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TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

BY

COLONEL DONALD T. McCRACKEN, JR.
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Since the creation of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), there has been an ongoing controversy about its training. That controversy has focused on several questions: Should they be trained? Who should be trained? Can they be trained? This study explores the controversy and identifies what the IRR is and who its members are. It also identifies what the mobilization requirements are and what part of the IRR should be trained and when. The recommendations resulting from this study are that,

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proper mix of MOS and skill level is for the M-90 shortage of
personnel recently trained within the last 12 months.   The Army
should plan to train approximately 92,000 IRR soldiers during
peacetime and use the early post-mobilization potential of the
Training Divisions to train as many of the IRR as possible
before the new draftees begin arriving.   In addition,the Army
should develop a standardized inspection plan for the IGs to
ensure quality training for the IRR soldier during peacetime.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROJECT PAPER

TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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23 March 1987

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) consists of approximately 300,000 men and women who have been on active duty and all but a very few, less than 10,000, are MOS qualified. The purpose for the IRR is to have an immediate manpower availability in the event of national mobilization.[1] It has not been clear as to what to do with this force during peace time.[2] Several questions have been asked about the IRR:

1. Should they be trained during peacetime?

2. Should they be trained after mobilization?

3. If they are trained during peacetime, who should receive the training?

4. If they are trained during peacetime, how are they to be trained and how many will be trained?

The organization of this paper is as follows:

Chapter II is written to show the need for the IRR and the need to train the IRR.

Chapter III defines or explains who the IRR is and what it is made up of so that the reader will understand what it is we are working with.

Chapter IV describes the management of the IRR and who does it. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the network is in place to execute training plans.

Chapter V shows what the mobilization requirements are so that the authors can demonstrate the need for training and the training target to be addressed.

Chapter VI will show the type of training currently being used to train a small part of the IRR. The purpose of this chapter is to show that methods are already in effect that need to be expanded to include training more IRR members.

Chapter VII will show possible post-mobilization assets to train the IRR, and that the opportunity to use the Training Divisions early on is a viable solution.

Chapter VIII addresses evaluation of training. Evaluation is paramount because one of the arguments has been that the training for the IRR is of poor quality. This chapter will show positive improvements to the evaluation cycle and the quality of training and suggest further improvements.

Chapter IX will bring all of the chapters together in a conclusion as to where we should be with training the IRR during peacetime and addresses the need to upgrade the current status of the IRR, and an opportunity to train using available time and space.

The investigatory procedure for this study was difficult because there was not a lot of decisive direction on training the IRR, but there was a considerable effort to identify the IRR. This effort has been repeated over and over again, with no positive or aggressive action being taken on the results. Much of this study is reliant on personal interviews with those people who are working with or have worked with the IRR in an effort to manage or train the IRR. Many of the comments in this study are from the authors, who were each intensely involved in the IRR and trying to manage, train, evaluate, and understand the needs of this force. It has been difficult to provide a clear source for all data and comments because so little has been written about the IRR, but much has been said about the IRR.

Most supporting documents will be found in the Bibliography and Appendices. Other supporting material, such as figures, can be found at the end of each chapter.

ENDNOTES

1. HQ, ARPERCEN, "Welcome to ARPERCEN", Incoming Briefing, presented weekly, updated monthyl.

2. Authors' opinion.

CHAPTER II

THE NEED TO TRAIN THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

In Twentieth Century Warfare, more so than at any other time in the history of war, the outcome of military operations depends on the preparations made prior to the start of hostilities. This fact is self-evident and yet, historically, we Americans favor a small peacetime military force to display to the world our love of peace. This unilateral disarmament and an illogical reliance on hastily raised, but untrained, levies has probably cost us dearly in wasted human lives during the initial weeks of all our previous wars in this century.

If we wish to preserve our way of life, we must abandon the traditional distaste that democracies have had for expensive standing armies. It must be realized that an army has two missions: first, it must be powerful enough to deter any aggression; and second, if war should come, it must be strong enough to win quickly.

Our nation is inextricably bound to our European

neighbors through various political and military alliances (e.g. NATO and CENTO). We have learned from past mistakes that isolation from the problems of the world is an ineffective method of guarantying us peace. Thus, our alliances demand that we station troops in Europe, participate in the political processes, and be the guarantors of peace for our Allies.

This policy of backing up European Arms with American Forces has been successful in stopping communist encroachment on Europe and the Mediterranean Basin from 1949 to the present. This policy was successful because a joint military force backed up the statements and the collective will of the leadership of the countries forming the NATO Alliance.

It is now doubtful this status quo can remain in effect. The Soviet Government, with its counterpart to NATO, the Warsaw Pact, has put into the field the most powerful armored assault force the world has ever seen. It has built a Navy that it plans to use to extend Soviet power beyond the Eurasian land mass. Its Air Force has increased to a level that will guarantee control of the air over Europe. This buildup of naval and air power can be used against any American attempt to reinforce our European

9

forces. It would seem that we are on a collision course.

The present status quo of American forces in Europe backing up the NATO Alliance cannot be maintained in the face of Warsaw Pact military expansion. Recent increases in the quality and quantity of military equipment within Pact military forces allows them the capability of making war from a "standing start"[1]. The most optimistic military analysis indicates that we may have 72 hours advance warning; more pessimistic analysis would grant us only four to eight hours advance notice[2].

To achieve this level of surprise, the Warsaw Pact has not only upgraded its equipment levels, it has also increased its troop combat readiness training. Recent Pact training exercises have been noted for their sheer size as well as their aggressive offensive techniques[3].

Current US military policy dictates that the Regular Army exist as a strong striking force that can be expanded with minimum effort. In pursuit of this goal we have stationed 300,000 soldiers in Europe with prepositioned stocks of equipment to support additional reinforcements. This policy places a tremendous emphasis on a strong Reserve Component structure within the continental United

States[4]. This Reserve system acts to support the Regular Army in three ways: first, as units designed to be mobilized and deployed as a package with a mission; second, to establish and man Training Centers within the United States; and third, to provide personnel to be deployed as individual fillers to either strengthen undermanned deploying units or as theater replacements (casualty replacements)[5].

In the last ten years the Reserve Components have improved dramatically in the first two categories: deploying units and expansion of the training base. We have not done as well in the category of personnel to be used as individual fillers. This group is known as the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

The idea to have and maintain a combat-ready Reserve force is good. It allows this nation to maintain a small active force with a reliable backup. It simply costs less for a nation that does not want to spend a lot of money on a standing Army but still maintain a deterrence. We have not done as well preparing the IRR as we have the other Reserve Components. The purpose of the IRR is to provide fillers until the system can induct, train and deploy the manpower it needs for the Army in the field.

The shape of future conflict is unknown. We surmise that warfare will be highly mobile, very violent, and extremely lethal. If the Middle Eastern wars are an effective indicator of the level of lethality, we can anticipate very heavy casualties in the first week of combat in Europe. This of course depends on the form of violence used against us - chemical, nuclear, conventional, or a combination. Serious doubts exist as to whether or not the Regular Army can absorb these losses and stem the tide until adequate Reserve Forces can arrive. Where will we get the trained replacements to replace our losses?

This is the purpose for this study: to look at the options we have to prepare the IRR for mobilization and to provide a creditable force. The current IRR is approximately 300,000 enlisted strong and by 1990 it will have approximately 500,000. The numbers are there, but these men and women will have been off active duty between one and five years and there is some question as to their readiness to go to war. This study will look at the IRR and make a determination as to who they are, what they are, and what we can do to correct the problem of training readiness and evaluation.

ENDNOTES

1. General Alexander Haig: In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on the status of U.S. and Allied military forces and the NATO situation. Stenographic Transcript, p. 32.

2. Friedrick Viener: The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Nations: Organization, Concept of War, Weapons and Equipment, p. 121.

3. United States Strategic Institute, "Soviet Theater Strategy: Implication for NATO", p. 15.

4. Interview with Bert Terrazas, COL, Chief of Training Division, Office, Chief of Army Reserve, Washington, 4 February 1987.

5. Ibid.

6. Interview with Brian Morrissee, COL, Director of Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, HQ, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, MO, 6 January 1987.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

The IRR is made up of men and women who are a cross section of America and all that it stands for, good and bad. It also represents the Active Army because these men and women have come from the active force and are a by-product of that organization, both good and bad. The IRR is made up of officers and enlisted personnel. This study will confine itself to the enlisted side of the force. All numbers and percentages found throughout this paper will refer to the enlisted members unless otherwise stated. The officers in the IRR are responsible for their own training and the standards are determined by regulations for promotion and advancement.

The total strength of the IRR is 350,000 men and women from Private, E1, to General Officer. Enlisted members constitute 84% (294,000) of the force and officers 16% (56,000) (Figure 1). The enlisted force is further broken down into 35% (102,900) Combat Service Support, 38% (111,720) Combat Support, and 27% (79,380) Combat Arms

(Figure 2).

During a 12-month time frame, the IRR will lose 1/3 of
its population to discharges, retirements, Troop Program
Units (TPU), and the Army National Guard (NG). During that
period, approximately the same number of personnel will
enter the IRR from Active Components, National Guard, and
USAR Troop Program Units. The remaining population, not
recent accessions or pending losses, constitutes the other
2/3 of the IRR population.

Under the current strength of the enlisted population,
the 1/3 loss/gain is 98,000 of 294,000. This is based on
the current six-year contract of three years on Active Duty
and three years in the IRR or Ready Reserve. The new
contract of eight years will change the percentage
but not the number because the 98,000 loss will remain
approximately the same but will be 98,000 of 500,000 in
1991 instead of 98,000 of 294,000 in 1986. By 1991 the
loss/gain percentage will be approximately 20% of the force
instead of 33%. An illustration of the IRR loss/gain flow
is shown at Figure 3.

The enlisted rank distribution of the IRR is 85% E4 and
below, 14% E5 through E7 and less than 1% is in the E8/E9

15

category. Most of the E5, E6, and E7 rank is part of the loss/gain flow from the TPU and the Army NG (Figure 4). By 1991, under the eight year contract obligation, the 85% E4 and below population will grow to approximately 90% of the force; 445,000 of the IRR will be below the rank of E4 (Figure 4). The current and projected profile for 1991 of the IRR is shown at Figure 5.

There is a feeling that members of the IRR are unreliable, so much so that they would not show up in the event of national mobilization, they cannot be found during peace time, and they are the unsatisfactory participants from the Active Force, TPU, and the Army NG.

The 70% show rate that is talked about so much is very misleading and unfair to the IRR. That number was derived by Dr Ludden, who was a special advisor to the Secretary of the Army in the mid-1970s. He was asked to determine what the show rate would be at mobilization. Dr Ludden and his task force could not make that determination by any math model or computer simulation because of the many variables that had an impact on the problem. The final number that was determined by the study group was 70%. When Dr. Ludden was asked, during a conference,' as to how he came up with 70%, he said it was an impossible

16

tasking from the very start. There were too many variables and they were trying to speculate on the conduct of the human mind. They knew it wouldn't be zero and it probably wouldn't be 100%. They determined it would be 70% because that was safe. The fact is that the IRR came out looking unreliable. Dr. Ludden also said that he wished that they had not tried to qualify the show rate because it has been misunderstood from the very start and has probably had an adverse effect on money being made available for training the IRR.

The myth that they cannot be found during peace time is also misunderstood. In reality it is only 9% of the force or 26,000 personnel. This 26,000 is not a static number, instead, it is very dynamic because every 30 days 15,000 are located and 15,000 new names are added to the list of personnel who cannot be found. Most of the 26,000 non-locatees are received because the Active Force has not confirmed an address before transfering its personnel to the IRR. It should also be understood that this group of men and women are very transient at this point in their lives; getting jobs, getting married and going to school. At best it is a difficult group to track. Note the Air Force does not have this problem. They do not pay the total separation pay at the installation on the day of

discharge like the Army but, instead, mail it to the individual at an address provided by the individual before release from Active Duty. This simple procedure guarantees a good address.

