. Through 1927, though the country was in economic ruin, the Bolsheviks continued to reorganize the government and consolidate their power. Following the death of Lenin in 1924, a power struggle ensued which was ultimately won by Joseph Stalin.⁵ He inherited a Red Army

which Trotsky had organized as the Red Militia but which assumed much of the character and methods of the Imperial armies. The similarity of doctrine and organization occurred because the Bolsheviks employed many of the former tsarist officers and non-commissioned officers to train and lead the Red Army.⁶

Stalin decided to force his agricultural and industrial reforms through the existing economic structure. He probably realized that his reforms would cause social upheaval and result in strong opposition. Because of his concern about a strong military which he might not be able to control if they opposed him, he initiated massive, violent purges that decimated the Soviet society and military leadership. In all, Stalin's reign resulted in an estimated 20 million deaths from his purges.⁷ In this atmosphere, the Russian people developed that stoicism and acceptance of their lot which even today amazes most Western observers. It is a society that daily tolerates material shortages and personal inconveniences that are normally associated in the West with mobilization of the civilian sector during war.

The need for a strong military force to prevent a recurrence of the devastation history has wrought has an importance in the fabric of Soviet society that is impossible to conceive in an American context.⁸ The Soviet Union is ringed by neighbors that it perceives as hostile, any one or combination of which they believe might rise up against the USSR in the absence of Soviet military might. Throughout history, attacks by Napoleon, Hitler, and others have devastated Russia. The

ferocity of Hitler's attack killed an estimated 20 million Russians between 1941 and 1945 and seared that great national experience into Soviet consciousness. There is a far greater awareness of war among the Soviet population than among the population of any Western state. Its lessons are taught in schools, enshrined in films, and recalled in massive war memorials.

Decorated World War II veterans lead groups of school children through military museums during school vacations. The tours include lectures that describe the war experience. They further engrain the society with the devastating effects of military invasion of the Motherland and they increase the citizen's respect for the military as the savior of the society. This makes it easier for the state to maintain its military programs at the expense of the consumer sector of the economy. The Soviet people, however, abhor the idea of another war and are keen to avoid one that might resemble the last. Their cultural development has taught them that arms reductions will not render war less likely. They are convinced, to the contrary, that the stronger their armed forces, the less likely anyone is to attack them. It is a lesson of history that no Soviet citizen will be allowed to forget.

Soviet cultural experiences and the lessons of history were instrumental in shaping Russian national character and provided the foundation upon which they conduct foreign policy. Successive Soviet leaders since the death of Stalin began an approach to foreign policy that has to varying degrees moved

Soviet society away from their isolationist position. They have developed a policy of peaceful coexistence. Concern came from the recognition of the great destructive potential of the thermonuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Even though communist ideology maintained that a violent clash between capitalism and communism would occur, nuclear war with the United States became an undesirable means to promote the historical dialectic.⁹

ENDNOTES

1. United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Army Field Manual Volume 2, Part 1, Background to the Soviet Army, pp. 2-1 thru 2-13, and 5-1 thru 5-14.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Michel Garder, A History of the Soviet Army, pp. 18-21.
5. U.K. Army Field Manual Volume 2, Part 1, pp. 2-11 and 5-14.
6. Ibid., p. 5-17.
7. Ibid.
8. Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy, p. 81.
9. Ibid., p. 83.

CHAPTER IV

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Donald M. Snow, in his book, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy, writes,

"In the eighteenth century, military power was the standard by which a nation's greatness was normally measured. Today, the issues that divide societies are framed in ideological terms that can lead to conflicts of total political purpose. New forms of power allow a greater range of means of warfare. Where political division is profound but unresolvable by the application of maximum military force, then other measures must be found to exercise power. The means are the other instruments of power and are the so-called economic and the political (or diplomatic) instruments."¹

To these instruments of power as defined by Snow, the U.S. Army War College curriculum adds another, the sociopsychological instrument.

In order to offer an analysis of Gorbachev's reform package and make conclusions of its impact on the Soviet foreign policy process, one should look at the non-military instruments of power separately. Unlike the United States, these instruments of national power in the Soviet Union are not linked to the military instrument through economics or political necessity. They are linked through history and culture.