The last classification is the group known as the "Transfer in Lieu of Discharge", or TLDP, and Unsatisfactory Participation. This group, depending on who you talk to, ranges from 45%' of the IRR Force to 25%" of the force. This group represents, to some, the misfits and lost causes. We believe this is wrong. One example is that many good NCOs and soldiers who are members of the TPUs find it hard, at times, to stay in their unit so they transfer to the IRR instead of taking a discharge. This does not make them bad soldiers. Another example of the type of soldier found in this classification follows. Two men are right off of Active Duty; one liked the service so he joins a TPU. The second man disliked the service so he elects to go to the IRR and wait until his three years are up. The man who joined the TPU finds out his new civilian boss wants him to work on weekends or quit. Drill weekends cause a problem but he hangs on, thinking that he can do it; but finally he misses 9 drills (2 weekends and one half of one day in one year) and he is TLDPed into the IRR. He is now a "misfit" because he

18

tried. The individual who didn't try is still okay officially.

Because there is this category of TLDP and Unsatisfactory Participation, there is always argument that money should not be spent on training them. We disagree with this. If a man or woman is going to be mobilized, then he or she should be considered for training tours during peace time. We will not exclude them from any plans to train the IRR.

ENDNOTES

1. HQ, ARPERCEN, "Focus on Individual Ready Reserve", Briefing presented to Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, October 1985.

2. US Congress, Joint Committee, Congressional DOD Authorization Act of 1984, section 1022.

3. HQ, ARPERCEN, "Welcome to ARPERCEN", Incoming Briefing, presented weekly, updated monthly.

4. Information is opinion of authors; statistics calculated from best available data and informal conversations between authors and other individuals who work with the IRR.

5. Briefing to Armed Forces Reserve Policy Committee at Washington. February 1985. Author McCracken was present during briefing.

6. Interview with Brian Morrissee, COL, Director of Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, HQ, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, 6 January 1987.

7. HQ, ARPERCEN, "Focus on Individual Ready Reserve".

8. Briefing to Armed Forces Reserve Policy Committee.

9. Ibid.

56k
OFFICER
16%

294K
ENLISTED
84%

Figure #1

CSS 35%
102,000

CS 38%
111,720

CA 27%
79,380

Figure #2

MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENT

RETIREMENTS

INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE

ACTIVE ARMY

TROOP PROGRAM UNIT

IRR

STANDBY RESERVES

ARM- NATIONAL GUARD

REENLISTMENT

DEATH DISCHARGES RESIGNATION

51.4
.3
67.2
24.8
2.1
53.0
3.0
2.2
.8

X 1000
* Less Than 100

Figure #3

E4 AND BELOW
85%

E5,E6,
E7
15%

E8
E9
1%

Figure #4

0

	1986	1991
Average Active Duty Service	26 MON	30 MON
High School Diploma	70%	85%
Served In Combat	1.5%	.75%
Military Service Obligation	80%	88%
Average IRR Service	18.5 MON	26 MON
Male Population	86%	86%
Average Age	26 years	28 years
Average AFQT	III A	III A
Total Population	300K	500K

Figure #5

CHAPTER IV

MANAGEMENT OF THE ENLISTED IRR

In 1972, The Department of Defense declared a stop to the Selective Service System. Prior to that time, the enlisted soldiers incurred a six year military service obligation under which enlistees were required to serve three years on Active Duty and three years in the Standby Reserve (Inactive). Draftees were required to serve two years on Active Duty, two years in the Selective Reserve, and two years in the Standby Reserve.'

In 1974, the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) formed a steering committee to study the feasibility of establishing a centralized personnel management system, similar to that of the active component, for the US Army Reserve (USAR) Officer corp. The committee recommendations resulted in a four phase field test conducted during 1974 and 1975. It was designated The Officer Personnel System for the Army Reserve (TOPSTAR).²

During 1975, nearly 300,000 soldiers were lost from the

21

USAR program as a direct result of the stop to the Selective Service System. Concerns voiced by many senior reserve commanders in the field prompted the CAR to reinstate a committee to review the implementation of TOPSTAR and make recommendations regarding future development. The findings of the committee identified the need to establish an enlisted personnel management system for the USAR. The directorate responsible for this eventually became known as the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD). For a chronological history of EPMD, see Appendix A.

The major objectives of the EPMD are to:

1. Provide a means for the IRR soldier to be offered training opportunities and schooling which are structured to his primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) based upon the needs of the service and the availability of the soldier.

2. Provide a management structure for the coordination of all matters pertaining to the enlisted soldier's career development.

3. Provide a means, through recurring contact, to

maintain current mobilization data on each soldier.

4. Promote strength maintenance by keeping USAR
soldiers interested and actively involved in the military
through quality management and career counseling.

Since 1976, the enlisted IRR population has grown to
over 290,000 and is projected to grow to over 500,000 by
1991. The enlisted Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)
population has grown from 52 in 1976 to better than 4,500
in 1986 and is projected to grow to over 12,000 by 1990.
The number of IRR soldiers trained has grown from 42 in
1976 to 9,500 who will receive training in 1987.

The EPMD, at this time, provides training opportunities
in Exercise Support, Professional Development Education,
Skill Level 2 and 3 and Counterpart Training for
approximately 3% of the IRR population. With proper staff
increases, EPMD will be capable of providing training
opportunities to approximately 7% of the population during
1991, with increases to approximately 12% by 1995.'
The EPMD has experienced a significant and rapid growth
since its conception as a branch in 1976, and continues to
develop and implement programs which will enhance the
individual soldier's mobilization preparedness.

ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Brian Morrissee, COL, Director of Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, HQ, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, 6 January 1987.

2. _Ibid._

3. _Ibid._

CHAPTER V

MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS

The rate at which soldiers need to be trained is determined by the mobilization requirement as published quarterly in the Mobilization Requirement For Trained Manpower (MOBPOWER). This document describes the projected FY shortfall in trained manpower from wartime required strength in:

1. Continental United States Army (CONUSA) based Regular Army Units;

2. CONUSA based Reserve Component units with a planned Date Required to Load (DRL) during the first 90 days after mobilization (DRL is the date the IRR members report to units of assignment); and

3. Essential CONUSA Support Units (ECSU), i.e. units that do not deploy.

Upon mobilization these requirements will be filled to

the extent possible by soldiers of the IRR. Given the MOBPOWER data, training managers can establish strategies and programs that will best prepare IRR soldiers to fill mobilization requirements and to serve effectively in a theater of operation.'

The trained manpower shortfall, shown in the MOBPOWER document, and the priorities of these shortages are derived from three data sources. These are the Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS), the unit status report (DA Form 2715) personnel comments (MSPER) submitted by COMPO 1,2 and 3 units with a deployment mission; and the Personnel Master File (PMF).

MOBPERS is managed and operated at Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). Each month the system reports Initial Requirements: the aggregate mobilization manpower by grade and MOS level for enlisted personnel. MOBPERS also reports initial assets, the IRR population available for mobilization, and tentatively assigns each member to a CONUSA unit or mobilization station based upon specific selection and substitution criteria. These tentative assignments, called "earmarking", are made without regard to the training status of the IRR soldier.·

26

Unit status reports are submitted to Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (ODCSOPS), DA, by Regular
Army units monthly, Army NG units quarterly, and Army
Reserve units semi-annually. Commanders can identify up to
ten critical MOS shortages in order of need. A tape of
MSPER comments from all deploying units is provided to
ARPERCEN twice a year, in April and September. The output
is analyzed and sorted to determine the frequency of
appearance of each shortage reported by deploying units.
The list of MOSs by frequency of appearance in the MSPER
comments is the basis for prioritizing enlisted training
manpower requirements.

The PMF is the official source of information regarding
IRR personnel. Trained IRR soldiers, i.e. recently
trained within 12 months (RT-12), are identified from the
PMF and are considered able to mobilize and deploy as
qualified unit assets with little or no further
premobilization training. The RT-12 assets are subtracted
from the requirements for trained manpower to yield the
trained manpower shortfall, or to determine the number of
additional IRR soldiers that must be trained prior to
mobilization in order to meet trained manpower
requirements.

Prioritization of enlisted MOSs is determined in the
MOBPERS requirement for deploying units with MOSs that
appear most often as having a high priority of need at
mobilization. Those that appear only rarely in MSPER
comments have a low priority. Enlisted MOBPERS
requirements that do not appear in MSPER comments have the
lowest priority and are shown in descending order of
numerical need. An example of this MOS priority is shown
in Appendix B.[6]

Trained manpower requirements are severely effected by
Force Modernization. The introduction of new weapon
systems and major end items of equipment into the Army
inventory has a continuing impact on the MOS structure and
on training requirements in both the Regular Army and the
Reserve Components. A force modernization MOS is one in
which a soldier will support, maintain, operate, transport,
or fight a new weapon system or major end item and will
require intensive training management for these MOSs to
meet mobilization requirements.[6]

The total enlisted IRR RT-12 requirements, for the
first 90 days following mobilization, are 191,487. Within
the first 30 days, 80,064 are required by deployable units
and 16,976 are required by the ECSUs. 68,959 will be

28

required between M+31 to M+60 days and 25,488 between M+61 to M+90 days.[7] An example of mobilization requirements can be seen in Appendix C.

Including all gains and losses to the IRR and adding the 10,000 trained by ARPERCEN yearly, we have approximately 110,000 RT-12. It must also be noted that this number does not represent specific MOS shortages like MOS 54E, NBC Specialist, where we are short 61 RT-12 within the first 30 days or MOS 11B, Infantryman, where we do not experience a shortage until after 50 days or 26Y (Satellite Communications Equipment Repairman) where there is no shortage at all but an excess of 63 personnel.[8]

The point is that of the 191,487 RT-12 needed we will be short approximately 82,000 RT-12 during the first 90 days after mobilization. This shortage applies to all 346 MOSs at Figure 7. This gives us a target to plan to. With the 82,000 short plus 10,000 that ARPERCEN already trains every year, we have a total requirement of 92,000 soldiers to train for the first 90 day mobilization requirement.

ENDNOTES

1. HQ, ARPERCEN, <u>Mobilization Requirements for Trained Manpower</u>, Vol. 2, p. 1.

2. <u>Ibid</u>.

3. <u>Ibid</u>.

4. <u>Ibid</u>.

5. <u>Ibid</u>, Vol. 2, p. 2.

6. <u>Ibid</u>, Vol. 2, p. 3.

7. <u>Ibid</u>, Vol. 2, p. 8.

8. <u>Ibid</u>, Vol. 2.

CHAPTER VI

IRR TRAINING TODAY

IRR training today is a combined effort between Department of the Army DCSOPS, OCAR, ARPERCEN, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM). It is the effort between these five key players that sets the environment for training the IRR.

ARPERCEN is largely responsible for the coordination of the training effort and the funding. ARPERCEN manages the IRR and keeps the IRR soldier informed of the training opportunities available. The programs that ARPERCEN uses are as follows:

1. School house training offered by TRADOC is an ongoing process, where a few seats are made available for training the IRR in every class that TRADOC offers throughout the year. Approximately 15,000 seats are available every year for enlisted members of the IRR. To date, only about 45% of the available seats are used.' This is because of difficulty in coordinating

31

the availability of the IRR member and the seat at the same time. This number will improve in the coming years as the IRR grows in size and as required training is made a condition of the reenlistment bonuses. It is also hoped that the IRR screen now going on will identify more people who are willing to train. A major effort is being made to better inform the IRR soldier of all training opportunities. The IRR member is being informed of these opportunities when they arrive at the screening site.

2. Skill level 2 and 3 training is part of the TRADOC effort but is considered different from school house training because it is a program that is specifically designed for the IRR. The purpose for this is to make skill level 1 IRR soldiers eligible for promotion through training and maintain their interest in the IRR through promotion incentives. This is a new program that was started in 1983 as refresher training for skill level 1. It was through this refresher training that it was realized that the IRR soldier had not forgotten his basic skills. In fact, after 3 days of training, he was at the same level as if he had just left active duty. The program was redone to address skill level 2/3 and the first classes were taught in 1984. It has grown from three MOSs in 1984 to 46 MOSs in 1987 and the number of students from 200 to

2000+. The list of MOSs are found at Appendix D.[4]

3. Site Support Training is executed by FORSCOM and TRADOC. This type of training is used primarily to help installations with special projects. It may be for only one soldier or several hundred. It may be for two weeks or 26 days. An example of this training was the construction of the man-made lake at Ft Leonard Wood. In this case IRR soldiers with heavy equipment MOSs in the Engineers were used under the supervision of the active force to build a lake at Ft Leonard Wood, a mutually supporting project that does not happen often enough. This is a difficult type of training for ARPERCEN to anticipate and coordinate.[5]

4. Counterpart training is the newest method of training and is used most often by FORSCOM. This is where FORSCOM, through the solicitation of ARPERCEN, identifies specific MOSs and units so that ARPERCEN can provide IRR soldiers to work in a particular MOS at the unit level. The supervisor or leader will do an evaluation on the individual's performance so that additional education can be accomplished in school house training provided by TRADOC. This method shows the most promise because it can be planned for in advance, it will address specific MOSs,

and it allows the individual to work in his MOS environment for a performance evaluation. It is currently being used on a scale of approximately 5,000 soldiers annually.[6]

All four types of training for the IRR are important because they lend flexibility to the overall effort in training the IRR. Even if one is not as productive as the others, it is important because it may provide a training opportunity to a specific group, and there are so many variations to the IRR that any and all types of training should be used. It is also important to remember that there are no restrictions on how ARPERCEN can train the IRR.

Department of the Army DCSOPS published an IRR Training Action Plan on 20 June 1986. The action plan is a collection of 16 primary issues pertaining to the training of the IRR and identified who was responsible for each issue.[7] An enlisted MOS training priority list was developed and staffed on 1 November 1986. This list is a confirmation of the top priority MOS needs from M+15 and M+60 days after mobilization. A training evaluation system for each MOS skill level is being developed by TRADOC, FORSCOM and ARPERCEN with a projected completion date of the fourth quarter of FY87. Tests have been developed for selected MOS skill levels to estimate IRR soldiers'

34

proficiency. The initial program will be implemented in the fourth quarter of FY87.

Resident training programs are being developed now by TRADOC for critical IRR MOSs. ARPERCEN and TRADOC have identified 46 MOSs in this category and they are shown in Appendix D. These MOSs are not MOBPOWER's priority 1 through 46, but were determined by mutual agreement between TRADOC and ARPERCEN at a meeting held at TRADOC in January 1985.

FORSCOM is listing all IRR training opportunities that can be used for counterpart training. IRR training evaluation procedures have been developed and implemented. A single source document, to assist in understanding the IRR, and summarizing and consolidating all IRR regulations, is scheduled for publication by ARPERCEN in the third quarter of FY87. 1987 is the first year that a team effort is being made to evaluate and determine training for the IRR.

Department of the Army is maintaining a constant watch over the execution of their plan. Because of the emphasis placed on it by DA, progress is starting to be made to the benefit of the IRR.

There are other areas that could be used for training the IRR that are in place and working but the IRR population has not been included. Each of the CONUSAs have started Army Area Training Centers (ATC) so that they can train members of the TPUs in different MOSs.

These Army Area Training Centers could be expanded by the CONUSAs to include a larger spectrum of MOSs and ARPERCEN, through FORSCOM, could provide support in the forms of personnel and money. As it is, ARPERCEN provides support in the form of IRR personnel in administration and other staff-related jobs. These personnel are IRR soldiers who are receiving training under the Site Support category because they are working in their MOS in a special project. This support could be expanded in exchange for seats in ATC classes. ARPERCEN would pay for the IRR soldier so that there would not be a monetary stress on the CONUSAs. What ARPERCEN would be getting is an organization that was already in place and capable of being expanded for a larger student load, a variety of geographic locations in each of the five CONUSA areas and a larger variety of classes to choose from to offer the IRR soldier. This concept for training IRR soldiers could be used as a subject for an MSP in itself and may prove to be viable.

The major obstacle to training the IRR at this time is that it is 100% volunteer and the number of IRR soldiers trained each year is approximately 10,000 of the 300,000 members. The IRR screen or muster that is now in process, is informing the IRR population that there are training opportunities available and as a result we should be seeing an increase in the number of soldiers who want to train.[e] ARPERCEN should be seeing this increase in the next year or so and that would increase the number of soldiers that receive training. If every IRR soldier wanted training, it would cost one million dollars per 1000 students in 1985 dollars. This cost per student was arrived at by COL Tutt McCracken as Director of Training, ARPERCEN in conjunction with COL Brian Morrissee, Director of EPMD, and COL John King, Director of Resource Management of ARPERCEN in an effort to establish a cost for training the IRR in large numbers.

ENDNOTES

1. Interview with **Robert** Forbes, LTC, Chief, Operations and Training Branch, HQ, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, 6 January 1987.

2. Interview with Jack Parson, MAJ, Chief of Screening Branch, HQ, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, 6 January 1987.

3. Interview with Joseph Thorman, MAJ, Action Officer for Enlisted Reserve Component Training Branch, HQ, TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, 5 February 1987.

4. Interview with Brian Morrissee, COL, Director of Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, HQ, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, 6 January 1987.

5. <u>Ibid</u>.

6. <u>Ibid</u>.

7. HQ, DCSOPS, DA, "Action Plan for Reserve Component Training", Washington, October 1984.

8. HQ, ARPERCEN, "Individual Ready Reserve Test Muster", Report to Congress, St. Louis, January 1984.

CHAPTER VII

USE OF TRAINING DIVISIONS'

During any mobilization it will be necessary to train individuals who have lost their skill or who must be re-trained in a different, more critical MOS without regard to grade or proficiency. Individual training starts when one first enters the service and must continue throughout his service. These primary skills needed to perform assigned duties with a unit can be lost; however, learned skills do not require as much time to re-acquire. This being the case, due to the numbers of personnel needed during mobilization, the training base would have to be expanded quickly to retrain those IRR personnel to become filler personnel for front line units. One way to do this would be to utilize the 12 USAR Training Divisions. These Training Divisions can more than adequately accept IRR fills during the surge at the start of and during required BCT and OSUT training as the training base expands. Training Divisions report to assigned installations based on requirements and, during the early stages of mobilization, many of the companies could be assigned the

task of IRR training, based on DA requirements. TRADOC would have to develop training guidance which should be of short duration, a minimum of two weeks training, and allow quick personnel replacements.

During any mobilization the training base would expand through three stages: first, surge fill where available training assets exceed the training demand; second, peak fill where training requirements peak; and third, sustainment fill where training is maintained at levels necessary to support war requirements. During the first and third stages, a number of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and One Station Unit Training (OSUT) units are available for training the IRR members. During the peak fill period, there are also a number of uncommitted AIT and OSUT units, but, since there are not enough Basic Combat Training (BCT) units available to handle the anticipated basic trainee load, it can be expected that most of these AIT and OSUT units will be reprogrammed to perform as BCT units. Because of this, the excess AIT/OSUT units during peak fill were not considered as available for training the IRR. A few examples are shown below.

At Ft. Benning, Georgia, only OSUT training is conducted after mobilization. Currently during peak fill

there are 20 more companies than required. At surge, there are 32 more companies than required, and during sustainment, there are 42 more companies than needed. These figures will change in 1988 since Ft. Benning will be deactivating two companies.

Fort Hood, Texas has the requirement during peak and sustainment for 24 OSUT units to train BCT until mobilization plus 12 weeks (M+12) and for 17 units to train BCT throughout. However, beyond M+12, there are 3 extra companies and beyond M+29 there are 10 companies available.

At Ft. Knox, Kentucky, during surge fill at M+7 weeks, there are 20 more companies available than are needed to train. At peak, M+29 there are 35 more companies available than needed, and 49 more than needed during sustainment training.

These examples indicate that there are units which will be available to train the IRR. The training base would have to be adjusted and programs developed; however, the training base would be able to train the required 92,000 IRR members during the first 90 days after mobilization. Not an easy task, but one that is required and can be accomplished.

ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Harold Alvord, LTC, Student, Class 87, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, January - March 1987.

CHAPTER VIII

EVALUATION OF TRAINING

This chapter outlines actions which need to be taken throughout the Reserve to establish and implement a program of evaluation pertaining to the training and treatment of IRR members on active duty, i.e. Annual Training (AT), Active Duty for Training (ADT), IMA, training schools and extended tours. There is an absence of clear commitment and statement of intent by the Army to achieve the IRR training posture implied by current mobilization requirements'. Although training guidance is being developed by TRADOC, and direction by DA to the MACOMs has been greatly improved, evaluation is still an area which is only now being addressed.

The absence of training guidance or specific tasks to guide trainers results in inefficient and ineffective use of resources and the inability to assess the readiness posture of the IRR in operationally meaningful terms, e.g. number of personnel trained at a specific grade, specialty, and skill level in wartime essential skills. Current

44

practice is for the personnel manager to rely on an efficiency report (if available) and the reservist's personal judgement of his "training" experience. In the absence of an evaluation system or training guidance, personnel manager experience may bear little, if any, relationship to essential skills wanted during the mobilization process. Important to that end, personnel managers cannot translate such evaluations into, or correlate the training experience with, essential wartime skills. Clearly, the personnel manager's efforts should be guided by knowledge of essential skills possessed by reservists whom they manage. This information must be recorded in the IRR member's records for future reference so that training is consistent with available resources and will contribute to the individual's accomplishments.

Evaluation is extremely important if current training practices continue or practices recommended within this paper are adopted. There is no current evaluation program within the Army for the IRR. ARPERCEN, in conjunction with TRADOC, is developing an evaluation plan which should be completed during the fourth quarter of 1987. This plan is designed for the trainer to evaluate the trainee at the close of the training period. This program should be effective when completed. It must, however, provide

personnel managers feedback for logically determining who needs what training when; and assessing the readiness posture of the individual reservists in terms of ability to meet mobilization requirements as defined by grade, specialty and skill level.

Although the TRADOC initiative is a real start, there are some sub-assumptions:

1. Training is critical to job performance and therefore must be based on specific tasks to be performed.

2. Specialty and skill level qualifications are based on competency in task performance as measured against some standard.

3. That the mission to mobilize trained reservists to fill specific TOE positions implies that training must be based on established standards.

4. That resources are provided to allow primary skill training.

5. ARPERCEN needs feedback assessing the readiness posture of the IRR. This feedback must be communicated to FORSCOM, TRADOC and OCAR so that improvement on and understanding of what is happening in the field can be achieved.

There are two recommended additional methods which would assist the TRADOC plan.

Evaluation at Installation.

Expand the Director of Reserve Component (DRC) office at each installation with one additional individual (NCO or junior officer) who would act as an inspector or evaluator of training for that post (TRADOC or FORSCOM). The evaluator should be trained by ARPERCEN with guidance from FORSCOM and TRADOC. This would allow for a quality control of training for not only individuals who are training on that post, but would also allow a basis for coordinating unit evaluation, an area not discussed in this paper. The Director would have immediate feedback as to how good the training and treatment of reserve component personnel is on post. This would also validate the program which TRADOC is developing. It would also quickly identify IRR members who are unmotivated, unwilling and unable to do the job. Any initiative to improve IRR training quality should be thoroughly analyzed to preclude or minimize any adverse effects upon strength, which also effects mobilization strength.

ARPERCEN Inspector General.

Utilize the Inspector General (IG) at ARPERCEN in the evaluation process. The IG, RCPAC developed a plan in 1981 with the approval of The Inspector General of the Army, the Commander of RCPAC (now ARPERCEN), Commander of FORSCOM and the Commander of TRADOC. Due to changes of IGs and commanders at RCPAC, the program died and is not at this time being used or under consideration. A memorandum RCPAC IG section, Subject; Report on the Evaluation of Support and Training of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Personnel, dated 8 November 1982, was sent to FORSCOM and TRADOC giving results of those early staff visits (see Appendix E). That is all that is left of the RCPAC program. The intent of the early program was to educate and bring awareness to installations as to the intent of IRR training. It was a start; however, because of a lack of follow-up no progress has been made. A new program needs to be reinitiated.