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

Snow, in his discussion of the instruments of power and their influence on national security, offers the argument that the role and relevance of the military instrument is receding

rapidly and is being replaced in prominence by the economic instrument. He continues,

"The destructiveness of nuclear weapons causes this new security dilemma. The military instrument has become so muscle-bound that the threat of its use is no longer credible. In this void, other means of settling differences must emerge, chiefly, it would appear, the economic instrument, particularly because of the growing interdependence of the world."²

Recent history argues against his thesis. Use of the military has been in limited or small wars that use conventional weapons. The thesis has more merit when conflict would be on a global scale or would possibly include the use of nuclear weapons.

From a U.S. perspective, the economic instrument of power is the use of economic rewards or penalties to get people or states to comply with U.S. policies. This is different from a definition of economic power that pertains to the purely internal economic wellbeing, (i.e., per capita income or GNP), or the type of national development, (i.e., agrarian, industrialized, etc.). The United States, for instance, might offer to increase the level of economic aid to a country in return for allowing port of call rights for American naval vessels or the U.S. might threaten to withdraw a loan offer if the country failed to comply.³ It is in this sense that this paper looks at the current Soviet foreign policy process and its direction under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev.

The sheer size of the Soviet economy and especially of the industrial plant, coupled with centralized control over resources, provides the Soviet Union with considerable economic potential in support of its foreign policy. This potential is

sharply constrained in practice. Soviet involvement in the world economy is not commensurate with its status as a global power. The nature of Soviet power in foreign policy is such that if the military instrument is constrained, power is likely to contract.⁴

The other elements of Soviet power have far less weight; however, the Soviets attempt to prudently use economic power through economic coordination of their satellite states. In the economic sphere, the Soviet nomenklatura's main objective is to increase the dependence of the Soviet bloc countries on each other and above all on the Soviet Union.⁵ Whereas the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence might begin with economic assistance, the Soviet Union will assure that expansion through the use of their military.

The Soviet Union would like all Soviet bloc countries to constitute an integrated economic area, with each nation concentrating on a specific sector of production. Economic planning of each Soviet bloc nation is supposed to link the national economy to a regional market with a single currency, common planning of trade policies, and strong scientific and technological links. Economic interdependence of the Soviet bloc would strengthen the international effect of Soviet Union foreign policy decisions.

Despite unrelenting efforts to implement these plans, economic integration of the Soviet bloc has been limited. The Soviet Union cannot provide real economic incentives to integrate the national economies. In all Communist countries, the ruling

nomenklatura's power rests on its control over the state apparatus and central economic planning. Each national nomenklatura is, therefore, interested in strengthening its country's economic base. To do this, they maintain their monopoly on foreign trade and they agree to nothing that might infringe upon their sovereignty. Their attitude is not different than the Soviet Union itself but it is the decisive barrier to real enhancement of the Soviet Union's economic power. Since 1982, the Soviet Union has cut its oil deliveries to Soviet satellite countries by ten percent. The cut in oil compelled those countries to try to find other suppliers and made them more economically autonomous.⁶

The Soviet Union will be able to produce a general economic upswing with a resulting increase in economic power only by wide-reaching economic reforms. The reforms must begin within the Soviet Union and should be dramatically successful before other Soviet bloc nations would enthusiastically integrate them into their own national systems. Soviet publications now recount instances of productivity increases through restructuring and reform (perestroika). Without successful perestroika and without scientific and technological advances, the downward slide of the Soviet citizen's standard of living will continue.

Although no one in the West knows for sure, it appears that as Mikhail Gorbachev plans for moving the Soviet Union into the twenty-first century, he is forced to restrain and slow the arms race long enough to expand and improve the Soviet economic base. It follows that while he concentrates on internal improvements in

economic efficiency and productivity that are the essence of perestroika, Gorbachev must rely on other instruments of power for national security. He is faced with the dilemma that the Soviet people have a cultural need for a strong military to ensure national security and effect foreign policy. He realizes, however, that continued expansion of the military places a severe strain on the economic base. Because the strain could weaken national security and the Soviet ability to influence the international environment, Gorbachev may be forced to increase reliance upon the other instruments of power. In the Soviet Union; however, those instruments, although individually recognizable, are inseparable from the military instrument.

DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT OF POWER

Examples of the diplomatic, or political, instrument of power in the pure sense, are difficult to cite given the secretive nature of the Soviet Union. Donald Snow defines this instrument as, "... the skilled activities of one's diplomats to try to convince another party to comply with policy preferences."⁷ He cites for consideration the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, he also qualifies that by showing that Kissinger's efforts were backed by the secret promise of economic and military rewards. Snow's definition also overlaps in meaning with that used by the U.S. Army War College (AWC) when

explaining the sociopsychological instrument. The AWC indicates that the sociopsychological instrument,

"...includes a range of techniques (both overt and covert) that a nation uses as it explains to others its policies, seeks to promote its values and institutions, and tries to affect the attitudes of citizens and elites within other nations."⁸

Even though these two instruments overlap somewhat in definition, this paper will separate them for purposes of analysis.

If one were to look only at perestroika as a package for internal development, it would have little relevance when discussing international diplomacy. If, however, Gorbachev is successful at fine tuning the governmental and economic processes through perestroika, the attitudinal tuning that will follow can impact on the foreign policy process. However, the long-term success of perestroika and glasnost as they involve international diplomacy is less than promising. The impact of Soviet strategic culture can limit any real advance in the development of the diplomatic instrument and its role in enhancing national security.

It is exceedingly difficult to isolate Soviet diplomatic efforts from the other three instruments of power. Stephan S. Kaplan, in a study for the Brookings Institution, argues that the armed forces are the most commonly used Soviet political instrument.⁹ He defines political use as follows:

"A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence."¹⁰

He writes that the Soviet Union used military personnel coercively in 158 of the 190 incidents he investigated in his study. In the remaining 32 incidents, he says that Moscow practiced cooperative military diplomacy in that the armed forces were used to deter an antagonist from certain behavior or to compel the performance of some action.¹¹ The historical ties and the role of the military make the military the most pragmatic means when the Soviets attempt to exercise the diplomatic instrument.

Diplomacy, instead, has been the instrument of power emphasized to give legitimacy to the Communist elite. It has been emphasized internationally as the Soviet Union grew militarily to superpower status. Seweryn Bialer supports this view. He writes,

"There is greater emphasis on international issues in the deliberations of the Politburo and symbolic bodies like the Supreme Soviet. Important domestic issues are more closely connected with foreign policy concerns. The recognition of the consequence of foreign policy in ideological and theoretical literature is expanding. Soviet foreign policy and its successes abroad legitimize the leadership and the regime."¹²

Milan Svec, in the Christian Science Monitor wrote that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated in a speech to Foreign Ministry officials that, "the most important function of Soviet foreign policy is to create the optimal conditions for the economic and social development of our country."¹³

Perestroika and diplomacy have what one may call, in biological terms, a symbiotic relationship. Successes in diplomacy strengthen the legitimacy of the leadership and provide

opportunities for economic, scientific, and technological advancement. The strong leadership then has the power and the resources to enforce reform and overcome the cultural resistance to perestroika. This strengthens the nation and helps to create an environment for greater diplomatic successes which historically are linked to the use or enhancement of Soviet military power.

SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF POWER

The sociopsychological instrument overlaps in definition with that of diplomacy. Just as history is an influence on diplomatic decisionmaking, so is the effect of a country's cultural appeal. To offer a more attractive cultural standard, whether it be language, educational tradition or simply an impressive way of life, can be of great importance in furthering a country's influence diplomatically. Soviet culture is not appealing. Soviet cultural behavior exhibits an attitude of superiority in relations with the poor and backward nations, and a sense of inferiority in relations with the West.¹⁴

The question that comes to mind is how does the Soviet Union exercise national power if it has limited cultural appeal yet is not to rely on military coercion? An answer lies in Soviet attempts to influence public opinion. It is the answer that provides the difference between diplomacy and sociopsychology as separate instruments of power. Sociopsychology is

not disinformation or propaganda, but is the use of possible rifts, controversies, and differences of opinion to gain allies. Unlike most Western governments which, when dealing with Soviet bloc countries, limit official contacts to the government of the country; the Soviet Union attempts to influence the West's foreign policy by appealing directly or indirectly to Western public opinion. This is accomplished through access to the Western press, radio, and television; through participation in seminars and symposia; and through membership in various legitimate organizations founded on idealism and peace.