Concept Plan

First, any plan must have the support of Commander, ARPERCEN, The Inspector General(TIG), FORSCOM and TRADOC Commanders. The support of DA Major Command (MACOM) commander, a prerequisite to implementation, is critical to

48

the success of the program. The initial impetus, therefore, must be at general officer level. If approved the next step would be to develop a concept plan:

a. Memorandum of understanding between MACOM commanders. It must provide rationale for the program and outline how it is to be implemented, with their comments and concurrence.

b. Coordinate with MACOM IGs to explain objectives. Develop policies, responsibilities and procedures pertaining to evaluation of treatment and training of IRR members. Prepare an ARPERCEN, Inspection Guides (see Appendix F for an example of one used in 1981-1982). This plan must be compatible with the TRADOC evaluation plan.

c. Coordinate with ARPERCEN staff for suggestions and understanding of the program. Develop criteria to select installations to be visited and reservists to be interviewed. Establish what reciprocal information will be needed to support individual essential skills requirements.

d. If an inspection guide is published, it must be sent to all IGs to be used during the selected aspects of evaluation. This process would be further enhanced if all

IGs could be incorporated into this evaluation plan.

e. Coordinate with DAIG to explain objectives, obtain its support and recommend the training of the IRR be added as a special subject for inspection.

Site Visits

The implementation would be the actual site visits. At the completion of these visits, develop and distribute trend reports based on findings to FORSCOM and TRADOC. Request that other installation IGs inquire into any allegations of improper treatment or training submitted by ARPERCEN IRR members being trained. This could be expanded to include other training, schools, TPU and IMA training where applicable.

This type of program is very sensitive because it cuts across different MACOMs; therefore, no mention of information obtained during staff visits will be made available to installations, units, or persons above the level of the local IG. A standard format of finding should be developed and left with the local command during exit interviews (see Appendix F for example). Where appropriate, necessary data should be given to the IRR

member's Personnel Manager to assist in determining additional skill level training needed for mobilization. Individual counseling of the IRR member by the Personnel Manager is necessary. Confidentiality between the Post IG and the Post Commander is essential in order to develop a positive attitude toward the program; it precludes concern at the training site/activity for having to reply by endorsement to higher headquarters because of disclosures related to staff visit findings. This allows correction to be made by local commanders. It is assumed that the local commander will be responsible for support and training of IRR members and will take appropriate corrective actions in response to any unsatisfactory conditions. Further reports should be made to FORSCOM, TRADOC and OCAR as to trends identified during staff visits.

Training should afford the reservist an opportunity to learn and demonstrate competence in performing TOE mission task, i.e. skills and knowledge required under mobilization. Clearly, an evaluation system is needed if this is to happen. The above are suggested plans which could be expanded and improved upon which would allow the necessary evaluation of IRR members. Careful thought should be given to some type of evaluation program.

ENDNOTES

1. Authors' personal opinions.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The objective of this study was how many IRR soldiers should be trained and what type of training can be used that will prepare the IRR soldiers for their mobilization missions?

There are several areas that impact on the justification and the ability to train the IRR. These areas are the need for a trained IRR and the ability of the Army to provide the training in terms of status, time, space, and money.

1. The Need. The entire reason for having the IRR is to have a pretrained manpower pool available to round out the deploying units going into combat. One of the arguments against the IRR is its training readiness and its ability to perform. While this argument is being used, the intent to utilize the IRR and the importance placed on their mission is also being confirmed. An indication of this is the recent guidance from Congress and the approval

53

of the Army to increase the strength of the IRR from 300,000 to 500,000. Why have a 500,000 member force (1/4 of the mobilization manpower) if we do not plan to use it? The truth is, we will use these soldiers as is. What training they receive will probably be enroute from officers and NCOs who have a hundred other things on their minds, getting ready for deployment. There is cause to wonder about the effectiveness of this. Should we send these men and women into combat without the proper training? No, instead we have a responsibility to train these soldiers before combat.

2. Status. The status of the IRR soldier is not limited to the personal status of the soldier but also to the status of his management, his training, and the execution of his training. The management of the IRR soldier is in place at HQ, ARPERCEN through EPMD. EPMD has reorganized and reprioritized its effort so that it can better manage the IRR with available manpower and money. Instead of managing all the IRR equally, they manage a few very intensely, a few more less intensely, and keep track of the majority. This method works but there is no room for growth. If EPMD was expected to manage more IRR soldiers more intensely, for example 92,000, it would need more Personnel Managers. The training opportunities for

the IRR exists but it only produces approximately 10,000 trained personnel every year. What is important is that we do not have to develop a new organization because we have an organization in place to manage the training opportunities for the IRR soldier. This organization is a good network but what needs to be done is to expand and increase its production from 10,000 to approximately 92,000. The degradation of skills of the IRR soldier is not as severe as anticipated. Every training plan has shown that a few days of training brings the IRR soldier back to his discharge level of military skills. The newer training plans by TRADOC have taken this into account with their skill level 2/3 training, but it only produces 2,000 of the 10,000 trained IRR soldiers each year. This program is also an excellent program but it simply needs to be expanded. The major problem with today's status is its magnitude of execution.

3. Time. Time seems to be what we are gambling on. Simply put: will we have time to train at mobilization? Will we have time to implement all our plans? Will we have time to meet a suspense date set by Warsaw Pact Forces? If there is a chance that we might not complete the training during mobilization then we should do it before mobilization. There is a pretty clear cut goal for M+90

requirements, and, after we deduct the number of RT-12 personnel, we have a goal to train an additional 92,000 personnel to meet M+90 days requirements.

4. Space. Space, like time, is going to be in great demand at mobilization. The competition for space between Regular Army units deploying, NG units arriving and then deploying, USAR units also arriving and deploying, and USAR Training Divisions arriving and staying will probably challenge our resources. If the M+90 requirements were trained before mobilization, then those critical requirements will not make additional demands on training space. It would give all units a chance to deploy and the Training Divisions a chance to set up. We could then use the time and space, before the full force of the draft hits the Training Divisions, to train the rest of the IRR population. It would also give us a chance to look at the rate and type of casualties, probably in combat arms, and train IRR theatre replacements through the Training Divisions.

5. Money. What can we do today under a very limited money environment and what can we do at mobilization when there will be less restrictions on money? The difference between War and Peace is that in peace we have the time but

not the money; in war we have the money but not the time. We must spend some of the mobilization money during peace. The target has been identified at approximately 92,000 and the cost is one million per 1000, so we are looking at a Training Cost of approximately 92 million dollars plus additional cost for ARPERCEN management of the training program. The total cost would be approximately 100 million dollars per FY. 100 million dollars is relatively insignificant. $100 million would buy 3 AH-64 helicopters or 10 A-10 aircraft or 4 F-15 fighter planes or 1 B-1 bomber or equip, train, man and maintain 2 M-1 tank companies for the first year.

In conclusion we have determined that the problem is not in developing a new management network, training opportunities or evaluation system, but the magnitude of execution and the use of existing opportunities. The following are facts bearing on the conclusion:

1. The Army does have the need to train the IRR before it is committed to combat. This training does not have to start from the beginning since it has been shown that the IRR soldier can reach his discharge-level of training with as little as three days refresher training.

2. TRADOC is developing programs in selected MOSs for training the IRR and has many in operation now. ARPERCEN,

with FORSCOM, has developed training opportunities in the field for the IRR soldier.

3. ARPERCEN has the organizational structure, through BPMD, to coordinate the training opportunities with the members of the IRR.

4. The Army knows what the mobilization manpower requirement is, by MOS, through the first 90 days after mobilization.

5. The Army has a post-mobilization window and assets available, i.e. the USAR Training Divisions, for training additional IRR members beyond the first 90 day manpower requirements trained in peacetime.

6. The Army has the ability to evaluate the IRR training through the IGs.

It is recommended that, with the current network in place, the Army identify what the proper mix of MOS and skill level is for the M+90 shortfall of RT-12 personnel. The planning goal should be ahead of mobilization requirements with trained assets and have as much flexibility during mobilization as possible. To do this we should plan to train approximately 92,000 IRR soldiers during peacetime and use the early post-mobilization potential of the Training Divisions to train as many of the IRR as possible before the new draftees begin arriving.

This would keep the trained assets ahead of the requirements at a cost that is affordable. In addition, develop a standardized inspection plan for the IGs to ensure quality training for the IRR soldier during peacetime.

Let no soldier's soul cry out, "Had I the proper training".'

ENDNOTES

1. Sentence from a facsimile of an out-of-print Department of the Army Poster; date, author and artist unknown.

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APPENDIX A

HISTORY OF THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL

MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE

On 1 September 1976, a reorganization of the United States Reserve Component Personnel Administration Center (RCPAC) took place. Under this reorganization, the Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management System (OEPMS) Directorate was established. Part of the Directorate was the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) Branch.

In December, 1977, the OEPMS Directorate was redesignated as the Enlisted Mobilization Training and Management Systems (EMTMS) Division. In 1979, due to the declining strength of the US Army Reserve, DOD Directive 1200.15 required the services to remove soldiers from Standby Reserve (Inactive) and place them in the Standby Reserve (Active). The directive also placed restrictions on who could be placed in the Standby Reserve (Inactive). This action increased the Standby Reserve (Active) (commonly referred to as the IRR) strength to over 200,000. In 1981, due largely to increasing Standby Reserve (Active) (IRR) strength, RCPAC underwent a major reorganization. From this reorganization emerged a new command element, The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Management Support (DCSPMS). The EMTMS Division was redesignated as the Reserve Enlisted Personnel Directorate (REPD) under this command element.

In 1983, a new Army organization, the US Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) was activated. The Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD) became a major staff element of this organization. In 1985, RCPAC and ARPERCEN merged into a single command, ARPERCEN. Today the EPMD is one of the eight major operating elements of the ARPERCEN command. EPMD handles all matters pertaining to the enlisted population with the exception of the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel. The EPMD is organized with two management divisions, an Enlisted Services Division, and a Personnel Management Support Division. The primary mission of EPMD is to execute, sustain, and assist in the development of an Individual Ready Reserve Enlisted Personnel Management System that is responsive to the needs of the Army and to provide training and professional development opportunities which will meet wartime requirements.

Army mobilization requirements demand that enlisted members be proficient in their grade and occupational specialties in order to serve effectively upon mobilization. Due to these demands, an EPMS for the IRR was designated in 1981. This provides for the effective management of the training and professional development of enlisted members. Unlike the Officer Personnel Management

64

System (OPMS) which manages both unit and non-unit personnel, the enlisted system, at this time, provides for the management of reservists in the IRR and those reservists assigned to the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions. Enlisted TPU personnel are managed by their respective units.

APPENDIX B

PRIORITY OF MOSs NEEDED AT MOBILIZATION

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
1	54E	63B	54E	54E
2	71L	94B	71L	71L
3	94B	75B	94B	31V
4	63B	76Y	63B	63B
5	76Y	31V	31K	94B
6	31V	76Z	76Y	76Y
7	31K	71L	71D	11B
8	76C	76C	11B	76C
9	75B	31K	52D	31K
10	64C	64C	76C	96B
11	52D	52D	31V	64C
12	31C	54E .	72E	31C
13	76Z	31C	64C	95B
14	11B	76W	11C	11C
15	62B	91B	31C	52D
16	76W	62B	11H	91B
17	91B	91A	62B	62B
18	71D	91C	13E	19D
19	91A	71D	91A	72E
20	·72E	76P	95B	91A
21	76P	92B	13B	76W
22	11C	63S	76P	44B
23	96B	79D	75B	11H
24	95B	62F	75Z	63H
25	91C	72E	75C	02J
26	63H	63H	13F	19E
27	63S	96B	75D	13E
28	62F	11B	63J	75B
29	63J	91D	63H	76P
30	11H	63J	96B	71D
31	92B	95B	75E	71N
32	75Z	55B	62E	63J
33	79D	62E	76W	13B
34	13E	75Z	62J	13F
35	13B	71G	63S	62F
36	44B	91V	91E	12B
37	62E	71M	91C	63W
38	13F	11C	62F	31E
39	91D	76J	71G	91C
40	71M	55R	71E	61C
41	12B	71N	12B	12C
42	19E	12B	91B	71M
43	71G	44B	71M	76Z
44	71N	11H	35U	02B
45	19D	91P	72G	63S
46	55B	91Q	54C	75D
47	91V	52C	62N	63G
48	71Q	55X	44B	71Q

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
49	62J	71Q	42D	63T
50	75C	57E	71Q	45K
51	76J	63W	19D	97E
52	63W	93P	19E	43M
53	75D	13B	96D	71C
54	71E	19E	83F	02D
55	57E	98G	36C	02F
56	52C	31E	92B	02K
57	35U	62J	76J	75Z
58	31E	13F	75F	52C
59	63T	51K	62B	45L
60	43M	63D ·	71C	41C
61	63G	35U	71R	93P
62	95D	81E	12C	92B
63	98G	51C	91D	34Y
64	81E	27E	43M	57E
65	71C	63G	95D	34C
66	31M	71E	31M	95D
67	91E	51B	63T	02E
68	36C	36C	97E	31M
69	97E	63T	91V	31J
70	93P	13E	97B	91S
71	71R	31M	57E	81E
72	12C	36M	82C	18E
73	51C	67V	31J	61B
74	91Q	43M	52C	63N
75	36M	44E	73C	62E
76	75E	63Y	62H	75C
77	91P	95D	79D	36M
78	51K	51H	32Z	98C
79	31J	76X	34F	71E
80	63Y	94F	63W	71R
81	44E	67N	98G	51C
82	55R	82B	91S	02G
83	51B	98C	81E	18Z
84	45K	71C	57F	57H
85	55X	31S	71N	02H
86	54C	71R	76Z	55B
87	97B	57H	36M	63Y
88	98C	97E	63N	76X
89	27E	97B	63G	51N
90	76X	81B	45L	31S
91	63D	68D	52B	44E
92	96D	93J	73D	96D
93	82C	19D	96C	68B
94	91S	51R	51K	02L
95	57F	68J	44E	18D
96	31S	31J	63Y	12F

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
97	83F	75C	51M	98G
98	63N	57F	64Z	79D
99	67V	35E	51C	05H
100	34Y	45X	45X	68G
101	32Z	63Z	82D	35K
102	62N	68K	98C	91D
103	68B	68B	36H	32Z
104	51H	35L	26L	33T
105	41C	34Y	51H	51B
106	02J	26L	91G	52G
107	51N	92C	51G	18F
108	52G	31Z ·	51B	02N
109	26L	51N	51N	95C
110	96C	67Y	76X	82C
111	75F	13C	00Z	31N
112	82B	91E	68B	26L
113	42D	82C	31S	62J
114	57H	96C	31Z	57F
115	18E	41C	00B	91V
116	94F	93H	19K	02C
117	67N	18E	05H	52E
118	45L	54C	31E	36C
119	72G	68G	91Q	27E
120	68G	75D	67V	00Z
121	35E	91H	45N	91E
122	63Z	00R	93F	68F
123	18D	31N	35E	91P
124	92C	68F	63Z	82B
125	91G	83F	92C	96C
126	31Z	93F	43E	76J
127	61C	12C	55B	45N
128	73C	91S	12F	63D
129	36H	52G	74D	75E
130	68K	26C	27E	75F
131	51R	91F	18D	27F
132	31N	91G	68G	67V
133	81B	63N	82B	71G
134	73D	32Z	41C	91G
135	62H	12Z	34Y	36H
136	00Z	35F	74F	67N
137	68D	18D	96F	97B
138	34C	31Z	16S	33R
139	68F	26B	51R	94F
140	95C	19K	63D	51K
141	68J	16R	94F	35U
142	62G	73C	67N	45Z
143	93F	36H	81B	68K
144	12F	17C	45T	92C

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
145	45N	45D	95C	67T
146	35L	35M	17K	02M
147	34F	66V	91R	84Z
148	05H	35R	68H	00B
149	54Z	45T	54Z	51Z
150	02B	54Z	45Z	18C
151	16S	16S	84Z	16S
152	67Y	67T	18E	17C
153	26C	62H	26Q	68J
154	74F	74F	31N	17B
155	18Z	73D	91P	35E
156	18F	24M .	16P	68M
157	93J	67U	93P	74D
158	19K	84B	26C	13Y
159	45T	26Q	98J	45G
160	67T	66N	13R	68D
161	51M	34C	81C	91Q
162	64Z	35H	13Y	45B
163	84Z	00Z	68F	55X
164	45Z	66Y	05D	54Z
165	96F	45N	91F	63Z
166	17C	62N	83E	02R
167	74D	95C	13W	35L
168	45D	34H	32H	66N
169	00R	19Z	35G	66T
170	91F	67Z	68K	02T
171	31T	18C	33T	97G
172	00B	18F	34Z	96F
173	33T	16H	96R	67Y
174	26B	75E	84B	45D
175	91H	75F	45D	26C
176	18C	42D	12Z	00U
177	35K	81C	19Z	13R
178	12Z	51Z	35K	74F
179	51G	91R	63E	03C
180	51Z	81Q	67T	84B
181	93H	91N	42E	66Y
182	61B	55Z	91T	31Z
183	02D	45Z	31T	35H
184	02F	84Z	55X	13W
185	02K	96F	03C	51R
186	52E	12E	81Q	73D
187	13C	74D	51Z	74R
188	84B	13R	34B	66V
189	66N	68M	61C	02Q
190	82D	98J	84F	51H
191	66V	97G	26B	35C
192	35P	96D	67H	34L

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
193	02E	45G	16F	32G
194	26Q	64Z	68J	67U
195	13R	27B	17C	65B
196	19Z	51M	18C	83E
197	35H	74Z	67Y	92D
198	13Y	26K	97C	45T
199	35M	13W	18Z	19Z
200	91R	18B	34C	93F
201	13W	18Z	18B	27B
202	43E	52E	18F	55R
203	16R	66T	11M	83F
204	67U	45B	17B	81B
205	97G	66U	68D	31T
206	81C	16P	45G	34Z
207	45G	68H	00U	51G
208	66Y	83E	97G	35P
209	83E	13Y	66N	26B
210	67Z	52F	91H	67Z
211	02G	91T	91J	00R
212	02H	98Z	35L	62N
213	68M	55G	35H	02Z
214	98J	34F	33S	34F
215	35R	32H	35M	43E
216	68H	66H	27B	51T
217	81Q	82D	00R	54C
218	34H	61C	55G	98Z
219	02L	67X	73Z	92E
220	16H	11M	16H	66U
221	17B	62G	66U	72G
222	45B	45L	00D	16F
223	17K	05H	35C	73C
224	27B	35K	91Y	17K
225	66T	17K	41J	98J
226	34B	51G	34K	68H
227	33R	43E	41B	51M
228	24M	74B	34H	12Z
229	02N	63E	13Z	16J
230	16P	34B	36L	74Z
231	18B	35C	67Z	34K
232	66U	42E	98Z	41B
233	91T	16J	57H	41J
234	35C	34L	02B	91Y
235	32H	33T	34L	64Z
236	98Z	17B	26K	05D
237	34L	26D	92E	02P
238	02C	24N	05B	16H
239	00U	33R	52E	16Z
240	27F	00U	15D	91H

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
241	03C	91U	13C	42D
242	74Z	96H	68M	91T
243	91N	51T	45B	81C
244	55Z	35G	16R	26D
245	34Z	26E	55R	26Q
246	26K	00B	67U	16R
247	63E	24E	93J	34H
248	42E	61B	27G	45E
249	55G	16Z	27F	18B
250	67X	65B	67X	35M
251	35B	13M	33R	67X
252	02M	91J ·	61B	93J
253	65B	27F	66Y	93H
254	11M	55D	93H	81Q
255	05D	41J	96H	91R
256	74B	36L	35R	91F
257	16J	27G	66V	67H
258	52F	05B	91U	74B
259	51T	24K	35P	67G
260	26D	24G	16J	96R
261	92E	41E	41E	11M
262	02T	24C	32D	16P
263	66H	15D	67G	27G
264	02R	03C	02J	13C
265	41J	34K	45E	42E
266	34K	00D	84C	33S
267	41B	41B	74B	41E
268	67H	26H	66T	73Z
269	32G	02B	24N	84C
270	16Z	72G	51T	00D
271	24N	34Z	16Z	35G
272	02Q	24L	26H	55Z
273	92D	32D	91N	35R
274	96R	92E	02L	13Z
275	16F	73Z	26D	91U
276	91J	66G	55Z	36L
277	73Z	84C	74Z	05B
278	91U	13Z	24M	19K
279	96H	25L	26V	26V
280	91Y	26V	55D	24C
281	36L	17L	17L	24E
282	84F	33S	02E	52F
283	00D	02J	02D	24G
284	05B	05D	32G	24K
285	15D	91Y	02F	24L
286	13Z	45E	02C	17L
287	26E	67H	24L	62H
288	24E	96R	26E	24M

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
289	02Z	32B	02Z	15D
290	55D	02D	02G	62G
291	27B	67B	65B	13M
292	33B	02L	66B	24N
293	13M	02E	92D	25L
294	97C	97C	24K	32H
295	67G	02K	02R	55D
296	41E	84F	02Q	32D
297	45E	02G	02N	26E
298	24K	02P	02M	55G
299	24G	02F	02T	26H
300	24C	02H	02K	26K
301	32D	02R	52F	97C
302	26H	02T	02H	91N
303	66G	02N	02P	96H
304	84C	02Q	24C	84F
305	24L	02C	25L	82D
306	02P	02M	24G	66H
307	26V	16F	13M	66G
308	17L	02Z	24E	63E
309	25L	92D	66H	91J
310	76V	76V	76V	76V
311	67R	67R	27N	27N
312	27N	67S	27H	27H
313	27H	91L	91L	27M
314	67S	16D	53B	53B
315	91L	27H	27M	27Z
316	27M	27M	32F	66J
317	16D	15J	21L	00J
318	66J	27N	27L	32F
319	15J	66J	66J	27Q
320	00J	66S	26Y	27P
321	24H	24H	27Z	27L
322	66S	32F	24H	24V
323	32F	26Y	26T	23N
324	53B	27P	05K	22N
325	26Y	17M	34J	26T
326	27Z	27Z	24J	22L
327	27L	27L	16B	34J
328	21L	27Q	22L	21L
329	27P	66R	23N	24J
330	05K	24V	22N	26Y
331	17M	23N	93E	26F
332	26T	21L	84T	24R
333	24J	05K	00J	24H
334	96Z	24J	24R	17M
335	27Q	26F	27P	16D
336	23N	24R	27Q	16B

PRIORITIZED MOS FOR DEPLOYING UNITS
WITH DATE REQUIRED TO LOAD M-DAY TO M+90

ENLISTED

PRIORITY	AGGREGATE	DRL 0-30	DRL 31-60	DRL 61-90
337	66R	34J	17M	15J
338	24V	96Z	16D	05K
339	34J	00J	26F	93E
340	26F	26T	15J	96Z
341	24R	53B	24V	84T
342	16B	22L	96Z	67S
343	22N	16B	67S	67R
344	22L	22N	67R	66S
345	93E	93E	66S	66R
346	84T	84T	66R	91L

An example of mobilization requirements and assets for the top 10 MOSs is shown in this appendix. The following description will help in understanding this figure. Block 1 is the 3-digit MOS. Block 2 is the Career Management Field. Block 3 is the title. Column 4 is skill level 1 through 5. Column 5 is the number of IRR soldiers who are MOS qualified at each skill level. Category 6 is the trained manpower or RT-12 requirements needed in 30 day increments from M Day to include ECSU requirements which are priority 2 (PR2). Column 7 is the number of RT-12 available. Column 8 is shortfall by skill level for the first 90 days.