The most vivid example of Gorbachev's adeptness in this regard occurred prior to and near the close of the December 1987 U.S./Soviet summit. Just prior to the summit, General Secretary Gorbachev granted the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) an unprecedented exclusive interview. The interview drew millions of U.S. television viewers to see the highest Soviet official answering questions about his personal life and about international issues in a manner that, if not soothing to the general public, was certainly not disquieting. He followed that presentation later during the summit talks with an unscheduled halt of his motorcade in the streets of Washington, D.C., where he disembarked from his limousine and walked into the surprised crowds offering greetings and shaking hands. Again, his actions were widely publicized and were effective.

By these deliberate actions, the U.S. public saw not the leader of the "evil empire", as President Reagan referred to it some years ago, but a friendly, seemingly open and relaxed Soviet

leader who is genuinely interested in reducing the nuclear threat--a most noble goal. That appeal attracts supporters within the U.S. and among the Western nations to Soviet views that the deployment of the Space Defense Initiative militarizes space and has a destabilizing effect on international relations. His public appeal to Westerners paints a picture of world esteem that legitimizes his leadership role within the Soviet Union. It also creates a feeling of trust towards him by the peoples of Western nations. Many receptive audiences will transfer that trust to the Soviet foreign policy process where it makes Soviet publicly stated goals believable and seemingly worthy of support.

Within the Soviet bloc, the Soviet Union routinely uses the sociopsychological instrument of power to maintain its leadership role and to coordinate all political activity. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) places absolute priority on the cooperation of the Communist Parties of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Cuba, and Mongolia. All other forms of interstate cooperation, economic and military are based on cooperation among the leaders of the ruling parties. The ultimate aim is to justify and legitimize Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and to coordinate common policy positions. Soviet leadership proclaims the USSR to be the model, castigates any other move as antisocialist, and claims the right to suppress these moves by all available means, including military power.

The doctrinal basis of this claim is a theory called "general laws of the building of socialism", which states that after a successful revolution, politics, the economy, ideology,

and culture develop according to the experience of the Soviet Union. These "laws" contain four primary elements. After the socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat has to be established in one form or another, the Marxist-Leninist Party is the vanguard in the development of socialism, the economy must develop according to a carefully elaborated plan, and every socialist country must be ready to defend the achievements of socialism against external and internal enemies.¹⁵ If a Communist country cannot defend socialist achievements, the Soviet Union claims the right to do so on their behalf. The Soviet Union and its leaders see military intervention as a logical and legitimate follow-on to a weak or powerless sociopsychological instrument. Western nations, however, view it as military coercion to Soviet hegemony.

Neither Soviet history nor their cultural development supports the idea that any action in relations with Western nations or with Communist bloc nations deserves unswerving trust. Even though President Reagan intended it in a different context, he repeatedly used a Russian quote prior to and during the December 1987, U.S. and Soviet Union summit talks. He loosely translated the phrase as, "Trust, but verify". One should apply that quote as a guide during any diplomatic dealings with Soviet officials.

ENDNOTES

1. Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy, pp. 15-17.

2. Ibid., p. 19.
3. Ibid., p. 16.
4. James Sherr, Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge, p. 186.
5. Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin and The West, p. 104.
6. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
7. Snow, p. 17.
8. U.S. Army War College, Directive: Academic Year 1988, Core Curriculum Course 2, p. 156.
9. Stephan S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces As A Political Instrument, p. 15.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 32.
12. Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline, p. 293.
13. Milan Svec, "USSR and Foreign Policy: Perestroika Begins at Home", Christian Science Monitor 28 January 1988, p. 13.
14. Bialer, p. 275.
15. Leonhard, pp. 108-109.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

All the instruments of national power influence the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, as with any legitimate nation. However, history has had a significant impact on the development of a Soviet strategic culture. That culture is an overwhelming influence on Soviet national security decisions. Most nations routinely attempt to use non-military instruments of national power to influence other nations in the foreign policy execution process. The Soviet Union ties the other instruments to the military to an extent that is far beyond that of other nations. History has proven to them that they must rely ultimately on a strong military for national security. The Soviet government and the society keep that history alive and perpetuate the reliance on the military instrument of power. Soviet leadership may use other instruments of national power when it is convenient or practical but they rely on the military to achieve real success.