As an example of what this all means look at the Administrative Specialist, MOS 71L at Figure 8. At the skill level 1 we have 7112 71L personnel in the IRR. At Priority 1 (PR1), M+30 requirements are 1565 71L personnel, at PR2 it is 640, PR3 is 1227, and PR4 is 264. The total requirement at M+90 for 71L is 3696 personnel, but out of the 7112 71L available only 2139 have been trained within the past year (RT-12). There is a shortage of 1557 RT-12 even though there are 7112 71L personnel available.

APPENDIX C

TOP TEN RT-12 REQUIREMENT

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
54E	54	NBC SP

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORTFALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	957	330 *	4 *	243 *	110 *	687 *	269	418
2	172	333 *	18 *	296 *	86 *	733 *	66	667
3	87	175 *	18 *	130 *	32 *	355 *	26	329
4	32	102 *	16 *	101 *	20 *	239 *	9	230
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	1248	940	56	770	248	2014	370	1644

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
71L	71	ADMINISTRATIVE SP

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	7112	1565	640 *	1227 *	264 *	3696 *	2139	1557
2	843	143	174 *	137 *	10 *	464 *	245	219
3	369	46	54 *	42 *	8 *	150 *	81	69
4	178	30	49 *	37 *	4 *	120 *	37	83
5	104	11	38 *	15 *	2 *	66 *	11	55
TOTAL	8606	1795	955	1458	288	4496	2513	1983

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
94B	94	FOOD SERVICE SP

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	7219	1017	*1512	*1044	*323	*3896	2061	1835
2	716	*439	*662	*458	*302	*1861	218	1643
3	412	*298	*700	*266	*138	*1402	91	1311
4	268	*195	*772	*223	*102	*1292	56	1236
5	32	*14	*59	*12	*3	*88	2	86
TOTAL	8647	1963	3705	2003	868	8539	2428	6111

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
63B	63	LT WHEEL VEHICLE MECH

| 4. SKILL LEVEL | 5. PROJ ASSETS | 6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER | | | | | 7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12) | 8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL |
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	6996	1363	70	1052 *	331 *	2816 *	2085	731
2	809	417 *	27 *	161 *	57 *	662 *	197	465
3	227	106 *	56 *	97 *	12 *	271 *	44	227
4	83	133 *	29 *	88 *	9 *	259 *	16	243
5	9	11 *	2 *	2 *	3 *	18 *	6	12
TOTAL	8124	2030	184	1400	412	4026	2348	1678

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

βd

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
76C	76	EQ RECORDS/PARTS SP

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	3207	808 *	90 *	549 *	186 *	1633 *	876	757
2	164	109 *	5 *	45 *	35 *	194 *	34	160
3	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	3373	917	95	594	221	1827	911	916

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
-76Y	-76	UNIT SUPPLY SP .

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT- FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	6516	776	229	538	155	1698	1800	0
2	717	143	68*	67*	14*	292*	203	89
3	499	371*	97*	244*	40*	752*	96	656
4	183	76*	93*	96*	13*	278*	37	241
5	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
TOTAL	7915	1366	487	945	222	3020	2136	884

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. SCMF	3. TITLE
31V	31	TAC COMMO SYS OP/MECH

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	1395	694 *	28 *	267 *	68 *	1057 *	404	653
2	143	44 *	9 *	25 *	7 *	85 *	29	56
3	144	100 *	53 *	102 *	55 *	310 *	35	275
4	50	43 *	40 *	46 *	11 *	140 *	10	130
5	4	7 *	1 *	20 *	7 *	35 *	1	34
TOTAL	1736	888	131	460	148	1627	479	1148

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
31K	31	COMBAT SIGNALER

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	6299	2067 *	42 *	2140 *	1053 *	5302 *	1385	3917
2	327	467 *	8 *	230 *	115 *	820 *	80	740
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	6626	2534	50	2370	1168	6122	1465	4657

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

8h

1. DOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
738	71	PER ADMIN SP

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	1749	363 *	115 *	174 *	54 *	706 *	415	291
2	472	283 *	77 *	179 *	21 *	560 *	144	416
3	87	64 *	60 *	24 *	4 *	152 *	13	139
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	2308	710	252	377	79	1418	572	846

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

1. MOS	2. CMF	3. TITLE
64C	64	MOTOR TRASNPORT OP

4. SKILL LEVEL	5. PROJ ASSETS	6. FY87 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED MANPOWER					7. PROJ TRAINED ASSETS (RT-12)	8. PROJ TRAINED SHORT-FALL
		PR1 DRL 0-30	PR2 ECSU	PR3 DRL 31-60	PR4 DRL 61-90	TOTAL		
1	10061	3090 *	278 *	1727 *	658 *	5753 *	2702	3051
2	732	740 *	48 *	157 *	34 *	979 *	173	806
3	199	353 *	36 *	113 *	31 *	533 *	64	469
4	54	88 *	20 *	20 *	5 *	133 *	15	118
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	11046	4271	382	2017	728	7398	2954	4444

* - CUMULATIVE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED PROJECTED TRAINED ASSETS.

COMMENTS:

ASI: R4, Heavy expanded mobility tactical truck operator.

A-1

APPENDIX D

CRITICAL MOSs TRAINED DURING PEACE TIME

FY 87 AND BEYOND CONTINUED:

MISSILE/		
MUNITIONS	55B	30 / 0
	55R	10 / 0
ORDNANCE	44B	20 / 8
	63B	150 / 40
	63H	25 / 9
	63J	5 / 0
	63N	25 / 5
	63S	7 / 0
	63T	33 / 6
	63W	15 / 0
	63Y	12 / 0

SOLDIER SUPPORT	71L	100 / 25
INSTITUTE	75B	35 / 15
TRANS/AVN LOG	67T	6 / 0
	67V	19 / 5
	67Y	20 / 5
	68B	6 / 5
	68F	5 / 0
	68G	13 / 0
	71N	25 / 10

FY 87 AND BEYOND
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE
SL2/SL3 TRAINING

PROPONENT	MOS	SL2/SL3	PROPONENT	MOS	SL2/SL3
ARMOR	19D	50 / 15	QUARTERMASTER	51N	10 / 0
	19E	100 / 30		57E	10 / 0
	19K	10 / 5		76C	15 / 10
ENGINEER	12B	85 / 30		76P	25 / 10
	12C	30 / 5		76V	25 / 8
FIELD ARTY	13B	100 / 20		76W	25 / 5
	13R	10 / 0		76Y	50 / 20
	93F	5 / 10		92B	5 / 0
INFANTRY	11B	200 / 75		94B	50 / 20
	11C	45 / 15	SIGNAL	31E	7 / 0
	11H	35 / 10		31M	50 / 15
	11M	10 / 0		31V	30 / 5

AD-A183 145   TRAINING AND EVALUATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE   2/2
           (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
           D T MCCRACKEN ET AL. 23 MAR 87
UNCLASSIFIED   F/G 5/9   NL

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

APPENDIX E

MEMORANDUM FOR IG

(6)   Ft. Knox, KY

(7)   Ft. Lewis, WA

(8)   Ft. Ord, CA

(9)   Ft. Pickett, VA (LOGEX)

(10) Ft. Polk, LA

(11) Ft. Sill, OK

(12) Ft. Stewart, GA

    b. A total of 161 IRR personnel were interviewed and observed during
the on-site staff visits (CP^m: 147 and IMA: 14)

    c. Observations and findings. Twenty-six (16%) of the IRR personnel
interviewed were not assigned to positions requested on orders.
Melassigned IRR personnel were placed by the trainer unit so that better
use could be made of IRR members skills in accordance with the units
current training and personnel requirements. IRR personnel were assigned
special projects, details, IG preparation or similiar tasks which are
normal duties performed by soldiers; however, the absence of initiative
during training tour contributed to minimum SSI/MOS related wartime skill
training.

        (1) Placements of IRR personnel by the installations had not been
coordinated between personnel requirements and the unit training schedule.
Without this coordination, minimum hands-on SSI/MOS skill training was
accomplished. The result, although not measurable, was the loss of
hard-charger IRR personnel who felt they were not needed in the reserves
and minimum cost effectiveness.

        (2) Installations are reluctant to accept senior IRR officers or
senior enlisted personnel for training in command positions. IRR officers
and enlisted personnel need this type of training in order to better
understand and perform staff assignments during mobilization. It also
gives Troop Program Unit (TPU) commanders a larger resource of personnel to
fill unit vacancies.

    d. Installation support. The office which deals with the Reserve
Component are organized differently throughout FORSCOM and TRADOC
installations. This situation does not allow for good comparision or
trends, however, general comments are submitted as indicators of support.

        (1) OER's/FFR's did not appear to be a problem except in isolated
cases and the responsible installations are working to correct that
situation. Active duty personnel stated that they felt that 12 days was

MEMORANDUM FOR IG

SUBJECT: Report on the Evaluation of Support and Training of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Personnel

1. Reference.

a. Letter, FORSCOM, AFIG-MO, 30 Jun 81, subject: Support and Training of IRR Members.

b. Letter, TRADOC, ATIG, 15 Jun 81, reference staff assistance visit program.

2. Purpose. To report on evaluation progress and to measure the effectiveness of IRR counterpart (CPT) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) support and training. A total of 9,017 CPT and 6,497 IMA orders were cut by this command during FY 82 for the purpose of training IRR personnel for mobilization in their SSI/MOS and grade by FORSCOM and TRADOC installations.

3. Objectives. The following list of objectives cannot be measured directly. Indirect measures of the program's effectiveness are "complaint trends" and "training management improvements." The measures assume an undemonstrated correlation between the objectives and readiness. Evaluations during the period 1 Jun 81 through 30 Sep 81 proved to be measures of work effort; not program effectiveness.

a. Improve IRR readiness.

b. Improve active component awareness of the role of the IRR

c. Promote IRR members development of a sense of command.

4. Staff Visits Conducted by this Office to FORSCOM and TRADOC Installations.

a. Installations selected for staff visits were the largest trainers of IRR personnel. The twelve (4 TRADOC and 8 FORSCOM) installations visited during the period Aug 81 through Aug 82 were:

    (1) Ft. Bliss, TX

    (2) Ft. Bragg, NC

    (3) Ft. Campbell, KY

    (4) Ft. Carson, CO

    (5) Ft. Hood, TX

SUBJ: Report on the Evaluation of Support and Training of Individual Ready
Reserve (IRR) Personnel

(a) Coordinating placement of IRR members with unit training
schedule to maximize SSI/MOS related training.

(b) Education of subordinate units as to the purpose of IMA
and CPT. Training of senior enlisted and officer personnel on post.

(c) Instituting or updating a welcome letter with a sponsor
to be sent to IRR personnel prior to assignment.

(d) Use of installation inspectors general to observe IRR
members IMA and CPT as their schedule permitted.

5. End of Tour Evaluation Questionnaires Reviewed. IRR personnel are
requested to fill out and return a standard ADT assignment evaluation at
the completion of each active duty tour. A review of 809 CPT and 784 IMA
questionnaires was completed by this office during Training Year 1982. The
following questions were taken directly from the questionnaires and
resulted in the following compilation:

	AGREED	
	CPT	IMA
a. "Did agency coordinate your training with you prior to your arrival?"	80%	91%
b. "Was unit of attachment aware of your arrival dates and had a training/utilization program prepared?"	86%	97%
c. "Did training develop skills and qualifications of your specialty."	91%	94%
d. "Was training relevant to your mobilization position, and/or mobilization skills?"	93%	97%
e. "Did the duties you performed correspond to the duty assignment on your orders?"	95%	96%
f. "(IMA Only) Does your agency maintain contact with you throughout the year?"	---	88%
g. "(IMA Only) Are you provided training projects for retirement point credit throughout the year by your agency?"	---	69%

6. Installation Inspectors General Evaluation Reports. This office, in
coordination with the MACOM's Inspectors General, requested that selected
installation IG's evaluate IRR support and training. There were fourteen
requests (8 FORSCOM and 6 TRADOC) mailed and eleven responses received.

a. Number of IRR members interviewed and observed:

(1) CPT: 51

(2) IMA: 11

not sufficient time to properly rate an individual. The senior rater
profile for O-5's and O-6's is also a problem due to the number of senior
officers on post. Evaluation of IRR members is necessary for promotion,
military education and assignment selection. Therefore, the standard
current OER/EER must be continued.

(2) Billeting/mess. Each installation handles billeting
differently. Most FM's are billeted and provided meals with their unit of
assignment when quarters and mess are available. Two installations visited
had no quarters or very limited space. During heavy user periods (i.e.,
summer months), quarters became very limited on some installations. The
"Total Force" concept is important when assigning quarters; not whether an
individual is AC, NG, TPU, or IRR. Therefore, the key issue is one of
equal treatment for all military personnel.

(3) Transportation. Installations' transportation ranged from
reliable bus service to none. The inability to move from quarters to work
station or post facility creates a morale problem. One consideration, if
funds and equipment are available, would be to establish a reliable bus
service or taxi during peak periods of Reserve and National Guard training.

(4) Finance. Policy varies by installation, therefore, IRR
members do not always know what part of their pay they will receive at the
end of their tour. IRR members may be paid by RCPAC. If that is the case,
all entitlements will be delayed. IRR members paid by an installation will
receive base pay, however, any per diem or travel reimbursement may be
delayed. Another installation may pay all that is authorized at the
completion of the tour. Delay of any authorized pay is a financial
hardship on the reservist.

(5) Other observations requiring comment.

(a) Uniforms. One installations' clothing sales store was
closed on Monday and no coordination had been made to issue IRR members
clothing until Tuesday; this delayed training. The command was informed of
the problem. One installation had made no provisions to stock items of
clothing for incoming assigned IRR members and, if items of issue were not
available, the IRR members were sent home. The command has corrected that
problem. The current policy to issue uniforms to IRR members for use only
during training and then turn them in at the close of training created new
problems for Reserve Component FM's and should be monitored. Areas of
concern include: Are there enough uniforms in the supply channel for issue
during mobilization, and what impact will this have on IRR members when
they cannot maintain the same standard as their active duty counterparts?

(b) One installation was found to be involuntarily
terminating IRR personnel if they reported a day late for duty. The
installation does not presently have the authority to terminate IRR
members' orders involuntarily IAW AR 135-200. This matter was brought to
the attention of the Reserve Components Office.

(6) An exit briefing was offered to all installation Inspectors
General. Where possible, post Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives),
Directors of Reserve Affairs and, in one case, a Commanding General was
briefed. Below are general points discussed:

AGUZ-IG
SUBJ: Report on the Evaluation of Support and Training of Individual Ready
Reserve (IRR) Personnel

7. <u>Number of Referrals to Inspectors General for Appropriate Inquiry.</u>

a. This office referred nine (9) inquiries.

b. Other inquiries were coordinated between Training Coordination
Branch, this Center, and the installations' Reserve Components Office. No
figures were kept for this type of action.

8. <u>Improvements in Training Management.</u> Not quantifiable; however,
initiatives have been instituted which should improve both CPT and IMA
training by this command.

9. <u>Recommendations.</u> That the inspector general system continue to make
visible the conditions of support and training IRR members because of its
impact on the morale and readiness of the IRR and the "Total Force."

PAUL Z. BARNES
MAJ, IG
Assistant Inspector General

b. Observations and findings. General comments taken from
evaluations:

(1) IRR personnel interviewed enjoyed their training but did not
feel that it contributed greatly to their ability to perform their skills
during mobilization.

(2) The training observed by the Inspectors General was noteworthy
and the working relationship of the IRR members and their counterparts was
nothing less than outstanding. In all cases, the various commanders were
desirous of having each soldier return to their unit for additional ADT or
deployment upon mobilization.

(3) Personnel interviewed mainly focused on the need to continue
this type of training. Personnel stated overall an improvement in
coordinating tours from the previous year. Where possible, the IMA's would
like a POC at the unit of assignment prior to arrival. They felt this
would better help them to prepare for the tour.

(4) All personnel expressed satisfaction with their job positions
related to their MOS/SSI.

(5) Common concerns involved the coordination between the IRR
member and RCPAC. Felt that utilization would be enhanced if the action
officer at RCPAC gained a better understanding of the past and present
experience of IRR members.

(6) Did unit understand the purpose of training? In most cases,
no. They did not understand that the IRR members was there to get specific
training as opposed to being employedd in an area that was most beneficial
to the unit.

(7) Recommended installations develop an information packet to
send to IRR members prior to their arrival and to provide information on
the post and unit of assignment.

(8) IRR members would like to have some idea of what the unit
they are assigned to is doing for the period of time they are going to be
assigned prior to their arrival. Some IRR members commented that
subordinate units (battalions) did not know they were coming because orders
had not arrived at the unit.

(9) The unit that sponsored the officer was the only one aware of
pending IRR placement. The units that sponsored the enlisted personnel
became aware of their placement when they arrived at the installation.

(10) Commanders of individual units did not know that IRR members
were going to be assigned. Coordination between the Reserve Component
Office and units was at brigade or separate battalion level.

(11) One post did not interview any IRR members and the evaluation
questions were answered by the local Reserve Component Office.

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AGUZ-IG   12 November 1981

SUBJECT: Readiness of the Individual Ready Reserve

ALL INSPECTORS GENERAL

1. The Army Reserve Component is an integral element of the Total Force. It
exists as an entity distinct from the Active Component only in peace time.
Upon mobilization these forces are indistinguishable; individual reservists
and reserve units become elements of the Active Component.   Their preparedness
to take up that role is critical to our national defense.

2. Inspectors general provide objective evaluations of the efficiency and
effectiveness of Army programs and thereby ensure that deficiencies are surfaced
for correction by responsible commanders. I, therefore, solicit your support
in ensuring that members of the Individual Ready Reserve are ready to serve
when mobilized. This guide is intended to assist you in that endeavor.

1 Incl   C. F. BRIGGS
as   Brigadier General, USA
                                             Commanding

APPENDIX F

GUIDE FOR INSPECTIONS OF

RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVITIES

**US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS PERSONNEL
AND ADMINISTRATION CENTER
(RCPAC)**

GUIDE FOR INSPECTION
OF RESERVE COMPONENTS
ACTIVITIES

RCPAC
ATTN: AGUZ-IG
9700 PAGE BLVD
ST. LOUIS, MO 63132
TEL COM (314) 263-7572
AV 693-7572

US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION CENTER (RCPAC)
GUIDE FOR INSPECTION OF RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVITIES

1. **Purpose.** This inspection guide identifies subject areas pertaining to
Reserve Components administration and training that should be inspected by
Inspectors General.

2. **General.**

a. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is an integral part of the Total
Force. The readiness of these reservists for deployment is a critical
factor of the Army's readiness posture. Substantial resources are
committed to their recruitment, training, and administration and to
preparation for their mobilization. Commanders at all levels, therefore,
should evaluate the mission performance of their commands continuously as
contributors to the readiness and administration of the IRR. Such
evaluations validate those actions that are producing desired results and
establish the basis for new initiatives in those areas which require
improvement.

b. The subject areas and questions listed in appendices are not
intended to serve as a checklist for inspection but should provide the
basis for a systemic evaluation of:

(1) Administrative support provided Reserve Components and Active
Component units by RCPAC.

(2) Reserve Components and Active Component unit administration
of functional activities supported by RCPAC.

(3) Active duty support and training of the IRR by Reserve
Components and Active Component units.

3. **Definitions.**

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) Troop Program Units (TPU) - That portion of the Ready Reserve
Components whose personnel strength is determined each year by Congress.
The USAR "Selected Reserve" includes all troop program units. This term
should not be confused with "Selected Force(s)" which is defined in
JCS Pub 1.

(2) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) (MOBDES) Training -
That training provided to individuals assigned to IMA/MOBDES positions.
These positions are established in Department of Defense, Department of the
Army and other federal agencies whose mobilization tables of distribution
and allowance provide positions to be filled by preselected/nominated

members of the USAR. Individuals assigned to mobilization designation positions are required to perform twelve days of training annually, for which they receive pay and allowances, with their agency or related activity. IMA/MOBDES personnel are given extensive pre-mobilization orientation and on-the-job training for the position to which assigned.

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - This consists of Reservists who are assigned to RCPAC for control and administrative support and who are not assigned to troop program units. Members of the Control Groups listed below require pre-mobilization experience and training.

(1) Annual Training Control Group - consists of obligated non-unit members with a Ready Reserve service obligation who have a mandatory training requirement and by law may be mandatorily assigned to a Reserve or National Guard Troop Program Unit. ·

(2) Reinforcement Control Group - consists of obligated non-unit members who do not have a mandatory training requirement and those reservists who remain in the Ready Reserves beyond their mandatory training requirements.

c. Active Duty Support (Site Support) - That support provided the Active Component and Reserve Components by reservists in support of annual training of Troop Program Units, and that support for projects that require personnel augmentation and reserve experience. Examples of such requirements are Range Officers, USAR School Instructors, ROTC Instructors and training excerise support. This type of training may not develop the IRR member's primary mobilization skill but should be specialty related.

d. Counterpart Training - Specialty related training for IRR members. Members are attached to an Active Component or Reserve Component units to receive mobilization training.

4. Inspection of IRR Support and Training.

a. Inspectors General should find this guide useful in developing inspection plans. Many of the suggested inspection areas are governed by local operating policies and procedures, not DA directives; consequently, wide variations in local conditions do exist. The subject areas contained herein, however, reflect matters which should be addressed in local directives. These areas should be inspected with a view toward determining whether conditions are fully supportive of the Army's commitment to train the IRR and remove any vestige of "second-class" treatment of reservists on active duty for training.

b. Inspectors General should not limit their inspection of IRR support and training to scheduled general inspections. IRR members undergo counterpart and MOBDES/IMA training on a year-round basis. The greatest amount of ADT training, however, occurs during the period June through August. It is suggested, therefore, that inspectors general make

unscheduled observations of those areas, particularly during periods of high training density. Inspectors need to evaluate training with a view toward determining and documenting whether existing training concepts adequately prepare the IRR for rapid deployment upon mobilization. Reports from reservists indicate that inspectors general should adopt an active (as opposed to passive) approach in evaluating conditions which affect them on active duty. It is urged, therefore, that interviews with IRR members be conducted and observations of their training be made.

APPENDIX I

Training

1. Was the assignment coordinated by the Personnel Management Officer with the IRR member and based on primary specialty enhancing and mobilization needs?

2. Does the installation receive the orders or required information from RCPAC in sufficient time to plan for and coordinate the support and training of IRR members?

3. Are units or activities on the installation notified of the requirement to support and train IRR members in sufficient time to plan for their training?

4. Are IRR training placements coordinated by the Director, Reserve Components, with the G3/S3/training officer?

5. Is IRR training monitored or inspected by the G3/S3/training officer?

6. Are IRR members receiving training or performing duties that emphasize wartime essential skills and knowledge which correspond to their primary specialties and grades? Are IRR members being trained in the assignment called for on the assignment order?

7. Have trainers established training objectives for IRR members and a system for evaluating and counselling them on their performance?

8. Are IMA/MOBDES personnel receiving training in their mobilization duties?

9. Is the commander aware of the magnitude of IRR training within the command?

10. Does the comander receive information from IRR members regarding the quality of their support and training?

11. Are IRR members who are attached to TPU's for ADT performing in their primary specialty or related duties?

12. Are IMA personnel provided special projects, training or reading during the year to prepare for performance of their ADT/mobilization duties (AR 140-185)?