To provide a current perspective, the Soviet internal reform package, or perestroika, was reviewed to determine whether it signaled any significant domestic change that would eventually lead to a shift in Soviet foreign policy thinking. Strategic cultural influences and the control of the CPSU work to mitigate against any substantive change. Marxist-Leninist ideology may become somewhat convoluted by pragmatic necessities, but Soviet

foreign policy conduct is a continuation of the revolutionary ideals of 1917.

The primary problems of Soviet foreign policy lie in its exaggerated expectation of how military might can be translated into concrete power, and the conflict between a policy of expansion and the desire to prevent nuclear war. Mikhail Gorbachev is a product of the influences of Soviet history and the culturally developed obsessive drive for ensured national security. He also is a pragmatic leader who understands the need for economic and technological reforms so that the Soviet Union may continue the Marxist-Leninist progress into the twenty-first century.

Seweryn Bialer, in his book, The Soviet Paradox, indicates that current Soviet foreign policy is a holding operation. He writes that the Soviets are afraid of overextension internationally and have become more cautious in deploying their relatively scarce resources. They are afraid of troubles in their East European empire and particularly in Poland. They are eager to preserve detente with West Europe, for its economic benefits, its potential moderating influence on America, and its potential for driving a wedge into the Western alliance.¹

Mikhail Gorbachev is riding the crest of a wave that causes him to agree to asymmetric nuclear arms reductions while trying to reform the Soviet economy. He must decide whether to concentrate on domestic problems while moderating Moscow's international ambitions or to continue on a course that combines efforts to restore internal progress with expansionist plans.

When concentrating on domestic problems, Gorbachev as CPSU General Secretary is striving to combine economic revitalization with ideological rationalization. It appears that he has chosen to restore internal dynamism while pursuing global ambitions. He is attempting to reestablish his country's international image as a superpower that is strong, decisive, and determined to pursue a global role of equality with the United States.² Gorbachev is attempting to reform domestic programs for efficiency and effectiveness. Economic disadvantages cause a nation's peoples to look inward for relief at the expense of a foreign policy program that the leadership of the country may want to pursue. He needs stability on the international front while he implements improvements to programs instrumental to management of the economy, the military, and the government of the Soviet Union. Internal reforms, however, can be threatening to the existing bureaucracy because of the perceived challenge to position or status. Reform causes Gorbachev to risk an ideological confrontation with strong Marxist-Leninist purists. These dynamics create a situation that could end his leadership.

Although his control of the policy process is legitimate within the Soviet system, his power base is not broad within the CPSU, the military, and the KGB. As a result, he is using the process of perestroika and appointments within the Party, the bureaucracy, the military, and the KGB of those who support reform as the means to broaden his political base. This takes time and a relatively calm international environment. Gorbachev believes that domestic dynamism, social discipline, technological

progress, and better living standards are crucial for the country's sociopolitical stability.³ That is the purpose of perestroika. It is not his attempt to make an ideological shift of the Soviet Union towards the West. It is merely an effort to restructure the economy to be able to continue Soviet military advances. There is no difference between Gorbachev and his predecessors regarding the centrality of Soviet military power in gaining international power and influence.

The most productive platforms that answer Gorbachev's foreign policy needs are the world's perception of his desire for nuclear arms control and the achievement of nuclear arms reductions. Until domestic economic reform is a reality and until the Soviet Union achieves the sophisticated technology needed to move toward the turn of the century, Gorbachev's leadership will emphasize domestic problems over foreign policy goals. He desperately wants to avoid a new cycle of the arms race at this time because the Soviet Union is not prepared technologically to compete.

As the Soviet Union moves forward under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the direction of Soviet foreign policy will be neither war or peace. He will continue to stress the security of the homeland and its empire as the priority of military and foreign policy. The patriotic theme and the siege mentality that is a product of the Soviet strategic culture continues to be Gorbachev's stimulae for motivating the population to accept reform. Gorbachev and the Soviet leaders are still committed to the expansion of influence and power. The formula of neither war

nor peace is fundamental and will remain so. In the meantime, Soviet international interests and objectives are directly dependent on and subordinate to domestic reform. Perestroika is the opportunity to establish processes that may create the requisite resources to further the Soviet Union's influence and power without provoking a nuclear war.

ENDNOTES

1. Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline, p. 330.
2. Ibid., p. 336.
3. Ibid., p. 344.

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