13. Was the ORB/ERB properly filled out so that SM could be properly placed in the requested assignment?

APPENDIX II

Installation Support

1. Are living conditions for IRR members adequate? What actions have been taken to improve them if they are determined to be inadequate?
(AR 135-200)

2. If billeting and dining room facilities are not within walking distance of the work site, is transportation provided?

3. Do reservists receive treatment at post facilities equal to that received by Active Component personnel?

4. Have installations insured timely processing of pay claims by IRR personnel performing counterpart/MOBDES training?

5. Are dependents of IRR members permitted to use commissary and PX privileges when authorized access?

6. Are Reserve ID cards made available when requested by IRR members from installation DRC's, Reserve Units or National Guard Units when adequate proof of status is provided?

7. Are IRR members issued authorized clothing?

8. Have installations organized in/outprocessing of IRR members in order to maximize training time?

APPENDIX III

Administration

1. **Evaluation Reports (AR 623-105/600-200/15-185).**

   a. Are OERs/EERs/Academic Evaluations for IRR members attached to units, RTU's, schools, or MOBDES detachments being submitted to RCPAC?

   b. Are officers provided a DA Form 67-8-1 at the beginning of their ADT tours?

   c. Are rating schemes published for all assigned and attached USAR officers?

   d. Have exceptions to Senior Rater Grade requirement been approved on an individual basis and prior to publishing the rating scheme?

   e. Has an OER/EER control system been established to insure (1) OER/EER was prepared, (2) submitted on time, and (3) screened for completeness?

   f. Are rater narratives reflecting SM's performance included on EERs/SEERs?

2. **Points Accounting.**

   a. Are IMA members being credited with retirement points for completion of special projects, training or readings prior to going on tour? (AR 140-145)

   b. Are retirement points awarded and recorded? (AR 140-185/140-1)

   c. Are retirement points properly awarded and reported for attached IRR personnel on DA Form 1380? (AR 140-185)

   d. Has the authorization for training been properly entered in Item 10 on DA Form 1380? (AR 140-185)

   e. Are the completed DA Form 1380 for IRR members being forwarded to RCPAC? (AR 140-185, Para 3-3c(2))

3. **Promotions.**

   a. Are all qualified TPU personnel and IRR replacements being given proper consideration for TPU vacancies? (AR 135-155)

   b. Are units submitting a vacancy fill request to RCPAC to verify tha no one of the proper grade is geographically available before promotion action is initiated? (AR 140-10)

c. Are IRR/TPU members being notified of promotion criteria and eligibility?

d. Are promotion packets being sent to officers for review in sufficient time to make corrections prior to the board date?

e. Are TPU members being identified to mandatory promotion boards?

f. Are officers who have been twice not recommended for promotion being discharged ninety (90) days after board is submitted to DA if appropriate?

4. Orders. Are orders received from RCPAC by reservists and units in a timely manner?

5. Records.

a. Are records received by units from RCPAC in a timely manner? Are the documents authorized and filed IAW appropriate regulations? (AR 640-10)

b. Are records of TPU members who are transferred to the IRR forwarded to RCPAC in a timely manner?

•6. Correspondence.

a. Are inquiries from reservists answered by RCPAC in a timely and fully responsive manner?

b. Has a uniform system for processing Special Interest inquiries been established and followed?

7. Appointments.

a. Are appointment applications being processed in a timely manner?

b. Are units submitting a vacancy fill requests to RCPAC to verify that no one of the proper grade is geographically available before a appointment action is initiated? (AR 140-10)

c. Are appointment limitations and eligibility requirements being considered prior to the forwarding of the applications? (Para 1-2, AR 135-100, Para 1-4, AR 135-101 and Para 1-4, AR 135-100)

d. Are field examining boards being conducted IAW Ch 4, AR 135-100?

e. Are applications for active duty and receipt of orders being processed in a timely manner?

f. Are instructions in Para 3-4, AR 135-100 being furnished to applicants?

g. Are the requirements of Para 5-2, AR 135-210 being complied with?

8. <u>Finance.</u>

a. Has the installation taken action to insure timely processing of pay/travel claims?

b. Are the RCPAC copies of the MPV (Military Pay Voucher) promptly forwarded for IRR member IAW instructions on orders?

APPENDIX IV

Discipline and Morale

1. Do IRR members meet uniform and appearance standards? (AR 670-1, AR 600-20)

2. Are IRR members within height and weight standards as prescribed by regulation to perform active duty for training? (AR 600-9, AR 135-200)

3. Are IRR members who do not meet weight standards reported to the Commander, RCPAC?

4. Are IRR members who are continued on active duty in order to receive medical treatment being paid? If needed, was follow-on care provided?

5. Are IRR members included in hometown press release coverage provided by the public affairs office?

APPENDIX V

USAR LONG TOUR (AGR) and ROTC

1. The USAR Long Tour Management Program (LTMP) was established to provide the mechanism for equitable selection, assignment, promotion, rotation (career management) of personnel to fill positions designated as full-time support to improve the mobilization readiness of the US Army Reserve. It encompasses both officers and enlisted personnel in a variety of positions, including advisors, full-time manning (FTM), recruiting, retention, military technician conversions, career management, and assistant professors of military science and tactics.

    a. MACOM and above.

        (1) Are request for orders (RFO's) to place individuals on tour being requested 30 days in advance?

        (2) Are headquarters that request RFO's furnishing RCPAC with a listing of those positions that RCPAC is to fill by grade, MOS, and duty location?

        (3) Are headquarters notifying RCPAC of all changes to tour positions?

        (4) Does the headquarters have a written sponsorship program?

        (5) Is RCPAC's response to order requests completed in a timely manner?

        (6) Are individuals attached being properly utilized?

        (7) Were individuals attached to agencies at MACOM level and above effectively utilized?

    b. MUSARC and Unit level.

        (1) Do the MUSARC's and units have a written and working sponsorship program?

        (2) Do the MUSARC's and units give new individuals an orientation briefing?

        (3) Do the MUSARC's and units properly inprocess new arrivals through the MILPO and F&AO?

        (4) Do the MUSARC's and units properly use full-time manning and military technician personnel?

(5) Do the MUSARC's and units have a professional development plan for LTMP personnel?

(6) Do the MUSARC and unit have a written rating scheme for LTMP participants?

c. MILPO.

(1) Are LTMP personnel inprocessing with their MPRJ?

(2) Is RCPAC LTMP furnishing the MILPO with advance orders on in-coming personnel?

(3) Does the MILPO have a point of contact to RCPAC LTMP?

(4) Is the MILPO maintaining LTMP partici,.ant's MPRJ IAW with current regulations and directives?

d. Indiviudal Participants in LTMP.

(1) Were orders received at least 30 days prior to the reporting date?

(2) Was a welcome letter received from th᷐ sponsor?

(3) Was an orientation briefing given by the unit?

(4) Was the SM inprocessed through the MILPO and F&AO?

(5) Is the SM being used in the MOS for which he/she was brought on tour?

(6) Was the SM given or shown a written rating scheme identifying his/her rater, indorser, and reviewer.

(7) Is SM being supported by the unit, MILPO, F&AO, and RCPAC?

(8) Did the SM receive timely consideration for promotion purposes?

2. ROTC Training Controls.

a. Are ROTC institutions insuring that officers who are being commissioned are of the same standard for both active duty and reserve forces duty? Officers should not be recommended "only for reserve service" by the PMS.

b. Are ROTC institutions promptly reporting cnanges in status of individuals (e.g., disenrollments from school, discharge from ROTC program, and individuals who receive early commissions), so that accurate data of officers is furnished to the ROTC-RFD (Reserves Forces Duty) Program Manager?

SIDPERS-USAR (Systems Interface Division Personnel) and MOBPERS (Mobilization Personnel Processing System)

1. <u>On-site inspection policy and checklist.</u> The primary objective for IG inquiry into SIDPERS-USAR policies, programs and procedures is to determine the adequacy of the operating system, the timeliness and accuracy of the recorded data, and the system responsiveness to user requirements.

a. Is the system thoroughly documented to include file and input/output layouts, system description, and operating procedures?

b. Has a DA or FORSCOM Command Involvement Program been developed? Is it being used to monitor the system? Are the major commands involved in monitoring the system operations applicable to their commands? Is command emphasis being maintained by all appropriate commands to ensure proper and timely utilization of the system?

c. Do major commands have command unique reports processing requirements? Are periodic reviews of command unique requirements being made by DA, FORSCOM, or RCPAC for uniqueness? Are unique requirements that are not really unique to the major commands being integrated into the standard system? Does each major command have a command unique requirements evaluation procedure for establishing new requirements?

d. Is the computer processing facility providing adequate turnaround time of reports, error reconciliation, and processing support? Is the facility effectively and efficiently operating the system processing requirements? Is the facility logging receipt of inputs and monitoring the output requirements to ensure all actions have been completed?

e. Are Systems Change Request (SCR) procedures being followed for modifications to the system, once set-up for ongoing operations? Are the changes, once staffed and approved, being rapidly designed and implemented?

f. Are managers using the information available to them from SIDPERS-USAR?

2. <u>Active Duty.</u>

a. Are the mobilization stations receiving the microfiche Mobilization Personnel Processing Systems (MOBPERS) Reports and using them to assist them in mobilization planning? How are the reports used?

b. Are mobilization reports provided by the System Change Packages (SISPAC) from FORSCOM being used? Are they being used IAW USAFORSCOM Manual 18-1-B-DDY (VOL II)?

c. Are there any problems facing the mobilization stations that can be resolved through the use of the new MOBPERS Reports or through the reformatting of the existing reports? If so, what are the problems and what changes to the current reports need to be made?

d. Same questions in para 2c apply to the SISPAC Reports.

e. Are the mobilization stations encountering any problems processing the prepositioned FID-Q accession data? If so, provide specifics.

3. Reserve Components.

a. Is the source document (DA Form 1379) used to update the Reserve Personnel Information Reporting System (RPIRS) being submitted through channels in a timely manner and completed IAW AR 140-185 (Appendix D)?

b. Are responsible individuals at the CONUSA updating the RPIRS correctly? Data on RPIRS has a major impact on the MOBPERS selection process of IRR members earmarked against AC and RC requirements?

AR 15-185 - Army Board for Correction of Military Records

AR 20-3   - Special Subjects for Inspection

AR 135-1 - Reserve Components Policies

AR 135-91 - Service Obligation, Method of Fulfillment, Participation
            Requirements and Enforcement Procedures

AR 135-100 - Appointment of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army

AR 135-101 - Appointment as Reserve Commissioned Officers for Assignment to
             the Army Medical Department Branches

AR 135-155 - Promotion of Commissioned and Warrant Officers other than
             General Officers

AR 135-175 - Separation of Officers

AR 135-178 - Separation of Enlisted Personnel

AR 135-200 - Active Duty for Training and Annual Training of Individual
             Members

AR 135-205 - Enlisted Personnel Management

AR 135-210 - Order to Active Duty as Individuals During Peacetime, National
             Emergency, or Time of War

AR 140-1   - Army Reserve Mission, Organization and Training

AR 140-10 - Assignments, Attachments, Details and Transfers

AR 140-111 - Enlistment and Reenlistment

AR 140-120 - Medical Examinations

AR 140-145 - Mobilization Designations Program

AR 140-158 - Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion and Reduction

AR 140-185 - Training and Retirement Point Credit and Records

AR 600-9   - Army Physical Fitness and Weight Control Program

AR 600-39   - Dual Component Personnel Management Program

AR 611-101 - Commissioned Officers Specialty Classification System

AR 611-112 - Warrant Officer Specialty Classification System

AR 611-201 - Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Specialty
              Occupational Specialties

AR 623-1   - Academic Evaluation Reporting System

AR 623-105 - Officer Evaluation Reporting System

AR 623-205 - Enlisted Evaluation Reporting System

AR 640-10   - Individual Military Personnel Record

AR 670-1   - Wear and Appearance of Army Uniform and Insignia

DA Cir 140-13 - Long Tour Management Program - Enlisted Personnel

DA Cir 140-14 - Long Tour Management Program - Officers

DA Pam 135-2 - Briefing on Reemployment Rights of Members of the National
              Guard and Reserves

DA Pam 140-1 - US Army Reserve Officers Professional Development and
              Utilization

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